


Off the Shelf

Long before September 11, scores of authors and scholars were tilling the fertile ground of the struggle against terror that has been dubbed the Long War. Several offerings of new scholarship, plus one from the distant past, are suggested for additional reading on this issue's Forum topic.



Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves

by Brian Michael Jenkins
Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006
222 pp. \$19.95
ISBN-13: 978-0-8330-3891-3

Brian Jenkins began RAND's terrorism research program in 1972 after serving in the Vietnam War in the Special Forces, and he is now senior advisor to the president of RAND. In *Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves*, he has synthesized his shorter writings on terrorism from the past 6 years into a single volume that assesses the current situation, delves into the need for a deeper understanding of the terrorists and their motivations, prescribes a new set of strategic principles to guide our efforts in the Long War, and addresses how the Nation can strengthen itself. Jenkins is prone to the use of sweeping aphorisms ("Armed force alone cannot win this war. The real battle is ideological. . . . If you want to know what enemy leaders are thinking about, listen to what they have to say."). However, his careful explication of those aphorisms, combined with a willingness to take on some of the shibboleths of the past 5 years ("fighting them there instead of here," the color-coded alert system) and a level-headed reminder to keep the terrorist threat in perspective, make for thought-provoking reading. Two appendices chronicle selected terror attacks since 9/11 and planned attacks that were thwarted or otherwise not realized.

Is Iraq Another Vietnam?

by Robert K. Brigham
New York: Public Affairs, 2006
207 pp. \$24.00
ISBN-13: 978-1-58648-413-2

Arguments will rage for years over whether the 2003 invasion of Iraq was a distraction from the Long War or an integral part of it. With the Iraq conflict entering its fourth year, some observers contend that it increasingly resembles another controversial conflict from U.S. history. In *Is Iraq Another Vietnam?* Robert K. Brigham, a professor of history and international relations at Vassar College, cites evidence to both refute and support that contention. Distinctions, of which Brigham says there are an "overwhelming number," include the size and scope of the wars, the transition from insurgency to war in one case and from war to insurgency in the other, and presence or absence of insurgency leadership and backing. But he contends that "three similarities may be more important to the outcome in Iraq and the long-term future of U.S. foreign relations": the absence of a political corollary to U.S. military power, declining public support, and the challenge to American beliefs about the use of power. Brigham concludes that this third similarity presents the greatest danger: an "Iraq syndrome," resembling the turn away from war and interventionism after the Vietnam conflict, could prevent a future President from using force when it is legitimately needed to protect national security.

"How a Free People Conduct a Long War: A Chapter from English History"

by Charles J. Stillé
Philadelphia: William S. and
Alfred Martien, 1863
University of Michigan Historical
Reprint Series, 2005
42 pp. \$11.99
ISBN: 141819705X

Finally, some pages from history offer an interesting reminder that ours is hardly the first society to face a threat to our way of life requiring a response of indefinite duration. In 1863, Charles J. Stillé, a lawyer and historian, authored this short treatise in which he culls the English campaigns of the Peninsular War (1808-1814) during the Napoleonic wars for lessons on how the Union could prevail during the Civil War. Parallels between either of the wars and the current U.S. situation are tenuous at best, but the Duke of Wellington's words to his officers could apply as well to the Long War as they did to Waterloo: "Hard pounding, this, gentlemen, but we'll see who can pound the longest."

—L. Yambrick


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Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-state Actors

by Troy S. Thomas, Stephen D. Kiser, and William D. Casebeer

Lanham, MD:

Lexington Books, 2005

264 pp. \$75.00

ISBN: 0-7391-1189-2

Reviewed by

JOHN D. BECKER

After 9/11, the transformation of the U.S. national security environment occurred largely through the emergence of new nonstate-based global security threats: the appearance of international terrorist networks, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the recurrent phenomenon of failed states, the spread of transnational criminal organizations, and the advent of information warfare.

As a result, decisionmakers, policymakers, diplomats, military leaders, and academics have all turned their attention to the subject of nonstate actors and, particularly, violent nonstate actors (VNSAs).

However, much of this focus on nonstate actors has been limited to one type: terrorists. A search on the Amazon.com Web site reveals almost 2,000 items for terrorism, and a similar search on Google.com produces over 81,500,000 hits. Many of the other new threats are as significant as terrorist threats, if not more so. For example, the continuing crisis in Darfur, which has drawn the attention of the world, involves both a failed state and other VNSAs, but not terrorists. Accordingly, studies that address the broad range of threats are more helpful than those with narrower focal points.

One such study is *Warlords Rising*, in which Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer establish a framework for understanding VNSAs in the present security environment. The authors claim that their approach, grounded in open systems theory, frames violent nonstate actors (or violent systems) “in such a way that it is relatively easy to translate important qualitative insights into the behavior of the system into quantitative models and simulations which can be used to stress-test ideas and to flesh out such foundational work” (p. 19). The design of the framework is to improve understanding of VNSAs in order to affect their development and performance.

The authors’ framework functions on the interrelated environmental, organizational, and internal operating levels. The environmental level looks at the conditions and dynamics that shape VNSA formation and development. The organizational level examines the holistic characteristics and relationships that enable VNSAs to prosper, adapt, and achieve goals. Lastly, the internal operating level focuses attention on the organization’s functions and their contributions to overall performance during periods of uncontested growth and in the context of a turbulent environment. The open systems methodology, then, is a universal framework for understanding a global problem set—that of violent nonstate actors.

The second part of the study looks at the utility of traditional approaches of deterrence and warfighting, but in light of the insights gained by open systems analysis. The result is an elevated and developed understanding of the role the environment plays in shaping VNSAs, a recasting of deterrence in ecological terms—including emotional and rational factors—that offers new principles for structuring strategy and operations to defeat VNSAs.

VNSAs, in the study, are defined simply as nonstate actors who use collective violence. This broad interpretation opens the category to include not only terrorists and international terrorist organizations, but also transnational criminal organizations, guerrillas, and insurgents. They have different typologies, based on differing purposes and the nature of their divergent functions. Therefore, one of the major challenges becomes tailoring approaches and resources to target those different groups in ways that are effective and efficient.

Central to that tailoring is rethinking how we look at VNSAs and the use of force to deal with them. It is too easy to see all VNSAs as terrorists and think of

overwhelming force as the solution to the threats they pose. Instead, we need to see each one as unique, even within the specific typologies themselves, and recognize that these differences shape the appropriate responses, be they unilateral, regional, or international.


A strength of the authors’ framework is that it helps us do just that: see and understand VNSAs differently. Grounded in a multidisciplinary basis, the framework lets us look at these actors and their environments in varying ways. As we do so, various disciplinary fields can contribute to the formulation of a comprehensive strategy for confronting VNSAs. The danger of this basis is that analysts neither get deep enough into those fields, nor have the actual mastery to complete the analysis.

The authors do recognize the limitations of their work—specifically in that murky area of practical action. Translating theory into practice is always difficult, for no matter how much analysis occurs, other factors, planned and unplanned, will come into play in the real world. These factors upset the analysis, strategy, and corresponding actions of policymakers.

As former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan noted, while states remain the key players in the international system, nonstate actors will have a more significant role in the years ahead. Being able to understand them through detailed and developed analysis and in terms of practical action will be critical tasks for future decisionmakers and their staffs.

Warlords Rising is an excellent addition to the toolboxes of scholars, policymakers, and decisionmakers and their respective staffs. Perhaps the best endorsement of any text is its adoption in the classroom, which I have done for my own class on emerging security threats. Based on initial student response, I encourage others, both in and out of the classroom, to adopt this text too. **JFQ**

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Becker, USA (Ret.), is on the faculties of the University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies, the Norwich University Diplomacy program, and the University of Phoenix Online MBA program.



**Germany and the Axis Powers:
From Coalition to Collapse**
by Richard L. DiNardo

Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 2005
282 pp. \$34.95
ISBN: 0-7006-1412-5

Reviewed by
STEPHEN A. BOURQUE

Historically, most wars have been conducted by coalitions fighting to achieve common military goals, yet the minor partners of these associations tend to go unrecognized. Even today, most Americans would be challenged to name any state, other than the United Kingdom, that is serving with the U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq or Afghanistan. In these, as in most campaigns, the military efforts of smaller partners are usually either merged with the performance of the dominant state or ignored altogether. Certainly that is the case of the Axis powers in World War II; Germany has dominated the literature, with only an occasional mention of Italian military operations, especially in regard to the war in North Africa. Other partners, such as Hungary and Romania, are all but disregarded by writers, and the specific details of their ordeal are known only to the most specialized students of the conflict.

Richard L. DiNardo, a professor at the Marine Corps University and author of several works on Adolf Hitler's military forces, explores this relatively unknown aspect of the war in *Germany and the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse*. The book's primary focus is on Germany's effectiveness as a senior coalition partner. By the beginning of Operation *Barbarossa* in June 1941, four governments actively supported Germany in the field: Italy, Hungary, Romania, and Finland. DiNardo dismisses the Tripartite Pact with Japan as an agreement with little consequence in the European conflict, as Japan fought a parallel war with different aims, and its military activity had no effect on Germany's military undertakings. As DiNardo points out, Prussia's and Germany's histories of coalition warfare were extensive, although not very instructive. Prussia fought as part of coalitions in both the Seven Years' and Napoleonic Wars, experiences soon forgotten

by military professionals. The Great War of 1914 saw the Second Reich fighting alongside of, and gaining a wealth of experience from its partnership with, Turkey and Austria-Hungary. Yet by the time Hitler assumed power, the German General Staff had essentially forgotten past lessons, no longer making them the subject of either military education or intellectual debate.

Although his chapters are chronologically arranged, DiNardo investigates the Nazi relationship with three different components of the coalition: Italy, the major ally; Finland, which fought a parallel war in the north; and the feuding duo of Hungary and Romania. Italy was Germany's most important and troublesome partner. DiNardo devotes a major portion of the text to examining this relationship, especially in North Africa and the Balkans, and during Operation *Barbarossa*. While most readers are aware of Italian operations in the first two theaters, the Italian contribution to the war against the Soviet Union is somewhat obscure. The scale of Mussolini's commitment was somewhat surprising, with 75,000 dead and missing after Stalingrad alone. Not only did Italy contribute important forces on land, but also the Italian navy supplied 10 torpedo boats and several submarines to a flotilla on the Black Sea. This force—according to DiNardo, part of the most successful German-led coalition operation of the war—defeated Soviet efforts to support their operations on the Crimean Peninsula.

DiNardo does an excellent job of explaining the dynamics of the German-Finnish relationship and how the Finns maintained their independence in the process. Hitler needed the Scandinavian state because of nickel mines at Petsamo, and the Finns needed German help to regain the lands lost to the Soviets in the 1939 war. Because it mastered this


complicated relationship, Finland refrained from enraging Stalin during hostilities and was the only border nation not to host Soviet occupation troops at the end of the war.

Probably the most interesting aspect of this story is the participation of Hungarian and Romanian forces. DiNardo traces the countries' history back to the Treaty of Trianon in 1919, the provisions of which took about 70 percent of Hungarian territory and distributed it to its neighbors, primarily Romania. As a result, the states hated each other, and German commanders had to watch both contingents to ensure they did not pull out of the war to fight between themselves.

DiNardo's bottom line is that the German management of the coalition was generally aimless. The efforts of the various players were uncoordinated, and Hitler never convened a conference of his allies. Although the Wehrmacht, especially early in the war, had excellent equipment, little of it found its way to the partners. While there were bright spots in coalition cooperation, such as the Italian efforts on the Black Sea and Romanian air defense at Ploesti, it was generally ineffective.

This book does have its limitations. DiNardo expects readers to have a working knowledge of the war and the key campaigns, as the book is not a study of strategy, operations, or tactics. In addition, some readers may be disappointed by the absence of significant discussion of other contingents such as the Spanish Blue Legion, Slovakian or Bulgarian units, or forces from occupied Europe or the liberated regions of Eastern Europe, such as Latvia and Estonia. DiNardo focuses on those powers that were essential combatants in Germany's coalition warfare. With that minor caveat, readers will find *Germany and the Axis Powers* an excellent read from beginning to end, full of insights into an unfamiliar side of World War II. **JFQ**

Dr. Stephen A. Bourque is an Associate Professor in the Department of Military History at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.



Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War

by Robert M. Cassidy

Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006

202 pp. \$49.95

ISBN: 0-2759-8990-9

Reviewed by
JAMES S. CORUM

Robert Cassidy, who has served as a Special Operations Forces battalion commander and authored a book on peacekeeping (*Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Doctrine and Practice after the Cold War*, Praeger, 2004), examines the problems that major powers face in dealing with modern counterinsurgency. He focuses on how national military cultures affect nations' approaches to dealing with asymmetric warfare and provides three case studies as a base of analysis: the United States, Britain, and Russia.

Cassidy is on solid ground in his highly critical analysis of the U.S. military in its understanding of modern counterinsurgency. He argues that despite extensive experience with counterinsurgency, the U.S. military is generally indifferent to such warfare because of a traditional intellectual preference for big conventional wars, in which advantages in resources and technology give the Nation an unquestioned edge. Cassidy is spot on in his critique that the U.S. military leadership since Vietnam has generally resisted trying to understand the very different requirements of fighting unconventional enemies. This approach, which has its roots deep within U.S. military tradition, forces planners to relearn many of the basic principles that should have been learned through the counterinsurgency operations of the past. There is nothing really new in this analysis, as many authors have discussed the Armed Forces' lack of basic understanding of counterinsurgency since they became engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq. Still, it is important to keep hammering the point home, as the U.S. military needs to fundamentally alter its view of counterinsurgency if it wants to succeed in these operations.

In discussing the cultures of militaries with which he does not have personal experience, the author is much weaker. In examining London's response

to counterinsurgency issues, Cassidy correctly points out that the British military takes the study of counterinsurgency much more seriously than does the U.S. military (Northern Ireland made sure of that). But all too often, the author buys into the popular myths concerning Britain's special competence in counterinsurgency. For example, he emphasizes that since the massacre at Amritsar in 1919, the British have employed the principle of minimum force in countering insurgents. In fact, many British counterinsurgency efforts have been marred by excessive force and major human rights violations. The operations in Malaya and Cyprus saw numerous incidents of brutality, and the excessive force the British used in Cyprus worked powerfully to turn popular opinion against retaining the island as a colony. Several recent major works have exposed the horrendous behavior of British forces in suppressing the insurgency in Kenya in the 1950s, in which the violence against the native population is reminiscent of the French approach in Algeria. For some good revisionist history and a needed corrective, Caroline Elkins' *Britain's Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya* (London: Pimlico, 2005) offers a counterpoint to the view of the "softer" British approach to counterinsurgency.

The author reviews the problems the Russian military has had in fighting insurgents in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Because Cassidy does not read Russian, he is unable to access primary sources and thus must rely on secondary sources in English and French. He points out that the Soviets and Russians have employed an overly conventional approach. But the failure to develop an integrated counterinsurgency doctrine lies less within the military culture than within the strategic reality of the Russian state. Despite

vast natural resources and an educated population, centuries of incompetent and autocratic rule have made Russia a third-world state in which the government has expended the national wealth in creating a huge military establishment. Simply put, the Soviets, and now the Russians, have only one tool in the box to fight insurgents. Unlike the major Western powers, which learned the importance of employing civic action and economic development programs to win over the population, the Russians have no resources but the military to conduct the fight and consequently have nothing positive to offer disgruntled populations.

The last chapter is the best, for there Cassidy provides an overview of some of the most effective tactics employed by major and minor powers in combating insurgencies since World War II. Tactics include the creation of special units of ex-insurgents to fight insurgents, a method employed effectively by the Rhodesians in their war, and by the French in Algeria.

In general, the book is a good effort but brings little in the way of new information or original discussion to the table. Parts are useful additions to the ongoing debate on counterinsurgency, but the book should not make it to the top of any reading lists on the subject. **JFQ**

Dr. James S. Corum is a Professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.