

Executive Summary

The geographic combatant commander has a certain amount of capability, but when things start to heat up, he's going to want to reach back for scale. He is still the best person positioned for the agility of day-to-day transactions and activities, whether that be in trying to defuse a crisis or in trying to defeat an adversary. What we're trying to do is provide in a service construct the ability to move scale to him for whatever objective he's trying to do, whether it's to defuse or to defeat. If we do it that way, that tends to keep unity of command and unity of effort intact.

— General James E. Cartwright, USMC
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command

In this issue, *JFQ* again draws thematic parallels between focus areas in the Forum and the subject of our Special Feature: U.S. Strategic Command.

In the Forum, we have essays addressing developments in intelligence and technology, which lead quite naturally to the combatant command charged to enable effects through the application and advocacy of integrated intelligence and cutting edge technologies across a remarkably wide spectrum of responsibility. Those who haven't kept up with the changes and challenges that USSTRATCOM has shouldered in recent years will be impressed—as we were—with the diversity and gravity of this command's functional expertise. In the lead interview, General Cartwright speaks with candor and clarity about the command's progress in cyber security, combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and space policy.

Before introducing these articles, a few words should be said about the *JFQ* Dialogue section that preceded this overview. On a recent trip to U.S. Southern Command, *JFQ* learned that its commander, Admiral James Stavridis, was working on a book addressing the thorny challenge of strategic communication. At our request, he generously submitted an essay exploring the issues that will be examined in greater detail in his larger work. Readers should compare the Admiral's perspective with that of Dr. Carnes Lord, whose complementary article in the Commentary section speaks to the *nature* of strategic communication.

Also up front is an argument against elements of contemporary military jargon that may hearten the Russian linguists who translated *JFQ* 45 in its entirety. Proof that English is a living language, military euphemisms are frequently more troublesome than enlightening (the parallel case against an endless supply of unnecessary acronyms such as BLUF, *bottom line up front*, is already widely lamented). This trend is particularly egregious when suitable words already exist to communicate the intended thought. Long before Colonels Donald Lisenbee and Karl Wingenbach submitted "'Deconfusing' Lethal and Kinetic Terms," *JFQ* replaced these otherwise useful words when they described physical and nonphysical or dynamic and static effects. As the authors point out, however, some also interpret these words to underline a distinction between lethal and nonlethal actions. Ironically, the authors' case against sloppy jargon arrived coincidentally with a research paper detailing kinetic and nonkinetic information. It is worth noting that part of U.S. Strategic Command's mission statement includes "decisive global kinetic and nonkinetic combat effects."

As a final note about *JFQ* Dialog, we gratefully acknowledge the Political Advisor from U.S. European Command, whose manuscript arrived shortly after the last issue (which featured that command) had gone to press. Coordinated interagency action is clearly essential for most security challenges, and the Department of Defense plays an important *supporting* role in many

bilateral security efforts. Understanding the institutional orientations and individual perspectives of our interagency colleagues is essential in our patient face-off against agile, unconventional enemies. *JFQ*, as always, seeks insightful viewpoints from Federal, allied, and private sector partners.

Our first installment in the Forum makes the case that globalism has fundamentally changed the nature of warfare as Clausewitz described it. Dr. Marion Bowman suggests that classic political objectives are now passé and that a new reality inspires mission sets that promote "stability and responsible participation in international affairs." He further asserts that global complexity has increased the importance of intelligence and that associated requirements are increasing far more rapidly than capability. The solution, offered in an essay that ranges from biometrics through improvised explosive devices to economics and WMD, begins with efficient coordination between interagency partners.

Colonel James Howcroft, the author of our second Forum entry, would deny that the fundamentals of war have changed at all but agrees that traditional notions of the intelligence cycle seriously limit the emerging potential of intelligence efficacy on contemporary and future battlefields. In the course of his argument, he restates the widely acknowledged complaint that those at the tactical level—who are in greatest need of current intelligence—are precisely those least able to access it absent direct exposure. In response to calls for "actionable intelligence," CIA Director General Michael V. Hayden is noted for his counter to operators: "You give me action and I'll give you intelligence." The author complains that this is simply not happening for the forces in contact. Where Colonel Howcroft *does* fully agree with Dr. Bowman is in his assertion that the tools wielded by the interagency are critical to strategic success. Moreover, leaders and their organizations at the tactical level must be trained to paint the battlefield picture with fidelity in return for a commitment by higher headquarters to provide mission guidance and resources, and then step aside. The incessant demand for nonessential data by senior

command echelons must be disciplined. “Need to know” is a two-way street and this problem can only be resolved through trust.

Our third Forum article is an intelligence window on a topic that *JFQ* returns to frequently due to both writer supply and reader demand. The effects-based operations (EBO) concept has evolved from Millennium Challenge 2002 to General Lance Smith’s effects-based *approach* to operations (EBAO) informed by his experience at U.S. Central Command. Among the several issues that critics bring to bear on this method is the problem of metrics. *JFQ* asked a tenacious proponent of EBO, Dr. Jim Ellsworth, to address the ability of intelligence to inform and measure operational effects. He acknowledges that the current intelligence cycle must evolve to widen the focus of the commander’s priority intelligence requirements and focus on the systemic or psychological effects following stimulus. He then proposes refocusing the intelligence preparation of the battlespace and improving interagency collaboration. The author’s case for EBO efficacy rests upon intelligence fusion beyond current practices. It is instructive that interagency synergy is emphasized by each Forum author and numerous academic studies, but recognition of this cry for cooperative discipline has not led to progress at the National Security Council. That is the focus of a future *JFQ*.

The fourth Forum offering is an excellent complement to the Special Feature interview, as the commander of U.S. Strategic Command speaks at length on China’s anti-satellite test and subsequently noted that “we don’t need an arms race in space.” Dr. Phil Saunders and Colonel Chuck Lutes present the findings of a roundtable convened at National Defense University to debate the motivations and implications of China’s success against a target in low Earth orbit. China may have seriously underestimated the political damage the test would do to its claims of “peaceful development.” The authors survey the implications of this event for the liberty of Taiwan and U.S. relations. Readers will be interested in the range of technical and operational means proposed to mitigate potential Chinese ASAT capabilities as well as the broader military and policy options.

The final Forum entry springs from the premise that tactical counterinsurgency operations closely resemble police work and demand civilian “beat cop” skills and sensitivities. The authors begin by identifying four



FOTODYNAMICS (Ted Carlson)

contextual elements that interfere with the skills that are essential for effective counter-insurgents. As in the second Forum piece, the authors emphasize that high technology solutions are not available to the lower echelons where they are needed most. The authors seek to equip insurgency warfighters with the law enforcement technology employed successfully in cities with similar challenges. A reader short on time should skim directly to the concluding six recommendations.

In our Special Feature, we survey U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), beginning with a lengthy interview with its commander, General James E. “Hoss” Cartwright. In 2002, the Secretary of Defense directed the merger of USSTRATCOM and U.S. Space Command, and in the following year it was assigned four new responsibilities: global strike, missile defense integration, Department of Defense information operations, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In a 2005 reorganization to focus USSTRATCOM on strategic-level integration and advocacy of its chartered missions, General Cartwright delegated authority for operational and tactical level planning, force execution, and day-to-day management of forces to a handful of Joint Functional Component Commands (JFCCs). Since 2006, there have been five such JFCCs with the establishment of a separate functional command for space. Rounding out the organization are three organizations focusing on information operations, WMD and network operations. These

functional subordinate commands are individually explored in a series of short articles following General Cartwright’s very interesting introduction.

This is the longest issue of *JFQ* that has been printed in 10 years, thanks to an unprecedented number of submissions from civilian and military security personnel in the field. As mentioned earlier, *JFQ* is especially interested in non-military professional insights and interagency collaboration lessons as joint forces move to the next level of skill orchestration through partnership with nontraditional partners and colleagues in the war on terror. This said, military personnel are the writers, developers, and keepers of conventional warfare doctrine for the low frequency, high severity wars for which there can be no lapse in vigilance. General Burwell Bell, commander of U.S. Forces, Korea, recently warned *JFQ* that “conventional war is not extinct—it will happen again.” As this is undoubtedly true, manuscripts proposing innovation and analyzing the implications of technology and change are solicited across the entire spectrum of conflict, stabilization, and security. The National Defense University Foundation has generously awarded \$5,000 to *JFQ* authors in 2007 in recognition of the value and influence of this kind of scholarship. In the next issue, three articles from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Essay Competitions will be featured.

—D.H. Gurney