Building
Trust in US-Vietnam Relations:
The
Issue of Agent Orange
Statement of Catharin E. Dalpino
Visiting
Associate Professor, Southeast Asian Studies
Edmund A.
Walsh School
of Foreign Service
Georgetown
University
United States House of
Representatives
House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee
on Asia, the Pacific and the Global
Environment
Hearing on “Our Forgotten Responsibility:
What Can
We Do to Help Victims of Agent Orange?
May 15, 2008
Thank you
for this invitation to appear before the Subcommittee to discuss the legacy of the wartime use of Agent Orange and
its continuing impact on the people of Vietnam and the United States, and on
US-Vietnam relations. My views on this
subject are informed by my work as Visiting Associate Professor of Southeast
Asian politics, security and international relations at Georgetown University,
and as Director of The Aspen Institute Advocacy and Exchange Program on Agent
Orange/Dioxin. The latter seeks to
educate Americans on the urgency of the Agent Orange issue and to promote
dialogue –between the United States
and Vietnam and within the United States
- on its resolution. I also serve as
President of the Board of Directors of the War Legacies Project, a
Vermont-based non-governmental organization working to develop a fuller
accounting of the costs of war and to connect people who suffer from its
effects with those who can mitigate that suffering. The views expressed in my testimony today are
my own, and not necessarily of these institutions.
My training
is in political science, and I will therefore focus my testimony on the impact
of Agent Orange on US-Vietnam relations.
My colleagues on the panel who are physical scientists and medical
professionals are better able to assess the precise impact – on human health
and the environment – that dioxin has exerted and continues to exert in Vietnam. However, many of us have stood on the runway
of the Da Nang
airport and seen how the herbicides spilled there during the war have blistered
the tarmac. We have spoken with farmers
living on the perimeter of former U.S. military bases who lost their
livelihood when dioxin in the soil and water contaminated their livestock. And we have visited provinces with continued
high levels of dioxin where families – and even entire villages – have been
impoverished by the need to care for an alarming percentage of people with
profound physical and cognitive disabilities. The ravages of Agent Orange in Vietnam are
evident enough to the layperson.
Agent Orange in the US-Vietnam Relationship
Over the
past two decades, reconciliation between the United
States and Vietnam has been a double-edged
sword: each country has had to manage
intense domestic issues related to the damage of a tragic war while it has
attempted to find accord with its former adversary. In the process of normalization, domestic
dynamics have often been as important as –and at times have even overshadowed –
foreign policy issues in the bilateral negotiation process.
The impact of Agent Orange is a
potent domestic driver in both Vietnam
and the United States
because it is an ongoing and even future problem, given the suspected link
between high levels of exposure and birth defects. Moreover, in Vietnam contamination is ongoing in
those areas where dioxin continues to leech into the soil and water. However, the issue of Agent Orange has only
been broached in the official US-Vietnam relationship in the past few years.
In Vietnam, the environmental damage
caused by Agent Orange was evident before the war had ended, but realization of
the full impact of dioxin on human health was slower to unfold, particularly
with regard to birth defects. A parallel
process was taking place in the United States
and led to class action litigation by veterans groups against the US
manufacturers of Agent Orange in 1978, which was settled out of court in
1984. Payments were also made to
military personnel from Australia
and New Zealand
in the suit.
Identification of Vietnamese
suffering medical and other problems from dioxin exposure was a more
complicated process, because the pool of possible victims was much larger, and
because attention to Agent Orange victims had to be balanced with relief for
other war sufferers, such as those who had been injured by landmines. Moreover, US victims of dioxin exposure were
easier to isolate, since they were largely confined to Vietnam War veterans and
their families. In addition to their own
veterans, Vietnam
was also faced with millions of civilians who had been exposed to dioxin
because their provinces had been sprayed.
In each country, as health problems
related to dioxin exposure became apparent the government was under pressure to
provide some degree of relief. The US
Veterans administration currently provides medical services to Vietnam
veterans for eleven disorders believed to be linked to dioxin exposure. The descendents of veterans exposed to Agent
Orange are also allowed services to treat spinal bifida. Veterans groups have complained that many are
not receiving the services promised, and that coverage for children is
particularly inadequate. In Vietnam,
people who are classified as suffering from the effects of exposure to Agent
Orange receive approximately $50 per year in assistance. The government struggles to provide them with
some services in institutional programs, many of which are maintained with
donor aid.
Vietnam
and the United States
wrestled with the domestic problems presented by Agent Orange in isolation of
one another during the first two decades after the war. When negotiations on normalization commenced
and the two countries embarked upon a “roadmap” to diplomatic recognition,
humanitarian assistance to remediate the impact of Agent Orange in Vietnam
was not on the table. However,
accounting for US prisoners of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) was a
centerpiece of the plan. Indeed,
US-Vietnam cooperation in this area has been a mainstay of the relationship for
more than twenty years.
During the normalization period the
issue of Agent Orange in Vietnam
was tacitly pushed aside. Although the
issue is increasingly considered to be a humanitarian one, it was often viewed
through an ideological lens in the years immediately following the war. Both governments were inclined to avoid
issues that might derail the normalization process.
With US-Vietnam diplomatic
relations established in the mid-1990’s and full trade relations completed
earlier in this decade, the tenor of the bilateral relationship is rapidly
changing. The normalization “roadmap” prescribed
a linear relationship, in which progress was measured according to established
benchmarks. However, the relationship
has expanded into a busy agenda of policy issues that play out simultaneously,
sometimes reinforcing one another and sometimes seeming to contradict one
another.
Moreover, the number of actors has
increased exponentially. Philanthropic
groups, non-governmental organizations and corporations all play a growing role
in the relationship, and public opinion is given greater weight by both
governments. As one indication of this
phenomenon, at the beginning of the decade the most prominent American to visit
Vietnam
was President Bill Clinton. More
recently, it has been Bill Gates.
New Opportunities – And Imperatives - To Resolve An Old
Problem
Despite the
present flowering of US-Vietnam relations, war legacy issues still have
resonance – and present significant problems – in both countries. Paradoxically, to continue moving forward in
the relationship, it is important to look back to these issues and make a
conscious and concerted effort to address them.
There are several compelling reasons for the United
States to work with Vietnam to remediate the impact of
Agent Orange in this new era:
1.
The growing importance of US-Vietnam relations in US policy toward Southeast
Asia. With its high
literacy rates and its spectacular growth rates, Vietnam’s economic development has
thrust it into the international spotlight as a new economic “superstar.” US-Vietnam trade has quadrupled in this
decade, and the United States
is now Vietnam’s
largest trading partner. Less
spectacular but equally important is the emerging US-Vietnam security
relationship. Security ties will proceed
at a more cautious and incremental pace, but the Pentagon has expressed its
clear interest in expanding the bilateral security dialogue.
2.
The need to strengthen trust between the two
countries as the relationship expands.
US-Vietnam relations may be fully “normal,” but a certain amount of
wariness remains between former adversaries.
Expansion into new policy areas – particularly security – will require
building greater trust between the two countries. Increasingly, Vietnamese are inclined to see
issues such as Agent Orange as a litmus test of US intentions and reliability
as a partner, not least because the United States has placed such
emphasis on accounting for its own POW/MIA’s.
Vietnam is not
expecting a direct quid pro quo, but they are looking for an indication
that the United States
takes Vietnamese needs – as well as US interests – into account in the
relationship. If the United States increases cooperation with Vietnam
on Agent Orange, there may not be immediate links to other policy issues, but
it may well improve the overall policy environment.
3.
The growing power of Vietnamese public opinion on
Agent Orange. In
recent years, Vietnamese victims
of Agent Orange have become more
visible to the Vietnamese
public. Popular artists often perform
charity concerts for their benefit. The class action lawsuit in US Federal
Court brought by the Vietnamese Association for the Victims of Agent
Orange/Dioxin (VAVA) against American manufacturers of herbicides has boosted
the profile of the issue enormously in Vietnam. To date, the lawsuit was rejected in the
lower court and has been turned down on appeal.
Without visible efforts from the United States to lessen the damage
caused by Agent Orange, the Vietnamese public may easily come to view this
issue as a clear negative in the bilateral relationship. In an era when the United
States is concerned about a drop in its “soft power”
abroad, it is difficult to fathom why Washington
does not view assistance to address Agent Orange as an asset to its public
diplomacy policy in Vietnam.
Initial Steps Toward Partnership on Agent Orange
In the
post-normalization period, the US Government has been reluctant to enter into
cooperation on Agent Orange with Vietnam. In the face of growing Vietnamese public
awareness of this issue, and growing pressure from US scientific and
humanitarian groups, in 2002 Washington
acceded to a Vietnam-US Joint Advisory Committee. Shortly thereafter the two countries
attempted to launch a joint research project on dioxin, which foundered when
the two sides could not agree on a number of issues. One more positive activity in this period was
the provision of technical equipment and expertise on analyzing soil samples
from the Environmental Protection Agency.
The EPA also co-funded, with the Ford Foundation, an assessment of
cost-effective measures to contain the dioxin at the Da Nang airport. Overall, however, these early efforts to
cooperate were discouraging.
In the past
three years, however, a series of events have created a modest upturn in this
policy area. For the first time, joint
statements following US-Vietnam Summits, one in Washington
and one in Hanoi,
mentioned cooperation between the two countries on dioxin. The 2006 report of the Appropriations
Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee included language
recommending a small pot of funds for the remediation of Agent Orange in Vietnam. In 2007, the first earmark of funds, in the
amount of $3 million, was appropriated and plans are in train for a 2009
earmark that could be slightly higher.
This new,
if modest, momentum has also sparked public-private partnerships and a Track Two
process to forge cooperation on Agent Orange between Vietnamese and American
non-governmental actors. In 2007 the
Ford Foundation announced the creation of the US-Vietnam Dialogue on Agent
Orange/Dioxin, launched with assistance from Ford’s Special Initiative on Agent
Orange/Dioxin. The Dialogue Group seeks
to draw attention to the range of human and environmental needs related to
Agent Orange in Vietnam,
and to identify a wide range of donors to help address those needs. One early success in this venture has been containment
of dioxin on one end of the runway at the Da
Nang airport, to prevent the chemical from leaking
into the surrounding soil. A written
statement provided to the Subcommittee by Walter Isaacson, President of The
Aspen Institute and Co-Chair of the US-Vietnam Dialogue on Agent Orange/Dioxin,
provides additional information on the work of the Dialogue Group.
Thusfar, in
this new climate of cautious cooperation on Agent Orange, the greater
commitment of American funds and effort has come from the private side. For example, the Ford Foundation’s two-year
Special Initiative is funded at nearly twice the amount of the 2007
earmark. Without question, private
sector support will be crucial to address Agent Orange but an equal, if not
greater, share needs to come from the US Government if progress is to be made,
and if Vietnam
is to believe that US intentions in this regard are genuine.
Next Steps and Recommendations
The small,
incremental gains made in the Agent Orange issue area in recent years are
encouraging but they do not yet add up to a solid policy. The long term nature of this problem will
require the combined efforts of the US Government and American philanthropic
and humanitarian organizations, as well as enduring partnerships between
Vietnamese and Americans on both official and non-governmental levels. In the short to mid-term, the following steps
should be considered:
1.
The US
executive branch needs to develop a stronger constituency for this issue within
its own ranks. The Agent Orange
issue has few, if any, champions in the foreign policy agencies, and attitudes
toward it are more a matter of individuals than policy. This dynamic is not likely to change until
Agent Orange and related war legacy issues are given greater attention at the
political levels.
2.
Congress should consider stand-alone legislation
to provide humanitarian
assistance and technical aid to
Vietnam
on Agent Orange. Beyond the obvious
salutary effect, such legislation would help ensure long term funding for this
purpose.
3.
Advocacy and education groups need to do more to
bring Agent Orange and other war legacy issues to the attention of the US
policy community and the American public.
Although the Vietnam War ended forty years ago, it is still a source
of debate and disagreement in American society.
This discourse can be channeled more constructively to address the
tangible side of legacy issues. To do
so, however, Americans need greater information on the long term impact of the
war. For example, most university-level
courses on the Vietnam War in the United States fail even to mention
these issues.
4.
Assistance to Vietnamese suffering the effects
of Agent Orange should be
matched with more vigorous
attention to the plight of US veterans.
Beyond the obvious humanitarian justification for this, helping our own
veterans will be critical to building public support for a long term
partnership with Vietnam
on this issue.
5.
Efforts should be made to determine the extent to
which wartime exposure to Agent Orange has affected Vietnamese-Americans. Some Vietnamese-American leaders have begun
to explore this issue quietly.
Vietnamese-
Americans who may suffer from
dioxin-related disorders are effectively
orphaned in this issue, since
assistance is not available to them through the Veterans Administration.
6.
Best practices in the remediation of Agent
Orange in Vietnam
should be
considered for Laos and Cambodia, along with appropriate
assistance. Although far less herbicide was sprayed in
these two countries compared to the amount in Vietnam, the “Ho Chi Minh Trail”
ran through both countries. The US
Government denied that Agent Orange was used in Laos until a 1982 Freedom of
Information request by the National Veterans Task Force on Agent Orange led to
the release of Operation Ranch Hand documents which revealed spraying in Lao
territory. A Lao working group on Agent
Orange was formed several years ago but has not been able to make as much
headway in documenting the impact of Agent Orange as have agencies and groups
in Vietnam. As US-Vietnam partnerships on Agent Orange
progress, they might consider triangular activities that can include Laos and Cambodia.
Although
this list of future tasks and challenges may appear daunting, I believe that
initiatives such as this hearing are an important component to this process, by
promoting public discussion on Agent Orange and other war legacy issues. Thank you for convening these discussions,
and for permitting me to participate in them.