

Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Policy and “Other Means”

Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman

Appendix B

Appendix B to Joseph Felter & Brian Fishman *Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Policy and “Other Means”* is a compilation of documents released from the Harmony Database. The Harmony Database is a repository for information collected during the course of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Readers should carefully contextualize this information before drawing conclusions. Interpreting information collected on a battlefield is fraught with risk. It is almost inherently incomplete. Nonetheless, we hope that this data offers scholars further insight into Iranian foreign policy and covert operations.

The entire report can be accessed at www.ctc.usma.edu

Document Title: Iraqi Intelligence Documents (various dates)

ID: CMPC-2003-000562

Date: Various (early 2003)

Synopsis:

This document contains a series of Iraqi intelligence documents written by the Saddam Hussein regime. Many seem to be from early 2003, just before and during the US invasion.

Key Themes:

Key words:

CMPC-2003-000562
Full Translation (pp 11-14, 45-49, 53-56 and 66-69)

Page 11

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate
(Logo of the Republic)

Republican Guards Secretariat
Supervisor's Office
Date: 1 March 2003

To: State Command Member, Supervisor of the Republican Guard (RG)
Greetings,

Attached is the Intelligence Service's letter 456 on 26 February 2003. It includes information about the conference held by the Intelligence Service to discuss the plan that was prepared by the Ministry of Defense to deploy units of the Iranian National Liberation Army in case of any aggression against Iraq.

Kindly acknowledge and advise ... Best regards

Acknowledged

1 March

(Signature)
Staff Brigadier General
'Abd-al-Salam Yasin Mansur
Secretary
1 March 2003

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate
(Logo of the Republic)
Top Secret

Republic of Iraq
Intelligence Service

(Logo of the IIS)

Ref: 140/2/2/456
Date: 26 February 2003

195
1 Mar 2003

(Saddam Hussein's Quotation)

To: Mr. Qusay Saddam Hussein, State Command Member and Supervisor of the Republican
Guards

Subject: Combat Preparation

In reference to our Top-Secret letter 140/2/2/294 on 6 February 2003, kindly be informed that:

- 1- We held a conference for representatives of the Ministry of Defense and the Iranian National Liberation Army Staff, attended by Mr. Mas'ud Radjavi, and both Staff Major General Karji Hasan, the Director of Military Operations and Staff Major General Salih 'Abu, the 2nd Corps' Chief of Staff. They were assigned by our apparatus to discuss the plan made by the Ministry of Defense to deploy the units of the Liberation Army in case of the aggression against Iraq as follows:

A. Pinpointing the areas where the Liberation Army would mobilize (as shown in the enclosed diagram) including Ab Nift , Imam Ways, Drawashkah, Jalula' Storages and Qurtubah District

(1)

Top Secret

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate
(Logo of the Republic)

Top Secret

Republic of Iraq
Intelligence Service

(Logo of the IIS)

Ref: / / /

Date: / / 2003

(Saddam's Quotation)

B. The commanders of the Liberation Army, coordinating with the 2nd Corps, will reconnoiter the aforementioned areas, in preparation of digging trenches, supported by the Ministry of Defense's Engineering Units. It is also agreed to determine liaison officers from our apparatus and the 2nd Corps and the Organization's unit to supervise and control these troops and organize their operations under the leadership of the 2nd Corps.

2. Mr. Radjavi expressed his content for the suggested plan, stating that it complies with their preparations and thoughts. He also explained their combat organizational structures and units that consist of Armored Brigade Grouping including three battalions and the combat power of each battalion consist of (9 tanks, 7 carriers, 2 machineguns, one 120 mm launcher, two 107 mm rocket launchers, 120 mm mortar, one 23 mm machinegun as well as other Administrative Support and Staff (Diagram 2)

3. Therefore, Mr. Radjavi distributed 14 Armored Brigade Groupings...

(2-3)

Top Secret

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In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate
(Logo of the Republic)
Top Secret

Republic of Iraq
Intelligence Service

(Logo of the IIS)

Ref: / / /
Date: / / 2003

(Saddam's Quotation)

.... to the suggested areas (2-4) brigades each. It was agreed to start implementing this plan, stipulating that the Organization's forces stay in their current locations and will not move unless the start of aggression.

Kindly acknowledge ... Best Regards

Enclosures
3 Diagrams

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Saddam', written over a grid background.

(Signature)
Comrade
Intelligence Service Director
25 February 2003

Copy to:
Staff Major Sultan Ahmad Hashim, Defense Minister
Kindly acknowledge ... Best Regards

(3-3)
Top Secret

Page 45

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate
(Logo of the Republic)

Top Secret

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Ref: M7/35/6/489
4 January 2003

(Saddam's Quotation)

5
5 January 2003

To: Presidency of the Republic
Subject: Activities of the Iranian Troops

Below are the most important activities of the Iranian troops, opposite to our operation sectors from (1-31) December 2002.

- 1- A helicopter reconnaissance operation over Al-Fakkah
- 2- Detecting a white helicopter conducting 25 flights over the Iranian territory (5-6) km opposite to (Al-Za'faran post, Al-Tal, 'Ayn Al-'Abd, Al-Zayadi and Al-Jusur Complex)

Comment



This helicopter belongs to the Iranian Oil Company and is used to conduct maintenance operations on oil wells in the area. It is also used for reconnaissance of the old mine fields in this area by the Iranian Engineering Units that are responsible for clearing the mines planted during the Iraq-Iran war.



- 3- 5 Visual and Photography Reconnaissance operations over areas of (Ghuzayl -

(1 - 3)
Top Secret

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9

Serial	Position	Signature
1	The Republican Guards Chief of Staff	
2	The Republican Guards General Secretary	

Serial	Position	Signature
1	The Republican Guards Chief of Staff	
2	The Republican Guards General Secretary	

(Logo of the Republic)
Top Secret

...Al-Shihabi and Majnun)

4- On 17, December 2002, 4 Pick-ups, carrying soldiers stopped near the Iranian Al-Fakkah post and started firing towards the Iranian territory, using three mortars.

Comment

This field is used as a firing range for light and medium weapons

5- On 18, December 2002, the Iranian soldiers of the post opposite to the Iraqi frontier Al-Miqdad post fired shots towards Wadi Najaf area and towards the Iranian territory and engaged with unidentified soldiers.

Comment

There is doubt that there are elements sneaking into this area

6-The Iranian posts near Al-Shalamjah cemetery and Zayd post were supplied with 3 soldiers per post.

7- Engineering potential

A. Engineering work continues in the Majnun and Al-Huwayzah Sectors.

B. Repairing the routes leading to the Hunayjirah Iranian post and in front of the Al-Mansur Iraqi Post

8- On 18, December 2002, the Iranian Radio broadcasted a statement of a well-informed source, stating that the Iranian Army had been ordered by 'Ali Khamenei, the General Commander of the Iranian Armed Forces ...

(Logo of the Republic)

Top Secret

... to deploy military units in the Iranian eastern and western frontier areas.

Comment

No sign was detected proving that they implemented these orders by the Iranian frontier armed troops (We are still following-up)

9- On 30, December 2002, heavy, medium and light weapons fire was heard in the Al-Shalamjah Sector

Comment

It is possible that there is tactical training being conducted in the area.

10- We have received information from a trusted source that the Iranian troops in the Middle Sector checked and distributed chemical protective masks to the troops in this area.

11-Analysis

The Iranian Military activities serve as precautionary measures to control points vulnerable to infiltration on the Iraqi-Iranian borders.

Kindly acknowledge ... Best regards

(Signature)

Staff Major General

Director of the General Military Intelligence Directorate

3 January 2003

Copy to:

Mr. Comrade State Command Member and Supervisor of the Republican Guard, kindly acknowledge ... Regards

Mr. Defense Minister... kindly acknowledge ... Regards

(3-3)

Top Secret

Page 53

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate
(Logo of the Republic)
Secret and Confidential

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
The Republican Guards Secretariat
Ref: (SATTS M :) / 69
Date: 4 January 2003

To: Republican Guards Chief of Staff Office – Office of Chief of Staff
Subject: Information

In reference to remarks of the State Command Member and Supervisor of the Republican Guard, "Notify the Republican Guards Chief of Staff - Republican Guards Allah Akbar Operations Commander - Republican Guards Al-Fath Al-Mubin Operations Commander – Division Commanders", concerning the information included in the General Military Intelligence Directorate's attached secret letter 90683 on 31, December 2001

Kindly acknowledge ... Best regards

Enclosures

Copy of Letter

(Signature)

Staff Brigadier General

'Abd-al-Salam Yasin Mansur

Secretary of the Republican Guards Supervisor

4 January 2003

Copy to:

The Special Republican Guards Commander, to notify the Special Republican Guards of information included in the State Command Member and the RG Supervisor's attached letter ... Best regards.

(1-1)

Secret and Confidential

Page 54

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate
(Logo of the Republic)

Republican Guards Secretariat
Supervisor's Office
Date: 2 January 2003


To: State Command Member, Supervisor of the (Republican Guards)

Greetings,

Attached is the General Military Intelligence Directorate's secret letter 90683 on 31, December 2002 that included information about the Iranian Guard Forces and Bassej forces' maneuvers during December 2002.

Kindly acknowledge and advise ... Best Regards

(Notify the Republican Guards Chief of Staff - Republican Guards Allah Akbar Operations Commander - Republican Guards Al-Fath Al-Mubin Operations Commander – Divisions' Commanders"



2 January

(Signature)
Staff Brigadier General
'Abd-al-Salam Yasin Mansur
Secretary
2 January 2003

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate
(Logo of the Republic)

Secret

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Ref: M7/35/90683
31 December 2003

(Saddam's Quotation)

1
2 January 2003

To: Presidency of the Republic

Subject: Maneuvers

We have been informed that the Iranian Guard Forces and Bassej Forces conducted maneuvers during December 2002 as follows:

1. The 57th Brigade Abu-al-Fadl (Guards) conducted a maneuver in Khurm Abad from (17-24) January 2002, and named it (Al-Ghadir), aimed at raising the combat levels of the brigade units. This maneuver was implemented in five stages, including airborne troops, engaging enemy targets, using locally made supplies. This maneuver was attended by Brigadier General Muhammad 'Ali Ja'fari, the Commander of the Guard Land Forces.
- 2- 'Ashura' and Al-Zahra' Regiments (Bassej Forces) conducted a maneuver in Quds Camp in Shushtar from (11-14) December 2002, where 1,900 fighters took part, aimed at improving the combat capability of these forces.
- 3- Two fighters of 'Ashura' Regiment, cooperating with ...

(1-2)

Secret

(Logo of the Republic)


Secret

... the Guards in Biranshahr, conducted a maneuver named " Defenders of the Wilayah (State)" from 15-16 December 2002, including training on engaging enemy targets.

Comment

The aforementioned maneuvers aimed at improving the combat preparation of the Iranian units and preparing the Guard Forces and Bassej Forces for a forthcoming American attack that would affect Iran and the Iranian People.

Kindly acknowledge ... Best regards



(Signature)

Staff Major General

General Military Intelligence Director

30 December 2002

Copy to:

Comrade, State Command Member and Supervisor of the Republican Guards; kindly acknowledge ... Best regards

Minster of Defense; kindly acknowledge ... Best regards

(2-2)

Secret

10. Supplying the Iranian post opposite the Majnun Southern area with 12 military personnel

11. Engineering work

A. Engineering work continues in the Majnun Sector and Al-Huwayzah Sector

B. A bulldozer was used on the hills located left of Mayan Tank Post.

Comment

This area is possibly being prepared to build a monitoring tower or a post

12. We received information from a trusted source that the Iranians renamed the 4th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the 81st Commando Corps to the 71st Mechanized Infantry Brigade.

Comment

A. This brigade opens in the Middle Sector from the Baba Hadi area to Nift Shah

B. It is possible that the following unit will also be renamed, the 4th Infantry Brigade, 21st Infantry Corps and 4th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, 77th Infantry Corps.

13. We received information that the 35th Commandos Brigade moved from Kaylan in the west to Kermanshah (under tracking)

14. On 30, January 2003, the Iranians planted mines on the left side of the Khasrawi Complex and supplied the Khasrawi new post with a 106 mm gun

15. Analysis

The Iranian Military activities serve as precautionary measures and they are trying to control the areas suspected of being vulnerable to infiltration on the Iraqi-Iranian borders

(Logo of the Republic)

Top Secret

4- The Iranian border troops were rotated at the (Zayd and Ghuzayl) Posts

5- Controlling the frontier fortifications by adding one extra platoon at the (Khasrawi- Al-Darraji Post- Sumar and Al-Kharnubiyyah)

Comment

We have received information from a well-informed source that orders were issued to the Iranian troops to check the operation lines and conduct exercises to control the important frontier areas, while improving the level of combat operations.

6-On 12 January 2003, 36 civilians were seen exiting a civilian car and a Land Cruiser, taking photos and repeating Anti-American slogans in front of Ghuzayl Post.

7- On 15 January 2003, a military vehicle approached Monitoring Post (22) in the Majnun Southern Sector, where 7 people shouted insults towards the personnel there, wherein they directed fire towards the vehicle which fled into Iranian territory.

8- On 19 January 2003, live-ammunition training was conducted behind the Iranian Custom building in the Al-Kasbah Area.

9- The watch towers, along the Shat Al-'Arab area, witnessed an increase in the number of guards; from one guard to three.

(2 - 4)

Top Secret

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate
(Logo of the Republic)

Top Secret

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Ref: M7/35/6/8337
6 February 2003

(Saddam's Quotation)

122
7 February 2003

To: Presidency of the Republic
Subject: Activities of the Iranian Troops

Below are the most important activities of the Iranian troops in our operation sectors from (1-31) December 2002.

1- 4 helicopter reconnaissance operations over (Al-Fakkah- Saddam Post- Nift Khanah and Al-Ta'an post)

2- - Observation of a white in color helicopter conducting 25 flights over Iranian territory (5-6) km opposite to (Al-Za'faran Post, Al-Tal, 'Ayn Al-'Abd, Al-Zayadi and Al-Jusur Complex)

Comment

This helicopter belongs to the Iranian Oil Company and conducts maintenance operations for oil wells in the area. It is also used in reconnaissance for old mine fields in this area for the sake of the Iranian Engineering Units that are responsible for clearing the mines planted during the Iraq-Iran war.

3- 6 Visual and Photography Reconnaissance operations over areas of (Khasrawi, Nift Shah, 'Ayn Al-'Abd post and Al-Faw)

(1 - 4)

Top Secret

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate
(Logo of the Republic)

Republican Guards Secretariat
Supervisor's Office
Date: 9 February 2003

To: State Command Member, Supervisor of the Republican Guards

Greetings,

- Attached is the General Military Intelligence Directorate's top-secret letter 8337 on 6, February 2003 that included information about the most important activities of the Iranian troops in the operation areas during January 2003.
- We suggest acknowledging the Republican Guards Chief of Staff and the Republican Guards General Secretary.

Kindly acknowledge and advise ... Best Regards

Approved

10 February

(Signature)
'Abd-al-Salam Yasin Mansur
Secretary
9 February 2003

Full Translation of pages 2, 5-10, 15-44, 50-52, 57-65 and 71

Page 2

In The Name Of God the Most Merciful the Most Compassionate

The Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
The Secretary



294
4/9/200

“Top Secret & Confidential”

Reference Number (SATTS 1/16/2/5912/K)
Date 3 Sep. 2000

To: Republican Guard Supervisor
Subject: Information

We are sending you a copy of the documents dispatched from Jalal Al-Talibani Group to the office of the Supreme Council in Al-Sulaymaniyyah, who sent it to his headquarters in Tehran. The documents include information related to the following subjects:

- 1- Saddam Airbase and the exceptional preparations that took place on 19 June 2000.
- 2- Details of the Deputy's visit to Al-Ta'mim Governorate on 30 May 2000, attended also by you.
- 3- The Republican Guards Forces intention to form a paratroops brigade.
- 4- Maintenance and repair of the Armed Forces weapons carried out by the Inspection and Acceptance Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, especially artillery.
- 5- The relation of Mas'ud Al-Barazani's group with the State, and the meeting held with 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid on 25 June 2000.

(1-2)

In The Name Of God the Most Merciful the Most Compassionate

Republican Guard Secretariat
The Supervisor's Office



13

Date 9 Feb 2003

To: Republican Guard Supervisor-Stat Command Member

Greetings

Attached is the IIS secret letter number 294, dated 6 Feb 2003. It includes information about a meeting with Mas'ud Rajawi, the Iranian Liberation Army Commander, on 4 Feb 2003 to prepare a plan to face American aggression on Iraq if it takes place.

Please review and order...with regards.

(Signature)
Staff Brigadier General
'Abd-al-Salam Yasin Mansur
Secretary
9 Feb. 2003

*to Husayn
it is not needed anymore
file*

In The Name Of God the Most Merciful the Most Compassionate

The Republic of Iraq
Intelligence Service



Iraqi Intelligence Service
IRIS

Reference Number: 14/2/2/294
Date: 6 Feb 2003

Top Secret

(A quotation form one of Saddam Hussein's Speeches)

126
7/2/2003

To: Qusay Saddam Hussein
The Republican Guard Supervisor
Subject: Combat Readiness

Reference is made to our letter number 140/2/2/235, dated 28 Jan. 2003.

On 4 Feb 2003 a meeting was held with Mas'ud Rajawi, the Commander in Chief of the Iranian Liberation Army, to determine what steps to take in case of an American attack on Iraq. The following is the important issue discussed in the meeting:

Mr. Rajawi confirmed that their enemy is the Iranian Regime and they will fight it to the end to maintain his integrity in front of Iranian people and the world, meaning that if the Iranian Regime or its agents (such as Badr Corps or any other) attacks Iraq, his army will fight back vigorously from inside Iraq in defense. But if the Iranian regime doesn't interfere, Rajawi will not do anything that may harm Iraq until the crisis ends

(1-4)

Top-Secret

In The Name Of God the Most Merciful the Most Compassionate

The Republic of Iraq
Intelligence Service



Iraqi Intelligence Service
IRIS

Reference Number
Date

(A quotation from one of Saddam Hussein's Speeches)

Top Secret

1. Rajawi explained his plan. He will deploy his forces to three positions: Al-Khalis, Jalawla' and a tactical headquarters near Al-Miqdadiyyah in the central sector. His presence in that area is known. Fighting from that area will not cause him any political problems, unlike if he was deployed in the Kurdish Northern Zone or in the Shi'ah dominated areas of the South. Iran and western countries claim that his forces are Iraqi and are using his Mujahidin to oppress Kurds and Shi'ah. The area occupied by Rajawi forces is considered the gateway to Baghdad through several routes (Mandali, Khanaqin, and North of Jalawla'). He determined the zone that he will confront the enemy in begins from Qasr Shirin in the north (in front of Iraqi Qura Tu) to Sawmar in the south (south of Iraqi Qazaniyyah). The length of the front line is about 100 - 120 km, and 80 - 100 km deep, to the point where their headquarters in Al-Khalis is. This sector is the 2nd Corps sector, which lies in the form of a semicircular pivot, as shown in the attached chart.

(2-4)

Top-Secret

In The Name Of God the Most Merciful the Most Compassionate

The Republic of Iraq
Intelligence Service



Iraqi Intelligence Service
IRIS

Reference Number
Date

(A quotation from one of Saddam Hussein's Speeches)

Top Secret

2. Rajawi and his forces will take part in dealing with the following situations:

- a. Stop any attempt by Iran or its agents to breach or infiltrate Iraqi borders from any point along a 120km front line from Shirin Palace in the north to south of Sawmar.
- b. Stop any Iranian attacks coming from the north and heading along the imaginary line that starts from the Iraqi zone facing Shirin Palace east up to north of Al-Khalis camp in the west.
- c. Stop any attacks coming from the south heading to the north along the imaginary line extending from the Iraqi area opposite south of Sawmar eastwards up to the south of Al-Khalis Camp in the west.

(3-4)

Top-Secret

In The Name Of God the Most Merciful the Most Compassionate

The Republic of Iraq
Intelligence Service



Iraqi Intelligence Service
IRIS

Reference Number
Date

(A quotation from one of Saddam Hussein's Speeches)

Top Secret

4. In addition to what has been said above, a technical meeting will be held with experts from the Ministry of Defense (Movements, Operations, 2nd Corps, who controls the central zone) to devise a joint plan and agree on a work plan.

Please review, with regards.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be a stylized name, possibly 'S. Hashim'.

Director of (IIS)
5 Feb. 2003

copy to
Staff General Sultan Hashim Ahmad \ Minister of Defense
Please review, with regards.

(4-4)

Top Secret

In the Name of God, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

12

Republic of Iraq
General Military Intelligence Directorate



(Saddam Hussein Quotation)

Reference number M7/35/2/3583
Date 2 Mar 2003

Top Secret and Confidential

To: Presidency of the Republic, the Secretary
Subject: Iranian Weapons Sources

In reference to our top secret and confidential letter number 2487 dated 11 Feb 2003, there is no information about any new Iranian arms deals during the month of February 2003.

Kindly review, with respect

Staff Lieutenant General
General Military Intelligence Director
1 Mar 2003

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a stylized 'S' followed by a horizontal line and a small flourish.


Copy to
State Command Member / kindly review, with respect
Supervisor of the Republican Guard/ kindly review, with respect
Minister of Defense/ kindly review, with respect

(1-1)

Top Secret and Personal

February 2003

Organizational chart for the Armored Brigade Group



Establishments of Brigade Group						
Tanks	Troop Carriers	Artillery	Katyusha/ 122 mm	107mm Missile Launcher	Mortar 120mm	23mm Artillery
18	22	6	3	6	6	3

Organizational Structure of the Armored Brigade Group

Brigade Group Commander:-

Chiefs of Staffs:-

Brigade Headquarters Commander

Individuals Administration

Supply

Administration

Operations


Intelligence

Communications


Liberation Army Battalion (1)

Liberation Army Battalion (2)

Liberation Army Battalion (3)



Establishments of the Liberation Army Battalion						
Tanks	Troops Carriers	Artillery	Katyusha/ 122 mm	107 mm Missile Launcher	120 mm Mortar	23 mm Artillery
9	7	2	4	2	2	1



Page 18

(TC: Duplicate of page 17)

Page 19

In the Name of God, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

The Iranian National Liberation Army:

- 1- The Iranian National Liberation Army was founded in 1986 under the command of Mas'ud Rajawi. The army fought a number battles during the Iraq-Iran War, the last being Al-Diya' Al-Khalid Battle in the central sector. In addition to its great role in fighting agents and the Khomeini Guard forces in the central sector (2nd Corps Sector) which was pushed in Iraq by the Iranian regime during the 1991 rebellion, the army managed to annihilate most of the forces that snuck into Iraq while losing (49) soldiers during the battle.
- 2- In order to strengthen the combat capabilities of the Iranian National Liberation Army, the Ministry of Defense supplied the army with armor and heavy artillery (see armament status attachment). They conducted intensive training for its members to be familiar with using these weapons, in addition to the tactical courses, exercises, intelligence and administrative support; which changed the units of this army into armored brigades.

- 3- Combat Capabilities: the army formations are based on the quadruple formation system. It consists of (8) thousand well trained fighters. This number increases or decreases according to the military or political situation. The combat capability is similar to the combat capability of two armored divisions minus one brigade.
- 4- The units of the Iranian National Liberation Army are deployed along the border adjacent to Iran and into divided into seven commands. They are Al-Khalis, Jalawla', Al-Ta'bawi (2nd Corps), Al-Kut, Al-'Amarah (4th Corps), Salaf Fakhir (4th Corps) and Al-Basrah (3rd Corps) headquarters. Al-Khalis special camp is considered the main base for the army with all field and academic training conducted in this camp. In addition, the Army's headquarters is located in Al-Khalis Camp. It is noted that military units deployed in the sectors have detailed information about the Iranian forces deployed opposite them on the other side. Corps intelligence officers share information.

Note:

The army recently pulled its units from the camps in the southern sector and redeployed them to the camps of the central sector (Al-Khalis, Al-Ta'bawi, and Jalawla').

- 5- The IIS is responsible for supplying this army with what it needs in weapons and ammunition in coordination with the Ministry of Defense, in addition to providing technical maintenance for these weapons on a monthly and yearly basis to include armor, tanks, vehicles, and other types of weapons. The IIS sets a special annual budget for this purpose, which reaches (1.5) Billion Dinars per annum.

Tanks	T55	T55 Command	T55 Rescue	T72	Chieftain Tank
	75	5	15	3	60

Armor	BMB1 Carrier	MTLB Carrier	MTLB Command	EE-9 Cascavel Armored Car	Panhard Armored Car
	85	63	36	86	70

Artillery	106 mm	122 mm	130 mm	155 mm	Anti-Aircraft Gun
	190	75	180	30	140

Vehicles	Faun Vehicle	Bridging Vehicle	Signal Vehicle	BTR Vehicle	Rescue Vehicle	Eva Vehicle
	24	6	3	5	15	450

Type of Weapon	Quantity
122 mm Launcher	50
107 mm Launcher	69
BKC Machine Gun	1185
RBG7 Launcher	1278
RBK Machine Gun	495
Duktyarev	66
60, 80, and 81 Mortar	567
DShK (12.7 mm heavy MG)	205

Light Weapons	Pistol	Kalashnikov	FAZ antitank rifle	Sniper rifle	GC rifle
	2450	11498	1387	336	340

Other Materials:

Earth Mover	43
Tanker	95
Trucks	33
Crane	13
Ambulance	25

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate

The Republic Of Iraq
General Military Intelligence Directorate



(Saddam Hussein Quotation)

Number /7/35/7/25/2/3978
Date 20 Jan 2003

Top Secret

To: Comrade, Revolutionary Command Council Member
Commander of the Southern Zone
Subject: Iran Agents Activities

Letter 3\9\22\12481\K dated 8 Dec 2002 contained the approval of the Presidency's Secretary on suggestions A and B, in article number 4 of our top secret letter number 85480, dated 4 Dec 2002.

Kindly review, with appreciation

Signature
Lieutenant General Staff
General Military Intelligence Director
19 Jan 2003

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a large, stylized loop at the top and several horizontal strokes below.

CC

State Command Member
Republican Guard Supervisor
Minister of Defense

the letter above was issued from the Presidency
kindly review, with appreciation

(1-1)

Top Secret

(SATTS T W (A.B.C))

Page 25

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate

The Republican Guard Secretariat
The Supervisor's Office



Number /7/35/7/25/2/3978
Date 22 Jan 2003

Top secret

To: Republican Guard Supervisor, State Command Member

Greetings,

Attached is the General Military Intelligence Directorate letter, classified top secret, number 3978, dated 20 Jan 2003, which includes the Presidency's Secretary's approval on suggestions (A & B) in article 4 in the directorate's top secret letter number 85480, dated 4 Dec 2002.

Staff Brigadier General
'Abd-al-Salam Yasin Mansur
The Secretary
22 Jan 2003

Page 26

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate

The Republican Guard Secretariat
The Supervisor's Office



Date 4 Dec 2003

To: Republican Guard Supervisor, State Command Member

Greetings,

Attached is the General Military Intelligence Directorate letter, classified top secret, number 85480, dated 4 Dec 2003, which includes information about the activities of Iran's agents and information obtained about the fields of operations

Staff Brigadier General
'Abd-al-Salam Yasin Mansur
The Secretary
22 Jan 2003

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
General Military Intelligence Directorate



(Saddam Hussein Quotation)

Top Secret

Number /7/ 35/7/85480
Date 4 Jan 2003

To: Presidency of the Republic, the Secretary
Subject: Iranian Agents Activities

The following is information about Iranian agents activities obtained from the field of operations for the period 1 through 30 Nov 2002:

1. Acts of Sabotage
Iran's agents conducted two looting operations. The first was at 2400 hours on 29 Nov 2002. They looted a public transport bus type Nissan in Abu-‘Awwaf area north of Al-Qurnah on Basrah, Maysan highway. They clashed with men of the 18th observation post, killing a man from 3rd Regiment/25th Mechanized Infantry Brigade. The second looting operation was at 0900 hours on 29 Nov 2002. The agents looted two vehicles. One is a pick up truck and the other is a Nissan sedan traveling on the Basrah – Nasiriyyah highway.
2. Information acquired
 - A. Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim visited Al-Kuwait17 to 29 Nov 2002. He met with the Kuwaiti Amir, Crown Prince, Ministers, Ambassadors of Islamic countries and some Kuwaiti personnel. He gave political and religious lectures in various Kuwaiti councils.

1-5

Top secret



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- B. Iranian intelligence gave (Mobile) communication devices to their agents (collaborators) in Iraq. It covers an area of 500 km. This matter is still being investigated.
- C. The Iranian regime created a Headquarters for Badir Corps in Dahlaran to organize the infiltration operation of its members into Iraq through the areas (Khuisah Valley, Al-Za'faran, Al-Tayyib, and Al-Sharhany).
- D. Badir Corps forces continued border crossings in Majnun and Al-Huizah marsh (barrier A) sectors to deliver mail and supplies to their hideouts inside Iraq.
- E. Badir Corps redeployed its brigades according to the instruction of Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim, after his meeting with 'Ali Khamina'i and before he went to Kuwait. We have confirmed information that the Haydar Al-Karrar division is deployed in the area between Qasr Shirin and Mahran to train in (Khanaqin, Khan Lil border police station, Sayf Sa'id border police station, Shoshrin border police station, Al-Daraji border police station and Zayn Al-Qaws border police station)
- F. We received the following information from the Russian Military Attaché in Baghdad about the following:

2-5

Top secret



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First: Some serious disputes have erupted between the members of the so called Islamic Revolution High Supreme Council about collaborating and coordinating with the US Administration. Some Badr Corps officials demanded to stop all contacts with the American Administration because it has damaged their reputation and they called upon Iran to interfere to prevent these communications.

Comments

We obtained information that Abu-Mahdi Al-Muhandis, the Deputy Commander of the Badr Corps submitted his resignation, protesting against the negotiations between the American Administration and the High Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.

Second: Badr Corps Command held a meeting on 16 and 17 Nov 2002 in Kermanshah City in Iran to solve problems and persuade its opponents about the importance of coordinating with the American Administration. The Corps Deputy Commander (Abu-Hasan Al-'Amiry) mentioned that talks with the Americans were approved by ('Ali Khamina'i), and the official stand of the Supreme Council emphasized the opposition to any foreign interference and American occupation of Iraq and the assurance of the unity and safety of Iraq.

3-5

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3. Analysis

- a. Badr Corps re-directed Haydar Al-Karar Division towards the central sector as part of their preparation to send their forces into Iraq with the start of an American aggression on Iraq.
- b. Iran's traitors Badr strive to alienate the role of other opposition groups who oppose coordination with the US administration to gain favors from the US administration and support, and in anticipation of a bigger role in Iraq in the stage following the aggression on Iraq.
- c. The traitor Al-Hakim visits Kuwait every year during Ramadan. He gives religious and political sectarian speeches and lectures, and meets with Kuwaitis officials to plot with them against Iraq. He offers false information about Kuwaiti prisoners of war in Iraq to ensure Kuwaiti financial support.

4. Suggestions

- a. Increase close watch of the borders, increase surveillance and observation (detection) operations, and direct our forces on the eastern front (border) to organize random ambushes in the southern and central sectors to stop traitor infiltration attempts and prevent them from communicating with their hideouts (dens) in Iraq.
- b. Emphasize on the check and observation posts on the roads of the southern sector to be alert and to prevent saboteur's acts of sabotage (looting operations)

Top secret



Top secret

C. Our troops in the southern sector should regularly search the places where traitors could be located to prevent them from settling down.

Signature
Lieutenant General Staff
3 Jan 2002

Copy to:

- Revolutionary command member and Southern zone commander
- State Command Member and Republican Guard Supervisor
- Minister of Defense

Kindly review, with appreciation

5-5

Top secret

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

The Republican Guard Secretariat
The Supervisor Office



Date 8 Jan 2003

To: State Command Member and the Supervisor of the Republic Guard

Greetings,

Attached is General Military Intelligence Directorate letter, classified top secret, number 992, dated 7 Jan 2003. It includes information about Iranian traitor activities in the southern and middle sectors and information obtained about them in the month of Dec 2002.

Kindly review, with appreciation

Signature
Lieutenant General Staff
'Abd-al-Salam Yasin Mansur
The secretary
8 Jan 2003

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
General Military Intelligence Directorate



(Saddam Hussein Quotation)

Ref \ 7\ 35\ 7\ 85480
Date 4 Jan 2003

To: Presidency of the Republic, the Secretary
Subject: Iranian Traitor Activities

The following is a summary of Iranian traitor activities in the southern and central zone and information acquired about them during the period 1 through 31 Dec 2002

1. Sabotage: The traitors carried out six sabotage operations.
 - a) 3 looting operations took place. One targeted a bus for a government civil establishment at the crossroad of Al-Majar district, near Umm Al-Aranib village. Four of its passengers were wounded, all civilians. The other operations targeted civil Volkswagen vehicles and a pickup truck, traveling on Al-Qurnah and Al-Chibaiysh. A police patrol clashed with the saboteurs. The outcome of the encounter resulted in the death of Police Lieutenant Bashir Qazim Al-Maliki and one of the vehicles' drivers

Comments

The saboteurs opened fire on the vehicles to force them to stop.

Top secret

Top Secret

- b- Two encounters with the ambushes prepared by our troops in the sector of the 14th Infantry Division on the vanguard (A). The first encounter was with an ambush prepared by the 1st Regiment/18th Infantry Brigade in Abu-Khassaf area and the second encounter was with an ambush prepared by the 1st Regiment/426th Infantry Brigade in Al-Majari area. The traitors escaped.
- c- The traitors launched four Katyusha missiles on Mujahedin-e Khalq Camp of Jalawla'. Three exploded without causing casualties or financial losses.

2. Attained Information

- A- 'Abd-al-'Aziz Al-Hakim attended the traitors' conference that was held in London from 14 to 17 December 2002, as the representative of Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim Head of what is the so-called "Higher Council for the Islamic Revolution". That conference was sponsored by the British Government and the American Administration.
- B- During his visit to Kuwait, Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim agreed to send elements of Badr Corps there in order to guide the American forces when the aggression begins against Iraq (God forbid). "Article 2/A of our top secret correspondence number 85480, dated 4 December 2002."
- C- When they have the chance, the traitors intend to install a control post in the area located between Saddamiyyah Al-Qurnah Bridge and Muzah Al-Qadimah control.
- D- Iran agents hid a large boat among canes in Al-Huwayzah Marsh....

(2-4)

Top Secret

...at Al-Mafrakah area. The boat was burnt and its engine was brought by 4th Corps (Intelligence).

- E- There are discussions between the US and the so-called Higher Council to open an office for Iran agents in Washington (follow up). The source of this information is the Russian Military Attaché in Baghdad.
- F- The traitors still enter Iraqi territories via Al-Huwayzah Marsh in order to deliver money and instructions in addition to obtaining information on the activities of our military troops and security and party services.
- G- The elements of Badr Corps received the following instructions:
 - I. Signalmen should stay near radio equipment.
 - II. Taking advantage of incidents and following the instructions when they start their sabotage actions.
 - III. Coordinating with the agents who work inside Iraqi territories.

3. Conclusion

Through coordination with the Higher Council, the US seeks to exploit the military forces (so-called Badr Corps) to collect information and conduct sabotage actions when the aggression begins.

4. Suggestions

- a. Notify the Ministry of the Interior to concentrate police patrols on highways that connect the southern governorates at night in order to control stealing.

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Top Secret

- b. Continuing preparing non-scheduled ambushes and patrols by our troops that are deployed in the vanguard (A) and eastern borders to control infiltration.

Kindly review and order, with respect

(Signature)
Staff Lieutenant Colonel
General Military Intelligence Director
6 January 2003

Send a copy to\

- Member of the Revolutionary Command Council-Commander of the Southern Zone
- Member of State Command-Supervisor of Republican Guard
- Minister of Defense

Kindly review, with respect

(4-4)

Top Secret

Document Evaluation (A, B, C)

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4
Commander of Al-Fath Al-Mubin Operations, Republican Guard

(Signature)

10 January

(Signature)

10 January 2003

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Republican Guard Secretary
Supervisor's Office



Date: 7 January 2003

Mr. Member of State Command, Supervisor of Republican Guard

Attached is the top secret correspondence of the National Security Council, Secretary number 16, dated 5 January 2003 and a copy of the secret and personal correspondence of the General Security Directorate number 9096, dated 31 December 2002, which includes the latest information obtained by the above directorate regarding the intentions and plans of the traitors. That information was provided by a secret source (trust degree: good).

Kindly review and order, with respect

Staff Brigadier General
'Abd-al-Salam Yasin Mansur
Secretary
7 January 2003

*(Illegible) Commander of Al-Fath Al-Mubin Operations, Republican Guard, Baghdad
Commander, Al-Madinah Commander, Al-Nida' Commander, Commander of the Special
Republican Guard, Deputy and (Illegible) regarding Al-Radwaniyyah axis.
(Signature)*

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Iraq Republic
Presidency of the Republic
National Security Council Secretary Office



(Saddam Hussein Quotation)

Top Secret

Ref.: L.D.M/16
Date: 5 January 2003

To: Special Security Organization
Intelligence Service
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Subject: Information

We are attaching a copy of General Security Directorate correspondence number (MS5/Q15/9096), dated 31 December 2002
Kindly review the included information, with respect

(Signature)
Secretary of the National Security Council
4 January 2003

Send a copy to\

- Supervisor of Republican Guard
 - Ministry of Defense – Bureau
 - Ministry of the Interior – Minister’s Office
 - General Security Directorate, In reference to your abovementioned correspondence
- To be acknowledged...with respect

We attached a copy of the correspondence of the General Security Directorate. Kindly review the information

(1-1)
Top Secret

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Iraq Republic
Presidency of the Republic-Secretary
General Security Directorate



(Saddam Hussein Quotation)

Secret and Personal

Ref.: MS5/D15/9096
Date: 31 December 2002

To: National Security Council Secretary Office
Subject: Information

We would like to inform you of the latest information attained from a secret source regarding the intentions and plans of the traitors:-

On 12 December 2002, a meeting was held between Badr Corps affiliates who work inside Iraqi territories, Abu Hasan Al- 'Amiri Commander of Badr Corps and Abu Liqa' Al-Safi the Assistant of the Corps' Commander. The following were raised during the meeting:-

1. They studied and evaluated the Corps performance during 1991 Rebellion (Page of Treason and Treachery). They agreed on adopting the following to give success to their march towards Baghdad:-

- A- To establish meeting places in Al-Nahrawan area.
- B- To control Wasit Governorate by enveloping and attacking the Republican Guard troops and emergency regiments at Al-Sawadah area. The Corps troops should move from Badrah and Jasan areas in groups from certain meeting places towards al-Shihabi area in order to isolate Wasit Governorate from Baghdad after attacking Baghdad-Al-Kut Control.
- C- They studied moving towards Wasit Governorate then to Baghdad via Al-Nahrawan sector. They will proceed through Al-Ta'awuni highway parallel to Al-Jabab River towards Al-Sawadah area. Thier purpose from there is to conduct successful attacks against the Republican Guard troops in Wasit Governorate.
- D- The traitors also discussed the following during the meeting:
 - I. Collecting inclusive information on Iraqi officials (transportation, addresses, and work places).
 - II. Observing the activities of security services during a emergency plan in addition to the movements of Mujahedin-e Khalq.

- III. Conducting offensive attacks against the state's quarters during the emergency plan, noting that the alternate headquarters for those quarters should be specified.
- E- They discussed the possibility of advancing towards the North from Al-Sulaymaniyyah Governorate on the way to Kafri. They will be supported by Liwa' Al-Mustafa (TC: Al-Mustafa Brigade) and the North Axis. Abu 'Ali Al-Basri "Commander of the North Axis" will be in command.
- F- As for their plan in the Southern Zone, they will rush from Al-Ahwaz towards Al-Khafajiyah, Al-Hamidiyyah and Al-Mahmarah.
2. As for the areas around Baghdad, the traitors discussed the possibilities of establishing meeting places in Al-Mahmudiyyah District in addition to conducting reconnaissance operations on the highway which connects Abu-Ghurayb with Al-Radwaniyyah and Al-Yusifiiyyah. Moreover, they decided to identify the important sites along the highway in addition to the Baghdad - Abu-Ghurayb highway and the areas around it and how to avoid the areas where official controls are located. They also discussed the following:
- a. The road which connects Al-Suwayrah with Saddam (Jablah) Subdistrict – Airport and then goes towards Baghdad – Al-Dawrah.

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In addition to making sure that there are no military controls or check points on the road.

- b. The road that leads to Al-Nu'maniyyah via Al-Dijayli Road at Wasit Governorate and how to cross the Tigris River using Al-'Nu'maniyyah Bridge.
- 3- The traitors also discussed the duties of the elements related to (Al-Qararkah). Those elements will only be assigned to reconnaissance operations to collect information and the military work will be assigned to the Corps' elements.

Kindly review and we suggest circulating the above information to the security services to make use of it, with respect.

(Signature)
General Security Director
31 December 2002

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Republican Guard Secretary
Supervisor's Office



Date: 5 January 2003

Mr. Member of State Command, Supervisor of the Republican Guard

Attached is the top secret correspondence of the General Military Intelligence Directorate number 489, dated 4 January 2003, which includes information on the important activities of Iranian troops that are observed in front of operations sector from 1 to 31 December 2002.

Kindly review and order, with respect

Staff Brigadier General
'Abd-al-Salam Yasin Mansur
Secretary
5 January 2003

(Signature)
5 January 2002

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate

Republican Guard Secretariat
Supervisor's Bureau



Date: 5 Jan 2003

To: Republican Guard Supervisor and State Command Member

Greetings,

Attached is General Military Intelligence Directorate letter, classified top secret and confidential, number 120, and dated 4 Jan 2003, with a report about new arms deals made by Iran during the month of Dec 2002

Kindly review and give your order, regards

Signature
5 Jan

Signature
Staff Brigadier General
'Abd-al-Salam Yasin Mansur
The Secretary
5 Jan 2003

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate

Republic of Iraq
General Military Intelligence Directorate



(Saddam Hussein Quotation)

Reference No: M7/35/7/2/120
Date: 4 Feb 2003

Top secret

To: Presidency of the Republic, the Secretary
Subject: Iran's sources of arms (where are they getting their weapons from)

Reference to our letter, classified top secret and confidential, dated 22219, dated 5 Dec 2002, attached is a report about Iran's new arms deals during the month of Dec 2003.

Kindly review, regards

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a large, stylized 'S' or 'Q' shape followed by a horizontal line.

Signature
Staff Lieutenant Colonel
GMID Director
3 Dec 2002

Cc:

- State Command Member and
Republican Guard Supervisor
- Minister of Defense

Kindly review, regards

(1-1)

Top secret and confidential

Document's evaluation (A.B.C)

Document Title: Working Paper by the Iraqi Anti-Espionage Corps (various dates)
ID: ISGP-2003-00023756

Date: Various Unknown

Synopsis:

This document is a working draft of an Iraqi intelligence paper describing various Iraqi opposition groups, including the Badr Corps and the Dawah Party. The paper also provides biographical information about the group's leaders, including Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (Abu Mehdi al-Muhandess).

Key Themes:

Key words:

[Page 3:]

Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

[Page 4:]

**IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE
MERCIFUL**

**Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service
Anti-Espionage General Office**

Study

on the Disloyal Badr Corps

Working paper prepared by the Anti-Espionage General Office at the
Intelligence Service pertaining to the disloyal Badr Corps.

/signed/
Regards,
Jamal Al-Jannabi

[Page 5:]

((Top Secret))

**IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE
MERCIFUL**

((Don't trust those who deceive God because those who deceive God don't
trust but the losers))

God, the Almighty, is trustworthy

((Put your enemy before your eyes and precede him and don't leave him
behind your back))

The Comrade Leader

[Page 6:]

Introduction:

The disloyal Badr Corps is the product of the security services and the religious establishment in the evil Iran which wanted from this military force to be a disloyal tool during the glorious battle of Qadisiyat Saddam in order to stab Iraq, harm it and use it as a mean of controversy for the Iranian Organization of Mujahidi Khalq. After ending the military chapter of the immortal battle of Umm al Ma'arik, the Corps wanted to harm Iraq by resorting to all the hateful and evil enemies and many countries renewed their support and assistance to it, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United States since it supplied them with a larger capability for hurting our country in accordance with their plan hostile to Iraq. Everybody participated to help Iran. The participation of the disloyal Corps in the events of the Chapter of Treason and Betrayal and in the joint planning is just one of the phases of the agreement between all the parties to conspire against Iraq and what it stands for; being unique in its military organization and power compared to what is called the disloyal opposition and having a direct influence because of its available military capabilities and its geographic location along the borders with Iran.

[Page 7:]

Its beginning and formation

In 1985, the creation of the Corps began, composed of fugitives to Iran who belonged to the disloyal Al-Dawa party. The latter formed a regiment it called (Martyr Al-Sadr) Regiment. Al-Dawa party was the unique political gathering on the Iranian arena which possessed the capabilities to create an armed regiment. At the time the headquarters of the regiment was in Al-Ahwaz, in the camps of Ghayour Asla. Later on, another regiment was formed by (Al-Tawabeen [i.e. the repentants]) who were renegade prisoners to whom was given the name of Imam Al-Khomeini Regiment, led by the fugitive Abu Ali Al-Basri (it attacked our units in the battle of Qurrah Dagh [Margin reads: *To confirm it with a date*], in the Northern region and the traitors incurred huge losses at that time. He and whoever was left with him fled to the evil Iran). After him, the leadership of the regiment was assumed by the Iranian Zu Al-Qadr... who is presently the Commander of the Iranian Naval Force [Margin reads: *To make sure of it*]. Later on, both regiments merged and to them were added whoever fled to Iran, the renegade prisoners and the exiled. The new formation was given the name of (Badr Brigade 9)... It was given this name after the name of the great battle of Badr which was for us the first battle of the Muslims against the polytheists in which they won although they were a minority. It was in the month of Ramadan which is the (9th) of the lunar months. It was given this name for this reason. After the creation of this brigade, it was attached to the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard (Al-Sibat) and it was led by the Iranian officer named Abdel Rahman Naqdi (also known as Diya' Shams, he is presently the Director of the Police Intelligence). [Margin reads: *To make sure of it*] Later on, the Iranian Ismail Daka'iki assumed the command of the brigade. He was killed by our courageous army during the glorious battle of Qadisiyat Saddam. The brigade remained under Iranian command until the end of Qadisiyat.

Two months prior to the agreement of Iran on the Security Council Resolution No. 598 and the discontinuation [Margin reads: *discontinuation*, Arabic had a typing error] of the military operations in 1988 A.D., the fugitive criminal Mohamed Baqer Al-Hakeem (President of what is called the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) announced

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that the forces of his suspected council have become a brigade and not a division. He gave it the name of "Badr Brigade 9." It included (12,000) twelve thousand elements. When the war was over, a not so small number of its elements stopped working for it. Following the [Margin reads: *begin a new line*] reactions to the Day of the Call and the liberation of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, Iran represented by its intelligence services began paying attention to this Corps to recruit it in the chapter of subsequent aggressions carried out by the evil Iran within the US plan to attack Iraq. Indeed, this disloyal Corps and whoever was supervising it had an effective role in the subversive activities in most of the governorates of our country since the beginning of March 1991.

[Margin reads: *After the events,*] Iran entrusted the declared command of the Corps to the fugitive traitor Adnan Ibrahim Muhsin Al-Najjar, also known as Abu Ali Al-Basari, to give the impression that it was not interfering in the Iraqi opposition's affairs and to accentuate its international role. It was also an attempt on its behalf to ascertain its non-interference in the internal affairs of Iraq.

_____ . _____ . _____

(4)

[Page 9:]

Organization of the disloyal Badr Corps 9 (See Annex (A) -Organization of the Corps)

The Corps is composed of a headquarters and four infantry divisions going on foot and a number of support formations and units attached to the headquarters of the Corps. The headquarters is located in Karmanshah (Tanakah Kanch) as shown below:

1 - Headquarters of the Corps

- A- General Staff of the Movements to which are attached three divisions as follows (Training, Intelligence (Al-Ittila'at) and Operations) and to the Operations are attached all the divisions.
- B- General Staff of the Administration composed of the Department for the Affairs of Sacrificing Individuals, Department of Daily Rations, Supply and Transportation (Tadarukat) and an administrative unit.
- C- Security (Al-Hifadat)^(x) attached administratively to the headquarters of the Corps and technically to the Presidency of the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Iranian Army – Security Section.
- D- Welayat Al-Faqih Representation to which are attached two departments; the Department of Information (religious guidance) and the Department of Political Belief (political guidance).
- E- Accounting Division.
- F- Legal Section.
- G- Intelligence Department.
- H- Medical Treatment.
- I- Command of Wilayat Al-Faqih Camp.
- J- The Corps has a recruitment headquarters for the administration of the units in the Southern sector.

(5)

^(x) Iranian terminologies exchanged during the conversations among the Corps' members.

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2 - Composition of the Divisions (See Annex (B) – Organization of the Division)

- A- Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division
It is composed of six Special Regiments, a Defense and Duties Regiment and a Support Regiment. (Annex C – Organization of the Division Support Regiment) and as explained in Annex (1-B).
- B- Ansar Al-Hussein Division
It is composed of five Special Infantry Regiments, a Naval Regiment, a Support Regiment and a Defense and Duties Regiment. Annex (2-B) explains it.
- C- Haydar Al-Karrar Division
It is composed of six Special Regiments, a Support Regiment and a Defense and Duties Regiment. Annex (3-B) explains it. It is located in what is called Martyr Al-Sadr Regiment (Al-Kawthar) and its commander is the criminal Hasan Kazim Hasan Al-Arsahd (Abu Ahmed Al-Rashed).
- D- First Division (Merging of Al-Hamza and Imam Ali Divisions)
It is composed of six Special Regiments, a Support Regiment and a Defense and Duties Regiment. Annex (4-B) explains it. It is located in Sarbil Zihab sector and it is opened along the region of Khanekeen. Its commander is the criminal Mohamed Ali Hasan Abbass (Abu Ahmed Al-Rumaythi).

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3- Malek Al-Ashtar Brigade (Artillery Support Brigade) (See Annex (D))

It is composed of a headquarters and three battalions as shown hereafter:

- A- Al-Muntazer Battalion composed of three batteries equipped with 130, 122 and 152 millimeter field cannons.
- B- Adawat Sayyed Al-Shuhada' Battalion composed of three batteries equipped with 130 millimeter mortar cannons, 107 and 122 millimeter tubular launchers.
- C- Al-Mikdad Battalion composed of three batteries equipped with 105, 130 and 122 millimeter cannons.

4- Al-Hasan Tank Battalion Annex (E)

It is composed of a headquarters and three armored companies as shown hereafter:

- A- First Company – Composed of four troop carrier and wheeled armored platoons.
- B- Second Company – Composed of four tank platoons.
- C- Third Company – Composed of four armored and scattered combat vehicle platoons.

5- Anti-Armor Defense Regiment Annex (F)

It is composed of a headquarters and three companies equipped with anti-tank weapons in addition to a Support Company equipped with a 60 millimeter mortar cannon and 145 millimeter quadruple machine guns and s.b.g./9 cannons.

[Page 12:]

6- Al-Mehdi Anti-Air Defense Battalion Annex (G)

It is composed of a headquarters and three batteries equipped with anti-aircraft cannons and Strella Missile Bases.

7- Defense and Duties Regiment Annex (H)

It is composed of a headquarters and four patrol companies in addition to the headquarters company.

8- Al-Mustafa Brigade Annex (I)

The location of the brigade is in Qasr Shereen and it is composed of three regiments and the headquarters of the brigade. They are:

- A- First Regiment located in the Camp of Meedan in the governorate of Al-Sulaymaniyah. Its commander is Hasan Salman (Abu Ali). It includes (100) renegades, is divided in three companies and comprises an intelligence (Ittila'at) group.
- B- Second Regiment located in Banjuween Camp in the governorate of Al-Sulaymaniyah. Its commander is Kareem Kamel (Abu Raja'), in the vicinity of Nal Barizah village and it includes approximately (100) renegades.
- C- Support Regiment located in Banjuween Camp in the governorate of Al-Sulaymaniyah. Its commander is Jamal Abdel Saheb (Abu Ammar) and it includes approximately (100) renegades.
- D- A post for the brigade of two offices in the city of Al-Sulaymaniyah and the district of Halbaja which is used to lodge their agents to go to the inside of the country for their subversive operations and come back.

[Page 13:]

Locations where the Headquarters and Formations of the Disloyal Badr Corps are opened

Below are the details on where the disloyal Badr Corps locations are opened:

- 1- Corps headquarters – Welayat Al-Faqih Camp in Bakhtaran – Tanakah Kanch.
- 2- Recruitment Center – Ghayour Asli Camp in Al-Ahwaz.
- 3- Haydar Al-Karrar Division – It is located in Abu Karrar Station in Al-Huwaiza with all its units.
- 4- First Division (Product of the merging of Imam Ali Division with Al-Hamza Division).
This Division was in Sankar Camp and later on was moved to Sarbil Zahab due to the take over of the camp by the Guard. It carried out joint military maneuvers with Iranian units in the middle sector at the beginning of 2001.
- 5- Ansar Al-Hussein Division
It is located in Ghayour Asli Camp in Al-Ahwaz with the exception of the Naval Regiment in Hor Al-Huwaiza in addition to some temporary locations in the Western Ahwar which are used most of the time to collect information and to explore the targets in the two axes of Baghdad and the Southern region.
- 6- Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division
It is located in Dayzafoul Camp (on Dayzafoul – Shusheshter Road in the direction of Shusheshter at a distance of 15 kilometers).
- 7- Al-Hussein Tank Battalion
Hajj Foujan Camp in Al-Ahwaz – Sifhat Al-Shamariya.

[Page 14:]

- 8- Malek Al-Ashtar Brigade
Located in Welayat Al-Faqih Camp in Bakhtaran, with the exception of Al-Mikdad Battalion which is in Al-Shahid Madani Camp in Dayzafoul.
- 9- Anti-Armor Regiment and Defense and Duties Regiment of the Corps.
Located in Welayat Al-Faqih Camp in Bakhtaran.
- 10- Al-Mehdi Anti-Air Defense Battalion
Distributed on all the camps occupied by the Corps and prepared to defend the Corps from an air attack.
- 11- Al-Mustafa Brigade
Its headquarters is located in Qasr Shereen and its regiments are in the two camps of Banjuween and Meedan.

[Page 15:]

System for the Administrative Division of the Corps:

The agents were distributed in the Corps based on the date of their retrogression and work with the Corps in the following manner:

- 1- The old ones who escaped to Iran before the events of 1991 A.D. and considered the best and capable of leading. They are divided in two groups:

Margin A- Official or Honorary Guard.

reads:/ B- The Fighter who gets his salary from Al-Sibat.

To (Therefore, those referred to are divided in two groups. The first explain (group was entered in the register of the Guard and the second

and (one was not entered and their sequence goes from (1 to

clarify (20,000).

- 2- Sessions of (Al-Ahrar – Al-Tawabeen). Those are the renegade prisoners. They are divided into sessions and there are (19) sessions only. They are considered to be the category supporting the command of the criminal Mohamed Baqer Al-Hakeem and their overwhelming majority imitates Al-Khomeini. Their sequence number begins from (20,000 to 30,000).

- 3- The volunteers from the cities. They are the exiled Iraqis and they are listed among the category of the old.

- 4- The insurgents (resistance). They are the criminals who participated in the events of the Chapter of Treason and Betrayal. They presently form two third of the Corps and their sequence numbers are divided as follows:

A- From (60,000 to 70,000) volunteers in the Southern axis.

B- From (90,000 to 95,000) volunteers in the Western axis.

C- From (40,000 to 60,000) military volunteers, inside Iran who escaped from their military units during the Chapter of Treason and Betrayal.

D- From (70,000 to 90,000) the so-called insurgents and city volunteers.

/Margin reads:/

To take into account

the sequence of the numbers

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Military operations carried out by the disloyal Badr Corps 9 against Iraq

- 1- 1986 A.D., Al-Ahwar operations, evidence of treason.
- 2- 1986 A.D., Hajj Omran operations, evidence of treason and participation with the Iranian army in the battle.
- 3- 1987 A.D., East Basrah operations, evidence of treason.
- 4- 1988 A.D., Halabja operations, participation in the battle and occupation of the city of Halabja, detention of Iraqi prisoners until they were handed over to the Iranian forces.
- 5- 1988 A.D., operations of Darbandakhan lake – subversive operation aiming at Darbandakhan dam.
- 6- 1988 A.D., the Iranian army assisted in obstructing the operations of Mujahidee Khalq.
- 7- 1991 A.D., it contributed effectively in the Chapter of Treason and Betrayal.
- 8- 1994 and 1998, targeting the units controlling the borders in the sector of Misan.
- 9- 1999 A.D., participation in the subversive operations in the governorate of Basrah.
- 10- Missile launching operations on Baghdad and the governorates and targeting of the presidential palaces, the security offices and important government offices.
- 11- A booby-trapped vehicle was seized in the sector of Kut to target the lines of Mujahidee Khalq.
- 12- 2000 A.D. a booby-trapped vehicle was seized to target Babil Al-Gharra' newspaper.

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Iranian plan to embrace the Corps (Indirect) Iranian Administration of the disloyal Corps

- 1- To attach the Corps to the highest authority in the military decision making which is the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and to directly supervise it, supply it with camps on the Iraqi borders, divide its operations into axes according to Karar Kah map in order to coordinate and avoid breaking off the relations. Since its formation in the year 2000, the Iranian intelligence introduced selected groups of the Corps elements to sessions specialized in blasting, surveillance, collection of information, opening of locks, forging of documents and targeting of prominent figures. The training operations are still going on and the trainees were distributed on the axes.
- 2- The Corps relies directly on Iran to get training, weapons, material support and it participates with the Iranian army in joint sessions on the arts of combat. It also participated with the Iranian army in the maneuvers which occurred in 2001 in the sector of Sarbil Zihab close to the Iraq borders.
- 3- To rely on some officers of the Corps to create the academic schools specialized in the military sciences to take advantage of the experience of the Iraqi army in the planning and recruitment. A staff school was created belonging to the disloyal Corps located in Teheran under the supervision of the renegade Ali Fekri.

Conflicts inside the Corps:

- 1- Conflict between the Old and the (Tawabeen).
As mentioned at the beginning of the study, the first cell of the disloyal Corps was constituted of elements belonging to the disloyal Al-Dawa party and it was called (Martyr Al-Sadr) Regiment and the Tawabeen were called the (Old) (14).

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The second regiment was called the Khomeiny Regiment. After merging them, the command was given to the Old for several reasons:

- A- They claimed to have the priority in Islam on the Tawabeen.
- B- They were considered a partisan organization which carried out the goals of (Al-Dawa) party.
- C- Because the Tawabeen made a mistake which was to fight of the Muslims of Iran.

Due to the difference in the allegiance of both categories; the Old were loyal to the Guard and in secret they were loyal to Al-Dawa Party and the Tawabeen were loyal to the Council and the Command of Al-Hakeem, many conflicts arose between them. The worst was the revolution of the Tawabeen in which they attacked the command of the Corps and occupied it. Abu Ali Al-Basari fled in his car. The following day, the Guard interfered and the situation was settled to the advantage of the Old. Later on, a large group of Tawabeen was dismissed from the Corps. The Old still believe that the Tawabeen are not competent to command and their repentance is not accepted. As to the Tawabeen, they accuse the Old of being against the rule and of taking advantage of the animosity the Old have towards Mohamed Baqer Al-Hakeem who was appointed by an order coming from Khomeiny. He is the Vice-President of (Saheb Al-Zaman) and disobeying him is considered a disobedience to the order of the (custodian of Muslims).

- 2- Conflict between the (Insurgents) on one hand and the (Old and Tawabeen) on the other hand.

At the end of the glorious battle of Qadisiyat Saddam, the Iranian regime tried to coordinate with the Syrian regime in power at the time by transferring the activity of what was called the opposition, including the Corps, to Syria. Indeed, the agent Al-Hakeem went with a group of renegade officers to explore one of the camps to move in. The events of 1991 A.D., the acceleration of events and the desire of Iran to take advantage of them prevented that. The opposition inside Iran remained and here begins the struggle between the two abovementioned groups. The demagogues claimed that they were the ones who restored the opposition after

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it was subjected to disappear and others claim that they were the ones who created it. The other group is the stronger for being supported by the Guard. Besides, the majority of the demagogues support Al-Khawa'i and in return the Tawabeen and Al-Dawa don't support him and keep away from him in their statements. That's what upset them and led to the separation of authority which developed sometimes into a clash.

- 3- Conflict among the command of the Corps
There are axes in the command of the Corps. The first one is Abu Ali Al-Basari, a civilian, (Al-Dawa Party), supported by the Guard in the command of the Corps. The second one is under the command of the renegade Abu Lika' Al-Safi (Margin reads: *We explain his military formation*). He is a supporter of Al-Hakeem command. He adopted the idea that the Corps command be for the officers and the military commander because the Corps is an army and it should be commanded by militaries. He is supported by the officers and the Tawabeen. As a result of that, the Southern axis has been separated from the headquarters of the Corps and there has been an attempt to create a Corps under the command of Abu Lika' in the South. The Guard interfered immediately after and the conflict was settled in 1993 A.D. by making Abu Ali Al-Basari commander of the Corps and Abu Lika' his assistant and his role was curtailed. After Al-Hakeem interfered, he was appointed as (General Commander) of the Iraqi Armed Forces whether in the Corps or outside it which means the forces working with Karar Kah.

Figures of the Corps

- 1- Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess (Commander of the Corps)
A- Graduate from the School of Engineering / Basrah University, resident of Al-Ma'akal, his parents reside in Basrah, married to an exiled Iranian. He fled to Iran

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for his connection with the disloyal Al-Dawa party. He resides in Teheran, Al-Fardous Street.

- B- He was living in Kuwait and in 1984 A.D., he blasted the US embassy in Kuwait. He was also accused of blasting oil wells. He fled immediately after to Syria, then to Iran. He was commanded at the time by the Khomeiny Guard.
 - C- In 1984, he volunteered in the disloyal Corps and was appointed Assistant of the Political Belief. Presently, he got promoted to the position of Commander of the Corps for his special connection with the Khomeiny Guard and the agent Al-Hakeem.
 - D- He is a man calm, ambitious who looks at the opposition command. He doesn't like to get public in conflict with anyone. He is intelligent, sophisticated, humble and he doesn't have military information.
 - E- His particulars.. Slim, tall, grey hair and moustache, 45 to 50 years old, wears medical glasses, always smiling. He uses two cars. A Mitsubishi Land Cruiser and a Crusade Salon, new model.
- 2- Hadi Farhan (Abu Hasan Al-Farahi)
- A- He was an employee of the Supreme Council until 1986 in his capacity of Official in charge of the Investigations.
 - B- In 1988 A.D., he was selected as Assistant to the Khomeiny Forces (Forces of the disloyal Corps).
 - C- He works presently as an official of the General Intelligence Service (Al-Ittila'at) at the headquarters of the Corps and President of the Corps Administrative Panel.

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- D- Resident of Al-Khaless district, graduate from Baghdad University, School of Administration and Economy, born in 1956 A.D., short, tanned complexion, loud voice, uneducated, coward, married to an exiled Kurdish/Iranian from the residents of A'aylam, resides in Karmanshah/Ballura – Tak Bustan – Shahrak Muften / Residential complex of the officials.
 - E- He uses a Nissan car, 1998 car, his driver is an exiled by the name of Abu Qaiss.
 - F- He is from (Hizballah) group to which he is affiliated for interest. He participated in the demagogic events in the sector of Khanekeen. One of the operations he carried out was to enter Kasba Kafawi, burn the Post Office, destroy the station of electric power in addition to intercepting the military units in the sector of Sankawa. At the time, he was ordered to escape and he left the subversive groups which were with him.
- 3- Adnan Ibrahim Muhsin Al-Najjar (Abu Ali Al-Basari)
- A- He occupies presently the position of Assistant Commander of the Cops and Official in charge of the Western axis (to explain). He occupied previously the position of Commander of the disloyal Corps.
 - B- Resident of Basrah city – Shatt Al-Arab – Al-Tanuma district. Graduate from the School of Arts – English Language Section.
 - C- He fled to Iran in 1980 A.D. after disclosing his ties with the disloyal Al-Dawa Party and being one of its cadres.
 - D- He is 50-55 years old. His particulars... Short, tanned complexion, thin hair, wears glasses from time to time.

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- E- Married to an Iraqi, has grown-up children, resides in Karmanshah – Dur Al-Sibah. He uses a grey/black Land Cruiser car bearing a Karmanshah number.
- 4- Nouri Ja'afar Muhsin Faraj Al-Safi (Abu Lika')
 - A- He is presently in charge of the Corps intelligence (Ittila'at) (handwriting reads: before his escape in 1980) and supervises the middle axis, having the rank of First Lieutenant of the Intelligence Section.
 - B- Born in 1955 A.D. in Baghdad, graduated from the First Military Academy. He previously resided in the governorate of Kut – Al-Hay district / Al-Mua'alemeen quarter.
 - C- On 11/8/1980, he escaped to the Iranian enemy side when his unit was in the sector of Obadan and he belonged to the unit of Division 9 / Brigade 33, Intelligence Section.
 - D- All his family is affiliated with the disloyal Al-Dawa party, even his sisters.
 - E- He is married to an Iraqi, resides in Al-Shush and has another residence in Dur Al-Sibah.
 - F- One of the very trusted elements of Al-Hakeem criminal. His particulars... Tall, big, with white hair, having a beard and moustache. Generally, he wears a military uniform and for the occasions he is in civilian clothing. He uses a ~~1990~~ Mitsubishi and a grey Patrol.
- 5- Hasan Kazim Hasan Al-Rashed (Abu Ahmed Al-Rashed)
 - A- Born in 1963 A.D. in Basrah. He resides presently in Iran/Al-Ahwaz, married with 4 children.
 - B- He escaped during the 1991 events. He is tall with a black beard and moustache, white complexion face and medium structure.

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- C- He previously entered an Iranian intelligence session in Kum. He uses a Land Cruiser Toyota.
- D- He participated in the subversive events of the Chapter of Treason and Betrayal. Later on, he escaped to Iran and got affiliated with the disloyal Badr Corps. He is presently Commander of Haydar Al-Karrar Division and has a direct connection with Karar Kah Kuds (Ali Khamansi).
- E- The subversive operations he carried out:
 - First: Assassination of Comrade Settar Mohamed Lazem in the district of Karnah after placing a mine in front of his house.
 - Second: Attack on Mujahidee Khalq in Basrah.
 - Third: Placement of a booby-trapped poster in the district of Karnah which resulted in the martyrdom of four partisan comrades.
 - Fourth: Attack on the Karnah Intelligence Center of and the party division with Katyoucha missiles.
 - Fifth: Attack on the party division in Al-Shursh region.
- 6- Mohamed Ne'emeh Hasan (Abu Zul Fiqar)
 - A- A renegade prisoner, First Lieutenant, Intelligence Section, /handwriting reads: before his escape/ he belonged to Brigade 33, Intelligence Section.
 - B- Married with two wives. One is Iraqi, residing in Urdakah Mathari and the other one is Iranian, residing in Shahraq Khomeini. He had the intention of moving to the village of Shamiran on Shusheshter - Dayzafoul Road.
 - C- He was the commander of Haydar Al-Karrar Division. He is presently the Commander of Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division operating in the Southern axis.

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- D- His particulars: Tall, full, with a belly, beard and moustache. He wears black medical glasses. His face is red with a long nose.
 - E- He has a brother named Abu Dua'a (Moussa), graduate from the School of Agriculture and Forestry / Al-Karma. He escaped in 1996 A.D. to Iran, married, residing in Al-Khaffajiya.
- 7- Hamza Qassim Sabet Al-Darraji (Abu Haytham Al-Saddaki)
- A- Born in 1959, A.D. A fugitive Deputy Officer, married to an Iranian, with three children, residing in Karmanshah / residential building for the Corps officials. He was previously a resident of Misan. Later on, he moved with his family to the city of Baghdad – Saddam city.
 - B- he escaped in 1989 A.D. to Iran and joined the organization of the disloyal Al-Dawa party in 1981 A.D. He created the first platoon of the disloyal Badr Corps which he named Moussa Kazim Platoon (For the Mujahideen).
 - C- He occupied several positions in the disloyal Corps including the position of Commander of Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division and official in charge of the Corps operations. He is presently in charge of the Baghdad axis and he is in A'aylam.
 - D- One of the hostile elements and a protégé of the Iranian Intelligence inside the Corps. In coordination with them, he collects the information with Karar Kah Zafr connected with Ali Khamansi. He was brought to find elements and move inside the city of Baghdad with restrictions.
- | | |
|---|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| X | E- It was reported that he collects information on the members of the command and their families including Mr. Qusay Saddam Hussein to target them. |
|---|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

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8- Ali Fekri Hasan Abdel Kareem Al-Najjar

- A- Born in 1949 A.D. in Basrah, resides with his parents in Baghdad – Al-A'azamiyah – Balal Al-Habashi Street – In front of the Intermediary School of A'aesah For Girl – House No. 1/59.
- B- On 6/5/1982, he was imprisoned by the Iranian enemy when he was a Major, Commander of the Second Infantry Regiment/48. He remained in Al-Ahwaz Camp for prisoners for a short while. This camp was called (School of Martyr Jameeran). He joined the renegade agents the same year and he is from the old sessions of renegades. The first mission he did was the investigation of the resisting prisoners in the same camp.
- C- He used to be released from time to time from the camp and for limited period of time by the Intelligence of the Khomeini Guard, along with a number of other prisoners, to present military information on the Iraqi regions on the border line of the Iranian military units.
- D- He has an Iraqi wife living in Iraq and she has from him Ammar and Ihsan. He has a brother called Kareem (he resembles his renegade brother a great deal) and works at the real estate bank.
- E- In 1991, and in August of that year, he asked his parents to come and meet with him in the Northern region but they refused meeting with him.
- F- He has a wife in Iran belonging to the Isfahan community. She resides in Dawlat Abad in the vicinity of Teheran and he has from her (Kareem, Melkiya and Abdelazim). It was reported that he has

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that he has a second residence, a kind of villa, in Bazdaran.

- G- He is Sunnite. The Iranian asked him to change his rite but he refused. That's the main reason for not getting appointed to a commanding position in the disloyal Corps, knowing that he is one of the most educated renegade officers and reads daily for long hours.
- H- He held the following criminal positions in the Corps:
 - First: Teacher at the Corps Staff School.
 - Second: Commander of the (Martyr Daka'iki) School which is specialized in training the elements of the Corps.
 - Third: Official in charge of the Corps military unit for a short period of time.
 - Fourth: Commander of one of the Corps' brigades.
- I- In 1986 A.D., the said person was replaced in the position of official in charge of the military unit by an individual called Abu Ali Al-Mawla (a resident of Mosul and a Shiite; a turbaned religious man) under the instructions of the criminal Al-Hakeem which deepened the disagreements he had with the turbaned religious men connected with Al-Hakeem to the point of an armed fight in which the Guards interfered. He was imprisoned for six months. His disagreements with the Corps' officials continued until recently. The information indicated that he has a large support from the Corps' officers.
- J- The said person is presently in charge of the Corps Training Staff Panel in addition to the fact that Al-Hakeem relied on him and made him his military consultant. He accompanied him to the Gulf countries and Syria.

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9- Tahseen Abd Matar Hussein Kulaib Al-E'ezzawi

- A- Born in Baghdad in 1961 A.D., married to an Iranian from whom he has a daughter. He was imprisoned by the Iranian enemy in the sector of Jannanah in 1982 A.D. during the glorious battle of Qadisiyat Saddam in which he was First Lieutenant. He was a Ba'ath member with the rank of supporter.
- B- His father and brothers reside in Baghdad – New Baghdad – Al-Mua'alemeen quarter – House No. 6559/3.
- C- He joined the disloyal Badr Corps and held several positions including:
 - First: Committee member
 - Second: Platoon Commander in Bin A'akil Regiment / Hamza Brigade and Company Commander in the same brigade.
 - Third: He entered the school's staff session of the late Iranian Ismail Daka'iki, founder of the disloyal Badr Corps.
 - Fourth: Official in charge of the Hamza Division's movements.
 - Fifth: He occupies the position of Commander of Ansar Al-Hussein Division belonging to the disloyal Corps.
- D- His father was an employee at the Presidency Office and retired on pension. He was approached according to a plan to take advantage of him with regard to his son and to specify the future practical course to pursue with him. The matter is still followed-up.

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Factors of weakness reported to us after conducting a follow-up

- 1- The Corps is composed of three competing ideological trends consisting first of the Islamic Labor Organization. It plays a minor role which is almost inexistent. The second trend is the so-called Hizballah which gets its power from Al-Hakeem and presently considered the most important faction inside the Corps. Then, there is the disloyal Al-Dawa party which gets its power from the Guard. Because of its supportive attitude towards the Guard's directions, it took hold of the important positions inside the Corps. The disloyal Al-Dawa party considers itself entitled to the command and considers the take over by Al-Hakeem of the command of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution and therefore, the Command of the Corps, a fraud since they were the ones who brought him from Syria.
- 2- There is a continuous rivalry between the supporters of Al-Sadr and Al-Khaw'i on one hand and most of them are fugitives after the Chapter of Treason and Betrayal and the supporters of Al-Hakeem on the other hand. This rivalry reached the degree of clashes with machine guns between the supporters of both trends, since the followers of Al-Hakeem pledge allegiance to Al-Faqih (Ali Khamansi). As to the followers of Al-Sadr, they ask for an Iraqi rule and consider Al-Sadr more entitled to the command because he is more knowledgeable and gives better advisory opinions during Friday prayer.
- 3- The presence of Ja'afar Al-Sadr on the Iranian political arena made him a competitor to Al-Hakeem known for his connections with the Iranian intelligence. He claimed to be more entitled to the command by the fact that his father was late Al-Sadr who was executed by the Iraqi government. But the Iranian intelligence finds in him a danger to its politics for not supporting the reign of Al-Faqih. This matter had an impact on the Corps and he finally decided to go to Syria and to reside there.

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- But the Iranian intelligence prevented him from doing so. He presently asks that the position for the command of the Council be filled by election and opened to all those present in Iran.
- 4- All the renegade prisoners try to leave Iran. Some of them wanted to work with the Corps in order to return home. We learned that in 2000 A.D. the Red Cross represented by its member for international relief (Emma Nichols – Member of the British House of Commons) visited the renegade prisoners and distributed survey forms to know their opinions on whether they want to return to Iraq or stay in Iran or travel to a third country. All of them wanted to leave Iran with the exception of the disloyal commands.
 - 5-+ All the fugitives during the battles of Al-Qadisiyat and Umm al Ma'arik were between the ages of 18 and 20 years old. Now, they are married to Iranians and they are facing three problems which are the military service, working with the enemy and their Iranian wives.
 - 6-+ /Margin reads: *Move it under Strength*/ Most of the renegade officers have been presently granted positions inside the Corps and they have properties, real estates and families. They basically involved themselves in material interests and considered their work with the Corps as secondary for them.
 - 7- They are poorly convinced of the nature of their work and some of the renegade prisoners fled from Iran in the direction of a number of foreign countries, including Australia because they felt frustrated, they discovered the falsity of their commanders' claims and their salaries were low compared to the high cost of living in Iran.

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- 8- Increase of mental illnesses. The majority of the Corps' agents are elderly, have families in Iraq and think to go back there. Iran buys their services and facilitates their travel outside Iran.
- 9- To limit the place of residence of the Corps' elements and to forbid them from moving without permission. Besides, Iran doesn't allow the children of those renegades and agents to attend the Iranian schools without special permissions because most of the agents and renegades are of a limited educational background and teaching their children will create a class of educated people which in the future will be a problem for them and will make the work of the Iraqi intelligence easy.

Reported elements of strength:

- 1- Military support from the Command of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
- 2- Most of the Corps' elements are fugitive soldiers and renegade prisoners. They are well trained on weapons. They are exiled and followed by Al-Dawa party. They are elements who hate the command in addition to the fact that they fled during the Chapter of Treason and Betrayal.
- 3- Weakness of the national guided media. The instructions pertaining to the prisoners and the explanation of the content of the decisions taken by the command don't reach these renegades and at the same time there is a counter media from the Iranian regime.

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- 4- Recruitment of the renegades and agents members of the Corps under several designations to carry out the work missions of the Iranian intelligence inside Iraq and among its targets are the locations of the Iranian organization of Mujahidi Khalq in Iraq, the collection of information about the military sectors, the technological advancement in the field of armament and the targeting of officials.
- 5- Members of the Corps were pushed to the inside and were entrusted with subversive operations to give them a role and to use them as a card in every operation of rapprochement between Iraq and Iran so they would be the peers of the Iranian organization of Mujahidi Khalq.
- 6- After the creation of what is called the United Iraqi National Conference and with the blessing of the United States and the support of the region countries and Iran, the latter emphasized the role of the Corps, claimed that it was the unique military force in the ranks of what is called the opposition and made it present in the vicinity of the Southern and Northern sectors.
- 7- The Corps cannot be considered a capable military force because as admitted by the group in charge of its supervision, it is incapable of resisting the Iraqi army, when we come to compare their armament and training. But this weak Corps could be a source of threats to the security of Iraq should the imperialist forces use it. These forces are represented by the US, especially that the criminal Al-Hakeem has meetings with the rulers of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait regarding the improvement of the Corps and the support of its role by resorting to the international conspiracy against Iraq.

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Remedies:

Through organized and accurate intelligence work on the disloyal Badr Corp done last year in accordance with a plan, we obtained categorized information in addition to the withdrawal of a number of renegades and the disruption and neutralization of the agents' plans. It was an excellent and precise work done pursuant to the following directions:

- 1- To work on modernizing the database of the Corps' formations, its command and influential elements, locations, alternative locations, amendments and changes entered on it.
- 2- To try to know the conspiratorial plans the Corps has against Iraq, the Corps' extensions in Iran and inside Iraq, its subversive intentions and the covers its elements use inside the country or its infiltration in depth in Iran.
- 3- To try to elect qualitative command members having an effect on the Corps' decision making and to move in their direction to recruit them or neutralize them or burn them when they don't agree on that.
- 4- To create an influential in depth group to be used as front probes and early warnings. Its effectiveness was proved in notifying us about some of the Corps' plans and their orientation and led to the elimination of some of the subversive performances directed against Iraq. /Handwriting reads: To target some of its codes./
- 5- To push the Corps in a direction to disrupt its movements and activities through

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- skillful misguidance and concealment done with accuracy to insure the performance of fictitious and fallacious operations.
- 6- To work on checking and verifying the renegade prisoners coming back to Iraq. To take advantage of the information they possess and to use them in the opposite direction by sending these prisoners back.
 - 7- To work on penetrating the Corps' computers and medical treatment division to use the information obtained for the benefit of our intelligence work.
 - 8- To maintain our penetration of the Corps by recruiting qualitative sources selected from its influential commanders to insure that the decision making sources are reached in a time record. To widen this process so it allows the control of the Corps' locations.
 - 9- To identify the officers working for Iran in general and for the Corps specifically. To limit their transfer unless there is an approval from the competent office. To differentiate them from their peers by rewarding them for their additional work efforts and to fill the vacant positions in order to monitor the activity of this faction.
 - 10- To continue working on the commands inside the Corps. To limit the scope of their connection inside Iraq and to take action with them in accordance with three lines. The first line is to be approached so it would work with us. To let the second line work in the Corps and leave Iran. To target the third line.
 - 11- To work on the axes existing in the Corps and hostile to Al-Hakeem by spreading division among them to increase their splitting. To support

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- the viewpoints hostile to Al-Hakeem and to work on dismantling the Corps by guiding our sources in this direction.
- 12- To study /Added by hand: *the expansion of the role of the national media by conveying the instructions of the command and the decisions issued/* on how to transfer the information to the Corps' elements by video or audio media or by resorting to friendly media reaching Iran. To create a steady program on the Iraqi satellite to be broadcasted weekly in which there are interviews with the families which took advantage of the pardon decision, provided that the interviews be conducted in their work places or homes.
- 13- /Handwriting in the margin reads: B/ To charge our stations abroad to study the possibility of conveying inside the Corps the decisions pertaining to the prisoners.
- 14- /Handwriting in the margin reads: C/ To allow the wives of the renegade prisoners to travel legally to Iran to explain to us the condition of their husbands after their return to Iraq, on the condition of meeting with this category and recruiting it.
- 15- To issue a pardon decision for the fugitives and to oblige the tribal sheikhs to move against their fugitive relatives, especially in the border regions.
- 16- To create a guided radio in the sector of the border line where the Corps' camps are present to disclose the bluffing methods used by the Corps' command, in addition to using the special cases we receive about the Corps from our sources in order to weaken the persons involved in them and gradually degrade them.

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- 17- To /Handwriting reads: *continuously*/ take action with respect to the relatives of those working in the Corps and to be in touch with them by phone or directly in order to recruit them or neutralize them or keep them away from any act against Iraq. In case they approve to work with us, we keep them inside the Corps to watch the intentions the agents have and their moves against Iraq.
- 18- To target the locations of departure of the agents on the borders which are equivalent to a point of entrance and exit for them.

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Full Translation

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Document Title: Iraqi Intelligence Reports (March 2003)

ID: ISGP-2003-00027262

Date: March 2003

Synopsis:

This document includes numerous Iraqi intelligence reports from the early period after the coalition invasion of Iraq. Much of the document describes the location of coalition forces, but it also includes discussion of Iraqi militia groups fighting against regime forces.

Key Themes:

Key words:

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In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Summary report of Department 27 for 2 April 2003

1.
 - a. At 0800 on 2 April, the enemy carried out a military airborne drop near observation post (800), Amiriyah Al-Fallujah. On 1 April about 100 tanks were seen near the same observation post.
 - b. At 1840 on 1 April, an airborne drop took place about 15 Kilometers from east Barwanah, Haditah.
 - c. At 6:50 on April, the enemy conducted an airborne drop of tanks in the city of Al-Nu'maniyah
2. Large reinforcements on a convoy in Al-Hay, Kut supported by around 15 to 20 helicopters. There are also reinforcements on the convoy that passed Al-Nu'maniyah going towards Al-Aziziyah road.

Stations of Wasit

3. Information from the air force security based on letter from Al-Qadisiyyah base showed that the enemy is currently in H 1 airport in 10 to 12 tanks supported by 2 helicopters. The enemy attacked the force guarding Al-Qadisiyyah dam and was able to take it over with a small force. A force from the Party and Ghazah Brigade are heading towards it.
4. At 1050 an enemy convoy is moving towards Al-Zubaydiyah from Al-Nu'maniyah. The enemy convoy is currently about 15 Kilometers north of Al-Nu'maniyah across from [illegible] going towards Al-Zubaydiyah and Sawirah to Wasit. At 1100, the enemy has advanced with [illegible] force towards Kut and the fighting is still ongoing.
5. The information indicates that the enemy has crosses the Euphrates from Al-Hay region with a force of [illegible], trucks, and administrative services going towards [illegible]. It is likely that the enemy's intention is to take over Abu-Ubaydah airbase, control the traffic to Kut city, and develop the axis towards Al-Husayniyah, Al-Nu'maniyah thus cutting off Baghdad-Kut road.
6. The enemy has taken control of Al-Hay District by taking the main road leading to it using tanks and personal carrier vehicles. The enemy is currently providing infantry reinforcement.

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7. From directorate headquarter, 25 tanks are moving from Al-Hay towards Kut supported by 5 Apache helicopters.
8. From the directorate headquarter, the enemy conducted airborne drops near the following areas:
 - a. Establishment 92 area, Thermal Energy Bridge, and Jarf al-Sakh with 2 to 4 carrier for each canon.
 - b. Al-Hasaniyah, north east of Kerbala'. Our forces are currently coming to contact with it.
9. Babil Section: Quiet. No enemy forces there all the way to [illegible]
10. Kerbala' Section: There are enemy armored units on the crossroad of Al-Hindiyah, Al-Hasaniyah, and Kerbala and the crossroad of Awan, Al-Hasaniyah, and Kerbala'. The battles are ongoing with the Republican Guards and the air raid continues.
11. Western Section: During the enemy American forces stop in Al-Qati' region until 0800 on 2 April 2003.
 - a. The American forces composed of 4 tanks and a [illegible] vehicle with a 106 mm canon is in Al-Qadisiyyah dam. A component from the Special Forces and the dam protection force engaged the enemy but due to the [heavy] fire of the enemy the force withdrew after 40 men were injured and Staff Colonel Abd-al-Karim was martyred.
 - b. The enemy bombed positions of Al-Quds forces in Martyr Abd-al-Aziz Mosque at 2100 hour on 1 April. There were losses.
 - c. No information is currently available about the enemy's airborne drop in H1.
 - d. 20 American tanks are in Al-Kasarat region.
 - e. There are no enemy forces in the region between Al-Habbaniyah and Al-Razazah.
 - f. Enemy aircrafts were seen in the skies of the city of Al-Ramadi; possibly engage in reconnaissance activities.

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17. At 1120 Lieutenant Colonel Walid, officer [illegible] could not reach Kut station for the following reasons:
 - a. When he reached Al-Dabuni area, he was stopped by a group of citizens who told him that there is a US position of 8 to 10 tanks on the public road before the exit to Al-Dayuni area in Kut region. They are searching the citizens. Another group of citizens confirmed the information.
 - b. While on his way back from Baghdad, he asked one of our posts and they confirmed the information.
 - c. One of the Republican Guards officer confirmed the information through the units located on the road and he said that they are ready to fight today.
18. At 1704 on 2 April, an airborne drop took place near Amiriyah Al-Fallujah.
19. At 1745, an airborne drop took place in Al-Yusufiyah in Al-Qa'qa' establishment.
20. At 1800, armored convoy in Al-Qa'qa' establishment.
21. At 1845, nine helicopters over Amiriyat Al-Fallujah.
22. At 1920, two helicopters shot down in Al-Nu'maniyah.
23. At 1940, a number of enemy armored vehicles with helicopters arrived at Jarf Al-Sakhr area and were able to affect a brigade from Al-Quds division. A battle is underway between them and the republican guards in Al-Jarf Al-Sakhr.
24. Tikrit: Situation up to 0900 on 2 April. The enemy continued their strategic raids against Tikrit radio station and the farm of Mr. Deputy.

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25. Fallujah information station:

- a. The battle is still underway at Al-Qadisiyyah dam (Haditah). Our sacrifices are 19 martyrs and 61 injured. There are about 20 [unknown abbreviation] between Anah and Rawah with the support of helicopters.
- b. Enemy forces are on the strategic road of Jarf Al-Sakhr towards Al-Amiriyah. The force is composed of 2 reconnaissance vehicles and 2 helicopters.
- c. The enemy set up a position in the area in front of Awn on Al-Wand river (Al-Khayran) in Al-Musabib; a secondary position about 800 miles away composed of two vehicles.

26. The enemy is surrounded in Al-Qadisiyyah dam. They took a number of citizens and demanded that the barricade be lifted before they let the hostages go.

27. Al-Fallujah Security Station:

6 armored vehicles and 4 helicopters are in Al-Amiriyah and Matyr's establishment.

28. At 2305 on 3 April. The fighting is still underway in Al-Qadisiyyah Dam in Haditah.

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Summary report for Section 37 for 28 March 2003

1. Status for Staff Major General Salman at 1110 on 28 March 2003
 - a. Al-Kifl: The enemy forces are still at Al-Kifl-Al-Hillah crossroad. 5 tanks. An attack detachment was sent forward and it is about 1 kilometer from the bridge. A tank was seen on the bridge.
 - b. Shumali region: There are no enemy forces on the highway to the area of Sumar.
 - c. Al-Diwaniyah: At 0900, enemy forces were on the crossroad Afk region going towards Al-Diwaniyah with 2 armored vehicles, 2 attack tanks. They were on the highway but there is nothing going on in the city except for the aerial attacks on the city's outskirts.
2. At 1020, an attack detachment came back on Al-Diwaniyah-Baghdad highway. Burned enemy tanks and large and small vehicles were seen on the sides on the roads. Also seen were signs of reinforcements in various scattered positions and enemy dug out infantry positions [illegible]. The enemy randomly planted mines on the side of the road and left behind food remains and ammunition casing. The detachment interrogated people on Baghdad highway and they reported that a large number of enemy forces is currently in Al-Makhazin [Depots] near the tire factory (the nature of the forces is not known) on the road leading to Al-Diwaniyah.
3. Situation in Najaf: At 2100 March, American vehicles were seen moving on the strategic road towards Kerbala coming from Al-Ramiyah region.

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4. At 1240, Major Mukhallad from [illegible] intelligence reported that there is a heavy bombing of Al-Habbaniyah (Military area) and Cruise missiles launched towards Al-Amiriyah region.
5. The situation in Najaf up to 1200 on 28 March 2003: The coward American enemy withdrew from Al-Abbasiyah region. The road is open from Najaf towards Al-Abbasiyah and [illegible] Kufah where there is 1 tank, and 1 truck in Al-Abbasiyah square. The enemy left behind 2 vehicles near the cement factory dam to do reconnaissance but they might evacuate. The enemy also left 2 vehicles near the technical institute on the Al-Munatharah road near natural gas station.
6. Karbalah-Najaf road: There was a detachment of 2 trucks in the fuel station (Al-Kifl). Intelligence agents withdrew and came through Najaf-Al-Kifl area. They found a roadblock set up to prevent entry to and exit from Al-Kifl. 2 trucks were also seen with 1 tank near plaster factory.
7. From Al-Fa'id to Shumali river: Nothing going on.
8. Al-Hillah-Al-Kifl: Enemy forces are in Al-Kifl with a force of 5 tanks, 2 on the right of the road, 2 on the left, and they are flying flags.
9. A Cruise missile seen launched towards Al-Amiriyah from south going north.
10. Cruise missiles seen going towards Al-Amiriyah from south to north.
11. Status of intelligence [illegible] in the south: Good.
12. At 1510, we had information pointing to the presence of 7 armored and 2 American tanks with 2 helicopters in Al-Butirah triangle. A force from the party and the tribes came out but found that the enemy had left the area to Sukkar fort. The force, it appears, is providing the flank of the enemy convoy on the Al-Nassiriyah-Kut road. It withdrew at night.
13. The US Secretary of Defense announced that any person entering Iraq other than coalition forces or their helpers will be considered an enemy to the coalition forces and this included the Islamic Revolutionary Council.

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14. At 1200, two enemy helicopters were seen hovering over Gumruk depots, Gumruk directorate, Al-Huswah, Gumruk, the middle region of Abu-Ghrayb. The detachments in Gumruk-Al-Huswah and Gumruk Baghdad directed heavy fire at the two aircrafts using all available weapons and they were able to shoot them down. The two aircrafts are currently in [illegible]
15. Kurdish collaborators attacked the post 214 located at 15 kilometers north of the city of Tuz. The details will be available later.

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In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Summary Report from Section3 for 27 March 2003

Western region

1. At 1725:
 - a. Between 4 and 6 armored vehicles in 160 Km area sent away the workers in the fuel station. Bombing in Al-Ratbah and Al-Anbar governorate.
 - b. The position on Najaf-Karbala-Haydariyah crossroad near Khan Al-Nasr was reinforced. No there the number increased to 10 armored enemy vehicles across from Maqali' Al-Raml.
 - c. 2 helicopters are engaged in reconnaissance mission of the strategic road across from Khan Al-Rub' (across from Thurmstun factory).
 - d. Situation in Kerbala is good but Najaf has been surrounded since 1100.
 - e. A convoy of armored vehicles with helicopters has moved forward on the highway at Al-Hamzah-Shumali crossroad. It is continues to move without making stops towards Baghdad. There is no resistance there except for detachments of Fida'iyin [Saddam].
 - f. Enemy forces of up to 20 vehicles are still in Al-Kifl. They already started to move toward the city of Al-Hillah. There are no enemy forces in Al-Ma'amil region.
2. At 1450, the enemy carried out a military airborne drop on the strategic highway behind the western region command. In Najaf, there are 2 armored vehicles. The first is in the military district and the second in Al-Quds district. There is no secured communication. The enemy has arrived to Shumali region and there in no wireless communication with the governorates of Karbal, Najaf, and Babil.
3. At 1500, CNN announced the presence of the Americans, the British, and the Australians in Baghdad and that they are looking for military positions and forces.
4. Interrogation report at 2040:
 - a. Fighter jets and helicopters were seen taking off from Al-Azraq and Al-Safadi airbase and entering our airspace.
 - b. 20 tents in the Jordanian Al-Ruwishid region.

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- c. At 0400 on 27 February, 9 tracked vehicles were seen in the 160 Kilometers area.
- d. Al-Qa'im road is open and there are no enemy patrol on it.
- e. The withdrawn soldiers in [illegible] the weapons depot [illegible] are selling their weapons to the Bedouins and are coming with in civilian clothes.

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Euphrates Middle Region

1. At 0900, an airborne drop of equipments took place near Al-Hashimiyah fuel station in Al-Hillah.
2. At 0915, enemy forces of up to 40 tanks were in Al-Fajr region on the right and left of the road. The enemy is quickly replacing their damaged armored vehicles. The Al-Hay-Al-Rifa'I road is blocked. There is no flow of movement which passes through Al-Rifa'i-Al-Maymunah road. A number of residents of Al-Qasabat and scattered villages in the area between Al-Hay-Al-Fajr have been charged to supply us with information about the intentions and the directions of the enemy forces.
3. At 0915, battles are still ongoing in Al-Kifl and the enemy has sent unknown enforcement on Karbal-Najaf road. The national highway Babil-Al-Kifl is currently under heavy bombing which led to the destruction of the road and made it difficult to use. Artillery fire is still being exchanged between our forces and the enemy forces.
4. At 0600, aircrafts were seen over the highway at Ifk crossroad. An Unknown number of trucks and armored vehicles are moving on the highway toward Baghdad from Al-Diwaniyah.
5. At 1000 observation post (955-958) Hashimiyah armor of up to 40 armored vehicles on the highway from Al-Hashimiyah towards Al-Hamzah.
6. At 0230, the enemy bombed Fida'iyyin Saddam site in Al-Ramadi. At 2300 on 26 February and (120-230-445) On 27 March 2003, the enemy bombed [illegible]/884 in Hadithah leading to injury of four and destruction of some of the battalion's equipment.
7. At 1155, armored vehicle in Al-Dagharah, 25 Kilometers north of Al-Diwaniyah.
8. At 0920, Second Lieutenant Ziyad from Najaf Al-Quds Army was able to destroy a tan. At 1020, 2 tanks were destroyed by the above mentioned Second Lieutenant was injured.
9. At 1200, one of Al-Quds Army units along with tribal and party fighters engaged the enemy in Al-Hay region.
10. At 1205, two helicopters were seen south of Al-Hashimiyah by observation post 961. Four helicopters were seen on the highway by observation post 978.

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11. At 1325 the following information was reported by Najaf Corps, Al-Quds Army:
 - a. At 1210 today, a tank was destroyed at Al-Jaryubah area located between Al-Mashkhab and Najaf near Abu-Sakhir by a detachment from Al-Yarmuk, Najaf Corps.
 - b. The two enemy tanks located in the above mentioned area withdrew towards the strategic road.
12. At 1240, the force that was present in Shumali broke up into two. The first half was composed of 2 tanks and moved towards the Babil-Baghdad highway and was provided cover by 4 helicopters; the size of the other half of the force is unknown and it is moving on Shumali road.
13. At 1340, there was a force of about 2 tanks and a truck with 4 helicopters in the area of Shumali and moving towards Baghdad.
14. The pedestrians were questioned on Tarbil road until 1200 on 26 February. There were 8 tanks in Jordan-Tarbil crossroad near Al-Ratabah. Search points were set up and about 8 to 10 tanks arrived at Tiwan crossroad on the same day. The tribes and party [forces] moved towards them and were able to destroy one tank. Two armored vehicles moved on Tarbil road. [illegible] inside the Jordanian territories are searching people. 3 buses carrying Syrian volunteers arrived and one of them crashed into the bombed bridge on Ramadi Bridge resulting in casualties among the volunteers.
15. At 1100, an enemy force of 25 tanks and trucks was deployed from Samarah train station towards the city center. It entered the military camp, Al-Samawah camp, the training center, and oil refinery. At 1210m the force returned to its original position in the station. At 1120, 10 black helicopters were seen hovering over the strategic road towards Najaf. At 1200, the enemy fired at 7 civilian vehicles in the outskirts of Al-Samawah coming from Al-Salman resulting in the martyrdom and injury of a number of civilians.
16. At 1515, the enemy began its withdrawal from Al-Abbasiyah region towards Najaf Sea.
17. At 1516, the fighting was still ongoing south of Al-Hay region with a deployment of 28 tanks from Shumali towards Baghdad.

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18. At 1516, an enemy reconnaissance team was in Qal'ah Sukkar-Al-Fajr crossroad with a force of 4 vehicles.
19. At 1515, two missiles fell on Sa'd camp in Ba'qubah.
20. At 1620, up to 50 American tanks south of Al-Hay, Al-Fajr crossroad. The enemy set up a position that allowing through civilians only.
21. At 1945, the enemy withdrew its forces of about 600 pieces of equipments (vehicles, trucks, tanks) from Najaf region to Al-Ratbah region on the strategic road accompanied by numbers from the collaborator Badr force.
22. At 2000, a convoy was heading from Al-Kifl to Al-Hillah through the bridge. After they crossed, our forces destroyed the bridge. The tribal forces and the army in Alexandria were able to destroy 10 trucks and captured 50 Americans and killed more than 20. This information needs confirmation.
23. At 2040, the enemy withdrew from the highway in Al-Shumali region towards Al-Diwaniyah. The enemy was seen withdrawing 12 damaged armored vehicles. The information indicates that the forces moving towards Baghdad is the size of Corps. The total number of vehicles seen was between 200 and 250. About 60 fighting trenches were seen near Al-Shumali and Al-Diwaniyah.
24. At 1700, one of the officers who was standing at the crossroad of Al-Shumali and the highway reported tracks of tanks and trucks which meant the presence of the enemy there. The enemy had a quick withdrawal. The locals were questioned about the possible reasons for the withdrawal but none could be determined.

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Southern region

1. At 0211, Lieutenant Colonel Abd-al-Hakim Mustafa the Deputy Commander of Misan Intelligence Center made contact and reported that the situation in Basrah district is currently good. There is an enemy military presence there and about 4 tanks crossed Al-Zubayr Bridge towards the Al-Zubayr position. At 1500, forces from [illegible]/18 Corps attacked them destroying one tank. The southern compounds were the target of enemy bombing that damaged its buildings but there were no losses. There is an air bombing targeting Corps 4. Six tanks and four armored vehicles supported by helicopters in Al-Hamzah region are moving towards Al-Dir, between Al-Qarnah and Basrah and were attacked by Division 6 and the battle is still ongoing. All communications are cut off. The situation in Misan governorate is good and there is no communication.
2. At 2145, a drone was shot down on Sa'd Bridge in Basrah. 18 Corps was able to destroy an enemy tank in Al-Zubayr region. The enemy convoy heading from Al-Hamrah to Al-Dir region was attacked by an army battalion from Corps 2 and forced it to stop. The battle has been stopped for now.

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Information report on 26 March 2003

Western Region:

1. Western region: At 0940, the enemy moved a force composed of 30 tanks from al-Abbasiyah towards Al-Hillah. It opened a position in Abu-Saghir region with 7 armored vehicles. The presence of two tanks were observed stuck in the sand with broken down [missing number] tanks and one destroyed tank in Al-Habbaniyah region in [illegible]-Abu-Saghir road.
2. Western region: At 0945 on 26 March 2003, an enemy force of 10 to 12 tanks was near Al-Kifl Bridge. There was also four vehicles on the national Najaf-Karbala highway in one of fuel stations west of Al-Kifl region in addition to two tanks in the tires factory.
3. Western region: At 0945 on 26 March 2003, an enemy force of seven tanks arrived near [illegible] bridge south west of [illegible].
4. Western region: At 0945 on 26 March 2003, the enemy moved a force of four vehicles and two tanks on Najaf-Kerbala national highway [illegible] 38 Kilometers south of Karbal governorate. A recon soldier was seen carrying a while and read flags about 200 miles from the above mentioned force and laying down barbed wire to keep people off the road. The armored vehicles were flying British flags.
5. Western region: At 1000 on 26 March 2003, the enemy moved its forces on Najaf-Al-Kifl-Babil road. A force from Fida'iyin Saddam and the tribes went out to meet them. Four tanks were burned.
6. Western region: It has been confirmed that the enemy conduct an airborne drop on [illegible]-Al-Diwaniyah road, around Al-Sadir, to conduct reconnaissance operation in the area. The paratroopers were lifted with helicopters. At 1240 on 26 March 2003, a force of 20 armored vehicles was dropped in the area mentioned above. The force is sending groups of seven tanks to carry out

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assigned missions; they are supported by two to three helicopters present with the force on Diwaniyah-Hillah road. They force was met with our [illegible] it withdrew and attacked the resistance by air.

7. Western region: At 1300 on 25 March 2003, enemy forces composed of brigade is till on the Najaf-Kerbala national road about 38 Kilometers south of Kerbala.
8. Section 31: At 1220 on 26 March 2003, a force of 8 armored vehicles has moved forward on Al-Hillah-Al-Kurah road. There is no resistance there.
9. Al-Quds Army: At 1333 on 26 March 2003, enemy forces on the strategic Al-Salman axis is currently stopped at about 28 Kilometers south of Kerbala. A number of vehicles are not operational and the enemy took off their tires in addition to 25 tanks [illegible].
10. Al-Quds Army: At 1230 on 26 March 2003, two tanks were destroyed in Al-Manazirah region near Abu-Saghir Bridge. Another two tanks were damaged in [illegible] region on Al-Shaghab-Abu-Saghir road. An armored vehicle was destroyed near Al-Diniyah Bridge and another one burned by Al-Yarmuk brigade, Najaf Al-Quds Army.
11. Western region: The presence of batteries for medium range missiles have confirmed in Najaf Sea near Al-Rahbah. Missiles are launched from these batteries toward Baghdad after midnight. The batteries are guarded by tanks.
12. Al-Quds Army: At 1225 on 26 March 2003, Lieutenant Colonel Ziyad Tariq from Hatin forces in Al-Quds Army along with two of his men destroyed a tank in Al-Abbasiyah region.

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13. Western region: On 25 March 2003, one of the citizens noticed the presence of about 16 tanks in Al-Manjam region near Ukashat.
14. Western region: At 1725 on 26 March 2003, the enemy bombed Al-Jarwiyah region south of Najaf [illegible]
15. Western region: Situation at 1840 on 26 March 2003:
 - a. Al-Abbasiyah region: An enemy position near [illegible] region of about two attack tanks in addition to seven other tanks and 2 [illegible] and an ambulance and 9 [illegible].
 - b. Al-Kifl: (Fuel station). On Kerbala-Najaf road, there is a force of two tanks, two vehicles, and two ambulances. The enemy is using loud speakers to warn the citizen against fighting them.
 - c. Al-Hydariyah regions: There are four ambulances and the enemy burned two civilian vehicles and blocked the road traffic.
 - d. Al-Kufah: There are tanks in Al-Kunah position near Al-Kufah bridge. The enemy forces is not allowing crossing the bridge.
 - e. Al-Munazarah: Four armored vehicles on Al-Munazarah Bridge [illegible].
16. Western region:
 - a. At 1400 on 26 March 2003, 25 transport vehicles and 20 Jeep vehicles, carrying radio equipment; in addition to two armored vehicles and one tanker truck in Al-Sharqiyah region moving towards Al-Najaf.
 - b. Enemy forces have set up booby traps in its areas. One of such boob traps exploded against the citizen Ibrahim Naim, a resident of Al-Sharqiyah.
 - c. One of the shepherds who were interrogated by one of the collaborator accompanying enemy forces that there now about ten Iraqi collaborators accompanying them.

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16. Southern region: At 1230 on 26 March 2003, the American headquarters according to radio transmissions is in Um-Qasr [illegible] another gathering of equipment in Vegetable market in Al-Zubayr. A supply ship arrived to the unloading dock in Um-Qasr where the equipment and personnel are going to be unloaded. Two vehicles and nine tanks and two Humvees are in the coastal position on Um-Qasr road.
17. Al-Janubiyah: At 1525 on 26 March 2003, the enemy clashed with our military and party forces in Al-Rafa'I region and was able to get through them. It is now on the national road between Al-Rifa'I and [illegible] Sukkar.
18. Al-Janubiyah: At 1523 on 26 March 2003, members of Al-Zubayr force were able to burn one tank and shoot down a helicopter.

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In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate
Summary report of Section 37 on 26 March 2003

1. At 0825, there was a large number of aircrafts heading toward Baghdad.
2. At 0825, observation post 648 sound of Mosul [report] an ground explosion.
3. From Babil station, forces from Najaf to conduct recon mission in Najaf-Karbal road. The force was able to reach the Al-Kifl crossroad from Mosul. The enemy forces in Al-Kifl is about 12 tanks on Al-Kifl Bridge in addition to two tanks in the tires factory, and four armored vehicles in the fuel station on the national road. Battles are ongoing in Al-Kifl region.
4. At 0920, the American enemy bombed the positions of Corps 2/Brigade 22/infantry division 8 [illegible]. We will have the results later.
5. At 0945, a convoy composed of 20 tanks was heading towards Al-Hillah from Al-Abbasiyah. The enemy has a position in Abu-Saghir with seven armored vehicles and two trapped tanks, two damaged, and one burned in Al-Hassaniyah region. In addition there is 10 to 15 tanks near Al-Kifl Bridge and four trucks on the Najaf-Kerbala national road in the fuel station near Al-Kifl region. There are also two tanks at the door of the tires factory, and seven tanks near Al-Diwaniyah [illegible] Bridge.
6. At 0940, there were four trucks and two tanks on the Najaf-Kerbala national road across from Maqali' Raml about 28 kilometers from Kerbala. There is no change in the situation of Al-Abbasiyah. No change in the situation of Al-Hillah. No change in the situation of Hadithah. No change in the situation of (Al-Qa'im-Al-Qadisiyyah city-Al-Hillah).

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7. Western region intelligence office [abbreviate name] [Hafiz] indicated the necessity to deploy anti armor units [illegible] because they are currently using light arms only.
8. The situation at 1050 on 26 March 2003. Enemy forces are located now on (Al-Kilf- Al-Kifl crossroad - Al-Najaf - Kerbala) roads with four tanks and four [illegible] and on the strategic road between Khan and Khan Al-Rub (Al-Nakhilah). One reconnaissance vehicle is roaming Al-Hathiyah area between Abu-Sukhayr and Al-Mishghab by 10 Kilometers.
9. The enemy is moving its forces on Al-Najaf-Babil road crossing through the door of Um Al-Abbasiyat Bridge towards Al-Kifl-Babil road. Fida'yyin of Saddam and tribal forces burned four tanks. The enemy is moving from Al-Najaf station towards [Incomplete sentence]
10. Fifteen armored vehicles across from Al-Kifl.
11. At 1200 a drone is flying over the area 20 Kilometers east of Al-Sharqat towards the north.
12. At 1220, observation post 834 north of Al-Nu'maniyah reported a land explosion. Observation post 822 reported the sound of bombs.
13. Security reports indicated that the American forces in the south are based in Um-Qasr and another behind Al-Zubayr Al-Dawajin farms near the sea position on the left side [illegible]. There is also a number of equipment in Tomatoes market in Al-Zubayr. The supply ship arrived near [illegible] at the southern unloading dock in Um-Qasr is unloading equipment and personnel.

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Two trucks, four tanks, and two Jeep vehicles in Al-Bahriyah control post on Um-Qasr road.

14. At 1230, observatories 203 and 206 reported explosions.
15. At 1230, the drone 15 Kilometers north of Saddam base disappeared.
16. At 1233, observatories 826 and 829 near Al-Nu'maniyah reported explosions.
17. At 1235, observatory 925 between Al-Nu'maniyah and Al-Hashimiyah reported an explosion.
18. Observatories near Al-Nu'maniyah reported explosion.
19. At 1240, enemy forces are on the Al-Siyahi [scenic] road, Al-Diwaniyah, Al-Sadir region with more 25 armored vehicles in Dawajin region. They are engaging Al-Quds Army forces. They have been withdrawing when met with resistance and using air support provided by attack helicopters.
20. The main convoy is currently stopping at 38 kilometers south of Kerbala. A detachment was sent towards Al-Haydariyah then from there towards Al-Kifl. The second convoy is moving towards Al-Abbasiyah.
21. Eight armored vehicles are moving towards Al-Hillah-Al-Kufah road. They are meeting no resistance.
22. We informed Kerbala Corps, Al-Quds Army about bring two operational tanks in Abu-Sukhir.
23. National Al-Khidr road is open. [Illegible] strategic axis is blocked. In-operational vehicles. The enemy has removed their tires. On Al-Hillah road there are 25 tanks and one armored personnel carrier vehicle.
24. Al-Najaf Coprs, Al-Quds Army informed us about the destruction of two tanks in Al-Munawarah region near Abu-Sukhir bridge and the damage of two in

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- on [illegible]-Abu-Sukhir road and the destruction of one armored vehicle near Al-Dubyniyah Bridge (Al-Najaf district). The Al-Yarmuk brigade, Najaf Coprs, Al-Quds Army destroyed a Jeep vehicle inside [illegible].
25. Muhannad Muhammad and Sa'd [illegible] in civilian clothes from Kerbala forces toward Najaf and Maqali' Al-Raml Al-Tahrir 28 Kilometers south of Kerbala. They witnessed four armored vehicles carrying the British flag and the soldiers wearing protective masks. A reconnaissance team about 200 meters ahead of the vehicles carrying a white and a red flag and there is barbed wire in the road not allowing anyone to pass.
 26. Medium range missiles units are in Al-Najaf sea near Al-Rahbah launching missiles in the direction of Baghdad. They were found two days ago after the launch of the missiles after midnight. The batteries are guarded by a number of armored vehicles.
 27. At 1230 we received information from Al-Najaf Corps, Al-Quds Army of the following: At 1245 on 21 March 2003, Second Lieutenant Ziyad Tariq from Corps 2 Hatin with two men destroyed an enemy tank in Al-Abbasiyah region.
 28. At 1415, a possible shooting down of a fighter aircraft in Kerbala with 2 missiles.
 29. At 1458, the enemy attacked a deserted site at 168 kilometers from Al-Habbaniya. There were no damages.
 30. At 1525, Lieutenant Colonel Abbud [illegible] reported that the enemy has engaged our military units and party militias in Al-Rifa'I region. They are currently on the national road between Al-Rifa'I and Sukkar fort.

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31. At 1523, Major Faris [illegible] fro Al-Zubayr center reported that some boy burned a tank and a drone was shot down.
32. Babil station (Najm Ahmad). The situation in Al-Kifl and Al-Abbasiyah. Two individuals from Babil intelligence office were sent to Al-Kifl city and they reported that that seven armored vehicles were inside the city. The city is deserted and there is a movement of tanks towards Al-Najaf. The firing is ongoing in the region. Two destroyed civilian vehicles were seen. There is destruction in the city and the Americans are accompanied by an Arabic speaker who is urging people to surrender. The citizens are moving from Al-Kifl towards Al-Hillah. There were seven tanks, one ambulance, two [illegible], and six armored trucks roaming in Al-Abbasiyah. There is no resistance.
33. The situation in Al-Qa'im district is good. No forces today, except enemy aircrafts. At 1600 on 25 March 2003, one of the citizens saw a force of six armored vehicles in the Al-Manjam region near Ukashat.
34. At 0200 on 26 March 2003, enemy aircrafts bombed the oil ministry communication tower located at 80 kilometers south of Al-Qa'im region on the strategic road.
35. At 1506, observatory 352 reported an explosion.
36. At 1725, enemy bombing against Al-Jayrubah region from Al-Najaf and Al-Abbasiyah regions. An enemy control position in Al-Hafarah [illegible]. Two tanks [illegible], one ambulance and nine personnel carrier vehicles. There is also the fuel station on Kerbala-Najaf road. At Al-Kifl crossroad, there are two armored vehicles and two personnel carriers and twelve ambulances.

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- There are four armored vehicles at 200 meters away in Al-Haydariyah region. It burned two civilian vehicles. The mentioned force has blocked entry to Al-Haydariyah. There are also tanks in Al-Kufah control position near Al-Kufa Bridge who are blocking the bridge. There are also four trucks on the Al-Munazarah Bridge towards [illegible] road Najaf-Al-Diwaniyah- Babil Intelligence center in Al-Kifl region, there are eight tanks and armored trucks. The enemy is urging the residents through loud speakers in Arabic not to fight.
37. Thirty-five pieces of equipment between trucks, armored vehicles, heavy cannons, and Jeep vehicles are on Al-Diyaniyah and Mushahadah highway [illegible]. There are also nine helicopters in the Ashur Company headquarters located on the highway. A convoy of 100 unloaded vehicles was seen moving between Al-Najaf towards Al-Nasiriyah on the strategic road. At 1100, 25 Jeep vehicles carrying radio equipment and accompanied by three armored vehicles and a tanker truck was seen moving toward Al-Najaf. The Americans are setting booby-traps everywhere they go.
38. Two helicopters were seen moving from Al-Najaf to Al-Nasiriyah at 1400. 25 vehicles and 20 vehicle carrying radio equipment, and three armored vehicles were in [illegible] American forces are leaving booby traps everywhere they go. This resulted in the explosion of one of these against citizen Ibrahim [Illegible], a resident of Al-Shanaqiyah. A shepherd reported in his interrogation by one of the agents working for the American forces that there are about eight Iraqi agents accompanying the enemy forces. At 1500 [continue]

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44. The situation in Um-Qasr is good. [Illegible]
45. [Illegible] Enemy presence, one to two armored vehicles in Al-Ghatfah across from Al-Rasas Island. One to two armored vehicles at Al-Sayhad crossroad.
46. At 2200 on 27 March, the forces [illegible] returned. It destroyed [illegible] an armored British vehicle with missile. [Illegible] British Landcruiser vehicle with a missile. Currently at 0630 on 26 March enemy helicopters are using bright lights for landing boats at Shat Al-Arab.
47. The Russian attaché informed us that B52 airplanes took off Diego Garcia Island at 2015. Scheduled arrival 0100 on 27 March.
48. Observation post 649 reported sounds of explosions on the ground.
49. Airborne drop has not been confirmed at area between [illegible] and Al-Habbaniyah.
50. [Observation post] 471 and 472 reported an explosion on the ground.
51. a. There is information indicating that the American enemy intend to use

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the destructive elements in the north to carry out their attack in the villages [illegible] Qadir Karam within 48 to 72 hours.

- b. The strategy would be that the destructive elements would slip along with some American forces behind our defensive lines; an attack from the air and with missiles would be used in combination with an engagement on the ground then a push towards the city of Karkuk.
 - c. There are five helicopters with 20,000 American soldiers. Another set of information indicates the presence of nine helicopters and [illegible] soldiers in [illegible]
52. A convoy of tanks is moving towards Al-Fajir region to Al-Hay. The size of the force has not yet been determined.
53. On 26 March 2003, an enemy convoy has moved from Sukkar Fort region towards Al-Hay is composed of 100 tanks and a truck. An enemy force of about four tanks is in the region of Al-Rifa'i and Sukkar Fort without the cover of helicopters.

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In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Summary report from Section 37 for 25 March 2003

1. At 0630, the observation posts in Al-Nu'maniyah reported the presence of aircrafts in the direction of Baghdad.
2. At 0610, a group of Martyrs group from the heroes of the Arabian Gulf Base in Al-Basrah burned an American tank in Al-Nida' position located at [illegible] Al-Dawajin road going to Safwan-Al-Basrah-Um-Qasr.
3. Al-Qadisiyyah/ No change.
4. Kerbala/ No change.
5. Haditha district: Bombing of a 20 Kilometers area in the eastern area of Baghdad.
6. Fallujah/ No change.
7. Al-Qa'im/ No change.
8. Al-Najaf/ [Illegible]. There is an advancing force in the direction of Al-Najaf. Details will be available later.
9. Al-Muthana/ No change.
10. At 0700 on 27 March 2003, enemy forces attacked the positions of Al-Karmal, Al-Qadisiyyah group, Al-Quds Army in Al-Dawajin region [illegible] (7273) about 22 to 25 Kilometers from the city of Al-Diwaniyah. The battles are still ongoing.
11. At 0935, observation post 669 reported explosions on the ground.
12. At 0520, the enemy attacked missiles boat 151m and the training ship Bin-Khaldun resulting in the damage of the latter.
13. At 0830, Presidential Yacht Al-Mansur was air bombed resulting in its damaged.
14. At 1000, the enemy set up a control position in Martyr Adnan observation post in [illegible] with a detachment of armor.
15. The presence of an Egyptian army in coalition forces uniform has been confirmed in Um-al-Qasr in twelve vehicles with a Saudi license number accompanying a convoy of 25 Saudi pieces of equipment on Safwan-Um-al-Qasr road towards Al-Basrah.

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16. Observation post 836 in Kut reported explosion on the ground.
17. Observation post 972 in Al-Hillah reported an airborne drop by helicopters of an unknown number of armored vehicles about 20 Kilometers west of Al-Diwaniyah towards Babil governorate.
18. At 1020 on 25 March 2003, the commander of Al-Najaf division, Al-Quds Army reported the following: At 2100, on 24 March 2003, an enemy convoy moved from Al-Hadidiyah towards Al-Kifl and has not yet arrived.)
19. Observation post 1982 reported an airborne drop by helicopters of unknown armor and infantry in Al-Kifl.
20. Information coming from head of Al-Qa'im border compound via individuals coming from Syria indicated enemy plans to open a front on Jordan road. A movement and gathering of enemy forces in Jordan has been witnessed.
21. Dawn of 24 March 2003, enemy air force bombed water project of Phosphate national company in Al-Qa'im resulting in its destruction. (The water project supplies the area of Ukashat- [illegible] - Al-Qadisiyyah compound).
22. Enemy air assault continues over Al-Qa'im particularly at night.
23. At 1110, observation post 964 south Al-Hashimiyah reported ground explosion.
24. Al-Jazeera Television reported that it has become a military, and political target and the British forces are seeking to control it and they are not hesitating to enter it.
25. At 1145, no battles or resistance around the convoy heading to Al-Kifl. The convoy has crossed the bridge that is about five kilometers from Al-Kifl Bridge.
26. Observation post 971 west of Al-Hashimiyah and south of Al-Hillah reported the sighting of a helicopter.
27. F 15 jets were seen over Al-Imadiyah flying in the direction of [illegible] to Mosul.
28. Convoy of armor is currently slowly crossing the bridge. It is composed of about 25 tanks, cannon, and vehicle. There is no resistance.

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29. Al-Mishkhab has been passed and currently there is another convoy in Al-Manzirah very close to Al-Najaf. The convoy is composed of 35 tanks, trucks, and vehicle.
30. We have been informed by the Russian [coded name] that B52s have already taken off from Diego Garcia Island at 0600 and will arrive to its targets between 1300 and 1400.
31. Battles are ongoing between our forces and enemy forces in Al-Haydariyah region towards [illegible] factory. Our artilleries are bombing the enemy.
32. An enemy force whose size is unknown has entered the city of Al-Mishkhab. Our artillery is bombing the enemy. An American force has neared the city of Al-Kifl. It has crossed Al-Kifl Bridge and set up positions near the bridge. The residents are evacuating towards Al-Hillah. Our artillery is bombing the enemy forces. A force from Fida'iyyi Saddam and Emergency forces were pushed forward to attack the American force.
33. Two American aircrafts and 1000 American soldiers are currently in Al-Sulaymaniyah airport.
34. [Illegible]
35. Islamic movement network [illegible] American airplane dropped forces in a number of areas. They moved together and set up positions and move to engage our regular armed forces.
36. British forces are now moving inside Al-Faw with its full equipment accompanied by masked servants of theirs. They have twenty-one check points on the road [illegible] at Al-Faw (the situation is relatively calm at this time).
37. At 0400 on 25 March 2003, [illegible] of Al-Quds Army in Salah-al-Din was subjected to heavy bombing on Al-Hawl road in Salah-al-Din.
38. Air force operations for 101 division has been halted in the south today Tuesday 25 March 2003 due to weather conditions (strong sand storm). It is impossible to fly in these conditions.
39. At 1255, enemy aircrafts were flying over Al-Rashid.
40. A company was sent on a reconnaissance mission to Al-Najaf [illegible]
41. [Illegible] command is on now on the way with two agents and two tanks.

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42. Two missiles towards Baghdad.
43. At 1700 a number of Cruise missiles went over Alexandria towards Baghdad.
44. Report of Al-Ratbah security office up to 1200 on 25 March was as follows:
 - i. People coming from Jordan through Tarbil were interrogated and did not confirm presences of convoys or armor coming to our territories form Jordan.
 - ii. Two helicopters are taking off every day from al-Azraq base to [illegible] the enemy armor in the western region.
 - iii. All airbases within the region under the jurisdiction of Al-Ratbah intelligence office, Al-Qadisiyyah and Al-Walid compounds are in good shape.
 - iv. Enemy air force continues of the city of Al-Ratbah.
 - v. Gatherings of enemy forces near the road [illegible]. They continue to move in the western region in search for missile dugouts.
45. At 1600, Cruise missiles were launched from the Mediterranean Sea and will arrive at 1900.
46. Information coming from Al-Najaf, from soldier Wisam Abd-al-Al one assigned to the special mission, indicate the presence of a camp of 60 tanks and armored vehicles with vehicles [illegible] and it has began moving towards the strategic direction.
47. B52 is bombing [illegible] between 1900 and 1920.
48. At 1300, Major Sa'd Deputy commander of Al-Qadisiyyah center supplied us with the information he received from Commander of Corps 2/ Brigade 1/ Al-Karmal Al-Quds Army Lieutenant Colonel Abd-al-Karim Muhamd indicating the following:
 - i. An enemy force of 20 armored vehicles accompanied with Jeep vehicles in [illegible] region. It was air dropped by helicopters that moved towards the highway.
 - ii. Teams from Al-Karmal brigade, which has been put on the highway.
 - iii. Four armored vehicles in the area of Dawajin [illegible] (3399).
49. At 1945, missiles south [illigible] Al-Ujah [illegible] two missile were shot down; One was shot down in Al-Ujah [sic].

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50. B52 airplanes will arrive between 2030 and 2040 and will be bombing the northern area.
51. Air raid by aircrafts from south moving north.
52. Information reached us [illegible] that the Jordanian embassy has been vacated and that only the guard is left in the building.
53. At 1630, three drones were shot down within Corps 2 area [illegible] two of which were downed by tribal and party forces while the third was shut down by the military forces.
54. British forces set up a check point in the area across Imam Abdallah. Each position has four armored vehicles, vehicle, and twelve soldiers. An Iraqi major called Azzam [illegible] was seen with another soldier wearing Special Forces uniform serving as guide for the British forces.
55. At 1300 on 25 March, a group of enemy forces attacked the defensive positions of the Euphrates, section [illegible], Al-Saydali region and tried to block the Al-Qa'idm-Al-Ramadi road. A force from the same section charged and forced the enemy to withdraw. An enemy aircraft attacked the party convoy killing five comrades and injured ten and burned seven vehicles.
56. At 1600 on 24 March, an enemy force blocked the road between Al-Qa'im and Al-Ratbah in Al-Mashari' area about 20 kilometers from Al-Qa'im. It set up a position on both sides and they were accompanied by a group of collaborators wearing the same uniforms and military gear and who were interrogating the passers by there. An officer was sent there under cover and he witnessed them threatening the residents against resisting and telling them that they were going to enter Al-Qa'im in two day. They handed out flyers and the so-called the new Iraqi flag. The flag is in three colors and three squares in black, white, and green with an octagon star in the middle. The force is made up of 18 vehicles and American soldiers.

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57. A drone was downed by tribal and party forces near Al-Miqdadiyah and is now in the intelligence office in the middle region.
58. There are information coming from the Secretariat of Al-Rashid indicating that there are 5000 American soldiers in [illegible] accompanied by some destructive elements to attack the city of Karkuk and Mosul (Situation being monitored).
59. Deputy Commander of the northern region informed them that the attack on Karkuk and Mosul today at 2400.

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Summary for 24 March

1. Western region
 - a. At 1807 on 23 March 2003, information from [code name] Western region intelligence office indicated that a convoy of 50 tanks is currently going along side the strategic line from Al-Najaf towards Kerbala. The convoy clashed with elements from Al-Najaf depots. Four tanks were burned. The tanks might head towards Al-Kifl.
 - b. At 1905 on 23 March 2003, Lieutenant Colonel Hindi from Western region intelligence office reported that the enemy carried out a drop with two aircrafts near the position near Al-Najaf-Kerbala road four kilometers from Hadithah. A force went towards the drop zone.
 - c. At 1600 on 23 March 2003, information from [illegible] Mahmud intelligence office of Al-Quds Army indicate that 27 armored vehicles on Al-Ma'amil and Fajr crossroads towards Al-Khidr district in Al-Muthana governorate in addition to six helicopter [illegible] one aircraft. One kilometer from these aircrafts, four other aircrafts were seen in the air. A Kuwaiti translator is with the above convoy.
2. Southern region
 - a. At 1728 on 23 March 2003, information from southern customs police indicated the advance of American forces on axis of Al-Nasiriyah-Al-Salam road. Our military, party, and tribal forces in the area confronted them and were able to burn two armored vehicle, two vehicles, and 8 soldiers were

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captured, and the rest of enemy force run away. The helicopters were able to remove the damaged armored vehicles and truck.

- b. At 2220 on 23 March 2003, information from [Abbreviated first name] Ali from Navy intelligence indicating that 13 Saudi buses in [illegible] carrying Egyptian soldiers. There were also 25 Saudi armored vehicles and more than 100 to 150 American and British pieces of equipment along with eleven Chinook and Apache helicopters, and a hospital ship on dock number 10, and a convoy of 25 pieces of equipment that crossed Sarwan-Um-Qasr road going towards Basrah. There are also British forces around Um-Qasr radio station.
 - c. At 2325 on 23 March 2003, information from [coded name] Omar from southern region intelligence office indicates that two tanks and four armored vehicles with full equipment were destroyed. Two Kenyans, six correspondence three of whom are from MBC agency, two Syrians, and one Lebanese were captured. Two Brits were killed.
3. Northern [region]
 - a. At 0215 on 24 March 2003, information from [Abbreviated first name] Anwar from Northern region intelligence office indicate the presence of three enemy armored vehicles in the region between Al-Anbar and Ninawa governorate. Al-Ba'aj party force went out to meet it.
 4. New information

At 0300 on 24 March 2003, information coming from Al-Quds Army office during heavy raids by enemy helicopters, one of the helicopters had a forced landing in Al-Hindiyah region. Its two-men crew was detained and it was sent to Mister Kerbala governor.

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In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Summary report from Section 37 for 24 March 2003

1.
 - a. Observation post 966 reported sounds of explosion between Al-Najaf and Al-Shataqiyah.
 - b. Missiles in Alexandria heading toward Baghdad.
 - c. At 0045 communication has been secured in Al-Ma'awuniyah and some lines are down.
2. At 0050, observation post 968 reported a helicopter between Al-Najaf and Al-Shataqiyah.
3. At 0120, observation post 954 reported [illegible] north west Kut.
4. Observation post 827 and 828 reported land explosion.
5.
 - a. At 0120, missile reported in Alexandria heading towards Baghdad.
 - b. At 0200, Cruise missiles from Alexandria heading towards Baghdad.
 - c. Sound of a helicopter between Al-Latifiyah and Al-Sawirah.
6. Presence of 21 armored enemy vehicles in [illegible] Khartah Um Sur (7439) between Al-Anbar governorate and Ninawah. Al-Ba'aj section went attacked the enemy force.
7. Cruise missile targeted Mosul city.
8. At 0710, aircrafts entered the [national] airspace from Turkey between Al-Imadiyah and Zakhu.

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9. Observation post (640-641) reported explosion 50 Kilometers south of Al-Amadiyah.
10. At 0645, American armor began entering the city of Um-Qasr. A coast guard force L/45 engaged them and they quickly left the city. Their current gathering is in Al-Arsifah [illegible], radio station, the old port, and the port resting area. Currently four helicopters are moving in the direction of the highway over the city of Al-Jazeera. A detachment from the defense team of the Gulf Academy moved to engage them. Yesterday was quite. Communications is underway with our forces in Al-Faw. Instructions have been sent out for them to gather in their old headquarters before if falls. Now the situation is calm in Al-Faw.
11. At 0200 on 24 March 2003, heavy enemy air raids and a helicopter made a forced landing in Al-Hindiyah district. The two-men crew was detained and helicopter was send to Mr. the governor of Kerbala.
12. At 0825, observation post 648 in Mosul reported bombing.
13. Observation post 501 reported sighting of eight tanks 160 Kilometer towards the observation post.
14. Observation post 504 reported eight tanks two to three kilometers from the northern observation post.
15.
 - a. At 0755, observation post 505 reported eight tanks 1 kilometer north of the 150 K area.
 - b. [Observation post] 506 reported one helicopter.

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16. At 0905, observation post 504 reported eight armored vehicles inside the observation area.
17. At 0910, observation post 503 reported fire from the armored vehicles.
18. At 0915, observation post 506 report explosion on the ground.
19.
 - a. Observation posts 506-507 reported repeated explosions on the ground.
 - b. Observation post 507 reported heavy fire across from the post.
20. At 0965, observation post reported two armored vehicles moving towards the observation post.
21. At 0930, observation 910 in Al-Dir reported an airborne drop.
22. At 0925, observation post 640 to 641 reported a strong explosion on the ground in Mosul.
23. Bombing of targets in the air on the eastern side.
24. Observation 209 reported [illegible] air bombing.
25. Observation 109 north of Al-Dir reported four helicopters.
26. Four aircrafts were seen flying in Al-Nasr village across from Al-Dir going toward area 4K. It is being engaged near Imam Salman Bin Dawud.
27. At 1000 on 23 March 2003, enemy forces bombed Al-Faji'I Bridge on [illegible] and was completely destroyed.
28. At 1100 on 23 March 2003, the enemy bombed Huran Bridge on the public street in the city of Heat for the second time completely destroying it.

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29. At 1005, enemy aircrafts attacked [illegible] base in Tall Al-Rumman in Mosul killing two officers and two soldiers.
30. A classified, urgent and secret letter 62 from police directorate in southern Karkuk in 23 March 2003. Southern [illegible] intelligence officer personally contacted Major Matlak Salih, Fida'iyyin Saddam in Basrah, and the latter told him that the Fida'iyyin and the brave men from the party carried out an attack on the loosing enemy on Al-Zubayr Bridge burning two tanks along with their crews. The enemy withdrew in shame. The beaten force was more 50 tanks.
31. At 1025, the forces in Kerbala shot down a helicopter and detained its pilot.
32. At 1020, one of the citizens told [illegible]/7 forces in Al-Nakhib that there are eight armored vehicles blocking the road with barbed wire and marked them with flags in the area of Anzah about eleven Kilometers away from Al-Nakhib.
33. At 0200, a drone was shot down in Al-Shalahjah area. Possibly American or Iranian.
34. At 1045, three enemy helicopters near Industry Institute fired at civilian vehicles coming into Al-Faw hitting two vehicles.
35. Drone was shot down in Al-Basrah.

(7-19)

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36. At 1050, observation post 829 south of Al-Aziziyah reported a ground explosion.
37. At 1115, observation post 960 west of Al-Diwaniyah reported sounds of explosions on the ground.
38. Enemy convoy slowly moved parallel to the strategic road towards the governorate of Kerbala. Brigadier General Salman Al-Ustur visited Kerbala intelligence center and took Babil-Al-JafI-National road and Al-Najaf-Kerbala national road and the road is open currently- no road blocks.
39. At 1210, heaving bombing on Al-Nasiriyah.
40. Attack with 2 air launched missiles on [illegible]/17 positions.
41. At 1200, on 24 March 2003, we received information indicating that Chinook helicopters from Al-Nasiriyah city toward Al-Samawah through Al-Khidr area on the new highway have dropped a number of armor and equipment. The size of the force is unknown.
42. At 1245, enemy aircrafts attack our defiant forces in Saddam international airport striking an empty building. No losses reported.
43. At 1235, a number of helicopters in western Al-Ahwar are likely to have dropped a force [illegible] using military vehicles.
44. At 1310, the Russian military attaché in Baghdad called on behalf of the Russian command and asked if they could receive the American Apache helicopter that was shot down and shown in TV.

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45.

- a. Team 800 supplied us with information collected through interrogation of Iraqi drivers coming from Jordan. The information indicated the movement of a large number of American and British military equipment. Soldier from maintenance were seen in Al-Jafr, Al-Azraq, Al-Safawi, and Al-Rushi areas.
- b. Large number of aircrafts was seen in those areas. This information is six days old.
- c. Large aircrafts were seen on 15 March 2003 in [illegible].
- d. Jordanian and Saudi vehicles were seen moving equipment and missiles from Al-Aqabah and Al-Ruwif to Al-Jafr on a daily basis.
- e. Jordan was transporting aircraft fuel from Jordanian refineries to airbases.
- f. The set up a base near Al-Ruwishid was seen [illegible] American forces. They were dressed up in civilian clothes and were driving civilian vehicles. They were transporting civilian vehicles [illegible] providing security for the base.
- g. Armored vehicles were seen moving from Al-Aqabah to Al-Ruwishid, Safadi, and Al-Jafr.
- h. A refugee base was set up near Al-Ruwishid.
- i. One of the drivers reported based on what a Jordanian citizen said that aircrafts bombing the country are taking off from Jordan.
- j. Journalist interviewed drivers going from Iraq to Jordan.

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46. A drone was shot down within the fourth district in Karkuk on its way to Baghdad. The time is unknown.
47. The done was shot down at 2235 on 23 March 2003. It is of type Pioneer carrying equipment for electronic jamming. It has a Turbo engine. Was downed in the Al-Jazeera area between Al-Tharthar and Tikrit with [illegible] missiles by [illegible]/202 forces.
48. At 1412, the military Russian attaché in Baghdad call regarding the delivery of the helicopter and he was told that his request will be transmitted to the authorities and will be contacted immediately when his request is granted.
49. Enemy convoy moving towards Kerbala through Khan Al-Nasr. It is moving in parallel in the strategic line on the left side towards Kerbala.
50. At 1400, the enemy armor set up a position across from natural gas in Um-Qasr. Enemy conducted an airborne drop in Um-Qasr and are currently in Um-Qasr radio station. Enemy armor gathered before natural gas tanks in Um-Qasr. Enemy conducted an airborne drop of reinforcement including various armored equipment from their main base in the oil company in Al-Faw. At 1300, four Chinook helicopters landed in Um-Qasr port. At 1405, seven Chinook helicopters is landing in Um-Qasr port then taking off carrying armored vehicles and flying towards the Basrah-Safwan main road. Currently, three helicopters carrying out air raids on Basrah-Al-Faw main road in front of Industry Institute. A convoy is currently moving towards the strategic road to Al-Basrah.

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51. Mr. Deputy directed that all centers be contacted to find out the status of the enemy within the jurisdiction of each center. Information must be sent to use within twenty minutes.
52. At 1520, a drone is currently over Al-Rashidiyah.
53.
 - a. Babil Center/ No change
 - b. Al-Najaf Command Center/ Everything is normal in the governorate. The convoy is still moving towards Kerbala in the area of Al-Rahba.
 - c. Al-Qadisiyyah Center/ the night of 23 March 2003. Enemy bombing of Al-Karmal brigade, Al-Quds Army. Airborne drop of 12 armored vehicles towards the highway [illegible]. The enemy forces withdrew after the confrontation with the above brigade.
 - d. Al-Muthana Intelligence Center/ Situation stable and the Al-Diwaniyah-Al-Muthana road is open. The information is from Al-Hitah due to the interruption of communication. An unusual situation in the switchboard. There is a dial tone but cannot make a connection. There is firing in the direction of the area of 7 April district near the cement factory towards Al-Hadr and Al-Nasiriyah. The resident has moved from the eastern bank to the western bank. A group of enemy tanks moved towards the training center. It is now about 400 meters away. Currently, there are no convoys in the direction of Al-Najaf governorate. On 23/24 March 2003 however, there are moving convoys. The enemy entered Al-Khidr district near the

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- depots. Seven collaborators, who were seen near the American tanks on board of two vehicles, one of them was a GMC and the other was Caprice, were captured. They are now under interrogation in Al-Muthana police station.
- e. Al-Ratabah intelligence center/ Communications are still unavailable but one of the units came from Tarbil compound (Al-Qadisiyyah) and everything is open. The road is passable.
 - f. Al-Qa'im Intelligence Center/ The lines are cut off and currently waiting for it to be fixed.
54. An injured American prisoner who is a truck driver. His name is Dan in the third Air Defense sector in Al-Nasiriyah. He was delivered by Fida'iyyin Saddam in Al-Nasiriyah.
- 55.
- a. Zi Qar (Line and wireless communication). Currently, there is heavy bombing inside the city.
- 56.
- a. At 1530, airborne drop by three aircrafts at the entrance of Al-Nasiriyah on Kut-Al-Habayish [illegible] and destroyed the force that engaged them.
 - b. Shat Al-Arab Intelligence Office/ There is communication except with [illegible] brigade. A drone was shot down.
 - c. Al-Qarnah Intelligence Office/ There is communication. At 1235, three helicopters landed in Al-Nashwah and a number of others in Al-Shafi. A force went out to carry out an offensive. Four aircrafts in Al-Nasr village in Al-Dir near Imam Salman Bin Dawud.

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- d. Al-Faw Intelligence Office/ There is currently no direct communication from Al-Faw Intelligence office. Communication is initiated from their side only. Presence of two member of the office. A collaborator was captured; he claimed that he is from Samar TV. Two that were with him fled toward Iran. The enemy is currently 10 Km from Al-Sibah with tracked armored vehicles on the public street in large numbers about 100 or more.
- e. Al-Zubayr Intelligence Office/ There is no communication. They are able to call us from their end. Communication was made with the party and security and two tanks and four armored vehicles have been destroyed and all equipment has been seized. Among this equipment are the films of the enemy's invasion. Two Brits and two Kenyans were killed. Six journalists were captured. Armored vehicles are moving towards Al-Rahimiyah at Safwan Um-Qasr crossroad and Al-Rahimiyah and the other direction is near the Tomatoes market. Currently there are two armored vehicles on the other bank of the Al-Zubayr Bridge.
- f. [Illegible] Intelligence Center/ Line and wireless communication. At 1235, a force of two armored vehicles and 20 to 40 soldiers were air dropped at Al-Sawirah. It was seen by citizen on his way from Baghdad to Al-Imarah early this morning. It was responded to by our military units and party forces. The force was destroyed, killed, and captured.

(3-19)

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57. A convoy is still moving slowly is currently on the right and left of the strategic highway. Enemy forces attacked a number of farmers and burned one of their vehicles across from Al-Haydariyah about 30 to 40 Km from Kerbala. Visibility is very low due to dust.
58. Wasit Intelligence Office/ There is no communication. Waiting on procedure.
59. American air force [illegible] towards the Iranian territories by about 20 Km [illegible].
60. Information that came to us from one of the assigned to special mission, a resident of Waryan [illegible] and Al-Ratbah, indicated the following: Presence of 15 armored vehicles, 10 helicopters in the area between [illegible] and Al-Ratabah. Four trucks [illegible]. Enemy airplanes attacked one of the house of a Shamar tribesman and burned his vehicle and killed four of his sheep. There is nothing unusual happening in [illegible] and Kerbala.
61. At 1730, one of the civilians of Kerbala intelligence office arrived to the strategic road 20 Km south of Kerbala [illegible]; he did not see an armored convoy but saw a number of helicopters hovering in the area. There are no armored forces in the area. Visibility is very low.

(14-19)

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62. On his way from Al-Ratbah, an agent noticed the presence of 6 armored vehicles in the eastern 160 Km area about 1 ½ to 2 km from the highway.
- 63.
- i. The enemy continues to be present in the form of groups of about 5 to 6 armored vehicles in the various areas of Al-Anbar and Al-Ratabah.
 - ii. On 23 March 2003, a force of 15 to 25 armored vehicles attacked Sa'd Shamal airport. A heavy air bombing after which the force withdrew.
 - iii. On 23 March 2003, equipment and ammunition have been taken out of the depots to the Wasil city of Al-Ratbah following orders from the command.
 - iv. Al-Qadisiyyah and Al-Walid compounds are in good condition. The situation in Al-Ratbah is good too despite the daily enemy air presence.
 - v. Al-Walid base which was consolidated with air defense/2 sector is still resisting and under heaving air bombing.
 - vi. On 23 March 2003, a vehicle carrying Arab volunteers coming from Syria was bombed. Five Syrians and one Palestinian were martyred. Sixteen were injured. They were evacuated to Al-Ratbah hospital.
64. Enemy aircrafts over Al-Hashimiyah towards Baghdad.
65. Information coming in indicating attempts of airborne drop in [illegible].

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- A force from the fighters in the Leading party and a unit from Division 14 to resolve the problem (details later).
66. Observation posts 782 and 784 near Kafri, green light in the east.
 67. Wave of Cruise missiles from Al-Najaf towards Baghdad.
 68. Observation post 511 reported sound of helicopter north of 170 Km area.
 69. At 2040, observation 508 reported a helicopter.
 70. At 2042, observation 847 on Iran side reported sounds of explosion.
 71. At 2030 enemy launched missiles from Al-Najaf sea towards Baghdad. The missiles were 8.
 72. At 2052, Cruise missile reported in the direction of Baghdad.
 73. Observation 511 at 160 Km area reported sound of helicopter.
 74. At 2129, observation 511 at 160 Km reported one helicopter west of Al-Qadisiyyah base.
 75. At 2145, Cruise missile going towards Baghdad from Alexandria. Currently trying to shoot it down.
 76. Observation posts 822 and 823 reported explosion on the ground.

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77. At 1630, Al-Rashid tribe captured 6 individuals, 4 of whom are Iranians, 2 Lebanese claiming to be journalists during their crossing from Iran to Al-Faw city.
78. At 1630, information came to us from technical sources saying the following: From Al-Adl area site to Hamid base in Al-Ahwaz site, American and British airborne drops in Corps 3 site and towards Nahrah Omar.
79. At 2115, reconnaissance was done for Al-Faw road [illegible]. Nothing to report.
80. At 1400, the enemy used helicopters to attack the Arab [illegible] line of the Academy base; and the beginning of Al-Basrah lightening strike. Sounds of explosions and firing from Al-Zubayr and the airport. At 1230, American forces used 18 Chinook helicopters to transport armor located in Um-Qasr port [illegible] towards the south from the sea side and going into Kuwait.
81. Explosion near Fifth Fleet in Bahrain.
82. There is currently a heavy exchange of fire in Al-Haydariyah area.

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and about 7 Km from command of Al-Gharbiyah bases 20 Km south of Kerbala. The firing is coming from the tribesmen and the party units. The size of enemy force is unknown. There are also two armored vehicles that crossed the national highway and stopped the passing vehicles from Al-Najaf to Kerbala and interrogated its drivers. Battles are still ongoing.

83. At 2100 on 24 March 2003, an airborne drop of armored vehicles by helicopters took place between Haditah train station and Haditah ammunition depots on T 1 road. There is 2 Km between the armored vehicles and the depots. A force of tribesmen and party elements to handle the vehicles.
84. At 2330, enemy aircrafts reported moving towards Baghdad over Alexandria.
85. At 2335, Cruise missile reported over Alexandria going towards Baghdad.
86. At 2350, heavy bombing of Martyr Al-Yasiri airport. Map of neighborhood 1/100000 m (2052)

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In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Summary report of Section/37 for 23 March 2003

1. Question about situation of convoy 300 tanks. Unit Direction showed the following: Al-Najaf convoy 10 tanks 10 Km from Al-Najaf towards the strategic line and Kerbala. The convoy in Al-Samawa is stopped at this time in the same area.
2. Observation post 971 west of Al-Najaf reported targeting of Baghdad.
3. Observation post 826 reported explosion between Budrah and Jasan
4. Observation 967 reported air raid north of Al-Najaf.
5. Phone communication between southern customs officer and deputy Abbas from Um-Qasr, Um-Qasr customs indicated the following:
 - a. The ten docks: Arrival of a ship in the old port and unloading of a number of bulldozer, barbed wire, containers, and a bus with Saudi and Kuwaiti numbers.
 - b. Fighting with coast guard.
 - c. A group of journalists visited the area many time.
 - d. American forces took position in radio station of Um-Qasr. There also a force behind Customs center. The enemy force has not yet entered the city of Um-Qasr.
6. Redeployment of Saudi forces along Iraq-Syrian borders on 21 March. Division 3 and Division 14. The equipment was moved at night on the train.
7. Observation 962 north of Al-Najaf reported explosion on the ground.
8. At 0200, enemy aircrafts bombed the Leader Party branch and intelligence office in Kerbala.
9. At 0955, observation post 972 Kerbala reported 2 fast and low flying missiles and bombing against Kerbala.
10. On 0525, Corps 1, Bait Lahm Division, Zi Al-Qar Brigade at Suq charged towards an American force at Al-Shuyukh crossroad:
 - a. Three Americans were killed. Their corpses were taken to the military base Zi Al-Qar and they were photographed.
 - b. Female soldier was captured and was received from Fida'iyyin Saddam.
 - c. Seven tracked vehicles were destroyed in Al-Khamsiyat village. The battle ended at 0900. The enemy force fled.

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- Al-Jazeera television. British military sources announce loss of British fighter.
11. At 1020, Nuclear energy project, missiles from south to North.
 12. At 1040, observation post 973 reported heaving bombing south of Kerbala.
 13. At 0900, Al-Nakhib area was subjected to heaving bombing.
 14. At 0330, enemy aircrafts carried out a heavy bombing against Al-Karmah region and air dropped two armored vehicles on the right and left of Al-Faw road. It was followed by air drop of six armored vehicles across from Al-Karmah area and airdrop of radar vehicle. At 0845, the enemy took the radar. Our forces attack today early morning and the enemy withdrew.
 15. At 1042, Anti-aircraft and anti-missile artillery shot down a Cruise missile at 1045. Observation post 964 north east of Al-Nakhib (Al-Hashimiyah) reported the sighting of a B52. Observation post 836 reported ground explosion in Kut.
 16. At 1050, observation post 958 south of Al-Hashimiyah reported two soldiers and one B52.
 17. Observation post 836 in Kut reported ground explosion.
 18. At 1105, observation 838 in Kut reported ground explosion.
 19. Observation post 975 in Al-Hashimiyah reported an air raid.
 20. At 1111, observation post 941 east Mosul reported the sighting of a soldier and an explosion.
 21. At 1120, observation post 626 reported engagement with helicopters near observation post in Tall Afar.
 22. Observation post 622 north of Mosul, reported sighting of soldier toward Dahuk.
 23. At 1145, observation post 624 in Ayn Zalah reported sighting of B52 with bombing at Al-Jabayish-Al-Islah crossroad.
 24. At 1150, air defense/ 3 Major Ahmad in Sayid Dakhil reported the outcome of the battle with the enemy. 15 killed and 6 that included 2 officers, 2 female soldier, and 2 male soldiers were capture. A truck which could be loaded with chemical weapons was captured. In addition, 2 were killed in Suq Al-Shuyukh area. 2 rescue Helicopters were in the area.
 25. Colonel Ayyad from Al-Janubiyah report 2 tanks destroyed in Abu Sakhr region by party apparatus, Al-Adilah branch command. Al-Jazeera area is currently under enemy artillery bombing.
 26. Collaborators rented about 50 transport vehicles from the citizens without a driver and they drove the vehicles. They had told the owners of the vehicles that the trucks would be brought be to them within five days. It appears that they were going to use the vehicles to transport equipment from Zakhu to their camps.

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27. A friend of the northern component supplied them with information indicating that the collaborator Sami Abd-al-Rahman met with the agent Democratic Party local council of Sinjar in Dahuk. A number of the relocated from Sinjar attended the meeting and they were told to be ready to move back to Sinjar after the fall of Mosul.
28. On 21 March, the collaborator Amin Al-Najar, head of the fictitious Arbil forces command visited Al-Shaykh Sirwan and Al-Dahiman villages where a number of the destructive elements are stationed [illegible] in order to ensure their readiness to carry out their activities and enforces these positions with more destructive elements.
29. At 1800 on 22 March, enemy jets and helicopters heavily bombed our forces positioned in Shat Al-Arab and the defensive lines (Al-Dawas, Majbala, Katak).
30. At 1900, enemy forces carried out an air drop of a number of armored vehicles (between 3 and 6) in Al-Kat'ah area. Corps 3, Brigade h/ 11 engaged the forces with a heavy support from the helicopters. The unit was able to attack the positions of the enemy and at 0200 on March 23, the enemy moved their positions towards the south.
31. At 0200, defensive lines in Al-Dawas and Mahilah were the target of air raids and helicopter attacks.
32. Loss of contact with the positions of Corps 51 Commandos division.
33. At 0540, a white vehicle was seen carrying an aerial radar with two solar panels in the area across from [illegible] base, in Al-Dawis. At 0800, the vehicle withdrew from the area.
34. Zat Al-Sawari base in Al-Nasr port has been reopened (Abu-Flus).
35. Observation post 852 in Al-Razazah reported a missile going from south to north.
36. Sixty-seven Arab volunteers are on Rabi'ah entry road.
37. The enemy is bringing its forces and equipment through the Saudi Al-Qaysumah road with an armor convoy with artillery missiles transported on military vehicles. It is also carrying barbed wire, bulldozers, and bridges coming from Saudi Arabia, Al-Sarawiyat station across from the Iraqi Akramah station on its way into Iraq towards Bakurat Al-Kibd, Basih Al-Salman road and towards Al-Mamlaha area, Al-Samawah along the strategic highway going to Al-Najaf.
38. At 1230, a camp for American forces with billeting, 15 helicopters, food supplies, and ammunition loaded on equipment guarded with armor is located in Kamit

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- region (1445) on the right of the road leaving Al-Salman about 24 Km from Al-Samawah.
39. At 1215, a drone was downed in 140 Km area.
 40. Observation post 970 in Al-Shanafiyah reported 50 advancing armor force with helicopter.
 41. At 1230, two armor vehicles were destroyed near Al-Islah, area Corps 4.
 42. Observation post 975 south of Kerbala reported armor force moving towards the area.
 43. At 1310, communication with the Infantry Corps a/ 51 Commando division has been restored.
 44. Observation post 976 reported heavy bombing south of Kerbala.
 45. Observation posts (972-975)/ communication with observation posts interrupted.
 46. Observation post 970 reported 2 helicopters.
 47. At 1330, three missiles fell on the outside of Mosul. Detail to be provided later.
 48. Observation posts (979 and 977) south of Al-Razazah reported sighting of armor.
 49. Observation post 970 was bombed.
 50. Observation post 970 reported sighting of helicopters.
 51. Observation post 971 reported sighting of helicopters.
 52. At 1410, observation post 962 reported armor north of Al-Shanafiyah.
 53. At 1414, air defense/ 3 destruction of 3 enemy trucks and martyrdom of 5 comrades in the city of Al-Nasiriyah/ Al-Nasiriyah Bridge.
 54. At 1330, 3 missiles fell on the outskirts of Mosul. Detail to be provided later.
 55. At 1345, observation posts 977 and 979 south of Al-Razazah reported sighting of armor.
 56. At 0800, an attack detachment from Navy intelligence was sent to Al-Faw. No enemy presence was found. Al-Faw-Basrah road was empty of all enemy armor and the road is open all the way to Al-Faw entrance. A battle is ongoing in Al-Faw.
 57. Al-Zubayr burned a British armored vehicle and detained two British soldiers.
 58. American enemy set up a moving fueling station in Al-Sharakiyah region towards Al-Salman 12Kms from Al-Samawah. It is a 13 tanker truck and 2 trailers and 2 Jeep vehicles with 60 soldiers and 4 female soldiers.
 59. At 1000, 78 tanks entered with a number of armor in the direction of Al-Nasiriyah

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- towards the strategic road going to Al-Najaf. Some of them are in-operational being towed by the others.
60. At 1230, a convoy of 101 vehicles and missile launchers, 6 barrels and single barrel, was reported coming from Al-Salman on the strategic road. It stopped at the refueling station. Source of information is [abbreviate portion of the name] Muhammad Lazzam, from Al-Muthana base used in Al-Samawah intelligence center as a guide.
 61. Observation post 57 near Al-Bu'asan village reported an air drop of armor on Mosul-Baghdad road.
 62. Information came to use from our sources about the agents of the Zionist network indicates the following:
 - a. A number of Badr Coprs has been sent from Hamid base and the northern camp of Al-Jabayish to Al-Basrah and its surrounding in order to take advantage of the current situation.
 - b. From Hur Al-Huwizah to Um Al-Siba' Hur Al-Hawizah could be complete and organized and could have a continued execution between the groups but there is reservation due the presence of our forces in the area. They must secure communication with us and continue to work at every hour.
 63. At 1515, infantry corps/ 11 and Fida'iyyin clashed with 6 armored vehicles and 6 helicopters at Al-Islah crossroad towards Al-Jabayish. The battles are ongoing.
 64. Two Jeep vehicles east of Al-Hafwah with unmanned weapons and equipment. The vehicles were burned and the weapons seized.
 65. Brochures were dropped on Al-Fallujah.
 66. Initial information indicated that there is a presence of a convoy of tanks from Al-Najaf towards Kerbala on the strategic road at 1550. Western region intelligence office, a convoy of about 20 tanks. Instructions have been issued to verify the information and its accuracy and informing us of any developments.
 67. Observation post 970 in Al-Shanafiyah reports 16 helicopters.
 68. Observation post 970 in Al-Shanafiyah reports 8 helicopters.
 69. Southern customer police directorate/ intelligence informed us in its letter 6 in 23 March that contact between southern customs intelligence officer and one of the deputies of the directorate informed them of the following: American forces advanced on Al-Nasiriyah-Al-Salam road. They were met with our forces and party and tribal forces in the area. They were able to burn two armored vehicles and two vehicles. Eight soldiers were captured with one female soldier. The enemy forces fled. Enemy helicopters were able to remove two armored vehicles and two damaged vehicles. The current situation is quite.
 70. A convoy of about 50 tanks is going in parallel to the strategic line from Al-Najaf towards Kerbala. It clashed with a unit from Al-Najaf Depots. Four tanks were burned and a portion of the tanks are possibly heading to Al-Kifl (weak probability).

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71. Observation post 655, reported one cruise missile from north to south.
72. Observation posts 622 and 627 south Al-Imarah reported a missile from south to north.
73. Observation post 653 south Makhmur Mushahadah reported 3 missiles going north from south.
74. Observation post 648 in Mushahadah reported 1 Cruise missile from north to south near Al-Qayarah base.
75. Observation post 775 and 776 reported Cruise missile going from north to south near Saddam Al-Qayarah base.
76. At 1900, observation 753 reported 1 Cruise missile west of Al-Tharthar.
77. Two enemy aircrafts conducted an air drop near the position located on Al-Najaf-Kerbala road 4 Km from the city. A detachment and all units went out towards the area of the drop. The force is going from Al-Najfa towards Kerbala; it has passed the Al-Haydariay region and ambush teams went out ahead of it.
78. At 2040, a number of Cruise missiles will be coming from the Gulf towards Baghdad. It is expected to arrive at 2130
79. Observation post 350 reported explosion on the ground on the Syrian borders.
80. Situation in Al-Qa'im district from 1100 on 22 March 2003 and until 1200 on 23 March:
 - a. Presence of 6 tanks in one of the farms in the 70 Km area on Al-Qa'im-Al-Ratbah road.
 - b. Presence of 6 tanks and Landcruiser vehicle in the former Division 3 [illegible] Brigade/ 16 base about 70 Km from Al-Qa'im. The base was fired upon and Husayn Isa Diwan. The rest of the men left to guard the base were able to evacuate the injure and leave the area.
 - c. An armor force of 3 armored vehicles advanced from [possibly T-1] station towards national highway of Al-Qa'im-Al-Ramadi. It has cross the road towards Al-Abdi area. They asked one of the citizens about the military presence then returned to the station mentioned before.
81. A wave a Cruise missiles from Al-Najaf towards Baghdad.
82. Al-Muthana division Intelligence officer informed us of the following:
 - a. At 1600, member of the intelligence was sent to Al-Khidr district and saw on the way at the tunnel near Commerce ministry depots 2 tracked trucks on the sides of the tunnel and a third hidden.
 - b. During his movement towards Al-Kidr area and at Al-Ma'amil [factories] and Al-Fajr crossroads, he saw an armor convoy of up to 27 armored vehicles and tanks was found.

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- c. There are six helicopters, five with single rotor, and one with two rotors.
 - d. During his movement and at about 1 Km from the above-mentioned aircrafts, four aircrafts with a single rotor were seen in the air.
 - e. A Kuwaiti translator was accompanying the convoy. He asked him where he was going.
 - f. He noticed dumping of oil on the national highway. He returned at 1830.
 - g. Intelligence officer of Al-Muthana division was told to inform Al-Muthana intelligence office commander of the information as well as comrade head of Al-Muthana units.
83. Cruise missiles going towards Baghdad from Alexandria.
84. Engaging Cruise missiles flying toward Baghdad by Al-Amiriya corps.
85. Observation post 758 in Al-Tharthar reported five Cruise missiles flying towards Baghdad.
86. Currently, the convoy has stopped between Kerbala and Al-Najaf. Isolating the force towards the farms. Possibly to provide protection for the main force on the strategic line or to conduct other operations.
87. Observation 763 reported a Cruise missile going from north to south.
88. Presence in Um-Qasr. 13 Saudi buses carrying Egyptian military. 25 Saudi armored vehicles. 100 to 150 armored personnel Carrier vehicles. A number of Kuwait [Salon] vehicles. 11 Chinook and Apache helicopters inside the ten docks. Hospital ship at the ten docks. Convoy made up of 25 vehicles crossed Safwan Um-Quds road towards Al-Basrah. British Infantry around Um-Qasr radio station.
89. Another wave of Cruise missile after 2330.
90. Two tanks, four British armored vehicles with full equipments were destroyed. Two Kenyans were captured and two Brits were killed, in addition to six journalists, three from MBC, Syrians, and one Lebanese.
91. Observation post 966 reported sounds of explosion between Al-Najaf and Al-Shanafiyah.
92. Two Cruise missiles going towards Baghdad.
93. At 0045 on 24 March, communication with the seventh commission were secured and it became clear that the line of the directorate are not working except for civilian lines.
94. At 0050, observation post 967 reported a helicopter between Al-Najaf and Al-Shanafiyah.
95. At 0120, observation post 954 reported sighting of red light north-west of Kut.
96. Observation posts 827 and 828 north of Budrah reported explosion.
97. At 0130 missiles from Alexandria towards Baghdad.

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98. At 0200, missiles from Alexandria towards Baghdad.
99. Sound of a helicopter between Al-Latifiah and Al-Sawirah
100. Presence of 3 enemy armored vehicles in Sijan between Al-Anbar governorate and Ninawah. Al-Ba'aj Section went out to meet it.
101. At 0705 on 24 March, missiles flying towards the city of Mosul.
102. At 0715 on 24 March, aircrafts coming from Turkish airspace between Al-Amadiyah and Zakhu.

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Summary report of Section 37 for 22 March 2003

1. Bombing of Al-Quds Army intelligence office by enemy aircrafts. There were casualties. Details coming up.
2. Observation post 984 in Al-Razazah reported one Cruise missile going towards Baghdad.
3. At 0730 complete [electronic] jamming. At 0730, observation post 812 between Khaniqayn and Mindili reported sighting of warhead coming in. At 0740, observation post [unknown] target of heavy bombing.
4. At 0400, enemy airplanes bombed Haditah ammunition depots.
5. At 0645, Zi Qar intelligence office informed us that an enemy armor convoy is at Al-Sharshab going towards Al-Samawah, Syrian district and a second convoy going toward Imam Ali airbase. Heavy bombing of Corps 3 Bait Lahm Division, Al-Quds Army (Suq Al-Shuyukh).
6. Two missiles towards Al-Razazah.
7. At 0825, observation post 982 reported in Al-Razazah two missiles moving towards Baghdad.
8. At 0830, observation post 948 in Al-Razazah reported five Cruise missiles going towards Baghdad. Observation post 950 and 952 in Al-Nu'maniyah reported explosion.
9. At 0830, observation post 770 and 771 in Al-Fathah reported a large target in northwest.
10. At 0831, an aircraft was shot down.
11. At 0835, four missiles were seen going towards Baghdad over Alexandria.
12. Al-Farnas air club- site of Al-Quds Army units, reports of two missiles- Administration and training office, Al-Quds Army, reports of two missiles- [unknown] Al-Quds Army, reports of one missile.
13. At 0845, observation post 978 in Kerbala reports one missile towards Baghdad.
14. At 0830, Zi Qar intelligence center informed us that fighting in ongoing between Corps 11 and [illegible] enemy forces in Awr region old site of 11 Infantry Corps. Fighting is still ongoing.
15. At 0845, observation post 269 in Al-Batha reports armor across observation post. Communication is cut off.
16. At 0700 at 160 angle from Al-Rashid, a Mirage aircraft was seen.
17. Al-Jazeera TV reports, two British helicopters collided in the Arab Gulf and their crew is considered missing.
18. At 0931, four helicopters near Al-Khidr district- Al-Samawah firing towards our units located in the area.
19. At 0946, observation post 709 between Kerbala and Al-Najaf reported strong explosions.

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20. At 1470, observation post 716 near Al-Nakhib reports continuous explosions and smoke.
21. Arrival of armor forces to outside of Al-Samawah attacking the city from Al-Salman side.
22. At 1006, observation posts 831 and 836 reports explosions between Jassan and Al-Nu'maniyah.
23. At 1018, enemy force (2) in east Baghdad.
24. At 1013, observation posts 279 and 280 south of Al-Ramithah reports sighting of (4) helicopters.
25. Enemy bombing of Al-Zubayr Bridge resulting in injury of Colonel Balasim Adnan commander of Third Regiment, Tariq Brigade, Al-Basrah Corps, Al-Qauds Army, and six men.
26. American force moving towards Al-Barjisah has passed Al-Zubayr area. There are tanks and canons outside Al-Zubayr.
27. At 1040, communication between the First section with [TC: Unknown abbreviation for military component] (51-52) has been established in Al-Niba'I and Al-Habaniyah.
28. At 1050, observation post 279 and 280 south of Al-Ramithah reports 8 helicopters going different directions.
29. At 1055, two Cruise missiles were reported by observation post 984 south of Al-Razazah towards Baghdad.
30. At 1057, three Cruise missiles were reported north of Al-Nakhib towards Baghdad station 763.
31. At 0900, Lieutenant Colonel Mu'im Salih, Um-Qasr police center director, borders intelligence, reported American force coming in on Um-Qasr radio station road and blocking Um-Qasr-Al-Zubayr road. Enemy forces are composed of armor and infantry on the ten docks of the port with presence of American forces in the old port. The enemy offered the residents of Um-Qasr food and water which was rejected. At 1400 on 21 March 2003, two Kuwaiti vehicles entered on the (UN) crossing road. It was chased by fled beyond the Kuwaiti borders. A frigate is currently in Um-Qasr port. Three vehicles with Kuwaiti numbers driven by foreign English and French speaking individuals and labeled TV and living in Um-Qasr hospital. There also 17 helicopters in Um-Qasr port.
32. At 1100, air defense operations center reported two Cruise missiles towards Baghdad.
33. At 1117, observation post 984 near Kafri reports explosion on the ground.
34. At 1124, observation post 701 south of Al-Razazah reports explosion on the ground.
35. At 1126, observation post 773 in Al-Fatha reports explosion on the ground.

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36. At 1127, observation 979 near Kerbala reports explosion on the ground.
37. At 1135, observation 978 west Kerbala reports explosion on the ground.
38. Appearance of armor on highway and in [unknown Iraqi military component] area. They are stopping traffic and searching vehicles. They are detaining soldiers and letting civilians go.
39. Information coming from an individual inside Um-Qasr indicated the following:
The enemy pushed forward a number of tanks and armor towards the ten docks in the port to defend helicopters coming from Kuwait in the area between Al-Sina'a area and Um-Qasr radio station.
40. Enemy aircrafts are dropping equipment of 30 X 5 cm with parachutes that can determine targets when transported.
41. A group of civilian individuals are mugging the soldiers and taking their weapons near Al-Karizah Bridge.
42. At 0600, the enemy was able to reoccupy Imam Ali base in Al-Nasiriyah and the withdrawal of Infantry division 11 from the base. Currently the division mentioned is attacking the enemy forces in the mention base.
43. At 1207, observation post 834 east of Al-Aziziyah report explosion on the ground.
44. At 1215, two missiles fell on Misan security office.
45. At 1225, observation post 701 near Al-Razazah reports two Cruise missiles from south going north. Observation post 984 south of Al-Razazah reports one Cruise missile from south to north to north. Observation post 706 west of Al-Razazah [illegible] [unclear sentence].
46. At 1226, observation post 984 south of Al-Razazah report explosion on the ground.
47. At 1240, large number of aircrafts moving towards Baghdad.
48. The enemy carried out heavy and continuous air raids through out the night and day today in Al-Qa'im.
49. At 2121, PTT was completely destroyed and five civilian citizens were injured.
50. Al-Qa'im water project was bombed. The electronic and electrical sections in it have been destroyed. No casualties.
51. The enemy carried out raids against the air defense forces in Al-Fusfat compound and T1 station.
52. The enemy is currently present in the form of armor groups in Al-Kasarat region 90 Km towards Al-Ratbah.
53. At 1240, a drone was downed in Al-Mahawil and it is currently in the party section in Jablah.
54. At 1244, Cruise missiles from Al-Diwaniyah going from north to north.

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55. Helicopters over Khur port is being engaged currently.
56. At 1220, enemy aircraft dropped three missiles on Al-Najaf governorate building and was destroyed.
57. At 1145, a helicopter downed in Al-Samawah area.
58. At 1200, the party branch of Al-Qadisiyyah was bombed and five comrades were killed.
59. At 1325, [illegible] aircraft 166 was shot down and the pilot landed in Al-Shu'lah area in Baghdad.
60. At 1325, observation posts 333 and 330 in Jassan reports explosion on the ground.
61. At 1355, Alexandria base reports downing of fighter aircraft.
62. At 1400, observation post 725 between Al-Nakhib and 160 km area reports artillery fire.
63. At 1230, enemy aircrafts attacked [unknown Iraqi component] 764 in Hadithah district resulting in injury of six men.
64. Enemy forces over Pharmacy university department in Bab Al-Mu'azzam
65. Observation force 979 reports air raid in our area.
66. This morning the presence of a container with a parachute was notices near Regiment and Duties/55, first oil protection force. The area was examined and the object was found to be 40 cm length, 5 cm of height with a parachute. The object was photographed and exploded under the supervision of Corps 1, security officer.
67. At 1300, enemy forces entered Al-Faw intelligence center and photographed it with a force of 25 individuals in a helicopter. The force in Al-Faw returned fire resulting in destruction of the force with 3 missiles. They immediately left the city. The enemy is positioned 50 m outside the city.
68. At 1525, observation post 709 reports one Cruise missile.
69. At 1535, Alexandria reports one missile towards Baghdad.
70. Observation 521 in Hadithah reports one Cruise missile from north to south Alexandria, one Cruise missile towards Baghdad.
71. At 1145, a helicopter downed with Roland weapon system in Al-Samawah. 100% confirmed.
72. Observation 507, reports of two Cruise missiles west to east towards Hadithah.
73. Heavy air presence over Alexandria towards Baghdad.
74. Pamphlets distributed in Al-Ghazaliyah. Have been asked to send a copy.
75. Information coming from Al-Muthanah village indicates presence of convoy of 37 tanks supported by Apaches.

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- They are accompanied by fuels tankers moving towards the strategic line.
76. Future equipment found will be destroyed without moving it
 77. Minister of defense reports presence of 300 tanks in Al-Samawah village.
 78. Al-Janubiyah customs police directorate informed us in its letter 59 on 22 March that Lieutenant Colonel Abd-al-Mun'im Salih Taqi Um-Qasr customs police center reported the presence of Arabic speaking forces (Kuwaiti) behind the center detonating land mines planted by us in preparation for expected airborne drop today or tomorrow. Looting by citizens of state institutions. Martyrdom of an infantry detachment in Um-Qasr. Presence of armor force in the ten docks and removal of vehicles located in Um-Qasr hospital to Kuwait. Convoys moving toward Um-Qasr coming from Kuwait.
 79. At 1750, observation post 271 in Al-Bathah, Al-Samawah reports a large number of armored vehicles moving towards Al-Samawah.
 80. 1st Brigade, 3rd Division reported by Al-Arabiyah TV.
 81. At 1810, observation post 975 Alexandria reports two Cruise missiles from south to north. Observation post 503 near 160 Km area reports airborne drop of 7 armored vehicles.
 82. Situation in Corps 11
 - a. Area Tal Lahm-Suq Al-Shuyukh: At 1000, seven enemy vehicles were destroy including five that were carried on trucks, six vehicles, and two vehicles on the bridge were also destroyed, and 16 American soldiers were killed.
 - b. Area Imam Ali Base: Enemy forces near the training center. Currently there is a ballet taking place.
 - c. Area Al-Batha-Electric energy: Battles with the enemy are still underway.
 83. Situation until 1600 on 22 March 2003
 - a. At 0800 on 22 March 2003, armor force of 20 vehicles coming from Al-Salman supported by helicopters and fighter jet attacked destroying fueling station of Al-Samawah base and entered the infantry training center in Al-Samawah.
 - b. At 0810, a force from Fida'yyin Saddam and the vanguards of security and party attacked the enemy force and they were able to determine its movement and took a defensive line at about 500 m from the city.

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- battles continued and the attacking force withdrew to near Al-Samawah Infantry training center. Fighter jets provided support.
- c. Enemy aircrafts continued its bombing of the city center and its suburbs as well as our air defense force positions and civilian centers.
 - d. The office of the member of Iraqi national command and head of Al-Muthana units was bombed. The home of Al-Muthana governor was also bombed.
 - e. American forces located in Qada Al-Salman interrogated citizens and checked their identity.
84. At 1800, six buses entered Um-Qasr carrying soldiers from Al-Fathah in Um-Qasr and they walked in. Their mission is to isolate the port from the city. Information source was a Bangladeshi individual.
 85. Six British individuals were killed and comrade Amir Sha'ban, primary school principal, was martyred. Nine others were injured. Currently, aircrafts are throwing flares to illuminate the district.
 86. Information coming to us from customs indicate truck carrying unknown loads accompanied by 30 to 40 empty buses carrying Kuwait license plates is moving from Safwan towards Al-Nasiriyah.
 87. Observation posts 354, 355, and 351 reported sounds of helicopters on the Syrian borders.
 88. At 1915 today, enemy aircrafts bombed Diyala party branch headquarter.
 89. At 1800, the American enemy attacked by air the 1st Corps, 501st Battalion in Khaniqayn.
 90. At 1800, enemy aircrafts dropped a rectangular device looks like a camera on one of the oil wells located on Imam Wis. One of the shepherds informed the party and a combined force from the party and our military units went out to investigate. The device was found and sent to Liberation Hero branch in Al-Miqdadiyah.
 91. Observation post 233 reported a Cruise missile going from south to north.
 92. Observation post 710, 711, and 716 reported advancing armor from Al-Nakhib towards Al-Razazah.
 93. Observation post 480 and 478 reported (2) helicopter south of Sinjar by 40 Km.
 94. At 1700, enemy aircrafts raided Al-Qadisiyyah base and Wadi Huran bridge on the public street between Baghdadi and Hadithah then made a detour near the bridge. The road is open now.

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95. Observation posts 342, 343, 476,477, and 349 reported sounds of helicopter moving east to west.
96. Observation post 471 in Ayn Al-Faras reported one helicopter.
97. Commander of 3rd Division reports airborne drop by two helicopters in Al-Shatrah region supported by fighter jets. They have contacted and they confirmed that the aircrafts left immediately without unloading any equipment.
98. Observation post 984 reported one Cruise missile from south to north (Kerbala)
99. Observation post 982 reported two Cruise missiles and a heavy air raid in Kerbala.
100. Observation post 984 reported two Cruise missiles from south to north in Al-Razazah.
101. Shot down a Cruise missile in Al-Amiriyah.
102. On the night from 21 to 22 of March, enemy forces bombed the communication center located 25 m from intelligence office of Al-Ratbah resulting in injury of Muhannad Fath-al-Din, Yahyah Kazar, Bashar Adi, and Mukhlis Muhammad by the flying debris. Their injuries are minor and they refuse to be evacuated.
103. At 2200 on 21 March, a blue Brazilian vehicle with two individuals riding it fired at a group of comrades in Al-Khadra resulting in the martyrdom of two comrades. A white Brazilian vehicle (217941) covered in mud was asking about alternative bases.
104. A resident of Al-Nattaf village in Al-Fallujah saw a landing of a helicopter near the tourist city in Al-Habaniyah. A force from the party and the tribes went out looking in the area but could not find anything.
105. Observation post 618 reported heaving artillery fire towards helicopters in the north of Sinjar.
106. Observation post 714 reported sounds of helicopter.
107. Observation post 612 and 617 reported sounds of helicopter.
108. Observation post 619 and 613 reported sounds of helicopter. Sounds of two helicopters in Al-Ba'aj and two helicopters in Tall Afar.
109. Observation posts of Tikrit reported a wave of Cruise missiles from north to south.
110. Observation post 408 reported downing of a helicopter in Al-Ba'aj, Al-Sakar village.
111. Observation 975 reported Cruise missile towards Baghdad and enemy forces from the north coming in through Bibyu area toward the Iraq-Iraq-Turkish triangle then withdrew.
112. Observation post 480 south of Al-Ba'aj reports sounds of helicopter and a fighter airplane.
113. Observation 624 and 471 reports one red light south of Mosul by 30 km.
114. Artillery fire towards 471 Tall Samir, south of Al-Halibah on the line 36.

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115. Verification of information about convoy of 300 tanks per Karbal-Al-Najaf-Al-Muthana center command and must supply us with the result before 0600 today.
116. Large enemy air force in Mosul and air bombing of civilian targets not yet known. The force of helicopter is expected to search for the down helicopter.
117. At 2345, 4th Corps base was subject to enemy bombing. No losses.
118. At 0055, observation post 612, 614, and 617 reported helicopter sounds in the Iraqi-Turkish-Syrian triangle near Ayn Zalah.
119. Airborne drop north of Al-Islah.
120. Intelligence office of Al-Najaf reported to us the following:
 - a. Presence of 10 tanks south of Al-Najaf near Al-Rahbah area. It is currently stopped near the strategic line. Our forces have taken a defensive posture and incurred the martyrdom of comrade Nayif Shandagh, member of Al-Najaf branch command, and Staff Major General Zayd Jawad, advisor of command member, and an unknown number of injuries. They are still at the location of the battle.
 - b. Special mission unit (111) with orders from Special Forces clashed with enemy forces in Al-Habariyah area leading to the burning of 3 pickup vehicles and captured 4 officers and other ranks. Three officers are injured. After negotiations with American forces they were release after they were taken Jami' Al-Habariyah. In Al-Habariyah, 5 to 6 trucks and a helicopter.
121. At 0145, beginning of ground assault against Al-Najaf governorate southwest Al-Najaf from Al-Najaf sea side. The force is unknown.
122. Missiles in Tikrit one was possibly shot down.
123. At 2002, observation 972 in southwest of Al-Najaf reports presence of bombing against the post.
124. Al-Jazeera TV reported at 0215 that someone broke into 101st Division camp in Kuwait and injured 8 American soldiers.
125. At 0219, observation post 978 reports four Cruise missiles near Kerbala.
126. At 0230, a wave of Cruise missiles towards Baghdad from Alexandria.
127. Al-Jazeera TV reported a new group of B52 aircrafts leaving For British Fort towards Iraq and that it is expected to arrive at 1100 on 23 March 2003.

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128. At 0300 on March 23, American enemy attacked the city of Al-Samawah from Al-Malhamah side towards Al-Salman with an armor force accompanied by two fighter aircrafts that provided illumination of the city and attack Fida'iyyin Saddam, Security, emergency force and Al-Quds Army units and the party vanguards. A number of our men were injured.

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In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Summary report for Section/ 37 on 21 March 2003

1. At 0540, the enemy bombed with artillery in the direction of Al-Radkah and Al-Lahibiyah area. The bombing is still ongoing.
2. At 0600, an airborne drop of tracked vehicles and bikes took place near the ammunition depots of Al-Walid airbase with two helicopters. They fled when attacked.
3. At 0608, observation post 776 in Tikrit governorate reported sounds of explosions.
4. At 0620, American aircraft conducted an airborne drop by Chinook helicopters in Al-Ma'amir area in Al-Faw. Our units and party force in the south and north of Al-Faw engaged it.
5. At 0635, observation post 246 and 247 north of Artawi reported a large number of American armor near the posts.
6. Capture of two of the individuals from ammunition depots in Al-Walid base by the American forces.
7. At 0648, observation post 249 west of Al-Basrah reported two helicopters.
8. At 0658, observation post 249 west of Al-Basrah reported bombing by enemy helicopters.
9. At 0810, observation 245, 246, and 247 reported that American forces have passed the posts on the highway (Al-Zubayr-Nasiriyah)
10. Observation post 263, reported armor force south of Al-Nasiriyah.
11. Observation post 122 in Sanam Mountain reported artillery bombing.
12. At 0915, observation post 123 west of Safwan reported continuing explosion on the ground and the sighting of one helicopter.
13. At 0930, observation post 259 north Al-Jalibah reported sighting of armor force moving towards highway 5 km.
14. At 1040, an enemy armor convoy was seen going towards Al-Basrah airport and the coming out of a new force towards Al-Tubah.
15. Al-Nakhib customs police center, on the evening of 20 March, four American armor units entered Al-Habariyah area. When they arrived, they asked if the house of Shaykh Mut'ab located in the area is Saddam Hussein's house and asked about Al-Nakhib area [illegible] and whether there are bases for launching missiles in the area.
16. At 1135, observation post 224 east of Al-Imarah reported explosion.
17. At 1150, Amar [abbreviated name] made contact and reported the following: The

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- road between Safwan and Um-Qasr near Martyr Hammam center. American forces took complete control of the city of Saftwan and is currently moving on the highway towards Al-Nasiriyah. There is also a British convoy near Al-Jazira, Saddam International airport and an American convoy towards the farms of Um A'nij on the borders between Zi Qa and Al-Basrah governorates. A check point was set up by the enemy forces on the highway letting civilian out but detaining military personnel.
18. At 1205, a group of special mission intelligence engaged in a fight with 5 foreign armored vehicles on the old road of Al-Ratbah, Al-Anbar about 35 km from Al-Ratbah. Three members of the special mission were injured and they evacuated to the hospital of Al-Ratbah. The rest of the members stayed to deal with the situation.
 19. At 1228, observation post 977 near Al-Imarah reported explosion and at 1230 observation post 290 northeast of Al-Najaf reported explosion. At 1238, there was an raid on [unknown Iraqi military component] in Al-Samawah.
 20. At 1302, observation post 268 west of Al-Nasiriyah reported our infantry forces engaging enemy helicopters.
 21. At 1325, Seventh Deputy met with Al-Janubiyah intelligence office and asked about the latest developments. He reported the following:
 - a. Presence of tanks at Safwan-Um-Qasr crossroad.
 - b. The enemy was able to isolate the city of Al-Faw and is currently going towards the oil southern company.
 - c. They passed Al-Zubayr district and the armored vehicles are moving toward the 44 km area. There is a bombing of Al-Nasiriyah camp currently.

Comment: He said that the enemy is more likely to block the Al-Nasirya national highway and that they are increasing their advance towards Al-Imarah and might block Al-Imarah-Al-Basrah national highway. It seems that the enemy has used all of their available forces in the area and might get reinforcement or open a front in the northern area.
 22. At 1323, auxiliary reconnaissance company C 72 reported sighting of an airborne drop in Huran [unknown Iraqi component]. At 1345 reported an enemy position in Tall Lahm.
 23. At 1330, four reconnaissance trucks were seen around Al-Ratbah on the old road. They opened fire and the 111st unit located in Al-Ratbah intelligence center and with them Staff Lieutenant Colonel Hafiz Awwad Khalaf and Staff Col Mahdi

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- and Lieutenant Colonel Staff Basil. They advanced to the source of fire with a group of tribesmen from Al-Ratbah and fired at the trucks that then withdrew. Currently the units and the citizens are located on the outside of Al-Ratbah near the dirt defenses. There is air bombing by helicopters on Al-Ratbah and the enemy vehicles withdrew.
24. At 1330, information about the presence of two groups of armored groups one of which in Al-Midhim village about 80 km from Hadithah heading towards Huran valley and the second in Buhayrah region in the direction of the same valley. It was seen by the Bedouins near the observation post 507 in Al-Midhim of [unknown Iraqi component]. A 60 men force from the party went out in the direction of the Al-Midhim.
 25. Two defense unit 111 currently on reconnaissance mission in Huran valley. Information to come soon.
 26. Security officer in Al-Anbar Al-Qudrs Army informed us of the following:
 - a. At 1335, they were told by Lieutenant Colonel Ghaza Brigade in the above Division located in Hadithah district that [unknown military component] saw two to three foreign enemy vehicles in Huran Valley.
 - b. A force from and above Division went out to correct the problem.
 27. At 1430, Al-Jazeera TV broadcasted reports of B52 aircrafts taking off from British Fair Fort base towards Baghdad. They were eight (8) aircrafts.
 28. At 1430, enemy aircrafts bombed a military vehicle of type [Orale] in the area 4 Km from Al-Batha check point. Lieutenant and one man were martyred.
 29. At 1230, enemy aircraft launched two missiles against western region near Al-Dawajin fields occupied by 2nd Division, Corps [illegible]. No losses.
 30. At 1530, air bombing against Imam Ali airbase in Al-Nasiriyah. Detail will be available later.
 31. During a reconnaissance by member of Kerbala intelligence office, three residents of Al-Nakhib and neighboring villages, and elements assigned to the special mission in Al-Nakhib, we received the following reports:
 - a. At 0935, four American armored vehicles were seen with a helicopter hovering over it in Al-Habari.
 - b. At 0900, five armored vehicles were seen in Amdisas area with a helicopter hovering over it.

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- c. At 1115, two armored vehicles were seen with a helicopter hovering over them north of Al-Nakhib about 40 Km in the direction of Kerbala. A force from 1st Corps [unknown component], Al-Nakhib customs and a force from the party, security, and Al-Nakhib director inspected the area towards Al-Habariyah. Secretary of Al-Qa'im section of the party supplied them with information coming from the tribes in the area indicating the presence of 15 armored vehicles in the 90 Km area located about 90 Km from Al-Qa'im near the gravel factory. A force from the party and security services in the district was formed to inspect the area. Results coming later.
32. At 1550, American armor forces entered Safwan city.
33. Security officer in Al-Anbar Division, Al-Quds Army informed us that one of the tribal Shaykhs informed A'ali Al-Furat section of the party that:
 - a. Presence of foreign forces between Al-Qa'im and Al-Rumanah.
 - b. Foreign armored vehicles were seen in Al-Mahattah area on Al-Qa'im road.
34. American armor force entering the area near Al-Zubayr and its arrival to Suq Sawadi, one Km from Al-Zubayr.
35. Nothing was found in the search of Huran Valley area.
36. At 1730, information came in indicating that 20 armor vehicles with three white pickups were in the Iraqi territory in Al-Ka'rah region. 15 armored vehicles entered into the Iraqi territory and Al-Kasarat area near Ukashat region.
37. Observation posts 972 and 979 reported explosion inside southwest Al-Umarah.
38. We have received information from security officer, Al-Anbar Division, Al-Quds Army indicating the following: Airborne drop took place with heavy air presence in Zankurah Heet crossroad. At 1815, a force from the party went out to the mentioned crossroad. Source was party in Al-Qati'.
39. A security officer in Al-Najaf Al-Quds Army reported that the American enemy targeted the Al-Najaf security Directorate at 1930. The attack resulted in the injury of six members up to now.
40. Three missiles were shot down by [Iraqi military component] Al-Amiriyah force in Baghdad. One was shot down on Alexandria and three were seen going towards Tikrit.

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41. The Russian attaché informed us that about 30 missiles with wings took off from the ships in the Gulf.
42. Cruise missiles over Alexandria towards Baghdad. A missile was downed over Al-Khalis.
43. Al-Jazeera TV reported that more than 1000 rockets were dropped on selected Iraqi targets.
44. L Mahmud, Al-Quds Army intelligence office director informed us of the following: Two missiles, one in the headquarters and the second in the room across from it.
45. Heavy air bombing on the Al-Qadisiyyah base (Hadithah).
46. At 2100, three missiles on National Security University Department. Two missiles on [unknown component. Abbreviated].
47. A wave of Cruise missiles over Alexandria going towards Baghdad.
48. At 2110, downing of a drone by 1055 Battalion in Al-Basrah.
49. We have been informed by Security officer of Zi Qar Corps of the following: At 2300 the enemy conducted a heavy air bombing in Al-Battah area resulting in the injury of a number of fighters of 3rd Corps, Bait Lahm Division, Al-Quds Army. Details coming later.
50. At 2245, Babil Security Directorate was bombed with two missiles. Details coming later.
51. We were informed by Security officer of Diyala Corps, Al-Quds Army, of where the missile fell:
 - a. Missiles going towards communications center, Central switch board in Ba'qubah center resulting in five injuries and three deaths.
 - b. [Abbreviated unknown component]
 - c. Mujahidi Khalq base in Al-Khalis.
 - d. Agricultural airport in Khan Bani Sa'id.
52. Southern region intelligence office informed us of the following:
 - a. Enemy advancing towards Imam Ali airbase in Al-Nasiriyah and was able to get a foothold in the base.
 - b. Counter attach force 11th Infantry Corps was able to make contact with the enemy and destroy six enemy tanks. Two Iraqi tanks were hit and one destroyed.
 - c. The fore was able to chase away the aggressors outside the base (south of the base).
53. Al-Jazeera TV reported that the number of rockets and bombs dropped reached 1500 on the third day.

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In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Summary report from Section 37 for 21 March 2003

1. At 0540, the enemy bombed Al-Radkah and Lahibiyah and the bombing is still ongoing.
2. At 0600, an airborne drop was conducted near Al-Walid air base ammunition depots with two helicopters. Tracked vehicles and bikes [were unloaded]. They ran away after they were attacked.
3. At 0608, observation 776 reported sounds of explosion in Tikrit governorate.
4. At 0620, American air force air dropped equipment from Chinook helicopters in Al-Ma'amir area in Al-Faw. Our forces and the forces in the party in the south and north of Al-Faw engaged them.
5. At 0635, observation post 246 and 247 north of Artawi reported American armored vehicles near it.
6. Two of the elements from ammunition depots were captured in Al-Walid base by the American forces.
7. At 0648, observation 249 west of Al-Basrah reported two helicopters.
8. At 0658, observation 249 west of Al-Basrah reported bombing by two helicopters
9. At 0810, observation post 245, 246, and 247 on Zubayr and Nasiriyah highway reported American forces passing the observation posts.
10. Observation post 263, reported armor south of Al-Nasiriyah.
11. Observation post 122 in Sanam Mountain reported artillery bombing.
12. At 0915, observation post 123 west of Safwan reported continuous explosion and a helicopter.
13. At 0930, observation post 259 north of Al-Jalibah reported armor movement towards the highway 5 km.
14. At 1040, an enemy convoy was witnessed heading towards Al-Basrah airport. New forces went out towards Al-Tubah.
15. Al-Nakhib customs police center, on the evening of 20 March, four American armor units entered Al-Habariyah area. When they arrived, they asked if the house of Shaykh Mut'ab located in the area is Saddam Hussein's house and asked about Al-Nakhib area [illegible] and whether there are bases for launching missiles in the area.
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50. At 2245, Babil Security Directorate was bombed with two missiles. Details coming later.
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 - a. Missiles going towards communications center, Central switch board in Ba'qubah center resulting in five injuries and three deaths.
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In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Summary report from Section 37 for 20 March 2003

1. At 0532, enemy air assault bombs the city of Baghdad.
2. Observation 256, 257, and 258 at 0555 reported one Cruise missile from south to north.
3. Qatari TV, Al-Jazeera reported missiles heading towards Baghdad.
4. At 0650, Attack near Al-Durah refinery.
5. At 0715, observation 401 reported invading armor taking positions near the observation posts in Al-Abyad region towards Saudi Arabia.
6. At 0725, the Qatari Al-Jazeera TV reported Cruise missiles launched from ships in the Arab Gulf.
7. At 0740, 1st Corps, Brigade 8 reported armor and tanks moving towards the Iraqi territories entering Ar'ar region.
8. At 0745, observation posts 407 and 416 were destroyed resulting in martyrdom of one man, four missing, and the rest have returned. Observation posts 901 and 906 reported five armored vehicles and helicopter inside Makr Al-Na'am. Observation posts 551 and 552 were targets to air bombing towards Jordan. Observation 541 and 548 missing.
9. At 0804, four Cruise missiles over Al-Zubayr towards the north. Observation post 728 reported explosion in the air and the sighting of a helicopter north of Al-Nakhib. Observation post 136, 117, and 121 reported explosion on the ground near Al-Zubayr.

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10. At 0815, withdrawal of all observation posts near by from Sanam Mountain. Observation post 728 reported sighting of helicopter.
11. At 0845, observation post 552 and 559 were targeted by unidentified air assault at 0835.
12. At 0900, attack on Al-Walid base at 0910 we were informed by 1st Corps Brigade 8 commander that American enemy forces moved towards Al-Najaf passing the borders by 80 Km. Enemy forces downed air defense observation posts in the area during their advancement. Enemy force was five armored vehicles with helicopters in Makr Al-Na'am area.
13. At 0930, five armored vehicles were positioned in a check point and captured air defense crews.
14. At 0900, Enemy aircraft dropped pamphlets on Um-Qasr (Details later).
15. Observation post 401 reported four missing among them three observers and one driver. Observation post 414 reported one martyr and two injured. They were evacuated. [Naza'im] Company, two missing and communication equipment destroyed.
16. Two Cruise missiles over Al-Harithiyah area targeting one of the Special Guards regiments.
17. Observation posts 938, 937, and 927 reported explosion. Observation post 232 reported sounds of ground explosion.
18. At 1120, observation 201 near Jasan reported sounds of explosion on the ground.
19. At 1123, reports of one helicopter and four armored vehicles that included Saudis, Qataris, and Americans. They are currently in Ukashat.

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20. At 1125, observation 500 at 160 Km was a target to air bombing which resulted in the martyrdom of two men and one injured.
21. At 1200 on 19 March 2003, withdrawal of all Kuwaiti troops that were stationed along the borders between Iraq and Kuwait.
22. At 1120, reports of 20 armored vehicles on Ukashat-Al-Qa'im road with civilian vehicles with Najaf license plate speaking in Saudi and Kuwait dialects.
23. At 1213, fall of two missiles from enemy aircrafts in Abu-Sakhir area in Al-Najaf. No one killed.
24. At 1315, observation post 136 reported sound of explosion on the ground at 1320. Observation post 120 reported sound of explosion on the ground. Observation post 136 reported explosion on the ground. At 1330, observation post 112 reported explosion on the ground.
25. At 1336, 20 armored vehicles surrounded [illegible] village about 5 km away from Ukashat. A regiment size force from Al-Qa'im moved out to meet it.
26. At 1340, enemy aircrafts bombed the area near the Navy Academy.
27. At 1400, observation post 136 and 125 reported sound of ground explosion.
28. At 1420, air assault a regiment from 7th borders Brigade resulting in injuries in the regiment.
29. At 1430, observation post 406, 407, 408, 409, and 425 no communication. Possibly was target to enemy attack.
30. At 1455, mortar attack on enemy forces on borderline within the disarmed area. The enemy responded with the same and artillery.

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31. At 1445, reports of loud speakers being set up then moved by the Kuwaiti side. They are used to call the area residents to evacuate before the battle.
32. At 1555, American forces in Al-Nakhib area withdrew.
33. At 1200, information came from Ghaza Brigade, Al-Anbar Division, Al-Quds Army indicating the presence of 4 enemy armored vehicles near Ukashat-Al-Qa'im road. Detachments from the party force supported by Ghaza Brigade, Al-Anbar Division, Al-Quds Army with vehicles with mounted machineguns. The Division intelligence Security officer is accompanying the force and will inform us of the developments.
34. At 1610, presence of 10 armor vehicles south of Al-Walid base.
35. At 1200, fall of enemy missiles on Al-Qadisiyyah region, Al-Najaf Governorate. No casualties.
36. At 1625, observation posts 341, 342, and 343 reported explosion on the ground.
37. At 1620 reported [illegible] 20 armored vehicles.
38. At 1710, enemy aircrafts dropped pamphlets on Al-Zubary, Safwan.
39. At 1715, five trucks were seen 5 km south of Al-Ratbah. Six trucks seen from 70 Km to 160 Km on the highway.
40. At 1717, enemy breached the Kuwaiti first dirt defenses north of Safwan passage. It was handled by 51st Division.

[Page 83:]

41. At 1733, observation posts 124, 136, and 122 reported explosion on the ground.
42. At 1828, observation 401 and 408 reported exchange of fire with American helicopters by [illegible] and loss of detachment commander.
43. At 1625, air assault on 1st Corps, 11th Infantry Division.
44. At 1830, air assault on southern oil company and 1st Corps and 4th Corps resulting in interruption of communication. Heavy air presence on Al-Nasiriyah.
45. At 1810, four Americans were captured from the force present in Ukashat area and 20 from enemy forces were killed.
46. At 1845, heavy air bombing in Sanam Mountain area and a number of trucks and personnel in Al-Abdali center.
47. At 1910, observation post 218 reported explosion.
48. At 1910, a force left Al-Tarbah to inspect the area towards the old road. Nothing was found. A force from Al-Nakhib went out towards Tal'ah and tracks of big and small wheels were seen. The force came back to the Al-Habariyah region to search it.
49. At 1915, enemy helicopters bombed the right and left of Sanam Mountain. Ibn-Majid Al-Bahri hospital in Um-Qasr was burned.
50. At 1945, 16 armored vehicles moving on the road connecting Al-Nakhib with 160 Km were reported. A force deployed towards it.
51. At 1955, Lieutenant Muhammad, Commander [illegible] detachment returned.
52. At 2000, observation 136 and 137 reported explosion on the ground.
53. At 1939, bombing of former 3rd Corps headquarter.
54. At 2000, air bombing of [unknown Iraqi military component] base.

[Page 84:]

55. At 2005, observation post 122 reported explosion on the ground near Al-Faw.
56. At 2000, heavy air bombing on Al-Raqitah.
57. At 2015, observation post 246 on highway near Al-Basrah reported explosion on the ground. At the same time there was aerial activities outside the northern region.
58. At 2020, enemy armor was seen advancing at the right of Sanam Mountain; the bombing is still ongoing on Al-Radkah region.
59. At 2022, observation post 117 reported drone in Al-Bisah.
60. At 0230, a battle between 51st Division and enemy forces.
61. At 2045, observation posts 255 and 254 reported 11 Cruise missiles going from south to north.
62. At 2055, observation post 292 west of Al-Samawah reported explosion on the ground and the cease of the bombing that targeted 2nd Corps, Brigade 704, Al-Radkah. Observation post 254 reported 4 Cruise missiles towards Iraq.
63. At 2115, observation post 980, 981, and 978 reported five Cruise missiles from south to north Al-Razazah.
64. At 2015, observation post 960 reported one Cruise missile going from south to north [illegible].
65. At 2039, shooting down of 2 missiles near Al-Habaniyah by [unknown Iraqi component] force in Al-Amiriyah.
66. At 2130, observation post 145 reported drone.
67. At 2100, enemy bombed fertilizer factory in Abu-Al-Khasb resulting in destruction of missile battery and injury of five individuals among them four soldiers and one civilians.
68. At 2210, enemy bombing began on Sanwan city and interruption of electricity. Enemy bombing of Al-Radkah continued.
69. At 2212, bombing began against Artillery Battalion base and its batteries. The bombing is ongoing.

[Page 85:]

70. At 2225, air bombing on [illegible] Infantry Division resulting in injury of one officer and damaged a vehicle [illegible] and burning a motorcycle.
71. Observation post 976, 977, and 983 at 2233 south of Al-Razazah reported explosion.
72. At 2235, observation posts 276 and 277 in Al-Samadah reported sound of explosion on the ground.
73. At 2244, observation post south Um-Qasr reported one Cruise missile from south to north.
74. At 2245, enemy air bombing on Al-Nasiriyah city.
75. Observation posts 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, and 127 reported sighting of two Cruise missiles from south going north.
76. At 2310, martyrdom of commander of [illegible] [Iraqi military component] and two soldiers.
77. At 2305, observation post 126 in Al-Ramilah reported sighting of two Cruise missiles from south to north.
78. At 2317, air bombing on Al-Walid base H3.
79. At 2355, air bombing continues on Al-Nasiriyah.
80. Heavy enemy air force and air bombing targeting ammunition unit in Al-Gharaf and sector [unknown component] and Infantry Brigade until 0015 on 21 March 2003.
81. At 0015, on 21 March 2003 eight Syrian individuals between 18 and 25 surrendered to Al-Qa'im border unit. They claim to have come to fight along side the Iraqi people as Mujahideen against the American enemy. They showed that a great number are going to arrive later. They were delivered to Al-Qa'im intelligence.
82. At 0050, the force composed of the security commission led by a police officer, Al-Qa'im security director, section secretary, fighters from the governorate emergency regiment, and tribesmen returned. They stated that the enemy force of 40 trucks and 21 pickups returned towards the Jordanian borders taking advantage of darkness.

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83. At 0055, observation post 127 reported sighting of Cruise missile in Al-Bikr port. Observation post 201 reported explosion on the ground south of Budrah.
84. At 0120, fall of four Cruise missile in Abu-Al-Khasib area at 0110.
85. At 0515, reports of airborne drop in Al-Walid airbase. Not yet confirmed.
86. Al-Jazeera TV reported fall of American military aircraft in Kuwait with 16 British and American soldiers on board.

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[Duplicate copy of page 79 above]

[Page 88:]

[Duplicate copy of page 80 above]

[Page 89:]

[Duplicate copy of page 81 above]

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[Duplicate copy of page 82 above]

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[Duplicate copy of page 83 above]

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[Page 94:]

[Duplicate copy of page 86 above]

Document Title: Iraqi Intelligence Reports (Late 1990s)

ID: ISGQ-2003-00032998

Date: Various (late 1990s)

Synopsis:

This document includes numerous Iraqi intelligence reports from the late 1990s, including description of fighting against Iraqi opposition groups such as the Badr Corps. The reports detail Iraq's suspicions of Iranian support for Iraqi groups and describe various activities along the Iraq/Iran border.

Key Themes:

Key words:

Document Number: ISGQ-2003-00032998
Full Translation of Pages 2-75

Page 2

In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
Command of the 4th Corps
(General Staff)
Intelligence
Ref: 26/ 8/ 1946
Date: 13 November 1999

Secret

To: the General Military Intelligence Directorate (Sect. 31, Sect. 35)

Subject: Information

We obtained the following information from our source # (535):

1. A group of Iranian agents entered Iraq through the unpaved road (2) Km north of the Dwayrij River. They proceeded towards Al-Mishawah area with the intention of conducting ambushes near the road between Al-Shayib and Itayb areas. The group includes the agent Husayn Abu-Sajad who lives in Iran.
2. The agents listed below reside along the southern riverbank of the Al-'Iz River in Sulaf Al-Furayjat:
 - A. Subayh Dakhil Al-Bazuni
 - B. Abu-Muntazir Al-Shaghabani
 - C. Abu-Majid Al-Fartusi
 - D. Muhammad 'Awdah Al-Sa'idi
 - E. Falih Maridi Al-Farraji
 - F. 'Awdah Muhammad Salman Al-Sa'idiThe abovementioned agents reopened the water canal # (2) after the engineers of the land reclamation closed it.
3. On 11 November 1999, a group of Iranian agents entered Iraq; their number is estimated at (7) individuals. They are from Al-Abyad area inside the Iranian borders; they entered Abu-Zakir area then Al-Zajiyah, and are armed with different types of weapons. They met the agent Salim Jakhiur Al-Nawfali and the agent Rawsah Al-Nawfali, both from Al-Zajiyah area, to help them in entering the Western Ahwaz area in order to investigate the situation of the area.
4. On 10 November 1999, the two agents Jasim Kabbashi Al-Haliji and Mazhar Yasin Al-Shaghabani entered Iraq from Iran. They entered by way of Al-Wazirah road in Al-Sardahiyyah area towards Al-Najiradah Village. They crossed Al-'Iz River and settled in Al-bu-Bakhit Village. The Iranian intelligence sent these two agents to collect detailed information about the plans of the Mujahidi Khaliq headquarters in the sectors of the 3rd and 4th Corps.

(1-2)


Secret

Page 3

Secret

5. Recently, the agents started training their affiliates on different weapons and on conducting suicide attacks against the state security and party headquarters. It is probable that these groups will settle in areas near 'Amarah/ Basrah Main Road to conduct suicide attacks against the Mujahidi Khaliq vehicles and headquarters.
6. Two agents' s each with (5-6) individuals, by way of Al-Khabitah area in Al-Hawayzah area in Um-Al-Ni'aj Lake, the boats enter the area between the 18th Infantry Brigade and the 2nd Corps, where (4) individuals landed to deliver mail in the Karishah area, they settled in the houses of the following agents:
 - A. 'Abd Al-Rida Ma'lah/ Resides in Karishah area
 - B. Sami Al-Salihawi/ Resides in Karishah area
 - C. Said 'Ali Musa/ Resides in Karishah area
 - D. The head of the group is the agent Abu-Liq'a' Al-Fartusi and the agent Khalid 'Abdallah Al-Farraji

Please review, with respect


Staff Brigadier General
On behalf of/ Commander of the 4th Corps
Staff Colonel
13 November 1999

Div. 7
Archive the information
23 November

(2-2)
Secret

Page 4

M5/ 7 November
Archived/ 9 November

Page 5

General Military Intelligence Directorate/ M5

Page 6

Top Secret

B. Reaction of Our Troops:

We informed the National Inspection team

C. Procedures of the Inspection Team:

They registered the information

3. Border Troops Command:

A. Iranian Violations:

First: 32nd Corps:

1) The Baldaruz/ Mandali/ Zirbatyah Map (1/100000)

At 0700 hrs on 13 Sept, the enemy established a location near the border pillar at grid (010900) about (200 meters) from the locations of the 3rd Platoon, 1st Company of the 510th Brigade.

2) In reference to our Top-Secret letter # 2191, on 13 Sept 1990, clause (4) paragraph (3), at 0900 hrs, on 13 Sept, we reinforced the detachment with (10) soldiers and one officer.

3) At 1430 hrs on 13 Sept, (2) enemy soldiers were at the (Rabaya Hizam) Observation Post at grid (649269) with a detachment from the 9th Platoon, 3rd Company, 2nd Brigade.

Second: the 41st Corps:

At 0900 hrs on 14 Sept 1990, the flood water levels reached:

- 1) From grid (838320) to grid (760320): between 0-48 Cm
- 2) From grid (9069) to grid (9010): between 0-55 Cm

B. Reaction of Our Troops:

We informed the National Inspection team

(2-3)

Top Secret

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Top Secret

C. Procedures of the Inspection Team:

They registered the information

Staff General

Ni'mah Faris Husayn

Chief of the Coordination for UN Inspectors Committee

14 September 1990

Brigadier General

Firas Yusif 'Abdallah

A copy to:

Armed Forces General Command

Ministry of Foreign Affairs/ International Organizations Department

Ministry of Culture and Information (Minister's Office)

Office of the Army Chief of Staff

Operations' Department

General Military Intelligence Directorate

Military Movements Directorate

Planning Directorate

please review

(3-3)

Top Secret

Secret and Immediate

Time and Date of Issuance

10 October

From: Intelligence of the 7th Infantry Brigade

To: Intelligence of the of 3rd Corps Command

Ref: Intelligence/ 509: An intelligence brief as of 1300 hrs on 10 October 1988:

1. Vehicles' Movement: vehicles observed in front of the brigade's sector: (41) vehicles:

Between 1330-1920 hrs, (17) vehicles were observed including:

(1) Water tanker vehicle from Mahran to the camp, (1) Zil and (1) Jeep vehicle from Sad Kanjan to Rida Abad, (1) dump truck vehicle from Rida Abad to Sad Kanjan, (1) Eva and (2) Jeep vehicles from Rida Bad to Sahi, (1) Pick-up vehicle from the camp to Mahran, (1) Eva vehicle from Mahran to Rida Abad. Moreover, (1) Ambulance, (1) Land Rover and (1) Sedan vehicle from Rida Abad to Mahran, (1) Transportation vehicle, (1) Water tanker vehicle and (1) Kaz vehicle from Mahran to Husayn, (1) Pick-up vehicle and (1) Dump truck vehicle from Mahran to Mansur Abad. Between 0815-1120 hrs, the movement of (24) vehicles was observed including, (1) Pick-up vehicle from Mahran to Rida Abad, (1) Jeep, (1) Dump truck vehicle, (1) Eva vehicle, (1) Water tanker vehicle and (1) Motorbike from Rida Abad to Mahran. In addition, (1) Jeep, (1) Pick-up vehicle from Mahran to the Camp. Besides, (2) Dump truck vehicles and (1) Zil vehicle from Rida Abad to Husayn Abad, (1) Water tank vehicle from Sad Kanjan to Malik Shahi, (1) Pick-up vehicle and (1) Bus from Mahran to Hurmuz Abad. Moreover, (1) Jeep vehicle and (1) Pick-up vehicles from Malik Shahi to Mahran, (3) Pick-up, (2) Jeep and (1) Ambulance vehicles from Mansur Abad to Mahran, (1) Eva vehicle from Husayn Abad to Mahran, (1) Eva vehicle from Husayn Abad to Rida Abad, (1) Toyota Pick-up vehicle from Husayn Abad to Mahran.

2. General Comment: A. Enemy's Activities: normal

Staff Brigadier General (Special Forces)

Commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade

Secret and Immediate

GMID
Microfilm

In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

4th Corps Command

(General Staff)

Intelligence

Ref: 26/ 8/ 1977

Date: 26 November 1999

To: Intelligence of the 19th Corps Command

Sub: Agents entering into the Al-Sardahiyyah area

1. We received information from the Southern Zone Command, from the General Military Intelligence Directorate and from our sources that agents and smugglers are entering into the Eastern Ahwar area to the Western Ahwar area through Al-Sardahiyyah area between our Corps and the 3rd Corps.
2. We informed you previously about the agents and smugglers entering through the aforementioned area according to our below listed letters and messages, in addition, we requested to prepare ambushes and patrols to curtail these incidents in the area:

A. Our Secret letter

1738

dated 12 September 1999

- | | | |
|------------------------------------|--------|------------------------|
| B. Our Secret and Personal letter | # 1295 | dated 6 October 1999 |
| C. Our Secret and Immediate letter | # 6812 | dated 7 November 1999 |
| D. Our Secret letter and Immediate | # 6478 | dated 10 November 1999 |
| E. Our Secret letter | # 1938 | dated 11 November 1999 |
| F. Our Top-Secret letter | # 1945 | dated 13 November 1999 |
| G. Our Secret and Immediate letter | # 6937 | dated 18 November 1999 |
3. We obtained information that the forces sent to the area were ineffective in minimizing the activities in the mentioned area.
4. In order to minimize the activities in Al-Sardahiyyah area, occurring between our Corps and the 3rd Corps, orders were issued for your Corps to carryout the following:

(1-2)

Top Secret

Page 10

Top Secret

- A. The 2nd Intelligence Officer of your Corps is to conduct surveillance in the Al-Sardahiyyah area to specify the locations from where the agents are entering into the mentioned area and to determine the best locations to set up ambushes, preventing such activities in and out of our national land.
- B. Coordinating with the 3rd Corps units, regarding the suitable locations for placing ambushes to attack and destroy the agents.
- C. Coordinating with the party organizations in Al-'Aziz area in order to minimize the activities in the area
- D. Utilizing the Secret Service agents and collaborators in the area in determining the routes used by agents and smugglers to set up ambushes on these roads.
- E. The intelligence officers in the units are to directly supervision the ambush patrols, brief the ambush patrols on their duties before they go out and to debrief the ambush members when they return.
- F. Using Rasit devices to monitor the agents' movements in determining their locations to destroy and prevent any future incidents of this nature.
- G. The ambush patrols should not be less than (15) fighters and (2) officers, equipped with a communication device to contact their unit's headquarters for support in case of emergencies.

Please take the necessary actions and inform us about your procedures regarding this issue.

Staff General

Hashim Ahmad 'Ulwan

4th Corps Commander

Staff Major General

Muhammad Ibrahim Al-'Ayyash

26 November 1999

A copy to:

Command of the 3rd Corps (Intelligence), please review and inform your units located in the area of our Corps.

General Military Intelligence Directorate/ (Sect. 35), please review

Maysan Governorate Security Committee/ please review and inform the Security Committee to coordinate with the 14th Infantry Corps about the abovementioned issue.

(2-2)

Top Secret

Page 11

16 December 1999/ 1852 hrs
Secret and Immediate/ 16 December 1999
From: Intelligence System of the Southern Zone
To: the General Military Intelligence Directorate/ Sect. 35

Ref: 1/ 1/ 7906:

Regarding your Secret letter # 12205, dated 27 November, we confirm the information mentioned in your letter. On 26 November, the agent Abu-Hasan Na'imah was arrested and sent to Dhi-Qar Security Directorate. Salah and Falah, the brothers of the agent Sabih Muhsin Khalaf, were killed. A year ago, the mentioned agent left for Al-Muthanna Governorate, Al-Ramithah District. We could not determine the location of the agent Jawad Kazim 'Abbas, because he proceeded to an unknown location due to a dispute between him and his brothers, wherein he killed one of his brothers and bad injured the other, at present, Al-Fuhud Party Section Command is tracking him. Please review.

The names were archived.

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In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Ref: M7/ Sect. 35/ Div. 7
Date: 28 November 1999

To: the General Security Directorate
Subject: Information

We obtained information from a source that a group of armed agents frequent Al-'Amarah Village, wherein they commit crimes against the people of the village, moreover, they attack the innocent people in the neighboring villages. These individuals were previously sentenced to life imprisonment but Al-Fuhud Police Station did not arrest them because they have relatives in the mentioned police station. From these individuals, we know:

1. Agent Badri Thijil Wahab
2. Agent Hammad Kazim Fayyad
3. Agent Subayh Muhsin Khalaf
4. Agent Fayiz Husayn Ni'mah

Please review, with respect.

Staff Major General

On behalf of the Director of the General Military Intelligence Directorate
27 November 1999

Review the names and inform me

(1-1)

Top Secret

Page 13

Secret and Immediate/ 26 November

From: Intelligence of the 3rd Corps

To: To: the General Military Intelligence Directorate/ Sect. 35 and Sect. 31

Ref: 12255:

We obtained information from a source that a group of armed agents frequent Al-'Amarah Village, wherein they commit crimes against the people of the village, moreover, they attack the innocent people in the neighboring villages. These individuals previously were sentenced from 20-year to life imprisonment and were not arrested by Al-Fuhud Police Station or by the Party Organization in Al-Nasiriyyah because they have relatives in the police and in the party. From these individuals, we know the agent Badri Thijil Wahab, the agent Hammadi Kazim Fayyad, the agent Subayh Muhsin Khalaf and the agent Fayiz Husayn Ni'mah. Moreover, groups of youth associate with them. We informed the Southern Zone Command through our Secret letter # 2254, dated 26 November 1999 and the Sect. 31 of the General Military Intelligence Directorate. The aforementioned information was the subject of our letter # 11180; dated 18 October, please review.

Prepare a brief

Div. 7/ archive

Div. 7/ write to the Southern Zone and the Security

Review the names; do we have any information about them?

Page 14

Secret and Immediate

Time and Date of Issuance

27 November 1999

From: General Military Intelligence Directorate

To: Intelligence System of the Southern Zone

Ref: M7/ Sect. 35/ Div. 7/ we received the following information:

A group of agents frequent Al-'Amarah Village at night, they are armed and commit crimes against the people of the village, in addition, they attack the innocent people in the neighboring villages. These individuals previously were sentenced to life imprisonment and were not arrested by Al-Fuhud Police Station because they have relatives in the mentioned police station. These individuals are,

- A. Agent Badri Thijil Wahab
- B. Agent Hammadi Kazim Fayyad
- C. Agent Subayh Muhsin Khalaf
- D. Agent Fayiz Husayn Ni'mah
- E. A group of youth

Please review and inform us.

Staff Major General

On behalf of the Director of the General Military Intelligence Directorate

27 November 1999

Secret and Immediate

Page 15

Secret and Immediate

From: General Military Intelligence Directorate

To: Intelligence System of the Southern Zone

Ref: Div. 7/ Sect. 35: we received information from a reliable source that a group of agents frequent Al-'Amarah Village at night, they are armed and commit crimes against the people of the village, in addition, they attack the innocent people in the neighboring villages. These individuals previously were sentenced to life imprisonment and were not arrested by Al-Fuhud Police Station because they have relatives in the mentioned police station. These individuals are the agent Badri Thijil Wahab, the agent Hammadi Kazim Fayyad, the agent Subayh Muhsin Khalaf and the agent Fayiz Husayn Ni'mah. Moreover, groups of youth associate with them. Please review and inform us.

Review these names, do we have any information about them.

Page 16

Secret and Immediate

27 November

From: 4th Corps

To: General Military Intelligence Directorate/ Sect. 31, Sect. 35

Ref: 7079: we received information from the source # (536) that, on 20 November 1999, the agent Said Nur returned from Iran. He visited the agents' headquarters at Bakhtiyar City, he returned through Khalif Ahwar area towards the Salty Lake in Um-al-'Azam area and then to Al-Fadli Village between Bait-'Abdallah and Bait Garil, he settled in the house of Basim Z'al Al-Harishawi. They both crossed to Al-Lami Village by way of Al-'Iz River, they are planning to go to the headquarters in the Western Ahwar in Al-bu-Salih area. Two unknown agents accompanied them; they have a large black bag and a video camera to take photos of the military troops and the engineering works in the area.

Sector: The agent Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim sent an agent to the agent Karim Mahud, the messenger has a handwritten letter requesting to renew relations between the agent Karim Mahud and the Badr Corps in the Kazinah area at Al-Maymunah District near Said Muhsin Shrine. On 18 November 1999, the following agents returned from Iran, Said Fadil Said, 'Atshan Subayh, at present they reside in Iran, on their journey, they passed through Al-Sulaymaniyyah area, Al-Khatarat area and Um-al-Fashak Lake, then to Al-Haddam area and finally to Khazinah area. The Iranian troops are on alert in the Itayb and Al-Sharhan areas; they are searching the valleys armed with different types of light and medium mono machineguns. They are searching Al-A'nazi Valley and deploy their troops on the border areas close to the borderline, please review.

Mr. Head of the Section

Please review, we suggest archiving the information

27 November

Div. 7/ archive and follow-up the information

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In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Ref: M7/ Sect. 35/ Div. 7/ 1672
Date: 6 December 1999

To: Sect. 31
Subject: Information

Regarding your Secret letter # Div. 1/ 1946, dated 28 January 1999, we confirm the information mentioned in the letter # 7054, dated 24 November 1999, of the 4th Corps.

Archive the information in the dossier of the properties

Staff Major General
Head of the Sect. 35
6 December 1999

(1-1)
Secret

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Secret and Immediate/ 5 December

From: the Northern Zone

To: General Military Intelligence Directorate/ Sect. 35

Ref: 1/ 4/ 7651/ regarding your letter # 12162, dated 25 November 1999, our sources # (75/ 145/ 147) besides a new reliable source confirmed the information mentioned in your abovementioned letter, please review.

Div. 7

1. *Prepare a reply to Sect. 31/ the information was archived*
2. *Preceding the information in the dossier, mention that it is mentioned in the letter # 7651, dated 5 December of the Southern Zone.*

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In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Ref: M7/ Sect. 31/ Div. 1/ 1946
Date: 28 November 1999

To: Sect. 35
Subject: Evaluation of Information

Regarding the Secret letter # 7054, dated 24 November 1999, from the 4th Corps (Intelligence), please review and inform us about your evaluation of the mentioned information.

Brigadier General
Head of the Sect. 31

28 November 1999

7th Command

1. Did you archive the information in the intention dossier?
2. Wait until the information is evaluated and then prepare a reply to 38th Section

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In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
General Military Intelligence Directorate

Page 21

In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Ref: M7/ Sect. 35/ 79119
Date: 28 November 1999

To: the General Security Directorate/ Collective Information Room
Subject: Information

We obtained information from a source as follows:

1. On 18 November 1999, the agent Ra'ad Ghazi Al-Nawfali, the agent Muhammad Majid Rahim and another unknown agent entered Iraq coming from the agents' headquarters in Shatt-'Ali heading to Al-Zajiyah. They are planning to go to Al-Wadiyyah to meet the agents in Salaf-al-Farijat and to try to gain new agents to work with them.
2. On 18 November 1999, the agent Sabah Dagher (Abu-Liqa') was seen with other four agents coming from Al-Hashiriyyah to deliver the mail to the agents in the area. They want to go to Said Ahmad Al-Rifa'i to meet the agent Qasim 'Atiyah in Al-Zi'aytir area in Said Ahmad Al-Rifa'i Island. Their mission is to collect information about the military troops, the party organizations and the security headquarters in Al-Maymunah, in Said Ahmad Al-Rifa'i and in Al-Majar districts.
3. On 19 November 1999, a group of (7) agents entered Iraq, their chief is Mazhar Yasin Al-Shaghabani, they belong to Ansar Al-Husayn Corps. They entered by way of Khalif Road and then to Sulaf Hamiri Road with the assistance of Muhammad Dawud Al-Fadalawi. They are planning to cross Al-'Iz River to Al-Shaghabanah Village to see their relatives and to meet their tribal leader Muhammad Mahawi.
4. The agents Hannun Darim Al-Harishawi, Sami Darim Al-Harishawi, Fallah Hasan Jallub Al-Harishawi and Said Salim Ibrahim frequent Al-'Iz River area and Al-Hawayliyat area in Al-Sadah Al-Shamaliyyah district. They help the agents cross from the southern riverbank to the northern riverbank of Al-'Iz River and vice versa to Al-Hashiriyyah areas and Um-al-Fashik and they use their houses as shelters for agents, please review, with respect.

Staff Major General

On behalf of: Director of the General Military Intelligence Directorate
27 November 1999

(1-1)
Top Secret

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Secret and Immediate

Time and Date of Issuance

25 November 1999

From: the General Military Intelligence Directorate

To: Intelligence System of the Southern Zone

Ref: M7/ Sect. 35/ Div. 7/ 41/ 2/ 12162: we received information as follows:

1. On 19 November 1999, a group of (7) agents entered Iraq, their chief is Mazhar Yasin Al-Shaghabani, they belong to Ansar Al-Husayn Corps. They entered by way of Khalif Road and then to Sulaf Hamirah Road with the assistance of Muhammad Dawud Al-Fadalawi. They are planning to cross Al-'Iz River to Al-Shaghabanah Village to see their relatives and to meet their tribal leader Muhammad Mahawi.
2. On 18 November 1999, the agent Ra'ad Ghazi Al-Nawfali, the agent Muhammad Majid Rahim and another unknown agent entered Iraq coming from the agents' headquarters in Shatt-'Ali to Al-Zajiyah. They want to go to Al-Wadiyyah to meet the agents in Salaf-al-Farijat and to try to gain new agents to work with them.
3. On 18 November 1999, the agent Sabah Dagher (Abu-Liqa') was seen with other four agents coming from Al-Hashiriyyah to deliver mail to agents in the area. They want to go to Said Ahmad Al-Rifa'i to meet the agent Qasim 'Atiyah in Al-Zi'aytir area in Said Ahmad Al-Rifa'i Island. Their mission is to collect information about the military troops, the party organizations and the security headquarters in Al-Maymunah, in Said Ahmad Al-Rifa'i and in Al-Majar districts, please review the information and inform us.

Staff Major General

On behalf of: Director of the General Military Intelligence Directorate

25 November 1999

Secret and Immediate

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From: the Intelligence of the 4th Corps

To: General Military Intelligence Directorate/ Sect. 31, Sect. 35:

Ref: 7054: we received the following information from our source # (636), Zuhayr Kazim:

1. On 19 November 1999, a group of (7) agents entered Iraq, their chief is Mazhar Yasin Al-Shaghabani, they belong to Ansar Al-Husayn Corps. They entered by way of Khalif Road and then to Sulaf Hamirah Road with the assistance of Muhammad Dawud Al-Fadalawi. They are planning to cross Al-'Iz River to Al-Shaghabanah Village to see their relatives and to meet their tribal leader Muhammad Mahawi. They aim at collecting information for the Badr Corps.
2. The agents Hannun Darim Al-Harishawi, Sami Darim Al-Harishawi, Fallah Hasan Jallub Al-Harishawi and Said Salim Ibrahim frequent Al-'Iz River area and Al-Hawayliyat area in Al-Sadah Al-Shamaliyyah district. They help the agents cross from the southern riverbank to the northern riverbank of Al-'Iz River and vice versa to Al-Hashiriyyah areas and Um-al-Fashik and they use their houses as shelters for agents. On 18 November 1999, the agent Ra'ad Ghazi Al-Nawfali and the agent

- Muhammad Majid Rahim besides another unknown agent entered Iraq coming from the agents headquarters in Shatt-'Ali heading to Al-Zajiyah
3. They stayed for one night and then they sent the unknown agent to Al-Khadirah area in Al-'Iz River with the help of the agent Qasim Rashij Al-Nawfali, who lives in Al-'Aziz. They are planning to go to Al-Wadiyyah to meet the agents in Salaf-al-Farijat and to try to gain new agents to work with them.
 4. On 18 November 1999, the agent Sabah Dagher (Abu-Liqa') was seen with four agents coming from Al-Hashiriyyah to deliver the mail to the agents in the area. They want to go to Said Ahmad Al-Rifa'i to meet the agent Qasim 'Atiyah in Al-Zi'aytir area in Said Ahmad Al-Rifa'i Island. Their mission is to collect information about the military troops, the party organizations and the security headquarters in Al-Maymunah, in Said Ahmad Al-Rifa'i and in Al-Majar districts, please review the information.

Inform the Collective Information Room in the Southern Zone
25 November

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A brief by Sect. 35 for 25 November 1999

Technical Sources: no changes

Public Sources: the Persian radio broadcast stated the following: Hamid Rida, the spokesman of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the irresponsible statement of the German Minister of Defense who accused Iran and Iraq of supporting terrorism and racialism to justify selling German made weapons to several Gulf countries.

Human Sources:

The Secret and Immediate letter # 7054, dated 24 November 1999, of the Intelligence of the 4th Corps included information from reliable sources as follows:

1. On 19 November 1999, a group of (7) agents entered Iraq, their chief is Mazhar Yasin Al-Shaghabani, they belong to Ansar Al-Husayn Corps. They entered by way of Khalif Road and then to Sulaf Hamirah Road with the assistance of Muhammad Dawud Al-Fadalawi. They are planning to cross Al-'Iz River to Al-Shaghabanah Village to see their relatives and to meet their tribal leader Muhammad Mahawi.
2. On 18 November 1999, the agent Ra'ad Ghazi Al-Nawfali, the agent Muhammad Majid Rahim and another unknown agent entered Iraq coming from the agents' headquarters in Shatt-'Ali heading to Al-Zajiyah. They are planning to go to Al-Wadiyyah to meet the agents in Salaf-al-Farijat and to try to gain new agents to work with them.
3. On 18 November 1999, the agent Sabah Dagher (Abu-Liqa') was seen with four agents coming from Al-Hashiriyyah to deliver the mail to the agents in the area. They want to go to Said Ahmad Al-Rifa'i to meet the agent Qasim 'Atiyah in Al-Zi'aytir area in Said Ahmad Al-Rifa'i Island. Their mission is to collect information about the military troops, the party organizations and the security headquarters in Al-Maymunah, in Said Ahmad Al-Rifa'i and in Al-Majar districts.

Comment: We will inform the Intelligence System of the Southern Zone and the General Security Directorate Collective Information Room about the aforementioned information to be reviewed and followed-up.

4. 2nd Corps Sector: 233

At 2330 hrs on 24 November 1999, Staff Colonel Basim of the 2nd Corps Intelligence informed us about an explosion that took place east of Al-Khalis Special Camp at 2000 hrs on 24th November 1999. A patrol from the IIS went to the location to investigate the reasons and we will inform you later.

(4-7)

The explosion took place at the same location

Comment: The guards of M7 telephoned us and stated that the accident was because of a guided missile type (Shahin); the missile was mounted on a transporting vehicle with three other missiles

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B. 3rd Corps Sector:

At 1300 hrs on 23rd November 1999, (9) vehicles were observed, (3) of them were military vehicles carrying (12) military personnel, (6) civilian vehicles carrying (8) civilians and (2) high-ranking officers, the vehicles stopped at the Iranian location (near Ghazil Iranian Police Station) for (3) hours. They surveyed the sector and at 1600 hrs, the vehicles returned to the Iranian depths.

Comment: We informed the Southern Zone Command of the information and they will use it in the monthly activities report.

B. 4th Corps Sector:

At 1800 hrs on 24th November 1999, an ambush unit of the Commandoes Company of the 18th Infantry Brigade engaged a group of agents (4-6 individuals) at Abu-Wada' Bridge area. One of the agents was arrested, his name is Subayh Khalif, there were no injuries and the area will be searched in the early morning.

5. Status of Al-Hawayzah Water Level: no changes

6. Status of the Searching for Bodies' Committee: no changes

7. Status of the Rasit Devices: no changes

8. Status of those who returned to our lines:

At 1500 hrs, on 22 November 1999, the deserter Muhammad Salih Juri Tarish- a military deserter- reported to the 1st Company, 2nd Guard Brigade. He lives in Baghdad, Al-Mahmudiyyah District

(5-7)

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Secret and Immediate/ 26 November

From: the 3rd Corps

To: General Military Intelligence Directorate/ Sect. 35

Ref: 12270, in reference to our Secret and Immediate letters # 12257, 12264 and 12265, dated 26 November. On 26 November, a force including individuals from the 2nd and 3rd

Regiments from the Al-Ikhlas Tank Battalion at the Brigade's Headquarters went out without tanks or armored vehicles searched the following villages; Al-'Alwah Village, at grid (2245), Al-Khaysat Village at grid (2161) and Bait 'Ibadah Village at grid (2257). The force found one Simnov rifle, at 1220 hrs, the mission was completed and the force proceeded back and arrived at 1200 hrs, the force returned safely with no accidents. At 1000 hrs, on 26

November, we heard the sound of shooting in our sector (2) Km behind Zayd Police Station at grid (8301). Immediately, the Commander of the 2nd Guard Brigade formed a force to search the area, (4) Iranian soldiers and (2) intruders were arrested and their personal weapons were confiscated. They were wearing camouflage military uniforms. At 1100 hrs, (4) Land Cruiser vehicles and (4) motorbikes were observed with about (30) Iranian soldiers. (5) Soldiers who speak Arabic advanced and the rest deployed in the area, they requested us

to release the (4) soldiers who were arrested earlier, and they threatened to attack our troops if we refused. We released the soldiers...

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...to the Corps' Headquarters and they are currently investigating. The 2nd Guards Brigade, the Shurahbil Tank Battalion, the 15th Armored Battalion, the 30th Commandoes Brigade, the 18th Corps and the 70th Commandoes Brigade are on alert as a precautionary measure. At 0630 hrs on 26 November, a force was formed by the 2nd Infantry Division, the 2nd Platoon of the 45th Infantry Brigade and the Armored Infantry Company of the 31st Infantry Brigade of the 3rd Corps, under the control of the brigade's headquarters, which is under the supervision of the Corps Command. The force searched Al-'Adaytim Village at grid (6035), at 1100, the force returned safely and they did not find anything. At 0600 hrs, on 26 November, a force from the 30th Armored Infantry Platoon of the 41st Armored Brigade and the 32nd Infantry Brigade was sent without tanks or transportation vehicles to search the Jubaydah farms at grid (5253), at 1100 hrs, the force returned safely and they did not find anything. In the Secret letter # 12269, dated 26 November, we informed the Southern Zone Command, please review.

*6th Division/ follo- up
Prepare a brief*

Page 28

Secret and Immediate/ 28 November

From: 3rd Corps Intelligence
To: General Military Intelligence Directorate/ Sect. 35
Ref: 12298/ page 6

At 0700 hrs, on 28 November 1999, a force from the 1st Company of Sayf Al-Qa'id Corps, the Commandoes Company of the brigade, a 120 mm Mortar Platoon of the 987th Battery, The Military Engineering Detachment of the 6th Battalion and the 33rd Anti-Aircraft Detachment searched Al-Zawrah area at grid (1328). At 1200 hrs, the force returned safely and they did not find anything. At 0630 hrs on 28 November 1999, a force from the 2nd Company of the Corps' Commandoes Regiment searched Al-Mashahid Village at grid (5850), at 1200 hrs, the force returned safely and they did not find anything. At 0600 hrs on 28 November, a force of the 3rd Platoon of the 3rd Commandoes Regiment searched the Salin area at grid (1012), at 1100 hrs, the force returned safely and they did not find anything.

*Div. 7: register searching the mentioned areas in the searching dossier
Div. 7: Archive*

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Secret and Immediate/ 26 November

To: General Military Intelligence Directorate/ Sect. 35
Ref: 12257:

We received information about the presence of agents at grid (2016). At 0900 hrs, on 26 November 1999, a force from the 2nd Platoon of the 3rd Infantry Battalion of Sayf Al-Qa'id Infantry Brigade and Al-Ikhlās Tank Battalion, the 120 mm Mortar Platoon of the 987th Battery, the Military Engineering Platoon of the 6th Military Engineering Battalion and the Medical Detachment of the 33rd Battalion was formed. The force was sent under the command of the brigade's headquarters and under the supervision of the Corps to search the area between Bait 'Ibadah at grid (3257) and Al-Khaysat Village at grid (3161). At 0630 hrs, a force from the Infantry Company of the 45th Infantry Brigade searched Al-'Artham area at grid (6036). The results will be sent later. End.

1. There will be a second letter

2. *Follow-up and archive*
27 November

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Secret and Immediate

From: 3rd Corps Intelligence
To: General Military Intelligence Directorate/ Sect. 35
Ref: 12245

At 0300 hrs, on 24 November 1999, we observed (3) individual at a distance of (200 meters) in front of the sector of the 5th Company of the 2nd Guard Brigade at grid (5649), they were engaged using light weapons and withdrew, the area was searched in the early morning but nothing was found. In the Secret letter # 12244 on 25 November, we informed the Southern Zone Command, please review, with respect.

Archived in the activities
27 November

Page 31

Secret and Immediate

From: 3rd Corps Intelligence
To: General Military Intelligence Directorate/ Sect. 35
Ref: 12243

A brief about the activities of the American agents as of (TC: illegible) hrs on 25 November:
The 6th Regiment: At 0300 hrs, on 24 November 1999, we observed (3) individual at a distance of (200 meters) in front of the sector of the 5th Company of the 2nd Guard Brigade at grid (5649), they were engaged using light weapons and withdrew, the area was searched in the early morning and nothing was found.

The 11th Regiment: no changes

Water level: no changes

Comment: no changes

End

Archive/ 27 November

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In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

Top Secret

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Ref: M7/ Sect. 35/ Div. 7/ 78746
Date: 26 November 1999

To: the General Security Directorate/ Collective Information Room
Subject: Information

We obtained information from a source as follows:

1. On 17 November 1999, a group of (8) agents entered Iraq, they settled in the Al-'Iz River area in the house of 'Abd Al-Husayn Jasim Al-Haliji who helps the agents enter the cities and villages of Maysan Governorate to execute their sabotage operations.
2. Agent Karim Mahud and agent Mahmud Al-Jawaybiri who lives in Bani Sa'id area were seen in Al-Sha'ir area operating a Mitsubishi brown pick-up vehicle with a government plate number (SATT S R Y). They were traveling on Al-'Assaf tribe Road. They have plans to kidnap party, intelligence and security members, please review, with respect.

Staff Major General

On behalf of: Director of the General Military Intelligence Directorate
25 November 1999

Secret and Immediate
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In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
Top Secret

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Ref: M7/ Sect. 35/ Div. 7/ 78748
Date: 26 November 1999

To: the General Security Directorate/ Collective Information Room
Subject: Information

We obtained information from a source as follows:

1. On 17 November 1999, a group of (8) agents entered Iraq, they settled in the Al-'Iz River area in the house of 'Abd Al-Husayn Jasim Al-Haliji who helps the agents enter the Maysan Governorate to attack party and security organizations.
2. Agent Karim Mahud and agent Mahmud Al-Jawaybiri who lives in Bani Sa'id area were seen in Al-Sha'ir area operating a Mitsubishi brown pick-up vehicle with a government plate number (SATTS R Y), they were moving on Al-'Assaf tribe road and have plans to kidnap party, intelligence and security members.
3. On 13 November 1999, Jasim Manati Tawbah, who lives in Karishah area, attacked the vehicle of the Fishing Supervision Committee in Abu-Khasaf area as revenge against Major Mazhar 'Abd-al-Hamid who hit him in front of several people, the mentioned escaped to Al-Hawayzah area, please review, with respect.

Staff Major General

On behalf of: Director of the General Military Intelligence Directorate
25 November 1999

(1-1)
Top Secret

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In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
Secret

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Ref: M7/ Sect. 35/ Div. 7/ 1635
Date: 28 November 1999

To: the Sect. 31

Subject: Evaluation of Information

Regarding your Secret letter # 1926, dated 23 November 1999, our evaluation of the information mentioned in the Secret and Immediate letter # 6990, on 21 November 1999 of the 4th Corps is as follows:

1. Paragraphs (1 and 2): We are still checking the information
2. Paragraph (3): Confirmed, please review.

Staff Major General

Director of the Sect. 35
28 November 1999

Secret
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In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

Secret

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Ref: M7/ Sect. 31/ Div. 1/ 1926
Date: 23 November 1999

To: the Sect. 35
Subject: Information

In reference to the letter # 6990, dated 21 November 1999, of the Intelligence System of the Southern Zone, please review and inform us about your evaluation of the mentioned information.

Staff Brigadier General
Chief of the Sect. 31
23 November 1999

Secret

Reply:

- 1. Paragraphs (1 and 2): We are still checking the information*
- 2. Paragraph (3): Confirmed*

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Secret and Immediate/ 21 November
From: Intelligence of the 4th Corps
To: General Military Intelligence Directorate/ Sect. 31, Sect. 35

Ref: 6990/ we received information from our sources as follows: On 17 November 1999, a group of (8) agents entered Iraq and they settled in the Al-'Iz River area in the house of 'Abd Al-Husayn Jasim Al-Haliji who helps the agents to enter the Maysan Governorate to attack party and security organizations. From the group, we know the agent Said Muhammad Said Muhsin and the agent Khalid 'Abdallah Al-Farraji. A group of (3) agents entered Iraq through Al-'Anitri Valley, their aim is to monitor the Training area of the 10th Corps. From them we know the agent Abu-Karrar and the agent Husayn Jasim Al-Darraji. On 17 November 1999, agent Karim Mahud and agent Mahmud Al-Jawaybiri who lives in the Bani Sa'id area were seen in Al-Sha'ir area operating a Mitsubishi brown pick-up vehicle model 1990 with a government plate number (SATTs R Y). They were moving on the road leading to Al-'Assaf tribe and have plans to kidnap party members or intelligence and security affiliates. Jasim Manati Tawbah, who lives in Karishah area, attacked the vehicle of the Fishing Supervision Committee in Abu-Khasaf area as revenge against Major Mazhar 'Abd-al-Hamid who hit him with a stick in front of several people. Major Mazhar did so because of the many accusations against Tawbah in Al-Raf'i Police Station. Note that the mentioned has three brothers living in Al-Salil area, they are 'Ali, Hashim and Sa'd Manati Tawbah Al-Darraji. The information stated that he escaped to Al-Hawayzah area after the accident and at present, he lives in Um Al-Ni'aj area. Please review.

*There is a letter and notification about the accident
22 November*

Register the locations of the mentioned individuals

1. 'Abd Al-Husayn Jasim Al-Haliji, he helps the saboteurs enter Maysan
2. Inform the Collective Information Room of the GSD about the agents issue
3. Archive
4. Register the unknown names
5. The information was registered on 184
6. Mention in the brief of our section on 21 November

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Secret and Immediate/ 10 February

From: the 3rd Corps Intelligence
 To: General Military Intelligence Directorate/ Sect. 35
 Ref: 2247:
 Regarding your letter # 1370, dated 9 February, we confirm the information mentioned in our letter # 11214, dated 20 October 1999. End.
Archive and follow-up
12 February
'Abd Al-Husayn

Page 38

Time and Date of Issuance Secret and Immediate
 9 February 2000

From: the General Military Intelligence Directorate
 To: the 3rd Corps (Intelligence)
 Ref: M7/ 35/ 7/ 1370:
 Regarding our Secret and Immediate letter # 12033, dated 22 November 1999, we have not received a reply as of yet. Please note that in the future do not delay a reply for more than (15) days so that we can review the information, inform us.

On behalf of Staff Major General
 Director of the General Military Intelligence Directorate
 9 February 2000

Secret and Immediate

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Top Secret

Tactical Status of the Troops

	Unit/ Formation	Permanent Location	Current Location
A	B	C	D

Top Secret

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In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Ref: M7/ Sect. 35/ Div. 7/ 78747
Date: 26 November 199

To: the General Security Directorate/ Collective Information Room
Subject: Information

We received information from a source referring to the following:

1. On 8 November 1999, the agent Said Jabbar, the Chief of Hezbollah Sector returned from Iran to his headquarters in Al-Tar area. He visited his groups of saboteurs in (Abu-'Ayish, Al-'Amirah, Al-Fuhud, Al-Tamrah Island, Mazlum 'Ayyal in Al-Fuhud District, Al-Mashij Islands and Karmat Hasan), he issued several instructions and orders to these groups. Moreover, his deputy the agent Abu-'Ali Al-Khatib has traveled to Iran.
2. Last week, the agent Shakir Dashar started paying salaries of his agents in Dhi-Qar Governorate. It has been three months since he last paid their salaries; the payment to each agent was one thousand dollars.

Please review, with respect.

Staff Major General
On behalf of the Director of the General Military Intelligence Directorate
23 November 199

(1-1)


Top Secret

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Date and Time of Issue Secret and Immediate
22 Nov 99

From: General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID):
To: intelligence of 3rd Corps
Ref.: M7 / Sect. 35/ Div. 7
We received the following Information:

- 1- On 08 Nov 99, the traitor Sayyid Jabbar, the administrator for Hezbollah, returned from Iran to his headquarters in Al-Tar region, he visited the saboteur groups at Al-bu-'Ayish, Al-'Amayirah, Al-Fuhud, Al-Tamrah Islands, Malzam 'Iyal belonging to Al-Fuhud Sub district, Al-Mashij Islands and Karmat-Hasan, where he issued them new instructions. His deputy, the traitor 'Abu-'Ali Al-Khatib traveled to Iran.
- 2- During the last week, the traitor Shakir Dashar paid the salaries of his agents located in Dhi Qar Governorate, after not doing so for three months, each agent received 1000 Dollars. Please confirm the information, and inform us.



Major General
On behalf of the GMID Director
22 Nov 99

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Date and Time of Issue Secret and Immediate
21 Nov 99 1924 hrs

From: Intelligence System of the Southern Zone
To: General Military Intelligence Directorate / Sect. 35/ Sect. 31
Ref.: 1/ 4/7329

We received the following Information from source 25, his trust degree is normal:

- 1- On 08 Nov 99, the traitor Sayyid Jabbar, the administrator for Hezbollah, returned from Iran to his headquarters in Al-Tar region, he visited the saboteur groups at Al-bu-'Ayish, Al-'Amayirah, Al-Fuhud, Al-Tamrah Islands, Malzam 'Iyal belonging to Al-Fuhud Sub district, Al-Mashij Islands and Karmat-Hasan, where he issued them new instructions. His deputy, the traitor 'Abu-'Ali Al-Khatib traveled to Iran.
- 2- During the last week, the traitor Shakir Dashar paid the salaries of his agents located at Dhi Qar Governorate, after not doing so for three months, each agent received 1000 Dollars. Please review 1700 Kazim.

To Div. 7

*1- Register the information.
2- Inform the 3rd Corp and the Collective Information Room.
22 Nov
Register the new regions names
Done
22 Nov*

Presented briefly to our section on 21 Nov

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Date and Time of Issue Secret and Immediate
27 Nov 99

From: Intelligence of the 4th Corps
To: the Security Commission of Maysan Governorate, General Military Intelligence
Directorate / Sect. 35
Ref.: 7078

We received the following Information from one of our sources:

1- A group of about five traitors entered through Al-Za'faran valley and settled at Al-Yara' village in Mulla Nafi' house and their intention are to attack the Ba'th Party group at 'Ali Al-Gharbi Sub district. The commander of the group has been identified; he is Sayyid Razzaq Al-Bakhitawi, residing in Iran.

2- A group of traitors entered through Duwayrij River with a camera, they headed to Al-Mashrah region and their intention are to carry out a reconnaissance of the military troops and the headquarters of the security systems. The traitor 'Ali Al-Darraj commands them; he works for the Iranian Intelligence (Itila'at). Please review.

*To Div. 7
Register and follow-up the information 28 Nov*

*To: head of the section
Please review, the information is registered in the brief report and records. 27 Nov*

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Date and Time of Issue Secret and Immediate
25 Nov 99 2216 hrs

From: Intelligence of the 3rd Corps
To: General Military Intelligence Directorate / Sect. 35
Ref.: 12247

In reference to our Secret and Immediate correspondence number 12237, on 25 Nov, at 1230, the force assigned to search Al-Ka'aniyyah region returned without results.

*To be register with the primary documents
27 Nov*

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Date and Time of Issue Secret and Immediate
25 Nov 99

From: Intelligence of the 3rd Corps
To: General Military Intelligence Directorate / Sect. 35
Ref.: 12237

A force composed from the Sayf Al-Qa'id Brigade is assigned to search Al-Ka'aniyyah region after receiving information about the presence of a group at grid coordinate 7541. Their results will be reported later.

Hasan/ Akram

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Date and Time of Issue Secret and Immediate
27 Nov 99

From: Intelligence of the 3rd Corps
To: General Military Intelligence Directorate / Sect. 35
Ref.: 12264

At 0600 hrs on 27 Nov, a force composed of the 3rd Regiment of the 41st Armored Brigade and the 3rd Regiment of the Mechanized Infantry Brigade, is assigned to search Shiridah farms region at grid coordinate (5253), after receiving information about the presence of a traitor group there. The force returned without results.

*To Div. 7
To be register
27 Nov*

Hasan/ Hadi

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Date and Time of Issue Secret and Immediate
25 Nov 99

From: Intelligence of the 2nd Corps
To: General Military Intelligence Directorate / Sect. 35/ Sect. 3
Ref.: (TC: illegible reference number)

In reference to our Secret and Immediate correspondence 9999 on 25 Nov, the Intelligence Staff Officer-Grade 3 of our Corps, checked the incident area and presented the following: At 2200 hrs, on 24 Nov, the transporting truck type DAVE, with license number 9443-Baghdad with a white in color cabin and green body cover, exploded near Tal Abu-Trabah village at grid coordinate 8168 (Qurrah Tayah Map 1/100 000).

The truck transporting four Shahin missiles Sign-2, Iranian made, with bombs mounted underneath exploded prematurely, the bombs were to explode after the launch of the missiles to destroy any evidence of the operation, however due to unknown reasons, probably timing error, and the bombs exploded earlier scattering the missiles fragments throughout the area. The civil defense of the Diyala Governorate neutralized the missiles. There were no losses. The missiles specifications; length 378 cm, total weight 580 kg, warhead weight 180 kg, diameter 320 mm, range 20 km. Please review, with respect.

*To Div. 7
To be register
27 Nov*

Registered on 25 Nov

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Date and Time of Issue Secret and Immediate
25 Nov 99

From: Intelligence of the 2nd Corps
To: General Military Intelligence Directorate / Sect. 35/ Sect. 3
Ref.: 50001

Here is the status of the Kurdish saboteurs' activities and our troop's activities as of 1830 hrs, on 25 Nov.

The 3rd, 15th and 34th Divisions, there are no changes.

General: At 2200 hrs, on 24 Nov, the transporting truck type DAVE, license number 9443-Baghdad with a white in color cabin and green body cover, exploded near Tal Abu-Trabah village at grid coordinate 8168 (Qurrah Tayah Map 1/100 000).

The truck transporting four Shahin missiles Sign-2, Iranian made, with bombs mounted underneath exploded prematurely, the bombs were to explode after the launch of the missiles to destroy any evidence of the operation, however due to unknown reasons, probably timing error, and the bombs exploded earlier scattering the missiles fragments throughout the area. The civil defense of the Diyala Governorate neutralized the missiles. There were no losses. The missiles specifications; length 378 cm, total weight 580 kg, warhead weight 180 kg, diameter 320 mm, range 20 km. Please review, with respect.

*To Div. 6
To be register and added to the next report
28 Nov*

*This is of Div. 7 concern, because it is an Iraqi truck
29 Nov*

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Date and Time of Issue Secret and Immediate

25 Nov 99

From: Intelligence of the 2nd Corps

To: General Military Intelligence Directorate / Sect. 35

Ref.: 50004

The intelligence summary about Iran as of 1800 hrs, on 25 Nov:

The 3rd, 15th and 34th Divisions, there are no changes.

General: At 2200 hrs, on 24 Nov, the transporting truck of DAVE type, with license number 9443-Baghdad with a white in color cabin and green body cover, exploded near Tal Abu-Trabah village at grid coordinate 8168 (Qurrah Tayah Map 1/100 000).

The truck transporting four Shahin missiles Sign-2, Iranian made, with bombs mounted underneath exploded prematurely, the bombs were to explode after the launch of the missiles to destroy any evidence of the operation, however due to unknown reasons, probably timing error, and the bombs exploded earlier scattering the missiles fragments throughout the area.

The civil defense of the Diyala Governorate neutralized the missiles. There were no losses.

The missiles specifications; length 378 cm, total weight 580 kg, warhead weight 180 kg, diameter 320 mm, range 20 km. Please review, with respect.

To Div. 6

To be register

28 Nov

Done

To Div. 7

29 Nov

Page 50

Ministry of Defense

Air Force Command

Air Intelligence and Reconnaissance Directorate

Ref.: Sect. 1 / Div. 1

Date: 09 Dec 99

Secret

To: General Military Intelligence Directorate / Sect. 35

Subject Information

Herein attached are the two correspondence of the Ministry of Interior – General Interior Directorate – Civil Defense Affairs Directorate, number 1902, 1905, dated on 25 Nov 99, sent to us by the Air Force Security System correspondence number 17235, dated on 01 Dec 99, about the sabotage operation perpetuated near Dali 'Abbas Sub district belonging to Al-Khalis District.

Please review.

Attachments

Two copies of the correspondence

Signature
Brigadier General
Basil 'Ali Muhammad
On behalf of the Director of the Air Intelligence and Reconnaissance Directorate

To Div. 6
Register, have we received this information?
12 Dec

To be forwarded to Div. 7 as the report is registered with them.
12 Dec

1-1

Page 51

To: Ministry of Interior – General Interior Directorate – Civil Defense Affairs Directorate
Repeated; Air Force Command - Security System
Repeated; Military Industrialization Commission – Technical Directorate

From: General Civil Defense Directorate – Technical Affairs - Operations
Ref.: 1905
Date: 25 Nov 99

In reference to our Secret and Immediate correspondence number 1902, dated on 25 Dec 99, the Diyala Civil Defense Directorate informed us of the following by its correspondence number 516, dated on 25 Dec 99:

At 0800 hrs, on 25 Nov 99, the intervention squad mention in our abovementioned correspondence arrived to the incident location with squads from the general security, the governorate security and the intelligence service. After inspecting the location, we found the following:

- 1- The truck was modified to be a launch platform carrying four Iranian made short-range missiles, resembling to the Iranian Shahin Missile.
- 2- A bomb was mounted underneath the truck of the same type as the transported missile warhead.
- 3- A remote control system that ensured a source of electricity for the missiles and the bomb was mounted on the ceiling of the driver cabin, due to a faulty connection in this system, the bomb exploded before the launch of the missiles, destroying the truck and scattering the missiles fragments.
- 4- Major Anwar, the Intelligence Officer of Al-Khalis Maujahedeen Camp reported a missile attack near the camp, after inspection, it was found to pieces of the engine and tail section from one of the missiles mounted on the truck.
- 5- After neutralizing and photographing the missiles, the missiles were delivered to the Intelligence Unit of Al-Khalis Maujahedeen Camp.
- 6- The missiles are Iranian made, ground-to-ground short-range missiles: length 250 cm, total weight 100 kg, diameter 350 mm, range 300 km, warhead highly explosive TNT. The missile has a system resembling the long-range missiles, and a 15 minutes timing device that has Persian symbols written on it.

End, we informed the Central Control.

Major General Qasim Muhammad Nuri.
General Civil Defense Directorate
26 Nov 99

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To: Ministry of Interior – General Interior Directorate – Civil Defense Affairs Directorate
Repeated; Air Force Command - Security System
Repeated; Military Industrialization Commission – Technical Directorate

From: General Civil Defense Directorate – Technical Affairs - Operations
Ref.: 1902
Date: 25 Nov 99

Diyala Civil Defense Directorate informed us by its secret and immediate correspondence number 515, dated on 25 Nov 99, the following:

At (TC: illegible time), Diyala Police Director, Lt. Colonel Karim Khalifah reported the explosion of a truck at Al-Sulaymani region belonging to Dali 'Abbas Sub district in Al-Khalis District.

Immediately, an intervention squad composed of Major 'Isa Ghazi, the Commissioner 'Adil Muhammad Faris and Sergeant Major Hamid Fawzi, moved to the explosion location, the squad arrived at 0200 hrs (TC: illegible word) explosion of a truck type DAVE, with license number 9443-Baghdad with a white in color cabin and unknown owner. The truck was entirely destroyed due to a missile attack at 2230 hrs. At the same time, another missile exploded near the Iranian Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) Camp. No casualties were reported from the two explosions.

We found four Iranian made missiles, each missile weighs (TC: illegible number), the missiles were neutralized and will be delivered later.

Dali 'Abbas Police Station took over the investigation. End, we informed the Central Control.

Major General Qasim Muhammad Nuri.
General Civil Defense Directorate
25 Nov 99

Page 53

Date and Time of Issue Secret and Immediate
25 Nov 99

From: Intelligence of the 2nd Corps
To: General Military Intelligence Directorate / Sect. 35 / Sect. 3
Ref.: 9999

At 2200 hrs, on 24 Nov, the traitors launched an Iranian made missile type Shahin from a Scania truck positioned near Tajdari village at grid coordinates 7866, (Qurrah Tayah Map 1/100 000). The truck carried four missiles, three of them exploded on the back of the truck

destroying it, the fourth missile hit Marvua region in the northeast of the camp, grid coordinates 7269. No casualties please review, with respect.

Warrant Officer Hamid 'Abd-al-Jabbar
25 Nov 99

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Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

Date and Time of Issue Secret and Immediate Telegram
24 Nov 99

From: Intelligence Service
To: Ministry of Interior, Special Security Organization, General Military Intelligence Directorate, General Security Directorate
Ref.: 140/ 2 / 2 /5038

One of our trusted sources provided us with the following information:
Starting at 1630 hrs until 1700 hrs, on 22 Nov 99, the Iranian Intelligence permitted a group of their agents equipped with weapons to infiltrate into Iraq at Musban 'Uzah region in 'Ilam Governorate through the sector of the 1st Brigade of the 172nd Division of the Iranian Army.
End.


On behalf of the Intelligence Service Director
24 Nov 99

*To the general Director
Please review, I suggest forwarding the information to M7, M 8 and Sect. 47 to be followed-up according to each unit competence, M 7 should inform the Intelligence System of the Eastern Zone and the Intelligence of the 3rd Corps*



24 Nov.

Yes, pay your full attention to the follow- up, the same information has been reported by the Intelligence of the 3rd Corps



24 Nov
13404

*Notification of 24 Nov 99
To: the 7th, the 8th Deputy Directorates and the Sect. 47
Please review and execute the comments of the Director General*



Major General Senior Secretary
24 Nov 99

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Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
General Military Intelligence Directorate

To: Head of the Section

Subject: Infiltration of several Iranian Agents

1- Please find herein attached, the correspondence of the Intelligence of the 3rd Corps number 2218, dated on 23 Nov 99, including the following information:

A- At 1630 hrs, on 22 Nov 99, Ilam Intelligence permitted a group of their agents to infiltrate into Iraq through the sector of the 1st Regiment of the 172nd Brigade of the 23rd Special Forces Division of the Iranian Army, opposite the 2nd Regiment of the 15th Frontier Brigade. At first, the Iranian Regiment prohibited access due to the lack of coordination, however, the Iranian Intelligence insisted on permitting them to infiltrate.

B- The group is equipped with medium weapons and mortars.

C- The commander of Al-Basrah Camp is the source of this information, obtained in cooperation with the Iranian Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK); the source affirmed that the group will execute a very important task in our territories.

D- Comments:

First: The Southern Zone Command was informed by the correspondence of the Intelligence of the 3rd Corps number 12217, dated on 23 Nov 99,

Second: we informed the Intelligence of the 4th Corps and the Intelligence System of the Southern Zone through our correspondence number 12073, dated on 23 Nov 99.

2- We suggest informing the Intelligence Service and the General Security Directorate – the Collective Information Room.

Please review and order, with respect.

Staff Lt. Colonel
Sami 'Abbas Mahal
Deputy Staff officer of the Div. 7 / Sect. 35
23 Nov 99

Div. 7
Register and Follow-up



21 Nov

Warrant Officer Ahmad
To be registered as per the comment of the Head of the Section

Page 56

Date and Time of Issue
23 Nov 99

Secret and Immediate

From: General Military Intelligence Directorate
To: Intelligence of the 4th Corps and the Intelligence System of the Southern Zone
Ref.: M7 / Sect. 35 / Div. 7/ 12073

One of our trusted sources provided us with the following information:

A- At 1630 hrs, on 22 Nov 99, Iranian Intelligence permitted a group of their agents, equipped with medium weapons and mortars, to infiltrate into Iraq through the sector of the 1st Regiment of the 172nd Brigade of the 23rd Special Forces Division of the Iranian Army, opposite the 2nd Regiment of the 15th Frontier Brigade.

Comment: the group will execute a very important task within you sector.

Please take the necessary measures and inform us.



Staff Major General


On behalf of the General Military Intelligence Directorate
24 Nov 99

To the Head of the section

Please review

1- We signed the second copy

2- We informed the Intelligence System of the Southern Zone and the General security Directorate – the Collective Information Room.



23 Nov.

Page 57

Date and Time of Issue
23 Nov 99

Secret and Immediate

From: Intelligence of the 3rd Corps
To: General Military Intelligence Directorate, Sect. 35
Ref.: 12218

The commander of Al-Basrah in cooperation with the Iranian Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) provided us with the following information:

1- At 1630 hrs, on 22 Nov 99, 'Ilam Intelligence permitted a group of their agents, equipped with medium weapons and mortars, to infiltrate into Iraq through the sector of the 1st Regiment of the 172nd Brigade of the 23rd Special Forces Division of the Iranian Army.

2- At first, the Iranian Regiment prohibited access due to the lack of coordination, however, because of the importance of the mission, the Iranian Intelligence insisted on permitting them

to infiltrate. Our source affirmed that the group will execute a very important task inside our territories.

We informed the Southern Zone Command through our correspondence number 12217, dated on 23 Nov 99,

Please review.

To the Head of the Section:

Please review, we circulated the 4th Corps correspondence, and we informed the Collective Information Room Security by telephone

The information is listed in the brief report



23 Nov

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Contains a copy of page 57

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Date and Time of Issue
10 Dec 99

Secret and Immediate

From: Intelligence System of the Southern Zone
To: General Military Intelligence Directorate, Sect. 35
Ref.: 1/ 4/ 7802

In reference to your correspondence number 12232, dated on 28 Nov 99, the information is confirmed by sources 24, 65 and 142, their trust degree is normal. Please review. End.

To be registered

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
Date and Time of Issue
28 Nov 99

Secret and Immediate

From: General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID):
To: Intelligence System of the Southern Zone
Ref.: M7 / Sect. 35/ Div. 7

We received the following Information:

The traitors aim to carryout a sabotage operation at Al-Basrah Governorate in the coming days, targeting the security and Ba'th Party headquarters, please follow-up and verify the information.



Major General
On behalf of the GMID Director
28 Nov 99

1- Follow up

2- Register the supporting information in the attached correspondence

30 Nov



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Date and Time of Issue Secret and Immediate

29 Nov 99 2152 hrs

From: Intelligence System of the Southern Zone

To: General Military Intelligence Directorate, Sect. 35

Ref.: 1 /4 /7533

In reference to your Secret and Immediate correspondence number 38/12067, dated on 23 Nov 99, the information subject of your abovementioned correspondence is confirmed.

Hamid

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Date and Time of Issue Secret and Immediate

26 Nov 99

From: Intelligence of the 3rd Corps

To: General Military Intelligence Directorate, Sect. 35, Sect. 31

Ref.: 2253

One of our trusted sources provided us with the following information:

1- The traitors have spread a rumor in Al-Basrah and Dhi Qar, saying that America will carryout a landing operation in the south to frighten the citizens and to demoralize the fighters.

2- The traitors aim to carryout a sabotage operation at Al-Basrah Governorate in the coming days, targeting the security and Ba'th Party headquarters.

We informed the Southern Zone Command through our correspondence number 12252, dated on 26 Nov 99, Sect. 31. The above information is by the source 6003. Please review.

Div. 7

Follow up

27 Nov

Listed in summary report

26 Nov

To Warrant Officer Ahmad

To be related to previous existing information

27 Nov.

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Date and Time of Issue Secret and Immediate
23 Nov 99

From: General Military Intelligence Directorate

To: Intelligence System of the Southern Zone


Ref.: M7 / Sect. 35/ Div. 7/ 12067

We received the following information:

1- The traitors 'Abbas Rahman and Rahim Shinin recently returned from Iran and met with a group of traitors at Al-'Iz River, who intend to carryout sabotage operations at Al-Midaynah – Al-Chibayish Road, they will set up control points to commit crimes against the people.

2- The citizens of Al-'Iz River are taking about the American forces intention to carryout an attack to isolate the southern zone, the traitor Badr Corps is preparing to enter Al-Basrah and Maysan Governorates with the help of American forces.

Please verify the information and inform us.



Major General

On behalf of the GMID Director

28 Nov 99

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Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
General Military Intelligence Directorate

To: Head of the Section

Subject: Information about Isolating Al-Basrah

1- In reference to the correspondence of the Intelligence of the 3rd Corps number 12151, dated on 18 Nov 99, including information about the American Forces intention to carryout a landing operation on 17 Nov, at Al-Qurnah region, in cooperation with the traitor Badr Corps that will incite riots to isolate Al-Basrah from the rest of Iraq.

The source of the information is the correspondence of the Ba'th Party Offices of Dhi Qar and Al-Basrah Governorates number 1963 on 16 Nov 99.

2- The 2nd article of the correspondence of the Intelligence of the 3rd Corps number 1963, dated on 16 Nov 99, stated that the citizens residing in the villages east of Tigris River are taking about the American forces intention to carryout an attack to isolate the southern zone. Also, the traitor Badr Corps is preparing to enter Al-Basrah and Maysan Governorates with the help of American forces.

3- The Intelligence of the 3rd Corps described the information as a rumor in the correspondence dated on 20 Nov 99, without referring to its previous correspondence containing similar information.

4- We suggest notifying the Intelligence of the 3rd Corps that it is important to refer to the previous documents to avoid confusion.

Please review and order, with respect.

Staff Lt. Colonel
Sami 'Abbas Mahal
Deputy Staff officer of the Div. 7 / Sect. 35
23 Nov 99

Div. 7
Register and Follow up



24 Nov

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Republic of Iraq
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Ref.: M7/ Sect. 35/ Div. 7 / 1617
Date 23 Nov 99

Top Secret

To: Sect. 31
Subject: Instructions

The information mentioned in the correspondence of the Intelligence of the 3rd Corps number 12180, dated on 20 Nov 99, was presented before the Director General, he ordered the following:

Intensify the work of our agents and sources and avoid mixing-up information.

Please review and take the necessary measures, with respect.



Major General
Head of Sect. 35
23 Nov 99

The summary of Section 35 for 20 Nov 99

1- Technical Sources: No changes

2- Public Sources; No changes

3- Human Sources:

The correspondence of the Intelligence of the 3rd Corps number 12180, dated on 20 Nov 99, contained information provided by a trusted source as follows:

A- The traitors 'Abbas Rahman and Rahim Shinin recently returned from Iran and met with a group of traitors at Al-'Iz River, who intend to carryout sabotage operations at Al-Midaynah – Al-Chibayish Road, they will set up control points to commit crimes against the people.

B- The citizens of Al-'Iz River are taking about the American forces intention to carryout an attack to isolate the southern zone, the traitor Badr Corps is preparing to enter Al-Basrah and Maysan Governorates with the help of American forces.

Please verify the information and inform us.

First: The Southern Zone Command was informed through the Intelligence of the 3rd Corps.
Second: we informed the Intelligence System of the Southern Zone in order to verify the information.

4- Tactical Activities:

A- 3rd Corps Sector:

At 1110 hrs, on 19 Nov 99, seven 18-passengers vehicles stayed at Al-Maqbarah Al-Iraniyyah (the Iranian Cemetery) in Al-Shalamijah, after the visit, at 1300 hrs the vehicles returned inside the Iranian territories.

A- 4th Corps Sector:

At 1530 hrs, on 20 Nov 99, a helicopter was spotted hovering along the border strip facing Al-Shihabi frontier Post, in the direction of Mahran city, at 1450 hrs the helicopter returned inside the Iranian territories. (TC: there is an error in the times)

3-6

Comment:

The helicopter incident might be to complete the sector reconnaissance by the commander of the 55th Parachute Brigade, mentioned in the summary of 19 Nov 99.

5- Water levels status, no changes

6- (Al - Razit) Ground Surveillance System status, no changes

7- Carcass Search Committee, no changes

8- Status of individuals willingly returning to duty after deserting, no changes

4-6

(Our secret correspondence number 77355, dated on 18 Nov 99, attached herein)
Please review and order, with respect.

Brigadier General
Kazim Muhsin Kazim
On behalf of the Head of Sect. 35
19 Nov 99

To the Senior Secretary
Please review, we will follow-up with the units, with respect.



19 Nov

To the Director General
Please review, with respect.



20 Nov

Div. 7
Follow-up and update the information



20 Nov

1-1

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Date and Time of Issue Secret and Immediate
21 Nov 99 2128 hrs
From: Intelligence of the 3rd Corps
To: General Military Intelligence Directorate, Sect. 35,
Ref.: 12151

In reference to the correspondence of the Ba'th Party Offices of Dhi Qar and Al-Basrah Governorates number 1963 on 16 Nov 99, communicated to us by the Southern Zone Command correspondence number 335, dated on 16 Nov 99, the information indicate the following:

The American forces intend to carryout a landing operation, possibly on 17 Nov, at Al-Qurnah region, in cooperation with the traitor Badr Corps.

The information indicates that they will incite riots, protect Al-Basrah Shiite population and isolate Al-Basrah from the rest of Iraq as they had done in the northern region. End

Warrant Officer Riyadh
To be registered



21 Nov

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General Military Intelligence Directorate
Ref.: M7/ Sect. 35/ Div. 7 / 1633
Date 23 Nov 99


Secret

To: Sect. 31

Subject: Evaluation of Information

The source of information mentioned in the 4th Corps correspondence indicated in your Secret correspondence number 1933, dated on 25 Nov 99, is the Security Committee of the governorate

Please review.



Major General
Head of Sect. 35
23 Nov 99

1-1

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Republic of Iraq
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Ref.: M7/ Sect. 31/ Div. 1 / 1933
Date 23 Nov 99

Secret

To: Sect. 31

Subject: Evaluation of Information

In reference to the 4th Corps Secret correspondence number 1946, dated on 13 Nov 99, Please review, and evaluate the mentioned information.



Brigadier General
Head of Sect. 31
25 Nov 99

To: Div 7


Answer that the source of information mentioned in the 4th Corps correspondence is the Security Committee of the governorate



27 Nov

To: Head of the Section

Please review, concerning the information mentioned in the 4th Corps Secret correspondence number 1946, dated on 13 Nov 99, communicated to us by the Southern Zone Command correspondence number 7387, dated on 22 Nov 99, the information source is the Security Committee of the governorate



27 Nov

1-1

Page 73

Date and Time of Issue
Nov 99

Secret and Immediate

From: General Military Intelligence Directorate
To: the Intelligence of the 3rd and 4th Corps
Ref.: M7/ Sect. 35/ Div. 7

We received the following information:

1- A group of Iranian agents entered Iraq by way of Al-Nisaymi Road, located two kilometers north of Duwayrij River, they headed to Al-Mashrah region with the intention to conduct an ambush on the old Al-Ta'awuni Road that connect Al-Ship and Al-Tayyib regions.

2- There is a road used by Iranian agents near Al-Sharhani Frontier Post within the sector of the 1st Regiment of the 15th Border Brigade, the path of the road is in the direction of Al-Bij village then turns in the direction of 'Ali-Al-Gharbi.

3- There is a group of Iranian agents at the southern dam of Al-'Iz River in Salaf Al-Frijat, they are: Subayh Dakhil Al-Bazuni, Abu-Muntazir Al-Shaghanibi, Abu-Majid Al-Fartusi, Muhammad 'Udah Al-Sa'idi, Falih Maridi Al-Furayji, 'Udah Muhammad Salman Al-Sa'idi. The aforementioned reopened the dam of the second canal after being closed by the engineering squad of the reclamation of land.

4- On 11 Nov 99, a group of about seven Iranian agents carrying various weapons, entered Iraq by way of the road in Abu-Dhakhir region and headed to Al-Zijiyah region. The group met the agent Salim Jakhuyr Al-Nawfali and the agent Rawhi Al-Nawfali, residents of Al-Zijiyah region, these two facilitate the passage of Iranian agents into Al-Ahwar western sector.

5- The Iranian agents Jasim Kabashi and Mizhir Yasin Al-Shaghanibi, affiliated with Khat Al-Wazarah, returned from Iran using the road in Al-Sardahiyyah region, in the direction of Al-Nujayrah village and headed to Al-'Iz River, they settled at Al-bu-Bakhit village. The

Iranian Intelligence assigned both of them to collect detailed information about the Iranian Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) within your Corps sector.


6- The Iranian agents intend to carryout suicidal sabotage operations against the security and Ba'th Party headquarters, in addition, some of them settled near Maysan–Al-Basrah Road to attack the vehicles of the Iranian Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization, as well as the commanders and officers' vehicles.

Please verify the information and inform us.

Major General
On behalf of the GMID Director
Nov 99

To: Head of the Section

Please review, is communicated to us through the Southern Zone Command, the information source is the Security Committee of the governorate and mentioned in the 4th Corps Secret correspondence number 1946, dated on 13 Nov 99,



23 Nov

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Contains a copy of page 73

Page 75

Date and Time of Issue Secret and Immediate

22 Nov 99 1346

From: Intelligence System of the Southern Zone

To: General Military Intelligence Directorate/ Sect. 36

Ref: 1/4/2387:

The Maysan Governorate Security Committee informed us of the following:

We received the following information:

1- A group of Iranian agents entered Iraq by way of Al-Nisaymi Road, located two kilometers north of Duwayrij River, they headed to Al-Mashrah region with the intention to conduct an ambush on the old Al-Ta'awuni Road that connect Al-Ship and Al-Tayyib regions.

2- There is a road used by Iranian agents near Al-Sharhani Frontier Post within the sector of the 1st Regiment of the 15th Border Brigade, the path of the road is in the direction of Al-Bij village then turns in the direction of 'Ali-Al-Gharbi.

3- There is a group of Iranian agents at the southern dam of Al-'Iz River in Salaf Al-Frijat, they are: Subayh Dakhil Al-Bazuni, Abu-Muntazir Al-Shaghanibi, Abu-Majid Al-Fartusi, Muhammad 'Udah Al-Sa'idi, Falih Maridi Al-Furayji, 'Udah Muhammad Salman Al-Sa'idi. The aforementioned reopened the dam of the second canal after being closed by the engineering squad of the reclamation of land.

4- On 11 Nov 99, a group of about seven Iranian agents carrying various weapons, entered Iraq by way of the road in Abu-Dhakhir region and headed to Al-Zijiyah region. The group

met the agent Salim Jakhuyr Al-Nawfali and the agent Rawhi Al-Nawfali, residents of Al-Zijiyah region, these two facilitate the passage of Iranian agents into Al-Ahwar western sector.

5- The Iranian agents Jasim Kabashi and Mizhir Yasin Al-Shaghanibi, affiliated with Khat Al-Wazarah, returned from Iran using the road in Al-Sardahiyyah region, in the direction of Al-Nujayrah village and headed to Al-'Iz River, they settled at Al-bu-Bakhit village. The Iranian Intelligence assigned both of them to collect detailed information about the Iranian Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) within your Corps sector.

6- The Iranian agents intend to carryout suicidal sabotage operations against the security and Ba'th Party headquarters, in addition, some of them settled near Maysan–Al-Basrah Road to attack the vehicles of the Iranian Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization, as well as the commanders and officers' vehicles.

Please verify the information and inform us.

Two agents' boats, each with 5-6 individuals, approached the area separating the 1st and 2nd Companies of the 18th Infantry Brigade. The aforementioned agents sent four individuals headed by the agent Abu-Liq'a' Al-Fartusi and 'Abdallah Al-Fariji to Karishah region. Note that the mentioned individuals want to deliver mail and they settled in the mentioned region. Please review.

Document Title: Iraqi Intelligence Reports (2001)

ID: ISGQ-2003-00037289

Date: Various (2001)

Synopsis:

This document includes numerous Iraqi intelligence reports from the 2001. Most describe Iranian weapons smuggling operations, including a description of “conically” shaped bombs that fit the description of Explosively Formed Penetrators.

Key Themes:

Key words:

309/28 Jul

Al-Husayn Brigade Headquarters
Security
Ref no. 29
Date: 25 Jul 2001

To: Karbala' Volunteers Division Command (Security)
Subject: Security Measures

In reference to your correspondence, number 102/197, dated 15 Jul 2001, we reviewed the information and took the necessary actions.
Please review.

Major 'Ubadah Muhammad Rajab
Al-Husayn Brigade
Jul 2001

Under processing
28 Jul

309/28 Jul

Karbala' Volunteers Division Command (Security) Headquarters
Security
Ref no. 102/197
Date: 25 Jul 2001

To: Security Officers of Yafa, Ariha and Al-Husayn Brigades
Subject: Security Measures

The Iranian regime supplied its agents with explosives in addition to 107 mm and 122 mm rockets. Those agents adopted new methods in their sabotage actions using conically shaped bombs and empty tin milk cans after filling them with TNT.

In addition, the Iranian regime supplied Badr Corp with mines, guided missiles, launchers, timing devices and pistols with silencers to carry out sabotage activities in Iraq.

Therefore, the Division Commander orders that you conduct patrols and monitor the area near your camps, and intensify the guard duty and patrols in order to prevent those agents from achieving their intentions. Also, you must use your sources to gather information about this affair in each sector.

Please review and take the necessary actions.

Signature



Intelligence Brigadier General
Security Officer of Karbala' Volunteers Division Command
15 Jul 2001

Page 4

Presidency of the Republic
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Al-Quds Army Intelligence System
Ref no. 2/2/516
Date: 11 Jul 2001

To: Karbala' Division, Al-Quds Army, Security
Subject: Information

In reference to our directorate secret and confidential correspondence, number 8/43/1/10420, dated 03 Jul 2001, we received the following information:

- 1- The Iranian regime supplied Badr Corp with significant quantities of explosives, and sophisticated timing and electronic devices to carry out sabotage activities in Iraq. Badr Corp members were trained to use these devices in the Dayzful and Bakhtran regions.
- 2- The Iranian and Kuwaiti regimes achieved an agreement with Badr Corp to support the so called "Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution" if they increase their sabotage activities in Iraq.
- 3- The agent Karim Mahud ordered some of his followers to execute sabotage activities in Baghdad upon orders from the Iranian Regime.
- 4- On 25 May 2001, Badr Corp agents brought 107 mm and 122 mm rockets to Al-Furat Al-Awsat Governorate and Al-Furat Al-Janubi Governorate. Also, they brought other rockets through the northern region to deliver them to Diyala, Salah-al-Din and Baghdad Governorates.
- 5- The agents received orders to intensify their sabotage and informative activities, focusing on Al-Basrah and Baghdad Governorates. Their activities include distributing hostile pamphlets and contacting the heads of clans...

1-2

Secret and Confidential

We called the formations security officers at 18:30 hrs on 15 Jul, and briefed them about this information and about the security measures to be taken.

Signature



15 Jul

Page 5

... near Dhi Qar Governorate, especially those near Al-'Abrat region.

- 6- Badr Corp recruits the Iraqi volunteers existing in Iran. Also, the criminal, Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim, increased the salaries of their agents.
- 7- Badr Corp agents adopted new methods in their sabotage actions using conically shaped bombs filled with TNT, weighing 5-6 kg and using a locally made metal base. Also, using empty tin milk cans after filling them with TNT, connected to Cortex fuse, a detonator and a timing device.
- 8- Badr Corp is at a top alert condition. They ordered the personnel on leave and the reserve forces to join their units, and they have opened a new headquarters in eastern Al-Ahwar (TC; Illegible word) the sand barrier. In addition, they brought ambulance and transport vehicles to the northern part of Shat 'Ali.


9- The Iranian regime supplied Badr Corp with mines, guided missiles, launchers, timing devices and pistols with silencers. These weapons are available in their camps in Al-Ahwar and Karmanshah.

10- The criminal Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim coordinated with the Iranian regime to print 10,000 pamphlets (small booklets and a flyer) urging citizens to revolt against the state. Their agents would bring them to Iraq to distribute them in the southern and Al-Furat Al-Awsat governorates.

11- The order is issued to take all measures to prevent them from achieving their intentions, use your sources to gather information about the subject in all sectors, and keep the information from leaking to lower ranks.

Please review and take the necessary actions.

Signature



Staff Brigadier General
Director of Al-Quds Army Intelligence System
11 Jul 2001

To the commander

We called the formations security officers to come to our headquarters to brief them about this information and about the security measures to be taken.

Pleased review and order




*Intelligence Brigadier General
Division security Officer
15 Jul 2001*

1- Inform all units' intelligence officers about the subject to monitor the areas near their camps and intensify the guard duties.

2- Intensify the guard duties in our headquarters.

3- Monitor all roads and areas near our headquarters

Signature



15 Jul

Document Title: Iraqi Intelligence Reports (2000 & 2001)

ID: ISGQ-2003-00052520

Date: Various (2000 & 2001)

Synopsis:

This document includes numerous Iraqi intelligence reports from 2000 and 2001. The documents describe a variety of Iranian activities inside Iraq, most related to targeting the anti-Iranian terrorist organization *Mujahdin-e Khalq*.

Key Themes:

Key words:

ISGQ-2003-00052520

Full Translation

Page 15

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

115
17 FEB

(SATTS N M)/4

1

IIS Logo
Secret and Confidential

Notification
M5/1

Date 16 FEB 2000
Ref. No./ 584

Respected Director of M55/7,

Attached is the letter of M5/1/1/3 No.1288 on 14 FEB 2000 as follows:

1- As per the approval of the Intelligence Service Director, the Service Deputy Director of the operations was ascribed to consolidate the harmful activities initiated by Iran against the country at M5/1.

2- Provide us with all the harmful operations committed by the Iranian intelligence and its internal agents against the national and vital internal targets. The intended Director will be responsible if we are not notified.

Please acknowledge and reply as soon as possible

... With Appreciation

Iran

Take the appropriate action
Accurately and as soon as possible


17 FEB 2000



Director of M55
15 FEB 2000

(1 - 1)

Secret and Confidential

In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

Socialist Arabic Ba'th Party
State of Iraq
State Secretariat Office

One Arabic Nation
with an eternal message

Presidency of the Republic
State Secretariat Office stamp
Dated 13 MAR 2000

Ba'th Party Logo

Ref: (SATTS L T) 63
Date: 12 MAR 2000

To: Presidency of the Republic - Office of the National Security Council
Secretariat

Subject: Religious Events



Subsequent to letter No. (SATTS L T)/21 on 18 JAN 2000 and in reference to your letter No. 34/3/97/98 on 22 JAN 2000

The Assistant Secretary of the Iraqi State - Director of the Executive Committee was assigned to notify the concerned departments regarding religious events and visits, as follow:

- 1- The General Security Directorate should log the number of visitors during the events, their age group and gender so they can refer to these records in case a political problem occurs, God forbid! Or treat these logs as a poll to identify the number of visitors along with their ages, implementing this procedure with every visit.
- 2- It is preferable to decrease the number of visitors and to set up roadblocks before they accumulate in Al-Najaf and Karbala' Governorates in each event where control members of the areas leading to the governorates should accurately search buses looking for taping devices, if found, the bus would be confiscated and the driver detained for two weeks or more.
- 3- At every checkpoint, the visitors' furniture should be offloaded from the buses by the visitors themselves, searched thoroughly then put back on the buses. If anyone complains, he will be detained and his vehicle confiscated for one week or more.
- 4- Pickup trucks and farm vehicles are not allowed to have tinted windows this is a traffic violation according to instructions, driver will be detained.
- 5- To move the visitors to the control areas outside the Governorate, a bus will pick them up and drive them back home.
- 6- Motivate the Party members and the Security Services to search the visitors starting from inside their homes and ending in their garage. There should be a joint effort for searching the visitors' furniture.

In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

Socialist Arabic Ba'th Party
State of Iraq
State Secretariat Office

One Arabic Nation
with an eternal message

Ref:

Ba'th Party Logo

Date:



7- The necessity of the coordination between the Party and the Transport Associations in order to notify the bus drivers not to play tapes related to recitation or read religious books during the transportation of travelers. The drivers should inform the control points of any violation, otherwise he will be considered as a political contributor and participant.

Please acknowledge and take the appropriate action... with appreciation

(Signature)

Comrade

'Adnan Dawud Salman

Director of the State Secretariat Office

12 MAR 2000

Copy to:

●●●●●●●●●●

Presidential Diwan / in reference to your letter N

o. (SATTS M W) / 2904 on 26 JAN 2000 and followed up by our letter above, please acknowledge... with appreciation

Secret and Immediate Letter

Date and Time of creation

From / M55/1,1

13 MAY 2000

To / M55/6

Repeated to: M55/7

457
17 MAY

Ref. No. / 1972 /// Al-Muthanna Operations Command provided us with information issued by Al-Muthanna Intelligence Directorate, revealing that the Iranian intelligence and the traitor Badr Corps have brought in suicide agents already trained in Lebanon to commit acts of sabotage in the name of (Tha'ir Al-Husayn), targeting the party sites and Mujahidin Khalq, execution date will be during and after Arba'iniyyat Al-Husayn (TC: means 40 days after his death)

Take precautions and be careful / ended.



Director of M55
13 MAY 2000



13 MAY



13 MAY

*Mr. Qasim Please take precautions and be careful
And inform all the officers*



Department Head
17 MAY 2000

(1 - 1)

Secret and Immediate

Secret and immediate letter

Date and Time of creation

From / M55/1/1

05 AUG 2000


To / M55/6

Repeated to M55/7

Ref. No. 4553, below is the text message of the letter issued by M5/1/1/3 9015 on 03 AUG 2000, the Iranian Intelligence is intending to target one of the Iranian Mujahidin Khalq's locations using a group of their agents in the next few days. Take precautions and be careful.

Mr. Qasim

To work accordingly



Department Head

05 AUG 2000



(Illegible) M55

03 AUG 2000

Receiver / 'Ali

Sender / Hasan

(1 - 1)

Secret and immediate

Page 25

1- Durayd Majid Checked (Signature)

2- Qasim Kamil Checked (Signature)

Page 29

8
(SATTSMN)/4

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

494
25 MAY

IIS Logo
Secret

Notification

Date 24 MAY 2000
Ref. No. / 2228

21/ M55/ 6
M55/7

(Illegible)
Checked



27 MAY

Information was provided revealing that Iranian agents are intending to sneak into Baghdad City in the coming days, disguised in military uniforms with the ranks of Staff Colonel and Staff Lieutenant Colonel. They will be driving a Land Cruiser with a government license plate (SATTSMN) and forged IDs. They are equipped with weapons and guided missiles to commit acts of sabotage targeting the vital locations or the families of officials and officers.


Please take precautions, be careful and follow up on this issue.

...with appreciation




Director of M55
25 MAY 2000

Mr. Qasim Please
(Illegible)



Head of the Division
25 MAY 2000

Mr. Head of the Division
all the Units to follow up
the information please



25 MAY 2000

Page 32

11

Secret and Urgent Letter

From: Directorate 55/1/1

To: Directorate 55/6

Repeated: Directorate 55/7

Security Department 1, Platoon Security

Issuing Date and Time

11 NOV 2000

Issue No. 5433 /// below is the text from the 1st Directorate letter No. 4456 on 11 SEP 2000; you are required to take precautionary measures and not give the Iranian agents a chance to implement their dirty plans. /// Finish.



On Behalf of the Director of the 55th Directorate
11 SEP 2000

Head of the Department

Please to be notified




12 SEP 2000

Sa'd

11 SEP

Kindly Mr. Qasim

Notification



13 SEP 2000

(1-1)

Secret and Urgent

Total P. 02

In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Compassionate
(TC: Logos of the Iraqi Republic and the Iraqi Intelligence Service)

Secret

872
02 MAR

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service
Ref: 698
Date: 24 FEB 2000

To: Al-Muthanna Governorate-Security Committee
Subject: Information


We were informed regarding the Iranian Regime and its agent's intentions to target the Party, security headquarters and high officials of the State.
Kindly be acknowledged and take the necessary precautionary measures.
...Regards



Intelligence Director of the West Area
24 FEB 2000

Hasan
24 FEB

Kindly Mr. Qasim
To be notified please



02 MAR

24 FEB

Copy to

Directorate 55/2:

Directorate 55/2:

Directorate55/(SATTs Q N)

Directorate 55/2: kindly be acknowledged and take the necessary actions to activate the role of your reliable sources in order to strike any operation that the agents intend to carry out... regards

Secret

Page 34

13 (SATTS N M)/ 4

(TC: Logo of the Iraqi Intelligence Service)

Secret


Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service
Date: 08 OCT 2000
Ref: 5864
To: Directorate 55/ 6

Notification

Referring to the Presidency/ Secretary Letter No. 6827 on 03 OCT 2000; we confirm your continuous patrols and search operations around your headquarters for any timed artillery shells used by the enemies to sever any chance they might have.

Iran


Kindly be acknowledged ...regards



On Behalf of the 55th Directorate Director
08 OCT 2000

Procedures

Notify and work according to it



Copy to Directorate 55/7


Same purpose of the above-mentioned ...regards

1012
12 OCT

Page 35

1- Jasim Muhammad

Informed



2- Hasan 'Ali

Informed



3-

4-

5-

6-

7-

Page 47

09:23

3551 P. 01

Secret and Urgent Letter

Issuing Time and Date

From: Directorate 55/1/1

19 MAR 2000

To: Directorate 55/6

Repeated: Directorate 55/7

628

05 MAY Iran

Issue No. 1538

Below is the text from Directorate 5/1/1 letter No. 2956 on 18 MAR 2001; including the following: inform us immediately with any Iranian operation that might happen in your work area when it happens.

Mr. Secretary of the Director Intelligence Service (TC: missing text) directly from your side (Illegible). We should notify the Presidency of the Republic and concerned formations in order to work according. Inform us.




On Behalf of 55th the Directorate Director
19 MAR 2001

Layth

19 MAR

Iran

Please take immediate and accurate action



20 MAR 2001

(1-1)

Secret and Urgent

Page 48

-Jasim Muhammad

-Qaysar Kamil	Informed	(Signature)
-Wamid Jamil	Informed	(Signature)
-Durayd Majid	Informed	(Signature)
-Hasan Husayn	Informed	(Signature)
-(Illegible) Muzaffar	Informed	(Signature)
-'Amir	Informed	(Signature)
-Husayn Hadi	Informed	(Signature)
-Khalid	Informed	(Signature)
-Sa'id Najm	Informed	(Signature)

(Illegible) 15:33

3551 P.01

627/ 05 MAY Iran

Secret and Urgent Letter

From: Directorate 55/1/1

To: Directorate 55/6

Repeated: Directorate 55/7

Activities Department

Issue No. 1650


Time and Date of Issuing

22 MAR 2001

Below is a text from Directorate 5/1/1/3 letter, we were informed of the following information through (SATTS G. M. M):

The KDP (Sons of Treason and Treachery) Group prepared suitcases with bombs under the supervision of their Intelligence Director, Karim Al-Sinjari, to set off explosions in Baghdad, Al-Mawsil and Kirkuk in the coming few days. The group sent one suitcase with a military individual from Al-Kalak Area to Baghdad City. The source from which this information came from believes the bomb that exploded in Baghdad on 15 MAR 2001 was planned by the same group.

A high level of precautions and important should to be given to this issue, so the enemy won't have a opportunity. Finished




On Behalf of the 55th Directorate Director
22 MAR 2001

Fadil
22 MAR

Iran

Be alert, follow up and activate your meetings with the sources, the indications and information shows the increasing hostile intentions.



22 MAR 2001

Secret and Urgent

Page 50

The Officers

Kindly be acknowledged ... regards

1-Jasim Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Aziz	Informed	(Illegible)
2-Wamid Jamil Fahad	Informed	(Illegible)
3-Khashbah Muzaffar	Informed	(Illegible)
4-Qaysar Kamil Jabbar	Informed	(Illegible)
5-'Amir Khalaf	Informed	(Illegible)
6-Sa'd Najm	Informed	(Illegible)

Page 51

(Illegible) 05:42

626 Iran
05 MAY

Secret and Urgent Message

From / M55/1/1

To / M55/6

Repeated / M55 / 7

Date and Time of Issuing

22 MAR 2001

Reference No. /1592/ below is the text message of M5/1 No. 3026 on 19 MAR 2001. We have been informed that the Iranian Intelligence is currently focusing its energy to recruit officers from our organization, especially from the security organization, in order to collect information regarding the organizations hierarchy and the names of managers and officers specialized particularly in the Iranian field.

Recruitment is done through financial enticements and providing all work requirements.

Please provide us with the available information regarding this issue and take the appropriate actions in order to eliminate the enemies' chances to get through to our personnel or making them fall.

Notify us.

Fadil
20 MAR



Director of M55
20 MAR 2001

Officers (Illegible) + Iranian Unit for follow up

Please acknowledge and take maximum precautions and security awareness against such intentions, pay attention to building special relationships from fear of being exploited, offering information about our officers



23 MAR 2001

(1 - 1)

Secret and Urgent

Page 52

1- Jasim Muhammad	Checked	(Signature)
2- Wahid Jamil	Checked	(Signature)
3- Durayd Majid	Checked	(Signature)
4- Khalid Husayn	Checked	(Signature)
5- Husayn Subhi	Checked	(Signature)
6- (Illegible) Muzhir	Checked	(Signature)
7- 'Amir Tal'at	Checked	(Signature)
8- Sa'id Jum'ah	Checked	(Signature)
9-		

Illusive Operations with Iran

1- Introduction:

The Iranian Intelligence is requesting from our sources a pushed towards the Iranian Intelligence to commit acts of sabotage inside the country, in order to maintain the credibility of these sources fake operations are conducted for them.

2- Objective:

To set rules and instructions that uses the fundamentals concepts for these fake operations'. The regulations are specified according to these concepts for the success of the operations (Illegible) the revealing of sources on one hand and misleading the Iranian Intelligence on the other hand.

3- The conditions that should be available and taken into consideration to implement a fake operation:

a- Specify the goal of the operation

b- Specify the elements of gains and lost, and the accomplishment

c- The source should have a good work history with us before being submitted for testing to prove their credibility.

d- The source should have submitted valuable and significant information that was proven to be true. The fake operation conducted will prove his credibility before the Iranian Intelligence.

e- To consult with M4/ 2 and the Iranian Mujahidin Khalq Organization (Illegible).

f- Not to implement more than one operation per source, in case of extreme necessity, (Illegible) according to the importance of the source.

g- The setup of the operation should be convincing, real, and credible taking into consideration that the Iranian Intelligence will verify the legitimacy of the operation through other sources.

h- The political stand of the country and the political situation of the organization should be taken into consideration so that we don't give the Iranians the impression that acts of sabotage is easily accomplished, and that the great Iraq is a tasty bite for them (TC: is an easy target for them).

Document Title: Statement by Badr Corps (possibly forged)

ID: ISGQ-2004-02311818

Date: Various (2003)

Synopsis:

This document is reportedly instructions to Badr Corps members issued in March 2007, around the time of the coalition invasion of Iraq. The document enunciates a strategy to cooperate with the invading forces in the belief that Badr members could seize power through the political process. This document was distributed widely in Iraq shortly after the invasion. In part because of its overt distribution, the document was widely suspected of being a forgery designed to discredit Badr Corps members.

Key Themes:

Key words:

Page 2

In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

Peace and blessings be on Muhammad, the Prophet of Allah and his innocent households and the Shiite of 'Ali (Peace be upon him)

After the fall of the unbeliever Sunni Regime of Saddam, we got our rights back and all the possessions of the Iraqis such as oil, mineral, agricultural and financial fortunes. We now receive 1/5th from the Shiites (TC: a 20% tax paid to the theological seminary). America and Britain promised that we would receive the regime's authority and the government after one year. Unfortunately, some Shiites cooperated with Sunni Muslims in not looting, setting fire and creating chaos especially in Baghdad so that we and the Theological Seminary of Shiite would lead the authority. The most important thing you should do is set fires especially the public religious and scientific libraries, in the printing establishments that print books which teach Tafsir Al-Quran and Al-Sunnah (TC: explanation of Quran), Hadith Al-Sharif (TC: Prophetic Tradition) and the Islamic history. This will allow us to publish new teaching books and material from the Quran and Al-Sunnah, Al-Hadith Al-Sharif, Islamic history and publish the history of Shiite through which we will clarify the message of Khumayni (May Allah prolong his life) and leave the beliefs of Sunnis.

Statement by Badr Forces

In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

Peace and blessings be on Muhammad the Prophet of Allah and his innocent households.

A call from Badr Corps cautioning to wait till the departure of the coalition countries and receiving the authority; the people living in Al-Anbar, Tikrit and Mawsil are minorities. We are supporters of 'Ali who is the Imam of the people living on earth and heaven. Do not show your enmity towards them (TC: towards Sunnis) these days, wait till we ask you to occupy Baghdad and it should be occupied by the inhabitants of Al-'Imarah Area specially and the inhabitants of the southern area gener. Publish photographs and distribute cassettes and video CDs in all the locations including streets, cars and shops during the time when they (TC: Sunnis) call to prayer and during their religious speeches and near their mosques.

The electricity in the south is for the inhabitants of the south and not for them (TC: Sunnis). Therefore, make sure that they do not receive electricity. Purchase their books, especially the books known as Al-Sahah, and burn them. Sneak into their mosques and create noise/confusion during their prayers because they should not pray in our lands till God grant us victory over them. This letter is a recommendation for you and it is between the hands of Imam Al-Hujjah (May Allah hasten his return and ease his coming).....Badr Forces Command.

The context of this document is available in the building of the Iraqi Intelligence located on Street 52, and also available in the headquarters of Al-Da'wah Party located in Al-Muthanna Airport in front of the Coalition Forces Command. This document was sent secretly to Al-Ihsa' and Al-Qitayif Organization in Saudi Arabia and was distributed among all the important individuals.

In His name, the Supreme

God bless Muhammad and his innocent household: Sons of Shiite of 'Ali
(Call and Legal Opinion)

As you know that the unbelieving Sunnis do not recognize the guardianship of 'Ali, and the innocence of the household, and the spirit of God Al-Mahdi Al-Muntazir (May Allah hasten his return and ease his coming). The Sunnis also deny the martyrdom of Al-Husayn and claim that Al-Husayn did not die for the right (TC: right of people) as he was coming for the position, and this thing opposes our beliefs. They also say that it is not allowed to visit the graves of Imams and perform prayers there. They also believe that remembering these Imams during funerals and butchering for them is against Quran and Sunna (TC: the mode of the Prophet's life). We already used Al-Taqiyyah method (TC: deception in order to achieve success) and should continue using this method till the appearance of Al-Imam Al-Hujjah. The Islamic countries (Iran), London and America helped us for long period of time, especially during the past two years, to get rid of Sunnis and Wahabists. Today, when the Theological Seminaries of Shiite joined in the Islamic world, specially in Al-Najaf, Qum, Damascus, Delhi, London and France; what should be done in case of waging a war is to avoid using weapons and surrender or throw the weapons away and run. The unbeliever Sunni regime of Saddam is overthrown. Therefore, we publish and present the following legal opinions:

- 1- Rob all the possessions, banks, departments, hospitals, schools, institutions and colleges especially the military colleges. Take their places (TC: Sunni's places) with an excuse that you are poor and do not own a house. Take their mosques if it is necessary.
- 2- Cooperate with the coalition forces and supply them with information about all issues.
- 3- Offer help and support to the foreign forces in order to accomplish our targets of striking them (TC: Sunnis).
- 4- Kneel, become obedient, beg and pretend that you are oppressed by them.
- 5- Acknowledge that the coalition forces fulfill all their promises. They promised the Kurds of a Kurdistan Region and its capital will be Irbil and; promised Shiites with their region and the capital of this region will be Al-Najaf.
- 6- What I started is top secret and should not be exposed to anyone but those whose religious rank is Ayatollah Al-'Uzma, as they will explain it to all the Shiites according to their own personal methods. Then, it should be burned in order to prevent its leakage to international media. We should show to the world that we are persecuted.
- 7- During the current time, I want to say in front of whole world and media that looting and setting fire is not accepted by Sunnis, Shiites, Al-Sadr, Al-Sistani, Al-Khu'yi and the religious men as we remember that God does not accept sins.
- 8- We will issue a legal opinion that they (TC: Sunnis) are unbelievers and the Shiites are allowed to loot their houses and properties.
- 9- Specifying Shiite names for cities, streets, mosques and stores after the fall of the regime. The English (TC: coalition forces) will help us in relocating our nations in the cities of Al-Hillah, Karbala', Al-Najaf, Al-Samawah, Al-'Imarah, Al-Nasiriyyah, Al-Basrah and in three quarters of Baghdad and Diyala. Therefore, the majority will be for us in the constitution.
- 10- Let America and Britain control the nation's resources, we, the Shiites, will never forget Iran's assistance; for the metallurgy industry ought to be directed to them (TC: in the last phrase he means we owe it to the Iranians to export our processed minerals in exchange for their assistance in the past).
- 11- This is what came in the letter of Ayatollah Al-'Uzmah, May Allah prolong his life, on the tongue of Al-Imam Al-Hujjah (May Allah hasten his return and ease his coming).
- 12- The Shiites have to implement this.

Document Title: Iraqi Intelligence Study about the Badr Corps

ID: ISGQ-2005-00038283

Date: Various (2002)

Synopsis:

This document is an Iraqi intelligence study of the Badr Corps, based largely on the interrogations of two alleged Badr Corps members captured by the Iraqi security forces. The document provides detailed breakdowns of the Badr Corps structure, including leadership and armaments. Although there is a lot of good information, the detail suggests that some of the information may have been fabricated.

Key Themes:

Key words:

[Page 2:]

Intelligence Services

Re.: Study of Badr Corps 9

[Page 3:]

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL

To the respectable Assistant Director of the Intelligence Service for Operations
Re.: Study about the disloyal Badr Corps 9

We would like to inform your Excellency about a summarized study prepared aside by the General Security Office pertaining to Badr Corps 9 in the following manner:

1. The Corps is composed of the following formations / Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Commander's Office, military security, political guidance, investigation and inspection, 4 divisions, two brigades, 3 battalions and a naval regiment.
2. Its most important weapons are: 122 millimeter, 130 millimeter, 152 millimeter, 120 millimeter, 122 millimeter and 106 millimeter cannons, Katioucha missile bases, RBG7 and BKC launchers, SBG9 cannons, T55 tanks and various armored vehicles, in addition to light and medium weapons. The naval regiment's weapons include Yamaha boats, some carrying 108 millimeter Katioucha rocket launchers with 12 muzzles.
3. In 1999, the (axes) were created as follows:-
 - A. Southern Axis – It includes 230 elements and its headquarters is in Al-Ahwaz. It has two branches in Al-Huwaiza and at the edges of Al-Ahwaz – Al-Mohammara Road.
 - B. Middle Axis – It includes 150 elements and its headquarters is in Andamashk. It has two branches; in the Dahlaran region and in Badiya, governorate of Al-Muthanna, called also Abu Al-Fadl headquarters.
 - C. Baghdad Axis – It includes 75 elements and its headquarters is in Bakhtaran – Al-Tanakah. It has a branch in Mahran.
 - D. Northern Axis – Its headquarters is located in Al-Sulaimaniyah and has a branch in Bakhtaran.
4. The weapons used for the communications are Racal HF, Icom 80HF for the communication between the division and its regiments and in case the division spreads out, it will use various VHF equipment. The code for the equipment is centrally prepared by the Corps' intelligence using a computer. It is changed every 3 to 4 months and the calling signals are changed daily.

[Page 4:]

5. The sessions held are training and preparatory sessions including (wired and wireless communications, military engineering, medical, chemical, cannon shooting, section commanders, cultural and ideological sessions) These sessions are held after the volunteer is trained on how to use the weapons and the fighting types. There are also special sessions for the disloyal Corps' cadres.
6. An annual budget is allocated to the Corps by the General Command of the Iranian Armed Forces in the limits of (20 millions) Dollars for the purchase of weapons, salaries, foodstuffs, vehicles and equipment.
7. The Corps' agents are granted privileges in addition to their salary. They are granted a health insurance booklet and a shopping booklet for the cooperative markets of the militaries. They could obtain a financial loan and they are provided with an ID with which they cannot be intercepted, allowing them to travel in the Iranian cities and register their children in the Iranian schools.
8. To attract and recruit elements, the disloyal Corps resorts to two methods. First, it plays the card of sectarianism and the second method which completes the first one is the financial enticement of the elements whom it wants to approach.
9. The Corps held a meeting for its cadres on 12/12/2001, in which was discussed the possibility of a US attack against Iraq leading to the overthrow of the regime (but they were disappointed). The agents discussed two possibilities. The first one is the open dispatch of military formations organized in the form of convoys inside Iraq. In the second possibility, the US would exert a pressure on Iran, putting it in an embarrassing situation. Therefore, they would enter secretly in the form of groups.

Kindly be informed... With appreciation.

/ill. signature/

Director of the Division for Operation Intelligence
October 13, 2002

/Handwriting reads:/

Ahmed
10/13

Lateef
10/13

A versed summary indicating the regions
to be taken into consideration.

/ill. signature/
10/14

[Page 5:]

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL

/Emblem/

Republic of Iraq

**Presidency of the Republic – The Secretary
General Security Director**

No.: Office of Division 5 – Section 75/7682

Date: Sha'aban 1, 1423 H.

Corresponding to: October 7, 2002 A.D.

/Seal reads:/

/ill./

No.: 6386 – Office 5

Date: October 17

To the respectable Director of the Intelligence Service

Re.: Study

Regards,

We refer to the letter of the Presidency of the Republic – Secretariat Office of the National Security Council No. (L. D. M./1806), dated 9/29/2002 and are glad to send you a copy of the said study.

Kindly be informed... With appreciation.

/ill. signature/

General Security Director

Sha'aban 1, 1423 H.

Corresponding to: October 7, 2002 A.D.

Attachments:

A study

1) I reviewed it. To make three copies. First to Office 4. Second to Office 5, and also to Office 4 to take advantage of it. To examine it and to prepare a letter by Office 1.

2) Letter of the Security Office to the Director of the General [Intelligence ??]

/ill. signature/

(1-1)

357 /ill./

10/9

[Page 6:]

General Security Office

Study about the

Disloyal Badr Corps 9

Taken from confessions made by two elements of the Corps' Cadre arrested

by the General Security Office

at the beginning of 2002 A.D.

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2. Corps' formations connected to the Corps' Assistant Commander
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4. Corps' formations connected to the Chief of Staff of the Corps
5. Locations of some Corps' formations
6. Corps' fighting force
7. Leading elements
8. Corps' armament
9. Corps' equipment
10. Training and preparation
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12. Corps' financial resources
13. Corps' recruiting methods
14. Privileges granted to the Corps' elements
15. Facilities granted to the Corps' elements
16. Law for the Purchase of the Service
17. Corps' relationship with the sons of the fugitive tribes to Iran
18. Organizational activity on the inside and its method
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23. Important meetings after September 11, 2001
24. Corps' plans upon the occurrence of the crisis
25. Corps' instructions for the Northern region

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Introduction

Since the beginning of Saddam's glorious battle of Qadisiya, Iran tried hard to build a fifth column of agents to carry out the dirty missions inside Iraq and to escalate the tension on the internal front in preparation for embarrassing Iraq and creating a propaganda force composed of fugitive agents and exiled Iranians to use them when needed and as requested by the plan of hatred and aggression. The creation of this force was considered the core of the disloyal Badr Corps and its elements were tested by the Persian Labor Organization and Al-Dawa Party to accompany the Iranian army as guides during the war against Iraq. The Iranians worked on gathering the fugitive Iraqis in (Ghayour Asli) camp located 25 kilometers south of Al-Ahwaz. The official in charge of this camp was (Abdelraheem Al-Shoki), a native of Al-Amara and one of Al-Dawa party's leaders. This camp also included elements from Al-Dawa party, Al-Mujahedeen Movement and the Scholars and Independent Group. At the beginning, their number ranged between (400 – 600) individuals. This camp's missions focused on training and sending elements from Al-Dawa party to Iraq. The activity of this program continued until February 6, 1983 when two elements of the Iranian Revolution Guard came to the camp along with the agent (Hajji Kazem Abu Zeinab Al-Khalesi), a native of the governorate of Diyala. They brought up the idea of creating mobilization forces. Indeed, they proceeded with this idea, and the number of those registered at the time reached (450) individuals including a number of exiled persons.

In March of the same year, the first session for those registered with the mobilization forces to train on the use of weapons was inaugurated for a period of three months. On June 6, 1983, the first group of volunteers from the mobilization forces was sent to the battlefield in the sector of Basra under the command of an Iranian Major General (Wali A'asr). After three months at the battlefield, they withdrew to the camp. Later on, a succession of sessions pushed such elements to the battlefield. Al-Sadr Regiment was composed of elements from the first and second sessions whose number varied between (200 – 240) elements. Their duties focused on participating in the fight with the Iranian against the Iraqi forces in the eastern sector of Basra under the command of the Iranian (Hasan Dawlat Ayyadi) belonging to the

Iranian Guard along with the agent (Abu Mohamed Al-Tayeb), a native of Al-Kut. He was later on replaced by the Iranian Abdel Ameer Salemi.

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In September of the same year, another regiment was created under the name of ((Dest Gheyb) and under the command of the Iranian (Nisi) belonging to the Guard. The location of the regiment was in the proximity of Keshk Al-Basri region. It had the same duty as Al-Sadr Regiment.

On January 15, 1984, a third regiment was created under the name of (Hashti Regiment) and under the command of the Iranian (Hasan Dawlat Abbadi).

In August 1984, after the creation of three regiments, a brigade was formed, including the three regiments mentioned at the beginning, under the name of (Imam Al-Sadek Brigade) and under the command of the Iranian (Ameer Huwashmi). Two months later, its name changed to (Badr Corps 9) and its commander was replaced by the Iranian (Ismail Daka'eki). Later on, a new regiment was created. It was added to the three previous regiments and given the name of (Ansar Al-Hussein Regiment). All the members of this regiment were from the tribes expatriated from the governorate of Misan. Its command was given to the agent Adnan Ibrahim Mohsen Al-Najjar (Abu Ali Al-Basari).

In March 1985, a fifth regiment was created under the name of (Musa Al-Kazem) Regiment and under the command of the Iranian (Mas'ud Al-Maleki). This regiment included elements from the fugitive and exiled people.

A short while after, a sixth regiment was created under the name of (Karbala Al-Thaniya) Regiment and under the command of (Ghazi Al-Fariji) also called (Abu Iman Al-Basari), a native of Misan who previously resided in the governorate of Basra. Therefore, the number of brigades reached 9 including six regiments.

In April 1986, the Iranian regime began arranging and preparing sessions for the Iraqi prisoners at a rate of (170) prisoners per session until the number of prisoners varied between (1000 and 1200) prisoners. Therefore, three new regiments were formed which were (Moslem Regiment), (Ammar Regiment) and (Ja'afar Regiment).

From these three regiments, a second brigade was created under the name of (Al-Hamza Brigade) and under the command of the Iranian (Joban).

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In the middle of 1986, another regiment was created, composed of the sons of the fugitive tribes from the governorate of Misan. It was given the name of (Abu Al-Fadl Regiment) under the command of the fugitive (Abu Ashwak), a native of Al-Nasiriya. Later on, Badr Brigade 9 and Al-Hamza Brigade with the Southern Axis, composed of two regiments which were Ansar Al-Hussein and Abu Al-Fadl Regiments settled in Al-Ahwaz region, formed Badr Division 9, for which a new headquarters was created in the governorate of Karmanshah – Al-Tanakah region, which is the Corps' present headquarters. The command of Badr Division 9 was entrusted to the Iranian (Ismail Daka'eki) who was later on replaced by the Iranian (Diya' Shams) after he was killed at the front in the battle of Nahr Jassim.

Two months before Iran was compelled to accept the international UN resolution No. 598, the Iranian Diya' Shams, leader of the Division, announced and for propaganda purposes that Badr Forces had become a corps and not a division. It was given the name of (Badr Corps 9) and its general force was evaluated at (6000) elements.

In 1989, Adnan Ibrahim appointed Mohamed Al-Najjar (Abu Ali Al-Basari) as Commander of the Corps in replacement of the Iranian Diya's Shams. At the end of the Iran Iraq war, a number of elements stopped working for the Corps. With the unsteadiness which followed the Kuwaiti crisis in August 1990, Iran represented by its intelligence services began taking interest in this Corps so it would hire it to launch an attack against Iraq. In fact, the Iranian intelligence services pushed this Corps to stab Iraq in the back under the form of the Chapter of Treason and Betrayal in March 1991. At that time, the Corps was composed of (Imam Ali Brigade) under the command of Abu Zul Fikar, Al-Hamza Brigade under the command of (Abu Haytham Al-Sadeki) at the beginning and later on under the command of (Abu Abdullah Al-Moussawi) and Imam Al-Hussein Brigade under the command of (Abu Husam Al-Sahlani – Hameed Ibrahim Al-Sahlani), a native of Basra. The number of Iraqi prisoners in these brigades reached a percentage of 60% of their total number.

After the 1991 events, Badr Corps 9 was composed of five divisions which were (Imam Ali Division, Al-Hamza Division, Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division, Haydar Al-Karrar Division and Imam Al-Hussein Division).

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In this focused study, detailed information will be raised pertaining to the disloyal Corps which are new information taken from confessions made by two agents who occupied leading positions in its formations until they were arrested.

With God's blessings

General Security Office

2002

[Page 12:]

Corps' Formations

Badr Corps 9 is connected to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and specifically to (Karar Kah Kuds) which supervises the intelligence activity outside Iran under the command of the Iranian (Kasem Salmani). The criminal Mohamed Baqer Al-Hakeem is considered the actual commander of the Corps in addition to its functions as President of what is called (Superior Council of the Islamic Revolution). He is assisted in the Corps' leading responsibility by Jamal Ja'afar Al-Ibrahimi (Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess), an engineer, native of the governorate of Basra. The headquarters of the Corps is located in the governorate of Karmanshah, the region of Tanakah, in the camp of Al-Faqikh province.


The Corps is presently composed of the following formations

The formations connected to the Corps' Assistant Commander are:

1. **Chief of Staff of the Corps** – The Chief of Staff of the Corps is Hadi Farhan Abdullah Al-A'ameri (Abu Hasan Al-A'ameri), a native of Diyala governorate.
2. **Office of the Corps' Commander** – Under the supervision of (Abu Ja'afar Al-Shaybani), a native of Zi Qar governorate.
3. **Military Security (Al-Hefadah)** – Under the supervision of an Iranian officer with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel named Ahmadi belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (Karar Kah Kuds).
4. **Political Guidance (a representation)** – Under the supervision of a religious man named (Ahmed Salek) assisted by a religious man named (Hasan Al-Kulaybakani).
5. **Investigation and Inspection** – Under the supervision of Mohamed Al-Samra'i (Abu Jassim Al-A'askari), a native of Baghdad governorate – A fugitive to Iran.

In addition to the following divisions, axes and formations:

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Structural Plan of the Corps



[Page 14:]

1. First Division:

Imam Ali Division is located in Al-Khomeini Camp at a distance of 16 kilometers from Al-Fatran region which has an approximate population of 1600 inhabitants.

❖ **The Commander of Mohamed Ne'emet Al-Hasan Division is (Abu Zul Fikar Al-Hasan)**, a military officer with the rank of captain, a prisoner native of the governorate of Basra.

❖ The Chief of Staff of the Division is (Ab A'akeel Al-Moussawi), a fugitive, native of Al-Qadisiya.

❖ The Official in charge of the division's operations is (Abu Ali Al-Waseti), a prisoner officer, native of the governorate of Waset.

❖ The Official in charge of the administration and the march to the battle of the division is (Abu Mustafa Al-A'ameri), a prisoner, native of the governorate of Diyala.

The division is composed of six regiments which are:

❖ Al-Hussein Regiment under the command of (Abu Karrar Al-Bahdali), a native of the governorate of Misan.

❖ Moslem Regiment under the command of (Abu Ali Al-Kara'awi), a prisoner.

❖ Ammar Regiment under the command of (Abu A'akeel Al-Hamadani), a prisoner.

❖ Abu Ala' Al-A'araji Regiment.

❖ Support Regiment under the command of (Abu Zaher), a prisoner.

2. Second Division:

Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division is settled in the civil camp of Dayzafoul located between Dayzafoul and Shoushter. This division counts between (1300 – 1400) persons.

❖ The Commander Ahmad Al-Helali also called (Abu Majed Al-Basari), a native of Basra, a teacher and fugitive.

❖ The Chief of Staff is (Abu Hawra' Al-Ahmadi), a native of the governorate of Waset, a teacher and fugitive

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- ❖ The Official in charge of the division's operations is (Abu Ayat Al-Baghdadi).
- ❖ The Official in charge of the administration and march to the Battle is (Abu A'aeel Al-Ne'emani).

The Division is composed of six regiments which are:

- ❖ Bakeyyat Allah Regiment under the command of (Abu Ali Al-Kena'ani), a native of Basra.
- ❖ 15 Sha'aban Regiment under the command of (Abu Majed Al-Najjar), a native of Basra.
- ❖ Tha'r Allah Regiment under the command of (Abu Yaser Al-Azraki), a native of Misan.
- ❖ Military Regiment under the command of (Abu Bassam Al-Faridawi), a native of Misan.
- ❖ Moussa Al-Kazem Regiment under the command of (Abu Ahmed Al-Meyahi), a native of Basra.

3. Third Division:

Haydar Al-Karrar Division is located in a civil camp in Dayzafoul between Shoushter and Dayzafoul and counts between (1250 and 1300) persons.

- ❖ **The Division's Commander is Kazem Hussein Al-Rashed also called (Abu Ahmed Al-Rashed)**, a native of the governorate of Basra and a fugitive.
- ❖ The Chief of Staff is Hamed Hussein also called (Abu Al-Nour Al-Husseini), a naval officer, native of Basra and a fugitive.
- ❖ The Official in charge of the operations is (Abu Yaser Al-Shuwaili), a prisoner.
- ❖ The Official in charge of the administration and march to the Battle is (Abu Abdullah), a prisoner.

The Division is composed of six regiments which are:

- ❖ Al-Sadr Regiment under the command of (Abu Mariam Al-Mansouri), a native of Basra and a prisoner.
- ❖ Al-Reda Regiment under the command of (Abu Jawwad Al-Ghannami), a native of the governorate of Misan and a fugitive.

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- ❖ Al-Hasan Regiment under the command of (Abu Hasan Al-Fayyad), a prisoner.
- ❖ Al-Mahtabi Regiment under the command of (Abu Zer Al-Wahili), a native of the governorate of Misan and a prisoner.
- ❖ Abu Zahra' Al-Halli Regiment under the command of (Usama), a prisoner.
- ❖ Support Regiment under the command of (Abu Wisam Al-A'akeeli), a native of the governorate of Misan and a prisoner.

4. Fourth Division:


Al-Imam Al-Hussein Division is located in a civil camp in Dayzafoul between Shoushter and Dayzafoul and counts between (1400 and 1450) persons.

- ❖ **The Division's Commander is (Abu Muntazer Al-Husseini)**, a prisoner officer native of Baghdad.
- ❖ The Chief of Staff is (Abu Sadek Al-A'akeeli), an imprisoned officer native of Nasiriya.
- ❖ The Official in charge of the operations is (Abu Nour Al-Moussawi), a native of Basra.
- ❖ The Official in charge of the administration and march to the Battle is (Abu Hashem Al-Moussawi), a native of Basra and a prisoner.


The Division is composed of six regiments which are:

- ❖ Ansar Al-Hussein Regiment under the command of (Abu Mujahed Al-Rukabi), a native of Nasiriya and a fugitive.
- ❖ Abu Al-Fadl Regiment under the command of (Abdullah Al-Mohammadawi), a native of Al-Amara.
- ❖ Al-Muntazer Regiment under the command of (Sherif also called Abu Rabab Al-Moussawi), a native of Al-Amara.
- ❖ Abu Al-Khair Regiment under the command of (Hadi Al-Sae'edi also called Abu Karrar Al-Sae'edi).
- ❖ Sayed Al-Shuhada' Regiment under the command of (Hussein also called Abu Muntazer Al-Moussawi), a native of Misan.
- ❖ Support Regiment under the command of (Abu Mohamed Al-Moussawi), a native of Basra.

[Page 17:]
Structural Plan of the Division



All these units are connected to the Official in charge of the Administration and March to the Battle



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5. Al-Mustafa Brigade, located in the governorate of Al-Sulaimaniyah between Banjuween and Midan including approximately (600) individuals under the command of **Ali Al-Sa'adi also called (Abu Zer Al-Khalessi)**, a native of the governorate of Diyala – Al-Khaless.

- ❖ The Chief of Staff is Abu Ayoub Al-Bayabi (Turkman), native of Kirkuk.
- ❖ The Official in charge of the Operations is Abu Usama Al-Sa'adi, a military officer, prisoner and native of Baghdad.
- ❖ Administration and March to the Battle (Abu Ammar Al-Rafi'i, a native of Najaf).

The Brigade is composed of three regiments which are:

- ❖ Al-Hussein Regiment under the command of (Abu Ali Al-Tamimi), located between the headquarters of the brigade and Banjuween.
- ❖ Al-Wilaya Regiment under the command of (Abu Shima'), located in the Misan region.
- ❖ Support Regiment under the command of (Abu Ahmed Al-Qassab).

This brigade operates in the direction of the Northern region of Iraq where part of the Northern Axis was located. It separated its activity and became independent. Most of its elements are from the camps' residents in Iran. Some of its elements are also from the Northern governorates of Iraq. The number of elements of this brigade amounts to approximately (300) individuals.

6. Malek Al-Ashtar Brigade

First: An armored brigade under the command of Ayyad Al-Amara (Abu Jihad Al-Amara), a native of the governorate of Basra who escaped in 1982. He is assisted by Abu Ammar Al-Miyahi, a native of the governorate of Basra. This brigade amounts to approximately (600) elements.

Second: The headquarters of the brigade is located in the region of Karmanshah with the headquarters of the Corps.

Third: The brigade is composed of the headquarters, support units and three armored battalions which are: -

[Page 19:]

- A. Al-Mikdad Battalion in Dayzafoul.
- B. Sayed Al-Shuhada' Battalion in Karmanshah with the headquarters of the brigade.
- C. Al-Muntazer Battalion in Karmanshah with the headquarters of the brigade.

It also includes three batteries and three platoons.

Fourth: Brigade's armament: -

- 122 millimeter cannons, quantity (6).
- 130 millimeter cannons, quantity (4).
- 152 millimeter cannons, quantity (4).
- 122 rocket launchers, quantity (2).
- Portable 107 millimeter Katioucha missile launcher bases, quantity (14).
- In addition to RBG7 bombers, BKC rifles and Kalashnikov.

Fifth: Its present activity consists of training, preparing, making ready and the participation of some of its elements with the Axes in the execution of some operations (122 millimeter Crad missile operations launched on Baghdad).

7. Al-Mehdi Battalion (Anti-aircraft)

Its commander is Abu Sadek Al-Muwali, a native of the governorate of Misan and a prisoner. He is assisted by (Abu Mohamed Al-Kannani) also a prisoner. It includes (275) elements and the weapons this battalion holds are:

- ❖ (44) 23 millimeter cannons.
- ❖ (1) Stella missile launcher in addition to light and medium weapons.

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8. Zul Fikar Regiment (Anti-Armor)

Its commander is Ali Zuwain, an imprisoned officer native of the governorate of Najaf assisted by Abu Hussein Al-Jarrah. This regiment approximately includes (200) individuals and the weapons in its possessions are:

- ❖ (42) 106 millimeter cannons.
- ❖ (26) **SBG9** cannons.
- ❖ (18) Malotka missile bases, in addition to light and medium weapons.

9. Al-Hasan Battalion (Armored vehicles)

Its commander is Abu Zunun Al-Khaledi, an imprisoned officer native of the governorate of Al-Qadisiya assisted by Abu Mohamed Al-Iraqi. The headquarters of this battalion is located in a civil camp – Dayzafoul region. It is present with the divisions of Mohamed Rasoul Allah, Haydar Al-Karrar and Imam Al-Hussein and it amounts to (200) elements. Its weapons are: -


- ❖ (7) T55 tanks.
- ❖ (29) various armored vehicles in addition to light and medium weapons.

10. Naval Regiment

Its commander is Abu Hamed Al-A'aredi, a native of the governorate of Misan. The headquarters of this regiment is located in Al-Ahwaz region and the number of its elements is around (250) persons equipped with boats which are:

- ❖ 48 horsepower Yamaha boats.
- ❖ 115 horsepower metal made Yamaha boats carrying 107 millimeter Katioucha rocket launcher with 12 muzzles.
- ❖ Diesel engine Volvo boats to transport large loads.

[Page 21:]
Structural plan of the regiment



Axes

At the beginning of 1999, the disloyal Badr Corps worked on creating a new formation to which was entrusted the subversive operations inside Iraq called (Axes). These missions were previously entrusted to the divisions of the Corps. To allow the commander of the divisions to dedicate himself to the division and its activity without dividing his attention between the division's activity and the headquarters existing on the inside, these axes were created inside Iraq and they became connected to the Assistant Commander of the Corps (Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess). These axes are: -

- ❖ **First Axis / Southern Axis** – Under the supervision of Hameed Ibrahim Al-Sahlani also called (Abu Hesam Al-Sahlani), a graduate from the School of Agriculture and a native of Basra. The number of elements of this axis amounts approximately to (230) persons. Its headquarters is located in Al-Ahwaz region and it has two branches. The first branch is located in Al-Huwaiza and has two subsidiary points in Shatt Ali region and the Iranian region of Hemat. The official in charge is (Hatem Aswad Al-Mohamadawi) also called (Abu Muntazer Al-Mohamadawi) from Al-Nawafel tribe. He is assisted in the management of this headquarters by Kareem E'elewi also called (Abu Kawthar Al-Mohamadawi). The second branch is located at the edges of Al-Ahwaz – Al-Mohamara Road under the supervision of (Abu Karrar Al-Hashemi). The axis has also a headquarters in the governorate of Zi Qar – Al-Fuhud under the supervision of (Abu Lika' Al-Jaberi). This headquarters doesn't exist at the present time because of the security measures taken by the security and party services against the headquarters existing in the region. Knowing that the field of action of this Axis is in (the governorates of Basra, Zi Qar, Al-Muthana and Misan).

[Page 23:]

- ❖ **Second Axis / Middle Axis** – Located in the region of Andamashk and having approximately 150 elements. It is under the supervision of the criminal (Hamza Qasem Sabbat Fada'am Al-Darraji) also called (Abu Haytham Al-Sadeki), a native of Bagdad – Saddam City. This Axis has a headquarters in the Dahlaran region under the command of (Abu Ja'afar Al-Darraji). It also has a headquarters inside Iraq located in Badiya, in the governorate of Al-Muthana called (Abu Al-Fadl headquarters) under the command of the criminal Abdel Ameer Abdel Zahra Al-Dirawi also called (Abu Hamad Al-Dirawi), a native of Basra, assisted by (Khairallah Farhan Thajil Al-Sua'aidi) also called (Rasoul Al-Sua'aidi). The field of action of this Axis is in the governorates of (Najaf – Babil – Karbala – Al-Qadisiya). It also has groups working in Baghdad.

- ❖ **Third Axis / Baghdad Axis** – It is under the supervision of Hameed Thajil Al-A'attabi also called (Abu Mustafa Al-Shaybani), a native of the governorate of Zi Qar. It counts approximately (75) elements. The headquarters of this axis is located in Bakhtaran – Al-Tanakah region along with the headquarters of the Corps. Its field of action is in the governorates of Baghdad – Waset – Diyala. This axis has a headquarters in the Mahran region called Al-Mikdad headquarters under the command of the criminal (Hussein Kazem Al-Tahhan) also called (Abu Hana' Al-Baghdadi), a native of the governorate of Baghdad – Al-Kazemiya. It also has a headquarters in Saleh Abad region under the command of the criminal (Abu Ali Al-Waseti), a native of the governorate of Waset and it has a third headquarters in Kasr Shereen region under the command of the criminal (Abu Jihad Al-Tamimi), a native of the governorate of Diyala.

[Page 24:]


❖ **Fourth Axis** – Northern Axis – This Axis is considered one of the operation axes on the inside belonging to Badr Corps 9. Its headquarters is in the north of Iraq, in the governorate of Al-Sulaimaniyah. It has a secondary headquarters in Iran, in Bakhtaran Kamfar Khalafi. The field of action of this Axis is in the northern governorates of (Al-Sulaimaniyah, Irbil, Ninawa, Al-Ta'mim, Diyala and Salaheddine). A station was created for the Axis in the sector of Toz Kharmatu under the supervision of Adnan Ibrahim Mohsen Al-Najjar also called (Abu Ali Al-Basari), a native of the governorate of Basra – District of Shatt Al-Arab (Al-Tanouma) and a mathematics teacher. He is assisted by Abu Firass Al-Hamadani, a native of the governorate of Diyala who is in charge at the same time of the intelligence of the Axis and the Diyala line.

* The most important elements of this Axis are Majed Hammadi Al-Sae'edi (Abu Shehab Al-Sae'edi), in charge of the special operations. Abu Jasem Kawet, in charge of the Irbil line. Abu Ayoub Al-Bayani (Assistant Commander of Al-Mustafa Brigade), in charge of Al-Ta'mim line. Abu Ja'afar Al-Fatlawi, administrative official of the headquarters. Abu Ali Al-Tamimi, in charge of collecting information from the governorate of Al-Sulaimaniyah. Abu Ahmed, in charge of public relations. Dr. Farhad, an Assistant Official in charge of the public relations. Abu Ali Al-Sahlani, a driver. Abu Abbass Al-A'askari and Abu Tayseer two drivers. Abu Nour, a PC operator.

* In addition to a group estimated at 14-18 elements between guards and intelligence. The headquarters of the Axis consists of a rented residence changed on a yearly basis. Three cars are used at the headquarters. A new red station wagon Toyota, a red Toyota Pick-Up Double Camary and a new white Super Salon.

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Structural Plan of the axes

The axes are connected to the (Assistant Commander of the Corps)



Formations connected to the Chief of Staff of the Corps

1. **Operations:** Under the supervision of Ibrahim Abd Jassim Albu Basiri, also called (Abu Ayoub Al-Basari), a native of the governorate of Basra who escaped to Iran.
2. **Corps' intelligence (Ittila'at)**
Its headquarters is located with the Corps' headquarters in Karmanshah – Al-Tanakah region under the supervision of agent Nouri Ja'afar Al-Safi (Abu Lika' Al-Safi), a native of Al-Hay in the governorate of Waset, an officer who escaped in 1981. He is assisted by four elements; two of them are native of Basra and the two others are native of Waset.
3. **Training:** Under the supervision of Abu Saif Al-Marzouk, a native of the governorate of Babil and a renegade prisoner. It is divided in two parts: -
 - A. Corps' Training Center in Hizbullah camp, Warameen region, Teheran. The official in charge is Youssef Al-Amara (Abu Ammar Al-Amara), a military captain, native of the governorate of Basra and a fugitive.
 - B. Cadre Preparatory Institute in the city of Qom – Rasoul Allah Al-A'azam Camp, under the supervision of Ali Fekri, a military full colonel, native of Baghdad and a renegade prisoner.
4. **Administration:** Under the supervision of Sadek Al-Sa'adawi (Abu Farkad Al-Sa'adawi), a native of the governorate of Najaf, a military officer with the rank of lieutenant and a fugitive.
5. **Planning and Budget:** Under the supervision of Abu Ihsan Al-Muhandess, a mechanical engineer native of the governorate of Basra.
6. **Finances:** Under the supervision of Samir (Abu Hareth Al-Basari, a native of the governorate of Basra).
7. **Military Engineering:** Under the supervision of Mohamed Al-Zawbai'i (Abu Haytham Al-Zawbai'i), a chemical engineer native of the governorate of Basra.
8. **Defense and duties:** Under the supervision of Abu Haydar Al-Lami, a native of the governorate of Misan.

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- 9. March to the Battle:** Under the supervision of Abdel Hussein A'abtan (Abu Ali Al-Najafi), a native of the governorate of Najaf.
- 10. Communication:** Under the supervision of Abu A'qeel Al-Sheikh Al-Kazemi, a native of Baghdad.
- 11. Cooperation:** Under the supervision of Hussein Al-Moussawi (Abu Ali Al-Saydali), he holds a PhD in pharmacy and a native of Baghdad.
- 12. Medical Treatment:** Under the supervision of Dr. A'alloush (Abu Isra'), a native of the governorate of Diyala.

Some of the Corps Formations' Positions

As previously mentioned, the effective position of the Corps' headquarters is in Welayat Al-Faqih Camp, in Al-Tanakah region, governorate of Bakhtaran (Karmanshah). It has no mobilization headquarters at the present time. It has been decided that the mobilization headquarters will be in the border region in front of the Iranian city of Mahran, in the proximity of the Iranian Police Precinct of Al-Karsiya facing the Iraqi region of Badra.

As to the locations of the divisions (their present camps), their mobilization and alternate camps, their permanent and rear camps and any information about them, they are:

- ❖ Imam Ali Division – Its present location is in the governorate of Karmanshah (Yastoun city), at an approximate distance of 16 kilometers from the governorate, in the proximity of the cement factory in the direction of Al-Jeel, on the right hand side of the street where the division and its regiments are settled in this region with the exception of the Support Regiment in Al-Hor Al-Raylahi Camp, in the city of Sankar, 80 kilometers distant from Bakhtaran.

- ❖ Rasoul Allah Division and Haydar Al-Karrar Division are both with their regiments in the civil camp located between the cities of Dayzafoul and Shoushter. They are (20) kilometers far from Dayzafoul on the right hand side of the street and at a distance of 3 kilometers from the street. Knowing that these camps don't have mobilization camps or alternate or rear camps with the exception of Imam Al-Hussein Division which has a mobilization camp in the border city of Al-Huwaiza, opposite to Al-Madina, in the western front under the name of Imam Al-Muntazer Camp. As to the administrative and supportive units of the Corps, they are all located in the Corps' headquarters in Welayat Al-Fakih Camp, in Bakhtaran, with the exception of the following units:

- ❖ Imam Al-Hasan Tank Battalion / in the civil Camp of Dayzafoul.
- ❖ Al-Abbass Naval Regiment / in Ghayour Al-Asli Camp in Al-Ahwaz.
- ❖ Mobilization Headquarters / in Teheran – Kalbazk Street.

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- ❖ Southern Axis / Located in Al-Ahwaz region opposite to Shahrak Ahwaz region at a distance of 5 kilometers from Sarah Kharmashahr region in the proximity of (Al-Khaffajiya – Al-Mohammara – Al-Ahwaz) intersection.
- ❖ Middle Axis / Located in Andamashk, at a distance of 5 kilometers from the city in the direction of Al-Ahwaz, at the right hand side of the street.
- ❖ Southern Axis / Located in the governorate of Al-Sulaimaniyah.

Size of the combat force of the Corps' formations

The size of the effective combat force of the Corps and its formations is calculated as being 60% of the general force for the following factors:

- ❖ Elderly persons.
- ❖ Sick and handicapped persons.
- ❖ Those with no desire to fight.
- ❖ Those with security and judicial measures against them.

At the present time, the number of the Corps' elements varies from (11,000 to 11,500) elements approximately distributed in the following manner:

- ❖ Corps Command Office, (70) elements.
- ❖ Judicial Office, (30) elements.
- ❖ Investigation and Inspection Office, (40) elements.
- ❖ Military Security, (70) elements.
- ❖ Imam Ali Division, (1650) elements.
- ❖ Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division, (1350) elements.
- ❖ Haydar Al-Karrar Division, (1400) elements.
- ❖ Imam Al-Hussein Division, (1450) elements.

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- ❖ Mustafa Brigade, (300) elements.
- ❖ Southern Axis, (230) elements.
- ❖ Middle Axis, (150) elements.
- ❖ Baghdad Axis, (80) elements.
- ❖ Northern Axis, (60) elements.
- ❖ Malek Al-Ashtar Brigade, (600) elements.
- ❖ Al-Mehdi Battalion, (280) elements.
- ❖ Zul Fikar Regiment, (220) elements.
- ❖ Al-Hasan Battalion, (200) elements.
- ❖ Al-Abbass Naval Regiment, (270) elements.
- ❖ Operations, (27) elements.
- ❖ Intelligence, (150) elements.
- ❖ Training, (14) elements.
- ❖ Administration, (80) elements.
- ❖ Planning and Programming, (34) elements.
- ❖ Finances, (50) elements.
- ❖ Supply and Transportation, (600) elements.
- ❖ Engineer, (340) elements.
- ❖ Defense and Duties, (370) elements.
- ❖ Medical Treatment, (170) elements.
- ❖ Communication, (70) elements.
- ❖ Technical, (40) elements.
- ❖ Cooperation, (130) elements.

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- ❖ Hizbullah Camp, (280) elements.
- ❖ Cadre Preparatory Institute, (70) elements.
- ❖ Mobilization, (170) elements.

As to the size of the reserve units for reinforcement sent to the Corps when needed, they are in the limits of (2000) elements. The source of this reinforcement is the refugee camps in Iran and the Iraqis present in the Iranian cities. The approximate time needed for these elements to join the Corps is between five to eight days. They are called in through the branches of what is called (Mobilization). The Corps has no instructions to recall the elements who were discharged from it.

Leading elements of Badr Corps 9

1. Mohamed Baqer Mohasen Al-Hakeem – Commander of the Corps.
2. Jamal Ja'afar Al-Ibrahimi (Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess), Assistant Commander of the Corps, an engineer native of Basra.
3. Hadi Farhan Abdullah Al-A'ameri (Abu Hasan Al-A'ameri), Chief of Staff of the Corps, a native of Diyala governorate.
4. Ibrahim Abd Jassim Albu Basiri (Abu Ayoub Al-Basari), official in charge of the Corps' operations, a native of Basra.
5. Nouri Ja'afar Al-Safi (Abu Lika' Al-Safi), official in charge of the Corps' intelligence, military First Lieutenant, fugitive, a native of the governorate of Waset – district of Al-Hay.
6. Abu Saif Al-Marzouk – Official in charge of the training.
7. Abu Hani Al-Kazemi – Official in charge of the mobilization.
8. Sadek Sa'adawi (Abu Farkad Al-Sa'adawi) – Official in charge of unifying the administration.
9. Abdel Hussein Al-A'abtan (Abu Ali Al-Najafi), Official in charge of the Corps' March to the Battle, a native of Najaf.
10. Abu Hareth Al-Basari, Official in charge of the Corps' finances, a native of Basra.
11. Abu Ihsan Al-Muhandess, Official in charge of the planning and budget, a mechanical engineer native of Basra.
12. Abu Jassim Al-A'askari (Mohamed Al-Samra'i), Official in charge of the Corps' investigation and inspection, a native of Baghdad.
13. Ayyad Al-Amara (Abu Jihad Al-Amara), Official in charge of Malek Al-Ashtar Brigade, a native of the governorate of Basra.
14. Abu Zunun Al-Khaledi, Official in charge of Al-Hasan Battalion (Armors), a native of the governorate of Al-Qadisiya and a prisoner.
15. Abu Sadek Al-Muwali, Official in charge of Mehdi Anti-Air Battalion, a native of Al-Amara and a prisoner.

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16. Fadel Zuwain – Official in charge of the Anti-Armor Regiment.
17. Ya'areb (Abu Ahmed Al-Kutaiifi), Official in charge of the Corps' technicality, a civil engineer, native of the governorate of Basra.
18. Abu A'aqeel Al-Sheikh (Al-Kazemi), Official in charge of the communications, a native of Baghdad.
19. Dr. A'alloush (Abu Isra'), Official in charge of the Corps' medical treatment, a native of Diyala and a prisoner.
20. Hussein Al-Moussawi (Abu Ali Al-Saydali), Official in charge of the Corps' cooperation, a pharmacist and native of Baghdad.
21. Abu Murtada Al-Nasari – Official in charge of the good loan.
22. Abu Haydar Al-Lami, Official in charge of the Defense and Duties Regiment, a native of Al-Amara.
23. Youssef Al-Amara (Abu Ammar Al-Amara), Official in charge of the training camp.
24. Ali Fekri, Official in charge of the Cadre Preparatory Institute in the city of Qom, a military full colonel, native of Baghdad and a prisoner.
25. Mohamed Al-Zawbai'i (Abu Haytham Al-Zawbai'i), Official in charge of the military engineering, a chemical engineer native of Baghdad.
26. The Iranian Full Colonel (Ahmadi), Official in charge of Al-Hefadah.
27. Abu Ammar Al-Jaberi – Official in charge of the judiciary.
28. Abu Ja'afar Al-Shaybani – Official in charge of the Command Office.
29. Sheikh Salek Al-Irani – Official in charge of the Representation.
30. Hameed Ibrahim Al-Sahlani (Abu Husam Al-Sahlani), Official in charge of the Southern Axis, a graduate of Basra School of Agriculture and a native of the governorate of Basra.
31. Hamza Qasem Sabbat Fada'am Al-Darraji (Abu Haytham Al-Sadeki), Official in charge of the Middle Axis, a native of Bagdad – Saddam City.
32. Adnan Ibrahim Mohsen Al-Najjar (Abu Ali Al-Basari), Official in charge of the Northern Axis, a teacher and native of Basra.

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33. Hameed Thajil Al-A'attabi (Abu Mustafa Al-Shaybani) – a native of the governorate of Zi Qar, Official in charge of Baghdad Axis.
34. Mohamed Ne'emet Al-Hasan (Abu Zul Fikar Al-Hasan), Official in charge of Imam Ali Division, a military captain native of Basra and a prisoner.
35. Ahmad Al-Helali (Abu Majed Al-Basari), Official in charge of Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division, a teacher native of Basra.
36. Hasan Al-Rashed (Abu Ahmed Al-Rashed), Official in charge of Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a native of Baghdad.
37. Abu Muntazer Al-Husseini, Official in charge of Imam Al-Hussein Division, an imprisoned officer native of Baghdad.
38. Ali Al-Sa'adi (Abu Zer Al-Khalesi), Official in charge of Al-Mustafa Brigade, a native of the governorate of Diyala.
39. Abu Hamed – Official in charge of the Naval Regiment.
40. Mohamed Alsani (Abu Ahmed Al-Rumaithi), Assistant Officer in charge of Baghdad Axis, a native of the governorate of Muthanna – Albu Hassan.
41. Abu Ammar Al-Amara, Official in charge of the Corps' Training Camp, a military captain, native of Basra.
42. Abu Farkad Al-Sa'adawi, Official in charge of the Corps' administration, military officer with the rank of lieutenant, a fugitive and native of Najaf.
43. Fadel Ali Zuwain, Official in charge of Zul Fikar Regiment (Anti-Armor), a native of Najaf and a prisoner.
44. Abu Ja'afar Al-Shaybani, an official in charge of the Corps Commander Office, a native of Zi Qar.
45. Hussein Kazem Al-Tahhan also called (Abu Hana' Al-Baghdadi), Official in charge of Al-Mikdad Headquarters in the Mahran region belonging to the Baghdad Axis.
46. Abu Ali Al-Waseti, Office in charge of Saleh Abad Headquarters belonging to the Baghdad Axis.
47. Abu Jihad Al-Tamimi, a native of Diyala, Official in charge of Kasr Shereen belonging to the Baghdad Axis.
48. Abu A'aqeel Al-Moussawi, Chief of Staff of Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a native of Al-Qadisiya governorate.

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49. Abu Mustafa Al-A'ameri, Official in charge of the Administration and March to the Battle for Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a native of the governorate of Diyala.
50. Abu Karrar Al-Bahadli, Commander of Al-Hussein Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a native of the governorate of Misan.
51. Abu Ali Al-Kara'awi, Commander of Moslem Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a prisoner.
52. Abu A'aqeel Al-Hamadani, commander of Ammar Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a prisoner.
53. Abu Daoud, Commander of Ja'afar Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a prisoner.
54. Abu Zaher, Commander of the Support Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a prisoner.
55. Abu Hawra' Al-Ahmadi, Chief of Staff of Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division, a native of the governorate of Waset and a teacher.
56. Abu Ayat Al-Baghdadi, Official in charge of the operations for Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division.
57. Abu A'aqeel Al-Ne'emani, Official in charge of the Administration and March to the Battle for Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division.
58. Abu Ali Al-Kannani, Commander of Bakiyat Allah Regiment within Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division, a native of Basra.
59. Abu Majed Al-Najjar, Commander of 15 Sha'aban Regiment within Rasoul Allah Division, a native of Basra.
60. Abu Yaser Al-Azraki, Commander of Tha'r Allah Regiment within Rasoul Allah Division, a native of Misan.
61. Abu Bassam Al-Faridawi, Commander of a military regiment within Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division, a native of the governorate of Misan.
62. Abu Ahmed Al-Miyahi, Commander of Moussa Al-Kazem Regiment within Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division, a native of the governorate of Basra.
63. Abu Ali Al-Miyahi, Commander of the Support Regiment within Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division, a native of the governorate of Basra.
64. Abu Al-Nour Al-Husseini, Chief of Staff of Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a naval officer native of the governorate of Basra.
65. Abu Yaser Al-Shuwaili, Official in charge of the operations for Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a prisoner.
66. Abu Abdullah, Official in charge of the Administration and March to the Battle for Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a prisoner.
67. Abu Mariam Al-Mansouri, Commander of Al-Sadr Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a native of the governorate of Basra and a prisoner.

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68. Abu Jawwad Al-Ghannami, Commander of Al-Reda Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a native of the governorate of Misan.
69. Abu Hasan Al-Fayyad, Commander of Al-Hasan Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a prisoner.
70. Abu Zer Al-Wahili, Commander of Al-Mahtabi Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a native of the governorate of Misan.
71. Abu Usama, Commander of Abu Zahra' Al-Halli Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a prisoner.
72. Abu Wisam Al-A'akeeli, Commander of the Support Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, native of the governorate of Misan and a prisoner.
73. Abu Sadek Al-A'akeeli, Chief of Staff of Imam Al-Hussein Division, an imprisoned officer and a native of Nasiriya.
74. Abu Nour Al-Moussawi, Official in charge of the operations of Imam Al-Hussein Division, a native of Basra.
75. Abu Hashem Al-Moussawi, Official in charge of the Administration and March to the Battle within Imam Al-Hussein Division, a native of the governorate of Basra and a prisoner.
76. Abu Mujahed Al-Rukabi, Commander of Ansar Al-Hussein Regiment within Imam Al-Hussein Division, a native of Nasiriya.
77. Abd Mohammadawi, Commander of Abu Al-Fadl Regiment within Imam Al-Hussein Division, a native of Al-Amara.
78. Sherif, also called (Abu Rabab Al-Moussawi), Commander of Al-Muntazer Regiment within Imam Al-Hussein Division, a native of Al-Amara.
79. Hadi Al-Sae'edi, also called (Abu Karrar Al-Sae'edi), Commander of Abu Al-Khair Regiment, a native of Al-Amara.
80. Hussein, also called (Abu Muntazer Al-Moussawi), Commander of Sayed Al-Shuhada' Regiment within Imam Al-Hussein Division, a native of the governorate of Misan.
81. Abu Mohamed Al-Mousawi, Commander of the Support Regiment within Imam Al-Hussein Division, a native of Basra.
82. Abu Ayoub Al-Bayani (Turkman), Chief of Staff of Al-Mustafa Brigade, a native of Kirkuk.
83. Abu Usama Al-Sa'adi, Official in charge of the Operations of Al-Mustafa Operations, a military Officer, prisoner native of Baghdad.
84. Abu Ammar Al-Rafi'i, Official in charge of the Administration and March to the Battle within Al-Mustafa Brigade, a native of Najaf and a prisoner.

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85. Abu Ali Al-Tamimi, Commander of Al-Hussein Regiment within Al-Mustafa Brigade.
86. Abu Shima', Commander of Al-Wilaya Regiment within Al-Mustafa Brigade.
87. Abu Ahmed Al-Qassab, Commander of the Support Regiment within Al-Mustafa Brigade.
88. Abu Ammar Al-Miyahi, Assistant Official in charge of Malek Al-Ashtar Brigade, a native of Basra governorate.
89. Abu Mohamed Al-Kannani, Assistant Official in charge of Al-Mehdi Battalion (Anti-Aircraft), a prisoner.
90. Abu Hussein Al-Jarrah, Assistant Official in charge of Zul Fikar Regiment (Anti-Armor).

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Armament

The armament of the Corps' headquarters and its formation is presently the following:

1. Armors and their types: -

- (7) T55 tanks.
- (5) armored vehicles.
- (10) Avigo Iranian wheeled armored vehicles
- (14) various armored vehicles.

2. Artillery: -

- (4) 152 millimeter cannons.
- (8) 130 millimeter cannons.
- (11) 120 millimeter cannons.
- (3) 122 millimeter rocket launchers with 40 muzzles.
- (8) 122 millimeter rocket launchers (with one muzzle).
- (14) 107 millimeter rocket launchers (with 12 muzzles) and 14 rocket launchers distributed among the divisions.

3. Anti-tank weapons: -

- (42) 106 millimeter cannons.
- (26) SBG9 cannons with 12 cannons in the divisions.
- (18) Malotka cannons (Launching base).
- One Tao base.

4. Anti-Aircraft weapons: -

- (60) 23 millimeter anti-air cannons.
- (16) Anti-air Stella cannons.

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- (4) 14.5 quadrilateral anti-air cannons.
- (8) 14.5 (bilateral) anti-air cannons.

5. Approximate Medium weapons:

- (600) BKC rifle.
- (70) Doushka machine guns.
- (1600) RBG7 bombers.
- (60) Shatayer sniping rifles.

6. Approximate Light weapons:

- (16,000) Kalashnikov rifles.
- (100) RBK rifles.
- (250) guns.

7. Mortars:

- (26) 120 millimeter mortars.
- (44) 81 millimeter mortars.
- (12) 82 millimeter mortars.
- (255) 60 millimeter mortars.
- With a quantity of mortar ammunitions according to the measurement of each one of them.

The source of armament are the weapons left during the war with Iran which the Iranian Revolutionary Guard prepared for them, in addition to what is bought by the Iranian Ministry of Defense.

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Equipment:

The number of specialized vehicles used by the Corps amounts to approximately (750) various vehicles distributed among its units and formations. In each division, there are the following approximate vehicles:

- 1- 10-12 pick-up vehicles (Land Cruise – Nissan – Patrol).
- 2- Three station vehicles (Box).
- 3- Two Land Cruise ambulance vehicles.
- 4- Two Toyota or Mazda Double Camary.
- 5- 2-3 Mercedes loading vehicles.
- 6- 1-2 reservoir cars.
- 7- Two 18-passenger vehicles.
- 8- Two 40-passenger Iranian made or German Ricardes vehicles.
- 9- One Iranian taxi vehicle.
- 10- One Land Cruise reservoir vehicle for the transport of fuel.

Service vehicles

- 1- Vehicles of Anti-Armor Regiment.
- 2- 50 Jeep Sonata vehicles.
- 3- 5-6 Pick-up Land Cruise vehicles.
- 4- 2-3 Mercedes loading vehicles.
- 5- Two Land Cruise reservoir vehicles for the transport of fuel.
- 6- Two drinking water vehicles (reservoir).
- 7- Vehicle for the transport of passengers.
- 8- Toyota station box vehicle.

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Vehicles of Malek Al-Ashtar Brigade

- 1- (5) Mercedes vehicles to pull the cannon.
- 2- (7) Hino vehicles to pull the cannon.
- 3- Two transport vehicles, each having a capacity for 40 passengers.
- 4- Two 18-passenger vehicles.
- 5- (2-3) station vehicles (Box).
- 6- Two reservoir vehicles.
- 7- (6-8) Pick-up Land Cruise vehicles.

Anti-Air Battalion's Vehicles

- 1- (3) Mercedes vehicles.
- 2- 18-passenger vehicle.
- 3- (6-7) vehicles including Pick-up Land Cruise + Nissan + Patrol.
- 4- Reservoir vehicle.
- 5- Two station box vehicles.

Corps Units' Vehicles

The number of vehicles for the Corps' units ranges between 8 and 10 different vehicles (Pick-up Land Cruise – Nissan Patrol – Station – Pick-up Double Camary – 5-passenger taxi) and they are distributed as follows:

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The supply and transport vehicles are approximately the following: -

- (40-50) different vehicles for the transport of 40 passengers.
- (10-15) different vehicles for the transport of 18 passengers.
- (30-40) different loading vehicles (Lowry and Trella) in addition to water and fuel reservoir vehicles for the transport of foodstuffs. Most of the vehicles used by the leaders and commanders are of taxi type and some use station box vehicles or Patrol Nissan or Toyota.

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Communications

The type of equipment used by the Corps are (Racal HF) Icom 80 HF and sometimes a regular telephone is used linked to a coding equipment. The number of the Racal equipment ranges between (50 and 60) equipments and the number of Icom 80 is (12) equipments. As to the communication equipments used between the divisions and their regiments in case they are spread out, they are the VHF equipment and the (BRC77, German equipment, Iranian equipment, Asfen Turkish equipment) equipments. There are in the Corps approximately (300-500) VHF equipments and also the Walkie-Talkie distributed among the divisions and units amounting to 400 equipments. The main network is located in the Corps' headquarters and it provides the communication with the headquarters of the divisions and axes. There are no network branches because all the Corps' units are in their camps with the exception of the Middle Axis which has Abu Al-Fadl headquarters located in Badiya Al-Muthanna and the headquarters of Imam Ali Division has the Support Regiment located in Al-Hor Al-Riyahi Camp. The range of frequency used during the day is approximately (3000-5000) Megahertz, and during the night it amounts to (8000-9000) Megahertz. As to the combat frequencies, they are not known at the present time. The code is centrally prepared by the Corps' intelligence by using the computer and changed every 3 or 4 months. As to the calling signals, they are changed daily and consists of two-digit numbers such as 11 or 12.

Other equipment

With regard to the night vision equipment used in open locations, they are not available at the Corps. The Corps used the GBS indicative equipment since mid-2001, where (22) equipments were bought and distributed as follows:-

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1. Middle Axis – (4) equipments.
2. Southern Axis, Baghdad Axis and Northern Axis - (Two equipments for each axis).
3. Malek Al-Ashtar Brigade – (4) equipments.
4. Corps' intelligence – (Two equipments).
5. For each division an equipment.
6. Al-Mustafa Brigade – One equipment.
7. Cadre Preparatory Institute (One equipment).
8. Corps' Operations Headquarters (One equipment).
9. Technical Headquarters (Two equipments).

The equipments for chemical protection include the protection mask and the disinfecting tools which are all 100% damaged since the Corps has not been equipped with these tools for the last ten years and their quantities don't cover 20% of the Corps' elements.

Training and preparation:

The course followed in the training is almost similar to the one adopted in the training of the Iraqi army where the Corps' Training Station prepares an annual training bulletin for the infantry, services and administrative units and divides the training year in the operative units into phases as follows:

1. First part includes the individual training phase

During this phase which lasts (20-25 days) training on the fighter's individual weapons is performed, then begins the general training phase including the battle of the section and platoon which lasts (20-25) days.

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2. Second part

The fighter is trained on alternate weapons. At the end of this part, an annual shooting operation is performed which lasts 20-25 days.

3. General training phase (Second part) during which the units are trained on different types of combat (Advance, attack, defense and withdrawal) and which lasts 20-25 days.

4. Training phase on special combat (ambushes, patrols, raids and field profession) which last 20-25 days.

5. Training phase on the war in the cities which lasts 20 to 25 days.

6. Phase for ending the training procedure by a mobilization exercise, i.e. it is required from each unit to carry out a mobilization exercise or to participate in the Corps' maneuvers performed once every two years. It means that the division carries out in the first year a mobilization exercise by itself and in the second year it participates in main maneuvers performed by the Corps. As to the training manuals used, the Training Station prints them out based on the training manuals used by the Iraqi army (old manuals), i.e. before 1991. The Corps gets also educated with training manuals belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard once they are translated, printed and distributed on the Corps' units.

Types of session created in the Corps:

1. Sessions held in the supportive divisions and units which are:
 - A. Wired and wireless communication sessions.
 - B. (Military) engineering sessions.
 - C. Medical session (First aids to those wounded in the battle).
 - D. Chemical sessions which are a protection against the weapons of mass destruction and clustered weapons.
 - E. Administrative session (Accounting – Administration – Supply – Security).

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- F. Sessions to those assigned to the artillery shooting.
- G. Sessions of the sections' commanders.
- H. Educational and ideological sessions.

The number of participants in these sessions is specified according to the needs of the units and it varies between 15 and 30 elements with an approximate duration of 30 days per session. These sessions are held in the units based on the unit's need.

- 2. There are sessions held at the Cadre Preparatory Institute of the Corps, located in the city of Qom, Rasoul Allah Camp. The sessions are:
 - A. Regiment Commanders' Sessions (Main Command), the number of participants in the session is 20-50 elements with a duration of one month. The lessons taught are (Military code – Art of command – Types of combat – Assessment of the situation – Intelligence – Administrative affairs – Reading of a map – Revolutionary war – Solution of a problem).
 - B. Command and Administrative Affairs Sessions with a duration of four to six months in which participate 20-50 elements per session and are taught the same lessons of the regiment's commanders but the focus remains on the administrative affairs.
 - C. Command and Staff Sessions, with a duration of one year in which participate 16 elements and are taught the same lessons but with more details to which are added the topics of military history, mountain wars and navigation.
 - D. Intelligence Sessions, with a duration of two months in which participate 16-20 elements and are taught the military codes, reading of maps and intelligence.
- 3. Training sessions in Hizbullah Camp, in the district of Warmeen – Teheran.

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- A. Commando Sessions, with a duration of two months each in which participates a regiment from each division since the number of the regiment's elements varies between (160 and 180) elements. Three Commando Sessions are organized annually in this camp.
- B. Platoon and Company Commanders Sessions with a duration of 45 days each in which participate 30 elements per session.
- C. Technical Sessions (Driving and Mechanics) in which participate 40 elements.
- D. Weapon Teachers Sessions (Mortar – Bomber – Sniping – BKC – Doushka), with a duration of 30 days each in which participate (25 – 30) elements.
- E. Main Sessions opened for the new Corps' Volunteers.
- F. Engineering Sessions in the units and divisions, in which participate (2-3) elements from each regiment and approximately (25) elements from each division. They get trained on how to plant all types of mines, finding areas in the mine fields, crossing all types of obstacles (barbed wires) and the way of using a bomb. The elements are trained in general on the first aids and transport of the wounded.

The types of sessions opened for the Corps under the supervision of what is called (Revolutionary Guard) and sessions opened in the Guard's camps:

- 1. 4 Special Sessions in which participate 30 elements per session from each division with a duration of three months and in which are taught (Physical fitness – Swimming –

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Mountain climbing – Mountain field – Light personal weapons such as rifle, gun, sniping, fusil).

2. All types of Intelligence, Espionage and Monitoring Sessions. These sessions are opened in the Revolutionary Guard's Camps in Teheran, Karj region.
3. Military Engineering Sessions, in which participate (14 – 16) elements. They are trained on how to use explosives as well as the technical methods. This session is organized for the elements operating within the axes' formations on the inside, the Corps' Intelligence and the Technical Office included.
4. Anti-tank Malotka Missiles Sessions in which participate 30 elements per session from the Anti-Armor Regiment. This session is opened at the headquarters of the Corps under the supervision of the Guard's training cadre.
5. Sessions for the use of GBS equipment and equipment for the specification of distances and indications. This session was opened in the Corps. The teaching staff is Iranian and the number of elements per session amounts to 26 elements.

Corps' mobilization exercises and maneuvers:

The Corps carries out a mobilization exercise every three years in which participate all its units. The majority of the mobilization exercises carried out by the Corps are three mobilization maneuvers for the years (1994 – 1997 – 2000). It was decided that the execution be done once every two years. There are preliminary preparations for the performance of the maneuvers for all the Corps' units and formations of the year. In their viewpoint, the summary of the idea for conducting these exercises is that as a result of the lengthy blockade and practices performed by the Iraqi government against the people, an uprising (Intifadah) should occur leading to the destabilization of the situation and the absence of control over

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the internal situation. In this case, orders are issued to the Corps to solve the issue and control the situation by cooperating with the people and the military units which join to participate alongside the people. On these grounds, the Corps draws a plan on how to enter Iraq in the indicated circumstances and how the Corps should be able to control the military units loyal to the regime. Therefore, the units become ready through their participation in the mobilization exercises including the battle of the section and platoon, the special combats, the sessions, ambushes and regiment's exercises (Advance, attack, defense and withdrawal), war of the cities, chemical training, first aids, security teaching including performances and exercises to boost the physical fitness such as sport games and contests, cross-country, endurance walks, morning jogging and Swedish exercises. At the end of these training programs the elements participate in the performance of a mobilization exercise, whether each units performs a mobilization exercise or the units participate in the maneuvers of the Corps. The Corps carried out recently three large maneuvers which are:

- A. 1994's Exercise in the region of Jafeer close to the borders (Eastern sector of Basra).
- B. 1997's Exercise in the governorate of Hamdan (Middle part of Iran).
- C. 2000's Exercise in Al-Khaffajiya region (On the hills of Allah Akbar).

The purpose of the abovementioned exercises was to specify a city, then to apply the method of controlling and defending it. The Revolutionary Guard participated in the 2000's maneuvers with an anti-air battalion composed of 57 and 23 millimeter cannons and anti-air missiles for the protection of the maneuver region only. As to the effective participation, it does not exist. All divisions and units of the Corps have participated in these exercises and with all their weapons (Artillery – tanks – anti-armor – anti-aircraft –

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light and medium weapons). Bombs were used during these maneuvers. The purpose of these maneuvers was the training of the Corps' elements and commanders for their future missions when entering Iraq during crises and disturbance of the security situation.

Corps' Administrative Affairs

The average monthly salary for each element of the Corps is 114,000 Tomans i.e. the equivalent of \$142.5. The highest salary varies between 70,000 and 200,000 Tomans. The salary is disbursed at the end of each calendar year and according to the Persian calendar. There is a special salary for the qualitative operations carried out inside the cities whether a missile launching operation or an assassination or a blasting. Special rewards are given by the command of the Corps to the perpetrators. As to the mechanism for the supply of ammunitions, it is done by submitting a request by the commander of the unit or the formation to the Operations Station of the Corps showing the reasons for the request. The Operations Station examines it and takes note of what is available at the unit (the cadre). If there is need, the effective need is examined with what is available at the Corps' warehouses. In case what is requested is available, an order is issued by the Operations Station to the Supply and Transport Station to equip the unit with the requested quantities.

As to the mechanism for the supply of the means of living, it is done directly by the Supply and Transport Station to the units settled outside Al-Tanakah Camp, based on the number of individuals available at the unit minus a percentage of 35% (for those who are on leave) and the means of living are disbursed once every two months.

The locations for the storage of ammunitions, means of living and medical treatment are in Welayat Al-Fakih Camp, in the region of Al-Tanakah, in Bakhtaran, meaning at the Corps' headquarters. As to the divisions, each division has ammunitions for the first and second lines and also means of living sufficient for three months.

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Leaves:

The Corps gets leaves according to the following arrangement:

1. The volunteer is given a 4-day leave for each thirty days, in addition to the holidays and gathering days for those who go daily inside Iraq.
2. The volunteer is given a 12-day vacation in case he has been in the camp for 25 days.
3. Whoever doesn't take the leave, the latter is counted as a balance but this method is no more in effect.
4. The divisions get leaves according to the law of the Corps but their leave is collective, meaning that all the division goes on leave with the exception of the administrative units of the division.
5. As to the individuals inside Iraq, their leaves are dealt with differently.

First: For the administrative units of the internal axes, according to the abovementioned Corps' system for giving the leaves.

Second: For the elements who go daily inside Iraq (the linkers) and present in the headquarters, each day they are on the inside is worth two days of leave. As to the (guides), they are sent to inside Iraq when there is a duty or mission. Later on, he goes home and when there is need for him, he is called from his residence.

Third: For the individuals who go inside Iraq, the linkers, present at the headquarters, each day spent on the inside is worth two days of leave. As to the guides, they are called when there is need to entrust them with a duty or mission inside Iraq. After executing what he was charged with, he goes home and whenever they need him, he is called from his residence.

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Corps' financial resources:

The General Command of the Iranian Armed Forces allocates an annual budget to Badr Corps 9 amounting to (16) billions Iranian Tomans, i.e. the equivalent of US\$ 20 millions. There are no other resources for the Corps' budget. This amount is disbursed for the salaries. The weapons existing before 1990 were given free of charge to the Corps but now their price is paid to the Revolutionary Guard, in addition to cost of the foodstuffs, vehicles, equipments and other expenses of the Corps.

Corps' mobilization methods:

The Corps' recruiting methods used is the voluntary approach of the Iraqi elements present in the Iranian camps and cities. The lack of work opportunities pushes them to volunteer to work for the Corps to adjust their financial condition and get privileges enjoyed by the Corps' elements such as freedom of movement inside Iran and acceptance of their children to join the Iranian schools, obtainment of the health insurance booklet and permission to shop at the cooperative markets of the military establishments. But the Corps stopped accepting volunteers and limited it to the elements harmed by the operations going on inside Iraq and who escaped to Iran. This process is done through a recommendation made by the supervisors of the axes for these elements. The main reason for not accepting volunteers at the Corps is the Corps' shortage of financial capabilities since it has to pay out salaries and privileges to these volunteers which constitutes a financial burden for it.

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The privileges granted to the volunteered elements of Badr Corps 9 are:

- ❖ Salary: Paid out to the volunteer at the beginning of his enlistment from (60-70) thousand Tomans. The salary increases with the years of service and responsibilities entrusted to him taking into account his educational background and the number of his family members.
- ❖ The volunteer and his family members are granted a health insurance booklet with which he could resort to hospitals and health specialists in exchange for a payment of 25% of the examination and treatment expenses.
- ❖ The volunteer is given a shopping booklet for the cooperative markets of the militaries where the prices are symbolic and with a 50% discount from the item price in the local markets.
- ❖ The volunteer is entitled to get a loan from the Corps' finances going from (150 to 300) thousand Tomans reimbursable to the Corps' finances in monthly installments deducted from the fighter's salary over a period of thirty months.
- ❖ The volunteer is given an ID with which he could not be intercepted by the authorities and he could travel in the Iranian cities. With the ID, he also obtains a form allowing him to get a vacation from the Corps.
- ❖ Foreigners, living in Iran and holding the green card issued to them by the heads of their administrative units in the Iranian cities, have the right to get their children admitted to the schools of the cities where the card was issued to them. In case they change their place of residence to another city, they have no right to register their children in the schools of that other city. The volunteer in Badr Corps 9 is exempted from this restriction.
- ❖ The volunteer is granted the right of ending his service with the Corps when he wishes to do so. He is paid one month and a half for each year of service he spent with the Corps.
- ❖ When the volunteer is entrusted with a mission inside Iraq, he is paid the amount of (1,000) Tomans for each day he spends inside Iraq.

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- ❖ When the designated element is charged with the execution of an operation inside (Iraq), a monetary compensation is paid out to him according to the type of operation he is entrusted with.

Facilities offered to those affiliated with Badr Corps 9:

There has been no case of political asylum granted by the Iranian authorities to the Corps' elements or permission to go outside the country as long as the element is in the service of the Corps. But there were elements of the Corps who ended their service with the Corps. They traveled outside Iran and were able to get the political asylum. For example, (Abu Haydar Al-Basari), the official in charge of the Corps' budget, ended his service at the beginning of 2000 and traveled from Iran to Malaysia then to Indonesia and Australia. Also, Sheikh (Abu Baqer Al-Kazemi) used to work in the religious guidance of the Corps. He ended his service with the Corps and is presently in Australia. Also, Abdel Abbass Ali Al-Moussawi, also called (Abu Mujahed Al-Moussawi), one of the Corps' elements, he is presently in Australia. There are approximately (16) members who ended their service with the Corps and are presently in Australia and some Scandinavian countries. There is a leading member of the Corps (Abu Zafer Al-Moussawi), a native of Kufa, who used to be the official in charge of the Corps' intelligence. He ended his service and is presently in Denmark.

The granting of the Iranian nationality to the Corps' elements and the Iraqi fugitives present in Iran is performed in the following manner: -

The Iranian nationality is granted to the Iraqi elements present in Iran capable of presenting documents to the concerned Iranian authorities proving their Iranian citizenship. The others are not granted the Iranian nationality. Some of them obtained the Iranian nationality including (Abu Mujtaba Al-Sari) who worked at Karar Kah Fajr and (Abu Mohamed Al-Muhajer), a native of Al-Amara who worked at the Corps. They submitted documents proving their Iranian nationality. There were other elements whose names are unknown belonging to Al-Sawae'ed tribe who obtained the Iranian nationality.

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Law for the Purchase of the Service:

At the beginning of 2000, a resolution was issued by the Revolutionary Guard to Badr Corps 9. This resolution was named (Law for the Purchase of the Service), according to which the elderly persons present at Badr Corps 9 could be eliminated and their service ended in exchange for giving them privileges consisting of one month and a half salary for each year of service spent at the Corps. This resolution was applied and the first group whose service was compulsorily ended amounted to (60-70) agents, all of them were non-leading elements of the Corps. Later on, the Corps gave the same right to the elements who wished to end their service with the Corps by submitting an application to the Command of the Corps for the purpose of ending their service and getting the same privileges. This law continued to be applied and the number of those who submitted applications to end voluntarily their service reached (300) elements. There are still other elements who submitted applications but their request was not approved for unavailability at the Corps of the required amount allocated to that. The purpose of this law was to get in young elements to work in the Corps in replacement of the elderly ones since the Corps had no retirement law should the person become old or be subjected to injury and illness. The law compensated such cases so that the elements would take advantage of the monetary amounts to adjust their living and financial condition. This law was considered in effect for some young elements as well, for many reasons including the following:-

- Desire of some elements to leave the Corps.
- There were aggressive elements with disciplinary problems or warnings against them.
- Elements who didn't have the enthusiasm and desire to fight.

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Relationship of the Corps with the sons of the tribes which escaped to Iran:

The tribes' priority with the Corps and their cooperation depends on the size of this tribe's elements affiliated with the formations of the Corps or present with their families in the refugee camps (Ordakat). The approximate number of the Corps' fighters and their families present at the refugee camps is as follows: -

- ❖ The number of the Corps' fighters varies between 11,150 and 12,000 fighters belonging to the Iraqi tribes.
- ❖ The Iraqi refugees present in Iran in the camps (Ordakat) amount to approximately (41) thousands persons distributed among eleven camps in the governorate of Khuzistan. These camps are:

- 1. Ashrafi Asfahani Camp** – Located in the city of Dayzafoul. The Ministry of Interior supervises its administration and the (14,000) Iraqi individuals present in it. The camp consists of residential units. Each residential unit is composed of two rooms. In the camp, there is an elementary school which previously taught in the Arabic language. Almost two years ago, the study changed and became in the Persian language. There are no differences among the residents of this camp with regard to the living privileges since the residential units are of the same type. In the camp, there is a market managed by the residents of the camp themselves. The elements of the camp could leave and go to the city close to the camp and get a food supply ration consisting of rice, flour, butter, groceries distributed to them free of charge. The residents of the camp could practice liberal work (construction work – farming work) inside the Iranian cities close to the camp. There is a mosque and a medical center inside the camp which are available in all the camps dedicated to the Iraqi refugees.
- 2. Hashti Camp** - Located in Dayzafoul. The number of those residing in it is approximately (2000) inhabitants.

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3. **Mathari Camp** - Located in Dayzafoul. The number of those residing in it is approximately (2500) inhabitants.
 4. **Ansar Camp** - Located in Andamashk. The number of those residing in it is approximately (5000) inhabitants.
 5. **Ba'athat Camp** - Located in Shoushter. The number of those residing in it is approximately (3000) inhabitants. This camp consists of caravans.
 6. **Bani Najjar Camp** - Located in Kut Wanad. The number of those residing in it is approximately (2000) inhabitants.
 7. **Azna Camp** - Located in Kharm Abad, in the district of Dord. The number of those residing in it is approximately (3000) inhabitants. It's an old camp.
 8. **Suristan Camp** - Located in the governorate of Shiraz. The number of those residing in it is approximately (2000) inhabitants.
 9. **Jahram Camp** - Located in the governorate of Shiraz. The number of those residing in it is approximately (4000) inhabitants. It's an old camp.
 10. **Gharib Camp** - Located in the region of Arak. The number of those residing in it is approximately (2500) inhabitants.
 11. **Safid Jakka Camp** - Located in the region of Bakhtaran. The number of those residing in it is approximately (1000) inhabitants.
- ❖ A census was done in the second part of the year 2001 for all the Iraqis and their trends, including the Corps and the camps which approximately comprise (53,000) persons. When this figure is divided among the Iraqi tribes, the sequence based on the higher lineage is as follows:
- Albu Mohamed Tribe (Albu Ghannam – Al-Nawafel)
 - Al-Sawae'ed Tribe – especially Al-Kurja.
 - Al-Shaghanaba.
 - E'ebada Tribe.
 - Al-E'edan Tribe – from the residents of Basra.

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- Al-Sada Al-Bukhat Tribe.
- Albu Bakheet Tribe present between Al-Aziz sub-district in Misan and the district of Al-Korna in Basra.
- Al-Miyah Tribe present in Basra and Waset (Al-Shahman – Al-A'awamer).
- Bani Sae'ed Tribe present in Zi Qar.
- Al-Joyeiber, native of Suk Al-Shuyukh – Zi Qar.
- Al-Sada Al-Battat – native of Basra – Al-Madina.
- Small numbers of other various tribes.

Among the Sheikhs and influential social figures who escaped and are present in Iran:-

- ❖ Criminal Waheeb Al-Shaghanebi – One of the influential social figures of Al-Shaghanaba Tribe, residing in Al-Ahwaz.
- ❖ Criminal Hammadi Ali Sheya'a (Sheikh of Al-Sawae'ed - Al-Kurja Tribe), residing in Bakhtaran.
- ❖ Criminal Mohamed Al-Daoud – from Albu Mohamed – Albu Faisal Shuyukh, residing in Al-Khaffajjya.
- ❖ Criminal Shafi – One of the influential social figures of Al-Joyeiber Tribe, residing in Ashrafi Asfahani camp.
- ❖ Criminal Sukkar – One of E'ebada Tribe's sheikhs, residing in Ashrafi Asfahani camp.
- ❖ Criminal Abdel Reda Jebara Al-Ghannami – One of Albu Ghannam Tribe's sheikhs, residing in Al-Ahwaz.

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All the abovementioned tribes present in Iran cooperate with the Corps when they are needed in any operation. For example, when the assassination of Imam Al-Sadr was known, the sons of these tribes present in the camps sent delegations and they went to the Camp of Badr in Dayzafoul in the form of groups announcing their readiness to volunteer and carry out what would be entrusted to them to revenge Al-Sadr. In the light of what was mentioned, the Corps considers the abovementioned tribes, which are related to the tribes of Iraq, on its side and it could resort to them to carry out its designs and as a base to rely on inside Iraq.

The results deriving from that is the supply and protection of the officials assigned with duties inside Iraq. These officials are selected from the sons of these tribes to get the assistance of their tribes in completing the missions they are charged with.

Organizational operation inside Iraq and its method:

The Corps adopts three rules of operations to work inside Iraq which are:

- 1. Stations:** They in are in charge of the first follow-up and they receive the officials coming from Iran to Iraq. They are usually in the border regions and they provide methods to prepare the requirements, guides, transportation and first information the officials need to enter Iraq.
- 2. Collection of information:** Elements who have the characteristics and possibilities of getting with precision the required information are selected and organized in groups ranging from (2 to 3) elements according to the need of the axis in the region where a group is desired. These groups are linked to the commands of the axes or the Intelligence Station in the Corps through linkers

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who directly and periodically get in touch with the officials of these groups. Through this process, the instructions, orders and financial support are dispatched to be used in the hostile activity against Iraq.

3. **Operation groups:** Capable elements having security coverage to carry out operations inside Iraq are selected and organized in groups. The number of each group varies from (3 to 5) elements according to the axes' need for them. Two linkers are allocated to them to link them to the Operation's Command. The elements belonging to the axes and intelligence are the ones in charge of carrying out the qualitative operations in all their types, knowing that each axis presents an annual operation plan which is submitted to the Command of the Corps to be approved and established. To get any monetary amounts required for each operation, or for any activity or operation meant to be executed, a detailed plan is drafted including the following:-

A. Type and purpose of the operation.

B. Location of the target.

C. Date of the reconnaissance and execution.

D. Time needed for the execution.

E. Method of execution.

F. Size of the force needed for the execution.

G. Operation's requirements which include the following:

First: Amounts needed for the reconnaissance operation.

Second: Amounts needed for the transport of materials.

Third: Other amounts such as (purchase of a car, rental of a house or farm for the follow-up and surveillance of the target).

Fourth: Allocation of a small monetary amount as an incentive or gift to the executors before the execution of the operation.

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Should the Command of the Corps approve the execution of a specific operation, the amount agreed on is transferred to the executing axis and the assessment of the amount is discussed with the axis. Sometimes, the amount requested by the axis to carry out the operation is not granted but instead the amount decided by the Command of the Corps is the one to be allocated.

Corps leading elements' plan for the gaining of recruits and movement inside Iraq:

The issue of the Corps' plans for movement and gaining new recruits among the social sections inside Iraq was discussed by the Corps' leaders and they reached the conclusion that any increase of new recruits would lead to more damages and therefore would create complaints from the families of the harmed individuals towards the Corps. An instruction was issued to the officials of the axes that their activities inside Iraq should not be an organizational one but rather limited to gaining a small number of elements whose duties consist of (collecting information – sharing in the execution of operations along with the members of the taskforce sent from Iran for these missions).

With regard to the desirable elements to be recruited among the social sections, an instruction was issued by the Corps' Command to Nouri Ja'afar Al-Safi also called (Abu Lika' Al-Safi), Official in charge of the Corps' intelligence, to move and gain new recruits among the ranks of the army, especially the influential elements of the officers. This instruction was issued at the end of 2000, and information about these elements are at the hands of (Abu Lika'). As to the preferred social sections to be gained, they are the educated social sections with the appropriate scientific education and social influence to supply accuracy of the information they provide and accuracy in the implementation of the instructions issued to them.

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The Corps uses in the gaining and recruiting process two methods. The first one is the use of the sectarian card. The second method completes the first one and consists of the financial enticement of elements whom it wants to approach. There is an institution called (Internal Information Center) administratively attached to the Representation (Political Guidance) which in turn is attached to the representative Ali Khamanathi at the Iranian Guard and attached to Al-Hakeem from an instructional viewpoint. The official in charge of this office is (Hasan Al-Zameli), a fugitive Warrant Officer, native of one of the southern governorates. The function of this office is to investigate the link between the students of Al-Hawza in Najaf and Mohamed Baqer Al-Hakeem. It also worked on introducing to Iraq sectarian books printed in Iran so they are at the disposal of Al-Hawza students. Early after the nomination of Al-Sadr they became a religious authority in Al-Hawza, Najaf. The Commander of the Corps at the time (Abu Ali Al-Basari) instructed (Abu Haytham Al-Sadeki) when he was the commander of Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division to go to Iraq, to have a direct meeting with Al-Sadr, to get acquainted with Al-Sadr's orientations, to know the extent of his influence on the society and to get to the bottom of his relationship with the authority and his viewpoint towards Iran, the Corps and Al-Hakeem. Indeed, Abu Haytham Al-Sadeki was able to materialize this meeting through the so-called (Abu Ja'afar Al-Husseini), one of Al-Badiya headquarters' elements belonging to the Middle Axis, a native of the governorate of Basra, a previous student at Al-Hawza Scientific School (presently deceased). He introduced them to Al-Sadr and Abu Haytham began asking Al-Sadr a few questions regarding the regime in Iran and what he thought about the regime of Ali Khamanathi. Al-Sadr answered him that Ali Khamanathi is the ruler of Iran only and not the ruler of all the Muslim nations and they had no disagreement with regard to the other issues including the issues and concerns of Islam and Muslims and what Islam is subjected to such as the disruption and attacks coming from the West and the persecution of Muslims everywhere and at any time because they have one interest in common and Ali Khamanathi defends the Iraqis.

He also clarified in some of his answers that he stressed the importance of Jihad against the government and should any person working against the government die or get killed he is considered as a martyr.

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Execution of operations and infiltration:

The mechanism for executing the subversive operations inside Iraq is performed as follows:

1. Each axis submits to the Operations Section of the Corps a number of goals examined by its elements and aimed at being carried out.
2. The Operations Section of the Corps unifies the goals submitted by the axes and presents them to the Assistant Commander of the Corps (Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess).
3. Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess discusses the important and appropriate goals.
4. Abu Mehdi discusses the goals to be executed with Quds Operations through its Iranian Official (Hamed) so that financial and technical capabilities would be allocated for the implementation of the operation.
5. The Operations Section issues the approval and informs the axes about the matter so they would begin with their implementation.

Before the resolution for the creation of axes, the operations inside Iraq were the responsibility of the divisions. The elements who were entrusted with missions were able to infiltrate to Iraq through Al-Ahwar without the approval of the Iranians. As for the Northern section, Diayala and Waset, there was a coordination to let the taskforces go through (Abu Hasan Al-A'ameri) who was in charge of the operations inside Iraq and who coordinated with the Iranian military units and border precincts to facilitate the missions for the crossing of weapons and taskforces. At the present time, Al-Ahwar (lagoons) dried out and the passage from the North to the South is done cautiously and with the approval of the Iranian side. There is a coordination between the axes, the border regiments and border precincts with regard to the operation of the axis on one hand and the Iranian Official in charge of the operation for the entry of the axes' elements to Iraq should the taskforces be forbidden to enter by the Iranian army or the border precincts on the other hand. Karar Kah Fajr Wa Zafr belonging to Karar Kah Ramadan is assigned to facilitate the crossing and frequent visits.

Methods of Infiltration

The Iranian Tala'iyya region opposite to the Iraqi Al-Nashwa region in Basra is considered the appropriate point for the infiltration of the Southern Axis' taskforces in the direction of Basra where these taskforces use the bicycle, the motorcycle and the walking on foot since the region is exposed and unfit to conceal the vehicles upon their entrance to Iraq. Also are used the passage of Al-Shalamja region located in front of Abu Al-Kusaib region and the point facing the previous petrochemical factory.

There is another passage used by these elements to infiltrate to Iraq which is the passage of Sayed Al-Shuhada' Street linking the southern edge to the northern island of Majnoun in the direction of the Iranian territory.

The Southern Axis also uses the Iranian Hemat Road in the direction of the northern field of Majnoun as a way of infiltration for the taskforces in the direction of Al-Amara. Once on the inside through this way, the taskforces resort to either the walking on foot or the use of carriages pulled by horses due to the nature of the region which does not allow the passage of vehicles. Vehicles travel only through the main street which links to the border region in the direction of Al-Jawaber region. There are on this street military units impeding the passage of the taskforce. Additionally, there is another passage in the Iranian region of Shat Ali opposite to the region of Al-Bayda belonging to the sub-district of Al-Aziz, in the governorate of Misan. There is also another passage through Al-Busayteen region facing Al-Mashrah region in the governorate of Misan and the passage of Al-Fakka opposite to Naft Al-Bazerkan region in the governorate of Misan as well.

As to the Middle Axis, it uses the Dahlaran road in the direction of the point of Wadi Khuwaysa opposite to the Iraqi precinct of Al-Manzeliya where the taskforce uses vehicles to get into Iraq and has a coordination with the headquarters of the border regiment located between Dahlaran and Wadi Khuwaysa through the Iranian military point of Wadi Khuwaysa. This road was previously selected by the axis because it has a coordination with the Iranian official within the sector and there are no Iraqi units on the other side, besides the region is fit for the circulation of the vehicles to the main street linking Waset to Misan.

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There are two other passages for this axis which are the border passage of Musyan opposite to Al-Tayb region in the governorate of Misan and the passage of Jallat opposite to Ali Al-Gharbi region.

As to the Axis of Baghdad, it goes through Mahran road in the direction of the south of Badra, then through Badra-Kut road or Badra Dabbouni road. The taskforces of this axis use vehicles and in the presence of Iraqi military ambushes on the road, they use bicycles or they walk on foot. The axis had previously another road through Kasr Shereen in the direction of Khanekeen. Presently, this road is not used by the axis' taskforces.

There are two other passages used by the elements of this axis. The first one is Al-Zeyadi Precinct located in the direction of the border precinct of Al-Shehabi in the governorate of Waset and in the direction of Sheikh Sa'ad region. The other one is the passage of Jankoula located 40 kilometer south of Wadi Kallala passage.

With regard to the Northern Axis, its taskforces infiltrated with the help of smugglers whether through Clar – Jaloula' or Jamjamal – Kirkul.

All the taskforces assigned to infiltrate in Iraq use regular false IDs and rental cars. They pass through regular checkpoints because of the poor search done in these checkpoints. Since the infiltration to the Middle Axis is done using modern cars and because the taskforces' elements hold security forces' ID, their passage through the checkpoint is done routinely. The ID they hold don't raise any doubt and don't push the members of the checkpoint to investigate the individuals holding these IDs. (Abu Ayoub Al-Basari) entered Iraq with the ID of an intelligence officer. He drove from Misan to Basra, then to Al-Muthana, and from there to Al-Anbar and Baghdad. He never witnessed any measure or inspection to the car he was driving done by the members of the checkpoints he went through.

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Weapons and missiles entered to Iraq by the Corps:

All the Middle Axis' weapons were entered through Dahlaran via the Iranian precinct of (E'ain Mansour) and the Iranian precinct located in the proximity of Wadi Khuwaysa opposite to the Iraqi precinct of Al-Manzariya, thanks to the coordination between (Abu Ja'afar Al-Darraji), the official in charge of the headquarters of Dahlaran for the Middle Axis on one hand and an Iranian officer with the rank of major named (Rahimi) working at the intelligence of the headquarters for the Iranian border regiment located between Dahlaran and Wadi Khuwaysa along with another Iranian officer with the rank of lieutenant assigned to the Iranian border point of Wadi Khuwaysa on the other hand. The weapons which were entered to Iraq from 9/1/2001 to 12/31/2001 are the following:

1. On September 1, 2001, (4) 122 millimeter Crad missiles with their bases were entered to Iraq in a Land Cruise car used at Dahlaran headquarters and belonging to the Middle Axis and utilized by the official in charge of (Abu Ja'afar Al-Darraji) headquarters. The missiles passed through the road of the Iranian precinct of Wadi Khuwaysa. Abu Ja'afar buried the missiles in Wadi Khuwaysa in the proximity of Sada Al-Shamshari.
2. On December 15, 2001, a 107 millimeter missile base with 12 muzzles along with BKC ammunitions and light ammunitions were seized in a Land Cruise car used by the headquarters of the Middle Axis in Dahlaran. They passed through the Iranian point located in Wadi Khuwaysa and were taken to Al-Badiya headquarters in the governorate of Al-Muthana. The taskforce was under the command of (Abu Haytham Al-Sadeki), the official in charge of the Middle Axis and with him (Abu Ali Al-Najafi), the official in charge of the supply and transportation and (Abu Ihsan Al-Muhandess), the official in charge of the planning and programming of the Corps.
3. On December 16, 2001, Abu Haytham Al-Sadeki, the official in charge of the Middle Axis entered Baghdad. He was at Abu Al-Fadl headquarters in Al-Badiya Al-Muthana. On the 20th of the same month, Abu Ahmed Al-Dirawi, the official of Al-Badiya headquarters, came to him with elements of Al-Badiya headquarters

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in a Land Cruise car bearing a government plate number. They had with them a number of weapons. They withdrew them from Al-Badiya headquarters and buried them in a nest they had in Baghdad.

4. On December 24, 2001, (10) 107 millimeter missiles with Kalashnikov guns, a case of ammunition and a case of hand grenades were entered to Iraq through the Iranian border point of Wadi Khuwaysa in a Land Cruise car used at Dahlaran headquarters and belonging to the Middle Axis. The taskforce which entered with the weapons from Iran was under the command of (Abu Ayoub Al-Basari), the official in charge of the Corps' operations and with him (Abu Rasoul Allah, Abu Turab, Abu Saji, Abu Karrar and Mohamed Ali) who were members of Abu Al-Fadl headquarters in Badiya Al-Muthana. Abu Hasan Al-A'ameri, the Chief of Staff of the Corps, came to say farewell to them. He had facilitated their entrance through the Iranian point of Wadi Khuwaysa. Abu Ayoub and the said elements transported the weapons to the headquarters of Al-Badiya, in the governorate of Al-Muthana. On the 25th of the same month, (Abu Haytham Al-Sadeki), the official in charge of the Middle Axis who was present at Abu Al-Fadl headquarters, transported the weapons from Al-Badiya headquarters to the nest they owned in Baghdad using a Land Cruise car bearing a government plate number.

Adjustment of the co-ordinates using equipments:

The launching of 107 millimeter missiles or 122 millimeter Crad requires the finding of exact co-ordinates for the target and the launching place of the missiles as well as the direction and trajectory. Since the GBS equipments provide that kind of information, therefore they were used and the Corps bought them from the markets of Teheran and distributed them on the axes in Iraq to be used in their operations. These equipments are also used

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to indicate the ground roads and they store the locations of the cities and the roads leading to them. The target meant to be reached is indicated by the equipment which gives a signal determining the target and distance both displayed on the screen of the equipment. Abu Al-Fadl headquarters in Badiya was also equipped with (2) GBS equipments to fit the capacity of the region in which the headquarters is located, its ruggedness and difficulty of signal in it.

Important meetings held in Iran after September 11, 2001 and trends raised in it:

1. In September 2001, a meeting was held in the governorate of Al-Sulaimaniyah at the Political Office of the National Union Group between the elements of the Corps' Command (Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess – Corps' Assistant Commander, Abu Ayoub – Official in charge of the Corps' Operations, Abu Zer Al-Khalesi – Official in charge of Al-Mustafa Brigade, Abu Ayoub Al-Bayani – Assistant Commander of Al-Mustafa Brigade, Abu Ali Al-Saydali – Official in charge of the Cooperation at the Corps, Abdulaziz Al-Hakeem and Dr. Abu Ahmed Al-Khaffaf) and the National Union Group represented by Jalal Al-Talibani and the Public Relations Official. During the meeting (Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess) raised the issue of admitting the sons' of those already affiliated with the Corps and the sons of the Iraqis present in Iran at Al-Sulaimaniyah University. Jalal agreed that the matter be studied and he assigned from the Corps Dr. Abu Ahmed Al-Khaffaf to coordinate with the President of Al-Sulaimaniyah University in this respect. Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess presented also to Jalal Al-Talibani the possibility of giving the opportunity to the Corps to enter into investment operations in Al-Sulaimaniyah such as contracting works and others. Jalal responded by agreeing on the request which was never materialized. The Corps continued receiving financial support from the Iranian regime according to what was previously mentioned in the financial resources of the Corps.

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2. In October 2001, a meeting was held between Mas'ud Al-Barazani Group and the Corps Command's officials. It took place in the summer resort of Salaheddine and was attended from the Mas'ud's Group by (Jawhar Namek, Fadel Mirani and Azad Barraqi) and on the part of the Corps by (Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess, Abu Ayoub Al-Basar, Abu Zer Al-Khalesi and Abu Ayoub Al-Bayani). During the meeting Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess outlined to the audience that the purpose of meeting was to resume the relations with Mas'ud (Democratic Party) and to reinforce these relations. He inquired from them about the US viewpoint towards Iraq and their future expectations.
3. In October 2001, a meeting between the abovementioned representatives of the Corps and Mas'ud Al-Barazani and Azad Barrawi took place in the summer resort of Salaheddine. Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess spoke about the ways of establishing and developing the contact between the Corps and the Kurdish Democratic Party. He inquired from him about the US intentions towards Iraq and their future expectations. He also raised the issue of agreeing on opening a public relations office for the Corps in Irbil. With regard to the contacts, Mas'ud welcomed the idea. As to the creation of an office for the Corps, he had to discuss the matter with the Political Bureau of the Kurdish Democratic Party. He also confirmed that the US had the intention of attacking Iraq after completing its mission in Afghanistan. Their future expectations were that the Turkish and US forces will enter from Turkey accompanied by the entrance of the US forces from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Mas'ud Al-Barazani expressed his concern about the entrance of Turkey since it had ambitions in the Northern region, especially Kirkuk. He also confirmed that part of the Americans relies on the National Conference Group and considers it the substitute which would take over the power in Iraq. The other part of the Americans considers the substitute whoever holds a real power in the region such as the Kurds and the Superior Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) and that the US support should not be given but to the opposition which takes the US side.

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4. In November 2001, a meeting was held at the recreation room of the Fuel Company in Al-Ahwas. The meeting was attended by Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess, the Assistant Commander of the Corps; Abu Hassan Al-A'ameri, the Chief of Staff of the Corps; Abu Lika' Al-Safi, the Corps Intelligence's Official; Abu Ayoub Al-Basari, the Corps Operations' Official and the Commanders of the axes. Also were present, Mohamed Baqer Al-Hakeem and Abu Nour, the Assistant Official of Al-Hakeem's Office. The attendants discussed the possibilities expected in Iraq in the light of the US threat of an attack and they named many possibilities including:-
 - ❖ Possibility of replacing President Saddam Hussein, may God bless him and protect him, by Mr. Qusay.
 - ❖ Possibility of replacing the prominent elements of the regime but keeping the same structure for the regime.
 - ❖ Possibility of arranging for a military coup with a group of officers and a US airdrop to support the coup.
 - ❖ The application by the US of the Afghani scenario after finding justifications and relying on the Kurdish and Islamic forces present on the political arena.

5. On December 10, 2001, a meeting was held for the officials of the disloyal Badr Corps 9 attended by the agents Jamal Al-Ibrahimi also called (Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess), the Assistant Commander of the Corps; Hadi Farhan Abdullah also called (Abu Hasan Al-A'ameri), the Chief of Staff of the Corps; Nouri Ja'afar Al-Safi also called (Abu Lika' Al-Safi), the Corps Intelligence's Official; Ibrahim Abdel Jassim also called (Abu Ayoub Al-Basari), the Corps Operations' Official; Abu Nour Al-Karbala'i, the Assistant Official of Mohamed Baqer Al-Hakeem's Office. The meeting was held after the visit Al-Hakeem paid to Kuwait. Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess spoke about the possibility of a US attack against Iraq which would lead to a change in the regime (but they were deceived in their hope)

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and that the Corps should be ready to take advantage of it and prepare a plan fit for the expected event. The attendants discussed the general context of the plan (to be drafted and revised later on by the attendants) taking into consideration the following issues:-

- A. Maximum utilization of the Corps' forces represented in its three divisions (Haydar Al-Karrar Division – Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division – Imam Ali Division and Al-Mustafa Brigade) in case of a US attack and the government incompetence of controlling the situation, to implicate these divisions so they would enter under the form of military convoys from the following axes extending from Al-Khanekeen region in Diayala to Al-Fakka region in Misan with a final objective of reaching Baghdad.
- First: First Axis: Mahran – Al-Fakka – Responsibility of Haydar Al-Karrar Division.
- Second: Second Axis: Mahran – Mandali – Responsibility of Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division.
- Third: Third Axis: Mandali – Khanekeen – Responsibility of Imam Ali Division.
- Fourth: Fourth Axis: Northern Region – Responsibility of Al-Mustafa Brigade with a coordination with the Kurdish parties.
- B. When advancing, the abovementioned divisions will occupy the army's camps located in the proximity of Waset, Diyala, Baghdad and will establish in them command and domination headquarters.
- C. The disloyal Badr Corps 9 will establish itself a headquarters in the Iranian region of Mahran.
- D. Should the abovementioned divisions be unable of fulfilling its indicated duties because of Iran's interdiction to allow said activities due to the possibility of a US pressure on Iran forbidding it from interfering to take advantage of the situation resulting from the coup and endorsing it in favor of its well-known interests and ambitions, at that time, the plan would take the following direction:-
- First: To divide the said divisions into small armed groups.
- Second: Some of these groups would work openly and some others would work secretly.
- Third: They will be supplied with light and supportive weapons.

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To get ready and gain time, the abovementioned attending agents agreed to proceed in a way to serve the purposes of their plan:-

- A. To contact the influential elements inside Iraq through their relatives who held responsibilities with Badr Corps 9 and to urge them to cooperate with them in case of a US attack against Iraq.
- B. To explore all the roads extending from the Iraqi-Iranian borders within the sectors of (Diyala, Waset, Misan) and to find guides to use them upon their entrance after beginning with the application of their plan.
- C. To bring in to Iraq the largest quantity possible of weapons in order to be used by their elements and sympathizers.
- D. To prepare the communication equipments including the long range (HF) and short range (VHF) Racal equipments and (Serial – Radium) international telephones.

Corps' plan in the occurrence of the crisis:

The Corps' presence in Iran means that the relationships between the Iranian authorities and Iraq are not satisfactory and it is normal that the Corps takes advantage of any opportunity to undermine the security and stability inside Iraq to weaken the force of the central authority. The best opportunity the Corps should take advantage of and draft a plan in its light is the (crisis) in which Iraq goes through with its international relationships, whether with the Security Council or with the Inspection Team or the US threats. When an attack is expected to happen against Iraq, the Corps begins arranging the conditions of its units and fighters, putting a detailed plan which would enable

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its elements to infiltrate to Iraq, play a role in the events and participate in the overthrow of the regime. The Corps held a meeting for its cadres on December 12, 2001 in which it discussed the possibility of a US attack which would lead to the overthrow of the power in Iraq and that the Corps should discuss two possibilities to select the appropriate time for them. In the light of this, an appropriate plan should be created with the participation of the Corps in order to enter Iraq, control the main junctions in Baghdad, instigate of the citizens on the inside and mobilize them and arm the groups sent to Iraq before the beginning of the attack.

In the first possibility, the Corps is requested to send openly to Iraq military units organized in the form of convoys. In the second possibility, a US pressure on Iran would happen placing it in an embarrassing position in which it cannot allow the Corps to enter Iraq in the manner mentioned in the first possibility. They would rather enter secretly in the form of groups in the direction of regions assigned to them. The attendants at the Corps' Command considered more likely the occurrence of the second possibility and they set the Corps' Working Plan in the light of the previous possibilities as clarified hereunder:-

- ❖ To sort out individuals from the Corps having a social influence in Iraq and to send them to the inside upon the beginning of the US attack. Their duties would consist of contacting the citizens and creating groups especially in the popular regions.
- ❖ To bring in to Iraq the largest quantity of weapons and ammunitions to arm the said groups.
- ❖ To determine different roads within the region confined between Khanekeen and Al-Fakka, to prepare the guides for the purpose of exploring the region, to use the GPS guiding equipments and to confirm that all the explored roads are distant from the presence of the Iraqi military units.

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❖ **Division of the region to three working sectors:-**

1. The first sector from Al-Fakka to outside Mahran – **Under the responsibility** of Haydar Al-Karrar Division.
2. The second sector from Mahran to outside Mandali – **Under the responsibility of** Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division.
3. The third sector from Mandali to inside Khanekeen – **Under the responsibility of** Imam Ali Division.,

❖ The three divisions create small groups, prepare small and large vehicles good to travel on sandy roads to transport the elements selected from the formations with their supportive weapons such as 106 millimeter cannon, 107 Katioucha base and 23 millimeter anti-air cannon.

❖ In case of a continuation of the US bombing, of the disturbance of the security situation and in the absence of the government's control on the inside, the divisions proceed, each one within its assigned sector, to occupy the camps close to Baghdad (Diyala and Waset), to create commanding headquarters for them in these military locations and to provide support and protection to the groups working on the inside.

❖ A headquarters for the Corps' Command should be opened in the border region of Mahran. The Corps continues to follow up the divisions' headquarters when the divisions are able to carry out their duties.

❖ The communication system among the Corps' headquarters, the divisions and axes is done by using HF equipments along with the serial and radium telephones. The communication between the division and the headquarters of the regiments is done through the VHF equipments and the use of Walkie-Talkie.

❖ The axes send individuals to inside Iraq with weapons and the mission of exploring the roads.

❖ The control of the ammunition and foodstuff warehouses and the stations for the filling of fuel by fear that they would not arrive from Iran.

❖ Imam Al-Hussein Division and the Southern Axis work in a similar way in the governorates of Misan and Basra.

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- ❖ Al-Mustafa Brigade and the Northern Axis coordinate the work with the Kurds according to the plan they prepared
- ❖ The Assistant Commander of the Corps prepared in writing a detailed plan of the Corps's future activity in accordance with the mentioned points and he confirmed that he discussed them secretly and personally with the commanders of the divisions and the axes' officials in accordance with the sector of responsibilities. The Corps Intelligence's Official (Abu Lika' Al-Safy) announced that he undertook the preparation of information for the drafting of the detailed plan. The Corps Intelligence's Official assigned (Abu Ayoub Al-Basari) to go to Iraq and examine Abu Al-Fadl headquarters, explore Badiya Al-Anbar confined between Najaf, Al-Nakheeb and Kilometer 160 in order to study the possibility of opening new headquarters for the Middle Axis. He examined the condition of the citizens, the extent of their readiness to cooperate with the group of headquarters present inside Iraq. As to the vital targets in Baghdad which the Corps confirmed, they consist of the presidential palace, the radio, TV, security service building, camps surrounding Baghdad, weapons and foodstuff warehouses and station for the filling of fuel.

Corps' attitude towards the Northern region:

The Corps has two designs for the Northern region. The first one is the Corps' conviction that perhaps the borders between Iraq and Iran will be closed under an Iranian decision and therefore the Corps' elements will be forbidden from infiltrating to Iraq. In that case, the Corps would have no way of entering except from the Northern region. The second design is that the Kurds represent an influential force in the Northern region and it is possible of finding ways to coordinate the relationships and the common activity with them. Therefore, the Corps worked on building good contacts with the agent Jalal Al-Talibani and got his approval on finding a military force for the Corps inside the city of Al-Sulaimaniyah and thus Al-Mustafa Brigade composed of two infantry regiments and a support regiment moved from Iran to Al-Sulaimaniyah. Headquarters were assigned to the Brigade in Banjuween and Midan and its presence has become as follows:-

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- **Headquarters of Al-Mustafa Brigade** – Under the command of Abu Zer Al-Khalesi, it is located in Banjuween and it occupies three buildings. Together with the Brigade's headquarters (First Regiment), there is Al-Hussein Regiment under the command of (Abu Hasan Al-Tamimi) along with two companies from the Support Regiment and the Second Regiment (Al-Wilaya Regiment occupies four floors with the Police Precinct) in the Midan region.
- To reinforce the presence of the Corps in Al-Sulaimaniyah, he also worked on finding a headquarters for the Northern Axis in the city of Al-Sulaimaniyah and he appointed to the position of Commander of the Axis Abu Ali Al-Basari who was previously the Corps' Commander.
- As to relationship with Mas'ud Al-Barazai, it is still a simple and limited relationship and the Corps was not able to convince Mas'ud to approve the creation of a Public Relations Office in Irbil. In any case, the Corps continues on maintaining and developing the contact with the Kurds hoping to participate in the execution of their plan upon the occurrence of any exceptional circumstance inside Iraq.

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Synopsis:

This document is an Iraqi intelligence study of the IRGC. The document describes a number of physical camps as well as companies and front organization associated with IRGC.

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Gist: This file discusses the foundation of Al-Quds Force after the end of the Iranian-Iraqi war and Khomeini's death. It explains that the Al-Quds Force was formed by uniting all the military forces, the terrorists, and the intelligence apparatus. The file also includes names and locations of Iranian terrorist training camps and operations in Sudan, Lebanon and Bosnia.			

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[TC: Page 2]

October 2000

Al-Quds Forces Associated with the Guards of the Islamic Revolution

1. Summary

After the end of the Iranian-Iraqi war and the death of Khomeini in 1990, the al-Malali regime [TC: plural for Mullah, which is a Muslim title for a holy man], established a new structure called al-Quds Force, by way of uniting all the military forces, the terrorists and intelligence apparatuses within the Guard Forces that were operating outside the Iranian borders.

This force was named the 5th Force of the Guard and it included Infantry, Air Force, Navy, and Mobilization Forces. The former General Commander of the Guards at that time, Muhsin Rida'i, confirmed that the goal of forming al-Quds Force was to establish a National Islamic Army.

2. The Leadership

The assignments of al-Quds Force are passed on through the Guards' General Command, working at the direction of the Military General Staff under the command of Major General Hassan Fayruz 'Abadi and under direct supervision of the jurisprudent custodian, similar to the rest of the Military Forces of al-Malali regime, such as the Guards, Army, and the Internal Security Forces.

In light of the above, it is clear that al-Quds Forces operate under Khamini's supervision and orders. The forces are under the command of Brigadier General Qasim Sulaymani and his Deputy, the General of the Guards Qa' Ani.

3. Goals and Duties

- A. Directing and forming radical movements in different countries, especially in the Islamic countries
- B. Organizing, training, recruiting, and providing administrative support to the loyalists of the Islamic Revolution, Islamic Movement, and Hezbollah Forces that are present outside the Iranian borders.
- C. Collecting information, especially military and domestic information
- D. Assassinating any opposition to the al-Malali regime in coordination with the Ministry of Intelligence, such as writers, publishers, and politicians who oppose the regime.
- E. Forming what is known as the Corps of the Islamic Revolution in different countries, like Badr Corps in Iraq, one for Bosnia, the 5th Corps for Turkey, the 7th Corps for Lebanon, and a Corps for Africa, etc.

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4. Staff Command and al-Quds Forces Command Centers

Al-Quds Forces Headquarter, is located beside Kazimi Camp, near the Guards' Staff Command in Tehran

Al-Quds Forces have four (4) main command centers along the border regions to direct its intelligence and operational activities in the neighboring countries along the borders in order to achieve its goals in these countries.

A. Ramadan Headquarter (1st Corps)

Is under the command of the Guard Brigadier General for Iraq, Ahmad Fruzanda, and its command center is located in Tehran. It has three camps along the border regions, parallel to Iraq.

- Al-Nasr Camp in the north "Naqda city", under the command of Mahmud Farhadi
- Zafar Camp in the west "Karmanshah", under the command of Guard Brigadier General, `Abidawi`

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- Al-Fajr Camp in the South (Ahwaz), under the command of Hamid Taqwa
- B.** Pakistan's Nabi Al-Akram Command Center (2nd Corps) is located in Zahdan, under the command of Guard Brigadier General Shibani. He is also in charge of security in Baluchistan and the Sistan provinces, as well as subduing any opposition or clans' movements in the region.
- C.** Al-Hamzah Command Center (3rd Corps). Intended for Turkey, and located in Arumiyya. It is in charge of coordinating with the anti-Turkish Kurdish groups, subduing the Iranian Kurds, as well as carrying-out terrorist operations against the Iranian Kurdish groups in Iraq.
- D.** Al-Ansar Command Center (4th Corps). Intended for Afghanistan and Central Asia. It is located in the Iranian city Mushhad. It also has extended command centers in the following cities: Zabil, Mirjawa, Birjund, and Tayibad.

5. Forces and Corps Designated to Countries

- Fifth Corps: It organizes the secret terrorist groups inside the Turkish territory, and conducts special terrorist operations. It is under the command of Hajj Mansur, and its headquarters are in Tabriz
 - Sixth Corps: It exports terrorism, and carries out destructive operations in the Emirates and the Gulf countries. The commander is Shayrazi.
 - Seventh Corps: It is called Lebanon Corps, and is affiliated with the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Islamic Jihad, and Al-Amal Islamic Organization. It has command centers in B`albak and Biqa` [TC: cities in Lebanon], and it consists of 2000 members from the Guard Forces. The Seventh Corps leased many buildings in the Biqa` valley. Many of the buildings are located in the regions of Beni –Shayt, Shamshad, Al-Na`ali, Harmal, Al-Riyaq, Brital, Mihad, Butal, Yamuni, Al-q`ar, and Al-Yazi. Brital city in Lebanon identifies with Qum city in Iran because of its large presence of Al-Malali factions.
- The important command centers of Al-Malali regime in Lebanon are:
 - Shaykh Abdallah Camp in B`albak
 - Imam `Ali Mosque (within the Guards' command center in B`albak)
 - Musa Sadar city
 - Al-Mahdi command center in B`albak
 - The Khomeini Hospital is considered a medical center for the Al-Malali regime

[TC: This page is continuation of page 3]

- Eight Corps (African Corps): The extent of its operations is in African countries such as Algeria , Tunisia, Sudan, etc... It has an active role in Sudan. According to the information we received, it has established different command centers in Sudan to train the Sudanese Army, in order to create a base from which it can carry out its objectives and operations in the neighboring countries, especially in Egypt. It is under the command of Sarraf, and his deputy is Afqahi. Al-Quds Corps has several training sites in Sudan, such as Um-Barmita, and Abu-Raqam in East Khartoum.
- Ninth Corp (for Europe, America, and east Asian countries). This Corps is under the command of Nahidiyan. It has great influence in Germany and Austria, and focuses on recruiting the Turkish and Arab Muslims in Germany; therefore a great deal of attention should be given to the Big Mosque in Hamburg
- Bosnian Corps: This Corps is considered the center of the Al-Malali regime in Europe; thus, it has a special and unique role.

The Guards' Brigadier General and former Deputy, Shams, is the commander of the training program in Al-Quds Force.

- **Azerbaijan Intelligence Station**

This station was established in June 1993, in the Iranian city of Maku, located within the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Its commander is the Guards' Brigadier General Buyaghji. He is commissioned to establish a base along the Iranian- Azerbaijani and Armenian border, in addition to another known as Muhammad Rasul Allah [TC: literally Muhammad the Prophet of God], in the Republic of Azerbaijan

- **Brigade Malik Ashtar**

It is considered an independent Brigade under the command of Al-Quds Force. However, during the Iranian-Iraqi war it was under the command of the Ramadan command center. Following the completion of operations inside the Iraqi territories, the Brigade was attached to Al-Quds Force and established its headquarter in Mazindran Province. It is commanded by Brigadier General Husni Niya, with two of its regiments positioned in Lebanon

6. Al-Quds Elements in the Embassies

Al-Quds Force has representatives in some of Al-Malali's regime embassies, each according to his scope of their work, such as in Iraq, Sudan, Austria, and Germany.

For example, Muhsin Jazayri who is the intelligence constituent for Al-Quds in Al-Malali embassy in Germany, is at the same time responsible for providing and preparing weapons for the Al-Malali regime, as well as for Iranian House Establishment in Germany.

During the assassination of Qasmilu in Austria, which was led by Deputy Sahrarudi of Ramadan's command center, weapons used in the operation were sent via a diplomatic briefcase to Austria twenty (20) days prior to conducting the operation. One of the members of the team was hiding in Al-Malali's regime embassy in Vienna.

7. The Islamic Associations and Covert Companies

Al-Quds Force extensively exploits all that is related to "Islam", such as cultural centers, handicapped accommodation centers, transportation companies, and other fronts in different countries. For instance, on March 1996, **Girfat Company** for Food Production, which belongs to the Guards, transported a huge 320 mm gun to Belgium on Klahduz ship, which is part of the Iranian fleet that belongs to the Maritime Company

controlled by al-Malali regime, to target the residence of the elected leader of the Iranian opposition in Paris. On March 16, 1996, they were exposed at Antwerp Harbor in Belgium. The manager of the company at the time was Ahmad Shuja`i. The office of the above-mentioned company was exporting canned pickles from Tehran through "Sadiq" Commercial Company to countries of Central Asia and Russia.

Paris Company [TC: illegible name] is considered another example. Al-Hajj Ahmad Khasrujrdi is the chairman of this company that started its business in Sudan in 1993, and has branches in Tanzania and Germany. This company deals in selling gas tanks, and trades in food products. This company owns a restaurant, and two storages in Sudan; one is located in Port Sudan region. The company works on recruiting Sudanese nationals, and sends them to Iran to receive terrorist training.

When Qasmlu was assassinated, a company by the name of (Vnimax) was used as a cover. An individual named Bahshti runs it. The "Rahbar" Transportation Company in Salzburg, and "Haja" Company in Vienna were also utilized.

8. Coordination with the Ministry of Intelligence

Coordination between Al-Quds and the Intelligence Ministry is conducted either between Al-Quds command and the Minister of Intelligence, or between the Intelligence Directorate in Al-Quds Force and the Foreign Intelligence Directorate in the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence (Akbaryan).

While Al-Malali Intelligence Ministry meticulously monitors internal cruelty and confronts groups that aim to overthrow the regime, such as the Mujahidin and Liberation Army, it also gathers information from the oppositions. Al-Quds Force continues to play a major role in exporting terrorism and fanaticism abroad.

9. Training Camps

1) “Bahnar” Training Camp

In 1993, this camp was formed near Karaj Dam. This camp is considered the main center for preparing terrorists for the regime. Some of the regime’s foreign agents receive training in this camp, in order to carry out terrorist operations.

The following are some of the groups that received training on terrorist operations at this camp:

- In June 1994, nineteen (19) Algerian nationals were trained on terrorist operations, then sent to Algeria
- In October 1994, two groups of 40-45 Bosnian Muslims were trained at this camp, some of them also participated in educational courses, then were sent to Bosnia
- In February 1995, twenty (20) Pakistanis were trained to deal with Kashmir and the Pakistani internal problems (the conflict between the Wahabis and the regime) [TC: Wahabis are a fanatic sect of Islam]
- In March 1995, twenty (20) Palestinians from Hamas Movement were trained
- In March 1995, twenty (20) Lebanese received an intensive training course and were sent to an unspecified country.
- In April 1995, eighteen (18) individuals from the Turkish Kurdish Labor Party were trained for four (4) months
- In June 1995, eleven (11) individuals from Bahrain (two of who received special training) were trained for two months, and after graduation they were sent to Bahrain
- In October 1995, six (6) Bahrainis received special training, then were sent to Bahrain


[TC: This page is continuation of page 5]

- In November 1995, sixteen (16) Pakistanis started their educational course
- In December 1995, seven (7) Lebanese from Hezbollah graduated after receiving a course at the Officer's Academy.
- Also, some of Al-Quds Force's active members in Austria, France, and Germany received their training at this camp

Bahtir Camp

Camp
Commander

Brigadier
General Mu`ini



[TC: continuation of page 6]

2) Al-Imam `Ali Educational College

This college is located in Tehran, Al-Jarish Square, at the end of Al-Barz Kuwa Street, and is under the command of “Nurwzi”.

Some of Al-Quds agents operating abroad receive training at this college. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with the Camp’s Admittance Office, is in charge of sending foreigners to receive training at this camp.

Classical classes pertaining to “CIA” techniques are taught at this camp.

This college is considered self-sufficient when it comes to qualified people.

It utilizes experienced and qualified teachers who have participated in overseas operations. For instance, there are two teachers experienced in terrorist operations named “`Aruj” and “Shams”.

The Iraqi instructors are permanent personnel working with Al-Quds Force, and they receive their salaries from the Force itself. Those instructors are Iraqi POWs who support our cause.

Individuals from Afghanistan, India, Sudan, Kuwait, and Lebanon receive training at this camp.

The person in charge of sending the Lebanese fighters is called (Kurush Fuladi). He was elected by Khatimi’s Wing as Council’s Deputy. He is the same person who was detained in Britain in 1981 and expelled to Iran when a bomb exploded in his car during a terrorist operation.

3) Bayt-al-Maqdis College

The compound of Bayt Al-Maqdis is located in Al-Imam- al-Sadiq Camp at the entrance of Qum city, in 72 Tin Square. The compound is located at the end of Al-Imam Al-Sadiq camp, and is separated by a wall. Guard Brigadier General, Sadiq Najad, one of Al-Quds Force commanders, is in charge of this compound

Bayt Al-Maqdis College, also known as (Malal Institute), is a center for teaching terrorists sectarian lessons, and then the students are moved to other camps to study military courses.

This college has two centers named “Khatim” and “Al-Qa’im”. Khatim center is responsible for recruiting religious figures and sending them abroad

Al-Qa’im center is responsible for setting-up educational courses, such as Koranic science, the afterworld, sectarian lessons, Islamic history, and interpretation.

10. Courses’ Curriculum

1) Lessons in Doctrine:


According to orders, first and foremost the agents must enter a course in doctrine that includes jurisprudence and Islamic rules.


On the subject of the principal of covert work, many extremist individuals are convinced that when carrying-out an operation, a person can perform acts that contradict Islamic law, such as drinking alcohol. In 1981, Al-Khomeini declared a Fatwa (religious decree) prohibiting the torturers of Evian prisoners from fasting during the month of Ramadan when interrogating al-Mujahidin [TC: Holy War fighters).

- 2) Learning how to behave during detention and interrogation
- 3) Learning intelligence and reconnaissance methods for different targets
- 4) Learning about weapons and physical fitness
- 5) Learning about security information
- 6) Learning how to adapt to special duties in a particular country

Different measures should be taken to cover the identity of individuals during the training process.

For the purpose of penetrating the enemy’s intelligence systems, the foreign agents should be carefully recruited and checked.





**Organizational Structure of
AL-QUDS FORCES**

**Al Quds Commander
Brigadier General Sulaymani**

Director of Ideology Counsel
Mulla Ahamad Salif

Commander's Office
Minshawi

Deputy Commander of Administration
BG.Gen. Qani

Al-Maqdis College
Sadqi

Political Guidance
Khakasawi

Admin Affairs
Ibrahim

Illegible

Illegible headquarter Director
Illegible

Military Disciplines
Tajna

Education and Evaluation
Ja'fari

Judicial Office
Taqi Badr

Secretary
Haj Sadiq

Intelligence
BG. GEN. **\`A. J. \`Ali**

Fax and
\`A. J. \`Ali

Comput
Hajji

Chief of Staff
BG Gen Bayni
Luhi

Director of Info
\`A. J. \`Ali

Surveillance/Search
\`A. J. \`Ali

Comptroller Department
Talibi

Evaluation Department
Babari

Planning and
\`A. J. \`Ali

Technical Departmen
\`A. J. \`Ali

Printing Department

Engineer Departmen
\`A. \`A. Husayn

Intelligenc e e
Illegible

Admin.
Illegib

Trainin
Illegib

Operati

Intellig

Manpo
Illegibl

Illegibl
Isma'il

Protoco

African
Saraf

Soviet

Middle

Syrian
Balgis

Lebane
Illegib

Palestin
Shafiq

Pakista

Afghan

Turkey

Iraq

Ansar
4th Corps

Hamza
3rd Corps

Nabr Akram
2nd Corps

Ramadan
1st Quarters,

Intelligence
Illegible

Intelligence
\`A. J. \`Ali

9th corps
\`A. J. \`Ali

Illegible
\`A. J. \`Ali

10th Corps
Hajj

8th Corps,
Saraf Bdr

7th coprs,
Haj Rida

6th Corps
Illegible




5th
Hajj

Ministry of Intelligence Organizational Structure

**Minster of Intelligence
Mullah, `Ali Yunis**

Minister's Office

Minister's
Deputy
Shafi'i



Intelligence
Agencies
Provinces

Report on Badr 9th Corps

December 2000

Introduction:

Commenting on the previous information concerning Al-Quds-Force, which is under the direction of the Guards [TC: Guards of the Islamic Revolution], the following new information was obtained regarding the agents' activities:

1. A meeting was held between leaders of Al-Quds Force and two agents, Mullah Baqir Al-Hakim and Abu-Mahdi Muhandis, to designate their assignments in Iraq. According to trusted information, Al-Quds Force is monitoring the work of the agents in Iraq and issuing instructions and orders directly to Mullahs Baqir Al-Hakim and Abu-Mahdi Muhandis. Hamid Taqwa, commander of Al-Fajr command center under Al-Quds Force, is in charge of their terrorist operations in Khuzestan Province.
2. During the months of October and November of 2000, Al-Quds Force and Mullah Baqir Al-Hakim made some changes concerning the duties of the agents and in the organization itself. They replaced agent Abu-Zu-Al-Fiqar, commander of the group known as Haydar Karar, with agent Hasssan `Ali Kazim Al-Rashid (Abu-Ahmad), who was the Operation Officer in the same group. Currently, agent Abu-Zu -Al-Fiqar works at Badr 9th Corps command center in Kerminsha city, his family remained in Ahwaz city. Agent Abu-Ahmad led a terrorist operation to booby-trap a truck at Habib Camp located near Basra. Currently, agent Abu-Ahmad lives in Darzful city [TC: The following was written on the margin: **true according to the investigations**].
3. All the terrorist activities are coordinated by the agents in the southern region, or Khuzestan Province, in a mobilization command center called Malachi, located at the crossroads in Kharmashhar city. All terrorist operations against Iraq and the regime are coordinated in Malachi command center. It is worth mentioning that due to some administrative problems, along with the incompleteness of the force, no work plan nor terrorist missions were assigned, thus, all terrorist operations were carried out independently. Agent Abu-Ammar Draw'i is scheduled to command Malachi command center. He was previously assigned to Haydar Karar group, and currently is transferred to Malachi command center. Mullah Baqir al-Hakim is the direct supervisor of Malachi command center. There are some problems facing this center, such as, shortage of qualified personnel, budget, insufficient use of border's crossing sites for exit and entrance, and lack of passing identification cards for the agents.
4. At the beginning of the year 2000, Abu-`Ammar Draw'i personally filmed and took pictures of Habib camp, which belongs to the Mujahidin [TC: fighters for Islamic Holy War]. At that time, he handed the filmsto Ahmad Fruznda, who is the Guard Brigadier General and Commander of Al-Fajr in Ahwaz. Also, a copy of the film was given

[TC: Page 13]

to the former commander of Haydar Karar group, agent Abu-Zu-Al-Fiqar, as a sign of appreciation from agent Fruznda.

5. The Ministry of Intelligence, requested from agent Baqir Al-Hakim to work against the Mujahidin in Iraq, and instructed him to speak against the organization during their meetings with the purpose of escalating the terrorist operations against the organization.
6. Agent Abu-Miriam Mansuri, commander of Badr 9th Corps, who lives in Kharmashhar city, reports on terrorist activities against the organization in southern Iraq
7. During November 2000, some of Haydar Karar's forces were transferred from Darzful to Huwayzah. In addition, there is a Brigade named Al-Immam Husayn, located in Huwayzah, with no missions assigned to it at the present time.

8. Relationship and Correlation between Al-Malali Organization and Badr 9th:

- A. A budget for Badr 9th Corps agents has been implemented by the General Staff of the of the Military Forces Command, and a Guard named Shiasi from the Planning Directorate is in charge of the Badr 9th Corps' budget.
- B. The Ministry of Defense supplies them with weapons, and engineer Haddad, who is in charge of planning in the Ministry of Defense, is assigned to support them. He usually participates in celebrations and military parades.
- C. On 21 September, 2000, Badr 9th Corps held a joint military parade with Al-Quds Force in Qum city.
- D. Badr 9th Corps has a representative in Lujisti Maytham and Bilal camps; there is also a representative in every Brigade and Guards' Unit.
- E. There is a residential compound for the Guards' Commanders in (Muftah) city in Karminshah Province. Also, the following are names of some Badr 9th Corps commanders who reside in the compound:
 - Badr 9th Corps Deputy, Abu-Mahdi Al-Muhandis
 - Abu-Mustafa Shibani
 - Lujisti Commander, Abu-`Ali Najafi
 - Intelligence Officer, Abu-Muhammad Tayib
 - Dr. Abu `Asr, from Badr 9th Corps Clinic
 - Mullah and Badr 9th Delegate, Abu-Mubarqa

- The Commander of terrorist operations in Miqdad province, Abu-Hanna Baghdadi
- Intelligence Officer, Abu-Anfal Baghdadi
- Abu-Muhammad Khalsi

F. Mullah, Salik, is the Chief Representative for the Jurisprudent Custodian of Badr 9th, as well as in Al-Quds Force.

G. The protection of Mullah Baqir Al-Hakim is the responsibility of the guard force. Previously, Guard Brigadier General Jawahiri was in charge of his protection, but he was replaced with Guard Sayfallah.

Document Title: Iraqi Intelligence Report about the Quds Force Activities in Iraq

ID: MNCI-2005-001140

Date: Unknown

Synopsis:

This document is an Iraqi intelligence report about Quds Force activities in Iraq. The document describes Quds Force support to a variety of Iraqi groups, including the Badr Corps, Hizballah (not Lebanese), Tharallah, and Sayid al-Shuhada', and 15 Sha'aban.

Key Themes:

Key words:

MNCI-2005-001140

“Iranian Activities In Iraq”

Full Translation

Batch: M5096-1

DOI: UNKNOWN

DOT: 20050407

Pages: 2

[Translator's Notes:

- 1. The source document for this translation is a Microsoft Word document, consisting of 2 pages. Translator's instructions are to do a full translation of pages 1 through 2.*
- 2. Handwritten text in the source document is indicated by [HW] in the translation.*
- 3. Unintelligible text in the source document, whether from poor scanning or poor handwriting, is indicated by [U/I-], followed by a number indicating the approximate number of words that are unintelligible, i.e., [U/I-3], for three unintelligible words.*
- 4. Words for which no translation can be found are indicated by [UNK-], followed by a number indicating the number of unknown words, i.e., [UNK-3], for three unknown words. A footnote may be included that gives additional information.*
- 5. Page breaks in the source document are indicated in the translation, accompanied by the corresponding page number of the source document.*
- 6. Translator's comments will be indicated with brackets [] or a footnote.]*

-----BEGINNING OF TRANSLATION-----

[Page 1 of the PDF/Source Document]

Iranian Activities in Iraq

Al-Quds force was established under the name of Arkan Isnad al-Kawthar. The goal of the group is to create a suitable infrastructure for its intelligence officers in Iraq, on a large scale, in order to provide support to those groups who are loyal to Iran. Arkan al-Kawthar practices economical, construction, commerce, and supply and passenger transportation openly. All these activities are just a cover in order to transport the elements of the Al-Quds force into Iraq.

This is considered an old tactic from the Al-Quds force, which they have done in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and other Islamic countries. The Guard General Mansur Haq is in the leadership of the Al-Kawthar organization, and he works under the direct supervision of Qasim Sulaymani, who is the General Commander of the Al-Quds Force. Hajj Mansur meets twice a week with Qasim Sulaymani and with Guard General Balalik, who is the logistics commander for the Al-Quds force. They study the situation in Iraq during those meetings.

The Al-Kawthar organization has the responsibility of coordinating and supervising of the different activities of the different institutions in Iraq, such as the Red Crescent, Al-Shahid Organization, Amdad al-Khumayni Committee, and different tourism and religious companies.

Assignments and responsibilities of Arkan al-Kawthar:

1. Secure and support the Badr Corps, and the different groups belonging to Al-Quds force, such as the movement of Hezbollah, 15 Sha'aban, Sayid al-Shuhada' Movement, and Tharallah [God's Vengeance].
2. Distribute the food supply and products among the citizens in order to win the support of the society.
3. Establish companies as a cover in order to transport the elements of the Al-Quds force into Iraq.
4. Coordination and supervision of the activities of all the economical and social organizations belonging to the Iranian regime in Iraq.

The assignment and responsibility of Arkan al-Kawthar is to fulfill the logistic needs of the Iraqi groups belonging to the Al-Quds force.

15 Sha'ban Movement

The Al-Quds force belongs to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which established different groups in Iraq. Among those groups is the 15 Sha'aban group, which is considered one of its important groups, and is working in the cities of Al-Nasiriyah, Al-Basrah, and the cities in the south.

-----**PAGE BREAK IN SOURCE DOCUMENT**-----
[Page 2 of the PDF/Source Document]

This movement continued its activities under the leadership of Hamzah al-Musawi (Al-Nasiri), after the incidents of 1991. Most of its members live in Iran and they have ties to Al-Fajr camp in Ahwaz. The group then moved to Iraq after the fall of the regime and took the city of Al-Nasiriyah as a place for its headquarters. (Complete information about the 15 Sha'aban Movement, the organizational structure, the liaison members, and financial means.)

The following are some of the operations carried out by the groups belonging to the Al-Quds force, in the southern region of Iraq:

The intelligence reports, from valid sources, indicate that the groups belonging to the Al-Quds force carried out a number of combined operations under the name of Islamic groups, upon receiving orders from Fajr Camp in Ahwaz, against the coalition forces in Al-Nasiriyah and Al-Basrah when the coalition forces entered the cities. They planted explosives set up ambushes. (We have a list of those operations.)

The media fronts belonging to the Al-Quds force.

The Iranian regime lays out the foundation in order to achieve their objectives in Iraq, taking advantage of the current Iraqi situation. They use their agents in Iraq. The Iranian regime established a number of radio and TV stations, and different newspapers in order to spread their extremist and old points of view in Iraq. They also want to have their

influence in the political arena, exploiting the religious sympathies of the people in Iraq.
(We have a list of all the different radio and TV stations.)

-----**END OF SOURCE DOCUMENT**-----
===== **(END OF FULL TRANSLATION)** =====

Document Title: Report on Tharallah (God's Rebel's)

ID: MNCI-2005-001143

Date: 2005

Synopsis:

This document is a report describing the linkages between the Tharallah organization and the Quds Force. Tharallah is active mostly near Iraq's southern city of Basrah.

Key Themes:

Key words:

MNCI-2005-001143

“Terrorist group Tharallah group in Iraq [God’s Rebel Group In Iraq]”

Full Translation

Batch: M5096-1

DOI: 20050119

DOT: 20050407

Pages: 1

[Translator's Notes:

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-----BEGINNING OF TRANSLATION-----
[Page 1 of the PDF/Source Document]

Tharallah Group in Iraq [God Rebels Group In Iraq]

An Iranian group, Quds Force, is considered one of the five main forces attached to the Islamic Revolutionary Corps’ Kat and Ralih Branches and supports the revolution through Rawalti aid. They believe in creating several groups for the Quds brigade by pursuing the instruction of the scholar. They also believe in [God’s Rebellion] Tharallah blessings and have a wide scope of activities in the southern area of Iraq. A.H.H in Iraq, especially in the Basrah Province and Dhi Qar Province. The Al-Amin [the leader] is Al-Battat Sanadi. We know him as Sayid Yussif and reports of the General Iraqi Affairs Office pertaining to this group indicate that he receives direct support from the Man’i Office. This office supervises the spying operations and sabotaging connected to ‘Ali Kha al-Battat Qiyam al-Sayid Yussif, who is responsible for supplying information in Iraq. It consists of 100 members in Al-Basrah Province and is responsible for killings and eliminations. The headquarters of this group acts as a republican guard and officers that reign over the affairs in the province by granting itself the right to prosecute and punish people who interfere in the affairs of the group. They can also dismiss people from work. This group is not satisfied alone with taking financial support from Al-Quds Brigade, but also takes big sums of money from the businessmen in Al-Basrah. Generally speaking, most of its cadre members are mercenaries and hostage-taking gangs and thieves. Beside the leader that we know from this group, we also know a person by the name of Rajawi. He is in charge of the group in the area of Nasiriyah. The location of Majid Farhan al-Lizi is in the alley of Sumar, next to the electric facility. Tharallah group in Nasiriyah. [God’s Rebel Group In Nasiriyah].

’Abbas Hatthut Jbarah

Badr Nayif ‘Amir

’Allawi al-Shiji

Hassan Darzan Muhawis

Director of the information analysis and gathering.

19 January, 2005

-----**END OF SOURCE DOCUMENT**-----
===== **(END OF FULL TRANSLATION)** =====

Document Title: Insurgent Group Outline and Administrative Documents

ID: NMEC-2007-624223

Date: Unknown

Synopsis:

This document describes a large militant organization in southern Iraq. The document outlines the number of fighters and political operatives available in numerous southern cities. The exact organization is not identified.

Key Themes:

Key words:

*Page 1 of 14

In the name of The Almighty

Organization (A):

Central Organization consisting of:

Organization Coordinators:

- Assistant count 4 (Educational..Financial..Administative...Tribal)
- Operations Staff (Engineering..Support..Intervention..Air Defense)
- Information
- Administrative Staff
(Numbers..Support..Training..Communications..Transportation..Medical
Technical (Mechanic, Electronic)
- Northern Region (al-Rasafah..al-Karkh..Diyala..Kirkuk..Mosul)
- Central Region (al-Hilla..al-Diwaniyah..Karbala”..An Najaf)
- Southern Region (al-Basrah..al-Nasiriyah..al-‘Imarah..al-Kut..al-Samawah)

Regional Coordinator:

- Educational
- Administrative and Financial
- Information
- Operations Coordinator (Support..Engineering..Intervention..Air Defense)
- Administrative Staff (Support..Numbers..Communications..Medical)
- Governorates

Governorate Coordinator:

- Administrative and Financial
- Educational
- Information
- Operations (Support..Engineering..Intervention..Air Defense)
- Administrative Staff (Support..Numbers..Communications..Medical)
- Positions (the number according to the governorate needs)

*Page 2 of 14

Table of Number of Sectors in the Governorates

Governorate	Old	New	Needed	Total	Notes
Ar Rasafah	5 positions	2 Positions	2 positions	9 positions	Central 1, Central 2, North, South1, South2, al-Za'faraniyyah, Jisr Diyala, al-A'zamiyyah Silaykh al-Qahirah/al-Karradah
Al-Karkh	7 positions	-	2 positions	9 positions	Al-Shu'lah/al-Mansur/al-Mahmudiyyah/al-Taji/al-'Amil/
Diyala	2 Positions	-	-	2 Positions	North/South
Kirkuk	2 Positions	-	2	4 Positions	Kirkuk/Tuz Khurmatu
Al-Mosul		1	1	2 Positions	
Al-Hillah	4 Positions	-	-	4 Positions	Al-Saddah/al-Hillah/Nahiyat al-'Imam/al-Shumali al-Dawli [International]
Al-Diwaniyah	2 Positions		1	3 Positions	The Center/South/North International
Karbala''	2 Positions	-	-	2 Positions	The Center/ al-Husayniyyah
Al-Najaf	2 Positions	-	-	2 Positions	The Center/al-Kafl
Al-Basrah	4 Positions	2	-	6 Positions	East Central/West Central/al-Madinah/Saffan/al-Faw/al-Zubayr
Al-Nasiriyah	3 Positions	-	-	3 Positions	Al-Dawli/al-Rifa'i/al-Dakhili
Al-'Amarah	2 Positions	-	-	2 Positions	Al-Tayyib/Qal'at Salih
Al-Kut	3 Positions	-	-	3 Positions	Al-Suwayrah/al-Kut/al-Nu'maniyyah
Al-Samawah	2 Positions	-	-	2 Positions	
14 Governorates	40 Positions	5 Positions	8 Positions	53 Positions	= The Grand Total

*Page 3 of 14

Table of Levels Salaries and Expenses

Ranks in the Organization	Number	Salary	Sum of Salaries	Monthly Expenses

*Page 4 of 14

Table of the Numbers of the Organization (A)

Location	Specialty	Number	Notes
The Main	Central Committee	105	Number of officials and individuals with them
The North Region	Regional Committee	11	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Karkh	Governorate Committee	15	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Karkh Positions -9	All specialties and position leaders	200	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Rasafah	Governorate Committee	15	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Rasafah Positions -9	All specializations and position leads	200	Number of officials and individuals with them
Diyala	Governorate Committee	15	Number of officials and individuals with them
Diyala Positions -2	All specializations and position leads	50	Number of officials and individuals with them
Kirkuk	Governorate Committee	15	Number of officials and individuals with them
Kirkuk Positions -4	All specializations and position leads	50	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Mosul	Governorate Committee	15	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Mosul Positions -2	All specializations and position leads	20	Number of officials and individuals with them
The Central Region	Regional Committee	11	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Hillah	Governorate Committee	15	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Hillah Positions -4	All specializations and position leads	100	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Diwaniyah	Governorate Committee	15	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Diwaniyah Positions -3	All specializations and position leads	60	Number of officials and individuals with them
Karbala'	Governorate Committee	15	Number of officials and individuals with them
Karbala' Positions -2	All specializations and position leads	50	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Najaf	Governorate Committee	15	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Najaf Positions -2	All specializations and position leads	50	Number of officials and individuals with them

The South Region	Regional Committee	11	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Basrah	Governorate Committee	15	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Basrah Positions -6	All specializations and position leads	140	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Nasiriyah	Governorate Committee	15	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Nasiriyah Positions -3	All specializations and position leads	60	Number of officials and individuals with them

*Page 5 of 14

Al-'Amarah	Governorate Committee	15	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-'Amarah Positions -2	All specializations and position leads	70	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Kut	Governorate Committee	15	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Kut Positions -3	All specializations and position leads	75	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Samawah	Governorate Committee	15	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Samawah positions -2	All specializations and position leads	40	Number of officials and individuals with them
		1513	= The Total

Note: These numbers are approximate

*Page 6 of 14

In the name of the Almighty

The Defense Organization (B):

Coordinator of the Organization:

Administrative and Financial (Sabah)

Educational Coordinator (plus three aides)

Social Coordinator (plus three aides)

Tribes Coordinator

Administrative Staff (support/Numbers/Medical/Communications)

Information

Military Coordinator (Abu-Kawthar)

Amir al-Mu'minin Region (Central): (al-Najaf/Karbala'/al-Diwaniyah/al-Hillah..)
(Coordinator A will be assisted by Sh. Faruq)

[TC: possibly Shaykh Faruq]

Al-'Abbas Region (South): (Al-Basrah/Al 'Amarah/al-Nasiriyah/al-Kut/al-Samawah) Coordinator A aided by.....)

Al-Kazimayn Region (Northern): (al-Karkh/al-Rasafah/Diyala/Kirkuk/Mosul/Samara) (Coordinator of al-Rasafah and Diyala, Samara, and al-Mosul Abu-Kawthar) (Coordinator of al-Karkh and Kirkuk Coordinator A in the Northern)

Regional Coordinator: Military Coordinator

Administrative and Financial

Educational Coordinator (plus three aides)

Social Coordinator (plus three aides)

Tribes Coordinator

Administrative Staff (support/Numbers/Medical/Communications)

Information

Governorates

Governorate Coordinator: (According to the Size of the Governorate Numbers)

Administrative and Financial

Administrative Staff (support/Numbers/Medical/Communications)

Educational Coordinator

*Page 7 of 14

Social Coordinator

Information

Deputy Officer (According to the size of the numbers in the governorate, there should be an officer for each governorate that has more than 4 groups)

The group consists of 25 people on average and the number of the groups in the governorate depends on what it needed.

Group Coordinator:

Coordinator of Team A, 5 members (Rockets and 4 Mortars/ 1 Automatic Machine Gun)

Coordinator of Team B who is Coordinator of the Group consisting of 10 (3 Engineering/2 RPG/2 PKC/1 Sniper/1 Communications)

Coordinator of Team C who is a deputy of the Group Coordinator, and the group is made up of 10 members (3 Engineering/2 RPG/2 PKC/1 Sniper/1 Medical)

*Page 8 of 14

Table of the Numbers in the organization (B)

Location	Specialization	Number	Notes
The Main	Central Committee	26	Number of officials and individuals with them
The North Region	Regional Committee	21	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Karkh	Governorate Committee	16	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Karkh Groups	All specializations and group leads	1000	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Rasafah	Governorate Committee	18	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Rasafah Groups	All specializations and group leads	1000	Number of officials and individuals with them
Diyala	Governorate Committee	14	Number of officials and individuals with them
Diyala Groups	All specializations and group leads	1000	Number of officials and individuals with them
Kirkuk	Governorate Committee	9	Number of officials and individuals with them
Kirkuk Groups	All specializations and group leads	200	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Mosul	Governorate Committee	9	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Mosul Groups	All specializations and group leads	100	Number of officials and individuals with them
Samarra'		9	
Samarra' Groups	All specializations and group leads	100	Number of officials and individuals with them
Central Region	Regional Committee	21	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Hillah	Governorate Committee	11	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Hillah Groups	All specializations and leads	400	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Diwaniyah	Governorate Committee	9	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Diwaniyah Groups	All specializations	100	Number of officials and individuals with

	and leads		them
Karbala'	Governorate Committee	9	Number of officials and individuals with them
Karbala' Groups	All specializations and leads	250	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Najaf	Governorate Committee	9	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Najaf Groups	All specializations and leads	50	Number of officials and individuals with them
Southern Region	Regional Committee	21	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Basrah	Governorate Committee	12	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Basrah Groups	All specializations and leads	500	Number of officials and individuals with them

*Page 9 of 14

Al-Nasiriyah	Governorate Committee	9	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Nasiriyah Groups	All specializations and leads	50	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-'Amarah	Governorate Committee	9	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-'Amarah Groups	All specializations and leads	50	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Kut	Governorate Committee	11	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Kut Groups	All specializations and leads	400	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Samawa	Governorate Committee	9	Number of officials and individuals with them
Al-Samawa Groups	All specializations and leads	100	Number of officials and individuals with them
		5552	= The Total

Note: These numbers are approximate

Table of Numbers of Military Organizations

Organization	Number	Notes
Organization A	1513	From Central to the region, governorates, positions, and specializations
Organization B	5552	From Central to the region, governorates,

		positions, and specializations
Special Organization	250	From Central to the region, governorates, and specializations
The Total	7315	

*Page 10 of 14

In the name of the Almighty

Special Organization

The total is 250 Mujahidin as the first stage with a possibility of increase depending on the evolution of the organizations and its missions

Coordinator of the Organizational: Abu-Liqa'

- Numbers and Prevention
- Support (Shelters/Storage/Transportation/Covert)
- Training
- Technical (Electronic Coordinator/Mechanical Coordinator/Chemical)
- Information (Special Eavesdropping/Special Information *Kamri*)
- Aerial
- Marine
- Baghdad Region
- Southern Region
- Central Region
- Coordinator Suicide Bomber File

- Regional Coordinator
- Coordinator Special Forces (Special Platoon/Suicide Platoon)
- Anti-Armor (Direct/Directed)
- Engineering Coordinator
- Air Defense Coordinator
- Rocket and Artillery Coordinator

*Page 11 of 14

Table of Training Courses

Specialty	Type of Course	Number	Organization	Special Training	Notes
Infantry	Fighter	600	A	-	50 per month

Infantry	Fighter	1200	B	-	100 per month
Infantry	Position Coordinator	30	A	Fighter	in two stages
Infantry	Sniper	120	A	Fighter	15 in each course
Infantry	Sniper	60	B	Fighter	Second half of the year
Infantry	Special Force	90	A	- -	30 in each course (Sports Program)
Support	Element	105	A	- -	15 in each course
Support	Position Specialist	45	A	Support Element	15 in each course (3 courses)
Support	Fire Management	30	A	Element or Support Position	15 in each course (2 courses)
Support	Element	200	B	- -	25 in each course
Support	Detachment Command	25	B	Element	One course
Support	Fire Management	20	B	Element or Detachment Commander	One course
Engineering	Element	100	A	- -	25 in each course
Engineering	Position Engineering	50	A	Engineering Element	25 in each course
Engineering	Element	160	B	- -	25 in each course
Engineering	Engineering Coordinator	30	B	Element	One course at the end of the year
Information	Information Coordinator	75	A	Fighter	25 in each course
Information	Information Coordinator	25	B	Fighter	One course
Anti-Armor	Direct and Directed	45	Special	Fighter	15 in each course
Support	Fire Management	15	Special	Support Element	One course
Air Defense	Element	15	Special	Fighter	One course
Marine	Element	15	Special	Fighter	One course
		3055			= The Total

*Page 12 of 14

Table of Required Weapons

	Organization A		Organization B		
Weapon	Number	Ammunition	Number	Ammunition	Notes

Document Title: Iranian Intelligence Document Studying Iran

ID: ODP1-2005-00009023

Date: Mid-1990s

Synopsis:

The document contains a series of Iraqi intelligence correspondence, many regarding Iranian influence in Iraq. Several documents indicate that the Iraqi government was receiving information from the Mujahidin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), an anti-Iranian terrorist organization. Western scholars are often skeptical of information provided by the MKO because the group has an obvious interest in providing negative information about the Iranian government.

Key Themes:

Key words:

Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

(SATTS M)

(SATTS :)

Sir: Director of 1st Department
Subject: Information

According to the oral instructions of the 2nd Division Director to the 3rd Department Director on 04 SEP 1995, we attach an inventory of the most important Headquarters of Ramadan and Iranian Intelligence Stations, especially which follow up the Iraqi affairs.
Kindly acknowledge. Best regards.

Signature
Khalil Ibrahim Hammad
07 SEP 1995

Sir Director of the 1st Section
According to instruction of the 2nd Division Director, kindly acknowledge the attached report and lists of the Guards and Army. Best regards.



3rd Department
09 SEP 1995


Mr. Khalil



09 SEP

Sir Director of 2nd Division
Kindly acknowledge and according to your suggestion
Best regards

-I acknowledged
-Kindly survey Headquarters accurately and cooperate with 5th Directorate, 5th Division because it is important



09 SEP



09 SEP

Divisions and Brigades of Al-Khumayni Guards

1- Divisions

- A. 3rd Division/ Adhrabayjan
- B. 4th Division/ Ba'that
- C. 5th Division/ Nasr
- D. 6th Division/ Fath
- E. 7th Division/ Wali Al-'Asr
- F. 8th Division/ Najaf
- G. 10th Division/ Sayyid Al-Shuhada'
- H. 14th Division/ Al-Imam Husayn
- I. 16th Division/ Al-Quds
- J. 17th Division/ 'Ali Bin Abu-Talib
- K. 19th Division/ Fajr
- L. 25th Division/ Karbala'
- M. 27th Division/ Muhammad Rasulallah
- N. 31st Division/ 'Ashura'
- O. 41st Division/ Tha'rallah

2- Brigades

- A. 212th Hamzah
- B. 18th Al-Ghadir
- C. 21st Imam Al-Rida
- D. 33rd Al-Mahdi
- E. 48th Fath
- F. 57th Abu Al-Fadl

Divisions and Brigades of the Army

1- Divisions

- A. 21st Infantry Division/ Hamzah
- B. 28th Infantry Division/ Sanandaj
- C. 30th Infantry Division/ GarGan
- D. 77th Infantry Division/ Khurasan
- E. 64th Infantry Division/Arumiyah
- F. 84th Infantry Division/ Khurm Abad
- G. 16th Infantry Division/ Qazwin
- H. 81st Infantry Division/ Karmanshah
- I. 88th Infantry Division/ Zahdan
- J. 92nd Infantry Division/ Al-Ahwaz
- K. 23rd Infantry Division/ Nawhad
- L. 58th Infantry Division/ Dhu-al-Fiqar

2- Brigades

- A. 25th Commandoes Brigade
- B. 35th Commandoes Brigade
- C. 37th Brigade/ Shiraz
- D. 40th Brigade/ Sarab
- E. 45th Commandoes Brigade
- F. 55th Paratroop Brigade
- G. 65th Special Forces Brigade

What kind of Brigades are they, Infantry? Armored? Or what?

Ramadan Headquarters

1- Main Headquarters of Nasr in Iranian Naqdah City

Commander/ Hurmati/ was assigned instead of Sukkari

Tasks/ inspecting the situation north of Iraq

Penetrate the Kurdish organizations within the Northern Area of the country

Dominating the borders by cooperating with military sectors and controlling smuggling

Following up the Iranian Kurdish and recruiting agents to penetrate the Iranian opposition.

2- Diyana Headquarters in Irbil Governorate (Main)

Commander/ Sayyid Rashid

Location/ Next to Jalil Al-Fayli house

Tasks/ chasing the Iraqi Kurdish parties

Penetrate the Iranian opposition

Recruiting agents and send them in and out of the country

Officers/ Agha Husayn, Agha Ahmadi, Rahmani, Hashimi, Tabrizi, Muhsini, Lieutenant Colonel

Mahdi, Captain Majidi, Lieutenant Colonel Rahman, Ilyasi, Sajadi, Husayn 'Ali Zadah.

3- Ramadan Branch Headquarters in Irbil City, at house of criminal 'Abbas Bawil (Branch)

Location/ between the old and new Diyana Bridge

Commander/ Majidi

Vehicles/ Military Land Cruiser, without a plate number

4- Ramadan Branch Headquarters in Al-Sulaymaniyyah Governorate

Location/ Al-'Aqari Neighborhood, next 'Ali Naji Hospital

Commander/ Gilani

Assistant/ 'Abd-al-Rahman Sadiqi Wamiza'i

Vehicles/ Red Corolla

5- Ramadan Headquarters in Irbil (1)

Location/ Shaqlawah

No. of the individuals/ 28-30 persons

6- Ramadan Headquarters in Irbil (2)

Location/ Khayrawa, Northern Photograph Laboratory

No. of the individuals/ 16-17 persons

7- Ramadan Headquarters in Irbil (3)

Location/ Al-'Arabi Headquarters

8- Ramadan Headquarters in Ranya District

Location/ Ahmad Salih Bik House

9- Main Headquarters of Ramadan in Al-Sulaymaniyyah Governorate

Location/ Bakhtyari Subdivision

Commander/ As'adi

Vehicles/ Two white and red Land Cruiser cars

10- Ramadan Headquarters in Al-Sulaymaniyyah: Established in DEC 1994 instead of Salah-al-Din Resort Headquarters, belonging to Ramadan Headquarters in Karmanshah (Al-Zafr)

11- Headquarters in Dahlaran City: Called Al-Fajr Mobilizing Headquarters, belonging to Al-Fajr Main Headquarters in Al-Ahwaz. Its Commander is Asadi who is a former guard's officer.

12- Ramadan Headquarters in Shaqlawah: Next to Al-Arzad Hotel

13- Al-Fajr Main Headquarters in Al-Ahwaz: Southern Sector
Commander/ Ahmad Faruzandah

14- Al-Zafr Headquarters in Karmanshah City: it is in charge of the area located from Qasir Shirin till the South of Mahran
Commander/ Shahla'i, who was commander of Nasr Headquarters in Naqdah City

The Intelligence Division of Guards General Staff inspects all Ramadan Headquarters under command of Guard Brigadier General Muhammad 'Ali Ja'fari, known by Sahrawardi. He is a well known terrorist, supervised the terrorist operations inside and outside the area, especially against the Iranian opposition leaders. The General Commander of Ramadan Command is Guard Brigadier General is Muhammad Karmi and his deputy Dibraby.

Intelligence

A. A Headquarters in Al-Sulaymaniyyah Governorate

Location/ Salim Street

Officers/ Isma'il Mahdi, Majid, Rahman Rahim Ma'ruf, Hamzah Ahmad Rahimi, Tuwan Muhammad Dashti

Commander As'adi

Vehicles/ Red Brazilian car and two Land Cruiser with plate No. Baghdad 54751 and 58 (SATTS B.K)

Building/ two floors with nut-brown color

Guards/ 2

B. Intelligence Headquarters in Shaqlawah next to Shahrazad Hotel

C. Intelligence Headquarters in Qasbah Sankar of Qal'at Dhurah including Iraqi agents

D. Intelligence Headquarters in 'Ibadan within Al-Maydan Area next to Police Station No. 3, including one floor and 10 persons

E. Intelligence Headquarters in Al-Falahiyyah, Khumayni Street, including officers Ahmad Sanjari and Kazim Mawlawi. It is a house of two floors

F. Intelligence Check point of Daruri included three to five persons camouflaged as customs

G. Several houses in Irbil Governorate, considered as nests for the Iranian Intelligence

H. Small headquarters in Tawilah, Sayyid Sadiq and Jiwar Qurnah

Page 126

3- Iranian Intelligence Divisions interested in Iraqi affairs

- A. Intelligence Division in Western Adhrabayjan and Iranian Kurdistan
- B. Immigration Headquarters in Yarah Center directed by Sayyid Agha
- C. Al-Ra'd Headquarters in Waywan Center
- D. Sanandaj Intelligence Division

4- Nasr Staff Committee interested in coordination of the Iraqi opposition's affairs

Page 127

Secret and Personal

(SATTS N.M).11

Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

(SATTS M)

(SATTS :)

Sir: Director of the 2nd Division
Subject: Iranian Intelligence Headquarters

According to the discussion with you, I would like to report to you our information about the Iranian intelligence headquarters in the northern area that is dominated by saboteurs and traitors. There are nine main and secondary headquarters within Al-Sulaymaniyyah and Irbil Governorates, and they are as follows:

1. Intelligence headquarters belonging to Ramadan Headquarters in Al-Sulaymaniyyah Governorate, established at the end of 1994 after closing Salah-al-Din Headquarters. It is an important headquarters, very active and frequently visited by many agents and officials of the regime.
2. Iranian intelligence headquarters in Al-Sulaymaniyyah Governorate, Bakhtiyari Subdivision, and its in charge is called Sa'idi. It included two Land Cruiser vehicles, the first white one with a plate No. 54751 and the second red one with plate No. 58 (SATTS B.K).
3. Ramadan Headquarters in Diyana City where Sayyid Rashid is in charge, and located next to the house of criminal Jalil Al-Fayli and the Supreme Council location.
4. Intelligence headquarters in Irbil, Tabrawah Subdivision, and Exportation North Laboratory.
5. Headquarters in Ranyah, in front of the petrol station. House of criminal Ahmad Salih Bik
6. Small locations in Halabjah, Tawilah and Sayyid Sadiq.
7. We are actually planning to attack one of these headquarters, which consist of fulfilling information about the concerned location. So we suggest the following:

Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

(SATTS M)

(SATTS :)

Sir:
Subject:

Assign Al-Ta'mim Intelligence Directorate to collect information on targets mentioned within Paragraphs 1 and 2 for their importance, entrance and exit gates for the location, the locations, timing, armament of the guard points and diagram of the site. Any other useful information to decide selecting the suggested source starting (TC: the rest of the sentence is covered in black)

What you see fit...Best regards

(Signature)
Khalil Isma'il
Director of the 1st Section
31 MAY

To Director of the 1st Section

1- We confirm the opinion, inform the Director of Al-Ta'mim and assign the very trusted sources to collect the information.

2- Coordinate with Section of the Kurdish in the 5th Department to know their information about these Headquarters and request them to assign their trusted sources to collect the information.

3- Coordinate with Comrade 'Abbas to know who can be assigned to collect information of the Iranian opposition sources.

I hope you will remember that it is one of our main tasks, and it is very useful to coordinate with M5 regarding this issue to have accurate information and procedures.

We are looking forward to experienced efforts and good results from you and your companions.



01 JUN 1995

The Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service

(TC: Logo of Iraqi Intelligence Service)

Military
Notification 5th Division



10 APR


Ref: 468
Date: 09 APR 1995
Notification

To: 1st Section

The representative of the Iranian Mujahidi Khalq Organization provided us with information regarding the identity of four individuals belonging to the regime (TC: Iranian Regime) who came from Qasr Shirin to Al-Sulaymaniyyah to meet with Al-Talibani as follows:

On 28 JAN 1995 a group of agents of the Ministry of Intelligence headed from Masif Salah-al-Din to Al-Sulaymaniyyah along with a group from Al-Talibani to meet Banu- Shayrwan Mustafa. On 01 FEB 1995 a delegation comprised of four individuals from the regime (TC: Iranian Regime) headed to Al-Sulaymaniyyah and they stayed there 5-6 days. Al-Talibani met with the representative of the US Government in Kurdistan-Iraq before he met with the others. Later he asked for a meeting with Juwad Ja'fari, the Commander of Ramadan Headquarters to discuss with the representative of the regime (TC: Iranian Regime) the American plot against Iraq. They agreed to deny Al-Talibani Group, KDP from broadcasting any news for one month of this date.


For your information ... regards



Director of the Directorate 4/ Division 2/2
09 APR

Mr. Khalil

To be archived with the related documents



10 APR

582
10 APR

The Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service

(Logo of Iraqi Intelligence Service)
Secret and Urgent

Ref: 287


Date: 19 FEB 1995

Notification

To: 5th Division

A reliable source informed us with the following:

- 1- Khamini'i issued a circular asking the staff of Nasr Headquarters to get prior permission before they enter the Iraqi territories even if they were members of the Ministry of Intelligence.
- 2- The in-charge of the Iraqi Affairs Muhammadi who is directly connected to Khamini'i was appointed as the representative of Khamini'i in all the Governorates found on the borders. He supervises everything related to Iraq and he is authorized to nominate representatives in the governorates where he appointed the so-called 'Azimi who is the Commander of Amir-al-Mu'minin Brigade as a representative at Ilam Governorate.
- 3- The in-charge of Al-Jihad Office of the Amal Islamic Organization, the criminal Al-Shaykh Baghdadi said
 - 1- Carrying out operations against Mujahidi Khalq inside Iraq is a religious obligation...

Received by hand from the 5th Administrative Division  09 FEB

The Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service


(Logo of Iraqi Intelligence Service)

Notification

... and that the Islamic Amal-Forces are assigned to strike Mujahidi Khalq whenever they get the chance. He added that members of his Organization were constantly visiting Iraq and they were collecting information about Mujahidi Khalq and referring it to the Khomeini Guards

4-Muhammadi (concerned person) is the only authorized person of the Iraqi Opposition affairs and is in-charge of Badr Corps. He coordinates with the criminal Al-Hakim while the other major decisions are strictly taken by Khamini'i. Furthermore Muhammadi visited London to attend one of the Iraqi Opposition assemblies and he conducted meetings with some of their leaders. Kan'ani Miqdam works as a deputy of Muhammadi.

5- Al-'Amal Al-Islami Organization belongs to the Ministry of Intelligence and the speaker of the Organization Abu-Juwad Al-'Attar has relations with Muhammadi and he frequently visits Nasr Headquarters... with regards.



Director of Directorate/ Division 2/1

Ahmad Zaki

19 FEB



19 FEB

16 FEB 1995

Thursday

Information

This information was received by our reliable sources so it is confirmed.

- 1- Imam 'Ali Brigade and Hamzah Brigade of the Badr Corps were transferred from Karmanshah to the Southern Sector to participate in the operations carried out against Iraq. Four bodies were transferred from these brigades to Karmanshah.
- 2- Orders were issued by Khamini'i for the individuals entering Iraq to take prior permission from Nasr Headquarters even if they were associated to the Ministry of Intelligence.
- 3- Muhammadi who is In-charge of the Iraqi Affairs and is directly connected to Khamini'i was appointed as the representative of Khamini'i in all the Governorates found on the borders. He supervises everything related to Iraq and he is authorized to nominate representatives in the governorates where he appointed the so-called 'Azimi who is the Commander of Amir-al-Mu'minin Brigade as a representative at Ilam Governorate.
- 4- The person in-charge of Al-Jihad Office of the Amal Islamic Organization, the criminal Al-Shaykh Baghdadi said that carrying out operations against Mujahidi Khalq inside Iraq is a religious obligation and that the Islamic Amal-Forces are assigned to strike Mujahidi Khalq whenever they get the chance. He added that members of his Organization were constantly visiting Iraq and they were collecting information about Mujahidi Khalq, their camps, deployment and addresses then referring it to the Khomeini Guards.
- 5- We were informed by our source that the forces of Badr Corps were frequently visiting all regions and cities of Iraq without any problem. They are supported by Khomeini Government and Nasr Headquarters to infiltrate from any of the Iraqi border sectors. The source confirmed that the military operations against Mujahidin Khalq inside Iraq were being carried out by Badr Corps or it is considered as one of their tasks.
- 6- The routes used to infiltrate Iraq are generally related to weather conditions but the Northern Sector is considered as the best and safest area for infiltration in comparison to the south. Therefore the Northern and Middle Sectors could be used in crossing large forces but the Southern Sector is strategic to the enemy. So if we get close to Al-Basrah we could supervise the Southern Area of Iraq and the Ahwaz route can be used to enter Al-Basrah Area.
- 7- Agha Muhammadi is the only authorized person in the Iraqi Opposition affairs and is in-charge of Badr Corps. He coordinates with the criminal Al-Hakim while the other major decisions are strictly made by Khamna'i who is the immediate boss of Agha Muhammadi.

To be continued

Few days ago Agha Mohammadi visited London to attend the assembly held to unify the Iraqi Opposition Forces. He conducted meetings with opposition leaders. The deputy of Agha Mohammadi is Kan'ani Miqdam.

8- Al-'Amal Al-Islami Organization belongs to the Ministry of Intelligence and the speaker of the Organization Abu-Juwad Al-'Attar has relations with Mohammadi and he frequently visits Nasr Headquarters.

9- There were unusual activities at Hamiyah Muntazri, the Headquarters of the Guards Missile Unit Command in the Middle Sector where units of the 7th Hadid Missile Brigade are found. The Missile Unit is getting ready to execute assigned orders.

Remark: Nasr Headquarters or Nasr Staffs is different from Nasr Headquarters located in Iran and is called Iraqi Affairs Committee (The headquarters of Nasr Staffs for Iraqi Affairs is at Karmanshah).

The necessary actions have been taken by Mr. Majid

In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

The Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service

(Logo of Iraqi Intelligence Service)

Secret

Ref: 2727
Date 24 OCT 1994

To: Directorate 5/ 1/ 1

A reliable source informed us of the following:

- 1- The criminal Mas'ud Al-Barazani discussed during his visit to Iran with the Iranian Regime the opening of borders between Iran and the Northern Area.
 - 2- There were some Iranian Intelligence Officers with the criminal Ahmad Al-Jalabi including the Major 'Abdallah Shabbar from Al-Najaf who was identified by our source.
 - 3- The Iranian Regime laid mines along the borders with the Northern Area fearing from the infiltrators of the Northern Area. Two explosions recently went off due to the pass of escaping families to Iran.
 - 4- The Iranian Intelligence deported 20 persons from Iran to the Northern Area after the 1991 Rebellion (Page of Treason and Treachery) because they did not have the Green Card Pass.
- For your information ... regards



Director of the Directorate 5/ 8
24 OCT 1994

Copy to:
4th Directorate/ 2nd Division/ 1 for your information regards

Please take the necessary action
30 OCT

Mr. Khalil
The highlighted paragraphs to be forwarded to the 5th Division
To be logged with original documents



30 OCT

3rd Section/2235
20 OCT

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)

(Logo of the IIS)

Secret

Date: 05 DEC 1994

Ref.:2240

Notification M4 / 2

To: M5

We were informed of the following from a source whose trust degree is good:

1- On 23 NOV 1994, the so-called Shahla'i Commander of Nasr Headquarters in Naqdah related to Ramadan Operations Headquarters conducted a short visit to Salah-al-Din resort in Irbil. He returned through borders of the Iranian Bawah city heading Karmanshah Governorate, where he and his deputy (Harmati) were called to attend a conference conducted by 'Ali Falahyat Minister of Iranian Intelligence. Governor of Karmanshah, Governor of 'Aylam, and Military Commanders. We do not know the details of the conference.

2- Shahla'I returned to Salah-al-Din resort Irbil governorate after the conference ended and it is possible that the Iranian regime will strike headquarters of the opposition.

(1-2)

Secret

Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service

(SATTS M)

(SATTS :)

To: Head of Department

Subject: Information

We would like to inform you with the following:

- 1- We received information from Mujahidin-e Khalq Organization indicating that Iranian Minister of Intelligence visited Karmanshah Governorate on 15 NOV 1994 and conducted a conference. Governor of Karmanshah, Governor of 'Aylam, and Military Commanders attended the conference. Moreover, Shahla'i Commander of Nasr Headquarters in Naqdah and his deputy Harmati were requested to attend the conference and he returned to Salah-al-Din resort in Irbil after the end of the conference.
- 2- We believe that the visit of 'Ali Falahyan to Karmanshah Governorate is for coordination and taking precautions due to the importance of the sector where the Iranian opposition exists. It is possible that the Iranian Regime will strike headquarters of the Iranian opposition especially the Kurdish within this month.

Kindly acknowledge and we are waiting for your orders to transfer the information to M4/5 and M5... best regards

(Signature)

Hamid Salih Khidir

14 DEC 1994

To: Director of the section

Kindly acknowledge and we are waiting for your orders to circulate the notification...best regards



Chief of the 3rd Department

05 DEC 1994

In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate
(Crest of the Republic)

Embassy of Republic of Iraq
Tehran
Military Attaché Department
Ref.: (SATTS =) / 1268
Date: 20 NOV 1993

Kindly refer to the complete number
Stamp of the incoming

Secret

To: Relations Section
Subject: Follow up

Following to our memo (SATTS =) / 1183 on 30 OCT 1993, we would like to inform you of the following:

- 1- On 14 JUL 1993, Rafsanjani visited the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and met all workers there
- 2- On 01 SEP 1993, Rafsanjani met the Minister of Intelligence and all the cadre of the Ministry in the building of Presidency of the Republic as we mentioned in our abovementioned memo
- 3- The purpose of the visit mentioned in paragraph (A) above is as follows:
 - a. Acknowledge the achievements carried out by the Ministry of Intelligence in providing security for the citizens, where the Minister Falahyan acknowledged him on the achievements
 - b. Commending the efforts carried out by cadre of the ministry in facing any sabotage activity
 - c. Emphasis on the achievements of the revolution which is the responsibility of the ministry
 - d. Congratulate the workers in the ministry for their success

Kindly acknowledge...best regards

(1-1)
Secret

*What are the achievements?
1669 on 28 NOV, 3rd Department
Al-Sayyid Salim
Kindly take the necessary actions
28 NOV
Archived
10 NOV*



*Illegible
27 NOV*



To: Head of the 3rd Department

Subject: Visit

Enclosed is the memo of Tehran station regarding the visit of Rafsanjani to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence on 14 JUL 1993, where he praised the efforts carried out by cadre of the ministry in facing the sabotage activities. He emphasized maintaining the achievements of the revolution, knowing that the Minister Falahyan acknowledged Rafsanjani on the achievements of his Ministry in providing security to the citizens.

Kindly acknowledge and log the mentioned information because it is opened and known and not new

Best regards

(Signature)

Salim Muhammad Nahi

30 NOV 1993

To: Head of the Section

Kindly acknowledge and the information is from open sources, waiting for your orders ... best regards

Deputy Director of the 3rd Department

30 NOV 1993



I acknowledged and the information is not new and it is the same as the mentioned in the media

To be logged

30 NOV



For fear of down falling by the National Liberation Army power
Rafsanjani emphasis on securing the borders

Khomeini regime radio stated that Rafsanjani expressed in his speech in the meeting of Commanders of Security and Intelligence within the Regime Security Forces, his deep concern for the enemy attempts to disturb the security and stability in the country. Moreover, he emphasized the serious responsibility of the regime security forces and military forces in protecting the borders.

A spokesperson from Al-Mujahidin described these declarations by Rafsanjani yesterday as a confirmation of the regime fears of increasing Iranian resistance, its military and political achievements, and the widening public's welcome to Al-Mujahidin.

The spokesperson stated: declarations of Rafsanjani clearly express the worry of Al-Malali (TC Malali means Clergy men) as they are collapsing by the power Iranian National Liberation Army; especially this speech coincides with the approval of an abusive draft law by council against employees of the government during the last week and authorize the Minister of Interior to control the Regime Security Forces.

He added, due to the drop of economical situation, increase of people's dissatisfaction and internal conflict in the regime. The Malali are in a critical situation and have no way out of it; consequently, they are very terrified of their certain down fall.

It is worth to mention that resistance leader Al-Sayyid Mas'ud Rajwi described the land-air "Shining Sun" training at the beginning of October for four days as a good step in preparation for the end of the regime. The training was conducted by the participation of army aviation units, tanks, mechanized infantry, and artillery related to Liberation Army.

(Crest of the Republic)

Embassy of the Republic of Iraq
Commercial Department
Tehran
Ref.: (SATTS =) / 1183
Date: 30 OCT 1993

Secret

To: Relations Section

Subject: Response

In reference to your memo No. 2 /1/ 353 on 08 SEP 1993, we would like to inform you with the following:

- 1- On 01 SEP 1993, Rafsanjani received Iranian Minister of Intelligence and the officials in the ministry, where the meeting was in Office of Presidency of the Republic and not in headquarters of the ministry as mentioned in our memo.
- 2- The purpose of receiving the mentioned individuals is as follows:
 - a. Urge the workers in ministries to maintain security and stability inside and protect the revolution
 - b. Confirm that Ministry of Intelligence and Internal Security Forces are responsible for protecting the revolution and its objectives
 - d. Take precautions and being ready for facing any internal or external enemy

The source / report about the public relation for Presidency of the Republic



(SATTS R. : =)

(1-1)

Secret

Negotiation took place with director of the 1st Section and to be logged in the database

06 NOV

Al-Sayyid Salim


Kindly take the necessary actions

04 NOV

Registered 1551

04 NOV

3rd Department



Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service

(Logo of IIS)

Date: 03 AUG 1993

Ref.: M4 / Dep.2/ 7/3/1527

Notification

To: M4/5

We were informed with the following:

- 1- 150 individuals from Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Iran participated in the ceremonies of 'Ashura' Commemoration that the Iranian Embassy held in Sweden
- 2- There are many Iraqis in Denmark whom the Iranian Embassy tries to mobilize within an organization financed by Iran and using them as agents for the Iranian Intelligence.



M4. M Dep2/1

03 AUG 1993

Salim

03 AUG

'Ali

04 AUG

Yahya

03 AUG

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service

(Logo of IIS)

Date: 01 AUG 1993

Ref.: 1069

Secret

Notification

To: 1st Section

Representative of Mujahidin-e Khalq provided us with the following information:

1- On 13 JUL 1993, Rafsanjani visited the Ministry of Iranian Intelligence, this visit is considered a business visit where he delivered a speech in the mentioned ministry and this event were transmitted by mass media of the regime.

2- During the meeting between a member of the organization and one of the Iraqis who intends to go from Sweden to Denmark, he stated that he participated in the ceremonies of 'Ashura' that was held by the Iranian Embassy in Stockholm. Moreover, 150 individuals from Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Iran participated in the ceremonies. In addition, the Iraqi added that his uncle was affiliated to Al-Da'wah Party but he was executed 10 years ago in Iraq. He confirmed that there are many Iraqis living in Denmark and the Iranian embassy is trying to recruit them in an organization financed by Iran and use them as agents for the embassy. He stated that living out side Iraq will create terrorism and if it is guaranteed that h will not be executed when he return, he will go back. And that is the desire of most of the Iraqis, Kindly acknowledge... best regards



Director of Dep. 2/12/8

(1-1)

Secret

The intelligence, making best use of paragraph (1) and refer paragraph (2) to the inimical activity



01 AUG

Paragraph (1) is to be logged to Al-Sayyid Salim Muhammad Al-Tahi and take the necessary actions for paragraph (2)



02 AUG

1345 / 01 AUG

M3



Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service

(Logo of IIS)

Date: 16 JUL 1995

Ref.: M4/2/2/883

Secret

Notification

To: 1st Section

In reference to your notification No. 640 on 04 APR 1995, Representative of the Iranian Mujahidin-e Khalq Organization that there is no serious disagreements between Rafsanjani and Falahyan who has a lot of authority because he is Minister of Intelligence and a member of Ministers Council. All the ministries in the regime are supporting the activity and operations of the Ministry of Intelligence as they support the regime in direct and indirect way. The western media focused on the rumors about the disagreements or escape of Rafsanjani, where this issue was not true and the mass media talked about a person named Manu (Illegible) Mu'tamir who had a collateral relation with the Ministry of Intelligence.

Kindly acknowledge...best regards



M4 M Dep. 2/2

15 JUL 1995

To Mr. Khalil to take the necessary actions

3rd Department

19 JUL



Archived

1355 / 16 JUL

3rd Department / Khalil / escape of Falahyan

With the original documents

16 JUL



Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service
Notification


Iraqi Intelligence Service
Secret

(SATTS N. M)/ 4

Date/ / 14
04 APR 1995
Ref / 640

To / 2nd Section


Following your memo numbered 588 on 29 MAR 1995, we were informed of the following:
During the era which preceded the rumors of Falahiyan's escape outside Iran, it was circulated among the Iranian governmental departments that Falahiyan was performing beyond his authority. Sometimes he was bypassing the authorities (Supreme Council for National Security). These incidents led to disagreements between him and Rafsanjani. For your information and kindly verify what was mentioned above specially the issue of disagreement with Rafsanjani and inform us...with appreciation.



Director of the M4, Division 1/2
04 APR 1995

Yahya
04 APR

Respected Head of the 3rd Department
The memo was reviewed and the Respected Director of the 1st Section requested to verify this information with (TC: Illegible), with appreciation.



04 APR

Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service

(SATTS N. M.) 11

Directorate

Section

Respected General Director of the M4
Subject: - Phone-Call

We would like to inform Your Excellency of the following:

1. The international news media recently circulated news related to the escape of the Iranian Minister of Intelligence 'Ali Falahiyan outside Iran. After verifying this news with the Iranian opposition groups inside and outside the state (TC: Iraq), it was clear that this news is incorrect. The respected Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service reviewed the subject on time.

2. We requested our stations in Tehran, Islamabad, Qatar and Istanbul to verify this news. The Tehran based station responded that Falahiyan escaped to the United States from Germany when he was attending a secret meeting with an Israeli delegation there. The Tehran based station was provided with this information by the Tunisian Consul who obtained it from manager of one of the 1st class hotels in Tehran.

3. In order to verify the information from our sources who are directly affiliated with the center, we suggest the following:

An approval of your Excellency to place two phone-calls between Baghdad and Paris with two of our sources in France.

Anticipating your instructions...with appreciation




Director of the 2nd Division
09 MAR 1995

Khalil
08 MAR

11 MAR

Yahya
08 MAR

Approved



08 MAR

From: Iran
To: Intelligence
Division 2/1/3

Message Form
Cipher

No: 42
Date: 07 MAR 1995

Mr. Khalil

Perform necessary actions immediately

*With the related documents and we can not
comment on it. It is required to call
(Qurah Kazlu and Mujtaba) for
conclusive verification.*



06 MAR

Your letter numbered 25 on 28 FEB 1995; the information related to the asylum of Falahiyan was verified. Falahiyan did not apply for asylum in one of the neighboring countries. He applied to asylum in the United States and he went there from Germany. He was a head of an Iranian delegation that was negotiating with the Israeli delegation in Bonn. This was the subject of our memo numbered (SATTS D)2/1/1/226 on 26 FEB 1995. The United States of America was able to influence the mentioned individual during the talks held last year in Bonn. The United States of America seduced him with money and offered guaranties to protect him from any threat. The mentioned individual possessed vital information related to the Iranian nuclear energy and terrorism. Falahiyan traveled to United States along with the Israeli delegation with which he was negotiating with. (TC: Text blacked-out) our side and he obtained it from manager of one of the 1st class hotels in Tehran. This manager obtained it from the Iranian Intelligence officers performing surveillance inside the hotel's rooms. These officers confirmed to the manager that the regime sentenced Falahiyan with death penalty and a special squad will eliminate him. Ended

Time of Receipt /
Date of Receipt /

72
07 MAR

Signature: 
Position: (SATTS M) 1 / Cipher
Date: 07 MAR 1995

Stamp of the Iraqi Intelligence Service

910

Respected Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service
Subject / Iranian Intelligence Minister

Your enclosed instructions that were given on 28 FEB 1995 about a statement of one of the former officials in the Iranian Intelligence regarding the escape of Iranian Intelligence Minister outside Iran, we would like to inform you the following:

1. We are indicated that the Iranian television showed an interview of the mentioned minister. This interview was done on 18 JAN 1995. After the news related to his escape came out, this interview was re-shown thrice. During this interview he spoke about Iran's struggle with economical problems.
2. The representatives of the Iranian opposition groups mentioned that this news was circulated by the news media and was quoted from (Daily Telegraph, Times and Washington Post) which indicated that one of the Iranian refugees declared the escape of the mentioned minister. The Iranian opposition groups agreed on the incorrectness of this news. We are following this issue with our stations abroad.
3. Information on Manujahr Mu'tamir who declared the escape of the mentioned minister is as follows:
 - A. He was born in Asfahan City in 1955. He is married and has (4) sons.
 - B. He is one of the employees of the Ministry of Intelligence. He was previously assigned (TC: Continued on next page)

(1 - 2)

He was previously assigned to work outside Iran between the years 1988 and 1993 using different covers.

C. His name was mentioned for the first time after the explosion of the Jews Center in Buenos Aires during last year. He claimed that he has information on the activities of a terrorist regime.

D. He is currently living in the United States, North Carolina, San Jose State.

E. He entered Turkey illegally along with his family in MAR 1994. He then traveled to Cuba. The employees of the regime's embassy (TC: Iranian regime embassy) arrested him in Havana and transferred him to the regime's embassy in Venezuela in order to transfer him easily from there to Iran by air. However, the mentioned minister was able to escape and he took a refuge in a branch of the United Nations in Venezuela. The United States agreed to grant him political asylum; several press interviews were done with him.

For your information...with appreciation



General Director of M4
06 MAR 1995

I reviewed



07 MAR

Khalil

05 MAR

Yahya

05 MAR

Khalil

05 MAR

07 MAR

(TC: Illegible)

06 MAR

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service
Notification

Logo of the Iraqi Intelligence Service

Secret

Date/ /14

03 MAR 1995

Ref / 303

To / 1st Section

Intelligence; Related documents and review because it was confirmed that he is still in Iran as an interview was done with him.



03 MAR

Your memo number 314 on 25 FEB 1995, the news related to the escape of the Iranian Intelligence Minister was verified and the results are as follows:

1. The representative of the Iranian (SATTS H. D. K) confirmed that the news was circulated by the international news media and was quoted from the following newspapers (Daily Telegraph, Time Magazine issued in London and Washington Post). These newspapers stated that one of the Iranian refugees in America declared the escape of Falahiyan. The party (TC: could probably be Al-Ba'th Party) called its agents inside but the news was not verified.
2. A phone call was placed with the Iranian citizen Sayyid Jamil Al-Husayni and with (3) of his agents in Sanandaj Area. These individuals confirmed the news (TC: Continued on next page).

(1 – 2)

Secret

Mr. Khalil

Kindly take necessary actions



04 MAR

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service
Notification


Logo of the Iraqi Intelligence Service

Secret

Date/// 14
/// 19
Ref /

These individuals confirmed the news and mentioned that the minister was arrested before his escape. They also assured that there were disagreements between Falahiyan and officials of the regime.

3. The representative of the Mujahidi Al-Khalq Organization explained that the news is untrue. He also stated that an individual named Manujahar Al-Mu'tamid, who is living in the United States, declared that the mentioned minister escaped but the Iranian media showed an interview of Falahiyan on 18 JAN 1995 in order to falsify this news. This interview was re-shown three times. In this interview, Falahiyan spoke about the economical problems faced by the regime. For your information...with appreciation

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be a stylized name or set of initials, enclosed within a large, hand-drawn oval.

On behalf of / Director of the 2nd Section
03 MAR 1995

(2 - 2)
Secret

In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate
Top Secret and Private

Ref: (SATTS H) / 1311
Date: 22 FEB 1996

To / Respected Director of the M4
Subject / Information

We obtained the following information on Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP):

Follow is the content of the telegraph of (TC: Text Blacked-out) for your kind information:

According to the information that I obtained, the Iranian opened headquarters in Al-Sulaymaniyyah City near the house of (Nisharwan) and near the cross road of (Sirinjar). This headquarters belongs to the Iranian Intelligence (Itila'at) and consist of two committees.

1. Committee that monitor the individuals in charge of the Iranian Opposition. In-charge of this committee is (Aghayi Banayi)
2. Committee that monitor the humanitarian organizations (UN). In-charge of this committee is (Aghayi Ja'fari).

According to the information, the Jalal Al-Talibani's Group assigned two of its intelligence personnel in (TC: Continued on next page)

(1 – 2)

Top Secret and Private


According to the information, the Jalal Al-Talibani's Group assigned two of its intelligence personnel in Qarar Gah (Headquarters) Mariwan in order to monitor our relationships in Mariwan and to monitor our comrades and to inform (Iran) about them. These comrades are affiliated with a special organization and they come from Iran to the resort. These comrades are as follows:

1. Siyamand Muhammad Karim / One of the inhabitants of Al-Sulaymaniyyah City
2. Ghazi Ahmad Sufi / One of the inhabitants of Kalar City

(SATTS W) / 1000

(SATTS T) / 2/21

For your information...with appreciation



On Behalf of the General Director of M17

24 FEB

1st Section, to be logged with original documents and to be followed-up



24 JAN

Mr. Salim

To be forwarded to Mr. Khalil to follow-up the information.

Inform the 5th Division and M5 about the information



24 FEB 1996

It was utilized by the Head of the (SATTS =. M. M.)

(2 - 2)

Top Secret and Private

Registered

Military

Notification of M5 and 5th Division



20 APR

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service
Notification: M5/11/2/3

Logo of the Iraqi Intelligence Service
Secret

(SATTs N. M) /4

Date/ / 14
11 APR 1996
Ref / 862

To / M4/2/1


After interrogating one of the prisoners of war who returned from Iran, we obtained the following information:

Agents of the Iranian Intelligence are as follows:

A. Iraqi citizen Sayyid Ghazi Al-'Alawi, one of the inhabitants of Al-'Imarah Area. He currently resides in Al-Khafajiyah Area. He is representative of what is known as the Supreme Council in Al-Khafajiyah. He frequently visits the Itila'at in Al-Khafajiyah.

B. Iraqi citizen Sayyid Mijbil Al-Ma'lan, one of the inhabitants of Al-'Imarah Area. He currently resides in Al-Khafajiyah Area. He works for the Ministry of Itila'at. He frequently visits the state (TC: Iraq) to perform tasks for the Iranian Intelligence.

For your information....with appreciation



On Behalf of the Director of M5/11
10 APR 1996

CC

M5/11/2/1...with appreciation

Mr. Khalil

Kindly take necessary actions



Head of the 3rd Department
21 APR 1996

3rd Department

Secret

Registered

Military

Notification of M5 and 5th Division



20 APR

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service
Notification: M5/11/2/3

Logo of the Iraqi Intelligence Service
Secret

(SATTS N. M) /4

Date/ / / 14
11 APR 1996
Ref / 864

To / M4/2/1

After interrogating two prisoners of war who returned from Iran on 30 MAR 1996, we obtained the following information:

Following is information on individuals working for what is known as the Staff Command of the Supreme Council:

1. Staff Major 'Ali Fikri –prisoner of war – one of the inhabitants of Al-Basrah. He previously worked in the 49th Naval Brigade.
2. Staff Lieutenant Colonel 'Adnan; he is a prisoner of war and one of the inhabitants of Al-Basrah. He is a former Commander of a regiment of the 66th Special Force Brigade.
3. Lieutenant Colonel Shahir "Abu-'Abdallah)
4. Lieutenant Colonel Abu-Ghasan

The task of this command is to assign commanders of regiments in Badr Corps to courses related to the tasks of the staff.

For your information...with appreciation



On Behalf of the Director of M5/11
10 APR 1996

CC

M5/11/2/1...with appreciation

Mr. Khalil

Kindly take necessary actions



APR 1996

Secret

Page 270

The Intelligence
Presenting Information
Ref.: 400
Date: 26 FEB 1996
Notification
M5/8/3/2

Secret



To / M4 Dept. 2/1

28 FEB

One of our sources provided us with the following information about the headquarters of Qarar Kah, Ramadan and Al-Hamzah in addition to the new procedures issued by the Ministry of Information in this matter:

- 1- The main headquarters is located in Karaminshah on Nusud - Yawah road and is headed by the Iranian Shahruri Shahla'i known as Aghay Shahla'i. A while back, a decision was issued by the Ministry of Information appointing Haji Hunayfi, who is in charge of Qarar Kah Al-Hamzah, as in charge of running both headquarters with all of their aspects.
- 2- Muhammad Ja'far known as Rahimi, who is in charge of the foreign affairs will handle the coordination with the Kurdish Parties in the North. He is assisted by Haji Mustafa and the main headquarters will be located in Naqrah on (Illegible) Road.
- 3- Merging all Food Distribution headquarters belonging to these two into one headquarters located in Khanah City near the asphalt Factory. Rida Quli will be in charge assisted by Nadir Yur a citizen of Saradasht.
- 4- Authorizing assassinations and terrorist acts in the North and Iraqi Governorates to the Iranian Ja'far Sahrawant helped by Akiri and 'Ayyawi.
- 5- Authorizing to grant Iranian entrance papers in both headquarters to the Iranian Aghay Hamdi and to all information platoons and cooperative members. Its headquarters will be in Naqrah.
- 6- The Iranian Ghalibi is in charge of the machinery in the two bases which was moved from Saradasht to Karwah Sur area.
- 7- Aghay 'Ala'i is in charge of the Administration in Naqrah Headquarters.

Please acknowledge. . With appreciation



M5/8 Director
25 FEB 1996

*Mr. Khalil for assessment
I think that what was reported has become public to the Kurds
In the northern area
The information source is (TC: Name is blacked out)
28 FEB 1996*

CC

M5/8/2 - Please acknowledge. . With appreciation

Khalil

256 / 28 FEB

(1-1)
Secret

In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service



Secret



Iraqi
Intelligence Service
IRIS

Ref.: 140/2/1/3/1277
Date: 18 AUG 1995

To / Presidency of the Republic – Secretary
Subject / Information

Our secret letter ref. number 140/2/1/3/864 on 29 MAR 1995.

- 1- The Intelligence Department of the Iranian Guard General Staff is supervising the command of Ramadan Headquarters. This Department is ran by the famous terrorist Guard Brigadier General Muhammad 'Ali Ja'fari who is known as Sahrawardi.
 - 2- Guard Brigadier General Muhammad Karmi was appointed Commander of Ramadan Command Headquarters and Doctor Sarayi as his Deputy.
 - 3- As for Al-Zafir Headquarters which was an Intelligence Office located in Karaminshah city and has a station in Qasr Shirin city which was abandoned a year ago, but work was reestablished when groups of saboteurs used it as temporary headquarters.
 - 4- The Iranian regime has recently opened a branch headquarters in Dahlaran city called Fajr Al-Ta'bawi which was a subsidiary for the main Fajr headquarters in the Southern Sector (Al-Ahwaz). An officer of the Guard Forces was assigned as the
- (TC: Continues on the next page)

(1-2)

Secret

In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service



Ref.:
Date:

Secret

Iraqi
Intelligence Service
IRIS

Commander of this headquarters and his name was Asadi. He also has other bases and stations along the borderline of that sector.

5- Sayyid Agha is responsible for Al-Hijrah Branch Headquarters in Yawah Area in addition to a small base in Nusud Area – Daw'ab Village

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be a stylized name.

Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service
17 AUG 1995

Khalil
15 AUG 1995

Hazim
15 AUG 1995

Khalil
15 AUG

Mu'ayyad
16 AUG 1995

Faruq
16 JAN

(2-2)
Secret

In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service



Secret



Iraqi
Intelligence Service
IRIS

Ref.:14/2/1/3/864
Date: 29 MAY 1995

To / Presidency of the Republic – Secretary
Subject / Information

Our letter number 140/2/1/3/766 on 11 MAR 1995

We have new information about the regime's headquarters in the North-West Sector of Iran:

1- Three intelligence systems are stationed in the mentioned sector and they are Hamzah Command Headquarters, Ramadan Command Headquarters and the Intelligence Department of West Azerbaijan and Iranian Kurdistan. The Head of Hamzah Headquarters is Guard Brigadier General Ahmad Kazimi.

2- There are a number of secondary headquarters for Nasr main headquarters in Naqrah such as Al-Hijrah Headquarters in Yawah area and Al-Ra'd Headquarters in Mariwan Area which are in charge of executing orders and work programs organized decided by Ramadan Operations Command in Naqrah.

(TC: Continues on the next page)

(1-2)

In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service



Ref.:
Date:

Secret

Iraqi
Intelligence Service
IRIS

The duties of a Branch Headquarters is to setup checkpoints, each within its boundaries, in addition to recruiting local members to help gather information on the activities of the Iranian Opposition Groups and the Iraqi situation, as well as providing support to the movements that are loyal to Iran in Northern Iraq.

3- In the mean time, Al-Ra'd Headquarters in Mariwan area has an active role in gathering information about the Iranian Kurdish Opposition through its relations with the Iraqi-Kurdish Groups.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be a stylized name.

Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service
29 MAR 1995

Khalid
27 MAY

Yahya
27 MAY

Khalil
27 MAY

Mu'ayyad
28 MAY

Faruq
28 MAY


(2-2)
Secret

Case Officer – Khalil Ibrahim Hammad

Written by Yahya 'Ali Jabr

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service



Mr. Khalil
To make use of the information
 23 JUN

24 JUN

Notification
M4 D2/2
Date: 22 JUN 1996
Ref.: 825

Secret

To / M5/1

A representative of the Iranian Opposition Groups provided us with the following information:

- 1- Members of the criminal Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim Group and Al-Da'wah Party instructed by Iran and under the cover of the Iranian Red Crescent are moving near the areas of Kalar, Irbil, Zakhu and Al-Sulaymaniyyah to gather information about the Iranian Opposition Groups.
- 2- A group of the Supreme Council has transported weapons from Iran to the PUK (Betrayal and Treason Corroborators). These weapons include Katushas, 120mm and 81mm mortars and 7 Dual DShK (Soviet 12.7mm heavy MG).
- 3- Two Lori vehicles are moving along the line of Bamu-Bashtah and Darbandakhan to transport the requirements of the traitor groups of Iran.
- 4- 50 members of Badr Corps are training in Salam Camp, as well as the existence of small groups in Hawrayn and Qaslan areas near Midan Mabu area.
- 5- The groups conspiring with Iran are holding meeting in the following places:
 - A. The Iranian Red Crescent Headquarters
 - B. The former prison of Al-Sulaymaniyyah which was transformed into a hospital by Iran, claiming that it holds the annual nursing training courses, while its actual objectives are to spy and commit sabotage. It is supervised by Iranian Women from Banat Zaynab Organization under the cover of the Iranian Red Crescent. The following vehicles are being used:
 - 1st: A 4 door white Toyota Pickup Truck with no license plate number.
 - 2nd: A white Land Cruiser with blue curtains and no license plate number
 - 3rd: A white Toyota Crown with the logo of the Iranian Red Crescent and no license plate number.
 - 4th: Frequently visited by an ambulance marked with the Iranian Red Crescent logo in Karaminshah, belonging to Karaminshah Intelligence and used to

Recorded

(1-2)

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service



Notification

Secret

Date:

Ref.:

transport their agents to Al-Sulaymaniyyah and Kalar districts.

Please acknowledge. . With appreciation

On behalf of M4 General Director
22 JUN 1996

CC

M4/5

D2/1

Please acknowledge. . With appreciation

(2-2)

Secret

In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

Republic of Iraq Logo

Embassy of the Republic of Iraq
Beijing

Ref: 11

Date: 10 JAN 1994

To be logged with our original documents

To / Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Minister's Office – Relations Section / M4 /Dept. 4) / 4
Subject / Weapons Supply in Afghanistan

We would like to inform you about the following information provided by the trusted source (TC: name is blacked-out):

1- According to a previous agreement in mid 1992, Saudi Arabia receives light weapons from China at low prices; these sorts of weapons are not for the Saudi use but rather forwarded to one of the struggling movements in Afghanistan which is represented by the Wahhabi Movement loyal to Saudi Arabia

2- Iran is supplying Loyal Islamic Party groups with light weapons inside Afghanistan. Last month, an Iranian plane landed in (Qundus), Afghanistan loaded with light weapons. In addition, Iran is training members of the loyal Afghani Islamic Party in special camps inside Iran, (60) Km from (Herat) area in Afghanistan. This camp's mission is to train on saboteur's acts to be carried out inside Afghanistan by the trainees who are accompanied by Iranians Khumayni Guards during the execution.

Please acknowledge...with appreciation

CC / (D 1)

(D 2/1)

To be archived

M. Sect. (SATTS =)

10 JAN 1994

Mr. Salim

Please follow-up this issue

18 JAN

16

18 JAN

M3

Embassy of the Republic of Iraq
Beirut

53
10 JAN 1994

Republic of Iraq Logo

Secret

Ref: 86
Date: 07 JAN 1994

To / Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Relationships Section
Subject / Report

Attached is a report issued by the General Security of Lebanon concerning information about Iranian trainers from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Unit conducting training for Pakistani fundamentalist agents from the Imamiyah (TC with reference to Imam “Shi’a Clergyman”) Movement in Pakistan. Training sessions are held in Wadi Al-Manar, in the eastern mountains of Ba'albak, near the Lebanese-Syrian borders.
(TC: Blacked-out information)

Please acknowledge...with appreciation

M. Relations Sect. acting for

CC:
D4 Please acknowledge...with appreciation

Mr. Ahmad (Illegible)
Your acknowledgment please

(illegible)
10 JAN

(1 – 1)
Secret

In response to the information provided concerning the training sessions in 'Amshakah / Ba'albak for Hezbollah

Information and sources within Hezbollah in Ba'albak indicated that the military mobilization of "Hezbollah" under the supervision of Iranian trainers from the Central Training Unit of the "Iranian Revolutionary Guards" Unit (The Basdaran), is conducting training courses for Pakistani fundamentalist agents from the Imamiyah Movement in Pakistan (Scholarship *Nafad Ja'fari*) led by "Ikhsar Husayn Khan" – and which is a branch of Al-Ja'fari Scholarship Diffusion Movement in Pakistan led by Al-Shaykh "Iftikhar Sajid Faqawi"...(illegible) and meetings...

*Its former President of the group 'Arif was assassinated
In Pakistan at the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990.*

...in the building that... (Illegible)

Information indicates:

The military trainings are held in Wadi Al-Manar in the eastern barren mountains of Ba'albak near the Lebanese-Syrian borders under the supervision of an Iranian trainer known as Hasan Najwadi from the Revolutionary Guards.

It is also known that Pakistanis are taking educational lessons in Hezbollah's Religious Al-Hawazat Al-Ilmiyyah (TC religious Shi'a school)'s building in 'Ayn Burday / Ba'albak.

Moreover, Pakistani and Tunisian officials are holding meetings and gatherings...

..In the building owned by the Iranian Embassy in Ba'albak, Al-Yaghi square, Bisharah Al-Khury Street.

Notification M5/8/3/2

Secret
Military

Ref / 1486
Date: 01 JUL 1996

Information to be transmitted to M5

To / M4 D2/1


06 JUL

A well trusted source provided us with the following information:

1- The Khumayni Guards Main Itila'at (TC Iranian Intelligence Service) headquarters is located in a 2-floor building in Sirinjar, Shahidan Subdivision. (Rafiq Muhammadi) is in charge of the center. In addition, there are platoons in Al-Sulaymaniyyah cities reporting to this headquarters which uses 2 unmarked cars: first one is a tinted Land Cruiser and the second one is Super and includes transmission units. The missions of the office are:

- a. To collect general information about Iraq
- b. To look for RASIT (French radar) and trying to buy them at any price.
- c. To limit the Iranian Opposition Groups' activities

2- Two weeks ago, the Iranian (Hajji Mas'udi) from Banah Intelligence visited the northern area and met members of the Islamic Movement in Ranyah, Halabjah and Al-Sulaymaniyyah accompanied by a member of the Islamic Movement called Jamal.

3- Few days ago, the Iranian regime executed 8 persons in Al-Rida'iyyah city, 4 of them were members of the Iranian Democratic Party and the rest were from the Iranian opposition groups.

4- Three weeks ago, a Kurdish delegation went to Tehran in order to negotiate concerning the Kurdish prisoners arrested during the Iraqi-Iranian war. The delegation included:


- a. Al-Shaykh Mahmud Karizah – Tribes Leader
- b. Karim Hajji – Representative of group 140
- c. Sami Al-Sinjari - Representative of group 130

5- Few days ago, 6 Iranian cannons pulled by cars were delivered to the group 140 at night, twice, through Saridan – Bashmagh – Banjawin road.

Please acknowledge...with appreciation

D3
1051
03 JUL

Please Mr. Khalil
Clause (1 and 2) to be transmitted to M5/1
Clause (3) to Sect. 2 and Clauses (4-5)
To (SATTS D5)


Head of 3rd Department
06 JUL 1996

(1 – 1)
Secret




Director of M5/8
01 JUL 1994

To be archived
06 JUL

Secret

Notification
M5/8/3/2

Intelligence
Sect.7 information to M5
 06 JUL

Ref: 1475
Date: 01 JUL 1996

To / M4 (SATTS D2) / 1

A trusted source provided us with the following information:


1- Six months ago, a hotel called (Mir Al-Siyhii) (TC: Tourist), owned by the Kurdish (Arras Hamah Law) a member of the group 140, was inaugurated in Al-Sulaymaniyyah by the traitor Jalal Al-Talbani and most of its guests are Iranians.

2- The Socialist Party Site is considered the office and the dormitory of the Iranian Intelligence Officers that are replaced every 2 months, moreover it comprises a hall to train the Kurdish youths on Judo and Karate under the supervision of Iranian trainers.


3- The majority of the Iranian Red Crescent Organization's employees are Iranian Intelligence Officers, and they are distributing medications and foodstuffs for the Kurdish families.

Logged in M5 original documents

Please acknowledge...with appreciation.


(SATTS E.M). M5 / 8
01 JUL 1996

Mr. Khalil
To be transmitted to M5 please


Head of the 3rd Department
06 JUL 1996

To be archived
06 JUL

1049
03 JUL

(1 - 1)
Secret

Document Title: Iraqi Intelligence Document Describing Iranian Intelligence (1993)

ID: ODP1-2005-008247

Date: 1993

Synopsis:

This document describes the IRGC and the Quds Force in detail. The document describes different functional organizations of the Quds Force. The document also describes various IRGC-QF operations outside of Iraq, including in Turkey, Afghanistan, and North Africa.

Key Themes:

Key words:

[Page 2:]

The Iranian Intelligence Services of Khomeini Regime

June 1993

[Page 3:]

Khomeini's General Intelligence Service

Khomeini's regime has several intelligence and security services. The major part of these services focuses on data collection with the objective of executing terrorist activities against organized activities inside Iran and Iraq and in other countries. At the same time the regime seeks to impose its intelligence hegemony on the development of Iraq in various ways and always tries to increase its information regarding the situation in Iraq and the Kurdish areas while updating this information.

So, before we begin the study of the enemy's main intelligence services that manage terrorist activities primarily, we are going to explain the general structure and the main divisions of the regime that are divided into three divisions.

1. The Military Intelligence Services in the Army and the Guard

The military intelligence is divided into two divisions: The army and the guards.

a. The army:

The military intelligence service is like the "second staff" in every unit and the land force intelligence as well. The second department is for the military joint staff whose duties consist in gathering military information.

b. The guards:

The organization of the guards has two intelligence services. Each one is a unit intelligence service a land force intelligence assistance is and a guards joint staff intelligence department whose mission is to gather military information. The second intelligence service is a terrorist one. It is called: "Jerusalem force". This force follows up on the special intelligence and terrorist duties inside and outside Iran.

2. The Intelligence Services within the Internal Security Forces:

All the information gathered by the internal security forces of the intelligence units all over the country reaches the "Security Assistance" which falls under the Ministry of Interior. This department works under the supervision of the commander of the internal security forces who is the guards Chief Rida Sayf Ilahi. It consists of the following departments:

First: The public security affairs led by Ghulam Husayn Balandiyan

Second: The police affairs department led by Mina'i

It is important to mention that the country's Security Council is the highest service for decision-making processes regarding the internal security matters the special pertinent plans at the level of the Ministry of Interior. The Minister of Interior is in charge of this council: There is also a council called the "Province Security Council". It plays the same role in every province.

3. Security & Intelligence Services:

To establish security in the country, all these services meet in the Ministry of Intelligence. The main task for the regime "information" is in the Ministry of Intelligence in general. It collects information it needs through the other intelligence services.

[Page 4:]

The party responsible vis-à-vis the National Supreme Security Council is led by the President is the Ministry of Intelligence. This service is in charge of collecting information to confront the so-called internal and external challenges. This task is executed in the regime's Security Council via committed called intelligence committee which is led by a Minister or the deputy Minister of Intelligence. This operation is current in different cities through: The Intelligence Department" which exists in all the (23) provinces of the country.

In this regard we are going to study and evaluate the situation of three main hostile intelligence services. They are: "The =Ministry of Intelligence" and: "The Guards Jerusalem Force" and 'Ramadan Headquarter" (The first corps of The Guards Jerusalem Force). These execute the main terrorist duties on behalf of the regime and other countries through these services and through a coordination and orientation mechanism.

[Page 5:]

The tasks they are in charge of are:

First: Military and strategic data collection for the neighboring countries (especially Iraq).

Second: Physical liquidation a terrorist acts against those oppose d or running from the regime.

Third: Training- Organization- Education, orientation and planning for the narrow-minded elements of the Islamic countries in order to overthrow their Government and establish a regime similar to Khomeini's in those countries.

Fourth: Export terrorism under the cover of backing up the liberal movements all over the world.

B. The Organization of Jerusalem Force Staff

Jerusalem force has the following intelligence:

First: **The military Staff:**

Jerusalem force military staff has 14 Directorates and they are:

- a. Intelligence Directorate
- b. Movement Directorate
- c. Training Directorate
- d. Finance Directorate
- e. Research and Evaluation Directorate
- f. Investigation and Inspection Directorate
- g. Human force Directorate
- h. Technical Directorate
- i. Administrative Directorate
- j. Planning and Projects Directorate
- k. Data Security Directorate
- l. (Medical treatment) health Directorate
- m. Communication Directorate
- n. Engineering Directorate

Second: **International Affairs**

These services are in charge of studying the political and economic issues of the Arab and Islamic countries, especially the regime's neighboring countries. There are political communications with fundamentalist forces of those countries through this force' military staff. This includes the following countries:

1. Lebanon
2. Palestine
3. Syria
4. Afghanistan
5. Turkey
6. Pakistan

[Page 6:]

7. The Soviets
8. The African countries (Sudan, Egypt and...)
9. Middle East
10. Iraq

C. Combat System of Jerusalem Guard Force:

This force has four command headquarters in bordering regions. It conducts intelligence and combat activities from Jerusalem force in different areas. In addition to four headquarters or "corps" there are several terrorist guard units in direct contact with this force command.

Badr 9 corps is linked with Iraq's Supreme Council and considered to be one of the units linked to Jerusalem force. This is the work scope of each service:

First: Headquarters of the Bordering Provinces:

1. Ramadan Headquarter (First corps)

This headquarter is in charge of intelligence within the Iraqi territories. It also organizes and supports the Kurds and Iraqi opposition groups. Ramadan headquarter has two branches along the borderline. They are: "al-Nasr headquarter" North West of Iran (Northern sector) under the command of an agent called Shahla'I and "Al-Fajr headquarter in the South under the command of agent Fruzandah. These two headquarters direct and lead all of the headquarters activities along the line bordering Iraq.

2. Nabiy Akram Headquarter (Second Corps):

The counter band and tribes network section is located in the area of Sistan and Balushistan. Pakistan's affairs is under the responsibilities of this headquarter.

3. Hamzah Headquarter (Third corps)

This headquarter is in charge of all the terrorist activities of Khomeini's regime. It is in touch of the opposing Kurdish groups in Turkey and also in charge of repressing the Kurd in Iran as well attacking shooting and conducting terrorist acts against the Iranian Kurdish groups within Iraq.

4. Al-Ansar Headquarter (Fourth corps)

It organizes and supports the Afghan groups inside Iran and conduct intelligence activities in the borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan by recruiting the Afghan and Pakistani forces. This headquarter has several headquarters under it in the cities of Zabil-Mashad- Mirjawah- Birjand and Taybad.

Second: The terrorist units and groups:

1. The Fifth Corps (5000):

One of the duties of this corps is executing special terrorist acts and organizing terrorist groups outside Iran's borders. The communications of these forces are top secret. The scope of work of this corps is Turkey since there are non-Iranians among the members of this corps. The commander of this corps is agent Haj Mansur.

2. Sixth Corps (6000):

This corps follows the execution of the terrorist operations outside Iran. The scope of work of this corps is the execution of special

[Page 7:]

terrorist operations in the Gulf countries. The commander this corps is an agent named Shirazi.

3. **The Seventh Corps (Lebanon)**

The duties of this corps are to execute terrorist acts and establish a relationship with the fundamentalist forces in Lebanon. The forces of this corps consist of forces returning to the areas of Teheran Province guards corps. The permanent cadres of the organizational structure of this corps change once every three months.

4. **The Eighth Corps (Africa)**

One of the duties of this corps is to execute terrorist activities in the African countries and establish relationships with the existing forces in the African countries such as Algeria, Tunisia and Sudan. This corps has a very active role in Sudan. Based on the information we have, this corps has opened several headquarters in Sudan in order to train the Sudanese army to obtain a base for its activities in the neighboring countries especially Egypt.

5. **9000 Corps**

This corps carry out terrorist operations for the regime are in Europe, America and sometimes Asia and some Arab countries. The commander of this corps is Hajj Nahidian. His assistant is Dushti.

6. **Malik Ashtar Corps**

The assassinations and the operations that are carried out outside the Iranian borders are among the duties of this corps.

7. **The Intelligence Headquarter on the Iranian-Azerbaijan border**

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the guards Brigadier General has ordered Buyakhaji to establish a camp on the Iranian-Azerbaijan border and the Iranian-Armenian border. This headquarter seems to follow the intelligence activities of Jerusalem Force on the Northern borders with the former Soviet Union.

Third: Badr 9 corps and the military unit of the Supreme Council:

Badr 9 is the military arm of the Supreme Council under the leadership of Mulla Baqir Hakim. This corps infiltrates the Iraqi territories by forming several of the advanced headquarters along the border line. It carries out war and terrorist operations. The main headquarter of Badr 9 forces is the lagoons and swamps that are in the Southern sector. There you have those who are running from the Iraqi Shiites. Badr 9 corps has a military unit called "Military unit". It consists of Iraqi elements from Ramadan headquarter. The duty of this unit is to recruit people on behalf of Badr 9 corps. This unit is divided into seven areas. Currently it has 18 headquarters all over Iran. The organization of the Iraqi Shiite groups is under the responsibility of this corps since it orients and plans terrorist operations as well as guerrilla warfare in Iraq. Currently one of the duties of this corps is to carry out terrorist operations against the organization inside the Iraqi territories

D. Centers and the other Jerusalem forces.

First: Training Centers

[Page 8:]

1. **Imam 'Ali Training Camp**

In this camp which is considered to be responsible for training on operations outside the national borders conventional security and intelligence courses were conducted. This camp plays the role of what is called "Security affairs faculty". The address of this camp is: Teheran- Tajrish square- The end of al-Barzakuh Boulevard.

2. **Al-Quds Faculty in Qum**

This faculty was known as "The Nations School" and had two centers: "Qa'im" and "Khatam". Belief training lectures are provided there.

3. **Khatam al-'Anbiyya' Camp**

This camp is a training center for the intelligence, operations and reconnaissance elements. The term of study in it is one year.

4. **Muntazari Camp is linked to Najaf**

This camp is a radio and map reading training center. This session is about the intelligence and reconnaissance elements.

Second: **Communication Station in Cyprus**

Jerusalem Force includes communication station in Cyprus whose objective is terrorist activities under the supervision of Isma'il Amir Hashimi.

Third: **Intelligence and Security Divisions outside the Guards Borders (Tawabis):**

The intelligence and security divisions outside the guards borders which was established in a unit outside the guard borders.

They were transferred to Jerusalem force after this force was created. This division is in a direction connection with agent "Wahidi" the commander of Jerusalem force and does not have any connection of the Jerusalem force assistance.

The duty of these divisions is to collect information from the opposing forces where they practice their terrorist activities based on the information they receive. "Tawabis" operates under the supervision of Manshawi the Director of Wahidi Office.

4. **Ramadan Headquarter**

a. The duties and organization of Ramadan headquarter:

Ramadan headquarter is considered to be (the first corps of Jerusalem force). The guard is primarily an intelligence force. Its special duty is to collect information about Iraq then establish headquarters and intelligence bases of mobilization along the border line between Iran and Iraq and also inside the Iraqi Kurdistan using their agents who try to gather military and strategic information about Iraq as well as the groups and regimes who oppose the Government of the Mullahs. This headquarter is provides part of the information needed by the Khomeini regime in order to carry out its air attacks and ground operations including terrorist activities.

Ramadan headquarter is responsible for conduction communications on the front and the Iraqi opposing factions (Among the Kurds and the Shiites). It benefits from the capabilities of these groups to achieve its goals. This includes sending intelligence operatives and terrorists inside the Iraqi territories to conduct different missions.

b. Operations Headquarters::

Ramadan headquarters conducts operations through two main headquarters. They are: "Al-Farq headquarters" along

[Page 9:]

the border lines with Iraq and also several mobilization bases and headquarters.

The duties of al-Farq headquarters are to obtain information from the Iraqi military armed forces and their organization as well as the social circumstances in Iraq.

The headquarters of al-Farq does not have a unit of their own and follow the facts via the headquarters they fall under.

Al-Isnad and mortars, engineering, artillery and the anti-aircraft system in al-Farq headquarters is centralized. For instance the 271st anti-aircraft brigade is in charge of the ground combat within all al-Farq headquarters. These headquarters hold weekly meetings under the following title "Meeting of the military command council. All the commanders of these headquarters are supposed to participate in this meeting. Ramadan headquarter is consists of 2 of al-Farq headquarters and several headquarters of the other type along the border line with Iraq. These headquarters are:

First: **The headquarter of al-Nasr in the North-West**

This headquarter is in charge of establishing a relationship with Kurdish groups of Iraq and the Kurdish opposition and also to confront the Iranian Kurds who are in Iraq. This headquarter is located in the city of "Naqdah" led by agent Shahlabi. The headquarters that under this headquarter in the bordering cities in the provinces of Western Azerbaijan and Kurdistan are:

1. Mriwan headquarter that has two satellite headquarters and they are:
 - a. Pasha headquarter located along the border line in the sector of Mriwan in North of the city
 - b. Sawji headquarter which is located on the borderline of the Mriwan sector of Pasha headquarter
2. Piranshar headquarter
3. Pawh headquarter
4. Headquarters inside Iraq that include other small headquarters in the other Kurdish cities and they are:
 - a. Diana headquarter that is located in the area of Qal'ah Dizah across from Piranshar sector
 - b. Sulaymaniyyah headquarter that located in the city of Sulaymaniyyah.
 - c. Arbil headquarter that is located in the city of Arbil.
 - d. Binjawin headquarter that is located inside Iraq across from Mriwan sector.

Second: **The Headquarter of Fajr in the South**

This headquarter is located in the city of Ahwaz. The scope of its work includes the Southern sector. It is in charge of coordinating the activities of Badr 9 forces.

The commander of this headquarter is agent Ahmad Fruzandah.

Here are the headquarters that fall under this headquarter in the Southern sector:

1. The mobilization headquarters in Dahlawan. It is called Shaykhi headquarter. It is 3 kilometers east of Wadi Jilat.
2. The mobilization headquarter in Bustan
3. The mobilization headquarter is in Khuramshahr

c. The Duties of Borders Headquarters:

The coordination among these headquarters are made with the intelligence assistance services of Ramadan headquarter. These headquarters control the activities of the Iraqi opposition parties and do the necessary in that regard. In each headquarter there are several contacts with a certain number of parties. These headquarters are under the command of the main headquarter. Each headquarter is responsible for the military discipline on Nusud axis and monitors the activities of

[Page 10:]

the Iraqi opposition and the regime elements inside the country and outside as well.

d. Ramadan headquarter intelligence services

The intelligence activities of this headquarter are carried out by intelligence service assistance headquarter, which responsible for gathering news and information from different sources and also investigations and their analysis. It is also in charge of sending groups for monitoring the Iraqi territories.

Choosing and training intelligence units for the main headquarters and the headquarters that fall under them is the responsibility of this headquarter. The intelligence assistance consists of the following divisions:

First: **Operational Intelligence**

This division communicates efficiently with the operational planning assistance department. It receives news and information through the intelligence units of the main headquarters and the satellite headquarters. This information is received through the planning and operations Directorate. The intelligence information is provided by the office of investigation and guerrilla warfare studies which is a link between the intelligence Directorate and the political intelligence. These are their duties:

- Preparing the intelligence elements for the main headquarters and the satellite headquarters of Ramadan headquarter.
- Dispatching reconnaissance teams to the bordering areas
- Scrutinizing the news and the information received through the chain of command such as the operations and planning Directorate and the political information.
- Selecting the indigenous people of the area including the Kurds among them and send them to intelligence and operations units of the main headquarters and the satellite headquarters and use them as guides to accompany the reconnaissance teams.
- Intelligence education that benefits Planning and Operations Directorate as well as the command staff of Ramadan headquarter
- Communicating with the Kurdish complexes and Badr 9 corps since these groups have a liaison officer within the intelligence Directorate of Ramadan headquarter

Second: **Office of Investigation Guerrilla Warfare Studies**

This office is a link between the intelligence Directorate and the political studies. It keeps in touch with other departments in this Directorate and the other organizations such as the operations and planning Directorate. It inquires about the main duties of this office namely sending special reconnaissance teams deep in the Iraqi territories. These elements were in touch in this office which has a duty within the satellite headquarters and which under the control of the operational intelligence. Their main task is to carry out reconnaissance activities deep inside the Iraqi territories. It is important to note that reconnaissance on the borderline and areas close to the borders is done by the operations and intelligence unit of the main headquarter and the satellite headquarters.

These are the tasks of the office of investigation and Guerrilla Warfare Studies in a nutshell:

- It is a link between the intelligence and the political information Directorate as well as the elements that used by the news and information departments after they are questioned. They are then delivered to the office of investigation and guerrilla warfare studies. This office uses them as guides for the special reconnaissance teams deep in the Iraqi territories.

[Page 11:]

Once their duty is finished, they are delivered to the Kurdish groups or they are referred to Kurdish camps.

- They study the news and the information they receive from the political information division.
- They send special reconnaissance teams deep in the Iraqi territories to complete the existing information and to obtain the other required information.

Third: **Securing information:**

The duty of this division is to preserve Ramadan headquarters' security and intelligence including the satellite headquarters. The element of this division is all over the headquarters but they do their job either secretly or openly under the command of Ramadan headquarters. They monitor various services. Data security personnel also monitor the activities of the Iraqi opposition in Iran. One of the duties of this division is the inspection and scrutiny of the military equipment and weapons in the units and the headquarters under the first corps.

Fourth: **The Political Bureaus**

The central intelligence Directorate includes several bureaus in different bordering areas called "Political bureau". There is a contact between these bureaus and different parties. The bureau gets the data and the news through its sensors (TC: spies) among the Kurds and the agents in every area. Some political bureaus are located in the building of the satellite headquarters, but their activities are different from the satellite headquarters' activities. There is a direct contact between them and the intelligence Directorate.

e. **The Political Information Bureau:**

The political information division operates independently from the intelligence Directorate. Its task is to gather news and data from open sources and radio interception and through intelligence sensors. This unit works with the objective of completing what the intelligence Directorate is lacking in terms of political information like:

First: A communication center

Second: Obtaining news and data through intelligence sensors from the Kurds, the Arabs and other channels.

Third: Radio communications through the radio or television (This includes all external and Persian radio broadcast). The radio communication center in Bakhtiar is in al-Fajr building and also in Sandaj.

Fourth: Screening and classifying the news and distribute it in the intelligence Directorate.

f. **Other Centers for Ramadan Headquarters**

In addition to the main central headquarters and which we alluded to in the diagram, there are other centers:

First: The Median Sectors

1. Kasah Karan training center South West of Kilan
2. Machine and weapons repair Centers for Ramadan headquarter on Bakhtaran road towards Kamiaran (Route 5)
3. Intelligence center for Ramadan headquarter on Bakhtaran road- Islamabad.
4. Political information center for Ramadan headquarter in Bakhtarn, Azaday square, crossroad after al-Ajaq crossroad-

[Page 12:]

5. The main headquarter for the 281st anti-aircraft brigades, Tanak Kanshat corps in Bakhtaran.
6. The headquarter for the administrative affairs for Ramadan headquarter in Bakhtaran
7. The main headquarter of Ramadan headquarter in Bakhtaran

Second: The Southern Sector

1. Unofficial Training camp in Ahwaz in Carmin camp
2. Tabtaba'i Nathrad camp is located in the South

[Page 13:]

Republic of Iraq 2685
President's Office
Intelligence service

Information

Secret

Mr. Yahya

Date: 07/1993

Memo in the presence of the officer responsible for this matter #9434

To section 1 division 3

Signature

6/7

Enclosed is a file containing the organizational structure of the Iranian regime's intelligence services which we provided to the representatives of Mujahid Khalq organization.

Regards

Enclosures

File

Mr. Salim Muhammad Nahi

Ahmad Zaki

Muhawishi 'Atiwi

For review the Director each according to their [ILLEGIBLE]

07/06/ 1993

Signature

ODP1-2005-008247
Full Translation

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

[Page 14:]

Republic of Iraq 2684
President's Office
Intelligence service

Information

Mr. Yahya

Date: 08/ 12/1993
#: 1578

To the Director of Intelligence/ Section 1/ Division 2

In reference to your memo # 3352 dated 07/24/1993 we enclose a copy of the footnote of the intelligence Director dated 08/9/1993 about the information provided to us about Jerusalem Force which is you are to inform the Jordanian counterpart about.

This is for your information. Please take the necessary measures.

Regards

Enclosures
A Copy of a footnote
Information

Signature
Yahya
Date: 08/11 1993

[Page 15:]

THE OPINION AND THE DECISION

I would provide the Jordanian intelligence with information if the information they provided us with is worth the reciprocation.

Mr. Ahmad Zaki
To Directorate 1

Director of the Intelligence service

08/9/1993

Signature

To the intelligence service Director

Enclosed is [ILLEGIBLE] with a footnote from the intelligence service Director to Directorate 1/ [ILLEGIBLE]
Date: 08/10

Section 1
Signature

For your information pending your approbation

Regards

Deputy Director of the intelligence service
08/09/1993

[Page 16:]

To the Deputy Director of the intelligence service
Subject: Jerusalem Force

We wish to inform you a bout the following:

1. Informing Directorate 1 about the approval of the intelligence service Director to provide the Jordanian counterpart with some data pertaining to Jerusalem Force.
2. Enclosed is the information that the Iranian section has about the Jerusalem Force. It was obtained from Mujahdi Khalq organization and Teheran station as well as the other sources of the people which are considered to be comprehensive that can be conveyed to the Jordanian counterpart and the other friendly parties.
3. Iran's section has other indications about the Jerusalem Force. It is currently being looked into and will be presented for the same purpose later on.
4. Based on has transpired above, we think that the intelligence service Director can give his approval to provide information about Jerusalem Force to the Jordanian counterpart and the other friendly parties through Directorate 1.

For your information...with regards

Date: 08/07
Ahmad Zaki

Director General of Directorate 4
Date: 08/07/1993

[Page 17:]

1. Jerusalem Force is one of the Iranian terrorist intelligence services. It is in charge of executing the terrorist intelligence duties inside and outside Iran. Therefore the establishment of this force was decided after Iran-Iraq war to reorganize (the revolutionary guard) in 1900 by uniting all forces and services that were focusing on the guards intelligence activities beyond the borders. The most senior e country) and most experienced commanders were hired (among those who had an outstanding role in the terrorist operations outside the country) in the Joint Staff command of Jerusalem Force.
2. The man in charge of Jerusalem Force command is ('Abd-al-Hamid Ahmad Wahidi). The duties that were assigned to this force are:
 - a. Collections of military and strategic information in the neighboring countries
 - b. Interfering in the Islamic countries' internal affairs particularly in (Algeria.), Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan).
 - c. Large scale interference in the internal affairs of Iraq
 - d. Physical liquidation of the elements opposing the Iranian regime abroad.
 - e. Support of the P.K.K (Turkish labor party)
 - f. Execution of terrorist operations
 - g. Provide support and training to the Islamic organizations that penetrate the Islamic countries.
3. All the Iranian institutions and the Ministries are responsible for the appropriate coverage of the Jerusalem Force elements so that they would carry out their missions.
4. The Staff linked to the commander of this force coordinates the missions and duties of the formations linked to it. The international affairs bureau of this force is one of services responsible for studying the political economic and cultural issues of the Arab and Islamic countries (particularly those neighboring the regime). It is responsible for making political contacts with the fundamentalist elements of those countries. The following are secondary bureaus linked to it
 - a. Bureau of Lebanon
 - b. Bureau of Palestine
 - c. Bureau of Syria
 - d. Bureau of Afghanistan
 - e. Bureau of Turkey
 - f. Bureau of Pakistan
 - g. Bureau of the Soviet Union
 - h. Bureau of Africa (It includes the African Arab counties in addition to the African Muslim countries)

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- i. Bureau of the Middle-East (It is in charge of the Jordanian Affairs and the Arab Gulf countries and the other Middle-Eastern countries.
 - j. Bureau of Iraq
5. The Jerusalem Force consists of :
- a. Bordering provinces headquarters
It consists of four command headquarters in the bordering areas. They are in charge of the intelligence and combat activities in addition to several guards terrorist units directly linked to this force command. The following is scope of work of each headquarter:
First. Ramadan operation headquarter: It is in charge of executing intelligence and combat duties inside the Iraqi territories.
Second. (Nabi Akram) operations headquarter. It is in charge of fighting smuggling and tribe networks in the areas of Sistan, Balushistan, and Pakistan's affairs.
Third Hamzah headquarter: It is in charge of managing terrorist activities and communications among the Kurdish opposing groups in Turkey and also the Iranian Kurds.
Fourth. Al-Ansar headquarter: It is in charge of supporting the Afghan groups that are inside Iran and carries out intelligence missions on the Afghan-Pakistani borders.
 - b. Terrorist nits and groups
They consist of the following corps:
First. The (5000) corps: One of the missions of this corps is to execute special terrorist operations and organize secret terrorist groups outside the Iranian borders. Turkey is this corps' scope of work. In it there are non-Iranian people who are members in the corps. The commander of this corps is (Haj Mansur).
Second. The (6000) corps: This corps follows up on the terrorist operations outside Iran. It is in charge of executing special terrorist operations in the Arab Gulf countries. The man in charge of this corps is (Shirazi).
Third. The seventh corps: One of the duties of this corps is the execution of terrorist operations and establishes relations with the Lebanese fundamentalist forces. The forces of this corps consist of the revolutionary guards of Teheran province. They change every (3) three months. The man in charge is (Haj Rida Sabiri).
Fourth. The eighth corps: The duty of this corps is to execute terrorist operations in the African countries and establish relationship with the forces already in Algeria, Tunisia and Sudan. This corps is active in Sudan. The man in charge of this corps is (Sarraf Bur).
Fifth. (9000) corps: It is in charge of executing the regime's terrorist operations in Europe,

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America and sometimes in Asia. The man in charge of this corps is (Haj Nahidian).

Sixth. Malik al-Ashtar brigade: One of its duties is to carry out assassinations outside the Iranian borders. The man in charge of this brigade is the guards Brigadier General named (Husni Niya).

Seventh. The intelligence headquarter on the Iran-Azerbaijan and the Iranian-Armenian borders. It is in charge of following the intelligence activities on Iran's Northern borders.

6. Training Camps

- a. (Imam 'Ali) training camp. This camp is responsible for training on operations outside the borders. It also provides conventional security and intelligence courses. It is located in Teheran, Tajrish Square at the end of al-Bazruqah Boulevard.
- b. Qum Jerusalem Faculty. It used to known as (al-'Umam School). It has two centers:
First. Qum Center
Second. Khatam Center
Religious lectures are provided there before the candidate of that force.
- c. Khatam al-Anbiyya' Camp: This training camp is in charge of training intelligence elements on operations and reconnaissance. The school term is one year.
- d. Muntazari Camp: It is in charge of training people on the use of radio equipment and map reading.

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In The Name of Allah the Most Compassionate the Most Merciful

Iraqi Intelligence Service

**Republic of Iraq
President's Office
Intelligence Service**

To Directorate 1/ Section 1 /Division 2

In reference to your memo 3353 dated 01/24/1993 enclosed is the information pertaining to (Jerusalem Force). We hope to obtain the approval of the Intelligence Director to circulate it to the rest of the friendly services

Regards

Signature

Ahmad Zaki

Yahya02
08/

Hasanayn
08/02

Directorate 4, Directorate 25
August 1993

Urgent/
R

For the Deputy Director of intelligence review with the signature of the Director General regarding the request of Directorate 1. We provide what we have to the Jordanians and others pointing out to the existence of other indications under scrutiny and which we will present at a later date for the same purpose.

08/07

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Top Secret

Above is the reply to [Handwriting not legible] Directorate 1/1/2/3352
07/25

To Directorate 4

2676 4599
07/25

Iraqi Intelligence Service

Republic of Iraq 775
President's Office 07/25/1993
Intelligence Service

Information

Date: 07/24/1993

The intelligence Director has given his approval to provide the Jordanian counterpart with the information you have about the Jerusalem Force which falls under the Iranian revolutionary guard according the enclosed inquiries.

For your information and please advise.

Regards

Enclosures

Form with queries.

Director of Directorate 1/1/2 proxy
07/24/1993

Mr. Ahmad Zaki

Please take the necessary measures and coordinate with
Mr. Khalil Ibrahim based on the information he may have about the subject.

Signature

07/26

1294

07/

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During the last two years the press and the opposing Iranian Mujahidi Khalq organization have reported that Iran has established the organization of Jerusalem Force which falls under the Iranian revolutionary guard and that one of missions is to support the extremist Islamic movements.

We are eager to know more about Jerusalem Forces as follows:

- The purpose of establishing it
- Its relationship with the Guard
- Its commander
- Its mission... Does it have terrorist missions or to export the revolution... such as to Iraq, Lebanon
- Its relationship with the other Iranian policies such as the Ministry of Intelligence and the Ministry of Guidance.
The Army
- Its composition and the nature of its elements
- Does it have independent camps and training centers or within the guard forces.
- Its capabilities to carry out activities and operations outside Iran.
- Is it active vis-à-vis Jordan

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Top Secret

Republic of Iraq
President's Office
Date: 08/10/1993

2675

Intelligence Service

Information

To Directorate 3 /2/1

In reference to your memo 607 dated 08/03/1993, we wish to inform you that the information contained in the report has been [UNINTELLIGIBLE]. Enclosed is your memo with the confirmed information about the new structure of the Iranian security services It has been confirmed to be accurate and public rather than secret.

For your information

Regards

Signed Yahya
Ahmad Zaki 08/10

Directorate 4
08/10/1993

Top Secret

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[This page is a duplicate of page 23 except that the date on this page is 08/09/ 1993 instead of 08/10/1993]

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Top Secret

Republic of Iraq **2678**
President's Office
Date: 12/20/1992
#: 2/1/9/25

Intelligence Service

Information Directorate, 2/1/9

To Division 8

As a follow up to our memo 45 dated 12/13/1992 we refer you to the information that interest you regarding the same subject which is as follows:

1. Sudan has become the main base to Jerusalem Forces in North Africa. Jerusalem Forces are in "Sh'ayat" area and "Karawi". They are in the process of establishing camps there. The Iranian ahs allocated 20 million dollars to build these camps.
Mr. Ahmad Zaki the organizing cadre is secured by Jerusalem Forces in Teheran. The commander of one of these camps which was named after one of the Sudanese citizens named (Na'im Bakrawi). in coordination with force 9 and its sector. A man named Majid in the Lebanese Bekaa valley and is considered one of the founders of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Generally the forces in the camps consist of elements from North Africa (Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Algeria).
In addition to the educational and religious trainings, they receive trainings with the Sudanese soldiers in Southern Sudan. They are trained to fight against the opposition forces (Sudanese Popular Liberation Army)
2. Iran is capable of sending forces to fight with the forces of Sudanese Government. So far more than (18) people were killed from

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**Republic of Iraq
President's Office**

Intelligence Service

Information

the forces operating under Jerusalem command during the clashes in Sudan.

3. Jerusalem Forces has recently sent a group of men among the cadres of (the Sudanese Islamic Front) to Teheran to transfer information and special training to establish "the Sudanese Popular Defense Forces" which will allow them to set up the revolutionary guard" in Sudan. Recently the he last militias that fall under the front was estimated in Khartoum at around one hundred thousand fighters.
We confirm the existence of several Iranians with them in addition to the special corps in the North African countries. There are two Directorates in charge of working within the popular milieus. These corps are:
 - a. Afghanistan
 - b. Pakistan

They are considered to be the front base but the backdoor back is Istanbul. From there the forces and networks operate in the direction of Europe.

4. The third corps operates independently in the third Directorate in terms of formations and operates under the guard's general command. It is in charge of Jerusalem Forces in Turkey. The man in charge of the third corps is the guard Chief (Kamal Hidayat) while operating under the command of (Muhsin Rida'i). (Ahmad Wahidi) also works under his command as well as in the camps linked to it. It is an educational camp under the command of (Jawad Tali'i).

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Republic of Iraq **2672**
President's Office

Intelligence Service

Information

This corps has assassinated the foreign diplomat in Ankara Turkey last March as a response to the confiscation of the Iranian ship of weapons.

4. There is a special Directorate in Afghanistan linked to a special corps that used to operate as headquarter for al-Ansar. It took charge of the revolutionary guard in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, after Jerusalem Forces were established and with the increasing number of their cadres in the eighth corps (**(not clear)** new formations were established under the name of (The fourth Ansar corps). The man in charge of this corps is the guard Chief (Qa'ani) who used to be the commander of the eight corps of the guard forces. His responsibilities were:
 - a. To organize and support the Afghan Shiites in Iran
 - b. Educate these categories and send them as terrorist teams to Pakistan to carry out terrorist operations
 - c. One of its functions is large scale attacks of homes in Karachi and Kweenah in June 1987

The fourth corps has four headquarters and they are: (Shabahad, Zahadan, Zabil and Firjand] along the eastern borders of Iran. The elements are sent from these

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**Republic of Iraq
President's Office**

Intelligence Service

Information

from these headquarters to Afghanistan, Pakistan , Kashmir and India.

5. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Mullahs regime in Teheran had reinforced the fourth corps and increased its current capabilities and was put in charge of exporting the Iranian revolution to the republics of central Asia. In this context five among the members of Jerusalem Forces delegated to Turkmenistan were arrested by the guards of Turkmenistan in 02/11/1992 which is the day corresponding to the celebration of the revolution of the late Khomeini. They were carrying weapons a machine gun and bombs. For you're your information and to benefit from this

Regards

Signature by proxy
12/20/1992

Document Title: A Letter From the Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader (may be fraudulent)

ID: RLSP-2005-000618

Date: 2005

Synopsis:

This document is reportedly a letter from the Office of Iran's Supreme Leader to the Leader of the IRGC. The letter suggests that if 2005 Iraqi elections do not bring Iran's allies to power in Baghdad, it will activate insurgent activity against the coalition and the Iraqi government. The document suggests it was leaked by internal opponents of the Iranian regime, most of whom have links to the Mujahidin-e Khalq Organization (MKO). Data from the MKO is sometimes accurate, but is widely viewed with suspicion by Western scholars. Readers should be skeptical of this document.

Key Themes:

Key words:

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
RLSP-2005-000618-HT-RLSP

This document reveals the crimes and interference of the leader of the clerical regime and the Revolutionary Guards in Iraq's unrest for the ominous aims of the Islamic Republic. As before, internal opponents leaked this to the outside world, by way of the site, in order to expose the leaders of the Islamic Republic ... Zakari

[TRANSLATOR NOTE – WRITTEN DOCUMENT FOLLOWS. All classifications included in text are from the document.]

Office of the Supreme Leader

Number: 1796

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

Major General Rahim Safavi
Honored Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps,

Peace Upon You,

Following Letter Number 379 dated 16/10/1383,¹ your office based on the necessary orders regarding the coming operation of the Qods Force² in the matters of the Iraqi elections, a picture of which is submitted in attachment, arrived for the information of the Supreme Commander of All Forces.

Based on a meeting held by representatives of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Islamic Jihad and Ansar al-Islam, they announced that Qods Force personnel which have been established in Iraq will not carry out any operations whatsoever which might identify themselves until the elections, and that these actions be entrusted to other supporters of the Islamic Revolution. Let that force prepare itself for coup d'état operations and carry out the necessary planning, so that if the elections are against the policy of Islam, they can enter the scene in a serious way.

You will be informed of circumstances towards appropriate measures.

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

Office of the Supreme Leader
Mohammadi Golpaygani
(TRANSLATOR COMMENT – SIGNED, WITH ILLEGIBLE STAMP ON SIDE)

¹ TC: Equivalent to 5 JAN 2005 on the Gregorian Calendar

² TC: The Qods or Jerusalem Force is the Revolutionary Guards special operations unit

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