


Book Reviews

Although terrorism and transnational threats from distant lands have absorbed much U.S. attention and resources of late, the Forum articles in this issue of *Joint Force Quarterly* remind us that our own hemisphere—particularly the southern part—remains relevant in the global security context. Both readings offer conjecture about the future of Latin America—one focusing on a single country, the other on the entire region.



After Fidel: The Inside Story of Castro's Regime and Cuba's Next Leader

by Brian Latell

New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005

273 pp. \$24.95

ISBN 1-4039-6943-4

Post-Castro Cuba is the Latin American elephant in the U.S. living room, a beast that probably will have to be acknowledged sooner rather than later since the 79-year-old Fidel has shown increasing signs of mortality in the past few years. Latell, a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, started his long career as a Cuba watcher in 1964, when he became a political and leadership analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. At the time, remote leadership analysis was a well-regarded analytical tool, and Fidel Castro was the world leader who most needed such scrutiny. Latell combines the intelligence culled from those years of study with information from secondary sources to produce character studies of Fidel and his designated successor, his brother Raul. Latell uses his assessments of Raul both as an individual and in the context of his relationship with Fidel to project what kind of country Raul's Cuba will be—and, more importantly, how that country might interact with the United States. The potential scenario of Raul dying before Fidel does is briefly discussed as well.


"The Americas in the 21st Century: The Challenge of Governance and Security"

Security Issues in the Western Hemisphere conference series

February 1-3, 2006, Miami, FL

The U.S. Army War College, in conjunction with Florida International University and U.S. Southern Command, held the ninth annual conference dealing with security and defense matters in the Western Hemisphere. This year's session attracted 150 military, governmental, and academic attendees who participated in panel discussions on interdependence and global security, the need for good governance, linking security and development, public security, and the information threat. The participants' conclusion—that the Western Hemisphere security situation is "extremely volatile and dangerous" and that the challenges of good governance and security need to be addressed lest the issue resolve itself in ways not to our liking—should give pause to security decisionmakers. A detailed conference report is available at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

L. Yambrick



On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas

by Hugh Smith

New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005

272 pp. \$29.95

ISBN 1-4039-3586-6

Book Review by
BARRY WATTS

Hugh Smith's *On Clausewitz* repackages *On War*, by Carl von Clausewitz, for the general reader while striving to do the least violence to the understanding of war that Clausewitz achieved in his final years. Given the difficulties Clausewitz's unfinished manuscript have presented to generations of readers since his widow published *On War*

in the early 1830s, Smith's endeavor is laudable.

Smith, however, does not intend *On Clausewitz* to replace *On War*. Because the "lucidity of Clausewitz's mind can only be appreciated at first hand," and because Clausewitz intended his opus to stimulate readers to reach their own judgments about the problems war presents, Smith rightly insists that

there is no substitute for reading Clausewitz directly (p. xi).

What Smith offers, then, is a fairly comprehensive companion volume to *On War*. In 23 short, readable chapters, he summarizes what scholars and military men have thought about such things as Clausewitz's life and personality, warfare during his era, *On War's*

intellectual and political context, Clausewitz's approach to war's theory and practice, and his relevance (or the lack thereof) to warfare in later times down to the present. The result is a generally reliable supplement for any reader, whether tackling Clausewitz's unfinished manuscript for the first time or revisiting it for the twentieth. Having scrutinized sympathetic interpretations of Clausewitz by scholars such as Peter Paret, Michael Howard, Bernard Brodie, Michael Handel, and Chris Bassford, as well as critics of *On War*, from B. H. Liddell Hart to Martin van Creveld and John Keegan, little escapes Smith's mention. His volume may therefore become a standard reference for students of Clausewitz.

Nevertheless, reluctance to depart even slightly from Clausewitz's understanding of land warfare at the time of his death is both Smith's greatest virtue and weakness. On the one hand, the theorist was a soldier from the age of 12 until his death at 51 in 1831; by the time he was 35, he had fought in 5 land campaigns

against France; and from 1790 to 1820, continental Europe witnessed some 713 battles (p. 27). On the other hand, *On War* contains virtually no mention of war at sea during this period, or of technology's potential to transform war's conduct even if its underlying nature remains unchanged. Following Clausewitz, Smith presents war fundamentally as armies fighting armies (p. 264). In doing so, he is true to the text of *On War*, but his exegesis also devalues seapower (even in Clausewitz's day) and gives short shrift to truly revolutionary developments in the means of warfare after 1820 (for example, machineguns, mechanization, airpower, and both thermonuclear and non-nuclear precision weapons).

Clausewitz, though not Smith, can be forgiven for neglecting the technological dimension. During Clausewitz's time, technological changes in the means of war were modest compared to those of the 20th century. As for seapower, Clausewitz was a soldier, not a sailor. Still, neglect of the sea was a major oversight. Britain's

Barry Watts is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and author of *Clausewitzian Friction and Future War*.

attainment of naval dominance in European waters during Clausewitz's lifetime was the culmination of "the largest, longest, most complex, and expensive project ever undertaken by the British state and society" (N.A.M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815*, W.W. Norton, 2005, p. lxxv). And while many 20th-century historians, even in Britain, have downplayed the significance of Admiral Nelson's triumph at Trafalgar in October 1805, his victory ensured

Britain's survival in a war "which no other nation survived unscathed," left Napoleon in a strategic box from which he futilely struggled to escape for the rest of his reign, and guaranteed Britain's economic prosperity (Rodger, p. 543).

Smith's dogged adherence to Clausewitz's understanding of war as fundamentally armies fighting armies has other consequences for appreciating *On War's* relevance to modern conflict. The most serious is Smith's treatment of the Prussian's unified concept of a general

friction. While the author acknowledges Clausewitz's view that general friction constitutes the "only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper" (Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 119), he clings to the traditional reading that separates chance from general friction rather than seeing chance as merely one of friction's sources. Smith's "trinity of trinities" diagram (p. 121) documents his refusal to push

Clausewitz's unfinished text beyond where the Prussian left matters in 1831.

In discussing another source of general friction—intelligence—Clausewitz observed that the "difficulty of accurate recognition constitutes one of the most serious sources of friction in war" (Howard and Paret, p. 117). The modern term for what Clausewitz was talking about is *situation awareness*, which, for commanders and combatants, necessarily includes their belief systems and experience. Consequently, the social phenomenon of

war becomes nonergodic in Douglass North's sense that future states (or outcomes) cannot be confidently predicted based on averages calculated from past states (Douglass C. North, *Understanding the Process of Economic Change*, Princeton University Press, 2005, pp. 19, 49–50, 167). The upshot is friction with a vengeance, but Smith's insistence on halting interpretation of *On War* at Clausewitz's untimely death ignores such important insights. **JFQ**



Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency

by Anthony James Joes

Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004

351 pp \$35.00

ISBN 0–8131–2339–9

Book Review by
TODD M. MANYX

During the 20th century, the United States developed the largest and most powerful military the world has known by capitalizing on its abundant natural resources and its geographic isolation, which protected against a direct assault on the homeland. The forces it fielded for both World Wars, the Korean War, and Operation *Desert Storm* supported and reinforced a strategic philosophy based on massing troops and equipment so they could conduct direct, violent assaults against massed armies. However, operations since the September 11 attacks have revealed weaknesses, not necessarily in military strength, but rather in the strategic vision for conducting counterinsurgency operations; lessons learned in years past were not retained.

Anthony Joes' *Resisting Rebellion* is a fresh look at the well-worn topic of how

to fight an insurgency. As the United States continues its counterinsurgent efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, frequent comparisons are made to Vietnam, where the Armed Forces faced a similar situation. Joes makes an intriguing contribution by approaching the topic from the perspective of developing and executing an effective counterinsurgent strategy—which could prevent these ongoing operations from turning into Vietnam-style defeats.

The central concept of *Resisting Rebellion*, rooted in Clausewitz, is that civilians are the center of gravity and that "guerrilla insurgency is quintessentially a *political* phenomenon, and that therefore any effective response to it must be primarily political as well" (p. 7). The author then states that the ultimate goal of "any intelligent counterinsurgency policy . . . is *peace*" (p. 8).

Key to Joes' thesis is a belief that nations generally have difficulty developing counterinsurgent strategies because the academic community tends to ignore the study of warfare, and most governments that have faced an insurgency have failed to capture their "lessons learned" on how to cope with insurrections, thus requiring "relearning old lessons." Joes' efforts to bridge these two points provide the book's overall structure.

The first step in Joes' analysis is a broad discussion of guerrilla tactics and strategies and the identification of insurgency-generating circumstances. Guerrilla tactics generally focus on the need to wear down the larger force in the long term and are predicated on a mixture of surprise, mobility, intelligence, morale, infrastructure, leadership, outside assistance, and a secure base. Likewise,

insurgency-generating circumstances usually include at least one of the following: foreign occupation, defeat in war, religious rebellion, resistance to a murderous regime, a tradition of civil conflict, the desire of would-be or former elites to gain power, and closing off any peaceful avenue to change through rigged or cancelled elections.

The second step is the detailed study of the political and military elements of a counterinsurgency strategy, including in-depth examples of counterinsurgent efforts that succeeded when these elements were addressed and failed when they were ignored. The key strategic political elements include providing a peaceful path to change, committing sufficient resources, and isolating the conflict area. The central elements of military efforts at the operational/tactical level include displaying rectitude, emphasizing intelligence, dividing insurgent leaders from their followers, offering amnesty, removing firearms from disturbed areas, disrupting insurgent food supplies, and maintaining constant pressure on the enemy.

The multiple detailed examples Joes uses are a central strength. They run the gamut from the 18th through the 21st centuries and include Napoleon's problems in Spain, the Boer War, the Philippines Huk Rebellion, Latin America, and the many insurgencies with declining colonial empires in Africa and Asia following World War II.


Thoroughly researched and annotated, *Resisting*

Rebellion is an intelligently written and easily readable work that is likely to become a standard text on counterinsurgency. It would also be a valuable addition to anyone's self-directed professional military education and should be studied by all policymakers, military officers, and senior noncommissioned officers. In addition, the first two chapters, dealing with guerrilla strategy and motivations, and the final chapter, concerned with the elements of a successful counterinsurgency, should be required reading for all servicemembers who expect to operate in either Iraq or Afghanistan.

The well-read student of insurgency is likely to view *Resisting Rebellion* as a 21st-century validation of the Marine Corps' *Small Wars Manual*. Originally published nearly 80 years ago, the manual was the Corps' effort to capture the lessons learned from its experiences in the Huk Rebellion and Central American banana wars, and its sections relating to politics and tactics remain valid. However, Joes examines the problem of counterinsurgency from a broader perspective and with a more focused academic process.

According to Joes, it has been said that "guerrilla warfare is what regular armies always have most to dread" (p. 1). Perhaps the lessons this book offers can help vanquish that dread, and a counterinsurgency doctrine that encompasses and balances both the political and military perspectives can be developed. **JFQ**

Captain Todd M. Manyx, USMC, is an Intelligence Officer with over 20 years experience, most recently with a deployment to Al Anbar province in Iraq.



**Attack from the Sea:
A History of the U.S. Navy's
Seaplane Striking Force**

by William F. Trimble
Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2005
196 pp. \$29.95
ISBN: 1-5911-4878-2

Book Review by
MARTIN J. SULLIVAN

After World War II, Government leaders believed they had the answers to a series of questions important to developing a national security strategy: where the next war would be fought, who the next adversary would be, and what missions and capabilities would best serve the Nation. As Trimble shows in this meticulously researched book, however, the future was no more foreseeable at that time than it is today. Trimble's work follows the Navy's search for a role in nuclear weapons delivery missions in the postwar years and provides a sobering glimpse of the limitations of organizations and technology in a rapidly changing strategic environment.

Trimble recounts the Navy's failed attempts through the 1950s to form a seaplane striking force (SSF) to compete with Air Force strategic bombers. Nearly every untoward event described in *Attack from the Sea*—poorly developed service operational concepts, contractors' hastily submitted and unworkable engineering proposals, Service leaders' and program managers' strongly worded statements supporting those concepts and proposals—eerily parallels the modern Navy's search for meaning and methods. This book reinforces George Santayana's axiom that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.

A philosophical touchstone shared by naval

leaders (as true today as it was 60 years ago) is the notion that the ability of maritime forces to remain dispersed yet to quickly consolidate their striking power affords the Nation a potent deterrent force. Through the 1930s, the Navy strove to increase the mobility and flexibility of its forces while extending their effective combat reach. Initially, in the interwar period, seaplanes were seen as a solution to the Navy's need to gather intelligence while providing surveillance and reconnaissance services well beyond the range of aircraft organic to the nascent carrier airgroups.

Many Navy leaders—most notably, future Fleet Admiral Ernest King—believed these so-called flying boats could also act as “mobile units, available to the Fleet as powerful striking forces in addition to their traditional scouting mission.” In technological and operational terms, carriers were still in their infancy. The tonnage limits imposed by the Washington Naval Treaty and by congressionally enforced budget authority also constrained the Navy. Compared to carrier aircraft, seaplanes in the early 1930s had superb endurance and could haul heavy ordnance such as bombs and torpedoes—the exact capabilities staff officers and fleet operators believed they needed to protect U.S. forces as they advanced to meet the Japanese fleet.

Trimble portrays the goal-driven sense of purpose of Navy leaders and the frustrating constraints and limitations of the “Treaty Navy” in which they worked. King wanted to develop the long-range seaplane into a “powerful offensive weapon capable of being concentrated at any desired point on very short notice,” but he could neither win over less visionary but more practical officers assigned to review requirements nor balance his demands against the resources and technology available. Members of the General Board, the rough equivalent of today's Program Assessment and Evaluation offices, did not share King's estimation of the usefulness of seaplanes apart from traditional reconnaissance.

By the mid-1930s, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William H. Standley and the General Board questioned King's assertion that the flying boats would undergo “unlimited development.” As Trimble recounts, advances in seaplane performance did not develop as expected over the decade. Additionally, in arguments echoing those against today's seabasing concepts, board representatives believed advanced “afloat bases” would be so vulnerable to attack that shore- and carrier-based aircraft would be required to protect the anchorages. Finally, the Bureau of Aeronautics' operational concepts for employment of the seaplanes, the manpower

and training necessary to operate them, and the supporting logistic requirements exhibited a stovepiped perspective and called for unrealistic numbers of seaplanes and tenders. As the decade ended, and war in the Pacific loomed, the rapid technological change in the range, ordnance carrying capability, and maneuverability of carrier aircraft made further investments in seaplane strike forces a low priority. Ultimately, the Navy entered the war using the obsolescent PBV Catalina flying boat as a patrol aircraft, expecting to employ the platforms as attack forces as a last resort. The patrol squadrons made some contributions to the war effort, but only in those arenas where the paucity of threatening Japanese fighters and enemy anti-aircraft weapons offset the Catalina's lack of speed and maneuverability.

Despite the outstanding wartime performance of the Navy's carriers and submarines, the Service underwent a postwar institutional and intellectual crisis. Professionals and defense strategists believed atomic bombs and long-range, land-based bombers were the transformational weapons of the day and the tools in the U.S. arsenal most likely to be used. Opportunities for nuclear retaliation against the Soviet Union drove emerging military strategy, doctrine, and materiel acquisition programs. As Trimble shows with the Navy, from the late 1940s through the 1950s, initiating Service acquisition programs specifically for developing capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons was seen as proof, through twisted logic, of strategic relevance. The author describes the Navy's almost desperate efforts to quickly achieve nuclear delivery capability despite daunting technological hurdles. For example, officers considered modifying land-based patrol aircraft (P2Vs) to carry atomic bombs and planned to station the aircraft at advanced bases near major ports worldwide. When an aircraft carrier came into port, the P2Vs would be lifted aboard the ship, “and after completing their

missions, they were to find bases ashore at which to land, or somehow ditch close enough to the task force for the crews to be rescued.”

The Navy sought a vision that could reassure its leadership of the institution's relevance and act as a bulwark against political, strategic, and budgetary buffeting. Finally, in what could be called a “back to the future” episode, leaders endorsed efforts to establish a sea-based striking force they believed could give the Navy advantages of mobility and strategic surprise, as well as dispersion and concealment, all considered vital in the context of survival for retaliatory nuclear strikes. Trimble describes each of the aircraft and some of the highly modified seaplane tenders proposed for the revived SSF, but he focuses on the centerpiece of the Navy's efforts: Martin Aircraft Company's development program to make a seaplane, the P6M SeaMaster, a viable competitor for long-range strategic missions.

In 1952, the SeaMaster was envisioned as a large turbojet-powered seaplane, capable of flying at high subsonic speeds during low-level ingress to a target while carrying nuclear weapons, conventional bombs, or mines programmed for release by an integrated autopilot/weapons delivery system. The program was a disaster waiting to happen. In page after page describing programmatic and budgetary woes, Trimble documents the Navy's and Martin's poor technological research, incorrect engineering data, difficulties in controlling aircraft weight growth, material failures, and lack of effective program management. Additional aerodynamic and propulsion deficiencies revealed during the flying portion of the test program exacerbated all these issues. Despite the problems, Trimble reports that “enthusiasm for the capabilities of the SeaMaster as a nuclear delivery platform and for the SSF as a mobile striking force seemed to have no bounds.” During a test flight on December 7, 1955, the aircraft suddenly pitched down, overstressing the airframe and causing it to break apart in flight. It

Colonel Martin J. Sullivan, USMC (Ret.), is a Senior Director for Defense Policy in the Center for Adaptive Strategies and Threats at Hicks and Associates.

took another such catastrophe and crash to finally end the SeaMaster saga, but not before millions more dollars were wasted on a program that never should have gone past the drawing board. Trimble summarizes the failures of the SeaMaster and its SSF cohorts:

The SSF fell far short of what it proponents advocated,


due in part to technological and managerial shortcomings and in part to strategic, operational, and economic realities. . . . Advocates of the concept did themselves no favors either by consistently underestimating its costs and the time needed for development. . . . Planners and strategists would do well to take the lessons of the SSF to heart before forging ahead

with costly technologies based on preconceived expectations that they will . . . bring about a revolution in the way wars are fought and won (pp. 140, 142).

As a former test pilot who watched the A-12, P-7, and EA-6B Advanced Capability programs be cancelled and who recently worked in the Marine Corps' Aviation Programs and Weapons

System Branch as the MV-22 and Joint Strike Fighter were under constant review, this reviewer found portions of this book painful to read. Even with today's computer-aided design and analysis technologies, and despite the best hopes and intentions of platform advocates, machine and human errors still create problems. I can only imagine what present-day

major program managers and service acquisition executives would think if they were to read *Attack from the Sea*. In truth, Santayana's condemnation might be avoided by reading Trimble's work. **JFQ**



Islam, Europe's Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural, and Political Landscape

Edited by Shireen T. Hunter

New York: Praeger, 2002

312 pp. \$28.95

ISBN 0-2759-7609-2

Book Review by
TARA A. LEWELING

Explosions tore through London subways in June 2005, killing 52 and injuring 700; 4 months later, riots broke out in immigrant-dominated areas around Paris and beyond. According to the British Broadcasting Company, young Muslim Britons planted the bombs in the London underground. The riots in France were prompted by the accidental electrocution of two Muslim youths who, according to community leaders, were being chased by French police at the time of their deaths, a charge denied by local officials. Regardless of whether gendarmerie were involved, the outcome was clear: nearly 3 weeks of rioting, 9,000 cars set ablaze, and 3,000 arrests. Yet many U.S. military personnel in U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) positions lacked a context for understanding these violent events, particularly in terms of how Muslim communities within Western European

countries interact with their governments.

Islam, Europe's Second Religion helps to address this shortfall. Shireen Hunter's edited collection of essays by scholars on the demographics, structure, organization, and mobilization of Muslims in Europe highlights commonalities and differences of the Islamic experience among Western European nations. The first part of the volume focuses on Islam within the context of state boundaries, while the second part explores transnational issues related to Muslims in Europe, such as the generation gap among first- and second-generation immigrants and the relationship of European Muslims to European Union foreign policy. Each country-specific section offers the basic demographics and ethnic heritage of Muslims in each country, as well as aggregate information about the civic organizations, such as mosques and Islamic charities, associated with the Muslim faith in

Western Europe. Attempts at pan-ethnic organizing, particularly through umbrella organizations, are also discussed. The second part of Hunter's volume examines transnational cultural trends related to Islam, such as how European-based Islamic scholars are changing global interpretations of Islam, as well as how issues such as racism and marginalization are affecting second-generation Muslim immigrants in Western European countries.

This volume offers a contemporary view, in aggregate terms, of the Muslim experience in Western Europe. While some of the data (such as specific demographic details) is outdated, those looking for such critical information as the history of contemporary Islamic immigration to Europe and the interaction of Islamic organizations with state institutions will be well served by this collection. For military personnel serving in USEUCOM and NATO or with NATO officers in coalition

environments, the volume offers particular insight into a growing influence on the foreign policy of NATO members. Personnel focused on long-term force planning will benefit from the key insight that the demographic composition of many NATO member states is rapidly changing. Those focused on shorter-term, current-year force execution will enhance their understanding of the intricate social forces affecting the domestic governance of NATO nations. Moreover, Hunter's volume points out that individual member states are responding differently to the challenge of integrating disparate ethnic communities into their social fabrics; it is possible that these differences will affect future foreign and military policies of NATO nations. As a result, close reading of *Islam, Europe's Second Religion* offers U.S. military personnel a chance to better understand and appreciate not only the social dynamics affecting some of the United States' key partners in the global war on terror, but also unique national aspects of these social dynamics.

The Paris riots probably were not related to any specific terrorist plot, and much remains unknown about the London bombings. Nonetheless, members of al Qaeda and other Islamic-oriented terrorist networks clearly have leveraged established Muslim communities in Europe and elsewhere for logistical support. In most cases, members of these communities have been unwitting enablers of terrorist actions. While other works, such as Marc Sageman's *Understanding Terrorist Networks*,

provide insight into how the intersection of global jihadist ideology and small group dynamics can coalesce into al Qaeda recruits, Hunter's volume explains the environment in which such intersections are possible. As such, the book is an important source for those trying to understand the dynamic, sometimes contentious, nature of Islam and Islamic organizations within Western Europe, and for those seeking insight into a larger context of Islamic community in which al Qaeda recruitment and organizing in Europe play only a minuscule part.

Implications for counterterrorism aside, *Islam, Europe's Second Religion*, is a good read for anyone wanting to be better informed on the Islamic experience in Western Europe from a macroscopic perspective. For those specifically seeking to understand some of the social factors related to the London bombings and Paris riots, Hunter and her colleagues provide a critical context through data-driven analysis, enabling U.S. military personnel to check personal conjecture against empirically based findings. **JFQ**


Major Tara A. Leweling, USAF, is pursuing a PhD in Information Sciences at the Naval Postgraduate School.

National Defense University Foundation

Building a Stronger and Safer America

Congratulations to the authors of the winning essays in the 2006 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Contest and to all the entrants and judges who participated in the 25th anniversary of this annual event. Look for the winning essays in *Joint Force Quarterly*, issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 in early October.

Keep informed about our activities with the NDUF E-newsletter at www.nduf.org/publications.html



Visit the NDU Foundation online at www.nduf.org

Thank you for your support

National Defense University Foundation, 251 Third Avenue, Building 20
Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC 20319 • (202) 685-3726 FAX: (202) 685-3582

JFQ



On target. On time.

Direct To You!

ndupress.ndu.edu

Distribution: *JFQ* is distributed to the field and fleet through Service publications distribution centers. Active, Reserve, National Guard units, individuals, and organizations supported by the Services can order *JFQ* through the appropriate activity:

Army: www.usapa.army.mil (cite Misc. Pub 71-1).

Navy: Defense Distribution Depot Susquehanna, New Cumberland, Pennsylvania 17070; call (717) 770-5872, DSN 771-5827, FAX (717) 770-4360

Air Force: www.e-Publishing.af.mil or email afpdc-service@pentagon.af.mil

Marine Corps: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps (Code ARDE), Federal Building No. 2 (room 1302), Navy Annex, Washington, DC 20380; FAX (703) 614-2951, DSN 224-2951

Subscriptions for individuals and nonmilitary organizations: <http://bookstore.gpo.gov/subscriptions>

Correction: The lead photograph of armored vehicles in the Joseph J. Collins' article "Planning Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq" (issue 41, 2^d quarter 2006) on page 10 is not of Bradley fighting vehicles, but rather M113A-3 armored personnel carriers. We appreciate the e-mails and phone calls from our readers.

The Editor