



REPORT
of the
SECRETARY OF STATE'S PANEL
on
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE SERVICES
in
IRAQ




Eric J. Boswell
Panel Member



George A. Joulwan
Panel Member



J. Stapleton Roy
Panel Member



Patrick F. Kennedy
Executive Secretary

October, 2007

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I. **Executive Summary**

Secretary Rice tasked a panel of outside experts to review the State Department's security practices in Iraq. Panel members spent two weeks in Iraq interviewing a wide range of officials in the U.S. Embassy, the U.S. military, and the Iraqi government. The Panel witnessed first-hand the difficulty and complexity of the security environment in Iraq.

The Panel found that the Department's security practices in Iraq had been highly effective in ensuring the safety of mission personnel, but that prompt measures needed to be taken to strengthen the coordination, oversight, and accountability aspects of the State Department's security practices in Iraq in order to reduce the likelihood that future incidents will occur that adversely affect the overall US mission in Iraq.

The Panel recommended a series of measures to strengthen security practices, including enhancements in training, the establishment of an Embassy Joint Incident Review Board, prompt actions by the Embassy and the U.S. military command to tighten coordination, the addition of personnel to improve oversight, and actions with the Iraqis to improve licensing procedures for security contractors, expand communications channels, and accelerate payments for injuries, deaths, or property damage sustained by innocent persons in the course of security operations.

II. **Mission**

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice assembled a panel of outside experts to review the State Department's security practices in Iraq, following an incident on September 16, 2007 resulting in the death of 17 Iraqi civilians. The panel's mandate was to be "serious, probing, and comprehensive" in its review and to provide recommendations on how to protect US mission personnel while furthering US foreign policy objectives.

III. Setting

U.S. government personal security detail (PSD) contractors in Iraq, including those of the Department of State, operate in an overall environment that is chaotic, unsupervised, deficient in oversight and accountability, and poorly coordinated. There are numerous PSD contractors: the Department of Defense has eight; the Department of State has three. Various agencies of the US government, including components and sub-contractors of State and Defense, employ many others. The United Nations, other governments, private corporations, media representatives, and non-governmental organizations hire their own security details. The Iraqi government also hires private firms to provide security. These numerous armed PSD contractors provide their services next to and within large scale military operations carried out by the Multi-National Force – Iraq and the Iraqi armed forces. It is within this setting that the Panel was asked to review the State Department’s security practices in Iraq.

IV. Methodology

The Panel spent two weeks in Baghdad interviewing State personnel, to include the Chief of Mission, the Deputy Chief of Mission, the Regional Security Officer, and the Embassy’s three PSD contractors. The Panel also interviewed key US Department of Defense (DOD) military officers and civilians, to include General Petraeus, LTG Odierno, the DOD Inspector General, and others. The Panel also met with the Minister of Defense and the Minister of the Interior. The complete list of those interviewed can be found at Section IX.

V. Findings and Recommendations

The Panel’s findings and recommendations can be found below. Our key finding is that prompt measures should be taken to strengthen the coordination, oversight, and accountability aspects of the State Department’s security practices in Iraq in order to reduce the likelihood that future incidents will occur that adversely affect the overall US mission in Iraq.

VI. Findings

Principal Findings

1. The Department's security operations in Iraq have been highly effective in ensuring the safety of mission personnel.
2. Improvements are necessary to address shortcomings in coordination and oversight that have undermined confidence in the operation of the security program on the part of the US military command and the Iraqi government and public.
3. The United States ambassador and the Commander Multi-National Force – Iraq have a strong commitment to act cooperatively to strengthen coordination and oversight.
4. The legal framework for providing proper oversight of Personal Protective Services (PPS) contractors is inadequate, in that the Panel is unaware of any basis for holding non-Department of Defense contractors accountable under US law.
5. CPA Order 17 and CPA Memorandum 17, the two documents that currently provide the regulatory framework for PPS contractors in Iraq, need to be updated or replaced.
6. The U.S. Military in Iraq does not consider it feasible or desirable under existing conditions in Iraq for the Department of Defense to take on responsibility for provision of PPS support to the Embassy.
7. The drawdown of the U.S. Military in Iraq is likely to create increased requirements for personal protective services.
8. The Diplomatic Security Service does not have sufficient Special Agents worldwide to take on all PPS operations in Iraq while continuing to meet requirements in other countries.
9. The Government of Iraq has issued a "Report by the Investigation Committee" on the September 16, 2007, incident involving a State Department contractor. The FBI investigation into the incident is on-going.

Personnel Findings

10. There are an insufficient number of Diplomatic Security Service Special Agents assigned to the Embassy to provide the appropriate level of oversight to ensure adherence to the rules and procedures currently in place.
11. Department of State PPS contractors lack Arabic language capability.
12. The sensitivity of Personal Protective Security specialists to local conditions could be improved through additional training on the cultural environment in which they operate.

Coordination and Oversight Findings

13. The Mission Firearms Policy of the U.S. Embassy provides comprehensive guidance on permissible uses of deadly force and the circumstances under which deadly force can be used. The guidance is less explicit on how deadly force should be used.
14. Technical devices have not been installed to record events during contractor operations.
15. The lack of specific identifiers for the many private security contractors operating in Iraq has led to confusion about responsibility for reported incidents and complicated the task of determining accountability.
16. When incidents involving the discharge of weapons occur, the scope of investigation has not been broad enough to ensure that on-the-scene information is gathered quickly and thoroughly and incorporated into the overall investigation.
17. The Embassy process for addressing incidents, including those involving the U.S. Military is insufficiently comprehensive.
18. The process for coordination and sharing of information between the Embassy and the Multi-National Force – Iraq is not sufficiently robust to ensure mutually beneficial situational awareness and knowledge of the particulars of incidents that could potentially affect U.S. - Iraqi relations.

U.S. – Iraq Findings

19. The licensing process for PSD contractors, both as to fees and procedures, is insufficiently clear and expeditious, increasing the risk that armed contractors will carry out their functions with an inadequate legal basis.

20. The Embassy does not have adequate channels to the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior for liaison in the event that incidents occur that involve State Department security contractors.

21. The Embassy process for provision of payments, as is expected by Iraqi legal practice and custom, to the families of innocent civilians killed or seriously injured in connection with PSD contractor operations, or for damage to property, is not as responsive or timely as that of the U.S. military.

VII. Recommendations

Principal Recommendations

1. To restore confidence in the Embassy personal security program, the “Coordination and Oversight” recommendations listed below should be implemented.
2. The State Department should urgently engage with the Department of Justice and the Office of Management and Budget, and then with the Congress, to establish a clear legal basis for holding contractors accountable under U.S. law.
3. The Department of State should work with the Department of Defense to determine how to commence discussions with the Government of Iraq on a new regulatory framework for PPS contractors.
4. The requirement to expand security oversight requires an overall increase in the Diplomatic Security Service’s authorized staffing levels. The Department of State should approach the Office of Management and Budget and request in the final appropriations action for FY-08 an increase of one hundred positions and the requisite salary and operating costs in order to provide the needed staffing in Iraq without stripping other missions of their security resources.
5. When the FBI investigation into the September 16, 2007, incident is completed, the Embassy should submit its recommendation as to whether the continued services of the contractor involved is consistent with the accomplishment of the overall United States mission in Iraq.

Personnel Recommendations

6. The Regional Security Office should be provided with additional Department of State Special Agents so that an Assistant Regional Security Officer (A/RSO) can accompany PPS movements. The State Department should ensure that each A/RSO should complete an Iraq-specific orientation program.

7. The Worldwide Personal Protective Service contract should be amended to require the contractor to provide a limited number of Arabic language staff for use as needed.
8. Additional training modules should be added under the Worldwide Personal Protective Services contract to enhance the cultural awareness of assigned personnel, acquaint them with diplomatic structures and procedures, and familiarize them with Multi-National Force-I tactics, techniques and procedures.

Coordination and Oversight Recommendations

9. To tighten the ground rules for the use of deadly force, and to ensure greater parallelism with USCENTCOM rules on the use of force by contracted security in Iraq, the U.S. Mission Firearms Policy should be revised to specify, without limiting the inherent right to take action necessary for self-defense, if an authorized employee must fire his/her weapon, he/she must fire only aimed shots; fire with due regard for the safety of innocent bystanders; and make every effort to avoid civilian casualties.
10. The Regional Security Office (RSO) should be provided video and audio recording equipment for each security vehicle, audio recording equipment in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) to record all radio transmissions; and computer enhancements to record all Blue Force Tracking data.
11. The Regional Security Office should place a readable number (like a license plate) on the right rear door of each vehicle utilized, to enable anyone wishing to question its mode of operation to identify the unit to the Regional Security Office, which can then review the matter and take appropriate action.
12. The Regional Security Office should establish a "Go Team" that would proceed as soon as possible to the scene of any weapons discharge to gather information and material and provide an analysis of what happened and why, and prepare a report. The Team would work with representatives of the appropriate Government of Iraq offices and the U.S. military unit responsible for the location.

13. An Embassy Joint Incident Review Board should be established to review all incidents involving the use of deadly force which are known or asserted to have caused injury or death or other serious consequences. The Board should be chaired by the Minister-Counselor for Political-Military affairs and other members should be the Regional Security Officer, another civilian Embassy Officer with a law enforcement background from an agency other than State or Justice, and a military officer designated by MNF-I. The Board would hear from the Assistant Regional Security Officer (A/RSO) who was in the motorcade, review the statements provided by the security personnel involved, as well as any protectee(s), plus the Go Team report, and then make a recommendation to the Ambassador on whether or not the use of force appears justified. If it does not feel that it was justified, the Department should be informed to notify the Department of Justice.

14. The Regional Security Office and MNF-I should establish a permanent working group to develop commonly agreed operational procedures; establish a robust liaison element; exchange information; ensure optimal situational awareness; and ensure that any issues are discussed and quickly resolved.

In addition to the above, three specific items should be on the agenda for the first meeting:

- 14a. ensuring that the planning, coordinating and routing information which currently flows from the Regional Security Office's Tactical Operations Center (TOC) to Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) liaison elements located in the TOC and posted to the U.S. Military's Command Post of the Future (CPOF) system, is available electronically to all operating elements under MNF-I
- 14b. providing TOC Spot Reporting electronically to any subordinate military element that wishes to receive it directly
- 14c. coordinating the provision of frequencies for the military radios the RSO has ordered to enhance coordination.

15. Coordination with MNF-I elements could be further enhanced if the pending order for Harris Corporation Model PRC-110 radios were received.

The Department of State should intervene, including with DOD as necessary, to obtain these units.

16. When the “Go Team” is not involved in investigating incidents, it should be employed in pattern analysis. The Diplomatic Security Service in Washington should provide the RSO with a relational data base to be used to review incidents and determine potential patterns. Such a data base would include:

1. Date and Time of incident
2. Destination and GPS coordinates
3. GPS coordinates of incident
4. Mission identifier
5. Vehicle identification numbers
6. Incident type
7. Names of all security personnel involved and their assignments in the motorcade.
8. Such other details as would be useful.

Data on each event would be input promptly after it occurs. Weekly reports should be generated to look for potential patterns that would call for systemic or individual changes.

U.S. – Iraq Recommendations

17. The Embassy should use the venue afforded by the Iraqi-U.S. Joint Commission to establish a working group to determine ways to move the licensing process forward in an open and transparent way;

18. The Regional Security Officer should establish direct channels to senior Iraqi police and security officials in Baghdad and in any other city where Provincial Reconstruction Teams are located. This should be a major step towards providing information on incidents in a timely way so that they can be appropriately investigated.

19. In order to be more responsive to Iraqi custom, the Embassy must actively seek out the families of those innocent Iraqi civilians killed or seriously injured, or those whose property has been damaged by Personal

Protective Services personnel. The Regional Security Office “Go Team”, assisted by the U.S. military unit responsible for the area in which an incident has occurred, should work with counterparts designated by the Government of Iraq to promptly offer appropriate condolences and compensation.

VIII.

INTERIM REPORT
TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE SERVICES IN IRAQ

October 4, 2007

Eric J. Boswell
Panel Member

Patrick F. Kennedy
Executive Secretary

Following discussions with a number of senior civilian and military officials, there are points of agreement as well as issues that will require further discussions, especially with the two other members of the review panel.

However, while this work continues, there are several steps that the Department of State could undertake which can have immediate value. Additionally, none of these steps should in any way prejudice the final findings and recommendations that the full team may make.

Recommendations

1. The Regional Security Office (RSO) currently has personnel who oversee Personal Protective Services (PPS) operations and accompany them on movements on a random basis. Increasing the RSO staff with additional Department of State Special Agents would enable an Assistant Regional Security Officer to accompany every movement to ensure that all mandated procedures and reporting are observed and to provide an ultimate command and control mechanism should it be required. Until such time as the full complement of twenty additional staff arrives, the first assignments should go to the deployed Tactical Security Teams (TST's) who provide the quick reaction capability and are the most heavily armed. This will put an Assistant Regional Security Officer with all but advance personnel movements.
2. Planning, coordination, and tracking information currently flows from the RSO Tactical Operation Center (TOC) to Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) liaison elements located in the TOC. The TOC already inputs this data into the military Command Post of the Future (CPOF) format and utilizes the military system (Blue Force Tracker) that geographically locates Embassy convoys. Embassy should complete on-going liaison with MNF-I to ensure that Multi-National Division – Baghdad (MND-B / First Cavalry Division), the military unit responsible for the Baghdad area, accesses this information electronically. TOC Spot Reporting should also be provided electronically to MNF-I and MND-B at the same time it is transmitted to the Department. These actions will increase information sharing.
3. There are a great many private security companies operating in Iraq. Currently when there is an incident a private security company there is no definitive way to determine which entity was involved because of the similarity of vehicles used. All State Department PPS vehicles should have a small but readable vehicle identification number, like a license plate, placed on the right rear of each vehicle. This would enable the RSO to review any incident involving a State Department mission.
4. In the event of an incident there will always be different views on what actually occurred. While no step is dispositive, the installation of cameras in every

security vehicle would provide additional information that may be useful in reviewing such incidents as they occur.

5. All radio transmissions on movements are currently monitored by the TOC. Appropriate equipment should be installed in the TOC to record these transmissions, so that they can be reviewed in the case of an incident.
6. The Blue Force Tracking program monitors and displays the movements of all Department of State missions. The equipment should be upgraded to add the capability to record and retain movement data so that it can be referred to if there is any question later about a reported incident.
7. Regional Security Office staff should be increased to provide for a permanent “Go Team” that would respond the scene of a serious incident as soon as possible after it occurs. The team would gather information and material and provide an analysis of what happened and why. This will require the addition of five staff to the RSO. Consideration should be given to proposing, as part of the Joint Iraqi-U.S. Commission deliberations, that this effort include GoI participation. This would also require a commitment by MNF-I to provide prompt support.
8. After any serious incident (involving vehicle collision or firing into a vehicle), the RSO should work with the military division responsible for that area to seek out the property owners or family members to extend condolences and offer appropriate compensation. This would be one of the duties assigned to the “Go Team.”
9. When the “Go Team” is not involved in investigating incidents, it should be employed in pattern analysis. The Diplomatic Security Service in Washington should provide the RSO with a relational data base to be used to review incidents and determine potential patterns. Such a data base would include:
 1. Date and Time of incident
 2. Destination and GPS coordinates
 3. GPS coordinates of incident
 4. Mission identifier
 5. Vehicle identification numbers
 6. Incident type
 7. Names of all security personnel involved and their assignments in the motorcade.
 7. Such other details as would be useful.

Data on each event would be input promptly after it occurs. Weekly reports should be generated to look for potential patterns that would call for systemic or individual changes.

10. There is no legal clarity on the ability of the United States Government to prosecute a civilian contractor of the Department of State for his/her activities if they do not occur on U.S. Government property, should such action be warranted. The State Department much urgently engage with the Department of Justice and, if necessary with the Office of Management and Budget, and then with the Congress, to set clear guidelines for such potential action or to obtain a legislative change.
11. Coordination with MNF-I elements could be further enhanced if the pending order for Harris Corporation Model PRC-110 radios were received. The Department of State should intervene, including with DOD as necessary, to obtain these units.

INTERVIEWS

Robert Alter, Economic Officer, American Embassy, Baghdad

Joseph Anderson, BG, USA, Chief of Staff, Multi-National Corps – Iraq (III Corps)

Michael Barbero, MG, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Operations, Multi-National Force – Iraq

Thomas Bergeson, Colonel, USAF, Staff Officer - Aviation, Strategic Operations, Multi-National Force – Iraq

Vincent Brooks, BG, USA, Deputy Commanding General, Multi-National Division – Baghdad (First Calvary Division)

Patricia Butenis, Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy, Baghdad

John Campbell, BG, USA, Deputy Commanding General, Multi-National Division – Baghdad (First Calvary Division)

Ricardo Colon, Deputy Regional Security Officer, American Embassy, Baghdad

Ryan Crocker, Ambassador, American Embassy, Baghdad

Christopher D. Crowley, Mission Director, Agency for International Development, American Embassy, Baghdad

Jeffrey J. Dorko, BG USA, incoming Commander, Gulf Regional Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

James Dubik, LTG, USA, Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq

Joseph Fill, MG, USA, Commanding General, Multi-National Division – Baghdad (First Calvary Division)

Michael Fuller, Colonel, USA, Chief of Staff, Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq

Anthony Helm, Colonel, USA, Command Staff Judge Advocate, Joint Contracting Command

Denise A. Herbol, Deputy Mission Director, Agency for International Development, American Embassy Baghdad

Frederic (Sam) Hill, Deputy Legislative Affairs Advisor, American Embassy, Baghdad

John Jack Holly, Director of Logistics, Joint Contracting Command, Iraq/Afghanistan,

Darin Johnson, Legal Advisor, American Embassy, Baghdad

Debra Johnson, Political-Military Officer, American Embassy, Baghdad

Claude M. Kicklighter, LTG, USA (ret.), Inspector General, Department of Defense

Sam McDonald, Attorney Advisor, American Embassy, Baghdad

Earl Miller, Regional Security Officer, American Embassy, Baghdad

Sandra Muench, Deputy Management Counselor, American Embassy, Baghdad

John Paxton, MG, USMC, Chief of Staff, Multi-National Force - Iraq

Lawrence T. Peter, Director, The Private Security Company Association of Iraq

Elizabeth Phillips, Director, Joint Strategic Planning & Assessment Officer, American Embassy Baghdad

Phyllis Powers, Director, Office of Provincial Affairs, American Embassy, Baghdad

Patrick Robinson, Executive Officer, Agency for International Development, American Embassy Baghdad

Darryl Scott, MG USAF, Commander, Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan

Matthew Tueller, Political Minister-Counselor, American Embassy, Baghdad

Michael Walsh, BG USA, Commander, Gulf Regional Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

IX. LIST OF THOSE INTERVIEWED

United States

Edward Alford, Management Counselor, American Embassy, Baghdad

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Gary Anderson, Management Officer, Office of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, American Embassy, Baghdad

Joseph Anderson, BG, USA, Chief of Staff, Multi-National Corps – Iraq (III Corps)

Michael Barbero, MG, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Operations, Multi-National Force – Iraq

Thomas Bergeson, COL, USAF, Staff Officer - Aviation, Strategic Operations, Multi-National Force – Iraq

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Vincent Brooks, BG, USA, Deputy Commanding General, Multi-National Division – Baghdad (First Calvary Division)

Patricia Butenis, Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy, Baghdad

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Frank Carrico, Counselor for Commercial Affairs, U.S. Commercial Service, Department of Commerce, American Embassy, Baghdad

Ricardo Colon, Deputy Regional Security Officer, American Embassy, Baghdad

Ryan Crocker, Ambassador, American Embassy, Baghdad

Christopher D. Crowley, Mission Director, Agency for International Development, American Embassy, Baghdad

Jeffrey J. Dorko, BG USA, incoming Commander, Gulf Regional Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

James Dubik, LTG, USA, Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq

Cheryl Dukelow, Commercial Attache, U.S. Foreign Commercial Service, Department of Commerce, American Embassy, Baghdad

Joseph Fill, MG, USA, Commanding General, Multi-National Division – Baghdad (First Cavalry Division)

Michael Fuller, COL, USA, Chief of Staff, Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq

William Gorman, Senior Advisor to the Stock Exchange, American Embassy, Baghdad

Anthony Helm, COL, USA, Command Staff Judge Advocate, Joint Contracting Command

Denise A. Herbol, Deputy Mission Director, Agency for International Development, American Embassy Baghdad

Frederic (Sam) Hill, Deputy Legislative Affairs Advisor, American Embassy, Baghdad

John Jack Holly, Director of Logistics, Joint Contracting Command, Iraq/Afghanistan,

Nicholas Holt, Political Officer, American Embassy, Baghdad

Jeffrey Huber, Project Manager, Worldwide Personal Protective Services,
Triple Canopy, Basrah, Iraq

Darin Johnson, Legal Advisor, American Embassy, Baghdad

Debra Johnson, Political-Military Officer, American Embassy, Baghdad

Claude M. Kicklighter, LTG, USA (ret.), Inspector General, Department of
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Sam McDonald, Attorney Advisor, American Embassy, Baghdad

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Earl Miller, Regional Security Officer, American Embassy, Baghdad

Sandra Muench, Deputy Management Counselor, American Embassy,
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Blake C. Ortner, COL, USA, Deputy Commander, Joint Area Support Group
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John Paxton, MG, USMC, Chief of Staff, Multi-National Force - Iraq

Lawrence T. Peter, Director, The Private Security Company Association of
Iraq

David Petraeus, GEN, USA, Commander, Multi-National Force – Iraq

Elizabeth Phillips, Director, Joint Strategic Planning & Assessment Officer,
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Williams Phillips, COL, USA, Commander, Joint Area Support Group
Central

April Powell-Willingham, Office of Legislative Statecraft, Political Section,
American Embassy, Baghdad

Phyllis Powers, Director, Office of Provincial Affairs, American Embassy,
Baghdad

Philip Reeker, Counselor for Public Affairs, American Embassy, Baghdad

Patrick Robinson, Executive Officer, Agency for International Development,
American Embassy Baghdad

Rachel Roe, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Justice, American Embassy,
Baghdad

Karen Sasahara, Deputy Political-Military Counselor, American Embassy,
Baghdad

Todd Schwartz, Economic Counselor, American Embassy, Baghdad

Darryl Scott, MG USAF, Commander, Joint Contracting Command –
Iraq/Afghanistan

Edgar C. Seely, Contracting Officer's Representative, Office of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement, American Embassy, Baghdad

George (Gerd) Smith, Treasury Attache, Department of the Treasury,
American Embassy, Baghdad

Matthew Stuckart, Director, Worldwide Personal Protective Services
Programs, Blackwater, Moyock, North Carolina

Matthew Tueller, Political Minister-Counselor, American Embassy,
Baghdad

Matthew Twigg, Project Manager, Blackwater, Baghdad, Iraq

Samantha Vinograd, Deputy Treasury Attache, Department of the Treasury,
American Embassy, Baghdad

Robert Waller, Deputy Political Counselor, American Embassy, Baghdad

Michael Walsh, BG USA, Commander, Gulf Regional Division, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers

Leon C. Yonce, LTC, USAF, Commander, Detachment 3, 732 ESFS,
International Zone Police, Joint Area Support Group

Government of Iraq

The Minister of Defense of Iraq

The Minister of Interior of Iraq

Other Governments

Representatives of Australian Embassy, Baghdad

Representative of British Embassy, Baghdad

X. ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS

A/RSO	Assistant Regional Security Officer
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CPOF	Command Post of the Future
DOD	Department of Defense
DS	Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department of State
DSS	Diplomatic Security Service
GoI	Government of Iraq
MNF-I	Multi-National Force – Iraq
MoI	Ministry of the Interior – Iraq
PPS	Personal Protective Services
PSC	Private Security Company
PSD	Personal Protective Detail
PPS	Personal Protective Services
PSS	Personal Security Specialist
RSO	Regional Security Office/Regional Security Officer
RSO/CC	Regional Security Office Coordination Center
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
U.S.G.	United States Government
WPPS	Worldwide Protective Services Contract