


THE CHAIRMAN



LTG Karl Eikenberry, USA, Combined Forces Commander, Afghanistan, briefs Chairman Pace

THE SERVICE CHIEFS



Left to right: GEN Peter A. Schoomaker, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, with BG Purl L. Keen, Commanding General, U.S. Army South, at Conference of American Armies; Air Force Chief of Staff Gen T. Michael Moseley, USAF, and Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force Gerald Murray meeting with troops in Southwest Asia; Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen Michael Hagee, USMC, receives report on Operation Guardian Tiger, Iraq. Left: ADM Michael Mullen, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, meeting with Navy and Marine officers at Camp Fallujah, Iraq

COMBATANT COMMANDERS



GEN John Abizaid, USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command, meets with Seabees of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa in Dikhil, Djibouti



1st Combat Camera Squadron (Jacob N. Bailey)

FORCES FROM AIR TO LAND



Left to right (above): F-22As and F-16s provide quick-strike bombing and close air support for troops on ground; Marines move out for 6-month deployment; B-2 combines long-range bombing ability with stealth technology; C-17s provide strategic airdrop capability right: USS Dwight D. Eisenhower provides Navy and Marine F/A-18 fighters with complementary support craft; USS Shiloh launches SM-3 as part of Missile Defense Agency test of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense; Abrams main battle tanks returning from readiness exercise



U.S. Air Force (Val Gempje)



U.S. Navy



USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (Miguel Araga Contreras)



Soldiers perform calibration fires with howitzer in Mosul, Iraq

# The Success of Global Force Management and Joint Providing Force

By MICHAEL FERRITER  
and JAY BURDON

Implementation of the Global Force Management (GFM) construct and associated Joint Force Provider (JFP) has changed the assignment, allocation, and apportionment of forces into a predictive, streamlined, and integrated process. GFM/JFP has enabled the team of force providers consisting of U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), Service components, Service headquarters, and combatant commands to bring to the Secretary of Defense sourcing recommendations from the global pool of available forces and augment those recommendations with assessments of current and future readiness. This enables the Secretary to make proactive, risk-informed force management decisions by integrating the three processes to facilitate alignment of operational forces against known allocation and apportionment requirements in advance of planning and deployment timelines.

The end result of these processes has proven to be timely allocation of those forces and capabilities necessary to execute combatant command missions, timely alignment of forces against future requirements, and informed strategic decisions on the risk associated with allocation decisions while eliminating ad hoc assessments. Additionally, Global Force Management has made significant strides toward developing a network-centric Global Visibility Tool, which will provide the

means for all members of the GFM process to access the information necessary to support more timely and accurate force-providing decisionmaking.

To appreciate the contributions of the new Primary Joint Force Providing process, it is important to understand the pre-9/11 force management procedure that formed the basis for the revised JFP construct for both allocation and rotation requirements. Prior to the war on terror, there was little stress on the available forces needed to meet geographic combatant commander requirements. In short, there was virtually no supply-demand problem. Forces were drawn from the three force providers (U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Joint Forces Command) that had combatant command authority over the preponderance of Department of Defense (DOD) forces.

Historically, DOD conducted strategic force management through a decentralized process that based decision opportunities for the Secretary of Defense on recommendations from each of the combatant commanders who had combatant command authority over forces. The recommendations were obtained in a redundant and sequential process that proved too slow and segmented for efficient and effective pursuit of the war on terror.

The system's flaws became apparent during the initial phases of Operations *Enduring Freedom* and *Iraqi Freedom*. As a result, the Secretary called for a *single* command to be responsible for the force-providing process and directed a review of provider responsibilities within DOD. Because of this review, on June 25, 2004, the Secretary signed the Primary Joint Force Provider Implementing Memorandum, which formally designated the Commander, USJFCOM, as the primary

joint force provider for identifying and recommending sourcing solutions from all forces and capabilities (except designated forces sourced by U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. Transportation Command) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

The Joint Force Providing process developed from this direction has focused on the sourcing allocation of forces for both emergent and enduring rotational force requirements for all of the geographic combatant commanders.

## How Joint Force Providing Works

Emergent force requirements are executed through the request for forces/capabilities (RFF/C) process, which provides the procedures, roles, missions, and functions to support the sourcing of combatant command requests for capabilities and forces to meet emergent or crisis-based requirements. The process begins when a combatant commander submits an RFF/C to support emerging operational requirements to the Secretary of Defense via the CJCS. The Chairman validates the request by conducting a strategic risk assessment to prioritize the requirement in relation to existing priorities, develop and articulate capability and/or force availability substitution guidance on alternate sourcing strategies (coalition, civilian, or contracted sources), and conduct a legal/policy review.

The Joint Staff also determines whether the requested capability or force sourcing responsibility rests with the primary joint force provider (USJFCOM for all conventional forces), other functional force providers, or another Federal agency. The Joint Staff then develops a draft deployment order and forwards it to the primary JFP.

*force management recommendations were obtained in a redundant and sequential process that proved too slow and segmented for the war on terror*

The JFP, using Joint Staff, combatant command, and Service inputs, then develops recommended global sourcing solutions to fill the request. USJFCOM executes this tasking using assigned Service components to assess globally available capabilities/forces and determine the most effective and efficient sourcing options to satisfy the combatant commander's requests. USJFCOM relies heavily on its Service

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components to coordinate with the Service headquarters and other combatant command Service components to track capabilities and forces in order to assess operational readiness, availability, commitment, and capability substitution options.

U.S. Joint Forces Command uses its component inputs to develop sourcing recommendations from the global force pool to complete the draft deployment order for final coordination with Service headquarters and combatant commands. When required, USJFCOM will coordinate sourcing solutions directly with the combatant commanders who have combatant command of the specific force to resolve any contentious sourcing issues. The role of the primary JFP in this step is to provide a single point of consolidation and staffing to capture operational risk to the combatant command owning the force and any force management, future challenges, or institutional risk to the Service providing the force.

This risk is assessed by the Service Component and/or combatant command providing the force and is communicated to USJFCOM for consolidation and inclusion in the sourcing recommendation. This process allows USJFCOM to recommend global sourcing solutions from all forces, including those assigned to other combatant commanders, those not assigned and retained under control of the Service secretary, and any recommendations concerning use of civilian or contracted assets.

Once the recommendation is received from USJFCOM, the Joint Staff coordinates with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, agencies, Services, or combatant commands to seek their input on any issues that would result in a nonconcurrence or reclama. The Joint Staff will, as required, convene a GFM board, consisting of flag officer or equivalent representation from the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary, combatant commands, and Services to resolve contentious sourcing solutions. The Joint Staff will then forward the solution via the deployment order book to the Secretary. Upon the Secretary's approval, a formal deployment order is released.

In addition to the emergent force requirements of the geographic combatant commanders, the Armed Forces provide overseas presence through a combination of rotational and forward-based forces, as well as the resources necessary to sustain and main-

tain them. Forward-based forces are assigned to geographic combatant commands in the assignment tables of the Forces for Unified Commands annex of the GFM document.

Rotational forces are those allocated to a combatant commander to execute tasks in his area of responsibility and are typically deployed for a specified period (generally, 90 days to 6 months). Rotational forces deploy as units, typically sized at the Army or Marine Corps brigade/regimental combat team, air and space expeditionary task force, or carrier strike group/expeditionary strike group level or larger. Rotational force requirements are sourced globally with the rotational force sourcing process, which delineates the roles, missions, and functions to support the sourcing of combatant command rotational force requirements.

The Rotational Force Allocation Plan gives the primary joint force provider, combatant commands, and Services strate-

The April board then reviews the approved rotational force schedule for changes identified subsequent to the Secretary's approval. Finally, the July board reviews guidance and assumptions developed by the Joint Staff prior to soliciting requirements from the combatant commands in preparation for the next October board. Rotational force schedule changes required between quarterly boards are addressed by either convening an off-cycle board or via the RFF/C process.

### Success Story

The success of the joint force provider processes has been both quantitative and qualitative and is directly related to the incredible leadership and teamwork of all involved. Measurable reduction of the time between identification of the requirement by the supported combatant commander and receipt of the force in-theater has been the hallmark of the new process. Gaining both time for troop predeployment preparations and decision time for strategic planners has proven critical to the DOD ability to manage force stress at acceptable levels while successfully prosecuting the war on terror.

Since designating USJFCOM as the primary conventional joint force provider, the average predeployment notification/decision time has grown from 3 months for the Operation *Iraqi Freedom II* rotation to more than 10 months for the Operation *Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom 06-08* rotations. Moreover, consolidating joint sourcing recommendations into a single coordinated and collaborative process that includes direct input from senior commanders through the CJCS has produced sourcing solutions more efficiently and brought a better understanding of the risks associated with those solutions.

Meeting the warfighters' requirements with the most capable, ready, and available force while simultaneously understanding the operational and force structure planning impact of a sourcing decision has been an enabler for several Service transformation strategies, to include the Navy's carrier strike group/expeditionary strike group surge program and the Army's Force Generation model and brigade combat team transformation strategy. Execution of these future-focused force structure strategies ensures that we are postured for the Long War. **JFQ**

### *the success of the joint force provider processes has been both quantitative and qualitative*

gic-level planning guidance for rotational allocation of forces for 2 fiscal years. The plan contains the rotational force requirement, the combatant command to which the force is allocated, the operation or mission the force is tasked to support, the nature of the presence requirement (for example, rhythm—periodic, near continuous, or continuous presence), and the size of the rotational force (for example, brigade combat team, expeditionary strike group, or air and space expeditionary task force).

The rotational force allocation process is facilitated by quarterly GFM boards comprised of flag officer or equivalent representation from the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and Services. Each year, the October board reviews and prioritizes combatant command rotational requirements for the next 2 years. Following board approval of the rotational requirements, the primary joint force provider develops a draft rotational force schedule and rotational force allocation plan. The January board reviews the draft schedule and allocation plan developed by the primary joint force provider and, on approval, staffs the plan with the Service chiefs and forwards it to the Secretary of Defense for approval.