

Combating WMD Collaboratively

By PAUL I. BERNSTEIN

Building international partnerships is a central element of U.S. strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD). U.S. policy recognizes that the proliferation problem is too large, complex, and urgent for any one nation to tackle alone. Meaningful and sustained progress requires active collaboration among all states that have a stake in managing the problem and the will and capacity to contribute. Current policies build on a foundation of international cooperation that dates back decades, even as they reflect significant changes in emphasis to adapt to contemporary proliferation challenges.

These challenges result in large part from the ongoing impact of globalization. As many have observed, this phenomenon is twofold—technological and political—and both dimensions are making the prolifera-

tion problem more complex and difficult to manage. Technologies with legitimate uses that could be applied to unconventional weapons continue to spread globally at a rapid rate, and the growing demand (and competition) for energy, in particular, has the potential to fuel nuclear proliferation pressures in strategically important and sometimes unstable regions. Politically, globalization has contributed to the erosion of traditional state power and boundaries and served to empower both smaller states that are seeking to challenge the status quo and nonstate actors—ranging from individuals to transnational networks—with independent and often extremist agendas. The results are clear enough: proliferation challenges from states whose WMD programs confer on them disproportionate strategic importance; growing interest on the part of terrorists to acquire

WMD; and weak states and poorly governed spaces where radical or criminal networks flourish. As these phenomena converge, new proliferation pathways are likely to emerge.¹

As proliferation dynamics continue to be shaped by globalization, the limits of traditional nonproliferation diplomacy and strategies have become more apparent. The international nonproliferation regime of treaties and institutions is an important political and legal foundation in the fight against WMD, especially in establishing norms of behavior and providing the basis for action to punish noncompliance by states. But this regime, despite its longstanding legitimacy, alone cannot deal effectively with the toughest proliferation challenges we face. It has structural weaknesses not easily overcome and an uneven track record in confronting and reversing noncompliance, and it is not well suited to attack directly the problem posed by nonstate actors such as terrorists and clandestine WMD procurement networks.

A principal thrust of American policy, therefore, has been to complement traditional nonproliferation and disarmament diplomacy with new policy instruments focused more on practical cooperation with security partners to enhance prevention efforts and build defense and response capabilities. In recent years, Washington has spearheaded a number of initiatives focused on different aspects of the proliferation challenge whose purpose is to create a framework for action among like-minded nations. By design, these initiatives do not seek to establish large, standing organizations or bureaucracies, but work instead to adopt actionable principles that enable

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Edgewood Chemical Biological Center

National Guardsmen train in chemical and biological incident management

concrete steps to reduce the WMD threat and increase the capacity of states to act.

This approach rests vitally on the responsible exercise of national sovereignty in combating WMD. This is no less important than sustaining the authorities vested in the institutions that govern the international treaty regime. Security partners are asked to recognize and act on the obligation all states share to address WMD challenges through cooperative activities that are consistent with international and domestic law, and to ensure their national territory is not a source of proliferation threats.

By effectively marshalling coalitions of the willing to act against proliferation threats, international initiatives have begun to alter the dynamics of global cooperation in combating WMD. Progress is being made through a flexible network of partnership activities that gives many nations a stake in the fight against WMD and opportunities to contribute to shared security goals. In particular, these initiatives respond to the unique challenges posed by relatively new proliferation problems such as sophisticated WMD black markets and WMD terrorism—problems that are not limited to individual states of concern but are transnational in nature and therefore require active collaboration to address. These initiatives foster common understanding of the threat, enhanced capacity and interoperability, and habits of cooperation that over time can be leveraged to address a number of security challenges. Collaborative efforts have progressed despite widespread hostility to many aspects of current U.S. foreign policy. Thus, even countries that opposed the war in Iraq have been strong supporters of U.S. initiatives to counter WMD proliferation. To a significant degree, then, U.S. leadership is expected and accepted and will remain indispensable to sustain existing activities and catalyze new efforts.

This article is not intended to be comprehensive. Rather, it highlights a number of important activities that exemplify the effort to establish new mechanisms for partnership, as well as areas where additional work is required.

New Dynamics of Cooperation

Proliferation Security Initiative. A proactive approach to interdiction has become a prominent component of combating WMD strategy, in recognition of trends in the trade

and trafficking of WMD- and missile-related materials and technologies that demand a systematic and broad-based response. That response has taken shape principally through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a growing coalition of nations working to impede the transfer and transport of WMD-related goods consistent with existing international and domestic law but outside the framework of any treaty or multilateral export control

commitment of a significant segment of the international community to define certain activities as unacceptable and to act collectively to thwart and delegitimize those activities. The willingness and capacity of states to enforce national and international laws in order to interdict illicit shipments are now seen as a test of their commitment to an activist global effort to combat WMD. As the de facto norm represented by PSI takes hold, this

security partners are asked to ensure their national territory is not a source of proliferation threats

regime. Launched in May 2003, PSI exemplifies how political support for combating WMD goals can be converted into operational capacity without creating a formal organization. The PSI began with 11 charter nations, but today more than 80 countries have endorsed its Statement of Interdiction Principles. More than 25 exercises have been conducted, and a number of successful interdictions have taken place, including operations that blocked export to Iran of controlled equipment relating to its missile and nuclear activities.

Just as important, participation in PSI has emerged as an important standard of nonproliferation behavior, and in this sense the initiative represents a form of norm-building—one that results from the political

could serve to exert pressure on important countries that have yet to become full participants, such as China and India.

Broadening participation is one challenge facing the PSI community and is also the key to expanding the initiative's operational reach, improving operational capacity, and increasing responsiveness to interdiction opportunities. Wider participation in the Asia-Pacific region is one priority. The importance of this region cannot be overstated; one of the most dynamic hubs of the global economy, it is home to some of the world's busiest ports, airports, shipping lanes, and transshipment centers, including some that figured prominently in the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market.

Elements of NATO's Multinational CBRN Battalion conduct decontamination exercise



Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

While an increasing number of Asian states are participating in PSI activities, such as the October 2007 Pacific Shield 07 exercise off the coast of Japan, several key regional powers remain reluctant to embrace PSI. These include India, Malaysia, Indonesia, China, and South Korea. The reasons vary. The Indian government faces domestic political pressure to resist participating in a U.S.-led initiative that some view as inconsistent with India's foreign policy independence. The government of Malaysia has expressed concern about both the legality of PSI and the prospect of increased international involvement in the Straits of Malacca—a concern shared by Indonesia.² Additionally, some reports note that these and other Asian governments may be suspicious of U.S. intentions with respect to PSI given that Washington has not ratified the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea.³ China and South Korea are more concerned about how North Korea might react to their participation in PSI, especially at a time when the ultimate outcome of the Six-Party Talks remains uncertain.

There have been calls, including from President Bush, to expand the scope of PSI to include interdiction of financial payments between proliferators and their suppliers, and proliferation networks more broadly.⁴ Others have argued that the informal nature of PSI limits its effectiveness and sustainability and should yield to some type of standing organization, formal membership, and more institutionalized means of communication.⁵ More severe critiques suggest that the impact of PSI has been exaggerated and that resources and political capital are better directed toward more aggressive efforts to secure WMD materials at their source.⁶

G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The Global Partnership offers a different model of international cooperation, one that leverages the unique capabilities of more prosperous nations to implement targeted WMD risk reduction programs. Established at the Group of Eight (G-8) summit in 2002 in Kananaskis, Canada, the Global Partnership committed the G-8 nations to raise up to \$20 billion by 2012 to support projects addressing nonproliferation, disarmament, counterterrorism, and nuclear safety and security, principally in Russia but also in other countries. By 2004, an additional 13 European and Asian nations as well as the European Union (EU) had joined the partnership and

pledged financial contributions toward the \$20 billion goal, which now appears to be within sight.⁷ Even taking into account the \$10 billion pledged by the United States, securing these commitments in full will represent a significant infusion of global resources toward combating WMD and a greater degree of burdensharing.

In its sixth year, the Global Partnership is generally viewed as a mixed success. Focused on securing or eliminating WMD materials at their source, Global Partnership programs have contributed directly to reducing WMD threats in the areas of chemical weapons destruction, nuclear submarine dismantlement, physical protection of nuclear materials, fissile material disposition, and employment of former weapons scientists.

Progress in these areas notwithstanding, much work remains to be done to realize the full potential of the Global Partnership. While the original goal of \$20 billion is close to being achieved, by most accounts it is clear that considerably more will be required to complete specific projects and more broadly to achieve threat reduction progress commensurate with partnership goals. More fully translating funding commitments into actual programs remains a challenge as well. A recent review of Global Partnership activities concluded that about \$8 billion had been expended through early 2007.⁸ Greater emphasis is needed on reducing nuclear and biological terror threats. Finally, G-8 leaders must give serious consideration to expanding the Global Partnership to include both new donors and new recipients, so assistance in reducing WMD threats can be made available wherever needed.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540 represents yet another approach to global collaboration. Rather than a political initiative designed to marshal a coalition of the willing, it provides a universal framework for all states to develop and implement measures to prevent proliferation. Adopted unanimously in April 2004, Resolution 1540 established for the first time binding obligations on UN member states to refrain from supporting by any means nonstate actors seeking to produce or acquire WMD, to criminalize the proliferation of WMD to nonstate actors, and to adopt and enforce effective domestic controls on WMD, their means of delivery, related materials, and means of financing proliferation activi-

ties. To raise awareness of Resolution 1540 and oversee its implementation, the UNSC 1540 Committee was established. On April 25, 2008, the Security Council reaffirmed its commitment to the resolution and directed the committee to intensify its implementation efforts.

More than 140 states have submitted initial reports on the steps they have taken or plan to take to implement Resolution 1540. Efforts are being made through regional outreach activities to encourage and assist the roughly 50 states—largely in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific—that have yet to submit initial reports. While some states have the means to meet these obligations on their own or with modest help, many countries have limited capacity and will require significant assistance. Gaps in implementation include areas such as accounting, physical protection, law enforcement, border controls, export and transshipment controls, and financial controls.⁹ While progress has been made, 4 years after its adoption it is clear that implementation of Resolution 1540 will be a long-term process requiring sustained political commitment and the broadest possible degree of international cooperation.

The 1540 Committee increasingly serves as a clearinghouse for facilitating needed assistance in capacity-building, matching requests for and offers of assistance, and actively promoting the role of donor nations, international and regional organizations, multilateral export control regimes, non-

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governmental organizations, and academia. Aggressively mobilizing and targeting available expertise and resources are perhaps the major challenges facing the committee as it seeks to develop a coherent and innovative strategy based on tailored outreach and assistance efforts and the development of national action plans and roadmaps.¹⁰ Going forward, the committee and the Security Council will need to address a number of important issues, including metrics for compliance and

evaluation, implementation priorities, and the committee's mandate and authorities for facilitating assistance from the international community.

Targeted Financial Measures. Disrupting the financial flows that fuel proliferation is a powerful new tool that the international community is using with growing sophistication. Regular coordination between security agencies and finance ministries is now an imperative. Like terrorists, proliferators require access to the global financial system and routinely abuse this system to bankroll their activities. Institutions and individuals enabling this abuse are subject to pressure and sanctions that, if properly targeted, can impede the ability of proliferators to operate. It is important to distinguish such measures—which are directed at individuals, key regime members, front companies, and financial institutions—from more traditional, broad-based sanctions regimes, which tend to target entire countries and therefore are less likely to be widely accepted by governments and other international actors.

Recent actions suggest that targeted financial measures can be effective in exposing and complicating the WMD activities of states of concern and even influencing their policies. The government of North Korea, for example, clearly was surprised by the disruptive effects of actions taken against a Macao-based bank that Pyongyang used to support illicit activities. The designation, in September 2005, of Banco Delta Asia (BDA) as a “primary money laundering concern” led the bank to freeze \$25 million in North Korean assets. More consequentially, it also led a number of financial institutions to curtail or terminate business with both the bank and the regime in Pyongyang.¹¹ This targeted financial measure ultimately created leverage in the Six-Party Talks, as U.S. negotiators were able to use the promise to lift the designation against BDA and work to release the funds as a bargaining chip in reaching the denuclearization agreement announced in February 2007.¹²

Both unilateral and multilateral actions and authorities underpin the increasing use of targeted financial measures. In the United States, Executive Order 13382, issued in June 2005, is designed to freeze proliferators' assets that come under U.S. jurisdiction and deny proliferators access to the U.S. financial system. To date, 35 entities and 3 individuals have been designated for their links to WMD-related

activities in Syria, North Korea, and Iran. The United States most recently expanded this list in October 2007, designating a number of Iranian individuals and entities, including two state-owned banks, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.¹³ Two additional entities, including the foreign operations arm of the IRGC, were designated under a different executive order focused on support to terrorism.

Even on their own, U.S. actions can have a global impact, given the central role of the dollar and U.S. institutions in the international financial system. But achieving wider and more lasting effects requires a sustained international response. Increasingly,

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as finance ministries around the world have become sensitized to the problem, multilateral actions are enhancing U.S. efforts. Four UN Security Council resolutions adopted since 2006 provide the basis for designating and freezing the assets of entities and individuals linked to the WMD programs of North Korea and Iran.¹⁴ The European Union has enacted two rounds of its own sanctions, expanding the list of entities and individuals cited by the United Nations and adopting more far-reaching measures to limit arms sales and travel by Iranian officials.¹⁵ Additionally, in October 2007, the Financial Action Task Force, a group of 34 states working to combat money laundering and financing of terrorism and proliferation, advised financial institutions of its member states to consider the risks in doing business with Iran and adopted guidelines for member states for implementing the financial measures in UNSC Resolution 1737.¹⁶

While implementation of UN and EU measures has been uneven, by many accounts financial measures directed at Iran are having some impact. A growing number of banks are unwilling to conduct business with Tehran. According to U.S. officials, foreign-based branches and subsidiaries of Iranian-owned banks are increasingly isolated, and there has been a significant drop in foreign investment—particularly in the energy sector, where Iran needs overseas partners to develop its oil reserves. That said, it is uncertain how effective targeted financial measures directed

at Iran ultimately will be. The November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear intentions and capabilities suggested that international pressure and scrutiny may influence Iranian decisionmaking.¹⁷ If true, the expansion of targeted financial sanctions may prove an effective instrument in shaping Tehran's calculus. At the same time, the effect of financial measures may be mitigated by high oil revenues and steps taken to limit the impact of sanctions on the regime and the economy.¹⁸ Even taking these uncertainties into account, the emergence of targeted financial measures directed at proliferators sends a strong signal that the international community is prepared to act collectively against those who would abuse the global financial system.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The Global Initiative seeks to strengthen mechanisms for multilateral and bilateral cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism and to provide the practical means to implement measures codified in recently adopted international legal frameworks—in particular, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540.¹⁹ Spearheaded by the United States and Russia, the Global Initiative recognizes that nuclear terrorism threatens not only a handful of states, but also all responsible nations, and thus requires coordinated action to enhance national and international capacity. Announced by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in July 2006, the initiative emphasizes improving capabilities in the following areas:

- accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear and radioactive materials
- security of civilian nuclear facilities
- detection, search, confiscation, and safe control
- denying safe haven and financial resources to nuclear terrorists
- national legal and regulatory frameworks
- response, mitigation, and investigation
- information-sharing.²⁰

As of July 2008, 75 nations had joined the Global Initiative. Members endorsed a Statement of Principles in November 2006, considered an initial work plan in February 2007, and in June 2007 identified more than two dozen specific activities to be conducted through 2008—to include expert meetings, tabletop and field exercises, and various forms of mutual assistance—designed to critically assess and enhance capabilities across all of the initiative objectives. A number of capacity-building activities have been completed, and the United States is engaged in bilateral discussions with a number of governments on intelligence-sharing, joint exercises, and training. The Department of State is establishing specialized partner capacity-building teams located at U.S. Embassies to provide tailored, task-specific technical and operational assistance to partners. At their June 2008 meeting in Madrid, members expanded their work plan and agreed to work toward greater cooperation between counterproliferation and counterterrorism communities, a strengthened exercise program, and enhanced efforts in detection and forensics.

As the Global Initiative adds partners and implements its work program, it can serve as a framework or umbrella for a broad range of discrete activities that can involve all members or subsets of interested members. But it will be important to harmonize this

technologies to recycle spent fuel, so as to avoid creating large new stocks of weapons-usable materials, and the creation of a fuel services consortium to provide an assured supply of fresh reactor fuel to and recovery of used fuel from nations that forego independent

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work with parallel efforts to reduce nuclear threats. Additionally, the private sector has an important role to play, not least with respect to the security of civilian nuclear power facilities, suppression of illicit trafficking through key transport nodes, and advanced technology development.

Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). This partnership seeks to address a specific WMD challenge: the proliferation risks associated with the expansion of civilian nuclear power. The GNEP seeks to marshal advanced nuclear technologies to facilitate this expansion in a way that limits proliferation dangers. Among its key features are the development of proliferation-resistant tech-

enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. In this way, it is hoped that emerging nuclear power needs can be met while limiting the spread of the most sensitive fuel cycle technologies that can support the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

Since it was unveiled by the Department of Energy in February 2006, GNEP has generated significant debate on a number of fronts, including the degree to which the technologies it is promoting are in fact proliferation-resistant, waste management challenges, the merits of moving quickly toward commercial-scale facilities, and nonproliferation risks associated with recycling plutonium. More work is required to examine and validate the

Beriev Be-200 amphibious plane participates in Russian-NATO joint antiterrorism exercise Kaliningrad 2004



technology concepts behind GNEP as part of a longer-term research and development effort. Accordingly, prudence suggests that nonproliferation efforts, such as planning for future safeguards requirements, proceed on the assumption that the goals of GNEP may change over time or may not in the end fully be achieved.²¹

In any case, nonproliferation benefits that might be realized through the technology innovations envisioned by GNEP are probably decades away. Progress toward establishing a nuclear fuel services consortium can be achieved far more quickly, but here the challenges are more political in nature. There is by now widespread appreciation that the

growing sense of urgency about the need to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies while accommodating growing interest in nuclear power.²² Both the security and economic rationales are strong. States choosing to pursue nuclear power principally for energy purposes must be given an economically attractive option, one that does not require developing a closed fuel cycle and making a huge investment in fuel production, storage, and disposal capabilities. The fuel services consortium envisioned in GNEP, as well as similar initiatives proposed by others, emphasizes economic incentives and reduced risk for states and would be voluntary rather than codified as part of the international nonproliferation regime.²³

Still, many nations will resist any effort perceived as limiting their access to peaceful nuclear technology as discriminatory and contrary to their rights under the NPT. While the GNEP Statement of Principles is clear that participating states will not forfeit any rights, the initiative is nonetheless viewed by many in the context of President Bush's 2004 call to the Nuclear Suppliers Group to permanently deny enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not

already possess them, even if these states are members in good standing of the NPT.²⁴ Thus, the fear persists that GNEP will lead to a permanent two-tier system comprised of those who provide enrichment services and those who must purchase them. In this context, the possibility exists that GNEP will actually stimulate interest on the part of some states to acquire independent enrichment capabilities. Taking these considerations into account, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei's proposal to create a multilateral framework for the nuclear fuel cycle leading, through a phased process, to the conversion of enrichment and reprocessing facilities from national to multilateral operations may be a more politically palatable approach for some, even if it is more cumbersome to bring to fruition.²⁵

Twenty-one countries have become members of GNEP, though a number of important nuclear energy states—including Argentina, Brazil, India, and South Africa—have chosen not to join.

Security Cooperation

U.S. strategy for combating proliferation has long recognized the importance of engaging with allies and other security partners to increase the capacity of friendly states to assist in preventing, deterring, defending against, and responding to WMD threats. Security cooperation and building partner capacity have become increasingly salient elements in defense strategy in general, and in the parallel campaigns against global terrorism and WMD in particular. Capable partners can reduce the burden on U.S. forces and contribute to regional and global defense in depth. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review highlights the importance of improving partner capabilities, and recent defense guidance directs that security cooperation be more tightly integrated into the operational plans developed by the geographic combatant commands (GCCs) to achieve national security goals.

The 2006 *National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* emphasizes the importance of security partners both to the military's role in nonproliferation activities and to coalition operations to counter WMD in peacetime or as part of a regional contingency.²⁶ To better focus partnership activities in support of combating WMD missions, the Defense Department is crafting a supporting strategy to build partner capacity and integrate the broad range of activities already under way or needed to take security cooperation to the next level. This strategy, still in development, recognizes that partner activities must be organized to maximize limited resources in addressing the most serious WMD challenges. It envisions a criteria-driven process to prioritize capacity-building goals and identify the most important partner relationships. It calls for building on existing initiatives, coordinating the activities of the GCCs, and encouraging selected partners to assume regional leadership roles. Within the GCCs, tailored approaches to security cooperation and partner activities have been taking shape for a number of years.

U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) has established a number of multinational forums (called *clearinghouses*) that serve as vehicles for theater engagement and coordina-

Co-chairmen of Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism announce endorsement of Statement of Principles



U.S. State Department

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center of gravity of the nuclear proliferation problem is the "loophole" in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that allows nuclear aspirants to develop the means to manufacture nuclear weapons under the cover of civilian power programs. In light of the North Korea experience and the ongoing struggle with Iran, and as more states pursue a nuclear energy infrastructure, there is a

tion. The objective is to maximize collaboration with limited resources by organizing at the subregional level. Three clearinghouses have been established. The Southeast Europe clearinghouse encompasses Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia (the Adriatic Charter nations), as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro. The South Caucasus clearinghouse serves as a forum to coordinate security cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The Africa clearinghouse joins 13 African nations with USEUCOM, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union, and the United Nations.²⁷

In NATO, members committed in 2002 to improve capabilities to fight new threats such as terrorism and WMD. The Prague Capability Commitments included a pledge to enhance national and collective capabilities to defend against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Not all the initiatives identified at that time have come to fruition, but NATO has nonetheless taken some important steps to develop a WMD defense concept and improved operational capabilities.²⁸ NATO's Multinational CBRN Defence Battalion is intended to be a high-readiness unit able to deploy quickly to support NATO missions of any kind in any location. Thirteen nations are represented in the battalion, which achieved full operational capability in June 2004 and is capable of reconnaissance, detection, sampling, and decontamination operations. The Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence opened in November 2007 in Vyskov, Czech Republic, to serve as a multinational resource for expertise, education and training, and the development of concepts, doctrine, lessons learned, and standards. Eight nations participate in the Centre, which is working toward accreditation for its education and training activities. On a different track not tied to the 2002 Prague commitments, the Alliance continues to investigate technical and operational concepts for a layered theater ballistic missile defense.

U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) engagement strategy emphasizes partner capacity-building in areas such as interdiction, WMD elimination, implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540, consequence management, and WMD terrorism. Bilateral working groups are one focus. With Japan, USPACOM and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have established a CBRN Defense Working Group whose objective is to improve the readiness and interoperability of U.S.

and Japanese forces to conduct operations in the event of a WMD attack, to include consequence management operations. Recent activities have addressed issues such as decontamination, WMD medical preparedness, and opportunities for cooperative research and development. A Counterproliferation Working Group established with South Korea is focused on developing WMD elimination capabilities.²⁹ USPACOM is also working with the Philippines to deny terrorist networks the ability to obtain WMD capabilities as part of its regional war on terror engagement strategy.

The command also participates in the Multilateral Planning and Augmentation Team (MPAT), a cadre of military planners from 33 nations with interests in the Asia-Pacific region. MPAT facilitates the rapid establishment and/or augmentation of multinational coalition task force headquarters, concentrating on smaller scale contingencies and operations other than war, including terrorism. MPAT also emphasizes developing standard operating procedures to guide multinational responses to crises, including contingencies involving CBRN and toxic industrial materials. Recognizing that effective crisis planning and response cannot be managed by defense ministries alone, MPAT engages with a number of international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and UN agencies that have become integral to its work.³⁰

U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) builds on largely bilateral activities to encourage host nations to develop integrated civil-military response capabilities. While some multilateral structures exist, advancing a broad-based multilateral strategy is difficult given the politics of the region and the degree of mistrust that exists among some governments. The command leverages a diverse set of activities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels:

- Commander, USCENTCOM, visits to host nation senior military and civilian officials, including chiefs of defense staff
- Cooperative Defense Program workshops and exercises in passive defense, consequence management, medical countermeasures, missile defense, and shared early warning
- international military education and training
- foreign military sales
- bilateral Air Defense Initiative to develop common approaches to the regional missile threat

- International Counterproliferation Program
- Proliferation Security Initiative
- Regional Disaster Management Center of Excellence in the Horn of Africa
- Disaster Preparedness Program in Central and South Asia
- host nation partnerships with state National Guard units in the United States.

Mind the Gap. The GCCs are well engaged in the effort to build partner capacity and strengthen cooperative activities. Perhaps the most important challenge to sustaining effective theater engagement is the growing perception among some partners of

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a capabilities gap with the United States—a belief that, regardless of their force modernization efforts, they will continue to fall further behind an increasingly sophisticated U.S. military. This is true for both conventional warfighting capabilities and more specialized areas of the combating WMD mission. The implications of this (real or perceived) gap are potentially serious if partners otherwise willing to assume regional security burdens come to believe they are unable to because they cannot operate effectively with U.S. forces. Going forward, security cooperation policies should focus on this problem, especially with our most important partners.

The Way Ahead

Initial progress in advancing new types of international cooperation for combating WMD is promising, but there remain major challenges to developing a network of partnership activities that can be sustained over the long term. The efforts of the last several years have provided a strong beginning, but more must be done to ensure these initiatives take root and continue to offer meaningful collaboration with practical security benefits. A number of questions merit attention.

Are there too many initiatives asking too much of countries that have limited capacity?

The multiplicity of initiatives reflects the complexity of the threat and the aggressive search for innovative means to attack it. Engaging the international community broadly across the many dimensions of the problem (political, military, financial, legal) requires putting in place a range of mechanisms for collaboration. From the U.S. perspective, there is merit in such an approach: it provides flexibility in marshalling small or large groups of partners into coalitions to work specific problems and thus enables tailored strategies. At the same time, the sheer number of combating WMD initiatives can place strains on the ability of states to contribute. This is revealed by the gap, in some cases, between commitments and actions. Where we have a strong stake in an initiative, addressing capacity problems should be a policy priority.

Will these initiatives have staying power? It is reasonable to ask whether the commitments nations have made can be sustained over the longer term. At one level, this is a political challenge for the United States. Some nations question whether the United States will remain committed to this general approach to the WMD problem, and to specific initiatives, particularly given the change in administrations in 2009. In the policy reviews that will take place, which programs will remain priorities? This concern underscores the recognized leadership role of the United States in forging international collaborative efforts. If the United States does not continue to push on key initiatives and exert leadership, the political commitments other states have made could weaken. Washington must remain mindful of the fact that for many governments, participating in U.S.-led initiatives entails a considerable political and resource investment, especially at a time when there is significant anti-American sentiment. For its part, it is reasonable for the United States to ask who else will step forward to assume a leadership role in this arena. Washington has facilitated leadership opportunities for states within the framework of existing cooperative efforts, but who will offer the next compelling idea for a partnership initiative?

At another level, the question of staying power is an organizational and management challenge. Can activities that by design have no permanent standing support organization be self-perpetuating? What is the minimum degree of institutional structure required to ensure sustainability? Is the U.S. Government organized to manage the growing number of

partnership activities effectively? The “policy entrepreneurship” that gave rise to the wide range of initiatives now under way is essential to devising innovative approaches to tough policy challenges. At some point, however, there also may be a need for more formal or centralized coordination of these activities to ensure unity of effort.

How can other important stakeholders be integrated? Despite broad involvement by nations and international bodies in many new initiatives, there is room to expand participation in the global network of combating WMD partnerships that can enhance both its effectiveness and its legitimacy.

First, better integration of *rising powers*, in particular China and India, could yield important benefits. These states are not isolated from the partnership network, but neither are they fully integrated. With growing power and influence, they are emerging as regional political and economic leaders, have growing infrastructures in critical sectors such as nuclear energy and biotechnology where proliferation risks could emerge, and are increasingly influential players in other relevant commercial sectors (such as international finance and banking). Bringing them more fully into the mainstream of global combating WMD efforts could build on existing areas of cooperation, such as the Six-Party Talks in the case of China, and a number of bilateral U.S.-India activities. Similarly, Washington should consider how best to include less powerful but still potentially important nations in regions such as Southeast Asia, Africa, and South America. These regions may appear less strategically important today from a proliferation standpoint but could emerge in the future as areas of concern.³¹

Second, the *private sector* has a large stake in managing the proliferation problem. WMD events of even less-than-catastrophic proportion could have a dramatic impact on global commerce and put at risk key sectors and individual businesses. Participating in proliferation-related transactions and networks, even unwittingly, can cost businesses and banks dearly, both financially and in reputation. Moreover, the business community may possess unique sources of information about WMD-related activities. In some areas, the private sector already is an important partner; the major effort of recent years to secure the global maritime supply chain relies critically on extensive cooperation with private port operators. As another example, the United States

has enlisted the support of the private banking sector to facilitate targeted financial measures against selected organizations and individuals in Iran. More can be done to mobilize the business community as a full partner in combating WMD, including encouraging private sector entities to endorse key international initiatives, developing partnerships with critical industries that have the potential to shape the proliferation landscape, promoting industry adoption of best practices and codes of conduct, and improving public-private information-sharing.

Third, with respect to the *global community of interest*, experience has demonstrated that no one country or national intelligence apparatus has sufficient information to understand fully all aspects of the WMD challenge. Indeed, intelligence agencies operating largely on the basis of classified information will see at best only some pieces of the puzzle. There is a growing appreciation of the need to exploit more aggressively and systematically the broader reservoir of knowledge that exists among experts around the world, both in and out of government. Tapping this tacit knowledge requires creating a networked WMD community of interest. A promising example of this approach is the Global Futures Forum, an initiative of the Central Intelligence Agency to create a collaborative body, both virtual and face-to-face, for multidisciplinary strategic level dialogue and research. In addition to proliferation, communities of interest are being established around such related problems as radicalization, terrorism and counterterrorism, illicit networks, pandemics, and social networking.

Quo Vadis 2009?

A new U.S. administration will want to put its own mark on the nonproliferation and combating WMD agenda and can be expected to make changes and adjustments. With respect to partnership activities, objective assessments should yield useful lessons about both the forms of cooperation and the challenges to achieving real impact on the ground. They also should conclude that international cooperation is only increasing in importance and that the concerted effort to put in place a matrix of partnership activities has in fact yielded benefits. Building on success should therefore be a guiding principle for the new team taking the reins of national policy. Even for those initiatives that have had a productive track record, a strong effort will be required to sustain the political commitment and

practical engagement of security partners both large and small. Indeed, the many partners that have joined various elements of the fight against WMD will be watching carefully for significant changes in the direction and emphasis of U.S. policy. The next administration should give early attention to these issues, with an eye toward establishing a framework for action that will strengthen the international consensus that has enabled the considerable degree of practical cooperation achieved in recent years. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ For a discussion of how globalization is shaping proliferation dynamics, see Kenneth D. Luongo and Isabelle Williams, “The Nexus of Globalization and Next-Generation Nonproliferation,” *Nonproliferation Review* 14, no. 3 (November 2007), 459–473.

² See Stephanie Lieggi, “Proliferation Security Initiative Exercise Hosted by Japan Shows Growing Interest in Asia But No Sea Change in Key Outsider States,” *WMD Insights*, issue 21 (December 2007–January 2008), available at <www.wmdinsights.com/I21/I21_EA1_ProliferationSecurity.htm>.

³ *Ibid.* The article goes on, “[T]his concern is intensified by arguments of U.S. pundits opposed to UNCLOS warning that ratification would endanger PSI activities. According to officials from the Bush administration, which now favors U.S. ratification of the convention, Malaysia and Indonesia have both given indications that they would be more willing to participate fully in PSI if the United States joined the sea convention.”

⁴ President George W. Bush, remarks on weapons of mass destruction proliferation, Lisbon, March 5, 2004.

⁵ See Alex Reed, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Too Much, Too Soon,” The Henry L. Stimson Center, August 13, 2007, available at <www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=533>.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ See Paul F. Walker, “Looking Back: Kananaskis at Five—Assessing the Global Partnership,” *Arms Control Today* (September 2007), for a recent unofficial accounting of Global Partnership commitments. See also the Global Partnership Resource Page maintained by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at <cns.miis.edu/research/globpart/funding.htm>. Nearly \$18 billion has been made.

⁸ Walker.

⁹ Resolution 1540 (2004), S/2006/257, United Nations.

¹⁰ United Nations Security Council, 5806th meeting, December 17, 2007, briefings by Chairmen of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, 5–7 (S/PV.5806).

¹¹ As reported by Patrick Murphy, Leonard S. Spector, and Leah R. Kuchinsky, “Special Report: Financial Controls Emerge As Powerful Nonproliferation Tool; North Korea and Iran Targeted,” *WMD Insights*, issue 15 (May 2007), available at <www.wmdinsights.com/PDF/WMDInsights_May07Issue.pdf>.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ The White House, Executive Order 13382, “Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters”; and U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, “Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism,” October 25, 2007, available at <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/94193.htm>, list designations as of December 26, 2007. See also Peter Crail, “UN Iran Sanctions Decision Awaits,” *Arms Control Today*, November 2007.

¹⁴ The Security Council resolutions pertaining to North Korea are 1695 and 1718. Those pertaining to Iran are 1737 and 1747.

¹⁵ Michael Jacobson, “Raising the Costs for Tehran,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, *PolicyWatch*, no. 1324, January 3, 2008, available at <www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2700>.

¹⁶ “Guidance Regarding the Implementation of Activity-Based Financial Prohibitions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737,” Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, October 12, 2007. See also “Guidance Regarding the Implementation of Financial Provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolutions to Counter the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” June 29, 2007.

¹⁷ National Intelligence Council, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” November 2007, key judgments, available at <www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf>.

¹⁸ Measuring the impact of sanctions, including financial sanctions, is recognized as a difficult task. The December 2007 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) questioned the impact of financial measures directed at Iran and argued for a more systematic effort to evaluate their effectiveness. See “Iran Sanctions: Impact in Furthering U.S. Objectives Is Unclear and Should Be Reviewed,” GAO-08-58, December 2007, available at <www.gao.gov/new.items/d0858.pdf>. Some commentators challenged the GAO’s methodology and findings. See, for instance, Matthew Levitt, “GAO Misleads on Iran Sanctions,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 17, 2008, available at <www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1122>.

¹⁹ The White House, “Joint Statement by U.S. President George Bush and Russian Federation President V.V. Putin,” July 15, 2006.

²⁰ See U.S. Department of State, “Statement of Principles for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,” November 20, 2006, available at <<http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/76358>>.

htm>, and “U.S.-Russia Joint Fact Sheet on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,” July 15, 2006, available at <www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/69062.htm>.

²¹ See “Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom,” Report of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Safeguards System, September 2007, 8.

²² Legislation under consideration in the U.S. Senate, “Nuclear Safeguards and Supply Act of 2007” (S 1138), includes the following “Declaration of New Policy”: “It shall be the policy of the United States to discourage the development of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities in additional countries, encourage the creation of bilateral and multilateral assurances of nuclear fuel supply, and ensure that all supply mechanisms operate in strict accordance with the IAEA safeguards system and do not result in any additional unmet verification burdens for the system.”

²³ See Christopher A. Ford, “The Promise and Responsibilities of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” remarks to the 19th Annual United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues, U.S. Department of State, August 27, 2007.

²⁴ President George W. Bush, remarks on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, The White House, February 11, 2004.

²⁵ “A New Framework for the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” statement at the Special Event on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, September 19, 2006. In December 2007, Congress authorized and appropriated \$50 million toward the establishment of an international fuel bank to be managed by the IAEA.

²⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, February 13, 2006), 26–27.

²⁷ Presumably the Africa clearinghouse will transition to the recently established U.S. Africa Command.

²⁸ Initiatives identified for the 2002 Prague Summit were Deployable Analytical Laboratory, NBC Event Response Team, Virtual Centre of Excellence for NBC Defence, Biological and Chemical Defence Stockpile, and Disease Surveillance System.

²⁹ *WMD elimination* refers to activities to systematically locate, characterize, secure, disable, and/or destroy a state or nonstate actor’s WMD programs and related capabilities.

³⁰ The MPAT Web site can be accessed at <www1.apan-info.net/Default.aspx?alias+www1.apan-info.net/mpat>.

³¹ Department of State International Security Advisory Board, “Report on Building International Coalitions to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” February 5, 2007, 10, available at <www.state.gov/documents/organization/66363.pdf>.