

# Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Policy and “Other Means”

Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman

## Appendix A

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Appendix A to Joseph Felter & Brian Fishman *Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Policy and “Other Means”* is a compilation of 28 intelligence reports paraphrasing interrogations of detainees captured in Iraq. These summaries are Unclassified as redacted and released to the authors. As emphasized in the Authors’ Note, information obtained from interrogations of detained militants must be interpreted with extreme caution. Detainees may be misinformed or lying, interrogators may misunderstand or incompletely transcribe information, and the context of a detainee’s story may be missing. Readers should be aware that the “voice” used in these intelligence reports often seems to be a composite of the interrogator’s 3<sup>rd</sup> person perspective and the language and terminology of the detainee. Readers should be wary of drawing firm conclusions based on a single statement.

The entire report can be accessed at [www.ctc.usma.edu](http://www.ctc.usma.edu)

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 001

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED (AS REDACTED)**

**Summary:**

[Detainee] and [REDACTED] traveled to Amarah for a meeting prior to traveling to Iran for their second trip for paramilitary instructor training. [Detainee] and [REDACTED] met the other trainees at the same house they met the other trainees at prior to traveling to Iran on their first trip. When [Detainee] and [REDACTED] arrived at the house, the other trainees were already there. The group spent one night at the house and learned the next morning from Naji that the trip had been cancelled. Everyone returned to their respective areas.

Approximately 10 days after returning to Kut, [REDACTED] called [Detainee] and [REDACTED] and told them that they needed to come to Amarah because it was time for their trip. [Detainee] and [REDACTED] took a taxi to the Baghdad Garage in Amarah where they met [REDACTED] the individual who takes people to [REDACTED]'s houses in Amarah. [Detainee] and [REDACTED] arrived at a house where they saw all of the other trainers waiting. This may have been the same home [Detainee] was at approximately 10 days earlier, but it may have been another house. [REDACTED] was not present at this house prior to going to Iran. [REDACTED] from Baghdad and [REDACTED] from Basra did not show up at the house and did not attend the second trip to Iran for paramilitary instructor training. [REDACTED], the support weapons trainer from Amarah was responsible for coordinating all travel for the second trip. [REDACTED] is also the individual who was in charge of [Detainee]'s payroll. [REDACTED] took the group to the Baghdad Garage where they took a taxi-bus to the Shalamchah border crossing. After crossing the border legally, the group took a taxi-bus to Ahvaz. [REDACTED] knew where to go because [REDACTED] had traveled this route several times before. The group went to a three or four story house in Ahvaz, the same one that the group stayed in on their first trip to Iran. The structure was a house but was divided in to apartments. The house had an Iraqi caretaker named [REDACTED]. [Detainee] saw other individuals who were staying at this house but none appeared to be other individuals receiving training. No one who stayed at or came to the house wore a military uniform. This house was designated for the travel; [REDACTED] and the rest of the group were required to stay the night there in Ahvaz. A large traffic circle was located across the street from the house. The traffic circle had an approximately two and a half meter tall statue of a teapot in the middle. [Detainee] could not hear any airplanes from the airport in Ahvaz while staying in the house. [Detainee] can not remember anything else significant about the area other than the enormous teapot.

The group spent one night in Ahvaz, and then traveled to the airport in Ahvaz the following morning. [Detainee] rode in a pickup truck while several other individuals rode in a Mercedes van. █████, the caretaker took the individuals to the airport and gave out the tickets. The group got on a large white and blue airplane and flew to Tehran. An unidentified Iranian met █████ at the airport in Tehran and put everyone in vehicles. The vehicles drove directly from the airport to the training camp. The group arrived at some time between 0000 and 0300 and immediately went to sleep. No training was conducted the following day and people woke up at various times through the day. Everyone was very tired after traveling to Iran and arriving late.

After the day off the paramilitary training began. [Detainee] provided the following breakdown of the paramilitary training received during [Detainee]'s second trip to Iran:

Day 1 – Woke up at 0800. The instructors gathered the group in a classroom. Four instructors were introduced, named █████ or █████, █████, and an additional Iranian instructor who was called █████ in honor of the late █████ who was killed between [Detainee]'s first and second trips to Iran █████ and █████ were both Lebanese Hizballah (LH). █████, or █████, and █████ were both Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). All instructors were in uniform, the IRGC instructors wore different uniforms than the LH instructors. █████ introduced the instructors briefly and then prepared the class for their first day of training. The class was issued pistols and moved outside to the soccer field at the northwest corner of the camp. This training was called 'skills'. █████ walked around telling the group how to hold their pistol while moving left and right and while walking and shooting. If someone looked lazy, █████ would hit the persons arm. The trainees were not happy with the training, and were constantly joking around and slacking off. No firing was done while conducting any of the 'skills' training.

Day 2 and Day 3 – Additional 'skills' training with pistol.

Day 4 – 'Skills' training with AK-47 assault rifle.

Day 5 through Day 7 – Additional 'Skills' training with AK-47 assault rifle.

Day 8 – This was an entire day off because it was Friday and the 'skills' training was completed. All the trainees felt like the 'skills' training was a complete waste of time and was very boring and tiresome. All the trainees felt that the 'skills' training was conducted because the cadre did not have enough real training to last the entire trip, and because the cadre did not like the Iraqi trainees because they were constantly goofing around.

Days 9-18 – ██████, the LH instructor pulled all the students into a classroom. ██████ taught all the students about how to act and dress in order to make a good impression as an instructor. ██████'s instruction was a general class that applied to all specialties. The instructor training consisted of 10 days of studying ones' specialty, and taking turns giving mock periods of instruction. The trainees did not take it very seriously, and were constantly making fun of each other while they attempted to demonstrate their teaching skills. Everyone made fun of ██████ while he was teaching because ██████ looks funny and has only four long hairs on his head that were always blowing around. Even ██████ was laughing at ██████ when he attempted to teach his classes. During some periods of instruction ██████ would show videos and pictures of successful LH operations. [Detainee] specifically remembers seeing a video of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of LH meeting with suicide bombers immediately prior to an operation. These suicide bombers then blew up an embassy immediately following the meeting. ██████ then showed photos and videos of the aftermath of this attack, saying it was a very successful LH operation and took place in 1981. The group did not view any photos or pictures of the bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut. [Detainee] was not given any of these videos or photos to have in Iraq, this was only shown in the camp in Iran. This is one of the specific events that gave [Detainee] the impression that the instruction they received was developed mostly by LH, and not IRGC.

Day 19 – On day 19, the groups split up in to four groups based on the specialties designated. [Detainee] and ██████ from Karbala were switched from Information to Tactics. No one trained on Information during the second trip. The four groups were put in four different classrooms where they all studied their specialty. Tactics consisted of [Detainee], ██████ from Karbala, ██████ from Amarah and ██████ from Nasiriyah. Day 19 was an introduction to Tactics, in which the instructor informed the group that Tactics is the most important of all subjects, because the other subjects were useless on their own. On Day 19 the group began studying tactics used to guard an area or a building including how to set up a perimeter and how to designate fields of fire. All tactics classes were designed around the idea that a team consisted of four people. Multiple teams can be used. The teams will function mostly autonomously but with a single goal in mind.

For example, an engineer team may be responsible for emplacing and detonating IEDs on a convoy while a Support Weapons team is simultaneously responsible for launching mortars or rockets at the same vehicles. A conventional weapons team would then be responsible for firing at the vehicles with small arms and assaulting the vehicles. The Support Weapons team would be responsible for launching mortars at the vehicles again once the conventional weapons team pulled back. Each team functions together but does not get involved in what the other team is doing. A plan would be worked out ahead of time for this, and one individual in each team would be responsible for coordinating with the other team leaders during the attack.

Day 20 – The Tactics group continued to study how to guard an area, a building and set up a perimeter.

Day 21 – The group learned about different types of terrain such as mountains, valleys, hills and open areas and how these different types of areas can be used to an attackers advantage. For example, if an attack is being conducted on a convoy then it is good to attack from a hill or mountain because you can see more of what is going on.

Day 22 – The Tactics class went to the training area south of the IRGC camp to conduct field training. The tactics class spent two straight days digging large V-shaped holes. These holes were to be used as shelter in the event of an attack or more importantly in the event that a perimeter needs to be set up around something. The holes were dug with a small ditch at the bottom to collect rainwater. The trainees did not do so, but were told that in the event that camouflage is needed the trainees can cover the tops of their holes with branches and leaves.

Day 23 – The trainees were shown how to dig trenches connecting foxholes. The trenches are used to move from foxhole to foxhole without exposing yourself from enemy fire. The trainees did not see much use for this training, but were told by the LH instructors that this is what is done at the front lines in Palestine.

Day 24 – The trainees were shown how to fill and stack sandbags in order to create a large sturdy structure that one can hide behind for cover. The group filled and stacked sandbags to create a circular structure approximately two meters high, that had a window in the front that someone can look or shoot out of.

Days 25 & 26 – The Tactics group conducted calisthenics for both the 25th and 26<sup>th</sup> day. The tactics group high-crawled and low-crawled around the obstacle course located in the northeast corner of the training camp. Some of the movement techniques were conducted with an AK-47 and some were not.

Day 27 – The tactics group was instructed on how to apply camouflage to hide. The group was taught how to pick leaves and trees from the surrounding areas and cover themselves with these things, as well as use them to disguise their positions from aircraft. The group was also taught how to apply camouflage face paint. The group was told to take black camouflage face paint and cover either the left or right half of the face with it. The other half of the face should have three diagonal lines running parallel from the middle of the nose down to the persons' neck.

Day 28 – The group practiced walking in different formations. The group was taught how to walk in a single file line, where the first person looks forward, the

people behind alternated which side to watch, and the last person looks to the rear. The group was also taught how to walk in a side-by-side formation with each person looking away from the group for security, and a 'zig-zaggy' formation which is like side-by-side but with people staggered. [Detainee] can not remember how far apart people are supposed to be when walking in each formation. The group was taught how to break up a protest. In order to break up a protest, the group should form a V shape while staying very close together. Upon entering the protesters, the group should attempt to split the group and push them back. The group learned about fighting at night. When fighting at night, a group must stay closer together than during the day time. The group must also be quieter as there is less background noise to cover up movements. When moving at night smoking is not allowed, neither is fire. If you have to fight at night, you should only do it in an area that you are familiar with so you always know where you are.

Day 29 – Ambushes – There are many different kinds of ambushes. The most important are destruction ambushes, specific target ambushes and trick ambushes.

The goal of a destruction ambush is to destroy the target and then pull back. When conducting a destruction ambush it is very important that support weapons are utilized as much as possible before sending conventional weapons teams in. This is done to limit the amount of resistance the conventional weapons team will encounter. The conventional weapons team will assault the objective and neutralize any threats. Then the engineer team will go in and destroy any equipment or facilities that are still in tact. Once the engineers have destroyed the facilities and equipment, the engineers and conventional weapons teams will pull back. The support weapons will launch mortars and rockets at the objective to facilitate the withdrawal of the conventional weapons and engineer teams.

A specific target ambush is normally conducted against a convoy of vehicles. A specific ambush will begin with engineers detonating roadside bombs focused on one vehicle of the convoy. The support weapons teams will then attack the other vehicles with mortars and rockets to force them back, while the conventional weapons teams assault the objective with small arms and RPGs. The conventional weapons teams will assault the target vehicle and take whatever equipment is available. If there is a person still alive in the target vehicle, then that person should be kidnapped if the situation permits. The indirect fire teams are responsible for keeping enough pressure on the other vehicles to prevent them from helping the target vehicle. The conventional weapons teams will withdraw with the seized equipment and persons while the indirect fire teams keep the other personnel from responding.

A trick ambush is not actually an ambush. It is the emplacement of a device that is obviously a roadside bomb, and is normally used to stop enemy forces from

entering an area, or forcing them in to a different route for the purpose of another type of attack.

Day 30 – Day 30 of tactic training focused on how to respond to an ambush. When ambushed, a team should attempt to stay together and get behind something that will provide them safety from incoming fire. The team should then throw smoke grenades and attempt to flee the area undetected.

Day 31 – Day 31 covered the type of fighting that is used in urban environments. This was referred to as ‘American street fighting’. The group was told that CF always leaves one way out when they seal an area. The group needs to find this area and use it to escape.

Day 32 – Day 32 was instruction on how to move over long distances on foot with a large pack full of supplies and a weapon. This topic was discussed briefly. The trainees were told that when this is done there needs to be a perimeter security force on each side of the movement element. The perimeter force is responsible for responding to an attack by the enemy.

The trip did not have any type of group exercise. The groups did not cross-train on their specialties following the specific instruction.

None of the training focused on CF tactics or how to overcome them. The only topics like this that were discussed, were about CF vehicles. The trainees were told that the CF vehicle is very well armored, and that penetrating this armor is difficult by regular weapons. The trainees were told that the two weak spots on CF vehicles are the windows, and the horizontal portion between the front and rear doors. This topic was discussed on the [Detainee]’s first trip and was discussed by [REDACTED].

[Detainee] has heard that weapons and EFPs are stored in and moved through Badrah. [Detainee] heard this [REDACTED] aka [REDACTED], [REDACTED] driver. [Detainee] overheard [REDACTED] talking [REDACTED] about this topic but can not remember when. [Detainee] did not hear [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] mention any specific locations where weapons are stored. [Detainee] also overheard [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] discuss the town of Aziziyah being used to store weapons. [Detainee] has no other knowledge on weapons storage locations.

During [Detainee]’s second trip to Iran for paramilitary training, [Detainee] got in an argument with one of the interpreters at the IRGC training facility. [Detainee] was upset because the instructors would not issue the trainees any socks to wear with their boots. [Detainee] and the other trainees repeatedly asked for socks until it escalated in to a larger issue about how they were being treated. The interpreter became upset, and called [Detainee] a very disrespectful name in front of the other trainees. [Detainee] did not want to cause a larger problem for everyone so [Detainee] did not make a comment back to the interpreter. [REDACTED],

█████ and █████ all showed up the following day to address the problem. Other trainees informed █████ and █████ about what the interpreter had said to [Detainee]. █████ and █████ did nothing about it and sided with the interpreter.

[Detainee] overheard the LH and IRGC instructors talking about the fact that Iraqis train in Lebanon for paramilitary training and that this training is far superior to the training conducted in Iran.



**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 002

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED (AS REDACTED)**

**Summary:**

[Detainee] does not know exactly what group or organization the Iranian trainers belonged. [Detainee] is not very familiar with elements of the Iranian military. There are two militaries in Iran and the Islamic military is better than the regular military. The Islamic Army in Iran is like the Republican Guard in Iraq during Saddam's regime. At one of the days of sniper training [Detainee] overheard [REDACTED] talking about the instructors being Officers of the Istala'at group of The Islamic Army in Iran. (**Comment:** Istala'at is probably the Farsi word l'tala'at, which means Intelligence. The word Istala'at is not an actual word in Arabic or Farsi. By Islamic Army [Detainee] is likely referring to the IRGC but did not specifically say this.) [Detainee] never saw any of the instructors wear any type of uniform or insignia.

The training [Detainee] received in Iran was not the normal training given. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] have previously attended every type of training available and were assisting in instructing the trainees [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] told some of the trainees that the instructors teaching this group were not very good and were giving bad advice [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] also said that the instructors in their last training course, for IEDs, were much better and paid more attention to the trainees.

On the last day of range training [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were talking to the instructors about their own abilities as instructors. [Detainee] overheard one of the Iranian instructors tell [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] that they will not return to Iran again, this was their last training session. The Iranian instructor told [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] that they would be in charge of starting a training program inside Iraq. This is necessary because the border will be under heavy scrutiny as CF begins to look more closely at Iran's association with fighters in Iraq. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], who were told that they have enough knowledge on all subjects in order to train fighters in Iraq, because Iran does not want this type of attention right now, will conduct the training. The Iranian instructor did not say anything about supplying or funding this training but [Detainee] believes that Iran will continue to bring weapons in to Iraq and some of these may be used for this training. [Detainee] does not know anyone else that has the qualifications that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] have. [Detainee] believes that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] attended the sniper training with [Detainee]'s group so that the Iranian instructors could make sure they at they are

knowledgeable enough to teach in Iraq. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] kissed the Iranian instructor and these three individuals appeared very close.

[Detainee] was well aware of the fact that SG members sometimes train in Iran prior to [Detainee] being told he would attend such training. It is common knowledge that SG members receive training in Iran. Without a doubt, all training received in Iran is intended for use against CF. No one discussed the use of this training with [Detainee] while [Detainee] was in Iran or after [Detainee] returned. No one needed to talk to [Detainee] about this point because it is known that this training is for use against CF.

Training in Iran focuses on different subjects such as basic weaponry, machine guns, sniper, mortars, IEDs, and anti-aircraft weapons. [Detainee] only attended the basic weapons and sniper portions of training. [Detainee] never used his training against anyone, especially CF. [Detainee] never fired a sniper rifle after returning to Iraq. [Detainee] quit SG and joined the Iraqi Police in Qusayrin shortly after returning to Iraq. [Detainee] was allowed to quit SG after returning from Iran because the training that [Detainee]'s group conducted was not good so no one expected anything from [Detainee]. The situation in Qusayrin was also very quiet at that time because [REDACTED] had fled so no fighting was going on in the area. Iran does not care about the fight between Shi'a and al-Qaeda. Iran just wants to force CF out of Iraq because Iran is afraid CF will use Iraq as a base for an attack in the future. Iran is training people to fight CF, not Al-Qaeda.

[REDACTED] told the other trainees that if someone attends IED training in Iran they are given the title of Engineer. Engineers are very good at using roadside bombs and other kinds of explosives. Engineers can be but are not required to be experts at all weaponry, only explosives. Engineers are special, and have to be smart. If you are not smart no one will waste the time and expenses to send you to Iran to train to be an engineer because you will fail. [Detainee] is not smart enough to be an engineer. The group was told that they could come back in the future for Engineer training if they are smart enough. [Detainee] did not care about Engineer training and did not want to come back to Iran because their training was a waste of time and [Detainee] had to leave His family for nothing.

[REDACTED] briefly explained to the group about the things that Engineers could do. [Detainee] did not pay attention to what [REDACTED] was talking about because [Detainee] is not interested in becoming an engineer. [REDACTED] just talked in general terms about how to place and detonate IEDs. [REDACTED] only talked about these things and did not demonstrate with any IEDs, props or training materials. [Detainee] did not pay attention to which type of IED [REDACTED] was discussing, a regular IED made with mortars or the special IEDs made in Iran. [Detainee] has heard of special IEDs made in Iran but has never actually seen one. (**Comment:** [Detainee] calls EFPs the special IEDs made in Iran.) [REDACTED] mentioned that he has trained people on this subject in Iraq. [REDACTED] told the group that his last trip to

Iran was for explosives training, and that he has trained on this subject more than once.

[Detainee] also heard ██████ and ██████ talking about missiles that can shoot down helicopters and planes. Training on how to use these types of rockets are taught at one of the training courses in Iran ██████ and ██████ told the group that the weapons are very easy to use and are fired like an RPG. You point the weapon at the plane or helicopter and fire, the missile follows the plane or helicopter until hitting it. ██████ told ██████ that before they came to Iran ██████ loaded one of these missiles into a launcher and did not know how to get it out. ██████ told ██████ that he would do it when they get back to Iraq. ██████ told the group that he and ██████ have several of these weapons in Iraq. [Detainee] does not know what type of missile ██████ was talking about but was told that it looks similar to an RPG in regards to how it is held. [Detainee] does not know what makes the missile follow the helicopter or plane.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 003

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED** (AS REDACTED)

**Summary:**

[Detainee] has traveled to Iran and Lebanon for SG training [Detainee] was told to go to the training by [REDACTED], leader of the SG Middle Region. [Detainee] told some members of his family that [Detainee] was going to Najaf to guard the shrines. [Detainee] told other members [Detainee] had located a temporary job in construction.

[Detainee] was instructed to travel to the Amarah garage. Once there [Detainee] met with 11 other individuals. These individuals were from Karbala, Najaf, Wasit, Hillah, Baghdad, Kirkuk, Amarah, Basrah, Diwaniyah, and Samarra. There were two individuals from Amarah.

The only other individual [Detainee] knew was [REDACTED]. The purpose of the travel was to obtain training in management for key personnel selected for management roles in SG.

[Detainee] and the others met at the Amarah garage. [REDACTED] met them, and introduced himself as their facilitator. Several members of the group had passports. These individuals traveled directly to Iran by bus. The rest waited for nightfall. They were then brought, by bus, to the marshes close to the Iranian border. [Detainee] and at least three others waited while two got into a row boat with [REDACTED], and rowed into the marshes. The boat returned later, with [REDACTED]. [Detainee] and the others then rowed through the marshes and crossed the Iranian border.

There was a vehicle waiting for them. [Detainee] and the others were taken to a house, where they waited for approximately one to two days. A small bus took them to an airport. The bus ride was at least one hour. They were flown via commercial carrier to an unidentified city in Iran. The flight took at least one hour. From the airport they were taken by bus to a large house inside a gated compound at the base of a mountain.

The compound was close to a main street, with steady automobile traffic, had one gate, and was guarded 24 hours a day, 7 days per week.

The guards for the compound wore military uniforms and spoke Farsi. [Detainee] and the others were taken into the house; they were the only occupants of the house. They were shown to their rooms. Four individuals were housed in each bedroom. There were bunk beds in the rooms.

The next morning [Detainee] and the others were instructed to prepare their own breakfast. After breakfast, classes started at approximately 0800.

[Detainee] provided the following courses of instruction that were covered:

- Small arms maintenance
- Personal security
- Operational security
- Counter-Interrogation training
- Physical surveillance
- Detection of physical surveillance
- Counter surveillance
- Use of maps
- Live firing range day for small arms

The instructors were Shia, wore military uniforms and spoke Farsi. An interpreter translated the lessons for the students.

Classes started every day at approximately 0800. Each class period lasted one hour, followed by a 15 minute break, where [Detainee] and his fellow students were allowed to eat and drink. Classes would resume on time after each break. The class day ended at dusk. [Detainee] remembers that the schedule was demanding, and several of the students felt that the course was too demanding. The course in Iran lasted approximately 21 to 24 days.

At the end of the instruction, [Detainee] and the others were taken to an unidentified city in Iran by bus. The bus ride was approximately one hour. [Detainee] and the others were allowed to visit the shrine of Imam Rida, and the shrine of Imam Khomeini.

At this point at least three students declined to participate further in the class. These individuals were taken away, and [Detainee] did not see them again.

[Detainee] and the others were taken to a hotel by bus. The ride was less than one hour. They were kept at the hotel for eight days, and were instructed not to go outside. [Detainee] does not know the name of the hotel or the location of the hotel. [Detainee] and his fellow students were the only guests of the hotel.

[Detainee] and his fellow students were taken to an airport by bus. They were flown to Damascus, Syria. They were met at the airport by two or three vehicles. The vehicles had tinted windows, with curtains in the back. [Detainee] and the

others were unable to see out the windows. [Detainee] and his fellow students were driven to the Lebanese border. They were instructed to get out of the vehicles, go past the border checkpoint, and walk up a hill to where two Chevrolet Suburbans were waiting. It was nighttime, the vehicles were dark blue or black.

[Detainee] and the other students got into the back of the Suburbans. The drivers were Lebanese Shias. The vehicle's windows were tinted, and there were curtains over the windows. [Detainee] and the others were driven through the mountains for several hours. They switched vehicles twice. The roads had a lot of curves, and several of [Detainee]'s associates got car sick and vomited in the vehicles.

It was still night time when [Detainee] and the others were brought to an apartment building in an unidentified city in Lebanon. They were taken to an apartment within the building. There were heavy curtains over the windows. [Detainee] and the other students were told not to look out the windows. [Detainee] recalled that on one occasion █████ looked out the window. Approximately 15 minutes later a guard came and asked █████ why █████ had looked out the window █████ denied doing so. The instructors came and scolded all of the students, and told them that if they did not follow the rules, they would not finish the course of instruction.

Over the course of the next approximately 18 to 20 days, [Detainee] and the others received instruction in various courses.

[Detainee] provided the following courses of instruction [Detainee] received in Lebanon:

- Personnel supervision/management
- Project planning
- Weapons inventory control
- Communications
- Weapons warehousing systems
- Security
- One day of refresher training on weapons at the range.

The instructors were members of Lebanese Hizballah. They were Lebanese Shia, they had complete control of the area, the students, and a familiarity with all of the management process needed to run a paramilitary organization. There is no possibility that they were anything else.

[Detainee] and the others completed the training, and were returned to the Lebanese border by the same route and method of travel used to bring them to the training. Once they crossed the Lebanese border, they were taken to

Damascus, and flown to Iran. They were returned to Iraq by the same route through the marshes. Their facilitator was ██████ again.

██████ does not use money exchange to pay SG members. SG members are paid in cash through [Detainee], who receives the cash from ██████. [Detainee] determines how much cash [Detainee] needs, calls ██████ to tell ██████ how much cash is needed, and ██████ has ██████ deliver the cash in USD to [Detainee].

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 004

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED (AS REDACTED)**

**Summary:**

Approximately three months after Ramadan 2006, [Detainee] visited a second training facility. [Detainee] described one of the buildings located at the second training facility as having multiple classrooms. [Detainee] observed thirty trainees in one classroom, and thirty-one trainees in another classroom.

[Detainee] provided the following information on the two groups of trainees that [Detainee] observed at the second training facility three months after Ramadan 2006:

The group of thirty-one trainees attended special forces training. Fifteen of the individuals were from al-Kut. The additional sixteen individuals were from Amarah. [Detainee] met the group of fifteen trainees in one of the safe houses in Amarah. [Detainee] met the group of sixteen trainees at the same house on the same day, later in the evening. The trainees waited at the safe house until a phone call was received from [REDACTED]. [Detainee] had met all thirty-one trainees and provided them each with 100 USD prior to their departure to Iran.

The group of thirty trainees attended the basic fighter course. [REDACTED] had recruited ten trainees from al-Kut and ten individuals from Basrah. Another individual [REDACTED] recruited ten individuals from Karbala. [Detainee] had been provided the telephone number for [REDACTED].

There are approximately five different courses held at the training facilities in Iran. [Detainee] provided information on the following courses:

Special Forces Training – trainees are taught courses in swimming, diving, driving, fitness. Trainees participate in various sports. There is more pressure on these trainees. The Special Forces training is the longest course lasting over one month. [Detainee] was unable to provide detailed information on the course instructors. [Detainee] had the impression that the instructors were Iranian military. The instructors were Iranian and not Lebanese.

Basic Fighter Training – Trainees are exposed to an overview of Mortars, IED's, and Regular weapons. This course is approximately twenty days.

Mortar Training



Regular weapons Training – Kalashnikov and regular weapons

IED Training – [Detainee] did not have a definition for this training course. [Detainee] was unable to provide detailed information on types of explosives or detail types of devices trainees were instructed. [Detainee] was unable to provide information on the differences between IED's and EFP's.

██████ was disappointed in the thirty-one individuals sent to special forces training. These individuals were not prepared for the training.

[Detainee] had knowledge of five individuals that obtained Special Forces training, [Detainee] referred to this group as "Samich" (**Comment:** [Detainee] was questioned about knowledge of "human frog" course. [Detainee] responded that these individuals are trained in Special Forces and referred to these individuals as "Samich" which is an Arabic word for fish.)

██████ and ██████ arranged Special Forces training for the group of five individuals. ██████ told [Detainee] that these five individuals were prepared for the training. [Detainee] met with four of the individuals in Amarah prior to their departure to Iran. [Detainee] provided the 100 USD to each trainee. One of the trainees was named ██████. [Detainee] provided ██████ with the 100 USD payment for the trainee that was not present.

There were no additional trainees that traveled to Iran with the five special forces trainees.

Two of the five trainees that obtained Special Forces training were from al-Kut. The remaining three trainees that obtained Special Forces training were from al-Amarah. [Detainee] had never met these trainees before. [Detainee] had no knowledge if these trainees had received prior training in Iran. [Detainee] had no knowledge on why these five trainees were qualified to attend Special Forces training.

██████ traveled to Iran with three additional individuals to act as a guide. The three individuals were going to Iran to assist in learning the language.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 005

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED (AS REDACTED)**

**Summary:**


SG in Iraq breaks down in to three major areas of operation which are North, Central and South. The North section consists of Kirkuk, and Diyala. The Central section consists of Baghdad, Wasit, Hillah, and Karbala. The South section consists of Amarah, Basra, Diwaniyah and Nasiriyah. Each of these areas breaks down further but [Detainee] is only familiar with the Wasit Province. The Wasit area breaks down in to eight major areas, which are Na'maniyah, Mu'afaqiya, Husayniya, Zubaydiyah, Hay, Aziziya, Suwayra and Kut. Each of the eight areas in Wasit has an SG leader responsible for that area. Each of these areas have leaders which answer to the SG leader for Wasit, which is [REDACTED]. [Detainee] has never seen [REDACTED], and does not know where [REDACTED] lives.

The leader of SG in Kut is [REDACTED] who works under [REDACTED]. If someone is a leader of one of the eight areas in Wasit then they must have attended the Overall Leader Course in Iran. [REDACTED] has four leaders underneath him that are leaders in the fields of Information, Tactics, Support and Engineers. [REDACTED] used to be the Engineer leader in Kut but was recently promoted.

Each of these specialty-leaders has attended a 45-60 day specialty-specific leadership course in Iran. This course focuses solely on that specialty, and there is no cross-training whatsoever. If someone attends the Engineer Leader Course, then they will not have any knowledge of the subjects taught in the Support Leader course. There is no cross-training following the course. If someone is an Engineer Leader, then they will not attend a Support Leader course at any time in the future. People are picked for the specialty-specific leader course based on their loyalty and devotion to SG, usually the people who attend the leader courses are people who have been in SG since it began.

The Engineer, Support, Tactic, Information and Overall Leader courses are all separate, it is not required to attend any other training in Iran in order to attend this training. If someone attends one of these leader courses then they will definitely be a leader upon their return if they were not one already. If someone attends the Overall Leader Course, then they will be put in charge of the four individuals who have attended the specialty-specific leader courses. These five individuals make up the leadership for that respective area. [Detainee] does not know the average size of each group, or how big the overall group is. There is only one leader with four specialty-specific leaders per area; therefore the

number of group members must be relatively large in order to conduct effective operations in that area. This is how it works in Kut. This organization is fairly new to SG. [Detainee] does not know for sure if this has already been implemented in the seven other areas in Wasit but in theory this is the way SG in Wasit is supposed to be organized. [Detainee] has no knowledge of why SG has decided to reorganize this way.



There are also a group of commandos who belong to SG and work in Wasit. The commandos are based out of Kut and operate all over the Wasit province. The commandos do not answer to conventional SG leadership. [Detainee] is not sure if the commandos conduct different types of missions than SG or if their function is the same. The commandos are very secretive and are not discussed openly. The commando training is conducted in Iran for periods of 30 to 60 days at a time. Commando training is recurring, and it is possible for a commando to have attended training 5 to 10 times. Commandos are familiar with every type of weapon available. Commandos have Stella rockets available for use against CF aircraft.

[Detainee] knows of two individuals in Kut that are members of the Commandos. [Detainee] does not know anything about commando training other than the fact that is very difficult and in-depth. It seems like [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are always gone. They are likely in Iran for training, because they are usually gone for approximately a month at a time. Commando training is different than Special Forces training because commandos work in their own group and answer to someone outside Wasit Province.

The Special Forces group is a small group of specially trained individuals who are excellent fighters. The Special Forces group answers specifically to the SG leader in that area. The Special Forces group is not usually used in attacks, but is more of a specialized reactionary force that responds whenever CF enters an area. The Special Forces group has to be composed of brave and good fighters because they have to run to an area and engage CF when everyone else is running away. The Special Forces training is separate from any other training. This training is conducted in Iran and lasts approximately 60 days. The Special Forces training is separate from the Commando training. [Detainee] has no knowledge if the Special Forces training is a one-time course, or if it consists of multiple training sessions in Iran.

[Detainee] was trained to be an SG trainer, which is another type of training available in Iran. In theory, [Detainee] is supposed to train the basic SG soldiers on the concepts of tactics, which is [Detainee]'s specialty. [Detainee] never actually trained any SG members in Iraq. If [Detainee] were training SG soldiers, he would be training the members of the Tactics Group, which operate under the individual who has attended the Tactics Leader Group. [Detainee] does not fall under traditional SG leadership in Kut, and could be responsible for training SG tactics group members from all over Iraq. This is unlikely though as the trainer group is spread out through Iraq.

An individual who has attended the Tactics Leader Course in Iran is a leader but could also train. [Detainee] would not be responsible for training the Tactics Leader, as this individual would likely have more knowledge on the subject than [Detainee]. Group members would receive basic instruction from [Detainee] because [Detainee] was taught how to actually teach. The group members would learn the specifics of how they would implement these things from their Tactics Group Leader who would be able to apply the practical aspect of this subject to the members based on the leaders' experience and operational needs.

The trainer group was started because Iran wants Iraqis to sustain their own training. This is more time and cost-effective, and makes it appear like Iran is having less of an influence. In theory, this would work the same for the Engineer, Support and Information groups. SG has not actually gotten this system functioning yet in Wasit. [Detainee] does not know if this is working in any other areas but of all the areas, Amarah would be the first to have this system up and running.

[Detainee] has no knowledge of when certain courses are taught in Iran or how much time is taken between each course. There are many places in Iran where SG goes to train, therefore multiple groups can train in Iran on different things and never know that the other group was there. [Detainee] has no knowledge of where any other training facilities are in Iran than the ones that [Detainee] has been to. The training in Iran usually takes place around holiday times, because

there are already a large amount of people moving across the border so it will not seem suspicious for a group of people to be traveling at these times.

██████ is the Lebanese Hizballah trainer in charge of the training camp [Detainee] attended in Iran. ██████ was always calm and collected. ██████ had very distinct cat-like eyes that were either bright green or bright blue. [Detainee] thinks ██████ has operated in Iraq because ██████ always used to talk about how Iraqi food is not good and how the Iraqis do not have good water. ██████ would drop hints like this to let the trainees know that ██████ has worked in Iraq. ██████ was one of the more respectful of the LH trainers, and appeared to demonstrate some knowledge of Iraqi culture. ██████ would say things about Iraq in a way that let the trainees know that ██████ has been to Iraq before. There are two kinds of LH, the kind you see on television, and the secret underground kind. All the trainers in Iran were the secret LH. If ██████ was in Iraq it would not be for a trip, ██████ would only go to do secret LH work. ██████ spoke Iraqi dialect very well but it was still apparent that ██████ was Lebanese.

██████, the Information trainer from Amarah told [Detainee] that he attended training in Lebanon and that it was better than the training in Iran.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 006

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED** (AS REDACTED)

**Summary:**

[Detainee] is a member of SG. [Detainee] attended paramilitary training in Iran on two occasions. [Detainee] was sent to become a trainer with a specialty in IEDs and explosives.

[Detainee], along with approximately 30 other individuals, attended paramilitary training in Iran covering a broad range of topics. [Detainee] has no knowledge where in Iran the training took place, as travel to, and from the training location occurred during night hours. [Detainee]'s first trip to Iran for paramilitary training lasted approximately 35 days, although many of the days did not include training. Approximately five or six days were spent at an apartment where no training occurred. Trainees were then moved to a different apartment and spent another two days with no training. The 35 day duration for the first trip includes travel to and from the training site.

[Detainee], along with 15 other individuals, attended the second phase of paramilitary training in Iran approximately two months after the first the first training trip.

During the second trip, trainees were separated into four different specialties:

IEDs/Explosives  
Light weapons  
Mortars  
Movements/Tactics.

Four trainees were assigned to each specialty. [Detainee]'s assigned specialty was IEDs/Explosives.

[Detainee] trained at the same location for the first two tips to Iran.

During [Detainee]'s second trip to Iran for training, many of the trainees began arguing and fighting with the instructors, both from Iran and from Lebanon. The arguments spawned from the trainees' lack of motivation during the training, as the trainees did not believe the training was beneficial. The Lebanese Hizballah instructors demanded too much from the trainees for such a short training period.

The instructors commented to the trainees that the training in Lebanon for Hizballah soldiers consisted of more than two years of instruction in their specialties.

[Detainee] did not attend training for the third trip to Iran because he did not believe in the SG movement anymore. [Detainee] feigned a leg injury so [Detainee] could be excused from the third installment of training in Iran.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 007

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED** (AS REDACTED)

**Summary:**

[Detainee] identified the following training courses conducted at the military facilities in Iran:

1. Mortar Specialty Training Course
2. IED Specialty Training Course
3. Weapons Specialty Training Course
4. Fighter Course
5. Tactics Course

The Weapons Specialty Training Course consisted of pistol, AK-47, PKC, and sniper training.

The Fighter Course is a shorter course than the Mortar Specialty Training Course, IED Specialty Training Course, and Weapons Specialty Training Course. The Fighter Course taught trainees weapons (pistols, AK-47, PKC, and sniper), IEDs, mortars, tactics, and physical training in a condensed overview course.

The Tactics Course taught the trainee movement, speed, and concealment.

In regards to the Iranian training, [REDACTED] was responsible for requesting SG trainee attendance to Iranian training from the SG areas in Iraq. The selection of the individuals was made through the SG region where the trainee is assigned. [Detainee] does not know the selection process for these [Detainee]s.

The request for trainees originates in Iran with [REDACTED] aka [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] would decide what kind of training is available and the time schedule for the training. [REDACTED] would call [Detainee] and have [Detainee] contact [REDACTED] about the training needs, slots available, and schedule for the courses. At times, different courses were scheduled for the same period of time and others for future periods.

[REDACTED] would contact the SG representatives responsible for the different SG areas in Iraq. [Detainee] does not know if [REDACTED] contacts the SG leaders of each area or a coordinator. It is the responsibility of each SG area to determine who they wished to have attend the training in Iran. Once the trainees were identified, [REDACTED] was called by the respective SG areas and informed of the SG members



picked to attend the training. The SG area would then await further instructions from [REDACTED].

When the training travel was ready, [REDACTED] would call the SG areas and have the trainees travel to Amarah. The trainees would usually travel by taxi, a seven to eight passenger vehicle, to the Baghdad garage in Amarah. Once in Amarah, the trainees would contact [REDACTED] and inform him of their arrival. [REDACTED] would arrange to have some, usually [REDACTED], meet the trainees and take them to an Amarah SG safe house.

[Detainee] would meet the trainees at the safe house where he would provide each 100 USD, brief them on their travel and what to be aware of, and verify their passports. The trainees would then wait at the safe house until [REDACTED] told them it was time to depart for Iran. The trainees would again use taxis, usually seven to eight passenger vehicles, in their travel to the Iranian and Iraqi border.

There were no specific qualifications for attending Iranian SG training other than it was mandatory for each SG member be able to read and write. [REDACTED] stressed the following attributes in each Iranian bound trainee:

- Open mindedness
- Physical stamina
- Maturity
- Organizational skills
- Responsible
- Individuals who are not a problem

Education was not required for the Iranian training. [Detainee] was not aware if prior military experience was sought after.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were superior to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] also appeared to be superior to [REDACTED]. While [Detainee] and [REDACTED] attended the meeting with the 16 weapons trainers at the Amarah safe house it was [REDACTED] who made the final decision on the weapons trainers' requests. [REDACTED] approved the request for funds in the purchase of four pistols and four laptop computers. The amount of 1,100 USD was allocated for the purchase of each pistol and the amount of 500 USD was approved for the purchase of each laptop computer. [REDACTED] gave the computer money to [REDACTED], who in return provided the funds to the requesting four SG trainers.

[Detainee] was later contacted by the requesting laptop computer weapons trainers who said the money received was not enough to purchase computers. In addition, the trainers wished to purchase flash drives for the laptops. [Detainee] called [REDACTED]'s phone, which was answered by [REDACTED]. [Detainee] informed [REDACTED] of the problem and the additional request for 100 – 250 USD per computer. The additional funds were approved for the laptops and flash drives.

Information obtained from the Iranian training was downloaded onto the flash drives for future reference and learning. [Detainee] does not know who entered the information onto the flash drives.

█████ wished to quit SG because he had a family and children. The laptop computer █████ received was turned over to █████. Since █████ requested a laptop, [Detainee] obtained the computer from █████ and brought it to █████ in Karbala.

[Detainee] does not know if the Iranian military advisors training SG in Iran have any input on the type of trainees sent for training. [Detainee] is only aware of █████ requesting SG personnel to attend specific training during a scheduled period.

[Detainee] has no knowledge of the Iranian trained SG members returning to Iraq and training other SG personnel. The only Iranian trained SG members that do conduct training in Iraq were the original 16 weapons trainers. Further, [Detainee] has never heard of returning SG trainees forming specialized cells or groups. The Iranian trained SG member would return to his original SG area.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 008

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008


**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED** (AS REDACTED)

**Summary:**

[Detainee] discussed in detail the Sayid al-Shahada training camp in Iran.

**(Collector Comment:** Collector rendered the camp from rough drawings and multiple verifications with [Detainee].)



Not drawn to scale

- 1. One story guard building
- 2. Two story guard building
- T. Metal guard towers
- ✦ Camera towers

[Detainee] had typhoid while in the training in Iran. He collapsed and had to be taken to his room to recover. The medical staff from the clinic located came to [Detainee]'s room and gave him some pills. The staff, which consisted of a civilian doctor and three or four military male nurses, did not seem very interested

in [Detainee]'s problem. [Detainee] went to the clinic once for additional medications.

During their month long training cycle, there were two other minor medical issues among the Iraqi trainees. One man had a sprained ankle. Medical staff treated him with an Ace bandage and gave him a mild painkiller.

Another issue was a trainee, [REDACTED], with a bad back. He was not helped significantly, as the staff thought he might be malingering.

During his first training cycle, [Detainee] spent about 10-15 days on the range. The range training facility was approximately 40-50 kilometers south of the al-Shahada training camp. The training on the range was organized and included a safety briefing. No one could even go to the restroom without telling cadre. There was night training during the first phase or cycle.

There were usually two Land Cruisers on the range. One, an older camouflaged military vehicle, was used to bring the weapons to the range. The other, a white newer model, was used as the ambulance. It was always at the entrance to the range and parked near the buses. The two buses brought the trainee and sometimes the cadre to the range.

The Lebanese mixed with the trainees during rest periods and down time occasionally. Often they would just sit by themselves.

At the end of the training cycle, the attendees were given a prayer rug, a Quran and a hand full of sweets.

[Detainee] discussed his third trip to Iran via illegally crossings of the border. He crossed in two different locations, and by two different methods. [Detainee] and [REDACTED] first arrived at the Baghdad in Amarah. [Detainee] called [REDACTED] the safe house manager. [REDACTED] came to the garage and picked him up. In addition to the trainee selects, a Farsi-Arabic interpreter was going to go across the border with the group. Aside from [REDACTED], [Detainee] and [REDACTED], the group was all going to Iran for the first time. [REDACTED] had been to training multiple times.

The following morning the group took off in two vehicles, traveling from Amarah to Shayikh Sa'ad. The group ate at a restaurant, and the driver called for a vehicle to come and pick up the group for the next leg of the journey. All of them crammed into a Land Cruiser, 12 people, plus the driver and the interpreter. They drove for on a dirt road for several hours. They arrived at around sundown at a house in a desolate area. The driver got out and went toward the house. He came back with a man with a black tracksuit. In later conversation, he said he was from Sadr City. The unidentified man said they should wait until it got a little darker. The man from the house had an AK slung on his back and night vision device on a neck strap. The glow when he put the device to his ears was either

yellow or red. After a short drive, the group got out and walked through the countryside. They crossed rivers, ran in a flat open country, and went up and down hills for between two and three hours. The man from the house picked up a signal from an automotive light. The group rendezvoused with two four-door pickups. One was white and the other red. The pickups took the Iraqi trainees to a house in Mehran. Along the way to Mehran, they were given chocolate, biscuits and snacks.

In Mehran, the training group went to an apartment. They ate a meal and stayed the night. In the morning, the group was divided and taken to the Kermanshah Airport. Their tickets were waiting and they boarded a flight for Tehran.

In Tehran, the group was met by two Iranian men. The Iranians took the group in a Land Cruiser, to an apartment about one hour distant. The building was a five-story building with a parking garage, elevator and stairs on the first floor. The group stayed on the second or fourth floor.

After a day or two, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] came to the apartment and told the group there was no trainer for them. Their class was delayed. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] took [Detainee] and [REDACTED] to another room to tell them the situation as well.

The group got into a car and were driven to Mashad to visit the shrines. They stayed in Mashad for four or five days, then returned to Tehran via airplane. [REDACTED] picked them up at their hotel in Mashad, paid their bill, and took them to the airplane. The same man met them at the airport in Tehran. [Detainee] and one other took a taxi to the building because there was not sufficient space in the Land Cruiser. They stayed at the same building for one night. In the morning, the whole group moved to a three-story building. The group was divided again into two groups. Those attendees who came from Qusayrin plus [REDACTED] were to remain on the second floor and the rest would sleep on the third floor.

The trainees were issued a tracksuit, tennis shoes, towel, and military clothes. The refrigerator was filled with a lot of food and fruit. The next day they began their training.

[REDACTED] was sent back to Baghdad early because he did not have a good attitude. Three of the group from Qusayrin, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], were also sent back early. The remainder of the class stayed for four more days. With the exception of [Detainee] and [REDACTED], the rest of the class left at the end of training. The total amount of days spent in training and travel to and from was 27 or 28 days.

[Detainee] and [REDACTED] were taken to Ahwaz, Iran and told they would ride a boat through the marshes to return home. The trip out was uneventful.

The boat used was 15-17 feet long and only three feet wide at the gunwales. It moved very fast and easily through the marshes. After arriving at a prearranged

spot, a truck picked up the group of four, which included [Detainee] and [REDACTED], an unidentified man, and the same Farsi-Arabic interpreter who had accompanied them through the desert walk at the beginning of their journey.

The pickup driver, [REDACTED]'s assistant and driver, took them to a garage where they hired a taxi to their home, after returning to the house to get [REDACTED]'s phone from [REDACTED]. The paymaster, [REDACTED] paid them 413 USD as their salary.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 009


**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED** (AS REDACTED)

**Summary:**

[Detainee] provided the following sketch of the organizational breakdown of the 16 Iraq-based IRGC/LH paramilitary instructed trainer specialties for [Detainee]’s second trip to Iran:



A different group of trainees than [Detainee]’s aforementioned group attends Stella anti-aircraft missile training, which is taught by a different group of instructors in a different training area within the paramilitary training camp in Iran. The Stella missile training only occurs in Iran.

**(Comment:** [Detainee] identified the class in which he received operational security, intelligence, counter-intelligence, surveillance, and counter-surveillance training as “Secrets” training)



**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 010

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED** (AS REDACTED)

**Summary:**

On the [Detainee]'s date of capture, [Detainee] had an ID card from the Third Intelligence Group. The Third Intelligence Group is part of the Iraqi Army (IA).

[Detainee] and other members of SG Middle Region provided assistance to the IA when the IA and SG fought Al Qaeda in Suwayrah. The IA ran out of mortar rounds. SG brought tubes, and mortars, and assisted the IA in attacking Al Qaeda Positions with indirect fire. [REDACTED] coordinated this assistance for the IA.

Most Iraqis remember the Iran-Iraq war, and distrust Iran. Iran will not help Iraqi Shia's accomplish any goals that do not directly benefit Iran. Iranians have an advantage over Iraqis in the field of medicine, technology, and engineering. The main advantage Iran has over Iraq is security within it's borders.

In the past Iran has supported JAM and SG with equipment and training. [Detainee] did not like [Detainee]'s Iranian trainers. [Detainee] does not trust Iranians. [Detainee] respected [Detainee]'s Lebanese trainers.

[Detainee] did not want military training in Iran. [Detainee] wanted management training. [Detainee] received the management training [Detainee] wanted in Lebanon. [Detainee] and [Detainee]'s fellow students complained about the training they were receiving in Iran. As a result of their complaints, they received training in Lebanon, which met their needs.

Iraqis prefer their religious leaders be Arab and Iraqi. [Detainee] looks to Muqtada al-Sadr (MAS) for guidance. [Detainee] has no knowledge of who would replace MAS as the leader of OMS, JAM, or SG should anything happen to MAS. There is no one who can replace MAS.

Shi'a will never unite under one leader; much less unite from Lebanon to Iran. Only the return of the Mahdi will accomplish this. Iranians are aware that Iraqis generally distrust them. [Detainee] has no knowledge of what Iranians think of Iraqis. Most Iraqis do not want an Iranian presence in Iraq after CF leave. The most important service that the Iraqi Government could provide is security. If the Government of Iraq can not improve security, nothing in Iraq will ever improve.

Iraq has good agriculture, and oil resources. Iraq will be able to provide social service once stability in Iraq is achieved.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 011

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED** (AS REDACTED)

**Summary:**

[Detainee]'s second trip to Iran lasted approximately 28 days.

[Detainee] arrived at the camp at dusk.

[Detainee] provided the following timeline as an example of the normal hourly schedule of training for [Detainee]'s second trip to Iran (**Comment:** All times are approximate and local):

0500 — wake up, morning prayers, exercise until the sun comes up, shower, eat breakfast

0800-0850 — class

0850-0900 — break

0900-0950 — class

0950-1000 — break

1000-1050 — class

1050-1100 — break

1100-1150 — class

1150-1330 — prayer and lunch time (The lunch break lasts approximately one and a half to two hours, and varies in time depending on when the food is ready.)

1330-1420 — class

1420-1430 — break

1430-1520 — class

1520-1530 — break

1530-1620 — class

1620-1630 — break

Classes end at dusk. (**Comment:** [Detainee] is not able to give a standard time the class sessions end, stating that the period of dusk varies with the months.)

Call to prayer — pray

Various — Dinnertime varies as dinner is brought to the trainees when the meal is prepared. After dinner the trainees play ping pong or sleep.

2300 — Mandatory sleep time. Trainees are often asleep prior to the mandatory hour as they are tired.

[Detainee] provided the following daily schedule of training for [Detainee]'s second trip to Iran (**Comment:** All days are approximate and all times are approximate and local):

Days 1-4: Pistol and AK-47 training. Once the trainees arrived at camp, they waited for four days before beginning the actual training due to the death of an unidentified Hizballah trainer. The Hizballah trainer died during an IED class. The death of the Hizballah trainer was also the reason that [Detainee] and the others were delayed in Ahvas, IR during their travel to the camp. During the four day waiting period, the Iranian in charge of the camp helped to keep the trainees busy with impromptu training of pistol positions.

Day 5: Began class. One to two days were devoted to training on the AK-47.

Day 6: Trained on the GC, also called the G-3.

Day 7: Trained on the M-16 and M-18.

Day 8: Went to the practice range to practice with the weapons which were taught to date. Approximate range schedule is as follows:

The trainees woke up before sunrise, exercised, and ate breakfast. At 0700, the trainees left on a bus for the range, riding for approximately 20 to 30 minutes. The trainer arrived to the range with a pick-up carrying weapons, ammunition, and targets which looked alike. The targets were placed and the trainees fired until lunchtime. Lunch was brought from camp. The trainees ate and smoked for approximately an hour and fifteen minutes. The trainees fired again until they were finished or approximately one hour prior to dusk. At dusk the trainees went back to camp. At camp the trainees cleaned the weapons, prayed, ate dinner after which they had free time to read, watch TV, review their homework, or play ping pong. Mandatory sleep time began at 2300.

Days 9-10: One to two days were devoted to training on the PKC.

Day 11-12: Trained on the RPG and bazooka.

Day 13: Four trainees spent the day at the practice range using the PKC, RPG-7, and bazooka. This practice range followed a similar schedule to the Day 8 range. The trainees practiced first with the PKC, secondly with the RPG-7 and third with the bazooka. The range ended two hours after lunch. When the trainees returned to camp they cleaned the PKCs and RPG-7s, had free time, ate, then went to sleep.

Days 14-16: Trained on the Russian sniper rifle.

Day 17: Practice range for the sniper rifles. The range ended early because the sniper rifles malfunctioned due to use of Iranian-made ammunition. The trainees waited while an attempt was made to procure Russian-made ammunition. No Russian-made ammunition was obtained. The trainees prayed, ate, and returned to camp. At camp the trainees had free time then slept.

Days 18-19: Trained on the big, German sniper rifle called both the 12.7 and Caliber.

Day 20: Practice range for the German sniper rifle. There were four trainees and one trainer at the range. The range ended after lunch because the German sniper rifles malfunctioned. After their return to camp the trainees cleaned the weapons and were given free time.

Days 21-22: [Detainee] sat for two days with nothing to do.

Days 23-26: When the explosive-specialization trainees were finished with their training, [Detainee]'s group of weapons-specialization trainees and the explosive-specialization trainees spent four days in Mashhad, IR. Each trainee had free time to do as they wished. [Detainee] visited shrines and the zoo.

Days 27-28: The trainees waited for approximately two to three days.

Day 29: Attended party dressed in a camouflage uniform like the uniform of the IRGC and Hizballah. [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and an Iranian named [REDACTED] attended the party as guests. There were cakes and gifts. [REDACTED] spoke. The trainees left.

[Detainee]'s training in Iran also included religious instruction everyday for 40 to 50 minutes. The religious instruction was given either as the first class of the day or before noon prayer. An unidentified Iranian Shayikh instructed the class. The Shayikh's Arabic language skills were poor and [Detainee] found the class to be boring.

[Detainee]'s instruction in Iran included discussions about CF body armor. There was no discussion on the limitations of the armor. [Detainee] did not receive instruction on the capabilities and limitations of CF armored vehicles during [Detainee]'s second trip to Iran.

[Detainee] did not receive training on the SA-7.

[Detainee]'s weapons-specialization class had four students.

Classroom training aids included actual weapons, a whiteboard, and a projector.

There was one trainer per specialization. [Detainee]'s trainer was [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was relaxed, but somewhat spacey and a deep-thinker [REDACTED] seemed angry,


possibly because he had to replace an unidentified trainer to provide instruction to [Detainee]'s class.

[Detainee] was placed in charge of the attendance of the group training with [Detainee]. [Detainee] was told to write down the names of those who were tardy on a sheet of paper. [Detainee] never wrote any names down as [Detainee] was always late to class himself.

[Detainee] became good friends with [REDACTED].

[Detainee] identified the following documents:

This paper does not belong to me. I have heard about this. It is for salary.



Document captured during the objective

The document shows the points used to calculate salary. [Detainee] has no knowledge of who developed the point system. [Detainee] heard [REDACTED] speak about raising salaries by using a point system. The system was implemented about two to three months prior to [Detainee]'s day of capture. [Detainee]'s salary was raised from 300,000 IZD to 400,000 IZD. [Detainee] received two payments at the 400,000 IZD salary level prior to being detained.



Document captured during the objective

[Detainee] thinks CF has a make-shift position at the above coordinates. If the coordinates are to a CF location, the intention is to attack the location.

**(Comment:** [Detainee] alluded to the use of missiles against the CF position.)

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTERROGATION REPORT 012

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED** (AS REDACTED)

**Summary:**

Iraqi Shia welcome Iranian support due to the sole fact support from anyone is considered welcome and good to Iraqi Shia. Iraqi Shia do not necessarily want Iranian support but feel any support is better than no support, regardless of the origin of the support. Iraqi Shia are afraid to lose their new-found power and position within Iraq. For three decades the Shia were oppressed by the Sunni and now the Shia control the Iraqi government. The Shia accept support from Iran due to the fact Iranians are also Shia. Iraqi Shia are superior to the Iranians; however, the Iraqi Shia accept support from Iran because of the sectarian brotherhood.

The Iranians help the Iraqi Shia in an attempt to further accomplish Iran's own goals. [Detainee] has no knowledge of Iran's goals for Iraq. [Detainee] has no knowledge of the goals of Iran for the government of Iraq.

Iranians do not have skills Iraqis fail to possess. Iraqi Shia are superior to Iranians in every way, especially in regard to religion. Iraqi Shia are proud individuals whereas Iranians are only show-offs. Iraqi Shia believe they are superior to Iranians. The only advantage Iranians have over Iraqi Shia is the fact that Iranians have a clean and organized country.

Iraqi Shia are superior to Iranians because Iraqi Shia are moral, good, compassionate, and emotionally sensitive. Iranians are not moral, are not sensitive, and believe they are superior to everyone. Iraqi Shia are not scared of Iranians. [Detainee] has no knowledge of JAM orders forbidding the acceptance of Iranian support. [Detainee] has no knowledge regarding Iranian facilitators or Iranian selection of targets for Iraqi Shia.

Iraqi SG trainees do not like their Iranian trainers. The Iranians do not show the SG trainees any respect and feel they are better than the SG trainees. The SG trainees like and respect the Lebanese Hizbollah trainers because the Lebanese trainers speak Arabic and treat the SG trainees with respect. The Iranian trainers and the SG trainees did not get along during the SG training.

The Shia in Iraq should be led by an Iraqi. Even a bad Iraqi leader is better than a good Iranian leader. The Shia from Lebanon to Iran will never unite under one



leader because of the difference of cultures in each country. [Detainee] has no knowledge regarding how the Iranians truly feel about the Iraqi Shia. Individuals from each country believe they are better than the other. Iraqi Shia do not want an Iranian presence in Iraq after CF leaves Iraq. Iraqis will not be able to provide social services without the aid of other countries when CF leaves Iraq.

[Detainee] has not personally encountered any IRGC-QF propaganda or anti-CF messages. The only anti-CF messages [Detainee] has encountered are messages played throughout Arab television and satellite channels. Any individual can turn on the television at any time and find an anti-CF message being propagated through the news. The Arab news stations play video clips of CF in firefights and state CF was involved in killing and attacking innocent individuals.

The best way to combat anti-CF messages, and the best way to propagate CF and the Iraqi Government's message is to broadcast pro-CF messages on television. Television is the best medium by which to communicate with the Iraqi public. The only message which will truly affect the Iraqi public is the proliferation of jobs and services. The Iraqi public will listen to whoever is able to provide jobs and services throughout the country.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTERROGATION REPORT 013

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED** (AS REDACTED)

**Summary:**

[Detainee] did not identify photos of the following weapons:

RPG-29

RPG-29 (Broken down)

Tiger

SVD-S - SVD with shortened barrel and folding metal butt stock

SA 7

Misagh

[Detainee] recognized photos of the following weapons:

This looks like a weapon we used, called the Draganov, except the one we used had more of the stock filled in, and the sight was black, not silver.



SVD, with polymer stock and hand guards

[Detainee] trained with the Draganov during the trainer training in Iran. The Draganov that [Detainee] and the others used during training had numbers on the side of the weapon which had been scratched out. The instructor demonstrated the use of the weapon and the trainees fired the weapon.

[Detainee] and the other trainer trainees in Iran did not fire the Draganov a lot. There were four Draganovs at the range, but only one weapon was serviceable, none of the trainees really benefited from this training.

The Draganov uses a round of ammunition that is approximately one centimeter longer than the ammunition used in the Kalashnikov. The Draganov is for long range shooting, and is light weight. [Detainee] and the other trainer trainees fired the Draganov from 100 meters.

This is similar to the Draganov, but we did not train on this weapon.



SVD with wooden stock

This looks like a Kalashnikov. We did not train on this type of Kalashnikov.



ROMAK-3/PSL

This looks like a Kalashnikov. This one has a scope, we did not train on this type of Kalashnikov.



NDM-86

This is the PKC.



PKC

[Detainee] and the other trainer trainees shot the PKC in both the first phase of the training and the second. During each phase, the trainees only shot approximately 50 rounds of ammunition with the PKC. The ammunition for the PKC is big. [Detainee] and the other trainees shot the PKC from 200 meters. The PKC is for offensive operations. The PKC is powerful and is for long range shooting.

I imagine these are IEDs, although I have never seen anything like this. The instructors brought dough explosives to the training, and detonated the explosives. The dough explosives did not look anything like this.



EFP

The instructors brought a weapon similar to this to the range.



Steyr HS50 12.7mm

Three trainer trainees fired this weapon (Steyr HS50 12.7mm), and then it broke. The last trainee to shoot the weapon was [redacted] [Detainee] was supposed to be the fourth trainee to fire this weapon (Steyr HS50 12.7mm), but the weapon broke so [Detainee] did not ever fire it. The [Detainee]'s who fired the weapon (Steyr HS50 12.7mm) shot from 200 meters.

This is an RPG.



RPG-7

[Detainee] and the other trainer trainees shot the RPG during training in Iran. During the first phase of training, the trainees each fired the RPG once. During the second phase of training, the trainees each fired the RPG twice. [Detainee] did not perform well during this course of instruction. The trainees fired the RPG from 100 meters.

The RPG is for offensive attacks on the enemy. The RPG can be used to attack headquarters buildings or trucks. The RPG does not work well against armored vehicles. There is another weapon for attacking armored vehicles.

This is a Bazooka.



RPG-22

All of the trainer trainees fired the Bazooka during the second phase of training in Iran. The instructors demonstrated the use of the Bazooka and then each trainee fired it. The trainees fired the Bazooka from 100 meters.

The Bazooka is a very dangerous weapon. Once it is opened, it must be used. Once it is used, it must be discarded. If it compresses again, the weapon can explode. This weapon is more dangerous than the RPG.

Some Bazookas are made in China, some are made in Russia. The Bazooka is for attacking machines, trucks, humans, and headquarters buildings.

[Detainee] and the other trainer trainees at the Iran paramilitary training camp fired some other weapons, including the M-16 and the 9mm Browning pistol.

The M-16 is better than the Kalashnikov. The M-16 is lighter weight and has a longer range than the Kalashnikov. The M-16 and Kalashnikov have the same reliability. The trainees fired the M-16 for familiarization only.

[Detainee] and the other trainer trainees fired 10 rounds with the M-16 in the first phase of training and 20 rounds in the second phase of training. The trainees fired the M-16 from 120 meters.

[Detainee] and the other trainer trainees also fired the 13 round 9mm Browning pistol. The trainees fired an unknown number of bullets with the Browning during the first phase of training. The trainees fired approximately 40 rounds with the Browning pistol during the second phase of training. The trainees may have fired the Browning pistol from 50 or 20 meters.

The instructors told the trainer trainees that if they would like to be snipers, a trainee would need to shoot 250 bullets per day. [Detainee] and the other trainees fired approximately two bullets per day with a sniper rifle.

[Detainee] provided the following outline of the second phase of trainer training in Iran (**Comment:** This is a translation of what [Detainee] wrote.):

First Day:

Receiving the gear and taking a tour of the facility, rooms, and study halls and getting to know the trainers.

Second Day:

Waking up for prayers around 0530 and PT gear on around 0600 for morning exercises.

At 0700, shower and breakfast after that then dress in a military gear from training.

At 0800, the start of the first lecture and it was about how to handle a pistol and Kalashnikov rifle. This lesson continued until 11am with 10 minutes break each hour.

At 1100 a lecture was given by a religious man and it was about morals. It continued until 12 noon then a break until 1400 for lunch and prayers.

At 1400, the second lesson started and it was a continuation on how to use the pistol and the Kalashnikov. The lesson continued until 1700 with 10 minutes break each hour.

After 1700, the evening break begins. The trainers go to change clothing, go to pray, dinner or just play ping pong.

The lesson about the pistol and the Kalashnikov continued for five days and it included training on how to walk with the weapon. The lesson took place in the camp not on the range. We did not go to the range until the final day of training to shoot pistols and rifles.

#### Seventh day:

The trainers spread around the classes according to their specialty. Each four trainers represented a specialty and each special lesson has its own trainers.

One of the trainers specialized in weapons parts, how to take them apart and put them back together. He also explained different shooting positions. These weapons were: Browning and Tariq pistol, Kalashnikov, PKC, M16, SMG, Sniper rifles, RPG7, Bazooka, DSHk and the G3. We shot some of these weapons but the rest we didn't shoot because they didn't work.

We shot the PKC, M16 but the sniper rifles didn't work. We also shot RPG7 'two rockets each' and one Bazooka rocket. We didn't have any ammo for the G3 or SMG so we didn't use it.

This lesson continued for 11 days, the lesson and training on Bazooka, DSHk and the RPG7 in the two final days of the course.

#### Nineteenth Day:

The start of the second half of the course. It was about the different teaching methods. The lesson took place inside the class room. It was about how to become a trainer. This lesson continued for four days.

#### Twenty-third Day:

It was about the dissection of a weapon in front of the trainers so we could learn how the trainer teaches the lesson.

#### Twenty-ninth Day:

It was about the Bazooka, the DSHk and the RPG7 and going to the range to shoot then as I stated before.

I think the 30th day was the end of the course and they announced the results. I managed to hold the last place in graduation.

The course was fast and general; lacked the weapons because most were broken and lacked ammo as well. One of the trainers stated that we might need further training but he didn't say what it is.

After leaving the camp, we went to Tehran where we split in two groups. One group wanted to go to al-Ahvaz and the other wanted to go to Mashhad for recreations. We went to the zoo and the tourist gardens and shopping around for two days in Mashhad. After that we went back to al-Ahvaz where we spent the night then left for Iraq the next day via Basra.

This course took 36 days from the time we left Iraq until we returned. When we arrived in al-Ahwaz we stayed at a house there for three days then left for Tehran.

This is all what I can remember, I can't remember more detailed times or days. I was not very eager to go on this trip and could not think of any thing but returning to my wife and children.

God is my witness.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 014

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED (AS REDACTED)**

**Summary:**

[Detainee] traveled to Iran for the second paramilitary training course some time in June 2007. [Detainee] was informed by [Detainee] would be going to Iran for very important and very useful Special Forces training. [REDACTED] told [Detainee] that this training would be much better than the first training course [Detainee] attended. [REDACTED] did not elaborate on the Special Forces training at that time. [REDACTED] gave [Detainee] a Kia bus, which [Detainee] took to Kut to pick up approximately 15 other trainees. [Detainee] drove the individuals to the Baghdad Garage in Amarah. [Detainee] [REDACTED], who came and met everyone at the garage. This individual is the same driver that picked [Detainee] up at the Baghdad Garage in Amarah prior to [Detainee]'s first trip.

[Detainee] followed the driver to a different house in Amarah and parked the bus on the street next to the house. The 16 individuals went in the house, which was being taken care of by the same individual who took care of the house [Detainee] was at prior to [Detainee]'s first trip. Approximately fifteen minutes after arriving at the house [REDACTED] arrived and spoke to the group [REDACTED] told the group that they were going to Iran for training, but would not be going for another 10 to 15 days. [REDACTED] told the group that the training would be very difficult, but is much better than training that has been given to SG members previously. [REDACTED] told the group that the training will teach them a lot of valuable things, and that they would train on pretty much every weapon available. [REDACTED] told the group good luck, and told them that they are doing good things for Iraq and SG. [Detainee] drove the group to Kut and dropped off the individuals from Kut. [Detainee] then returned to Suwayrah.

Approximately 10 to 15 days later [Detainee] received a phone call from [REDACTED], who told [Detainee] to go to Kut again and meet everyone, then go to Amarah because it was time to attend the training. [Detainee] took a taxi to Kut and met the other trainees at the main garage in Kut. The group then took a taxi-bus to the Baghdad Garage in Amarah. [Detainee] called the driver who came picked the group up. The driver took the group to the same house they were at approximately 15 days prior. Shortly after arriving [REDACTED] showed up and told the group some rules about how to act in Iran. [REDACTED] told the group to treat the Iranian instructors with respect and not get in to arguments with them. If the Iranian instructors try to make trouble then they should forget about it and tell



█████ about it then ext time they see him. █████ was with three other Iraqis. One of the individuals, █████ told the group that he was in charge of SG in all of Amarah. The second individual, █████ told the group that he was from Amarah and would be in charge of a special group under the unidentified Amarah SG leader. [Detainee] does not know who the third individual was. █████ from Amarah was very young and attended the training with [Detainee]. █████ was not present at the house this time. █████ put [Detainee] in charge of the group because [Detainee] was oldest and had been to Iran once before. Everyone was forced to leave their cell phones at the house in Amarah except [Detainee]. The group spent the night at the house in Amarah and went to the Iranian border the following morning. Once the group crossed the border they met 15 or 16 other Iraqi trainees. All together the group now consisted of 31 or 32 Iraqis.

At one point on both trips [Detainee]'s group was visited by an unidentified Iranian who appeared very important. The Iranian was completely missing two or three fingers from one of his hands. One of the instructors told the group that this happened in the Iran/Iraq war when the individual was fighting in the north. This individual came to visit the class because there was an argument between the trainees and the instructors. The individual told the group that they needed to treat the instructors with respect and if they do so then there will be no problems. The individual had an interpreter as this individual did not speak Arabic. This individual arrived alone. The individual was pleasant while speaking to the group, and the instructors appeared to treat him as a superior. The individual was wearing a suit without a tie.

On [Detainee]'s second trip the group was visited by █████, █████ and █████. █████ did not say anything and just stood in the back watching as █████ talked to the group. █████ spoke for approximately a half hour to the group and delivered a very pleasant speech about religion. █████ told the group that Iraq will be thankful for what they are doing. One of the group members asked if Sayid Muqtada al-Sadr knew the group was training in Iran. █████ told the group that Sayid Muqtada has approved this training and is behind the group 100 percent. █████ told the trainees that the Iranians are their Shi'a brothers in the fight to get the American occupiers out of Iraq. Sayid Muqtada did not say anything to insinuate that the group should fully embrace Iran or that the group should follow Ayatallah Khomeini instead of Sayid Muhammad al-Sadr. █████ did not say anything that would give the group the impression that █████ wanted the group to lean more towards Iranian religious beliefs.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 015

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED** (AS REDACTED)

**Summary:**

After training concluded in Iran, [Detainee] left Iran on a commercial plane and arrived in Damascus, Syria. [Detainee] and his fellow students were walking up the Jetway, leaving the plane from Iran. They were greeted halfway up the Jetway by an unidentified male. This individual collected their tickets and baggage tags. [Detainee] and his fellow students were led away from the passenger terminal, out a door, onto the airport operations area. There was an airport bus waiting for them. They got onto the airport bus, and were driven to the edge of the airport property. [Detainee] knew he was in Damascus when [Detainee] saw Syrian license plates that had the words Halab and Damascus on them.

[Detainee] and his fellow students got onto a 21 passenger bus. The bus had curtains around the passenger area. [Detainee] saw a road sign that gave an unknown distance in kilometers to Lebanon.

[Detainee] and his fellow students were driven along a highway for approximately one hour. The bus left the highway, and drove into a farm area. At this point in time, the group was still in Syria. [Detainee] and his fellow students were loaded into two GMCs. (**Comment:** Probably Chevrolet Suburbans or GMC 1500 type vehicles.)

The group was then driven towards Lebanon. After approximately 30 minutes they passed through a checkpoint, without inspection. Approximately one hour after leaving the farm they stopped. [Detainee] and his fellow students got out of the GMCs, walked up a hill and located two vehicles waiting for them. [Detainee] and his fellow students were instructed to load themselves and their luggage into two vehicles, one of which was a four passenger pick up truck.

The drivers did not get out of the vehicles, or address [Detainee] or his fellow students. The Syrian drivers of the GMCs approached the drivers of the two new vehicles. The Syrian drivers greeted the others by a standard greeting wishing them the peace of God and Imam Hussein. The Lebanese drivers of the new vehicles responded by saying 'Keefak,' which [Detainee] knows is greeting commonly used in Lebanon, but rarely used outside of Lebanon. (**Comment:** From this [Detainee] inferred that the new drivers were Lebanese Shi'a.)

[Detainee] has not traveled to any other countries other than Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. [Detainee] traveled only once to Iran and Lebanon via Syria for training purposes.

[Detainee] had field training in the use of weapons. This is the only field training [Detainee] received in Lebanon.

[Detainee] has no knowledge of which city in Lebanon [Detainee] was trained in. [Detainee] was able to provide a sketch of the residential area the instruction took place at.

[Detainee] used the knowledge taught in Lebanon in [Detainee]'s daily operational routine. [Detainee] was taught how to manage [Detainee]'s subordinates through the use of respect, emotional power and monetary incentives. [Detainee] was taught to instill respect for [Detainee] and to show respect to [Detainee]'s subordinates. The Lebanese trainers emphasized the use of emotional power and loyalty in dealing with subordinates. The Lebanese trainers also told the students to be humble when dealing with subordinates. [Detainee] was told to reward good performance with a positive comment and financial bonus.

[Detainee] was taught to require subordinates to maintain their equipment. As an example, [Detainee] cited the fact that most SG members need a vehicle to accomplish their assigned tasks. SG would give their operatives funds to purchase the vehicles. The operatives were required to produce a receipt for the purchase of the vehicle. When maintenance was necessary for the vehicle, SG would pay for the repairs. The operatives were required to produce a receipt for the repair. [Detainee] was told to monitor these receipts for suspicious purchases. For example, were an operative to purchase a new battery every month, [Detainee] should notice, and question the potential abuse/misuse of SG funds.

██████ implemented this system; the Lebanese trainers reinforced the necessity of this system into [Detainee] and his fellow students.

The Lebanese trainers taught [Detainee] and the other students about utilizing an organizational structure that is similar to what [Detainee] refers to as a military structure. In this organizational structure, individuals in charge of similar functional areas answer to one leader in charge of a functional family group.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 016

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED (AS REDACTED)**

**Summary:**

The first group of SG members to receive training in Iran consisted of approximately 30 individuals. Only 16 of the 30 individuals undergoing training in Iran passed the training. The training was structured in a pass/fail manner due to the fact the trainees were undergoing training to become SG trainers within Iraq. The first group's training lasted for approximately one month. The training occurred approximately two months after the end of Ramadan 2006.

The first group of SG members to receive training in Iran received weapons training and physical training. The trainees received training on rifles, pistols, PKCs, and sniper rifles. [REDACTED] coordinated the training between Iraqi SG leaders and the Iranian/Lebanese trainers within Iran. [REDACTED] coordinated the travel between Iraq and Iran for the trainees. Trainees with passports traveled into Iran by way of roads and entered into Iran through a legal checkpoint. Trainees without passports were smuggled into Iran through marshes located south of Amarah. [REDACTED] arranged for a boat to take the trainees from Iraq into Iran through the marshes. The first training occurred at an Iranian training camp approximately two hours away from Tehran. [Detainee] has no knowledge of the exact location of the training camp.

The second training for the original 16 occurred approximately four months after Ramadan 2006. The 16 individuals who passed the initial training were sent to Iran to receive specialized training on mortars, IEDs, weapons, and tactics. One of the 16 trainees, [REDACTED], was kicked out of the training due to the fact [REDACTED] was having fights and arguments with the rest of the trainees. [Detainee] overheard a Lebanese trainer, [REDACTED], discussing [REDACTED] with [REDACTED], and heard [REDACTED] tell [REDACTED] was attempting to hold conversations with the Iranian trainers, which subsequently irritated [REDACTED] fellow trainees. The 15 trainees were angry with [REDACTED] for attempting to get involved with the Iranian trainers.

The trainees completed their training at an Iranian training camp approximately two hours from Tehran. The second training occurred at a different training camp from the training camp used for the initial training. [Detainee] has no knowledge on the exact location of the training camp.

[Detainee] provided funds to the 16 trainees in Amarah prior to the trainees entering Iran for the second training session. The trainees met at a safehouse in

the Al-Awayshi area of Amarah, run by █████ prior to traveling to Iran. [Detainee] has no knowledge of routes taken to arrive at the safehouse in Amarah. [Detainee] has no knowledge of waypoints used by the trainees prior to arriving at the safehouse in Amarah. The training was coordinated by █████ while █████ coordinated travel to and from Iran. [Detainee] provided funds to the trainees but did not have any further role within the coordination of the training.

While the 16 trainees were training to become SG trainers, two separate SG training groups were also concurrently in Iran undergoing training at the same time. One group of approximately 30 individuals was SG fighters who were receiving weapons training. The second group, consisting of approximately 33 individuals was receiving special forces training.

The fighter training course lasted approximately 20 days while the special forces course lasted approximately one month. The fighter training, along with the special forces training was not a pass/fail type of training. [Detainee] met with the 30 fighter trainees and the 33 special forces trainees before the trainees left to attend the training in Iran, gave the trainees money, and talked with the trainees about morale, behaviors, fighting, and emotions. After [Detainee] briefed the trainees, █████ coordinated the travel of the trainees into Iran. Those trainees having passports traveled into Iran by vehicle and passed through legal checkpoints. Those trainees not having passports were again smuggled from Iraq into Iran by way of boat through the Amarah marshes. [Detainee] has no knowledge of the names of any of the fighter and special forces trainees.

Approximately five months prior to [Detainee]'s day of capture, [Detainee] received a phone call from █████ in which █████ told [Detainee] to call █████, █████, and █████ to request five individuals from each coordinator to receive air defense training. █████, █████, and █████ called [Detainee] and informed [Detainee] each had selected the five individuals to receive the air defense training. [Detainee] has no knowledge on what air defense training entails, or what weapons are used for the training. [Detainee] called █████ and informed █████ 15 individuals had been chosen to receive the air defense training in Iran. █████ informed [Detainee] to send the 15 individuals in groups of 5 instead of in one large group of 15.

The first group of five individuals sent to Iran to receive air defense training was from Karbala. The training lasted 15-20 days in length. The individuals from Karbala entered into Iran through Mehran. [Detainee] has no knowledge of any of the individuals sent to Iran for air defense training. The first group of individuals to receive air defense training met at a safehouse in Karbala and departed Iraq for Iran from the safehouse in Karbala. [Detainee] met with the trainees at the safehouse in Karbala and provided the trainee's with funding and a briefing on prayers, food, automobiles, studies, and morals.

After the first group of five individuals sent to receive the air defense training had returned, the second group of five individuals left Iraq from the safehouse in Amarah and entered into Iran through Ahvaz. [Detainee] traveled to Amarah to provide the trainees with funding to travel to Iran. [Detainee] also briefed the group on prayers, food, automobiles, studies, and morals.

Upon the second group's return from Iran, the third group of five individuals to receive air defense training left Iraq from Baghdad and traveled to Iran through Mehran. The third group of individuals left for Iran approximately three months prior to [Detainee]'s day of capture. [Detainee] provided the trainees with funds and a briefing. While the third group of five individuals was receiving air defense training, a group of nine individuals was concurrently receiving sniper training in Iran at a separate training camp. [Detainee] has no knowledge of the locations of any training camps within Iran.

The nine individuals to receive sniper training met at the safehouse located in Amarah. [Detainee] met with the sniper trainees and provided the trainees with funds and with a briefing on how to act while in Iran. The sniper trainees left Iraq approximately two-three days after the third group of air defense trainees left Iraq for training. The sniper training lasted 20 days. [Detainee] has no knowledge of further training events in Iran. After the nine individuals returned from Iran for sniper training CF began closing in on the training network. [REDACTED] called [Detainee] to inform [Detainee] training would be put on hold until the security situation for the training network improved.

[Detainee] has no knowledge of the names of any individuals sent to Iran to receive training on air defense, weaponry, fighting, sniping, or special forces.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 017

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED** (AS REDACTED)

**Summary:**

[Detainee] provided the following training schedule he would follow in order to teach trainees in the light weapons course:

Day 1 Classroom – AK-47, M-16, M18

AK-47:

History/Manufacture/General Information

Variants of the weapon

Assembly/Disassembly

Attachments (Rockets/Grenade Launchers)

Types of Ammunition

Magazines

Primary Marksmanship Instruction comprised of Firing Procedures, Breathing and Target Acquisition

**(Comment:** [Detainee] emphasized target acquisition as the most important section of the classroom training for each of the weapons discussed. He clarified that it is not the longest section of the classroom training; however, it is the most important concept to grasp before practical application at the range.)

M-16/M-18:

History/Manufacture/General Information

Variants of the weapon (including the M-18)

Assembly/Disassembly

Attachments (Rockets/Grenade Launchers, specifically the M-18)

Types of Ammunition

Magazines

Primary Marksmanship Instruction - Comprised of Firing Procedures, Breathing and Target Acquisition including different sights with the M-18

**(Comment:** The M-18 discussed by [Detainee] is the M203 grenade launcher attachment.)

Day 2 Range – AK-47, M-16, M-18

Practical implementation of classroom concepts for each weapon.  
No new material is introduced.

### Day 3 Classroom – RPG, Bazooka, PKC

RPG:

History/Manufacture/General Information  
Variants of the weapon  
Assembly/Disassembly  
Firing Procedures  
Target Acquisition  
Different types of ammunition/rockets  
Back blast area clearance of 30 meters  
Bazooka  
History/Manufacture/General Information  
Assembly/Disassembly (Prepackaged, but needs to be extended)  
Firing Procedures  
Target Acquisition  
Back blast area clearance of 30 meters

PKC:

Manufacture/General Information  
Variants of the weapon  
Assembly/Disassembly  
Types of Ammunition  
Magazines/Types of Feed  
Primary Marksmanship Instruction - comprised of Firing Procedures, Breathing and Target Acquisition.

### Day 4 Range – RPG, Bazooka, PKC

Practical implementation of classroom concepts for each weapon.  
No new material is introduced.

### Day 5 Classroom – Russian Sniper Rifle

Russian Sniper Rifle:

Manufacture/General Information  
Variants of the weapon  
Assembly/Disassembly  
Types of Ammunition  
Magazines/Types of Feed



Primary Marksmanship Instruction - comprised of Firing Procedures, Breathing and Target Acquisition.

Special Instruction would be given in the following areas:

Characteristics of a sniper – comprised of good sight, patience, and must shoot right-handed

Duties of a sniper include waiting for the right moment to fire, ideal positions to support other fighters in operations and target acquisition of high ranking individuals.

Functions of the scope - to include readings, estimation of distances and changing the battery.

#### Day 6 Range – Russian Sniper Rifle

Practical implementation of classroom concepts for each weapon.  
No new material is introduced.

#### Day 7 Classroom – German Sniper Rifle (12.7mm)

German Sniper Rifle:

Manufacture/General Information

Variants of the weapon

Assembly/Disassembly

Types of Ammunition

Magazines/Types of Feed

Primary Marksmanship Instruction to include firing procedures, breathing target acquisition

Special Instruction would be given in the following areas:

Characteristics of a sniper – consisting of good sight, patience and shoot right-handed

Duties of a sniper – consisting of waiting for the right moment to fire, ideal positions to support other fighters in operations and target acquisition of high ranking individuals

Functions of the scope – consisting of readings, estimation of distances and changing the battery

#### Day 8 Range – German Sniper Rifle (12.7mm)

Practical implementation of classroom concepts for each weapon.  
No new material is introduced.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 018

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED (AS REDACTED)**

**Summary:**

[Detainee] has made three trips to Iran. On the first trip to Iran, [Detainee] traveled with [REDACTED]. [Detainee]'s first trip to Iran occurred one to two months after Ramadan 2006.

[Detainee] and [REDACTED]'s decision to travel to Iran was on short notice. [Detainee]'s reason for traveling was for vacation. [REDACTED] made travel arrangements and informed [Detainee] the trip could be made without obtaining a passport.

[Detainee] and [REDACTED] met at the garage in al-Amarah. [REDACTED] made phone calls and arranged further transportation. [Detainee] and [REDACTED] were provided transportation by a young male individual driving a truck. Travel was made from Amarah to an unknown location. During the drive, [Detainee] observed a sign for al-Majjar. After an hour of traveling, the vehicle stopped on a main road. [Detainee] and [REDACTED] got into another truck that was waiting with another driver.

[Detainee] and [REDACTED] traveled for approximately one hour and fifteen minutes. [Detainee] and [REDACTED] came to a small river where they got out and changed clothing. Prior to the trip, [REDACTED] told [Detainee] to bring clothing, specifically Dishdashah, to change into for the next portion on the trip.

[Detainee] and [REDACTED] changed clothing and boarded a small motorized boat. There were a total of four people on the boat; [Detainee], [REDACTED], one adult male individual, and the male's son who was approximately fifteen years of age. The adult male operated the motor while the young male utilized a paddle.

The boat traveled down the river and into a body of water, possibly a lake. The initial portion of the boat travel was approximately twenty minutes. [Detainee], [REDACTED] and the young male individual were dropped off on a small peninsula. The boat continued to be navigated by the unknown male individual through an Iranian checkpoint. [Detainee], [REDACTED] and the young male walked to the other side of the peninsula and waited for the boat. The walk was approximately ten minutes. Once through the checkpoint, the point continued to the other side of

the peninsula and picked up all three individuals. The boat then traveled for approximately thirty minutes before reaching the shore.

The boat checkpoint had an Iranian flag and was located within approximately 225 yards away from the peninsula. [Detainee] was not worried police at the checkpoint would see the drop off because there were numerous boats in the area. Many individuals in the area were fishing as the lake seemed to be very populated.

Upon reaching shore, there was another 4 door truck waiting for [Detainee] and [REDACTED]. There were two Iranians inside the vehicle waiting for their arrival.

[Detainee] and [REDACTED] traveled by vehicle for approximately three hours and arrived in Ahvaz, Iran. [Detainee] was taken to a safe house located near a traffic circle containing a large tea pot sculpture. The tea pot sculpture was visible from the safe house.

[Detainee] arrived at the safe house with [REDACTED]. [Detainee] met with [REDACTED] and another unknown male individual. The two Iranian male drivers were also at the residence. [Detainee] and [REDACTED] stayed for dinner [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] conversed while [Detainee] watched television. [Detainee] has no knowledge of the conversation between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

The residence is a nice house, possibly two stories, located in a nice neighborhood.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 019

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED** (AS REDACTED)

**Summary:**

[Detainee] last traveled to Iran for approximately 28 days during Ramadan in 2007. (**Comment:** Ramadan took place from September 13<sup>th</sup> to October 13<sup>th</sup> in 2007.)

[Detainee] traveled to Iran with [REDACTED]. [Detainee] and [REDACTED] first traveled from Kut to Amarah and spent the night at a house belonging to [REDACTED]. [Detainee] has stayed at this house before but does not know [REDACTED] well. People normally stay at [REDACTED]'s house in Amarah prior to traveling to Iran for training. [Detainee] and [REDACTED] spent the night at [REDACTED]'s house along with 10 other individuals who arrived separately. [Detainee], [REDACTED] and the 10 other Iraqis traveled to Iran approximately three days after arriving in Amarah. The 12-man group traveled to the Shayikh Sa'ad area where an unidentified driver picked the 12-man group up and took them to a house in the desert. [Detainee] has the telephone number for the driver stored in [Detainee]'s phone but [Detainee] can not remember what it is stored as. From the house in the desert the 12-man group was taken at night to a mountainous area. The group walked across the desert, crossing the border and arriving in Iran.

The group got in two pickup trucks with Iranian drivers and traveled to an apartment in Kermanshah, IR where the 12-man group spent the night. The following morning the drivers took the 12-man group to an airport in Kermanshah where they took a flight to Tehran, IR. After arriving in Tehran the 12-man group were taken by an Iranian to an apartment in a normal civilian apartment building.

The 12-man group stayed in this one apartment for approximately three days until taking a bus to Meshhad to visit the Imam Riza shrine and a zoo. The 12-man group spent approximately five days in Mashhad before returning to Tehran. The 12-man group flew from Meshhad to Tehran. Once in Tehran the 12-man group was taken to the same apartment they had been in before traveling to Meshhad. The group spent one night in this apartment and was taken to another normal civilian apartment building in Tehran.

The group was split in to two groups of six and put in two different apartments. All instructional training was conducted in these two apartments in Tehran. No training on this trip had been conducted prior to arriving at these two apartments.

IRGC trainers came to the apartment and gave instruction on sniper training. [Detainee] knows that the trainers were IRGC because the trainers mentioned it to [Detainee] several times. [Detainee] heard no mention of Lebanese Hizballah trainers on this trip. The two groups were instructed on the use of the Dragunov sniper rifle and the use of an unidentified sniper rifle that uses a round significantly larger than the Dragunov. (**Comment:** The Dragunov sniper rifle uses a 7.62 x 54mm round.)

Training was conducted at a range located on the Sayid Shuhadah military base located on the outskirts of Tehran. [Detainee] does not know if Sayid Shuhadah is the official name of the military base. The first two trips to the Sayid Shuhadah base did not require the group to travel through any type of checkpoint. The third time the group traveled to the base they were stopped at a checkpoint manned by Iranian military guards wearing commando uniforms. The Iranian driver spoke to the guards and was allowed to pass. [Detainee] does not know if the guards were IRGC.

At the range the 12-man group used the Dragunov sniper rifle with a scope attached to it. The group was also instructed on the use of a pair of binoculars for use at night that displays images base on the amount of heat that the substance is giving off. These binoculars were referred to as thermals and displayed things in different hues of red and purple. When something was hot it looked black. The instructors showed the trainees how to identify a person while looking through the thermals. The instructors showed the trainees a blanket that someone can use when laying in a sniper position. When someone is under the blanket they are invisible to the thermal binoculars. The group also received training in the use of GPS devices. [Detainee] did not understand the GPS training because it was in English. (**Comment:** Deception Indicated.)

When the training was concluded the 12-man group returned in three separate groups. The first group consisted of four people from Diyala. The second group consisted of five people from Baghdad and one individual from Diyala named [REDACTED]. [Detainee] and [REDACTED] were the last of the trainees to return. [Detainee] and [REDACTED] flew from Tehran to Ahvaz, where they were taken to a marsh area. [Detainee] and [REDACTED] were taken in a boat by two Iraqis wearing Dishdashahs across a river to an unidentified area likely between Amarah and Basra. [Detainee] and [REDACTED] got in a truck with an unidentified Iraqi who was waiting for them.

On the way back to Amarah [Detainee] called [REDACTED] who is in charge of [Detainee]'s payroll. [REDACTED] was in Amarah and told [Detainee] that it was time to be paid so [Detainee] and [REDACTED] should come get their salaries. [Detainee] and [REDACTED] usually receive their salaries in Kut but picked it up in Amarah this one time due to convenience. [Detainee] and [REDACTED] went to [REDACTED] house to pick up their cell phones which they had left at [REDACTED]'s house prior to traveling to Iran.

[Detainee] and █████ got a taxi at the parking garage in Amarah and returned to Kut.

[Detainee]'s second trip to Iran was a familiarization trip with a focus on training. [Detainee] and █████ traveled to and from Iran legally through the Shalamchah border crossing and trained in an apartment in Tehran, IR. [Detainee] received a brief overview of EFPs, plastic explosives, AK-47 assault rifles, RPGs, pistols and PKC machine guns. [Detainee]'s second trip lasted approximately 30 days.

[Detainee]'s first trip to Iran was [Detainee]'s initial trip to Iran for training. [Detainee] and █████ traveled to Iran legally through the Shalamchah border crossing. The training was conducted in the same apartment in Tehran that [Detainee] trained in on His second trip. [Detainee] was told that he would be trained multiple times on different subjects in order to be certified as a trainer. When [Detainee], █████ and the rest of the trainees arrived in Iran they were told what specialties each person would focus on. █████ was told that he would be a master trainer. [Detainee] was told that He would be in charge of guerrilla warfare tactics. [Detainee] wanted to be designated as someone in charge of information but once someone was assigned a specialty they were not allowed to switch. [Detainee]'s first trip lasted approximately 30 days.

[Detainee] works for an individual named █████ who lives in Kut █████ sent [Detainee] and █████ to Iran to become trainers. █████ group is called 'the stuff' and is responsible for training throughout all of Iraq. █████'s group is not functional yet and does not currently train anyone. █████ reports to an individual in Baghdad named █████. █████ also works with an Iraqi in Iran named █████, who [Detainee] interacted with on all three trips to Iran. █████ works with an unidentified █████ in Baghdad who is very fat.

[Detainee] does not think much of CF. [Detainee] wants to take the opportunity in detention to learn if what everyone else says about CF is true. [Detainee] does not trust CF and thinks that everyone in CF is liars but is willing to give CF a chance to prove themselves. Everyone in JAM tells everyone that CF will use people and throw them away in prison for the rest of their lives with no regard for a person's family.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 020

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED (AS REDACTED)**

**Summary:**

[Detainee] did not travel to Lebanon for paramilitary training. Lebanese Hizballah (LH) operated training is reserved for more intensive and specific operations. [Detainee] overheard one of the LH instructors explain some of the weapons covered during LH training in Lebanon. LH provides instruction on size ten shoulder-fired missiles, built specifically to penetrate armored tanks. The large 12.7 caliber German made sniper rifle, to be instructed more intensively than the same training [Detainee] received in Iran, is also covered in LH training in Lebanon.

LH only trains in southern Lebanon under the cover of wooded areas in order to avoid spy planes. [Detainee]'s LH trainers in Iran also mentioned more intensive intelligence gathering instruction, such as gaining intelligence from military bases by living close to a military base for better intelligence gathering. LH trainers in Lebanon also instruct trainees to acquire a job near a military base, such as a taxi driver or a shop owner. The trainees are instructed to log down when military equipment enters and leaves the base. The LH trainers focused on instruction for gathering intelligence on CF bases in Iraq.

Upon [Detainee]'s second trip to Iran for paramilitary trip to Iran, [Detainee] learned of a trainer who was killed in an explosion while instructing a group in making EFPs two days prior to their arrival. The trainer's name was [REDACTED]. Medam Base is the name of the area where the trainer was killed. A bush is planted in the base in memory of the trainer.

[Detainee] does not use anyone at Camp Delta in Kut as a source to collect information on CF. [Detainee] does know of a [REDACTED], who works at the hospital on base; however, he does not know of [REDACTED] acting as a source.

The IRGC paramilitary training base in Iran where [Detainee] trained while in Iran is located in southern Tehran, approximately five miles from a mountain range. The base was near a town by the name Haydar 'Abbad or Jalal 'Abbad. The base was near a school because [Detainee] could hear the students outside playing during their recess.

Anti-aircraft weaponry is not [Detainee]'s specialty and [Detainee] did not train on the fundamentals of anti-aircraft weaponry in Iran; however other unidentified individuals came to Iran to train on Strella anti-aircraft missiles. The Strella training lasts ten to 12 days in Iran.

[Detainee] trained on the Draganov Russian sniper rifle with its original scope and the German made 12.7 caliber sniper rifle. The 12.7 caliber sniper rifle had an Iranian made zoom scope with 12 different points of adjustment for different distances. The above scope did not have night vision capability. [Detainee] trained with the above scope on his third trip to Iran. [Detainee] also trained on an M-16 rifle with a laser sight attached to it. The sight projected a red dot toward the target, however was only effective to 100 meters.

[Detainee] did not train on EFPs while in Iran. Among the [Detainee]'s group of individuals who were in Iran to become trainers with [Detainee], however, four individuals were tasked to specialize in EFP training. These four individuals were collectively called Engineers. These individuals were only known by aliases. The four Engineers in [Detainee]'s group were ██████ from Amarah, ██████ from Hillah, ██████ from Baghdad, and ██████ from Hillah. ██████'s real name is ██████ from the Rusafa area of Baghdad.

The aforementioned Engineer trainees were in [Detainee]'s group in Iran for [Detainee]'s first two visits. The Engineer trainees told [Detainee] about building three EFPs during training and blowing them up from 50 meters away. The goal of the Engineer training was for use against CF. [Detainee] also found four inch thick pieces of metal with holes from an EFP blast in them lying around the training area. The pieces of metal were used to simulate armor from a military vehicle and the holes were created from the EFPs.

When ██████ visits [Detainee] to pay him, ██████'s accountant accompanies ██████. ██████'s accountant always brings a briefcase with papers in them. ██████'s job is to travel from province to province, paying the 16 trainers from [Detainee]'s group who graduated from Iranian paramilitary training.

During one of [Detainee]'s training sessions, his group was instructed on techniques involving the attack of military convoys and abduction of POWs. Upon the arrival of a four vehicle convoy, EFP's would be emplaced to disable the first three vehicles in a convoy. The attackers, who are hiding on one side of the road from an unidentified distance away, would successively fire upon the fourth vehicle with shoulder-fired missiles. Amidst the attack, two small groups of individuals would alternatively bound from the hidden area away from the road to the fourth vehicle while firing upon the fourth vehicle using small arms. The alternatively bounding small groups would advance to the vehicle, pull out any individual who is still living, and bring the individual back to an area where the attackers' own convoy of vehicles is waiting. In order to prevent a quick reaction force from arriving to aid the disabled convoys, a simultaneous mortar attack



would be planned on a nearby military base. The simultaneous mortar attack would be followed through to keep the quick reaction force at the nearby base busy. Another way to prevent assistance from a quick reaction force would be to emplace more EFPs at a further distance down the same planned route as the military convoy.

While [REDACTED] is in charge of all of the IRGC/LH training in Iran for Iraqi trainees, [REDACTED] is possibly in charge of all of the trainees in Iraq who have graduated from training school in Iran. [REDACTED], who is now known as [REDACTED], is in charge of all of the LH trainers in Iran. Fu'ad can frequently be seen on the cell phone pictures of LH trainees. [Detainee] has seen a picture of [REDACTED] on the cell phone of an LH trainer. Every time [Detainee] goes to Iran for training, he sees [REDACTED].

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 021

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED** (AS REDACTED)

**Summary:**

[Detainee] joined JAM two months after the Second Battle, which was approximately two years prior to [Detainee]'s day of capture. The First Battle was in an-Najaf, between JAM and CF, two and one half years prior to [Detainee]'s day of capture. The Second Battle was six months after the First Battle, and was in al-Kut, between JAM and ING.

[Detainee] joined JAM because [Detainee] is from a big family and the family needed money. Through the committees of JAM, [Detainee] obtained temporary work distributing gas.

[Detainee] became SG approximately one year prior to [Detainee]'s day of capture. One day, [REDACTED] came to [Detainee] and told [Detainee] that [REDACTED] would give [Detainee] a good job with SG and a good salary, and [REDACTED] would also get jobs for other people in [Detainee]'s family. [Detainee] hesitantly accepted the offer. [Detainee] joined SG for the money.

[Detainee] has only been to Iran one time in his life. [Detainee] traveled to Iran in May of 2007 to attend training.

[REDACTED] came to [Detainee] and told [Detainee] that SG would give [Detainee] money to train. [REDACTED] told [Detainee] that [Detainee] would have to fight CF. [Detainee] has never fought against CF; [Detainee] does not even know how to shoot a weapon.

Approximately four or five months after joining SG and one month prior to traveling to Iran for training [REDACTED] told [Detainee] that [Detainee] would attend training in Iran, and the training would consist of the following:

Kalashnikov  
PKC  
Launcher  
Sniper  
Physical fitness

[REDACTED] said the training would be one month long, and then [Detainee] would return home.

█████ gave [Detainee] money with which to obtain a legal passport. [Detainee] went to the passport agency office in al-Kut, filled out paperwork, and got the passport in one day. █████ also gave [Detainee] money with which to obtain a visa for Iran. [Detainee] went to the Iranian Embassy in Karbala where he obtained the visa that same day.

On the day [Detainee] departed al-Kut for training in Iran, from al-Kut Garage, [Detainee] and six other men, also going to training, took a GMC car to Amarah. The following men were in the GMC with [Detainee]:

█████, aka █████  
█████, aka █████, aka █████  
█████, aka █████  
█████, aka █████  
█████, aka █████, aka █████  
█████, aka █████

[Detainee] knew █████ and █████ prior to the training. [Detainee] recognized █████ as being from [Detainee]'s area, but did not know █████ prior to the training. [Detainee] did not know the other trainees prior to the training.

Each man in the GMC paid 10,000 IZD for the trip from al-Kut to Amarah. █████ had given each man 100 USD prior to departing on the trip. █████ had given █████ the money approximately two days prior to departing on the trip, and █████ in turn gave the money to the other six men.

When the GMC arrived at the Amarah garage, █████ called a man at a phone number which █████ received prior to departing on the trip. An unidentified Iraqi man came to the Amarah garage and took the men to a house. [Detainee] has no knowledge of the location of this house. The unidentified Iraqi man told the group that they would be departing the following day for training in Iran.

When [Detainee] and the other six men arrived at the house there were six or seven other men at the house who were also going to Iran for training. The house was a family house, and there was a family present, but [Detainee] and the others stayed in a living room away from the family. Another unidentified man brought [Detainee] and the others food.

[Detainee] and his group of six, with the other six or seven men from the house in Amarah and 14 other men from Amarah departed the following day for Iran. There were 28 men traveling together for the training.

Someone brought many cars to the house in Amarah, and all of the cars together drove with the 28 men to Mehran.

At Mehran, [Detainee] and the other 27 men departed Iraq with their passports, went through customs, and entered Iran. This occurred without issue.

On the Iran side of the border, [Detainee] and the others waited for approximately an hour or two, and a small car arrived with two or three unidentified men in it. The unidentified men rented cars for the group of 28 men, and told the cars where to go. The cars drove the 28 men to a hotel in Tehran. The drive was through the night, from evening through morning. They arrived in Tehran at dawn. The men spent two days at the hotel in Tehran.

[Detainee] has no knowledge of the name of the hotel in Tehran where the group stayed, or in which neighborhood in Tehran the hotel was located. There was nothing distinctive about the area where the hotel was located; there were no significant landmarks or structures.

The afternoon that [Detainee] and the others arrived in Tehran, [REDACTED] the coordinator for the training in Iran, came to the hotel with an unidentified Iranian interpreter, and talked to the men who had arrived for training.

[REDACTED] probably lives in Iran, because he came to the hotel to meet with the men and also visited the training camp twice during the training. [Detainee] saw [REDACTED] on the day the group arrived in Tehran, when the group left for training, and then again at the mid point of the training. [REDACTED] may have also gone to the training camp at the end of the training.

[Detainee] and the other 27 men stayed in the hotel in a large room with two smaller rooms attached.

[REDACTED] told the men that they would be going to the training camp. [REDACTED] took photos of all of the men and had them complete a form with personal identifying information.

When [REDACTED] came to the hotel, [REDACTED] spoke mostly with [REDACTED], one of the men from Amarah.

[REDACTED] told the men that they were not allowed to leave the hotel and that if they needed anything; any food, any drink, or cigarettes, they could ask the hotel and it would be provided.

Two days after arriving at the hotel, [Detainee] and the others departed the hotel in two Coaster 18 passenger buses. [REDACTED] was at the hotel and directed [Detainee] and the others to get onto the buses, and told them that the drivers knew where to go. The buses departed the hotel at approximately 1000 hours

and arrived at the training camp at approximately 1400 or 1500 hours. The bus trip was four or five hours.

The buses may have stopped enroute to the training camp for lunch at a restaurant. During the trip to the training camp, [Detainee] felt like they were going up into the mountains. They passed fields with crops enroute to the camp.

The camp has buildings and rooms and a shooting range a little distance away from the camp.

When they arrived at the camp, the group of 28 men stayed for two days without doing any training. They played football and ate. Three Iranian men [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and an Iranian interpreter brought food for the trainees. No one talked to the trainees during this two day period.

[REDACTED], [REDACTED] wore camouflaged uniforms, but they were not uniform, they were not the same color. There were a total of 12 men working at the training camp.

On the first day of training, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and the Iranian interpreter provided the men with uniforms. The training day commenced with physical fitness training, gymnastics and exercises.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 022

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED** (AS REDACTED)

**Summary:**

Badr Organization wants to give Iraq to Iran. The biggest reason Muqtada al-Sadr has problems working with the Government of Iraq is because approximately 60 percent of the Iraqi Government are members of Badr Organization. [Detainee]'s father was a POW for approximately eight years during the Iran-Iraq war and was tortured by members of the Badr Organization. Badr Organization members say they are Muslims, but Muslims would not give their country away. Anyone who has a mind and watches the news can see clearly the Badr Organization trying to give Iraq to Iran.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 023

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED (AS REDACTED)**

**Summary:**

[Detainee] traveled to Amarah with [REDACTED] prior to [Detainee]'s second trip to Iran for paramilitary instructor training. [Detainee], [REDACTED] and 14 other trainers met at this house and discussed the training with [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. This [REDACTED] is not the same individual as [REDACTED], who was also present and was maintaining the house that everyone was meeting at. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] separated the 16 individuals into groups of four based on their specialty.

[Detainee] was put in the 'information' group because this is what [Detainee]'s specialty was initially supposed to be.

[REDACTED], one of the individuals running the meeting has been previously trained as an Information specialist. [Detainee] does not know how many times [REDACTED] has been to Iran to receive training. [REDACTED] was part of a group that went through the trainer program prior to [Detainee]'s group. [Detainee] does not know how many people attended the training cycle with [REDACTED]. The group spent one night at the house in Amarah and returned home the following day after learning that the trip had been cancelled. Approximately 10 days after [Detainee] and [REDACTED] returned to Kut [REDACTED] told [Detainee] that it was time to travel again to Amarah to attend the training that had been cancelled. [Detainee] and [REDACTED] traveled to Amarah again and met the same group of 14 individuals at a house run by [REDACTED].

[Detainee] is not sure if this was the same house that the meeting took place at approximately 10 days earlier but knows that [REDACTED] was the caretaker of this house as well as the previous one. [Detainee] does not have [REDACTED] phone number in [Detainee]'s phone.

One of the individuals attending the first trip to Iran for training, whose name was [REDACTED], was in charge of the second trip

The first 7-10 days of training on the second trip was a repeat of the basic weapons training received on the first trip. A day was also taken to receive a class from an older IRGC trainer named [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] taught the groups about discipline by making the groups hold a rifle for an hour at a time. [REDACTED] would hit the trainee if he did not hold the rifle properly. Following [REDACTED]'s class the group received a class from a Lebanese instructor named [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] taught the group about how to teach, saying that a trainer must dress well, speak well, and know the subject he is attempting to teach. After the basic weapons refresher the group split up in to four groups of four people based on their specialties. One of the Lebanese instructors ran through everyone's evaluations and moved

individuals to different groups based on what they were good at. [Detainee] was moved to tactics because [Detainee] is very athletic. The last 14 days of training was conducted in groups of four with each group spending the entire 14 days focusing on their specialty. [Detainee] received Tactics training from both Lebanese Hizballah and IRGC trainers. The Engineer trainers were only taught by Lebanese Hizballah trainers.

During the second trip the group took one day to travel to the Massumah shrine. [Detainee] and seven other students were not allowed to go because they were speaking badly about some of the training and the instructors. [Detainee] and the seven other students did not feel that the instructors were being fair by not allowing the group to call their families every day. The individuals who stayed behind were [Detainee], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and second individual named [REDACTED]. At the end of the second trip the group traveled from Ahvaz to Mehran on a coach bus. The group all sat together and discussed the training. Most of the group members, including [Detainee] and [REDACTED] were upset at the instructors for restricting their phone calls during the trip. This issue aside, most individuals felt good about the training they had received but wished that the training had been more in depth. The individuals did not feel that it was necessarily worth going to the hassle of traveling all the way to Iran to receive this training but were not too upset because their trip was paid for. An older Lebanese individual named [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] was talking to the trainees telling them that the instructors training them were very qualified. [Detainee] and the rest of the group felt that the instructors on the first and second trips were qualified to train them and were very knowledgeable in their subjects.

The training received on the third trip was not as good as the training received on the first two trips. The IRGC instructors from the third trip sometimes gave out instructions to the sniper students that [Detainee] and [REDACTED] thought was inaccurate or incorrect.

[Detainee]'s third trip to Iran occurred during Ramadan. When it came time for the celebration of Eid the instructors took the group to the Imam Khomeini shrine. [Detainee] decided not to go because [Detainee] did not want to spend his Eid celebrating at the shrine of the Imam Khomeini. [Detainee] follows Sayid Muqtada al-Sadr because Sayid Muqtada has always helped the poor Shi'a like his father Sayid Muhammad. Sayid Muqtada does not put himself above the poor people and is a very simple man. When the group returned from the Imam Khomeini shrine they were visited by [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] asked why everyone did not go to the shrine. [Detainee] told [REDACTED] that [Detainee] alone did not want to go and no one else should be punished for this. [REDACTED] told [Detainee] that He should attend events with the rest of the class [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] did not directly state anything about following religious guidance from Iran but [Detainee] got the impression that everyone in Iran was attempting to draw the trainees into following a different leader than Sayid Muqtada al-Sadr.



**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 024

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED** (AS REDACTED)

**Summary:**

Iran is using Badr Organization and SG to fight against CF in Iraq. Iran is using Badr Organization and SG to fight against CF for Iran, because Iran does not want to fight CF directly. Iran is using Badr Organization and SG to fight against CF in Iraq so Iran does not have to directly utilize Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members in Iraq. Iran no longer wants to directly operate within Iraq using IRGC members due to the fact CF has captured IRGC members in the past. Iran does not want to fight a direct war against CF due to the fact Iran knows CF will destroy Iran. Iran does not want to cause an international crisis by starting a war with CF. Iran wants to fight and cause problems for CF but does not want to start an overt war. Iran is using the Iraqi based Badr Organization and SG to fight against CF in order for Iran to appear as if Iran is not fighting CF. Iran does not want to appear as if Iran has activity in Iraq.

The government of Iran controls both Badr Organization and SG. The government of Iran provides funding and support to both Badr Organization and SG within Iraq. The government of Iran provides support to Badr Organization and SG so Iran can control and manipulate the actions and activities of Badr Organization and SG within Iraq. The government of Iran controls Badr Organization and SG within Iraq in order for SG and Badr Organization to fight against CF for Iran's purposes. Iran wants to fight against CF, disrupt the Iraqi infrastructure, and upset the government of Iraq to cause CF to fail in Iraq, and to force CF to focus solely on the situation within Iraq and not on CF and the United States' relationship with Iran.

Iran is forcing Badr Organization and SG to work together to provide intelligence on, and attack CF. The government of Iran produces and provides intelligence requirements to the IRGC. Once officers and officials within the IRGC receive the intelligence requirements from the Iranian government, the intelligence requirements are passed from the IRGC officials to the IRGC's intelligence collection branch, the Ramadan Corps. [REDACTED] is the head of the Ramadan Corps and is in charge of all Ramadan Corps operations.

[REDACTED] receives the government of Iran's intelligence requirements and passes the intelligence requirements to [REDACTED], the head of Badr Organization in Iraq [REDACTED] receives the Iranian government's intelligence requirements and passes

the intelligence requirements to the intelligence department of Badr Organization. An unknown individual from Badr Organization's intelligence department then tasks █████ and █████ to collect the intelligence information on CF to fulfill Iran's intelligence requirements.

Once █████ and █████ receive the intelligence requirements █████ and █████ collect intelligence on CF and pass the intelligence information to SG within the Diyala province and Shahraban. SG within the Diyala province and Shahraban use the intelligence information collected against CF to plan and carry out attacks against CF. Once SG has carried out attacks against CF, SG reports on the efficacy and success of the attacks against CF to █████ and █████. █████ and █████ report the success/failure and effectiveness of the SG attacks against CF to the intelligence department for Badr Organization. An unknown individual within the intelligence department of Badr Organization passes the information regarding SG's effectiveness against CF to █████ relays the information to █████ of the Ramadan Corps. █████ passes the information to IRGC officers and officials who then proceed to pass the information to unknown individuals within the Iranian government.

Iran has been directing Badr Organization to work with SG in Diyala and Shahraban for approximately the past one and a half to two years prior to [Detainee]'s day of capture. The government of Iran is directly responsible for directing Badr Organization to collect intelligence against CF. The government of Iran is directly responsible for directing SG to attack CF. It is clear Iran can be held directly responsible for attacks against CF.

[Detainee] provided the following diagram illustrating Iranian control and influence within Badr Organization intelligence collection and SG attacks against CF:

[Detainee] does not have knowledge of the mediums with which the intelligence requirements are passed from the Iranian government to Badr Organization. [Detainee] does not have knowledge of the mediums with which feedback from SG attacks against CF is passed from SG to Badr Organization. [Detainee] does not have knowledge of the mediums with which Badr Organization passes feedback from the SG attacks against CF to the Iranian government.

Badr Organization and SG are working together throughout the Diyala province and Shahraban. [Detainee] does not have knowledge regarding whether or not Badr Organization and SG are working together in other provinces or neighborhoods within Iraq. Due to the cooperation between Badr Organization and SG within Shahraban, █████ has been made the leader over the SG individuals operating within Shahraban. █████ gave [Detainee] a list of names and demographic information for 13 SG individuals which █████ leads in Shahraban. █████ asked [Detainee] to obtain false identification cards for the 13 SG members in Shahraban approximately three months prior to [Detainee]'s day

of capture.. [REDACTED] is one of the SG members for whom [Detainee] was asked to obtain an identification card.

[Detainee] does not have knowledge regarding whether or not [REDACTED] is actively engaged with SG operating in the Diyala province and Shahraban. [REDACTED] is actively and directly engaged with SG in Shahraban.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTERROGATION REPORT 025

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED (AS REDACTED)**

**Summary:**

Upon arriving in Tehran, Iran for paramilitary training, [Detainee] and his training group stayed in an unidentified apartment for four days in order to wait for a vacancy to open up for [Detainee]'s group at the training base. [Detainee]'s group had no permission to leave the first apartment and did not leave the apartment for the entire four days. The second apartment in Tehran was used for training and instruction. The first floor of the second apartment was partially below ground level. Therefore, upon entering the stairwell, one set of spiral stairs descended to a small living quarters. The small living quarters housed an Iranian physical training instructor and the Egyptian interpreter. If facing the front of the training apartment building, the aforementioned stairwell is on the left side of the building and an entrance to the Iranian family's living quarters is on the right side of the building. The entrance to the family's living quarters on the right side of the building possibly opened to a set of descending stairs to separate living quarters for the family. [Detainee] did not see inside of the family's living quarters.

For days when they visited the weapons range, [Detainee]'s group traveled on foot, one at a time, with a considerable distance between each individual for reasons of operational security. Each individual traveled approximately 50 meters south on the sidewalk and passed two wide streets on [Detainee]'s left side. Upon traveling 50 meters, [Detainee] encountered an overpass on his right side. The overpass was a walkway over the highway, which ran parallel to the sidewalk in front of [Detainee]'s training apartment. [Detainee]'s group used the overpass to walk over the highway and encountered a Mercedes passenger van waiting for the group on the side of the highway under the overpass.

Approximately 15 individuals were in the passenger van including the driver. The van consisted of 12 trainees, the Iranian physical training instructor, and the Egyptian interpreter. The van traveled south on the main highway for approximately five minutes at a rate of approximately 50 miles per hour. The van crossed an electric rail car track and took an immediate right on a paved road. The van traveled in and out of avenues in a zigzag pattern, but continued in a westerly direction. The van passed three military bases on [Detainee]'s right side throughout the travel west. The van traveled approximately one and a half hours until [Detainee]'s group reached the city limit, characterized by agricultural areas.

After another one and a half hours of driving, the van entered the highway connecting to the Imam Riza Shrine in Mashhad, Iran. The van traveled west, which is the opposite direction of the Imam Riza Shrine.

The van containing [Detainee]'s group, the Iranian physical training instructor, and the Egyptian interpreter, traveled west for approximately five minutes through an agricultural area until [Detainee]'s group took a left and began to travel east, in the opposite direction, for approximately 30 minutes. [Detainee] observed mountains on his right side. The van also passed six to seven abandoned military bases with radar towers on the left side. After thirty minutes of travel, the van took a right on to a bumpy road and waited there for approximately five minutes while the Iranian physical fitness instructor made a phone call. At this point, mountains surrounded the van. Five minutes following the phone call, a white Iranian police land cruiser appeared in order to escort the van to the weapons range. The Iranian police land cruiser had a green horizontal line along the side of it with an unidentified badge on the door.

The van needed an escort because [Detainee]'s group was in a currently active Iranian military training area. The weapons range appeared after five minutes of bumpy driving. The weapons range is possibly an active weapons range for the military because [Detainee] could hear jet planes flying overhead.

[Detainee]'s group traveled the exact same route to return to the training apartment from the weapons range. [Detainee]'s group did not deviate from the aforementioned route throughout his time in Tehran.

While on the bus with several other unidentified Iranian civilians en route to the Imam Riza Shrine in Mashhad, an unidentified member of [Detainee]'s group convinced the bus driver to insert a JAM propaganda video in the bus DVD player. The civilian bus patrons looked confused because the video was in Arabic, and when several clips of IED's blowing up CF military vehicles appeared on the screens, the civilian passengers started to inquire if the vehicles were American. An argument ensued between members of [Detainee]'s group and some civilian passengers about the appropriateness of showing the video. After roughly five minutes of viewing, the bus driver shut the video off.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTERROGATION REPORT 026

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED** (AS REDACTED)

**Summary:**

The IRGC-QF is supplying SG with all of their weapons and ammunition. The IRGC-QF is supplying SG with Islamic IEDs. Islamic IEDs are EFPs which are manufactured and shipped by the Islamic government of Iran. SG members in Sadr City are always talking to one another about receiving weapons from the IRGC-QF. [Detainee] worked in the Mirayd market selling false ID cards. While [Detainee] worked in the Mirayd market, [Detainee] witnessed SG weapons smugglers and weapons dealers openly bragging to other SG members about receiving shipments of EFPs, RPG-7s, Katyusha rockets, and PKCs from the IRGC-QF. [Detainee] frequently observed RPG-7s, Katyusha rockets, PKCs, and Iranian ammunition for sale in the Mirayd market.

SG weapons smugglers and weapons dealers attempt to sell the RPG-7s, Katyusha rockets, and PKCs to one another. The SG weapons smugglers and weapons dealers attempt to sell the weapons to one another in an attempt to make money for the purchase of vehicles or other group supplies. [Detainee] has observed RPG-7s, Katyusha rockets, PKCs, Iranian ammunition, and small arms for sale in the Mirayd market by SG weapons smugglers and weapons dealers. [Detainee] does not have knowledge of the names of SG weapons smugglers and weapons dealers operating within the Mirayd market. The Mirayd market is huge and most of the vendors sell weapons of some type.

The weapons are openly displayed in the Mirayd market due to the fact none of the weapons smugglers or weapons dealers fear being captured or found by CF. Each sector of Sadr City has multiple individuals placed throughout the sector with hand-held communications devices. When CF enters Sadr City, the individuals with hand-held communication devices begin to notify one another of CF's presence and direction of travel. The individuals with the hand-held communications devices notify individuals within the Mirayd market. When CF enters Sadr City, the weapons dealers within the Mirayd market immediately pack up the weapons and transport them into homes and businesses. When CF enters the Mirayd market, the market appears to be a normal market.

The SG weapons smugglers often spoke of receiving EFP shipments from Iran through Basrah, Amarah, and Diwaniyah. The weapons are being smuggled from Iran into Iraq by trucks hauling sheep, cigarettes, and cement. [Detainee]

does not have knowledge of the routes taken by SG weapons smugglers. The weapons smuggled into Iraq through Basrah, Amarah, and Diwaniyah are taken to Sadr City and distributed to SG in outlying provinces from Sadr City.

It is clear Iran is arming and supporting the Iraqi Shia extremists. It is clear the government of Iran is involved in supporting the Iraqi Shia extremists by supplying Iranian-made weapons to the Iraqi Shia extremists. The IRGC-QF is closely monitored and controlled by the Iranian government, and it is the IRGC-QF which is supplying the weapons to the Iraqi Shia extremists.

Approximately one-and-a-half months prior to [Detainee]'s day of capture, ██████ told [Detainee] to purchase a computer. ██████ instructed [Detainee] to purchase a computer in order for [Detainee] to become proficient in using a computer, email, and the internet. [Detainee] received 400 USD from ██████ to purchase a used, Acer laptop in Bab Al-Shurji. [Detainee] purchased one thumb drive and three memory cards on the same occasion [Detainee] purchased [Detainee]'s laptop.

██████ controls the Al-Watan television station. The Badr Organization supplies the Al-Watan television station with financial support and the Al-Watan television station broadcasts Badr Organization news, propaganda, and advertisements. The Al-Watan television station is located in either Karada or Jadriyah. [Detainee] has no further knowledge on the Al-Watan television station.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTERROGATION REPORT 027

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED** (AS REDACTED)

**Summary:**

[Detainee] map tracked to a marsh area near Qal 'at Salih where boats bring weapons from Iran (IR).



This area is used heavily by small boats carrying weapons from IR. The boat handlers most likely use the same drivers each trip and make arrangements prior to leaving IR. Drugs and contraband are smuggled into IZ by the same routes. The area is dangerous and everyone carries weapons even while fishing. The boats carrying weapons are covered with reeds and are easily hidden. The boats can be unloaded anywhere along the shoreline, and the weapons are placed in the beds of pickup trucks, which are then covered with bundles of reeds. Most smugglers use local dirt roads to avoid CF checkpoints.

█ receives the weapons and stores them at an unknown location. [Detainee] has no knowledge of the individuals █ employs in these operations, or who █ receives orders from. Most weapons are smuggled from IR by boat since vehicles can be x-rayed at CF checkpoints.

[Detainee] met █ through █, and knows that prior to capture by CF, █ was a bodyguard for Muqtada al-Sadr and was a JAM commander in Baghdad, IZ. █ was a close friend of █, █ aka █ and █'s brother █.



█████ is in charge of SG in Baghdad, IZ, and is responsible for rocket attacks against CF. █████ placed █████ in position, but █████ receives rockets from █████

[Detainee] has no knowledge of Iraqi or Lebanese Hizballah leaders, media, or areas of operation.

**SUBJECT:** REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 028

**DATE:** SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

**SOURCE:** DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

**UNCLASSIFIED** (AS REDACTED)

**Summary:**

Iran supports Iraq's economy in the same way that China supports the United States's economy. Everything used or consumed in Iraq comes from Iran. When [Detainee] started realizing that almost every product in Iraq came from Iran, [Detainee] figured out that Iran was fighting the United States by proxy.

People can travel from Iraq to Lebanon through Iran but must have a visa and identification. It is much easier for someone in Lebanon to travel to Iraq through Iran because the marshes are an open border into Iraq. SG in Lebanon goes to Iran for training the same way that SG in Iraq goes to Iran for training. The main center for SG training is in Iran.

Badr Organization used to be a military brigade entirely supported by Iran, to include Iranian weapons, uniforms, supplies, and training. Badr Brigade was trained on Iranian military bases beside the Iranian Army and blended into the military base. No one would have suspected that Badr Brigade was not part of the Iranian military unless they already knew. SG probably trains on military bases with Iranian uniforms and weapons just like Badr Brigade.

Ahwayzi, IR a city in Ahwaz Province, has an Iranian military base. [Detainee] went to this military base when [Detainee] smuggled the first family into Iran in 1999. There are several military bases and many government buildings on the road through Ahwaz Province to Ahwayzi.

Lebanese Hizballah (LH) works politically in Iraq under Badr Organization because LH gets support from Iran. Most political parties currently in Iraq originated from Iran. There is no difference between Badr Organization and Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). ISCI is made of Da'wa Party and Hizballah members. Most people in Iraq like Da'wa Party and Hizballah. Da'wa Party has a very respectable reputation because the party is older and has had many martyrs. Hizballah is a Shi'a Party that was created during the regime of Saddam Hussein. Da'wa Party was created before the Iraq-Iran War. The Tharulah Movement is also an Iranian backed political party. (**Comment:** Tharulah means "God's revenge" in Arabic.)

LH and Iraqi Hizballah (IH) exist because Hizballah was divided into two parties by Iran according to geographic region. Iran also divided the Da'wa Party into

the Iraqi Da'wa Party (IZDP) and Iranian Da'wa Party (IRDP), also according to geography. IH and IZDP are both officially recognized as Iraqi political parties, both parties' goals and motivations support Iran. Iran divided the political parties during the first Iraqi elections because each major political party is given 30 seats in Parliament. Minority parties are given 15 seats in Parliament. As long as each subdivision was still officially recognized as a major political party in Iraq, Iran could stack Parliament with candidates supported by an Iranian agenda. Therefore Iran is running the Iraq government through a majority of seats in Parliament.

The political parties in Iraq used to be militia groups. The militia groups transitioned into political parties by the same name, and ranking members kept their same rank in the new civilian organizations. Badr Organization is the only political party that kept its military extension.

Badr Organization, or ISCI, which are the same party in function, is the most powerful political party in Iraq. Badr Organization controls almost all of the ministries and most government employees. Da'wa Party, led by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, is part of the 25 percent of the Iraqi government that does not support Iran. Sometimes Nuri al-Maliki is not entirely supportive of Iraqi interests, but he may be responding to the political pressures of a Parliament dominated by Badr Organization.

Iran benefits directly from invading Iraq, and the invasion also serves as a distraction for CF in order for Iran to develop its nuclear weapons program. Iran gains money, oil, an excellent trade relationship, and easier smuggling capabilities as a result of Iran's covert invasion in Iraq. There is a Badr Brigade consisting of three Badr Battalions in Nasiriyah alone, although Badr Organization has military units all over Iraq. The Badr Brigade in Nasiriyah is known as the "Marsh Brigade," whose purpose is to enable smuggling across the Iraq-Iran border from Nasiriyah to Amarah.

Due to the strength of Iranian political influence in Iraq, CF will never be able to improve Iraq unless the current situation changes. The Americans should fake an announcement that the United States is going to close the Iraq-Iran border as a test balloon to see the Iraqi government reaction. CF will very quickly learn where loyalties lie. Americans should also include in the announcement that Iraq is no longer going to maintain trade with Iran. The immediate phone calls and connections that would be made to fight this economic decision would be enormous and immediately identify which members of the Iraqi government are really working for the interests of Iran. This announcement would be big news for Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, any of whom could easily replace Iran as Iraq's major trading partner.

CF should imprison the 75 percent of the Iraqi government who identifies themselves after the fake announcement. However, most of them will return to

Iran on their own because they have more in common with Iran. Iran's first reaction would be to shut down religious travel by Shi'a, to the shrines in Iran. Iraq could issue short term visas, such as for 15 days, in order to allow Shi'a from Iran to visit the Shi'a shrines in Iraq. Short term visas were issued to allow bus tours from Iran to visit the shrines in Iraq under the regime of Saddam Hussein.

The political threat to Iraq is much more dangerous than any physical violence SG is capable of. Whoever controls the Iraqi government controls the power of SG. The Iranian dominated Iraqi Parliament keeps the border to Iran open, in order for SG to easily receive Iranian funding. Badr Organization government employees receive salaries from both the Iraqi and Iranian governments, and, at least in Shatrah, are completely open about their dual sources of income. Badr Organization employees are most likely open about their dual sources of income in other cities in Iraq also.

The Iraqi government controls SG and controls politics by directing SG violence. The Iraqi government can blame the violence on the Sunnis, thus perpetuating the sectarian war in Iraq. An example of this occurred when the two shrines in Samarra were attacked by Sunni. More recent information suggests that Iran was actually responsible for the attack on the shrines. CF is busy attempting to control the sectarian violence in Iraq, while Iran is using the Iraqi people to wage their war against CF using Iranian weapons. Iran fears that CF will invade Iran if Iraq settles down and becomes more stable. CF needs to cut the Iranian influences into Iran to resolve the sectarian war.

There are several non-government organizations (NGO) which are actually fronts for Badr Organization. Al-Tabligh al-Islamic Organization and Shahid al-Mahrab Organization have branches in every province in Iraq. The NGOs are everywhere. ██████ has been the Director of both organizations for four years prior to [Detainee]'s date of capture. ██████ is a well known member of Badr Organization. ██████ is called 'Uday because he is just like 'Uday Hussein, the spoiled son of a dictator. ██████ does not hold any government position. Thriving NGOs exist in poorly funded small towns because they are supported by Badr Organization.

Any social service organization supported by Badr Organization is supported by Iran and largely staffed by women because they are non-threatening. Women have more experience with domestic services and can generate less suspicion while working as spies. Women can more easily smuggle documents, files, and information across the border without being searched. Employees must be qualified and loyal to Iran. The employees are trained in Iran and probably go to the same military bases as SG. The cultural organization employees are, at a minimum, college educated. Most educated women will not take these positions because the positions are dangerous.

The NGOs offer classes on the Shi'a religion and culture. The organizations also offer food, clothing, and medical supplies. The poor are not the main beneficiaries of these NGOs. Anyone who joins the NGO is eligible for benefits, so many people become members. Badr Organization financially supports the NGOs. Each branch manager gets money from the main Badr Organization office, which is located in Baghdad. Badr Organization also provides each branch with vehicles, security, and pays the salaries of all branch employees.