

**Egyptian Collection on Islamist Militant Groups:
Expose' of the Writings of Terrorism Scholar Abd al-Raheem Ali on al-Qaida**

By

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Introduction

The examination of what Arab scholars and commentators are saying about the problem of violent Islamist militancy has become an important yet neglected part in the education of future American military leaders. The Joint Forces Command has started the process with its three volumes Terrorism Perspectives Project that provides insight into such al-Qaida thinkers as Abu Musab al-Suri, the Clausewitz of al-Qaida affiliated networks. The three volumes are published by Naval Institute Press and must form the basis of any serious examination of the narrow ideology of the adversary. Another organization that is conducting serious work in translating and analyzing books by Islamist radicals is the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. CTC West Point was even mentioned by Ayman al-Zawahiri in May 2007, this in my view represents a success, when the al-Qaida deputy mentions the assessment by a U.S. Army entity. Islamist militancy is an ideology that dismisses the scholarship, history and details of Islamic precedence, history and law. This essay will highlight the work of the Arab Center for the Study of Islamist Movements, which has produced a multi-volume collection in Arabic on Islamist militant groups. The essay will examine volume eight, entitled, "*Tanzeem al-Qaida, Ushrun Ahman, wal-Ghazu Mustamir*, (Al-Qaida, 20 Years and the Battle Continues)," by Abd-al-Raheem Ali, an Egyptian scholar, his 498 page book, which was released in 2006, explores al-Qaida from its foundations, its leadership, and its relations to other Islamist radical groups. The volumes are produced by *Dar al-Mahroosa* Press in Cairo, Egypt. The national security of the United States is dependent upon delving into the militant theology, organization and tactics of our adversary. This expose of the work of Abdal-Raheem Ali is not meant to agree or disagree with his findings, but provide a basis from which American military leaders can read, debate, and get to know the adversary through intellectual discussions of their ideology, tactics, evolution, and strategy. We conducted such debates with Soviet ideology, strategy and order of battle; the time now has come to do the same for Islamist militant movements.

Abdullah Azzam: The Spiritual Founder of al-Qaida

The book begins with al-Qaida's spiritual founder Abdullah Azzam, whose books postulated the theory of *al-Qaida al-Sulba*, or the Firm Foundation that would respond to oppressed Muslims around the globe by providing fighters, military trainers, money, and media

awareness. Azzam, known as the fighting cleric, for his belief that jihad meant fighting only, met the Egyptian Kamal al-Sananiri, among the Muslim Brotherhood exiles in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Sananiri proposed to Azzam that he represent the Muslim Brotherhood in Afghanistan, as the Soviet-Afghan War was in its early stages. Azzam's involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood stretched back to his teens and included membership in Palestine, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Sananiri and Azzam pondered the idea, in 1981, of creating reception centers for Arab jihadist youth arriving Pakistan, to fight in the Soviet-Afghan War. These would be the early seeds of what would be *Maktab al-Khidmat*, the Special Services Office for Arab Jihadists based in Peshawar, Pakistan. The skeletal structure of what would be al-Qaida. In 1983, a position was found for Azzam at the Islamic University at Islamabad, his main mission was to capitalize on Arab youth desiring to fight the Soviets with the eventual plan of creating an Islamist militant vanguard capable of being deployed wherever Muslims were oppressed. *Maktab al-Khidmat* had as its founding purpose to:

- Unify Arabs into a Pan-Islamist military organization.
- Link Muslims to the Soviet-Afghan War.
- Publicize the mystique of jihad against the Soviets.
- Train the pan-Islamist vanguard in combat techniques.

Azzam focused on the future of the Afghan youth and to rebuild Afghan society among militant Salafist lines and to compete against western Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and what he believed were Christian evangelical charities in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The study looks into Azzam central role in providing the charisma needed and attracting the talent to lead the organization that processed thousands of Arabs into the Soviet-Afghan War. This talent included Usama Bin Ladin, who was able to establish a more permanent presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, around 1985. So important was Azzam to the Muslim Brotherhood, that their emissary Zaynab al-Ghazali, among the few charismatic Islamist radical female leaders, the grand-dame of the Muslim Brotherhood and leader of the Muslim Sisters, negotiated with President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan to protect Azzam. Zaynab al-Ghazali is reputed to have said the Pakistani dictator, "My only son (Azzam) is amongst you," before returning to Egypt. Azzam would be killed in November 1989, a year after Zia ul-Haq's assassination in late November 1989.

Of the many conspiracies surrounding the assassination of Azzam, he and his two sons were killed when their vehicle passed by a massive vehicle borne explosive device, the lead suspect is Ayman al-Zawahiri. Azzam's strategic vision of what to do with this Arab-Afghan vanguard differed from Zawahiri's, the two were fighting for control of Usama Bin Ladin, and finally Azzam began endorsing Bin Ladin's nemesis Ahmed Shah Masood, the charismatic Lion of Panshir. Azzam's fight with Zawahiri was public amongst jihadist circles and included pamphlets and Zawahiri bringing a charge of embezzlement upon Azzam. The book discusses

detained al-Qaida operative Mohammed Sadek Awdah who says that Usama Bin Ladin killed Azzam. Also sharing this view is Algerian jihadist Abdullah Anas, who was Azzam's son-in-law.

Post-Soviet Survival of al-Qaida

After Azzam's death, and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the so-called Arab-Afghans split into three groups. A year before Azzam's demise in 1988, al-Qaida was formally created, and understanding this split is important to comprehend what Usama Bin Ladin worked with in creating the initial seeds of a globalized Islamist militant network that came to be called al-Qaida. The three groups were:

- European political asylum seekers, who sought refuge and established a presence in London, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and other European capitals.
- Those who returned to their respective countries in the Arab world. They would be known as the Returnees from Afghanistan, after the trial held by the Egyptians. These were Algerians, Tunisian, Egyptians and others who returned to energize the Islamist movement in their respective countries.
- Azzam's visionaries, who were a cadre of jihadists who would carry the fight to Bosnia, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, Kashmir, and Chechnya.

One could add a fourth group, those Arabs who remained and settled in Pakistan and Afghanistan, although the leadership and potency that Bin Ladin would derive for al-Qaida would come from these three groups. The fourth group that remained in Afghanistan and Pakistan seemed subdued by Afghan warlords and Pakistani security and intelligence personnel. Of note, the book relies heavily on Egyptian court and interrogation transcripts of jihadists, such as the detained Mohammed Sadek Awdah, who recounts that Zawahiri was involved in the murder of Mustafa Shalaby, Azzam's New York representative.

Operation Desert Storm: Further Erosion of Pan-Arabism

Operation Desert Storm would see another blow to Arab solidarity, as Arab nations were incapable of dealing with Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. From an Islamist militant perspective this was the death knell of pan-Arabism, which was discredited beginning in the 1967 Six-Day War, and from a jihadist theoretical perspective continues, with a severe blow dealt with the arrival of United States forces into Saudi Arabia. It was during Operation Desert Storm, that calls for a worldwide Islamist revolution would resonate in backroom mosques, and *Sahwa* (Awakening) Clerics of Saudi Arabia, led by Sheikh Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-

Awdah would begin an Islamist and radical Salafist (Salafism can best be described as a fundamentalist Sunni revivalist movement) critique of the Saudi royal family.

Usama Bin Ladin Restructures his Finances

Typically the focus on Bin Ladin in 1990 and 1991 is his critique of the Saudi Royal family, the book delves deeper into his supporting of Islamist militants against communist Yemen and his reevaluation of his financial network after the Bank of Commerce and Credit International (BCCI) scandal. BCCI would be the bank of choice for drug dealers, smugglers, terrorists, dictators and liberation movements. Bin Ladin would spread wealth and donor funds not only into regular banks, but Islamic banks, as well as Hawala accounts. Usama Bin Ladin did not always rely on Hawalas, the unofficial and pre-industrial Islamic banking system based on reputation, and keeping one's word. The book claims that Islamist radical donors organized by Bin Ladin would infuse \$12 million to support the electioneering of the Algerian Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) in 1991. Another transaction by the al-Faisal Islamic Bank in Khartoum would handle the transaction of \$20 million to the FIS as they were poised to win the parliamentary elections in Algeria in 1992. Al-Qaida detainee Jamal al-Fadl claimed that Bin Ladin co-founded the al-Shamal Bank in Sudan, to allow additional freedom to finance Islamist militant causes around the globe. Azzam's vision of a foundation would have its earliest applications not in Afghanistan but in Sudan. What the book stresses, is that the BCCI scandal and financial collapse, would see Bin Ladin complicating and concealing his financial network, creating front companies in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. This was not only to protect the funds, but to protect and conceal the identity of regular donors. One deception technique Bin Ladin applied was the exploitation of Islamic charities; this provided not only a means to hide funds but to set up offices in England, Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan. These charities would take in millions, part of these donations were skimmed to finance terror operations. It is important to note that book describes them as financial networks that are redundant and overlapping. One charitable network linked to Bin Ladin was controlled from Stockholm and had thirteen branches in Albania, Pakistan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, and the Gulf States. Pre 9-11 saw financial and fund raising networks in North America.

Zawahiri and Bin Ladin Create Vanguard of the Conquest

Usama Bin Ladin left Saudi Arabia for Sudan, while Zawahiri traveled between several European nations, spending time in Geneva, Switzerland before ending up in Sudan. In Sudan, both men would undertake deep strategic analysis, evaluating the situation of the Islamic world after Operation Desert Storm. They discussed U.S. forces remaining in Saudi Arabia, American troops in Somalia, and settled on an initial strategy of rolling back American influence in the Middle East, Africa, and Southwest Asia. Their network would strike American interests in

more than one place around the globe to force its retreat from the region. Zawahiri and Bin Ladin established al-Qaida training camps in the Sudan, and Zawahiri would call the first trained cadres to emerge from these camps *Talaa al-Fath* (Vanguards of Conquest), although *Fath* literally means conquest, it symbolically refers to the lightning conquest of Muslim armies from 630 to 711 CE, that stretched from Spain to the frontiers of Afghanistan. The Arab world would be introduced to Zawahiri's *Talaa al-Fath* cells when they were rolled up by Egyptian authorities and the subsequent trial was named after these cells. Zawahiri had associated his Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) with Bin Ladin's al-Qaida, giving it the name *Tanzeem al-Qaida wal Jihad* (The al-Qaida and Jihad Organization), noting the co-equal status Zawahiri and Bin Ladin enjoyed in Sudan in the early nineties. Zawahiri began providing Bin Ladin with competent operational commanders to include Mohammed al-Makawi, a cashiered Lieutenant Colonel in Egyptian Military Intelligence (DMI), better known as Saif al-Adl, who would play a key role in establishing communications between Bin Ladin and Zawahiri in Sudan and Yemeni veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War who settled in Yemen. Through Saif al-Adl's facilitation efforts al-Qaida was successful in establishing base camps under the protection of the Hashid Tribal Confederacy located in the Murqsha Mountains of North Yemen. Al-Qaida's main patron in Yemen was Tarek al-Fadly, one of the sons of the last sultans of Yemen who were made obsolete by the Republic of Yemen as well as their arch-rival Communist Yemen. Al-Qaida, in addition to camps in the Sudan, established three camps in Yemen called *Badr* (*Islam's first battle*), *Qadisiyah* (after a pivotal battle that defeated the Sassanid Persians) and *Murqasha* (after the mountain region where the camp is located).

Saleh Suleiman, among the *Talaa al-Fath* (Vanguards of Conquest) detainees, explained in his trial and to Egyptian investigators that his group trained in psychological warfare, arms, explosives, use of detonators, and urban warfare. Among the graduate of Sudanese camps were a handful of terrorists who would augment Somali insurgents fighting U.S. forces in Mogadishu. In 1992, 400 members and affiliates of *Talaa al-Fath* were arrested, their arrest exposed operations such as:

- The Failed assassination attempt on Egyptian Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi;
- The Failed attempt on the life of Egyptian Prime Minister Atif Sidqi;
- Insurgent pipelines from Yemen, Kenya to Somalia and back;
- Plans to attack U.S. military personnel in Yemen to strategically draw away military pressure on Somali insurgents;
- The 1992 attack on the Golden Mohur Hotel in Aden; and
- Plans to bring down U.S. military flights taking off and landing from Aden.

Plans to Create an East Africa Network

In 1993, Usama Bin Ladin having established a presence in Sudan and Yemen set his sights on East Africa. Zawahiri visited Nairobi and Mombasa to explore the potential environment for al-Qaida to establish a new presence in Kenya and infuse East Africa with jihadists from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kenya was viewed as a strategic location for al-Qaida to influence events in Yemen, Somalia and Sudan. Zawahiri assigned Mohammed Sadek al-Awdah and Ali al-Rashidi aka (Abu Ubaydah al-Panshiri) to establish cells in East Africa and develop a network. It was this cell that would offer the foundations by which the 1998 U.S. embassy attacks on Tanzania and Kenya would take place. An infusion of trainers and experienced Arab-Afghan veterans were sent to Kenya using tourist visas. However, the setback would be the drowning of Abu Ubaydah al-Panshiri in a 1996 ferry accident on Lake Victoria. According to the book, this led to the rise of Muhammed Atef (aka Abu Hafis al-Masri), who was introduced to Bin Ladin and Zawahiri by the late Abu Ubaydah al-Panshiri in the late eighties. Atef would prove to be competent military trainer of Arabs in Afghanistan, drawing no doubt on his experience as an Egyptian police colonel. Muhammed Atef would rise to become al-Qaida's military operations chief and likely played a facilitation and planning role in the 9-11 attacks, dying in a U.S. airstrike during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002. Atef's first major test was the development of the East Africa al-Qaida network that under his leadership undertook the East Africa embassy bombings. He then rescued the East Africa network anticipating tremendous pressure from African security services in the aftermath of the East Africa embassy bombings. He exfiltrated East Africa al-Qaida operatives, trainers, and fighters from Kenya into Somalia having arranged asylum and protection from Hussein Farah Aideed in return for financial payments to him and his Somali National Alliance. This is an interesting allegation, as Aideed was a former U.S. Marine and son of the Somali warlord Muhammad Farah Aideed, he was recently part of an alliance that ousted the al-Qaida sympathetic Council of Islamic Courts and was aggressively pursuing Islamist militants. The book does not explore the ties further.

Bin Laden's Vision of a Global Network

Before the East Africa embassy bombings, Usama Bin Ladin and Zawahiri sought to link their camps and leaders in Sudan, Yemen and East Africa as well as financial and operational cells in Europe, the Middle East and North America with other Islamist militant groups into a global network, then take to the next step and establish a union of Islamist militants movements in 1994 and 1995. They coordinated a series of conferences and meetings in Cyprus, Teheran, and culminating in Khartoum that drew the late Imad Mughniyah of Hizbullah (killed in 2008), Palestinian Islamic Jihad's Fathi Shikaki, Hamas leader Musa Abu Marzook, Yemen's Abdul-Mejid al-Zindani, Pakistani militant groups, Algerian militant groups, and the Tunisian Islamist militant group al-Nahda. The most important meeting was a conference held in April 1995 in Khartoum which laid plans for:

- Increasing the efficacy and support of Islamist networks fighting in the Balkans.
- Infusing directed and selective donations to Islamist networks in Somalia and Ethiopia.
- Increasing the efficiency and develop recruitment, financing, and media networks in London and North America.

The Cyprus meeting was designed to address primarily the coordination of aid, assistance and fighters for Bosnia. Meanwhile vanguards trained in Sudan began planning to kidnap American tourists in Egypt, and bomb Egyptian tourist sites in 1995. Perhaps the boldest operation was the assassination attempt against Egyptian president Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Egyptian security in combination with Ethiopian officials uncovered a network of 1,600 jihadists in East Africa cultivated from 1992 to 1995 with camps training militants in Merka, Bardiera, Jalekieu, Bosasso, Kismayo, and Ogaden.

Zawahiri versus the Egyptian Government: Messages Sent though Terrorism

Terrorism is not just an act of political violence, but designed to send a message, it is an abhorrent means of political expression. Zawahiri in conducting the 1995 bombing the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan sent two messages, one that Egyptian security officials spying on Egyptian jihadists in Pakistan are unsafe, and two the government of Benazir Bhutto must cease its cooperation with Egypt and Saudi Arabia that netted in the extradition of operatives back to those countries. Of note, the first choice for the bombing of a diplomatic mission in Pakistan was the U.S. embassy, this was deemed too hard. In November 1995, an Egyptian diplomat Alaa Nazmi was murdered in Switzerland. The Egyptians believe Zawahiri ordered the hit, because Nazmi was involved with surveiling Zawahiri in Switzerland. It is important to pause and reflect on the simultaneous nature of operations, assassinations, and bombings conducted by Bin Ladin and Zawahiri. While the plans for developing the East Africa network were being laid, in 1993 Bin Ladin visits the Philippines to lay the groundwork for donors, setup, presence, and opportunities in Mindanao and the southern Philippines. Bin Ladin's main agent in the Phillipnes was his brother-in-law Jamal Khalifa. From the network emerged Operation Bojinka, Ramzi Yusef's plan to conduct a multiple bombing of American airliners and planes bound for the United States, also included was a plan to assassinate Pope John Paul II. Ramzi Yusef had already pulled off the first World Trade Center bombings in 1993, when he was laying plans in the Philippines to attack American interests.

Bin Laden and Zawahiri Leave Sudan: Reconstitution of al-Qaida under the Taliban

Pressure from the United States, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia on Sudan led to Bin Ladin's departure in August 1996 for Afghanistan with 125 of his loyal followers. Bin Ladin and Zawahiri would have to rebuild, but under the Taliban they established the Farouk Camp and

within two years reconstitute 1,400 Arab-Afghans and jihadists. Bin Ladin never abandoned his goal of creating a pan-Islamist global network and with the aid of the Taliban he hosted 14 Arab Islamist militant groups to include:

- Al-Qaida
- Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
- Islamic Combat Group of Morocco (GICM)
- Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)
- Egyptian group Gamaa al-Islamiyah (The Islamic Group or IG)
- Algerian Jihadist Cadre
- Tunisian Jihadist Cadre, made up of Tunisians vets who fought in Bosnia
- The Jordanian and Palestinian Cadre led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
- Uzbek cadre, the largest non-Afghan group.
- Turkestan Cadre
- Turkish Cadre, the smallest group, designed to train and return to Turkey to conduct operations and develop cells.

The camps included not only the Farouk Camp, but also the Khaldan Camp, considered the oldest Arab jihadist camp set up by Abdullah Azzam, the Abu Khabab Camp that specialized in explosive training and the use of toxic chemicals, and the Ghurbaa Camp for higher military studies that included not only training Arabs but Taliban military leaders in regional tactical and strategic doctrinal studies.

As a testament to Lawrence Wright's book, "*Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*," (New York: Knopf, 2006), the Arabic study highlighted references and quotes copiously from the book. This is a good sign, for not only should it be required reading for American military planners, in an Arab world rife with conspiracies, their use of American sources on al-Qaida is useful in the mutual understanding of an organization and ideology that kills Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

Saif al-Adl's Manifesto, al-Qaida's Military Chief: Understanding Post 9-11 Al-Qaida

Saif al-Adl's manifesto is also discussed in the book and his rationalization for 9-11 offers a glimpse into the pseudo-intellectualism of al-Qaida. He says that the United States has been on a mission to dismantle and undermine the Muslim world since the Barbary Wars, Saif al-Adl references the Second Barbary War of 1815 in particular. He also writes that the 1815 Congress of Vienna was an American attempt to dominate Muslims, when the United States played no role in this congress that defined the European order in the aftermath of Napoleon. Saif al-Adl takes a Qutbist (named after the modern Islamist militant theoretician Sayyid Qutb who died in 1966) view of American history, believing it is only sustained by constant warfare

and the feeding of the military-industrial complex. He declares that al-Qaida represents a new movement and leadership against the Zionist, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant alliance. The events of 9-11, would illicit an irrational, angry, and reactionary response from the United States. The way the United States conducted Operation Enduring Freedom with the use of tribes and the Northern Alliance was totally unexpected by al-Qaida, who expected U.S. to mass ground forces in Afghanistan. In many ways al-Qaida was fighting the last war, and Iraq represents a closer model to what they wanted in Afghanistan, however, it required they move part of their operations closer to Iraq.

In Afghanistan Usama Bin Laden cultivated his financial donor network, as economic counselor to Mullah Omar, he conducted clandestine investments for the Taliban leader in Europe, and the United States while exploring with these investments the means of cultivating cells. 9-11 and Operation Enduring Freedom caused al-Qaida to split into two groups. One group went with Zawahiri and Bin Laden to the tribal zones of Northern Pakistan, the second group escaped Afghanistan via Iran with a cluster making its way to Northern Iraq. In Northern Iraq, they sought refuge with the Kurdish Islamist militant group Ansar al-Islam. Among these groups were the Jordanian-Palestinian cadre led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Of note, the Kurdish areas of Northern Iraq were considered a periphery for al-Qaida, Operation Enduring Freedom turned it into a central haven, and the lead up to Operation Iraqi Freedom increased its importance to al-Qaida. Saif al-Adl was in charge of the Afghanistan, Iran to Iraq escape routes and maintained contacts with members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Donors became critical as infusions of cash sustained al-Qaida as it reconstituted itself under tremendous pressure from coalition forces in Afghanistan and the Pakistani military. The cash came from donors in Kuwait, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia; these funds enabled Saif al-Adl to rent safehouses for 500 fleeing jihadists, a fifth of which were Egyptian according to a website that featured Saif al-Adl's discussion of al-Qaida's survival plans in the aftermath of the toppling of the Taliban. Aside from Operation Iraqi Freedom, when Iranian security began detaining senior al-Qaida officials to include Usama Bin Laden's son and Saif al-Adl, the Kurdish zones of Northern Iraq became even more important. From Kurdish areas, Afghan escapees would make their way to Sunni areas of Iraq and find common cause with Baathist Republican Guard, and Fedayeen Saddam, to coalesce into a cell of 5,000 as U.S. forces began combat operations against Saddam Hussein.

Jurisprudence of Violent Islamist Extremism

The book delves into a chapter called the jurisprudence of jihad, and begins with the Azzamist theory, based on the writings of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam. Although there are ten books by Azzam, his posthumously published collection of writings and sermons on jihad published as "*Al-Jihad Fiqh wa Ijtihad*," (Jihad Jurisprudence and Re-interpretive Struggle) is the seminal document for all 21st century Islamist militants. In it Azzam argues that if Muslim

land is occupied, jihad becomes incumbent and an individual obligation for every Muslim. He innovates and says that jihad is the ultimate religious duty except for the obligation to pray. Azzam rationalizes that fasting Ramadan is excused for those on military expedition, and that Prophet Muhammad broke his fast, when he prepared to enter Mecca, conquering the city in 630 CE. Azzam goes further saying that jihad takes precedence over all the other pillars of Islam, even prayers are altered to accommodate fighting conditions. He says that jihad became *fard ayn* (an individual obligation) versus *fard kifaya* (a collective obligation for a few) when Ferdinand and Isabel conquered Spain in 1492 CE. Jihad does not cease after one participates for 1 or 10 years, only when all Muslim lands are liberated and re-conquered does the obligation end. After Afghanistan turn your attention to Palestine, Bukhara (the former Islamic Soviet Republics), and the Philippines. *Fard Ayn* does not end until liberation or death; it does not require a parent's permission. Azzam dismisses the Prophet Muhammad's saying narrated by his companion and second caliph Omar that says the Prophet turned away a young man from participating in a military expedition, saying his obligation was to his parents. One cannot fast part of the month, or pray part of the day, one cannot wage jihad one year and skip the next. From Azzam, events and the inexperience of those al-Qaida affiliates in Iraq would lead to a new generation of violent and savage Islamist militant thinkers like Yousef al-Aeri who uses abrogation of Quranic verses and a narrow interpretation to justify beheadings of captives. Another is Abdul-Aziz Jarbuaah who argues that suicide is taking one's life due to personal depression and not taking ones life to cause harm to an enemy. He invents a whole corpus of expedient Islamic law arguing that *Maslahah* (expediency) justifies suicide tactics, and then divides this into three categories, (1) *Daruriah* (necessity) the only way to reach an infidel is through self-sacrifice; (2) *Kuliah* (totality), meaning self-sacrifice benefits the totality of Muslims and finally (3) *Qataieeah* (brevity in analysis), no other tactic is possible to strike at an enemy. It is this new, violent, and simplistic use of Islamic language that is designed to entice those who have little knowledge of Islamic law, history, or precedence. Of note in Islamist militant ideology is the evolutionary and opportunistic nature of Islamist militant doctrine fits the conflict and time of today

Returning to Saif al-Adl's Writings on Security and Intelligence Gathering

Returning to Saif al-Adl, the book devotes an entire chapter on security methods and intelligence. He justifies the use of deception arguing that Prophet Muhammad used his own cousin Ali as a decoy, placing him in his bed to give the appearance that he remained in his home, when attempting to flee Mecca. Saif al-Adl quotes from Muhammad and Abu Bakr's use of deception and evasion to reach Medina safely and escape persecution. In addition, Muhammad used Abu Bakr's son Abdullah and his uncle Abbas to gather intelligence on Mecca during his time in Medina. Although all true in Islamic history, this represents the narrow view Islamist militants have of Prophet Muhammad as a warrior, when he was that and city-leader, father, husband, merchant, and arbiter. One cannot read a book about Muhammad's generalship and derive from that single lens an understanding of the Prophet. Saif al-Adl uses his training in

Egyptian military intelligence to write about backup plans, compartmentalizing information, need to know, and concealment of plans. He discusses the phased approach of recruiting operatives that includes knowing his political views and his commitment to God. Saif al-Adl is very concerned about agents penetrating al-Qaida and is on the lookout for recruits who ask many questions that do not pertain to their training or assigned tasking.

Conclusion

Among the most revealing aspects of Saif al-Adl as he describes the rationale for 9-11 is his quote of Rubaie ibn Amer to the Sassanid Persian Commander Rustum Farokhzad before the start of the Battle of Qadisiya in 636 CE. When Rustum asked the Arab military commander, “Why have you come Rubaie?” The Arab answered, “God hath sent us to lead your slaves from the worship of you, to the worship of your maker, from the division and injustices of your faiths to the justice of Islam, and from the oppression of this world to the striving of the next world.” This represents the view of al-Qaida, a narrow, irrational, and unrelenting campaign that can only be rolled back. It derives its energy from the narrow reading of Islamic warriors like those quoted above by Saif al-Adl. It views Muhammad’s life from a narrow lens of warrior and does him a dishonor by not exploring the complexity and width of his total 63 years of life. Al-Qaida even does an injustice to the Quran, providing a regular diet of narrow verses, no more than 70, when the Quran is 6,236 verses. The United States military must immerse itself in the mechanics of Islamist militant ideology, we can no longer afford these topics to be taught as electives in our war colleges, but begin by digging deeply into Arabic books written by terrorists or those Arabs like the featured author who has spent years studying the al-Qaida trend. It has been seven years since 9-11 and we have yet to agree on a single definition on what this ideology is. For me, having read copious amounts of radical literature and lectured on the topic, the wording is clear, Islamist militancy is an ideology unified by its violent expression, political objectives and its murder of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. It is not and cannot be representative of all one billion Muslims, and in fact is intolerant of diversity within Islam itself.

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Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri, as they appear in the FBI's most wanted poster.



The late Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, the Spiritual Founder of al-Qaida



Sayf al-Adl (Mohammed Makkawi) Al-Qaida Military Chief and Tactical Theoretician.