

Defining the War on Terror

U.S. Marine Corps (Jason Ingersoll)

JFQ FORUM

By PHILIP G. WASIELEWSKI



55th Signal Company (Ronald Shaw, Jr.)

Soldier helps Iraqi medic move car bomb victim in Baghdad

On September 11, 2001, America was attacked not by a nation-state but by a nonstate group. Now the Nation is involved in a war on terror—but what type of war is it? Although America has used military force against nonstate groups, such as Pancho Villa's troops in 1916 and Jean LaFitte's pirates in the early 19th century, it has never considered such operations a "war."

Defining the type of war we are engaged in means also defining our goals.¹ If the policy goal is the destruction of all terrorist groups with global reach, will the war on terror thus be a series of counterinsurgency campaigns, a war of covert actions, or a series of preventative wars? Properly defining the war on terror follows the Clausewitzian dictum, "The supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."²

Who are we fighting, and what is their nature? What kind of war is the "war on terror," and what is its nature? And what are the implications for future U.S. security strategy? This article attempts to answer these

questions by providing an overview of terrorism. It then delves into the specific threat from Sunni Islamic extremism and describes its ideological basis and goals. Next, it looks at al Qaeda. Based on these analyses, the article concludes with plausible answers to the foregoing questions and possible implications for national security strategy.

Terrorism: The Idea and the Deed

The Department of Defense (DOD) defines *terrorism* as the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, which is intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.³ This definition is crucial for creating a framework in which to answer questions of what type of war we are fighting and what policy goals it should achieve. The DOD definition makes a direct connection between terrorist acts and specific goals, which is important in linking terrorism to policy and therefore giving political context. When one reviews this political context, it becomes clear that terrorism is not a modern phenomenon.


The Travels of Marco Polo tells of the Old Man of the Mountain, who kept a stable of assassins and dispatched them to murder neighboring princes who might be at odds with him, using calculated violence to inculcate fear for political purpose.⁴ This centuries-old example shows that politically motivated terrorism may be as old as politics.

Modern terrorism, however, has been a weapon of the weak in their attempt to bring down the strong. The first modern terrorist movement, known as *anarchism*, arose in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Anarchism was inspired by a utopian idea that revolted against the inequalities of the early capitalist period. According to Barbara Tuchman, anarchists believed that property was "the monarch of all evil," and if it were eliminated, "no man could again live off the labor of another and human nature would be released to seek its natural level of justice among men."⁵ Since owners would not release their property voluntarily, only a revolution could

Pentagon on September 11, 2001, shows how far terrorists will go to strike the United States

Colonel Philip G. Wasielewski, USMCR, is a Foreign Service Officer currently serving as a Political Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan.

U.S. Navy (Lyle G. Becker)



Marine and Navy forces patrol near USS Cole after attack by terrorists in Aden, Yemen



Poster supporting Osama bin Laden discovered by SEAL team in Afghanistan

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topple the structure and install a “new social order of utter equality and no authority.” The only thing wanting for the masses to arise and fulfill this idea was a spark—an act—to show them the way. The anarchist’s task was to awaken the masses by propaganda of word and of deed (an attack against a major symbol of the current order that would one day flash the signal for revolt).

During this period, several world leaders were assassinated in the name of the deed. There was no real leadership; rejection of all authority doomed anarchism since the movement opposed the concept of organization it needed to reach its goals. Moreover, there was no leadership hierarchy between the (usually well-born) philosophers of the idea and the (usually poverty-stricken) perpetrators. Social reforms and police action killed the movement by the end of the century. Its energy morphed into trade unionism in the Western democracies, while its energy was funneled into Vladimir Lenin’s revolution of 1917 in Russia.⁶ But the movement established itself as the first worldwide terrorism phenomenon of nonstate actors using targeted violence to fulfill political goals.

Many national liberation movements in the post-World War II environment used terrorism as a tactic to gain political goals of independence. Examples include the Israeli Stern Gang bombing of the King David Hotel in 1946, the Mau Mau use of terror against European farmers in Kenya in the 1950s, and the deeds of Palestinian and Provisional Irish

Republican Army operatives. Other groups used terrorism to pursue ideological goals, however ephemeral, such as the Japanese Red Army and the Italian Red Brigades of the 1970s and 1980s.

What all these groups—Jewish, Catholic, Muslim, atheist, African, European, Asian, Middle Eastern, nihilist, religious, nationalist, or socialist—had in common was their calculated use of unlawful violence to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that were generally political, religious, or ideological. Terrorism is thus an old tactic that transcends race, creed, and nation and adapts to almost any type of religious, political, or ideological goal.

To understand this phenomenon, we must review the different types of organized terrorism—mainly those used by religious militants, more specifically al Qaeda. Jessica Stern identifies three organizational models religious militants use: inspirational leaders and their followers, lone-wolf avengers, and commanders and their cadres.

According to Stern, inspirational leaders and their followers use moral suasion rather than cash to influence their followers, appealing to higher-order deficiency needs, including the desire to be part of a community

and gain recognition for one’s achievements. They inspire “leaderless resisters” and lone-wolf avengers rather than cadres. They run networks, or virtual networks, rather than bureaucracies, and they encourage franchises. Inspirational leaders rarely break the law themselves.⁷ Stern cites a violent segment of the anti-abortion movement in the United States where leaders use Web sites not only to identify and target doctors but also to inspire others to acts of violence against them. The inspirational leaders model is also a good description of the 19th-century anarchist movement.

Lone-wolf avengers are similar to followers of inspirational leaders, but instead of acting on a higher calling from a leader, they are often directed by internally based pathologies, frustrations, or impulses. Lone wolves often develop their own ideologies, combining personal vendettas with religious or political grievances. The Washington, DC, area sniper John Allen Mohammed, Unabomber

Ted Kaczynski, and Mir Aimal Kansi, who attacked employees of the Central Intelligence Agency outside its headquarters in 1993, are examples. Although these were domestic cases, this model has potential for a future wave of international terrorism.

The model of commanders and their cadres is hierarchical and is found in many terrorist movements. Commanders recruit cadres based on appeals to a higher cause as well as the more immediate needs of food, shelter, and safety. Rewards and punishments play an important role in the organization. Although many initially join for a higher cause, they may continue their participation for the material benefits, whether they are monetary rewards or a sense of belonging. Lashkar-e Taiba, which recruits young men from the *madrassas* in Pakistan to fight in Kashmir, is such a group.

Stern describes al Qaeda as the ultimate terror organization and worthy of a model in itself. In her view, it is hierarchical, with cadres, managers, and commanders. Cadres consist of skilled and unskilled labor. According to Stern, al Qaeda has changed its organizational style since 9/11 to counteract the loss of its original leadership and now relies on an ever-shifting network of sympathetic groups and individuals, including the Southwest Asian jihadi groups, franchise

outfits in Southeast Asia, sleeper cells trained in Afghanistan and dispersed abroad, and freelancers such as Richard Reid, the convicted “shoe bomber.”⁸

Al Qaeda is both an organization and a movement. Michael Scheuer suggests that the threat America faces from Osama bin Laden is not the episodic campaign typical of traditional terrorist groups. It is rather a worldwide, religiously inspired, and professionally guided Islamist insurgency against “Christian crusaders and Jews” being waged by groups that bin Laden might control, direct, and inspire.⁹

Sunni Islamic Extremism

Historically speaking, Western dominance in world politics has been a phenomenon of the past two and a half centuries. The change in global positions of power over that time still rumbles seismically throughout much of the Islamic world. Bernard Lewis explains that “in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, the primacy and therefore the dominance of the West was clear for all to see, invading the Muslim in every aspect of his public and—more painfully—even his private life.”¹⁰ There have been many attempts to remedy the imbalance. Secularism under the model of Mustafa Kemal’s modern Turkey was one response, but it was abhorrent to most Muslims. Arab nationalism and socialism under Egypt’s charismatic Gamal Abdel Nasser was briefly popular but died in the Six-Day War of 1967. Regarding the attempts of Muslim societies to regain past glory and influence, Lewis notes that “many remedies have been tried, but none achieved the desired result. Here and there they brought some alleviation, and even—to limited elements of the population—some benefit. But they failed to remedy or even to halt the deteriorating imbalance between Islam and the Western world.”

With the failure of secular (and Western) concepts such as democracy, socialism, nationalism, and communism to bring restoration to the Islamic world, some Muslims began to believe that a return to early Islam—Islam of the sword—could regenerate their society. Like terrorism, this concept had a substantial history of Islamic thought and jurisprudence. Not all Muslims agree with this thinking, but it has had substantial

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influence on those who fight the modern-day jihad.

For many Muslims, the Golden Age of their faith was the time of the Prophet Mohammed and his four immediate successors, when Islam spread rapidly throughout the Arabian Peninsula and beyond—before the split between Sunni and Shia and before early Islamic achievements were destroyed by the invading Mongols. Yet the main theoretical foundations are more recent. Al Qaeda’s

ideology has its origins in the late 19th-century attempts to modernize faith and society in Egypt. These efforts became known as Salafism to honor the supposedly uncorrupted early Muslim predecessors (*salafs*) of today’s Islam.¹¹ The Salafi strategy is based on two tenets: Islam became decadent because it strayed from the righteous path; and recapturing the glory of the Golden Age requires a return to the authentic faith and practices of the ancient ones, namely the Prophet Mohammed and his companions.¹²

Jamal ad-Din Al-Afghanni (1839–1897) was the modern-day founder of Salafism. He taught in Cairo and believed that a return to the path led by Mohammed and his original followers could create a spiritual revival of the faith. He also believed that with this spiritual renewal of Muslim society, the Muslim world would soon develop the intellectual equipment to redress the West’s technological and military advantages.¹³

The next Egyptian spiritual thinker to develop these ideas was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan Al-Banna (1906–1949). He sought to unite and mobilize Muslims against the cultural and political domination of the West. When Banna reached an accommodation with King Farouk, however, the more radical members of the movement began searching for other leadership.

One of these former members of the Muslim Brotherhood was Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), who developed the theological justification for jihad against other Muslims and the need to remove corrupt Muslim rulers. Before Qutb, one of the most feared concepts in Muslim thinking was *fitna*, the state of chaos or disunity of two civil wars that tore the Muslim community apart within a half century of the Prophet’s death, resulting

in the Shia-Sunni split. According to most Muslim scholars, even a poor Muslim ruler was better than *fitna*.

Qutb, however, took a line of reasoning that harked back to the days of the Mongol invasions, when it was believed that the Arabs could not wage jihad against the Mongols because the invaders too had accepted Islam. But a contemporary Muslim scholar, Taqi ad-Din Ahmed ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), argued that since the Mongols did not use Islamic sharia law and instead maintained their own tribal laws, they were not really Muslims but apostates and therefore legitimate targets of jihad.

Referring to *jahiliyya*, the state of barbarism and ignorance that prevailed amongst the Arabs before Mohammed’s revelations, Qutb argued that modern secular Muslim leaders were illegitimate not only because they did not follow sharia but also because they had reverted to *jahiliyya*. This reasoning was used to justify opposition to Nasser’s secular policies. Qutb was jailed for his teachings and hung for sedition in 1966.

Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, a theologian for an extremist group in Egypt, spread Qutb’s message among those opposed to Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, and his peace policy toward Israel. He wrote a manifesto entitled *The Neglected Duty* that called for attacks against secular Muslim rulers and developed a strategy for defeating the *near enemy* (apostate Muslim regimes that had to be attacked and overthrown) before the *far enemy* (Israel, the United States, and the West in general).

The modern Salafi philosophy was codified by the mid-1970s, but it needed two events to galvanize it into an organization. The first occurrence was the Soviet war with Afghanistan. The second was the failure of Islamic extremists to overthrow the secular Egyptian government. These events sparked the beginning of al Qaeda in its present form.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created a broad reaction in the Islamic world. Muslim nation-states supported Western efforts to undermine the incursion both to assist their coreligionists and to protect their geopolitical position from further encroachments. Some Muslim states also used the jihad against the Soviets as a safety valve, sending their own disaffected youths in hopes that they would be more engaged in fighting communism than finding fault with their own societies.

The Afghan commander who invited the first Arab jihadists to fight was Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, an Islamic scholar who studied in Cairo prior to the invasion. To assist the movement of Arabs into Afghanistan, a Palestinian, Sheik Abdallah Azzam, created the Mekhtab al-Khidmat (Service Bureau) to address administrative problems for volunteers and the Bait al-Anser (House of Supporters) to house them. For Azzam, Afghanistan was the first step in a worldwide jihad to recapture lost lands. However, his view of jihad was essentially defensive, arguing for recapture of old Muslim lands but not the conquest of new ones. His assistant was young Osama bin Laden, and the two worked throughout the 1980s supporting the Afghan jihad.

During this time, the efforts of the Egyptian underground movement to overthrow the secular regime of Anwar Sadat and then Hosni Mubarak failed. The movement split into two groups, Egyptian Islamic Jihad under Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the Islamic Jihad Group. Al-Zawahiri, a medical doctor, was arrested and later exiled to Saudi Arabia. He then moved to Peshawar, Pakistan, and worked with Azzam and bin Laden, treating wounded mujahidin and supporting

but only against non-Muslims who had taken over Muslim lands (first and foremost his native Palestine). Azzam and two of his sons were murdered in Peshawar on November 24, 1989, by a remote-controlled car bomb. Their murder is still unsolved.

With Azzam's death, leadership of al Qaeda fell to bin Laden and his deputy, al-Zawahiri. They worked with the Afghans to defeat the Najibullah regime but became exasperated with Afghan infighting. When Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in 1991, bin Laden volunteered his force to Saudi authorities to drive them out. When the Saudis deferred and instead invited Western troops, bin Laden's relationship with the royal family soured, and he returned to Afghanistan, moving al Qaeda headquarters to Sudan where it could more easily support operations against the Egyptian regime.

The Sudan interlude lasted until 1996. Bin Laden left the country after the Sudanese received pressure from Egypt following a failed assassination attempt against President Mubarak in 1995 that was traced to a bin Laden associate.

The Sudanese period, however, had one long-lasting effect on al Qaeda. It changed

Muslim regimes to hitting their erstwhile supporter, the United States. This led to a chain of attacks, from the Kenyan and Tanzanian U.S. Embassy bombings in 1998 to the attack on the USS *Cole* in 2000, and finally to September 11.

The al Qaeda Mind

To the popular imagination, the 9/11 hijackers and other al Qaeda members are mentally disturbed—after all, only a depraved mind would hijack a plane to kill innocents and themselves in such a horrific way or would seek weapons of mass destruction to commit even worse horrors—or they are impoverished, single young men with no hope of a future, unaware of the benefits of modern Western society, who were brainwashed in medieval *madrassas* since infancy.

According to data on 172 known al Qaeda terrorists, none of the assumptions is true. A minuscule number showed only a trace of sociopathic aberration. Actually, antisocial personalities would find it difficult to work in such an organizational structure. Nor were many particularly religious in early life; most attended secular schools. Instead of poor, ignorant, single young men with no knowledge of the West, most were middle- to upper-middle-class, highly educated, married, and middle-aged. Most had traveled to or lived in the West.

What drew most terrorists to the Salafi philosophy was a sense

of alienation and loss when they moved into new environments, most often urban and Western (for example, the Hamburg cell), that their earlier belief system could not handle. As Marc Sageman notes in his study:

They were isolated when they moved away from their families and became particularly lonely and emotionally alienated in this new individualistic environment. The lack of spiritualism in a utilitarian society was keenly felt. Underemployed and discriminated against by the local society, they felt a personal sense of grievance and humiliation. They sought a cause that would give them emotional relief, social community, spiritual comfort, and cause for self-sacrifice. Although they did not start out particularly religious, there was a shift in their devotion before they joined the global jihad, which gave them both a cause and comrades.¹⁵

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their jihad work. With him were many other Egyptian radicals in exile.

When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1988, the jihadis began debating what to do next. Azzam dreamed of using his current organization to help Muslims in other oppressed countries, such as Bosnia, Kashmir, and the Philippines, to regain control over their traditional lands. While many Arab mujahidin went home, those who were in exile, such as the Egyptians, could not. Thus, by a process of elimination, the most radical elements remained in Afghanistan and Peshawar.

There were different opinions regarding future actions. The Egyptians believed in Qutb's and Faraj's teachings and wanted to use their Peshawar "base" (al Qaeda) to overthrow the Mubarak regime. Azzam disagreed with Faraj's teachings, stating that jihad should not be waged against Muslim rulers

its Qutb-Faraj-inspired Salafist philosophy from attacking the near enemy to striking the far enemy. This change was announced in bin Laden's "Declaration of Jihad against the Americans Occupying the Land of Two Holy Sites," released in late 1996 from al Qaeda's new sanctuary in Afghanistan. This text redefined the principal goal of jihad as Saudi Arabia's liberation from its American protectors.¹⁴ The reasoning behind this change of tactics was reflected in the thinking of al Qaeda's subcommander, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, who argued that the main obstacle to the establishment of a Muslim state and the primary danger for the worldwide Islamist movement was the United States, which was seen as moving in on Muslim lands, such as the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa. While some disagreed, believing the focus should stay on the near enemy, subsequent events confirmed the switch from attacking corrupt

Once they had selected themselves for involvement, they attempted to join al Qaeda by finding facilitators with access to the global jihad. These contacts provided hubs that interacted between the top leadership of al Qaeda and the three main sources of its cadres (Muslims from Southeast Asia, the core Arab states, and the Maghreb). Once access was established, these volunteers attended training camps. Only the most dedicated were invited for further training and then to participate in missions.

By this method, al Qaeda leadership recruited, vetted, trained, and tested its cadres. The results were seen on September 11, 2001. Instead of crazed lunatics, the enemy was a well-trained and dedicated foe who hated us. What probably surprised America

violence against Western civilization and its supporters in the Muslim world, and to seek answers in the past rather than taking an introspective look and developing a viable future to address the real problems found in Muslim society.

Terrorism is a tactic that has been practiced by every race and creed for diverse and incompatible political, religious, or ideological reasons. But one cannot wage war against a tactic. One *can* wage war, however, against terrorists who are animate and therefore susceptible to force. The war on terror may be global, but it is not universal. Despite the post-9/11 rhetoric of destroying all terrorist groups who have global reach, we cannot destroy the Tamil Tigers and all other terror organizations. That would not only

Pakistan's, which will wish to avoid appearing to be puppets of the West. Their fears of overt American involvement in their internal affairs preclude most conventional, and even some unconventional, military options.

Destruction of al Qaeda the movement requires:

- neutralizing al Qaeda propaganda and making it irrelevant with the long-term commitment of the diplomatic, informational, intelligence, developmental, educational, and covert action tools of statecraft
- removing emotional sources of inspiration for those who are searching for a cause for self-sacrifice
- keeping close contact with religious leaders, encouraging them to counteract the

First group of all-Sunni Iraqi soldiers passes in review after graduation from training



U.S. Marine Corps (Samantha L. Jones)

most were the lengths some would go to in the name of ideology.

What Must Be Done

The enemy we are fighting is both a terrorist organization and an ideological movement. The original structure has evolved from a hierarchical model to a more adaptable network, functioning via modern communications between its depleted leadership and a pool of cadres facilitated by hubs of organizers in different countries. Coupled with similar Islamic extremist groups, al Qaeda has a diffuse and loose structure coordinating its anti-American operations in Muslim lands, while it still prepares to strike the U.S. homeland again. Its "far enemy" belief structure puts America at the root of all Muslim problems.

The nature of the organization is to attack the far enemy until it is either destroyed or suffers such losses that it will reform and rethink its purpose. The nature of the movement is to foster anger, resentment, and

be beyond America's capacity, but it would also fritter away resources from destroying the one group that is specifically dedicated to harming America. To eradicate that most immediate threat, then, the United States must understand al Qaeda and destroy it as an organization and as a movement.

The nature of the war against al Qaeda the organization should be aimed at finding and destroying the hubs that connect the leadership in hiding with the pool of candidates wishing to participate in the jihad, further isolating the leadership by stripping it of communications, eventually capturing it, and turning those prisoners against their former comrades as either informers or propaganda spokesmen. In Afghanistan and Iraq, this would take part in the context of our ongoing counterinsurgency campaigns. In the rest of the world, however, this would be an intelligence officer's and policeman's war, sometimes assisted by military special mission groups. This war depends on close cooperation with governments such as

philosophy of Salafi extremism so Muslims can show other Muslims how harmful and bankrupt this ideology is.

To answer Clausewitz's question as to the type of war we are embarking on, we must consider the war on terror as *both* an act of force to compel a group to our will *and* a struggle to convince civilization of the evil of their intentions. The nature of the struggle will be long term and nuanced. Its future military context should be constrained to specific instances that cannot be solved with other applications of American or international statecraft. It is not a conventional war. And although it involves violence, we should avoid turning it into an open war that could benefit the enemy.

What are the implications for future U.S. security strategy? Graham Fuller suggests a three-part strategy for the war on terror.¹⁶ First is the elimination of the al Qaeda organization and those who support it, such as the Taliban. Second is intensified

1st Combat Camera Squadron (Tammy L. Grider)



Delegate speaks on Islamic practices and history before Iraqi Interim Authority Conference

police and intelligence work to deter and block future attacks. Third and most important is attending to sources of grievances in the Muslim world that constitute the soil for terrorism. This is similar to the National Defense Strategy, which provides succinct policy goals: protecting the homeland, countering ideological support for terrorism, and disrupting and attacking terrorist networks. The National Defense Strategy is also correct in stating that victory will not be on the battlefield alone.¹⁷

There are three major implications for our future security strategy in regard to the

and injustice to Muslim peoples. Therefore, one of the lessons to be learned is to do everything in our power to avoid another war in the Muslim world that could further inflame these perceived threats, however unjustified, while we work to destroy al Qaeda the organization. Otherwise, a future war, no matter how it will be seen in Western eyes or however necessary it may appear to strategists, will provide the renewal that al Qaeda the movement needs, which in turn regenerates the organization.

Second, because of the ideological underpinnings of this struggle, America will

the National Defense Strategy is correct in stating that victory will not be on the battlefield alone

war on terror. First, it is a struggle against both a nonstate group and a particular ideology. Pronouncements by senior DOD officials in 2005 trying to define the *war on terror* as a *global struggle against violent extremism* were a step in the right direction but were still incomplete. Whatever new catchphrase is used, it must mention the specific Salafi content of the extremism we are fighting, and new strategies of statecraft must work to disconnect this ideology from what sustains it: a sense of alienation brought on by perceived threats to the faith

have to engage its soft power far more. This is not a struggle against a bearded man in a cave in Waziristan; it is a clash of ideas and beliefs and who can mobilize more support in a part of the world that is critical to American security.

Third, efforts to transform the Muslim world to end the causes that brought us al Qaeda the movement must be left to the Muslim world itself and supported through the many tools of U.S. statecraft, but not with overt military force. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other “near

enemies” must reform in their own way, with American assistance and prodding if necessary, but not with American coercion so as to remove the justification for the movement and battle cry that these regimes are American creatures.

We should remember the advice of T.E. Lawrence: “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly.”¹⁸ JFQ

NOTES

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87–88.

² *Ibid.*, 88.

³ Department of Defense, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1–02 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 30, 2004).

⁴ Henry Yule and Henri Cordier, eds., *The Travels of Marco Polo*, vol. 1 (New York: Dover Publications, 1993), 143.

⁵ Barbara Tuchman, *The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World Before the War, 1890–1914* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1962), 64.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 63–113.

⁷ Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 165.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 269–270.

⁹ Michael Scheuer, *Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America* (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002), xvii.

¹⁰ Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 151.

¹¹ Christopher Henzel, “The Origins of al Qaeda’s Ideology: Implications for U.S. Strategy,” *Parameters* 35 (Spring 2005), 70.

¹² Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 4.

¹³ Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 115–117; quoted in Henzel, 72.

¹⁴ Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West*, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 92.

¹⁵ Sageman, 97.

¹⁶ Graham Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 85–86.

¹⁷ *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, March 2005).

¹⁸ T.E. Lawrence, *Twenty-Seven Articles*, from Public Broadcasting System Web site “Arab Warfare,” available at <www.pbs.org/lawrenceof-arabia/revolt/warfare4.html>.