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Author: Omar Taj Al Dein Bin Abdullah "Abu Belal" and others

Title: Abu Belal's Report on Jihad in Somalia

Date: Unknown Length: 10 pages

Synopsis

Omar Taj Al Dein Bin Abdullah "Abu Belal" and possibly others describe the jihad situation in Somalia, an ambush against allied forces, the problems faced by the local movements, and what is needed for jihad.

Key Themes

The first section of the document appears to be a highly fragmented letter from Omar Taj Al Dein Bin Abdullah "Abu Belal" and possibly others describing the jihad situation in Somalia, and updating the recipient on the organization's activities.

Jihad in Somalia was started by the youth without any planning or coordination, against the advice of shura councils outside of Somalia. America is getting closer, and there is a danger of the money being misspent. Now is not the time for jihad, but for da'wa (prosletyzation). Each member of the movement is still too attached to his tribe rather than Islam. As a result, the Executive Council should participate, and military operations need to be planned. Military forces are apparently not up to standards, and information is spotty. 'Abdu Rahman in Djibouti is mentioned several times as being involved.

The next several pages describe a battle. The author was in a caravan that stopped in a potentially hostile area against his advice. The enemy then ambushed them, and the author (called "Muhammad" by one of the soldiers) took charge. The ambushed forces successfully prevented the enemy from encircling them, cut off the enemy's routes, and deployed an anti-tank force to protect them [the author provides a map]. Eleven 'Muslims' and about fifty enemy soldiers died. The author's allies want to return by the same way they had come, but the author told them not to make the same mistake twice. Instead, they returned a different way, and faced a confrontation with local Somalis that failed to escalate.

The author mentions that he is sending Abu Salman with more details, and asks for money for expenses. He proposes setting up a company in (Baru?) region to support operations in Ogaden. Preferably the office will be led by a Somali, and will not cost too much. It is possible to buy very cheap weapons. The author also mentions a split among the ranks of the Al-Wadi Company [probably a specific jihad group], Al-Cabal Company, and Al-Ittihad Company.

There are a number of positive aspects of the Al-Sharika movement, notably the large numbers of members, and the mutual respect the members have, but they need to organize military forces, and representative councils. In terms of negative aspects, the movement is not prepared for jihad. In terms of willingness to engage in jihad, ability to gain the support of the Somali people, ability to train young people, and authority of the leaders, the movement is still lacking. In general, the movement's leaders have not successfully coordinated jihad, da'wa, and other religious work, do not court outside opinions when necessary, and simultaneously seem to have no desire for jihad, yet a certain amount of impatience and agitation.

Finally, the author wants to know about the disposition of the enemy, both external, and internal groups that are against a foreign presence.

The last section is possibly unrelated to the beginning of the document. A number of tribes would like to regain authority from the Hawi tribe. There is only one Muslim group in the area. It has a camp in "Bu Saso" where brothers who left Afghanistan train recruits. There are also a large number of Muslim youths in Mogadishu belonging to a number of different movements. The 'brotherhood' and Al-Ittihad apparently have camps in the city itself. The author asks for mujahidin brothers to supervise the intellectual aspects of the movements, and a coordination and communication center that will connect and strengthen the youths, and the unity of the people in order to carry out jihad.

Northern Somalia is controlled by the Somali National Movement, which refuses to join the rest of Somalia. There are two Islamic movements, the Islamic Union, and the Unity movement, but neither has been able to establish camps.