Forty Years of COIN
The Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territories

In an October 31, 2007, speech at Carnegie Mellon University, retired Army General John Abizaid warned that "we shouldn't assume for even a minute that in the next 25 or 50 years the American military might be able to come home, relax and take it easy."[1] If General Abizaid's assessment is even partially accurate, the U.S. military will be engaged in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility for a long time to come, probably in some counterinsurgent capacity.

The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 40 years old in June 2007, may hold lessons for just such a mission. Israel is battling an insurgency that is driven by Islamist and secular nationalist movements. Its experience against the Palestinian insurgency should be valuable to U.S. policymakers and military planners as counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Middle East continue.[2]

This article assumes that the government's response to an insurgency plays a predominant role in explaining insurgent success. It examines Israeli government policies toward the Palestinians and observes when there are reductions in the frequency and lethality of Palestinian insurgent attacks. This does not mean that factors other than the Israeli government's response have had no influence on Palestinian insurgent strength. In fact, the physical and political environment, the insurgency's level of organization and unity, and insurgents' strategies have also played a role. Still, "of all the variables that have a bearing on the progress and outcome of insurgencies, none is more important than government response."[3] This study does not develop a comprehensive explanation for Palestinian insurgent strength, but merely identifies Israeli occupation policies that have coincided with COIN success and failure. Given limited space, it leaves to future research the explanation of why these associations exist.

Measuring Israeli COIN Success

This study uses the frequency of insurgent attacks and the number of fatalities they cause as measures of COIN success. The lower the frequency of attacks and the number of casualties they cause, the greater is counterinsurgent success. This definition is justified inasmuch as the ability to launch a large number of attacks and inflict a large number of fatalities suggests a great deal of operational strength on the part of insurgents. Reducing that strength is the overall objective of COIN operations. With that said, this measure of insurgent strength captures only short-term, *tactical* COIN success, not long-term, *strategic* COIN success, which is measured at a more general level and is not amenable to the policy-evaluation approach employed here. So the question this article addresses is what Israeli occupation policies have coincided with tactical success against the Palestinian insurgency.

By this measure of insurgent strength, Israeli policies have coincided with COIN success from the beginning of the occupation

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Israel Defense Forces (Dan Bronfeld)

Israel Defense Forces soldiers train in Golan Heights

(1967) until the outbreak of the first intifada (1987) and from about 2005 on, but with relative COIN failure in between. The insurgent push that developed after the 1967 Six-Day War had largely petered out by the mid-1970s. Both the frequency and lethality of insurgent attacks decreased measurably after 1975 or so, remaining at a fairly low level for the 1970s and most of the 1980s.

With the outbreak of the first intifada in December 1987, this success waned. Israel experienced increases in the frequency and lethality of insurgent attacks, both in the occupied territories and in Israel proper, increases that were dramatic after 1994 when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) returned to the territories in the form of the Palestinian National Authority (PA). During this time, the insurgency used the resources and infrastructure of the PA to plan and execute attacks against Israeli citizens and interests.[4] In addition, in 1994, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) began using a deadly new tactic: suicide bombing.

It is only recently—since the effective end of the second intifada, which began in September 2000—that Israel has succeeded in blunting the effectiveness of the Palestinian insurgency. In the last 3 years, Israel has significantly reduced the lethality of insurgent attacks, especially in the case of Hamas, which has essentially ceased using suicide bombers.

Figure 1 illustrates these trends in relative COIN success and failure during the Israeli occupation. It gives the number of confirmed Palestinian attacks in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, as well as the number of victim fatalities as a result of

insurgent attacks, by year.[5] Two points are of note. First, there are significant spikes in the number of fatalities in the mid-1990s, after the creation of the PA, and in the early 2000s, after the beginning of the second intifada, followed by a significant diminution in the number of fatalities in the last few years. These two spikes in fatalities also represent nontrivial increases

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in the number of incidents and are not the result of a handful of spectacular attacks. There is also a slight, though noticeable, increase in the frequency and deadliness of Palestinian attacks in the late 1980s.

Second, there are increases in fatalities in 1972, 1974, and 1978 that do not represent an increase in the overall number of insurgent attacks. Instead, these spikes are mostly the result of three surprisingly successful attacks, on May 31, 1972; May 15, 1974; and March 11, 1978, resulting in 25, 31, and 43 fatalities, respectively.[6] Given that no other attacks before 1994 resulted in more than 20 fatalities, these spikes should not be taken as representative of a trend in Israeli COIN failure, as the latter attacks should. In short, figure 1 suggests a pattern of Israeli COIN success in the 1970s, followed by insurgent effectiveness that increased marginally in

the late 1980s and increased dramatically in the 1990s, and then increasing Israeli COIN success in the last 3 years.

Israel's occupation policies have been most successful in reducing Palestinian insurgent violence when they have emphasized four elements:

- reducing international support for the Palestinian insurgency
- hindering insurgent ability to operate within the occupied territories
- isolating the insurgency from internal Palestinian support
- restricting Palestinian access to Israeli territory.

Reducing International Support

Even in the presence of significant internal popular support, external support is usually critical to insurgent success.[7] Over the 40 years of its occupation, Israel has used two main tactics to isolate the Palestinian insurgency from external support: international diplomacy and control of its borders.

International Diplomacy. Immediately following the Six-Day War, most Arab states were extremely hostile toward Israel. For the most part, the frontline Arab states either continued or increased support for Palestinian insurgents. In addition to this, Soviet diplomatic and moral support for Arab states in general—and the Palestinian cause in particular—remained high during the Cold War.[8]

This state of affairs began to change as the occupation wore on. Of particular importance was Egypt, which expelled Soviet advisors and began to turn toward the West in the early 1970s[9] and which signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1978. With this, one of the principal supporters of the Palestinian insurgency retired from the fray. In addition, deepening U.S. political support for Israel throughout the 1970s and 1980s blunted support for the Palestinian insurgency in the international community. On top of this, Israel has used international publicity campaigns to excoriate Palestinian attacks and discredit the PLO.[10]

These diplomatic efforts became so effective that, by the end of the second intifada, Israel could cut off external material support for the insurgency nearly at will. For instance, when Hamas was voted into power in the January 2006 Palestinian elections, the international community froze all funds intended for the PA. While Israel initially faced significant hurdles in isolating the Palestinian

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Figure 1. Palestinian Insurgent Strength, 1967–2007

Source: Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, "Terrorism Knowledge Base." As of March 31, 2008, the Terrorism Knowledge Base is no longer available. For more information on how to access this information, visit <www.tkb.org>.

insurgency diplomatically, by the early 2000s, Israel's diplomatic efforts had greatly curtailed international support for the insurgents. Israeli diplomacy did not correlate with early success against the Palestinian insurgency, although it has done so in recent years.

Border Control. The other tactic that Israel has used to isolate the Palestinian insurgency from external support is its control of international borders. At the occupation's outset, Israel clamped down on the international borders of the occupied territories. By December 1968, there was a security barrier—consisting of double fences with mines in between—along the Jordan River. Control of the borders not only limited the flow of weapons and insurgents into the territories, but also made cross-border raids by Palestinian insurgents more difficult.[11]

The reintroduction of the PLO into the territories in 1994, however, complicated Israel's ability to control the borders. The close relationship between the PA and the insurgency facilitated the circumvention of Israeli border controls. In addition, the Israelis gave partial control over border crossings to the PA as part of the negotiated peace process. Although Israel has tried recently to regain control over the borders, at least in Gaza it has not experienced total success.[12] Thus, Israeli border control measures coincided with COIN success at the beginning of the occupation, but have not done so since the mid-1990s.

Hindering Insurgent Operations

Israeli efforts at limiting insurgent operations in the territories themselves have met with success. The Palestinian insurgency launched a number of transnational terrorist attacks in the first two decades of the occupation, suggesting that Israeli policies limited their ability to operate inside the territories.[13] Three factors have sometimes coincided with COIN success: Israel's intelligence network, targeted killings, and deportation policies.

Intelligence Network. From the beginning of the occupation, Israel developed its intelligence network in the territories.[14] The most well-known aspect of this network is Israel's employment of Palestinian informants to provide information on insurgent activities. Two other elements of this network are the Arabic-speaking Israeli agents implanted in the territories for extended periods and the insurgents who Israel has induced to divulge

information about co-insurgents.[15] The information this network provides has constituted an important advantage for the government in combating the Palestinian insurgency, inasmuch as Israel has proven able to identify and capture insurgents and—occasionally—to prevent attacks even after insurgents have left their base.

Targeted Killings. Israel's effective intelligence network in the territories has supported its campaign of targeted killings during the last two decades. For example, Israel has been able to target and kill leaders of Hamas in recent years, which has coincided with a dramatic decrease in suicide bombings over the same period. Israel's policy of targeted killings, which began in earnest in December 2000,[16] has correlated with Israeli COIN success since the beginning of the second intifada.

Deportations. Until 1992, when the Israeli High Court made the practice illegal, Israel occasionally deported Palestinian insurgent leaders to other Arab countries.[17] The trends shown in figure 2 suggest that Israel enjoyed more COIN success when it implemented this policy aggressively. The high level of deportations in the late 1960s and early 1970s correlates with early success against the insurgency. By the same token, Israel's concerted deportation efforts in the early 1990s (principally against Hamas) coincided with the end of the first intifada: the number and effectiveness of insurgent attacks decreased during these times. So an aggressive deportation policy has correlated with Israeli COIN success, as have an effective intelligence network and the policy of targeted killings.

Isolating the Insurgency

Israeli policies designed to drive a wedge between the Palestinian insurgency and the Palestinian population were associated with COIN success in the beginning of the occupation. Israeli policies, however, have been unable to isolate the insurgency from internal support since then, hindering COIN success. Three factors have affected this element of Israeli policies: limiting violence against Palestinian civilians, economic development, and Israeli settlements on occupied land.

Violence against Palestinians. Limiting violence against Palestinian civilians denies internal support to the insurgency in two ways. First, by dealing sharply with attacks by Israeli civilians against Palestinians, the government prevents the insurgency from using such attacks as a recruiting tool. Second, by

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curtailing Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence, the government prevents the insurgency from intimidating the population into supporting it.

In the early years of the occupation, Israel generally dealt firmly with violent acts by Israelis against Palestinian civilians. For example, after a bombing at a bus terminal in September 1968, a mob of Israeli Jews attacked a number of Arabs who had nothing to do with it. The government subsequently

Figure 2. Israeli Deportation of Palestinians

Note: The number of deportations is averaged for 1970 to 1973.
Source: Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem), "Statistics: Deportation," available at <www.btselem.org/english/Deportation/Statistics.asp>.

arrested those involved in the mob and, in the newspaper the day following, began a campaign to educate Israelis on how these types of actions bolstered the insurgency.[18]

Israel's response to reprisals against Palestinians has been mixed since then, however. Such reprisals were an exception until 1977, but in that year the Likud Party "ushered in an era of regressive COIN policies,"[19] creating a permissive atmosphere for reprisals against Palestinians.

The policing of Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence has also been mixed over the years. In the first years of the occupation, Israel dealt severely with such violence on the West Bank, investigating and punishing the intimidation and lynching of collaborators. In the Gaza Strip, however, Israel let Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence proceed unchecked, contributing to the poor security situation there compared to the West Bank.[20] On the West Bank, street executions of collaborators were nearly unheard of in the early years of the occupation, and the Palestinian population trusted that the government would protect them from insurgent intimi-dation. Israeli efforts to police Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence coincide with early success against the insurgency.

From the mid-1990s on, however, the lynching of Palestinian collaborators became commonplace, and armed showdowns have raged unabated between Hamas and Fatah in the Gaza Strip, whence most rocket attacks have originated. Since the beginning of the second intifada in

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Israeli efforts to police Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence coincide with early success against the insurgency

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September 2000, 556 Palestinians have died as a result of Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence.[21] This has facilitated insurgents' efforts at keeping the population under its control. In short, Israel's policing of Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence was correlated with COIN success early on, but the lack of policing more recently has not met with success.

Economic Development. Israel began its occupation of the Palestinian territories with a significant investment in the economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip but did not maintain this level of investment. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Israeli economic policies in the territories improved the standard of living for Palestinians and "[gave] the people a stake in stability and made them reluctant to support guerrillas and terrorists."[22] Immediately after the Six-Day War, Israel paid $800,000 to stabilize the West Bank economy for a month, conducted an economic survey, and encouraged Palestinian farmers to produce crops that they could market in Israel. West Bank agricultural production rose in value from $12 million to $60 million in only 3 years. Israel also allowed more Palestinians to work in Israel (20,000 were doing so by 1970) and launched vocational training programs in the West Bank. Thereafter, the West Bank became relatively peaceful.[23]

The economy of the territories has deteriorated significantly since then.[24] Unemployment hovers between one-third and one-half of the labor force, and most Palestinians attribute

Israel Defense Forces paratroopers conduct combined arms training

Israel Defense Forces (Abir Sultan)

the economic situation to Israeli policies. Any COIN success that Israel has enjoyed since the early years of the occupation has probably not come as a result of Israeli economic development policies in the territories.

Settlements. Israel's settlement program has been the single most upsetting occupation policy for the Palestinian population. It has done the most to push the population into the arms of the insurgency. Figure 3 suggests that when settlement activity was in its early, subdued stages, it did not constitute a hindrance to Israeli COIN success. However, the dramatic increase in the number of settlements in the mid-1980s—just before the outbreak of the first intifada—made it difficult for Israel to limit internal support for the insurgency.

The number of Israeli settlements in the West Bank reached a plateau in the 1990s, but that did not make it easier for Israel to deny popular support to insurgents. From 1996 to 2005, the number of Israelis living in West Bank settlements increased by 45 percent.[25] Israel has often built settlements on prominent hills and on the best land, which is irksome to Palestinians.[26] In fact, Palestinian hatred for the settlements runs so deep—and the economy is so weak and Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence has become so rampant—that any COIN success that Israel has achieved in recent years has likely been in spite of its almost complete inability to win the Palestinian population over from insurgent control.

Restricting Access

Another policy associated with COIN success has been restricting Palestinian access to Israeli territory.[27] Israel controlled this access most strictly during the first 5 years of the occupation and from the early 1990s on. Israel has been particularly effective at hindering Palestinian access to Israel since 2002, when construction began on the security fence near the border with the West Bank.

Early Restrictions on Access to Israel. From 1967 to 1972, Israel regarded the territories as closed military areas, permitting little movement into or out of them. By December 1, 1968, traffic between the east and west banks of the Jordan River was "nearly eliminated" and Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek had replaced the prewar barriers between East and West Jerusalem, barriers that Israel had removed following its victory the previous June.[28] These border control measures coincided with Israeli COIN success in the early years of the occupation.

Restrictions from the 1970s to the 2000s. From 1972 to 1989, Israel allowed Palestinians to enter Israel without a permit as long as they did not stay overnight. Beginning in 1989, in response to the intifada, Israel required Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to have individual permits to cross into Israel, and since then Israel has gradually increased the restrictions on Palestinian movement. In fact, Israel on occasion closes the territories completely, during which time no Palestinian can enter or leave, a policy it has used with increasing frequency from the early 1990s on. As a case in point, for more than one-third of the days during 2005, the Palestinian territories were completely closed. Interestingly enough, restrictive policies on Palestinian access to Israel have correlated with greater COIN success only before 1972 and after 2005. The more permissive policies in place from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s

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coincided with relative COIN success, and the increasingly restrictive policies begun in 1989 were not followed with decisive COIN success until the end of the second intifada.[29]

Security Fence. In 2002, Israel began constructing a security fence to control the entry of Palestinians from the West Bank into Israel. Beyond simply reducing movement out of the West Bank, this barrier has made it possible for Israeli military operations to have a strategic effect. For instance, the fence has hindered the ability of insurgents to rehabilitate cells and infrastructure in the aftermath of Israeli operations. In addition to the security fence, since the 1990s Israel has increasingly made use of checkpoints and roadblocks inside the territories to limit the ability of Palestinians to move. During Operations *Defensive Shield* and *Determined Path* in 2002, Israel imposed extended 24-hour curfews on Palestinian cities and large portions of the West Bank. While sometimes condemned in the international community, severely restricting Palestinian access to Israel has occasionally coincided with greater COIN success.

Lessons Learned

Israel's occupation experience holds valuable lessons for U.S. forces based in Iraq and Afghanistan. Keeping in mind that the reasons why particular Israeli policies coincided with COIN success are not entirely clear, four main lessons can be discerned. First, U.S. strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan may need to put more emphasis on isolating insurgents from external support. The borders of both countries are relatively porous. Indeed, the Palestinian territories have much shorter borders than Iraq and Afghanistan, but an emphasis on controlling the borders at the very beginning of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan may have put insurgents in a much weaker position than they are in today.

Figure 3. Israeli Settlements on the West Bank

Source: Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem), "Statistics: Data on Settlements' Population by year, XLS," available at <www.btselem.org/english/Settlements/Settlement_population.xls>.

Second, the U.S. military has done an admirable job of hindering insurgent activity in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the most part, U.S. forces have maintained the tactical initiative against insurgent foes, despite limited resources in troops and materiel. Israel has enjoyed greater success when it has aggressively targeted insurgent operations. By the same token, U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Afghanistan experienced COIN success with aggressive operations aimed at blunting the Taliban's offensive in the spring of 2007, and the U.S. surge in Baghdad has succeeded in pacifying many of the city's neighborhoods. That said, the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan may need to leave open the possibility of adopting aggressive tactics—targeted killings, for example—that Israelis have used with success.[30]

Third, at the beginning of operations, U.S. COIN strategies might have placed more emphasis on economic development in Iraq and Afghanistan. Immediately after the Six-Day War, and for a few years thereafter, Israel's commitment to Palestinian economic development was noticeable. While this commitment waned after the Likud Party came to power in 1977, it was not before economic prosperity in the territories helped give Israel the upper hand against the insurgency.

Finally, U.S. strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan may need to focus more on isolating insurgents from internal, popular support. Some among the Palestinian insurgency challenge Israel's very existence and are close to Israeli territory.[31] These are two factors that generate a significant amount of political will in Israel to do what it takes to beat the Palestinian insurgency, resulting in policies that have often had harsh consequences for the Palestinian population. Insurgent opponents of the United States, however, are generally not near to U.S. territory nor do they pose a credible threat to its existence. So whereas the Israeli polity can support policies resulting in harsh conditions for the Palestinian people, the United States cannot do the same without invoking shame abroad and dissent at home. The best alternative may be to counter insurgents' popular support by protecting citizens from insurgent intimidation and by employing tactics that do not alienate large portions of the population.

Israeli occupation policies have met with tactical counterinsurgency success when they have isolated the Palestinian insurgency from external and internal support, hindered the ability of the insurgency to operate within the occupied territories, and restricted Palestinian access to Israeli territory. That said, simply because these policies have sometimes coincided with counterinsurgency success for Israel does not necessarily mean that U.S. leaders should apply them wholesale. What it does mean is that the United States should remain open to using them. **JFQ**

NOTES

[1] "Abizaid: Middle East Wars May Last 50 Years," *Army Times*, November 12, 2007.

[2] Thomas H. Henriksen, *The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare and Implications for the United States*, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Report 07–3 (Hurlburt Field, FL: The JSOU Press, 2007), 1.

[3] Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005), 155.

[4] Efraim Karsh, *Arafat's War: The Man and His Battle for Israeli Conquest* (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 6–7.

[5] A confirmed Palestinian attack is one that is carried out either by a known Palestinian group or by Palestinians. Data come from the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), "Terrorism Knowledge Base," accessed at <http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp>. Machine-coded events data from the Kansas Events Data System (KEDS) reveal a similar pattern of attack frequency over time. See KEDS, "Levant Data Set," available at <http://web.ku.edu/keds/data.dir/levant.html>.

[6] MIPT.

[7] O'Neill, *Insurgency*, 139, 142–151.

[8] Michael N. Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Michael B. Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[9] Michael N. Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Taha al-Majdub, *Years of Preparation, Days of Victory: June 1967–October 1973* (Cairo: The Ahram Center for Translation and Publishing, 1999) (in Arabic).

[10] O'Neill, *Insurgency,* 185.

[11] Henriksen, 10.

[12] Barak Ravid, "Livni to Egyptian FM: Put a Stop to Weapons Smuggling into Gaza," *Ha'aretz*, November 6, 2007.

[13] O'Neill, *Insurgency*, 104.

[14] Bard E. O'Neill, "Revolutionary Warfare in the Middle East: An Analysis of the Palestinian Guerrilla Movement, 1967–1972" (Ph.D. diss., University of Denver, 1972), 98–99, notes that a well-developed intelligence network is essential to government success against an insurgency.

[15] Henriksen, 5, 11–14.

[16] Amira Hass, "What the Fatality Statistics Tell Us," *Ha'aretz*, September 3, 2003. The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem), "Statistics: Intifada Fatalities," available at <www.btselem.org/english/statistics/Casualties.asp>, reports that 218 Palestinians have been targeted and killed by the Israel Defense Forces since September 29, 2000. See also Henriksen, 16–18; Ilana Kass and Bard E. O'Neill, *The Deadly Embrace: The Impact of Israeli and Palestinian Rejectionism on the Peace Process* (Lanham, MD: National Institute for Public Policy and University Press of America, Inc., 1997), 249–309; and David B. Tinnin and Dag Christensen, *The Hit Team* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976).

[17] B'Tselem, "Statistics: Deportation," available at <www.btselem.org/english/Deportation/Statistics.asp>.

[18] O'Neill, "Revolutionary Warfare," 194–196.

[19] O'Neill, *Insurgency*, 176.

[20] O'Neill, "Revolutionary Warfare," 240–248.

[21] B'Tselem, "Fatalities."

[22] O'Neill, *Insurgency*, 172.

[23] O'Neill, "Revolutionary Warfare," 196–201.

[24] Sara Roy, *The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-development* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995).

[25] B'Tselem, "Statistics: Data on Settlements' Population by Year, XLS," available at <http://www.btselem.org/english/Settlements/Settlement_population.xls>.

[26] See also Paul Maliszewski and Hadley Ross, "Divide and Conquer: The Making of Israel's Suburban Occupation," *Harper's Magazine*, November 2005, 78, who observe that Israel "annexed East Jerusalem after the 1967 War" and "now seems determined to create a sprawling suburban barricade . . . to isolate the city from the rest of Palestinian territory."

[27] On the importance to COIN success of controlling the population's movements, see O'Neill, "Revolutionary Warfare," 96, 131.

[28] O'Neill, "Revolutionary Warfare," 191. The quotation comes from note 22.

[29] B'Tselem, "Statistics: Checkpoints and Roadblocks: Figures on Closure Days," available at <www.btselem.org/english/Freedom_of_Movement/Closure.asp>.

[30] See Henriksen, 43–44.

[31] Karsh, *Arafat's War*, 1–10. See also O'Neill, "Revolutionary Warfre," 257, and Eitan Y. Alimi, "The Dialectic of Opportunities and Threats and Temporality of Contention: Evidence from the Occupied Territories," *International Political Science Review* 28, no. 1 (2007), 101–123.