Testimony of Joseph Cirincione
Senior Fellow and Director of Nuclear
Policy
Center for American Progress
Committee on Foreign Affairs
May 10, 2007
Mr.
Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today. It is an honor to be
on the same panel as one of my heroes, Senator Sam Nunn, and my innovative
colleague, Henry Sokolski. I believe the
Foreign Affairs Committee can and should play the lead role in the House of Representatives
in developing and shaping the next nonproliferation policy of the
The nation’s current policy is in transition, as we learn through bitter experience that there are no easy solutions to the spread of nuclear weapons. Further innovations will come, particularly with the election next year of a new American president. But ours is not the only electoral change in the next two years.
We
are entering a period of dramatic political transition. By early 2009, four of
the five permanent members of the UN Security Council will have new
leaders.
Rarely have the political stars re-aligned so dramatically. The group portrait at the 2009 G-8 summit may not have a single leader from the 2006 photo. This is a unique opportunity to advance new policies that can dramatically reduce and even eliminate many of the nuclear dangers that keep the Members of this Committee awake at night.
I am delighted that Members of the Committee, led by Chairman Lantos, are already swinging into action. Your introduction of H.R. 885, the International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation Act of 2007, is an important step to resolving one of the most significant problems with the existing regime. The legislation shows the kind of new perspectives and new strategies that can help mobilize global support for more effective policies before it is too late. [1]
The Good News about Proliferation
There is
nothing about nuclear weapons that is easy.
Not inventing them, not making them, not getting rid of them. But none of these problems are insolvable. We have actually made remarkable progress in
the past two decades in reducing many nuclear dangers—progress often overlooked
in the rush of daily headlines.
The number of nuclear weapons in the world has been cut in half over the past 20 years, from a Cold War high of 65,000 in 1986 to about 26,000 today. These stockpiles will continue to decline for at least the rest of this decade.
There
are far fewer countries that have nuclear weapons or weapon programs today than
there were in the 1960s, ‘70s, or ‘80s.
In the 1960s, 23 countries had weapons or were pursuing programs,
including
In
fact, more countries have given up nuclear weapons or weapons programs in the
past 20 years than have started them.
These were not easy cases.
The
Non-Proliferation Treaty itself is widely considered one of the most successful
security pacts in history, with every nation of the world a member except for
Until
There
is more good news. The ballistic missile
threat that dominated national security debates in the late 1990s was greatly
exaggerated. The danger is declining by
most measures: There are far fewer nuclear-tipped
missiles capable of hitting the
Finally, thanks to treaties negotiated by Presidents Richard Nixon and George H.W. Bush, chemical and biological weapons have been largely eliminated from state arsenals—including ours.
There are four
core problems, however, that are more difficult to resolve. They require forging a consensus of expert
opinion, focusing the attention of senior officials, securing the necessary
funding, and, above all, presidential leadership. None of these problems can be solved from the
bottom up. The president of the
Solving Problem Number
One: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism
It is common sense that
national security policy should be oriented towards the main danger to the
Given the difficulties of a
terrorist acquiring or making a nuclear bomb, the actual risk of such an attack
are still low.[4] But they are not zero, and the consequences
would be enormous. Hurricane Katrina
provided some idea of what it would mean to have a
Like the known risk to
Nuclear terrorism is not a new
threat. The danger was obvious to many even at the very beginning of the
nuclear age. Over sixty years ago,
Manhattan Project Director J. Robert Oppenheimer was asked by a Congressional
committee whether three or four men couldn't smuggle units of an atomic bomb
into
It is now possible to shore up the nuclear security dams and levees that can prevent this ultimate disaster. A broad expert consensus already exists on the core elements of such a plan: secure all weapon-usable materials (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) against theft or diversion; end the production of these materials; end the use of these materials in civilian research, power reactors, and naval reactors; and eliminate the large surplus stockpiles of these materials held by the United States, Russia and other nations.[7]
Many of the programs to secure these materials are now in place. Lacking is the high-level political commitment and adequate funding to fully implement them. That is, though these are tough problems and there are often national bureaucratic obstacles to overcome, these programs work. As numerous independent studies have found, they need presidential leadership to energize them.
For
example, since 1991, Congress has funded significant technical and financial
assistance to
This
latter program, dubbed “Megatons to Megawatts,” now powers one out of ten light
bulbs in the
There
are also programs underway to eliminate or secure all of the dangerous nuclear
material outside of
With increased funding and presidential commitment, all these efforts could be accelerated to secure or eliminate the vast majority of nuclear weapons and materials by 2012.[15]
The final report of the 9/11
Public Discourse Project (an extension of the 9/11 Commission), gave the
Solving Problem Number
Two: Preventing Nuclear Fuel Rods from
Becoming Nuclear Bombs
The core problem with the spread of nuclear technology is not nuclear reactors; it is what goes into and comes out of the reactors. The same facilities that enrich uranium to low levels for fuel can be used to enrich uranium to high levels for bombs. The same facilities that reprocess spent reactor fuel rods for disposal can be used to extract plutonium for weapons.
Over
40 countries have nuclear reactors. Very
few of them make their own fuel. They
purchase it from one of the 3 countries that make and export fuel (France,
Russia, and the United States) or from the one existing international
consortium, the Uranium Enrichment Corporation (URENCO) run by Germany, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. (
Today,
the fuel problem is growing more serious as several new nations seek fuel
production capabilities and as the technological barriers to acquiring them
shrink.
In
addition to
From the very beginning of the nuclear age, scientists and policy makers tried to control the production of fuel. Scientists believed in 1945 that the rationing of uranium ores could be the simplest way to control nuclear technology. Under an international agreement, uranium would be accounted for, and there would be a check on the conversion of natural uranium into fissile material, they argued. Thus, the American plan Bernard Baruch presented to the United Nations in 1946 sought to establish an International Atomic Development Authority that would own and control all "dangerous" elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, including all uranium mining, processing, conversion, and enrichment facilities.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower picked up parts of these ideas in his Atoms for Peace Program in 1953. In the decades that followed, there were several major efforts that either studied or recommended the creation of multi-national fuel supply centers. These included the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, and the Committee on the Assurances of Supply.
There is again today broad agreement that a comprehensive nonproliferation solution must include the reform of the ownership and control of the means of producing fuel for nuclear reactors. Proposals for doing so have been advanced by President George Bush, IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei, Russian President Vladimir Putin and by leading non-governmental experts.
All
these proposals seek to end the further production of materials for use in
nuclear weapons and stop–at least temporarily–construction of new facilities
for enriching uranium or separating plutonium.
Some propose that all such enrichment or separation take place only in
facilities owned and operated by multi-national entities, others seek tougher
export controls to prevent the development of new fuel factories, others
propose new contractual and commercial means of control. But all recognize that preventing new nations
such as
On February 11, 2004, President Bush said:
The world must create a safe, orderly system to field civilian nuclear plants without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation. The world’s leading nuclear exporters should ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce enrichment and reprocessing. Enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.[20]
Little progress has been made
in furthering President Bush’s proposed reform, in part due to a lack of
ElBaradei agrees with President Bush’s assessment of the problem. “The wide dissemination of the most proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle …could be the ‘Achilles’ heel’ of the nuclear non-proliferation regime,” he warned in March 2004. He disagrees with the President, however, in how the problem could be solved: “It is important to tighten control over these operations, which could be done by bringing them under some form of multilateral control, in a limited number of regional centers.”
H.R. 885, the International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation Act of 2007, would be an important step in building the needed consensus for a new international arrangement that would guarantee fuel cycle services (supply and disposal of fuel) to states that do not possess domestic capabilities. The mechanisms outlined in the resolution could provide a credible international guarantee of fresh reactor fuel and removal of spent fuel at prices that offer an economic incentive to the recipient state. Such an arrangement would reduce, if not eliminate, the economic or energy security justification for states to pursue their own fuel cycle facilities, and in so doing would test states’ commitment to a non-weapons path. States that turn down reliable and economically attractive alternatives to costly new production facilities would engender suspicion of their intentions, inviting sanctions and other international pressures.
The measures proposed in H.R. 885 are likely to enjoy broad international support. As the resolution notes, in January 2005 Russian President Vladmir Putin proposed the creation of a global infrastructure “to offer nuclear fuel cycle services, including [uranium] enrichment under the control of the IAEA” to all countries, provided that they observe the nonproliferation regime. [21] “Its backbone element will include a network of centres providing services in nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment, and they will be controlled by the International Atomic Energy Agency and will operate on the basis of nondiscriminatory access,” Putin said. [22]
As the H.R. 885 further notes,
the six fuel-exporting countries (
The key is to get these initiatives moving. H.R. 885 provides a critical push through its findings, statement of policy, reporting requirement and authorization of funds.
Why are these efforts needed? Promising non-nuclear weapon states access to nuclear technology was critical to forging the grand bargain that allowed the Non-Proliferation Treaty to enter into force. Today, any efforts to restrict or deny access to that technology (especially when many in the West are calling nuclear power essential to solving the world’s energy shortages and reducing the greenhouse effect from carbon emissions) are resisted by states unwilling to cede any ground on their access to nuclear technology, particularly when they believe that other existing nonproliferation obligations, including those associated with disarmament, are going unimplemented. Meanwhile, states with nuclear fuel capabilities are reluctant to place them under international control.
Only high-level attention to this difficult issue can forge
the international agreement necessary to push a solution over the finish line. The
Solving
Problem Number 3: Preventing New States
Most
of the news, debate and discussion of nonproliferation problems have focused in
recent years on the two or three states suspected of developing new weapon
programs. In part, this is because the
overthrow of these governments, particularly in the
The
crises with
Attempting to stem
nuclear proliferation crisis by crisis—from
While
the specifics and politics vary from country to country, all of the threats we
face from new nations acquiring weapons –
Think
for a moment what it will take to convince the current or future Iranian
government to abandon plans to build between six and twenty nuclear power
reactors and all the facilities needed to make and reprocess the fuel for these
reactors. As I detail with my co-author
Andrew Grotto in our new study from the Center for American Progress, Contain and Engage: A New Strategy for Resolving the Nuclear
Crisis with Iran, plans to do so pre-date the Islamic Republic. The
Whatever its true intentions, convincing Iran that while it could proceed with construction of power reactors, the country must abandon construction of fuel manufacturing facilities will not be easy. It will likely require both threats of sanctions (and as a last resort, military action), and promises of the economic benefits of cooperation.
This
is the package of carrots and sticks that comprised the negotiations between
the European Union and
Part
of the security equation can be addressed by the prospect of a new relationship
with the
But
there is also a regional dimension.
Ending the threat from an Iranian nuclear program will require placing
the Iranian decision in the context of the long-standing
Members
of the Committee might throw up their hands at this point. “
Ridding
the region of nuclear weapons will, of course, be difficult, but it is far
better than the alternative of a Middle East with not one nuclear power (
This
is not a distant fear. In just the past
six month, a dozen Muslim nations have expressed their interest in starting
their own nuclear power programs. In the entire 62-year history of the nuclear
age there has been exactly one nuclear power reactor built in the Middle East
(the one under construction in Iran) and two in Africa (in South Africa). Suddenly, ten states have begun exploring
nuclear power programs. This is not
about energy; it is about hedging against a nuclear
The
key to stopping this process is to get a counter-process going. States in the region must have some viable
alternative to the pessimistic view that the
In
order for this plan or any similar plan to succeed, there will have to be a
concurrent effort to change fundamentally the way nuclear fuel is produced and
reprocessed, as detailed above. Doing so
would satisfy a nation’s security considerations that it does not have to build
its own facilities in order to have a secure supply of fuel for its
reactors. Some Iranians see the current
negotiations as a new effort by the West to place them, once again, in a dependent
relationship. This time the West would
not control their oil, they say, but the energy of the future, nuclear
fuel.
A comprehensive approach operating at several levels is the only sure way to prevent more and more nations from wanting and acquiring the technology that can bring them—legally—right up to the threshold of nuclear weapons capability.
Solving Problem Number Four:
Reducing Existing Arsenals
Finally,
as Senator Nunn so eloquently notes, none of these efforts will succeed absent
dramatic reductions in the deadly arsenals of nuclear weapons held primarily by
the
As we concluded in our Carnegie study:
The nuclear-weapon states must show that tougher nonproliferation rules not only benefit the powerful but constrain them as well. Nonproliferation is a set of bargains whose fairness must be self-evident if the majority of countries is to support their enforcement . . . The only way to achieve this is to enforce compliance universally, not selectively, including the obligations the nuclear states have taken on themselves…The core bargain of the NPT, and of global nonproliferation politics, can neither be ignored nor wished away. It underpins the international security system and shapes the expectations of citizens and leaders around the world.”[25]
Nuclear weapons are more highly valued by national officials than chemical or biological weapons ever were, but that does not mean they are a permanent part of national identity. We may be seeing the beginning of a move to recapture the vision of a nuclear-free world, dramatically heralded in the January 4, 2007 oped co-authored by George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry and Sam Nunn.
Breaking
the nuclear habit will not be easy, but there are ways to minimize the unease
some may feel as they are weaned away from dependence on these weapons. The
Such an effort would hearken back to President Harry Truman’s proposals which coupled weapons elimination with strict, verified enforcement of non-proliferation. Dramatic reductions in nuclear forces could be joined, for example, with reforms making it more difficult for countries to withdraw from the NPT (by clarifying that no state may withdraw from the treaty and escape responsibility for prior violations of the treaty or retain access to controlled materials and equipment acquired for “peaceful” purposes).[26] It would make it easier to obtain national commitments to stop the illegal transfer of nuclear technologies and reform the fuel cycle. The reduction in the number of weapons and the production of nuclear materials would also greatly decrease the risk of terrorists acquiring such materials.
Conclusion
Ultimately, reducing the risks from nuclear weapon in the 21st century cannot be just a military or nuclear energy strategy. At the beginning of the nuclear age, it was already clear that unless we solved the underlying political conflicts that encourage some states to seek security in nuclear arms, we would never prevent nuclear competition. Oppenheimer said, “We must ask, of any proposals for the control of atomic energy, what part they can play in reducing the probability of war. Proposals which in no way advance the general problem of the avoidance of war, are not satisfactory proposals.”[27]
Thus, nuclear-weapon-specific
efforts should be joined by focused initiatives to resolve conflicts in key
regions. A quick look at the map should
make clear that nuclear weapons have not spread around the world
uniformly. It has not been like a drop
of ink diffusing evenly in a glass of water.
Vast areas of the world—entire continents—are nuclear-weapon free. There are no nuclear weapons in South
America, Africa,
Countries
have given up nuclear weapons and programs in the past only when these disputes
have been resolved. The pattern of the
past should be the template for the future.
Avoiding nuclear war in South Asia requires continuing the progress in
normalizing relations between
Resolution of some of these may
come more quickly than most imagine. Even
ten years ago it was inconceivable to many that Ian Paisley, the leader of the
militant Protestant Democratic Union Party would ever share power with Martin
McGuinness, a leader of the militant Catholic IRA. Both called the other terrorist. Both swore to wipe each other’s groups from
the face of the earth. Yet, this week they shook hands and were sworn into
office as the joint leaders of a united
Others conflicts may take more time to resolve, but as history teaches us, it is the direction in which we are moving that informs national attitudes and shapes each state’s security decisions. The more arrows we can get pointed in the right direction, the easier it becomes to make progress on all fronts.
Former
U.S. State Department official
There is every reason to believe that in the first half of this century the peoples and nations of the world will come to see nuclear weapons as the “historic accident” Mohamed ElBaradei says they are. It may become clearer that nations have no need for the vast destructive force contained in a few kilograms of enriched uranium or plutonium. These weapons still appeal to national pride but they are increasingly unappealing to national budgets and military needs. It took just sixty years to get to this point in the nuclear road. If enough national leaders decide to walk the path together; is should not take another sixty to get to a safer, better world.
[1] This testimony is based in large part on my new book, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (Columbia University Press, 2007)
[2] In 1987
the Soviet Union deployed 2380 long-range missiles and
[3] See Joseph Cirincione, “Get Smart on Ballistic Missiles,” May 8, 2007, Center for American Progress, Washington, DC, available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/05/missiles.html
[4] For an excellent discussion of why nuclear terrorism is unlikely, see Robin M. Frost, “Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11,” Adelphi Paper 378, International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: December 2005).
[5] David Ruppe, “Republican Lawmaker Slams Bush Nuclear Plans,” Global Security Newswire (February 4, 2005), available at http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2005_2_4.html#88A200EA.
[6] Kai Bird
and Martin Sherwin, American Prometheus:
The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer (
[7] These recommendations are elaborated in
[8] “
[9] Ashton
B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive
Defense: A New Security Strategy for
[10] Ibid., p. 66-67.
[11] C.J.
Chivers, “
[12] “Acceleration of Removal or Security of Fissile Materials, Radiological Materials, and Related Equipment at Vulnerable Sites Worldwide,” Interim Report, Unclassified Summary, NNSA (2005).
[13] U.S.
Department of Energy, NNSA Newsletter, April 2007 (http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/newsletters/2007/nl_2007Apr_NNSA_News.pdf)
[14] Interim Report, Unclassified Summary, NNSA (2005).
[15] The Baker-Cutler report of 2001 recommended that
funding for nuclear threat reduction programs in
[16] “Opening Remarks of Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, Chair and Vice Chair of the 9/11 Public Discourse Project,” (November 14, 2005), available at http://www.9-11pdp.org/press/2005-11-14_remarks.pdf.
[17] See
Graham Allison, The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (
[18] Ashton B. Carter, “Worst People and Worst Weapons,” Statement before the 9/11 Public Discourse Project’s Hearings on “The 9/11 Commission Report: The Unfinished Agenda,” (June 27, 2005), available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/Testimony9-11Commission-6-27-05.pdf.
[19]
[20] George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation,” (Feb. 11, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html.
[21] "Putin proposes access to nuclear energy for all countries," RIA Novosti, January 25, 2006.
[22] "
[23] Perkovich et al, Universal Compliance, pp. 94,97.
[24] Henry
Sokolski and
[25]
[26] See for
example, the excellent suggestions made by
[27] J. Robert Oppenheimer, “The International Control of Atomic Energy,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (June 1946).
[28] Kurt M. Campbell,