

CTC REPORT

An Assessment of 516 Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) Unclassified Summaries

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Authors' Note

On July 20, 2007, a three-judge panel of the U.S. federal appeals court in Washington ordered the U.S. government to release all reasonable information on detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay who are challenging their detention.

The court ruled that meaningful review of the military tribunals would not be possible “without seeing all the evidence.” The ruling, written by Douglas H. Ginsburg, the chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, noted that, “In order to review compliance with those procedures [for determining whether the government’s classification of an individual as an enemy combatant was supported by a preponderance of evidence], “the court must be able to view the government information.”¹

This ruling comes in the midst of a highly charged debate over the issue, with critics of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) process arguing that most detainees have no way to contest charges that are based on generalizations and incomplete intelligence reports. As we were not involved in the initial data collection process nor were we present at any of the CSRT hearings, we cannot comment in any meaningful way on the veracity or completeness of data contained in the publicly available CSRT unclassified summaries. We did seek to familiarize ourselves with the various dimensions of the CSRT process by visiting the facilities at Guantanamo Bay where the CSRT hearings were conducted and by meeting with personnel directly involved in the CSRT process.

We are pleased to share the findings of our analysis of this public data as part of the Combating Terrorism Center’s ongoing effort to make information related to aspects of terrorism and counterterrorism more accessible for public scrutiny and dialogue. Given the politically sensitive and highly charged nature of this topic, we have tried to be as methodologically rigorous and transparent throughout our report as possible.

We recognize that advocates of America’s current detention policy will point to this study as an illustration of the threat posed by these individuals. We also anticipate that those justly concerned with advocating for the legal rights of the detainees will point to this study as further evidence regarding the dearth of information made publicly available by the U.S. government about their cases. It is this debate that we hope to stimulate and inform with this report.

Any inaccuracies or oversights made in this study are entirely the responsibility of the authors as this report does not reflect the official position of the Combating Terrorism Center, the United States Military Academy, the U.S. Army nor the Department of Defense.

We sincerely hope that this report will stand as a useful contribution in the ongoing discussion over U.S. designation and detention of enemy combatants.²

Joseph Felter and Jarret Brachman

¹ See the ‘Bismullah, Haji vs. Gates, Robert’ (06-1197a) Opinion Released on July 20, 2007 by the United States Court of Appeals, Washington D.C. Circuit.

<http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200707/06-1197a.pdf> (July 2007)

² The authors would like to thank faculty at the Combating Terrorism Center and faculty of the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy, especially Dr. Michael Meese and Dr. Cindy Jebb for their review and comments of this article.

Executive Summary

Between July 2004 and March 2005, the Department of Defense (DoD) conducted Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT's) for 558 detainees being held at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). The DoD's objective in conducting this tribunal process was to determine whether those detainees continued to warrant the 'enemy combatant' designation through a non-adversarial, administrative status review process.

In early 2005³ DoD (the Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants) released 517 CSRT (pronounced "see-cert") unclassified summaries.⁴ These unclassified summaries, prepared in advance of the actual hearings, informed the detainees about the unclassified basis for their detention as enemy combatants. Of the 517 unclassified records, one of those records is a duplicate, which brings the total of CSRT unclassified summaries to 516. The DoD posted those 517 unclassified summaries (including the one duplicate) on its public website in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.⁵

In 2007, the Office of Detainee Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, asked faculty at the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point to review information recorded in the 516 CSRT unclassified summaries (hereinafter referred to as "CSRT records") and provide an objective assessment of this information.⁶

After querying the 516 CSRT unclassified summaries, the CTC found that 73% of the unclassified summaries meet the CTC's highest threshold of a 'demonstrated threat' as an enemy combatant. The CTC established two other categories with four discrete proxy characteristics in each⁷ ('potential threat' and 'associated threat') in order to help assess whether the information in these records indicated these individuals *posed or potentially posed a threat as an enemy combatant*. The CTC found that six of the publicly available CSRT unclassified summaries contained no evidence that fit any of the CTC's twelve threat variables.

Level 1: Demonstrated Threat as an Enemy Combatant

Data in the CSRT unclassified summaries indicating that a detainee participated, prepared to participate or intended to participate in, direct hostilities against the US and its Coalition

³ The final CSRT hearing was held in January 2005 and the final Convening Authority letter was signed in March 2005.

⁴ See Department of Defense website, <http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/OARDEC_docs.html>

⁵ See Department of Defense website, <http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/OARDEC_docs.html>

⁶ The Combating Terrorism Center was asked to review and address the criticisms raised in an earlier study by a research team affiliated with Seton Hall University and the Denbeaux & Denbeaux law firm. The Seton Hall study draws on the same 516 unclassified CSRT summaries and concludes that the DoD is wrongfully holding individuals who, based on the DoD's own data, neither pose a serious threat to America's national security, nor seem to have been involved in conducting or supporting hostile action against the United States.

⁷ Detailed coding criteria are discussed in subsequent sections. CTC worked closely with the Office of Detainee Affairs in order to ensure that the coded data accurately represented the raw data contained in the publicly available 516 CSRT unclassified summaries.

Allies was placed into the *Demonstrated Threat* as an enemy combatant category. It includes the following detainee activities and attributes:

- **HOSTILITIES:** Having definitively⁸ supported or waged hostile activities against the US/Coalition allies. 56% of the 516 unclassified CSRT summaries met this criteria.
- **FIGHTER:** Having been identified as a ‘fighter’ for al-Qa`ida, the Taliban or associated forces. (35% of the CSRT unclassified summaries)
- **TRAINING CAMP:** Having received training in a training camp run by al-Qa`ida, the Taliban or associated forces. (35% of the CSRT unclassified summaries)
- **COMBAT WEAPONS:** Received training in the employment of combat weapons *other than or in addition to rifles/ small arms* including grenades, rocket propelled grenades, sniper rifles and the construction and/or deployment of explosives and IED’s. (27% of the CSRT unclassified summaries)

73% of the publicly available CSRT unclassified summaries contained at least one piece of evidence that meet this threshold definition of demonstrated threat.

Level 2: Potential Threat as an Enemy Combatant

Data in the CSRT unclassified summaries indicating that a detainee *supported* hostile activities or was affiliated with groups that executed and/or supported terrorist acts, or received weapons training/possessed weapons that could be used in support of terrorist activities was placed into the *Potential Threat as an Enemy Combatant* category. Four discrete variables were included in this category:

- **SUPPORT ROLES:** Evidence of performing a supporting role in terrorist or extremist groups. (27% of the CSRT unclassified summaries)
- **COMMITMENT:** Having expressed a commitment to pursuing violent Jihadist goals. (19% of the CSRT unclassified summaries)
- **SMALL ARMS:** Received training in the use of rifles e.g AK-47 and other small arms but not in other combat weapons such as RPG’s, grenades, explosives and IED’s. (17% of the CSRT unclassified summaries)
- **GROUP AFFILIATIONS:** Affiliations with al-Qa`ida, the Taliban, and other terrorist/extremist groups. (92% of the CSRT unclassified summaries)

95% of the publicly available CSRT unclassified summaries contain one or more pieces of evidence that meet the criteria considered a *potential threat* as an enemy combatant⁹.

⁸ By ‘definitive’ the CTC means that there is an explicit statement made without qualification about that data field in the publicly available CSRT unclassified summary.

⁹ Much of this total is attributed to the 92% of the CSRT unclassified records that contain evidence of affiliations with terror groups.

Level 3: Associated Threat as an Enemy Combatant

Data contained within the CSRT unclassified summaries indicating that a detainee interacted with members of terrorist groups or exhibited behavior frequently associated with terrorist group members was placed into the *Associated Threat* as an enemy combatant category and includes the following discrete variables:

- CONNECTIONS: Possessing a definitive connection to an al-Qa`ida member and/or other individual affiliated with an extremist groups. (62% of the CSRT unclassified summaries)
- GUEST HOUSE: Evidence of staying at a guest house known or suspected to be used as a way station for individuals enroute to supporting jihad and other terrorist activities. (24% of the CSRT unclassified summaries)
- TRAVEL: Evidence that the detainee traveled to three or more different countries (23% of the CSRT unclassified summaries)
- LARGE SUMS CASH: Detainees carrying large sums of US or foreign currencies.(2% of the CSRT unclassified summaries)


77% of the CSRT unclassified summaries contain evidence associated with terrorist group members and behavior and met the stated criteria as an associated threat as an enemy combatant.

Level 4: No Evidence of Threat

Importantly, six of the publicly available 516 CSRT unclassified summaries (1.16%) do not contain evidence of involvement or attributes fitting any of the aforementioned twelve variables. The CTC does not know whether additional incriminating details on these six detainees are available in their respective classified files.

Recap

A summary of the Level I through Level III attributes identified in the CSRT unclassified summaries is depicted graphically at Figure 1: (Note: Most summaries visualized in this graph and those that follow contain evidence of multiple attributes across all three categories thus the total number often exceeds 516 or 100% of the 516 population)



The mean number of attributes across all twelve discrete measures supported by evidence in 516 CSRT unclassified summaries is 4.2. Nearly half of these summaries - 48% - contained 7 or more pieces of evidence that indicated the detainee demonstrated, potentially demonstrated or was associated with threats as an enemy combatant.

The following study is almost entirely informed by the information that is publicly available in the 516 CSRT unclassified summaries, which by their nature are limited in detail. The Department of Defense has kept the remaining information classified as it is being used in support of ongoing military operations.

The authors of this study have sought to be both objective and impartial in their interpretations of this data. They have strived to maintain transparency regarding the coding criteria, as well as their interpretation and analysis of the processed data. The authors visited U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and discussed coding rules and details of the CSRT process with those directly involved. The study's coded data set is available on request. The authors also note that classified files likely contain additional evidence relevant to any decision on detainee status as enemy combatant.

It is the hope of the CTC that this comprehensive data collection and accompanying coding effort will inform a variety of future studies. Ideally, this report and the data from which it was informed will enhance our collective understanding of the threats facing the United States, its allies and its interests.

Assessment of the 516 Unclassified CSRT Reports

Introduction

Between July 2004 and March 2005, the Department of Defense (DoD) conducted Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT's) for 558 detainees being held at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). The DoD's objective in conducting this tribunal process was to determine whether those detainees continued to warrant the 'enemy combatant' designation through a non-adversarial, administrative status review process.

Each of the detainees under review had been captured during the course of U.S. and Coalition military operations against the Taliban, al-Qa`ida and their associated forces. The 2004-2005 status review tribunal process concluded that 520 of the 558 detainees continued to warrant the enemy combatant status designation. The DoD released the 38 detainees that were determined to be 'No Longer Enemy Combatants' as soon as the appropriate humane treatment assurances were obtained from the receiving countries.

In early 2005¹⁰ the Department of Defense (Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants) released 517 CSRT (pronounced "see-cert") unclassified summaries.¹¹ Of the 517 unclassified summaries, one of those summaries is a duplicate, which brings the total of CSRT unclassified summaries to 516. The DoD posted those 517 unclassified summaries (including the one duplicate) on its public website in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.¹²

The 516 publicly released Combatant Status Review Tribunal unclassified summaries, prepared in advance of the actual hearings, informed detainees about the unclassified basis for their detention as enemy combatants. Each unclassified CSRT summary is divided into four sections. Three of those sections are standardized across detainees and refer to more procedural type of information. The only section of those four that significantly varies from detainee to detainee is section 3, which provides an unclassified summary of the details used in the process of determining whether an individual was an unlawful enemy combatant. A sample of section 3 is below:

¹⁰ The final CSRT hearing was held in January 2005 and the final Convening Authority letter was signed in March 2005.

¹¹ See Department of Defense website, <http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/OARDEC_docs.html>

¹² See Department of Defense website, <http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/OARDEC_docs.html>

3. The United States Government has previously determined that the detainee is an enemy combatant. This determination is based on information possessed by the United States that indicates that the detainee is a member of the Taliban, associated with al Qaida, and participated in military operations against the United States or its coalition partners.

a. The detainee is a member of the Taliban and associated with al Qaida:

1. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan in June 2001 from Saudi Arabia via Pakistan.
2. The detainee went to Afghanistan to fight the jihad.
3. The detainee is a member of the Taliban.
4. The detainee completed military training at Al Farouq.
5. The detainee received weapons training on the Kalashnikov rifle, rocket-propelled grenade launcher, and pistols.
6. The detainee met Usama Bin Laden.

b. The detainee participated in military operations against the United States and its coalition partners:

1. The detainee was engaged in the conflict at the Konduz line.
2. The detainee was engaged in the conflict at the Khoshaghar line.
3. The detainee was present at the Al Janki uprising at Mazur-e-Sharif.

Figure 2¹³

The summary of details for any given CSRT unclassified summary is neither comprehensive nor all that specific. This is due, in large part, to the fact that much of the information used to determine an individual's status remains classified.

In 2007, the Office of Detainee Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, asked faculty at the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point to review information recorded in the 516 CSRT unclassified summaries and provide an objective assessment of this information.¹⁴ The CTC, a research and education center in the U.S. Military Academy's Department of Social Sciences, was asked to conduct this study given its substantive background on terrorism related issues and a record of conducting rigorous and objective reports.

The Combating Terrorism Center reviewed data from the 516 unclassified CSRT summaries and identified attributes associated with threatening activities that are consistent with research on enemy combatant activities. CTC faculty were not present at the Combatant Status Review Tribunals nor were they part of the process to record or verify the veracity of incriminating information about the detainees. The CTC authors did seek to familiarize themselves with the CSRT process. This report, therefore, focuses exclusively on the

¹³ CSRT Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal - BIN ATEF, Mahrnrnoud Omar Mohammed. 07 October 2004. The full CSRT unclassified summary is available in Annex B.

¹⁴ The Combating Terrorism Center was asked to review and address the criticisms raised in an earlier study by a research team affiliated with Seton Hall University and the Denbeaux & Denbeaux law firm. The Seton Hall study draws on the same 516 unclassified CSRT summaries and concludes that the DoD is wrongfully holding individuals who, based on the DoD's own data, neither pose a serious threat to America's national security, nor seem to have been involved in conducting or supporting hostile action against the United States.

publicly available information contained within the 516 CSRT unclassified summaries released by the Department of Defense in 2005. The CTC found that evidence could be divided into three broad, analytical categories conceptualized around perceived threat to US interests. They are ordered in the following paragraphs from highest to lowest threat level:

Level I (Demonstrated Threat)- Information that indicates a detainee participated in, prepared to participate in, or intended to participate in, direct hostilities against the US and its Coalition Allies

This included evidence of participation and/or planning of direct hostile acts and supporting hostile acts; performing the role of a fighter in support of a terrorist group; participation in terrorist training camps; training and/or possession of combat weapons – in addition to or beyond small arms – such as RPG's, grenades, sniper rifles, explosives and IED's;

Level II (Potential Threat)- CSRT unclassified summaries that contained evidence that the detainee supported hostile activities or was affiliated with groups that executed and/or supported terrorist acts, or received training that could be used in support of terrorist activities.

This category included evidence of performing a supporting role in terrorist or extremist groups; having expressed a commitment to pursuing violent Jihadist goals; receiving training in the use of rifles e.g AK-47 and other small arms but not in other combat weapons; affiliations with al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, and other terrorist/extremist groups.

Level III (Associated Threat) - Information that a detainee interacted with members of terrorist groups or exhibited behavior common among some terror group members

Data that placed individuals into this category included possessing a definitive connection to terrorist entities or individuals; having stayed at a guest house known or suspected to be used as a way station for individuals enroute to supporting jihad and other terrorist activities; extensive international travel allegedly in support of terrorist activities; carrying large sums of US or foreign currencies.

This assessment proceeds in the following manner: First we provide information about the capture of the detainees. Next, we define each of twelve variables across all three threat categories coded from the unclassified CSRT reports and use them to provide summary statistics on the 516 detainee CSRT unclassified summaries. Lastly, a multivariate analysis of the data is provided in an effort to identify causal patterns within this sample.

Level IV (No Evidence of Threat) - Importantly, six of the publicly available 516 CSRT unclassified summaries (1.16%) do not contain evidence of involvement or attributes fitting any of the aforementioned twelve variables. The CTC does not know whether additional incriminating details on these six detainees are available in their respective classified files.

Background Information

The 516 detainees hail from 39 different countries around the world.¹⁵


COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	TOTAL	% of Total
AFGHANISTAN	124	24.03
ALGERIA	24	4.65
AZERBAIJAN	1	0.19
BAHRAIN	6	1.16
BANGLADESH	1	0.19
BELGIUM	1	0.19
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	1	0.19
CANADA	1	0.19
CHAD	1	0.19
CHINA	22	4.26
EGYPT	5	0.97
ETHIOPIA	1	0.19
FRANCE	2	0.39
INDIA	1	0.19
IRAN	2	0.39
IRAQ	6	1.16
JORDAN	5	0.97
KAZAKHSTAN	3	0.58
KUWAIT	12	2.33
LIBYA	8	1.55
MALDIVES	1	0.19
MAURITANIA	2	0.39
MOROCCO	9	1.74
PAKISTAN	12	2.33
QATAR	1	0.19
RUSSIA	1	0.19
SAUDI ARABIA	112	21.71
SOMALIA	2	0.39
SUDAN	6	1.16
SYRIA	9	1.74
TAJIKISTAN	6	1.16
TUNISIA	10	1.94
TURKEY	2	0.39
UGANDA	1	0.19
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	2	0.39
UNITED KINGDOM	3	0.58
UZBEKISTAN	5	0.97
WEST BANK	3	0.58
YEMEN	102	19.77
Total	516	100%

Figure 3

¹⁵ The publicly available 516 unclassified CSRT summaries do not contain information about detainees' countries of origin. The CTC requested this information from the DoD's Office of Detainee Affairs in order to provide a more comprehensive picture about the detainee population.

As clear from Figure 3 above, the highest represented countries of origin include Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Individuals from China and Algeria are also strongly represented in the population. These trends match with what is already generally known by observers of recent terrorist movements about the primary countries of origins for radical Sunni Islamic combatants and terrorists.

Some of the 516 publicly available CSRT unclassified summaries provide information with regard to the force responsible for capturing a given individual. The CTC found the following break-down with regard to the identity of capturers:



- 110 unclassified summaries have information indicating capture by elements of the Pakistan government
- 25 unclassified summaries have information indicating capture by U.S. Forces
- 48 unclassified summaries have information indicating capture by the Northern Alliance
- 5 unclassified summaries have information indicating capture by the Afghan National Army.
- 42 unclassified summaries have limited details with regard to the capture
- 286 unclassified summaries had no capture data stated.

Of those 42 with limited details on capture data, the following information is available in the publicly available CSRT unclassified summaries:

- Captured by Pashtun tribe members
- Captured by forces of the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan

- Captured by Afghan Intelligence Forces
- Captured by Iranian authorities
- Captured by Bosnian authorities

Capturing forces apprehended the 516 individuals in multiple geographic locations. The CTC found that the majority (239) of the publicly available CSRT unclassified summaries contain no information about the capture location. Of those unclassified summaries that do contain this information, the CTC found the following statistics regarding capture location:

CAPTURE LOCATION	TOTAL NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN	11	2.13
AFGHANISTAN	116	22.48
PAKISTAN	144	27.91
NOT STATED	239	46.32
OTHER LOCATIONS	6	1.16

Figure 5

The next section will examine the actual behaviors and attributes of the 516 individuals drawing exclusively on the data contained in the publicly available 516 CSRT unclassified summaries.


Level I: Evidence of Demonstrated Threat

Hostilities

Upon CTC’s review of the data, 291 of the 516 unclassified summaries, or 56%, contain specific information demonstrating involvement with hostile actions. Unclassified summaries with this evidence are included as a Level I threat because they demonstrate that the detainee has demonstrated his capacity to threaten US and/or Coalition interests.

The 291 unclassified summaries with evidence that the detainee directly participated in or supported hostile acts have the following additional information (See Figure 6):


- 56 individuals admitted to fighting the U.S. or Coalition forces
- 104 individuals were found to have manned the front lines
- 9 individuals were found to have participated in a bombing operation, improvised explosives device (IED) attack or other explosives-involved operation
- 98 individuals were found to have directly participated in, or supported the planning or plotting of, a combat operation.
- 3 individuals were found to have purchased weapons for the furtherance of committing hostile acts.
- 21 individuals were found to have engaged in ‘other’ hostile activities.



According to the unclassified public CSRT summaries, some of these “Other” hostile activities include guarding weapons, guarding posts, conducting surveillance and reconnaissance in support of operations and transferring weapons.

Fighting Roles


Over 35% of the CSRT unclassified summaries contain evidence that the detainee served in the role of a fighter. Many of the detainees that served as fighters also served in a variety of support roles but were considered fighters - and therefore a Level I threat - if any of the stated roles in their unclassified summary included that of a fighter.



Training Camp Attendance


The Department of Defense uses the phrase, ‘terrorist training camp,’ when referring to a facility run by al-Qa`ida, the Taliban or associated forces where individuals can come to gain a variety of tactical and operational combat skills. The CTC found that 181 of the 516 CSRT unclassified summaries contain information about whether an individual attended at least one terrorist training camp. This is considered a Level I Threat because attending these camps suggests that the detainee voluntarily chose to prepare for and train on the skills used to directly threaten US/Coalition interests.

Entrance into these training camps is limited to known camp staff, including trainers and coordinators, and trainees. In most cases, camp trainees could only gain access via a sponsor already involved in a related organization and after having undergone a screening process.



Throughout the 1990s, al-Qa`ida and their associates administered a number of these training camps throughout Afghanistan (some estimates place the number over 100). The Afghan training camps provided thousands of militants from around the world with tactical and operational training during the 1990s and through 2001. Although the commonly accepted understanding is that the majority of those trained in those camps would not go on to formally join al-Qa`ida, anecdotal evidence suggests that a large percentage still did participate in some level of violent Jihad, including participation with the Taliban or associated groups and movements. The primary al-Qa`ida camps included al-Farouq, Khaldan, Camp Derunta and Tarnak Farms.

The CTC found that of the 181 individuals with information in their unclassified summary indicating they attended at least one training camp, individuals attended at least 16 different major camps, including:



A plurality of those who had record of training in the camps attended al-Farouq Camp (44%). The next most represented training facility was that of Khaldan Camp (5%). Both of these camps provided basic and accelerated military instruction to students, some of whom included 9/11 hijackers.

Al-Farouq Camp was located outside of Kandahar, Afghanistan. It was known for providing training in the following fields:

- weapons familiarization and firing,
- land mines
- tactics
- topography
- field movements
- basic explosives
- guerilla warfare and mountain tactics
- marksmanship
- small team tactics
- ambush
- camouflage
- rendezvous techniques

- covert communication ¹⁶

In addition to the major named camps above, a number of the publicly available 516 CSRT unclassified summaries indicate that at least one or more of the 516 detainees trained at ‘other’ camps and facilities including:

- Syed Ismail Shaheed Camp
- Camp run by the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan near Dushanbe, Tajikistan
- The Khalid Center near Baghram, Afghanistan
- The Dimaj Insitute
- The Mullah Omar Compound
- Camp run by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan near Lajard, Tajikistan
- Khoja Khar in Afghanistan
- The Mansehra Jihad military training camp
- The Taliban Center near Khwajajaghar, Afghanistan
- Camp Vietnam in the Philippines
- Moasqr Kari Bilal Camp
- An al-Qa`ida sponsored camp two hours north of Northwest Jalabat, Afghanistan
- Abu Abaida, Jalalabad, Afghanistan
- Uighur camp in the Tora Bora mountains, Afghanistan
- Lashkar-E-Tayyiba camps in Afghanistan
- Camp outside of Konduz, Afghanistan
- Pakistani Center #5 in Pakistan
- Taliban Office of Intelligence, Division 2 in Mazar-e-Shariff, Afghanistan
- Zubair Center near Tora Bora, Afghanistan
- Taliban training camp, “Post” near Imam Saheb, Afghanistan
- Terrorist training camp in Georgia
- Qulio Urdo Taliban training camp
- Dara Sufe
- Mousauwal Compound
- Gund Talimi Military School; Zakar Khel Village, Pakistan; Shamshato Refugee Camp, Pakistan
- Shaker-Dari, Afghanistan; Pul Sayad, Afghanistan
- Quralemsha, Pakistan

Combat Weapons

149 unclassified summaries have evidence that the detainee received training/possessed weapons other than, or in addition to, small arms such as AK-47’s. This is included as a Level I threat because it indicates an increased capability to conduct hostilities. Unclassified summaries with weapons information limited to small arms such as AK-47’s are omitted

¹⁶ See <http://www.dni.gov/announcements/content/DetaineeBiographies.pdf> for discussions of various training that high-value detainees (HVD’s) received at al-Faruq camp in Afghanistan.

from this category as training and possession of such weapons are ubiquitous in the region and not necessarily an indicator that the detainee intended to threaten US or Coalition interests.



Highlights of the data on weapons training/possession available in the CSRT unclassified summaries include evidence that:¹⁷

- 55 detainees trained on/possessed rocket propelled grenades (RPG's)
- 28 detainees trained on/possessed grenades
- 24 had training and/or were in possession of explosives/IED's
- 2 received training in the use of sniper rifles


¹⁷ In addition to RPG's, grenades, explosives, and sniper rifles, forty records contained evidence of training/possession of "other" weapons which were coded separately than "AK-47's and "Other Small Arms". Records that included weapons in the "other" category were included in the count for the variable "COMBAT WEAPONS". Some individuals fit into multiple categories, which is why the statistics in this figure exceed the number of 149 summaries containing data.



Level II: Evidence of Potential Threat

Supporting Roles

183 CSRT unclassified summaries contain evidence that the detainee performed the role of a fighter and were classified as such. 139 CSRT records include evidence that the detainee performed roles other than that of a fighter and were included in the support role category. These roles include, but are not limited to, accountants, cooks, facilitators, financiers, instructors, trainers, bodyguards, scouts, smugglers, couriers, drivers and recruiters.



Many of those captured with information on their functional role fulfilled multiple roles and functions in support of terrorist groups and organizations. Highlights of these are included in Figure 14.




Figure 14

The ‘Other’ category depicted in Figure 14 above includes a variety of roles such as::

- fundraising
- interpreter
- in charge of an anti-aircraft launcher
- weapons repair and assembly specialist
- document forger
- interrogation
- construction and improvement of camp facilities
- religious authority
- recruiter
- In charge of the police precinct under the Taliban and involved with Taliban conscription and recruitment efforts
- Running a safe house for members of the Karim explosives cell in Khowst
- Airfield Commander

Commitment to Jihad

Commitment is a significant –albeit somewhat subjective- measure, particularly when attempting to determine an individual’s long-term threat to the United States. Al-Qa`ida, the Taliban and like-minded groups are, above all else, the manifestation of an ideological

movement. The Combating Terrorism Center's previous work on the Jihadi Movement¹⁸ has shown that Movement adherents believe, to some degree, in the following three principles:

- the religious duty to establish the Sharia, or Islamic law throughout the traditional Islamic world (and globally if possible)
- the religious duty to employ violent methods in order to obtain that end-state
- the religious duty to support, whenever and wherever possible, those individuals who are waging violent Jihad when one is unable to directly fight (due to sickness, injury, age, etc..)

Consider the writing of the intellectual forefather of today's violent Jihadist movement, Shaykh Abdallah Azzam. Azzam provided much of the ideological fervor for those young Muslim men traveling to Afghanistan during the 1980s in order to fight against the Soviets. In his famous fatwa, "Defense of Muslim Lands," Azzam wrote that,


Whoever can, from among the Arabs, fight jihad in Palestine, then he must start there. And, if he is not capable, then he must set out for Afghanistan. For the rest of the Muslims, I believe they should start their jihad in Afghanistan. It is our opinion that we should begin with Afghanistan before Palestine, not because Afghanistan is more important than Palestine, not at all, Palestine is the foremost Islamic problem. It is the heart of the Islamic world, and it is a blessed land but, there are some reasons which make Afghanistan the starting point.¹⁹

Those individuals who express a dedication to the ideological tenets of waging violent Jihad, or those who are pursuing violent Jihad out of a feeling of religious necessity, ought to be considered hostile to the United States, its allies and its interests.

The CTC found that 98 of the 516 CSRT unclassified summaries include some data indicating an individual's level of commitment to pursuing violent Jihad.

¹⁸ See the CTC's Militant Ideology Atlas: <http://ctc.usma.edu/atlas>

¹⁹ Azzam, Abdallah. *Defense of Muslim Lands*. Pg. 23.



Of these 98 publicly available CSRT unclassified summaries containing explicit data on an individual’s ideological commitment to waging violent Jihad, the CSRT unclassified summaries provided the following significant insights:²⁰

- 31 provided non-combat support in waging violent jihad
- 6 pledged to continue waging violent jihad
- 5 pledged to continue motivating other to wage violent jihad
- 10 admitted that they would or have followed a fatwa to wage violent Jihad
- 8 pledged bayaat (sworn allegiance) to Usama Bin Laden²¹

²⁰ 422 summaries provided no data for this field. 47 summaries were coded as ‘other’ commitment.

²¹ As in previous sections, individuals could fit into multiple categories, accounting for why the statistics in the figure exceed the total number of unclassified summaries containing relevant evidence.




Figure 16

Small Arms Training/Possession

Of the 238 unclassified summaries that contain evidence of training and/or possession of weapons, 89 were limited to AK-47 rifles and other small arms.

In the Afghanistan-Pakistan region where most of these individuals were captured, familiarization with and possession of AK-47's and other small arms is part of daily life for many and not a sufficient indicator of threat. For this reason, the CTC felt it was prudent to identify and separate those unclassified summaries containing evidence of weapons training/possession limited to small arms such as AK-47's and include them as a Level II versus Level I threat.

Group Affiliations

The 516 CSRT unclassified summaries provide a wealth of information about the operational associations maintained between detainees and organizations known to be involved with, in some way, supporting the activities of al-Qa`ida, the Taliban or their associated forces. As described above, the CTC distinguishes 'Connection' between two individuals and 'Affiliation' between an individual and an organization, group or institution.

This measure refers to operational affiliations, including membership, enrollment, allegiance, employment and other types of joined affiliation by detainees and known terrorist groups. Such affiliations are incriminating and suggest a higher likelihood that the detainee supports terrorist groups and their activities and therefore are considered a Level II threat.

The CTC found in its study that of the 516 CSRT unclassified summaries,

- 476 unclassified summaries show an individual having at least one suspect affiliation
- 239 unclassified summaries show an individual having at least two suspect affiliation
- 40 unclassified summaries show an individual having at least three suspect affiliations
- 6 unclassified summaries show an individual having at least four suspect affiliations

The table below (Figure 17) visually depicts the various groups discussed in the publicly available CSRT unclassified summaries.

Group	1st affiliation	2 nd affiliation	3 rd affiliation	4 th affiliation
55th Arab Brigada	-	-	1	-
AIAI (Al-Ittihad al-Islami)	1	-	-	-
Al-Haramain Foundation	7	-	-	-
al-Qa`ida	314	4	-	-
al-Wafa	2	26	-	-
Anti-Coalition Militia	1	-	-	-
Armed Islamic Group	1	1	-	-
East Turkestan Islamic Movement	5	3	-	-
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)	-	1	-	-
Gama`at al-Islamiyah Italian Network	-	-	1	-
Hizb E Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)	12	7	-	-
HUM	1	-	-	-
IIRO (International Islamic Relief Organization)	-	-	1	-
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	6	1	-	-
Jama`at al-Dawa al-Quran	-	2	-	-
Jama`at al-Tablighi	2	22	1	-
Jama`at Islamiyyah (JI)	-	2	1	-
Jaish al-Muhammad	1	1	1	-
Kuwait Joint Relief Committee	-	1	-	-
Lashkar E Tayyiba	2	2	1	-
LDI	-	1	-	-
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group	3	3	2	1
Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group	-	-	1	-
Revival of Islamic Relief Heritage Society	-	1	-	-
Salafist Group for Call and Combat	-	-	1	-
Sanabil	-	1	-	-
The Syrian Group	1	-	-	-
Takfir Wal Hijra	-	1	-	-
Taliban	105	134	21	3
Tunisian Combat Group	1	-	-	-
WAMY (World Assembly of Muslim Youth)	-	-	1	-
Not Disclosed	11	25	7	2

Figure 17

Level III- Evidence of Associated Threat

Individual Connections

The CTC refers to an individual-to-individual relationship as a ‘Connection.’²² 321 of the 516 CSRT unclassified summaries include information about an individual’s connections to others who have directly supported terrorism.




Figure 18

Of those 321 CSRT unclassified summaries where a connection to al-Qa`ida, the Taliban or associated forces is definitively stated, the CTC found that:

- 141 individuals had a definitive connection with an al-Qa`ida member.
- 144 individuals had a definitive connection with a Taliban member.
- 49 individuals had a definitive connection with Usama Bin Laden
- 2 individuals had a definitive connection with at least one of the 9/11 hijackers.
- 39 individuals had a definitive connection with a known terrorist facilitator and/or operative.
- 17 individuals had a definitive connection with a mujahid (Islamic fighter)
- 1 individual had a definitive connection with at least one of the 1998 East Africa embassy bombers.

²² While related, “Connection” is coded differently than “Affiliation”. The CTC coded ‘affiliation’ as an ongoing relationship between an individual and an organization, group or institution considered by the U.S. government to be hostile or threatening to this country, its nationals or its interests at home and abroad. Affiliation could include membership, employment, allegiance and other types of formal or informal relationships between an individual and established group.

- 5 individuals had a definitive connection Jihadists/Jihadi Veterans
- 2 individuals had a definitive connection with Radical Imams
- 4 individuals had a definitive connection a High Value Detainee (HVD)
- 25 individuals had other connections

These relationships are graphically depicted in Figure 19:




Figure 19

Guest House Stay

Safe-houses, sometimes referred to as ‘guest-houses,’ facilitate an individual’s ability to discretely transit from one location to another by providing them with a place to spend the night, acquire resources, obtain false documentation or secure modes of transportation. Organized crime syndicates, terrorist networks and traffickers all rely on safe-houses to move people from place-to-place. They may be houses, apartments, mosques, stores, refugee camps, barracks, or any other type of infrastructure that houses individuals involved in nefarious activities.

Al-Qa`ida, the Taliban and their associates have leveraged the safe-house network to great ends, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan.²³ Many of these houses and apartments, which had been run for the specific purpose of ensuring safe passage for associates of those

²³ Dr. Thomas Fingar, chair of the National Intelligence Council, which released the *National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland* on July 17, 2007, noted that, “Pakistan's inability to root out these safe houses and training compounds is perhaps the most important factor in al Qaeda's revitalization...The existence of the safe haven is critical to al Qaeda's capability to plan, to train, to organize.” See ‘Al Qaeda's Comeback’ by Kevin Whitelaw in *U.S. News and World Report* (7/17/07).

movements, have been identified by the United States in its ongoing counterterrorism operations.

Of the 516 CSRT summaries made public, 122 of them indicate that a detainee had made use of a safe-house. Of those 122 unclassified summaries mentioning the use of at least one safe-house, the following safe-houses were identified:

- 1 individual stayed at Al-Ansar safe-house
- 1 individual stayed at Crescent Mill safe-house
- 1 individual stayed at Ghulam Bacha safe-house
- 1 individual stayed at Hassan safe-house
- 1 individual stayed at Mes Ainak safe-house
- 1 individual stayed at the al-Qa`ida associated Nibras safe-house
- 30 individuals stayed at the Taliban safe-house
- 2 individuals stayed at the Tunisian safe-house
- 2 individuals stayed at the Zubair safe-house

The aforementioned safe-houses are known within the counterterrorism community for being affiliated with the Taliban, al-Qa`ida or associated forces. The CTC's previous research has indicated that al-Ansar safe-house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, for instance, was used as a waiting area for recruits heading into the Afghan training camps. The Crescent Mill safe-house is a transit station located in Faisalabad, Pakistan. Mes Ainak refers to the al-Qa`ida training camp located in an abandoned Soviet copper mine near Kabul that was used to train and house recruits.²⁴

The publicly available unclassified CSRT summaries provide a great deal of additional information on safe-house stays not particular to a specific safe-house. The CTC found a number of other mentions to safe-houses including:

- A safe-house in Khost, Afghanistan
- A safe-house near the front lines in vicinity of Konduz, Afghanistan
- A safe-house in Akbar Kan neighborhood of Kabul, Afghanistan
- The Uighur safe-house in Kabul, Afghanistan
- The Uighur safe-house in Jalabad, Afghanistan
- An al-Qa`ida safe-house in Kandahar, Afghanistan
- An al-Qa`ida safe-house in Kabul, Afghanistan
- A safe-house in Faisalabad, Pakistan
- The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) safe-house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan
- An al-Qa`ida safe-house owned by Abu Zabayda
- The Jalozaï refugee camp
- An Algerian house in Jalalbad, Afghanistan
- A safe-house in Lahore, Pakistan
- A Taliban safe-house in Quetta, Pakistan

²⁴ As in previous sections, individuals could fit into multiple categories.

- A Yemeni house in Faisalabad, Pakistan
- The Daftar Al-Taliban Guesthouse
- A safe-house in Peshawar, Pakistan
- An al-Qa`ida safe house in Karachi, Pakistan


International Travel

445 of the 516 unclassified summaries contain information about an individual's foreign operationally relevant travel history. Operationally relevant travel can include any foreign travel taken by an individual in order to gain training, acquire or transfer necessary resources for committing or supporting hostile action, meeting with personnel or conducting other related activities that support hostile action.

While not determinative of an individual's threat or propensity to commit hostile acts, operationally relevant travel history does help to provide a much more complete picture about an individual's potential involvement with hostile activities, ideological commitment, social networks and previous experiences. There are multiple known al-Qa`ida and Jihadist international travel routes that have been established over the past two decades in order to facilitate operations.

The CTC found that a number of the publicly available CSRT unclassified summaries discuss operationally relevant travel by the detainees to Afghanistan/Pakistan, North Africa, Europe/North America, Middle East, parts of Africa, China and Central Asia.

As an interesting point-of-fact, half of those captured individuals who had been to the United Kingdom had spent time at the Finsbury Park mosque, which became associated with supporting militant strains of Islamist thought in the early 2000's, primarily due to its relationship with the radical cleric, Abu Hamza al-Masri. Al-Qa`ida operatives including Richard Reid and Zaccarias Moussaoui both attended the mosque as have a number of other local radical militants.



A measure for extensive operationally relevant travel - “High Travel” - was coded and assigned to detainee records with evidence of conducting operationally relevant travel to three or more countries. 119 of the 516 unclassified summaries met this threshold definition of “High Travel”.²⁵

Pocket Litter

Pocket litter is a phrase commonly used by law enforcement and intelligence communities to refer to everything on the person and in an individual’s possession at the time of capture. It most often refers to written material, including names, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, letters, documents and other similar types of material. In the case of the publicly available CSRT unclassified summaries, the CTC found that limited information was available with regard to three variables, including: possessing a large amount of U.S. dollars, possessing a large amount of foreign currency, possessing a digital watch.

While in itself possession of large amounts of currency is not a highly concerning indicator of threat, when taken in concert with other variables, including being in an active combat zone, possession of large amounts of currency (U.S. dollars or other) tends to provide some sense of an individual’s role within an organization, specifically as a financier, courier or an operative. The CTC found that eight detainees had large amounts of U.S. currency in their possession at the time of capture. Two individuals (one of whom also had large sums of U.S. currency) had large sums of other currency in their possession at the time of capture. The CTC found that two individuals had documents in their possession with the names of

²⁵ As in previous sections, individuals could fit into multiple categories, accounting for why the statistics in the figure exceed the total number of unclassified summaries containing relevant evidence.

known al-Qa`ida members on them. Fifteen of the individuals had digital watches of a concerning type in their possession at the time of capture.²⁶

Recap of Summary Statistics

The evidence from the unclassified CSRT reports presented in the preceding section is summarized at Figure 21. (Note: As emphasized earlier, detainee CSRT unclassified summaries contain multiple pieces of evidence meeting the criteria of many of the twelve attributes assessed in this study.)

Detainee Attribute	# CSRT Evidence	% Population
<i>Demonstrated Threat</i>	377	73%
HOSTILITIES	291	56%
FIGHTER	183	35%
ATTENDED TRAINING CAMP	181	35%
COMBAT WEAPONS	149	29%
<i>Potential Threat</i>	488	95%
SUPPORTING ROLE	139	27%
COMMITMENT	98	19%
AK-47/SMALL ARMS	89	17%
GROUP AFFILIATION	475	92%
<i>Associated Threat</i>	397	77%
INDIVIDUAL CONNECTIONS	321	62%
GUEST HOUSE	122	24%
LARGE SUMS CASH	10	2%
HIGH TRAVEL	119	23%
<i>(Demonstrated Threat+Potential Threat)>0</i>	505	98%
<i>(Demonstrated Threat+Potential Threat+ Associated Threat)>0</i>	510	99%

Figure 21

Of the 27% of the 516 unclassified CSRT unclassified summaries that contain no definitive evidence meeting the threshold definition of Demonstrated Threat, 34% contain evidence of playing a support role; 12% meet the criteria of commitment to jihad; 8% received/possessed training in small arms; 89% have affiliations with known terrorist organizations.

Six unclassified summaries contain no evidence meeting the threshold criteria of any attribute in any category defined in this study. 48 unclassified summaries – 10% of the population had evidence of 7 or more attributes. Figure 22 provides a detailed breakdown of

²⁶ Law enforcement and intelligence agencies have found that certain models of everyday digital watches have a dual-use capability to serve as an easily programmable triggering mechanism for explosive devices. While possession of this brand of digital watch is not, in itself, concerning, when taken in concert with other variables, such as having trained on explosives at an al-Qa`ida sponsored camp, it does provide an additional indicator of an individual's threat.

the total number of attributes identified in the 516 unclassified summaries across all twelve measures²⁷.

Total # of Attributes Across All 3 Categories (Demonstrated Threat + Potential Threat+ Associated Threat)	# CSRT Unclassified Summaries	Percent of 516 CSRT Unclassified Summaries Total
0	6	1%
1	26	5%
2	61	12%
3	90	17%
4	95	18%
5	109	21%
6	81	16%
7	37	7%
8	10	2%
9	1	<1%
10	0	0
11	0	0

Figure 22

Of the 27% of the 516 records that do reflect evidence assessed as a *Demonstrated Threat*, nearly half - 49% - contain evidence of two or more attributes included in this category. A quarter of the detainee population assessed possessed at least three of the four attributes assigned to the Demonstrated Threat category – hostilities, fighter, combat weapons or training camp attendance. Almost 10% of the records assessed had evidence of all four *Demonstrated Threat* measures.

Total <i>Demonstrated Threat</i> Attributes (4xTotal)	# CSRT Unclassified Summaries	% 516 Total
0	139	27%
1	125	24%
2	123	24%
3	83	16%
4	46	9%

Figure 23

95% of the 516 CSRT unclassified summaries have evidence of at least one of the four attributes assigned to the *Potential Threat* category, which include playing a supporting role, training/possession of an AK-47 or other small arms, a stated commitment to violent jihad, and affiliations with know terror groups. Given that 92% of the unclassified summaries contain evidence of an affiliation with a known terror group, this skewed this measure considerably. That said, almost half of the 516 detainee unclassified summaries -49%- contained two or more attributes that fell into the *Potential Threat* category. Figure 24

²⁷ Evidence meeting the criteria for the variables COMBAT WEAPONS and SMALL ARMS is mutually exclusive- a record cannot be classified as both.

contains a break down of the number of unclassified summaries with evidence across the four attributes in this category.

Total <i>Potential Threat</i> Attributes (4xTotal)	# CSRT Unclassified Summaries	% 516 Total
0	28	5%
1	239	46%
2	188	36%
3	58	11%
4	3	2%

Figure 24

23% of the detainee unclassified summaries contain no evidence meeting the criteria of any of the four measures assigned to the Associated Threat category while nearly half contained evidence of at least one attribute. See Figure 25 for a breakdown of this category. (Note: Carrying large sums of cash was an indicator included in this category but shared by only 8 detainees- 2% of the total population assessed.)

Total <i>Associated Threat</i> Attributes (4xTotal)	# CSRT Unclassified Summaries	% Total
0	119	23%
1	250	48%
2	120	23%
3	26	5%
4	1	1%

Figure 25

The mean number of total attributes found in these CSRT records is 4.2. A breakdown of the mean, standard deviation and range of observations in the 516 unclassified summary population is depicted at Figure 26 below.

Evidence Category	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min-Max
Total	516	4.22	1.76	0-9
<i>Demonstrated Threat</i>	516	1.56	1.29	0-4
<i>Potential Threat</i>	516	1.25	.90	0-4
<i>Associated Threat</i>	516	1.19	.554	0-4

Figure 26

Multivariate Test Results and Analysis

Results of multivariate regressions testing the statistical and substantive significance of all twelve independent variables across the three threat categories introduced earlier on the *Demonstrated Threat* and select *Potential Threat* variables are presented in Figure 27.

Linear Probability Model Results²⁸

Figure 27

	Model 1 DV Hostilities	Model 2 DV Fighter	Model 3 DV Training Camps	Model 4 DV Combat Weapons	Model 5 DV Support Role	Model 6 DV Committed
Hostilities		0.453*** (0.040)	-0.027 (0.045)	0.129*** (0.043)	0.156*** (0.051)	-0.039 (0.042)
Fighter	0.510*** (0.483)		0.068 (0.057)	0.298*** (0.056)	-0.703*** (0.052)	0.161*** (0.053)
Training Camps	-0.026 (0.043)	0.073** (0.037)		0.307*** (0.042)	-0.018 (0.043)	0.021 (0.039)
Combat Weapons	0.155*** (0.050)	0.225*** (0.045)	0.382*** (0.051)		0.131** (0.056)	0.021 (0.048)
Support Role	0.168*** (0.055)	-0.689*** (0.030)	-0.015 (0.048)	0.096** (0.047)		0.101** (0.044)
Committed	-0.049 (0.052)	0.166*** (0.048)	0.027 (0.051)	0.011 (0.050)	0.120** (0.049)	
Rifle Only	0.078 (0.055)	0.261*** (0.049)	0.214*** (0.062)	-0.633*** (0.040)	0.156** (0.061)	-0.019 (0.052)
Affiliations	0.032 (0.079)	0.207** (0.081)	0.103 (0.068)	-0.024 (0.077)	0.262*** (0.064)	0.003 (0.054)
Connections	0.0001 (0.041)	0.095** (0.037)	-0.016 (0.042)	-0.070* (0.038)	0.185*** (0.050)	0.050 (0.034)
Guest Stay	-0.038 (0.045)	-0.034 (0.040)	-0.007 (0.046)	0.056 (0.043)	-0.067 (0.049)	0.079* (0.042)
High Travel	-0.086* (0.044)	0.005 (0.039)	0.095* (0.051)	0.054 (0.044)	-0.036 (0.050)	0.002 (0.041)
Cash	0.064 (0.164)	-0.318*** (0.120)	-0.005 (0.143)	-0.047 (0.114)	0.055 (0.161)	0.332** (0.166)
Constant	0.296*** (0.796)	-0.188** (0.084)	0.089 (0.068)	0.095 (0.075)	-0.026 (0.063)	0.058 (0.054)
Number of Observations	516	440†	516	473†	425†	516
R ²	0.260	0.504	0.162	0.318	0.250	0.057

*** p<.001 ** p<.05 * p<.10

All standard errors in parentheses are robust in order to correct for heteroskedasticity

† When originally regressed with all observations included, this model had a number of fitted values greater than 1 or less than zero. These poor observations were dropped from the model; thus resulting in less than 516 observations. As a precaution, we also ran a multi-variant

²⁸ Results from multivariate logit tests using the same independent and dependent variables are posted at Annex B.

logit model which fitted all the values between 0 and 1. This backup model showed no substantial deviation from the linear probability model in the magnitude, direction, or significance of our parameter estimates. The results of these logit tests are at Annex B.

Model 1-Dependent Variable: Hostilities

Evidence of performing the role of a fighter was—as expected—the most statistically and substantively significant predictor of committing or participating in hostilities against the United States or Coalition Allies. CSRT records denoting a detainee was a fighter were 51% more likely to also contain evidence of committing or directly participating in hostilities. CSRT records that contained evidence the detainee served in a supporting role for a terrorist group were 17% more likely to have evidence of hostilities while evidence of training in/possession of combat weapons including RPG's, grenades, explosives and IED's predicted a 16% greater chance of participation and/or support of hostilities. Interestingly, evidence of possession/training in only small arms —e.g. AK-47 rifle —was not a statistically significant predictor of hostile actions. This lends support to the conclusion that small arms training and possession are ubiquitous in regions such as Afghanistan and not limited to terrorists and other unlawful combatants. Detainees with evidence of operational travel to three or more countries were 9% *less* likely to have evidence they participated or supported hostilities albeit not quite as statistically significant. ($P < .05$)

Model 2-Dependent Variable: Fighter

CSRT records with evidence of participation in hostilities were 45% more likely to list fighter as one of the roles performed by the detainee. Training/possession in small arms such as AK-47 rifles predicted a 26% greater likelihood of accompanying evidence of performing as a fighter while combat weapons training/possession predicted somewhat surprisingly slightly smaller likelihood of serving in a fighter role at 23%. Detainees whose CSRT unclassified summaries have evidence of affiliation with terrorist group(s) were 21% more likely to contain information linking the detainee with service as a fighter. Commitment to jihad, and individual connections to terrorists/terrorist groups predicted a 17% and 10% greater likelihood of performing the role of a fighter respectively. Detainees captured with large amounts of US or foreign currency, however, were 4% *less likely* to have accompanying evidence of service as a fighter.

Model-3 Dependent Variable: Training Camps

Evidence of training in combat weapons— e.g. RPG's, grenades, sniper rifles, explosives and IED's make it 38% more likely there will be evidence that a detainee attended training camp(s). Those records with evidence of training/possession in weapons limited to small arms were 21% more likely to contain evidence of training camp attendance. These findings are consistent with the activities known to occur in the jihadi training camps and lends support to the accuracy of the model. CSRT unclassified summaries that indicate a detainee traveled to three or more countries were nearly 10% more likely to include evidence of training camp attendance although somewhat less significant statistically than combat weapons and small arms.

Model 4- Dependent Variable: Combat weapons

Evidence that a detainee attended one or more Jihadi training camps is far and away the most significant predictor of having received training in or possession of combat weapons. CSRT records indicating the detainee attended one or more Jihadi training camps are 31% more likely to include evidence that they were trained/possessed combat weapons which is consistent with expectations. Records identifying detainees as fighters have a 30% greater chance of including evidence that they received training or possessed combat weapons. Both of these findings are consistent with expectations. The next predictors in order of statistical and substantive significance are evidence of participation in hostile acts and serving in a support role for a terrorist organization which predict a 13% and 10% greater chance a detainees' record contains information that he received combat weapons training. Evidence of an individual connection to terrorists predicted a 7% smaller chance of information linking the detainee to training in combat weapons albeit just within the threshold of statistical significance ($p < .10$)

Model 5-Dependent Variable: Support Role

CSRT records with information indicating an affiliation with a terrorist group or individual connections to terrorists/terrorist groups predicted a 26% and 19% greater likelihood of evidence the detainee served in a support role for terrorist groups respectively. This is plausible as such affiliations and connections facilitated the relationships, communication and contacts needed to support terrorist activities. Detainee CSRT records with evidence of participating in or directly supporting hostilities were 16% more likely to also contain evidence of serving in a supporting role for terrorists groups while those records indicating commitment to jihad were 12% more likely to contain such evidence. Records with evidence of training/possession of AK-47's/other small arms were 16% more likely to have evidence of performing a support role-this is 3% higher than the increase in probability that training/possession of combat weapons adds to the likelihood this information is included in the unclassified CSRT record.

Model 6 - Dependent Variable: Committed

The most significant predictor of commitment in this sample was carrying large sums of cash which increased the likelihood a record contained evidence of commitment by 33%. Evidence of being a fighter boosts the chances of also containing evidence of commitment to jihad by 16%. Detainee records with evidence of playing a supporting role for terror groups are 10% more likely to have evidence of commitment while information linking a detainee to a guest house stay increases the chance there is also evidence of commitment by 8%.

Recap of Evidence and Conclusions

Based on analysis of the information contained in the publicly available 516 unclassified CSRT records, the Combating Terrorism Center's study concludes that varying degrees of evidence exist within these CSRT unclassified summaries relevant to determining the status of those individuals as enemy combatants.

The analyses conducted in this assessment determined that 56% of the unclassified summaries contain information that an individual supported or waged hostile activities against the US and/or Coalition allies. 35% of the records contain evidence that an individual could be definitively identified as a fighter for al-Qa`ida, the Taliban or associated forces. 35% of the CSRT unclassified records show evidence that an individual received training at a formal training camp and 27% provided evidence that an individual received training in the use of combat weapons *other than or in addition to rifles/small arms* including grenades, rocket propelled grenades, sniper rifles and the construction and/or deployment of explosives and IED's. Overall, 73% of the records contain at least one piece of evidence that met the threshold definition developed in this study to classify them as a demonstrated threat.

The CTC found that 95% of the publicly available CSRT unclassified summaries contained evidence that a detainee *supported* hostile activities in some way or was affiliated with groups that executed and/or supported terrorist acts, or received weapons training or possessed weapons that could be used in support of terrorist activities. These records are deemed to meet this study's definition of potential threat. 77% of these records met the stated criteria to be considered an associated threat as an enemy combatant. This included interacting with members of terrorist groups or exhibiting behavior frequently associated with terror group members.

Coding and interpretation of raw data is not a precise process. It unavoidably requires making subjective assessments over whether data definitively meets threshold criteria for many of the variables defined. The authors of this study sought to be both objective and impartial in their interpretations of the data. They have strived to maintain transparency regarding the coding criteria and their interpretation and analysis of the processed information. The authors visited U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and discussed the details of the CSRT process with those directly involved. The study's coded data set is available on request. Classified records may contain additional evidence relevant to any decision on detainee status as enemy combatant.

Importantly, this study is almost entirely informed by the information that is publicly available in the 516 CSRT unclassified summaries, which are by their nature limited in detail. It is the hope of the CTC that this assessment of the available information from the Combatant Status Review Tribunals, and the accompanying coded data set, will inform a variety of future studies. Ideally, this report and the data from which it was informed will enhance our collective understanding of the threats facing the United States, its allies and its interests and how we can best respond to them.

Annex A-Multivariate Logit Results

	Model 1 DV hostilities	Model 2 DV fighter	Model 3 DV training_camps	Model 4 DV combat_weapons	Model 5 DV support_role	Model 6 DV committed
hostilities		2.69*** (.323)	-.158 (.243)	.775*** (.279)	.714*** (.249)	-.296 (.279)
fighter	2.55*** (.296)		.331 (.289)	1.58*** (.330)		1.18*** (.356)
tngcamps	-.142 (.243)	.471 (.1) (.318)		1.69*** (.251)	-.074 (.290)	.118 (.259)
combat_wpens	.867*** (.276)	1.51*** (.349)	1.76*** (.247)		.625* (.337)	.136 (.300)
support_role	.702*** (.245)		-.069 (.277)	.659** (.333)		.817** (.328)
committed	-.308 (.277)	1.38*** (.395)	.138 (.257)	.058 (.303)	.645* (.342)	
rifle_only	.364 (.303)	1.50*** (.382)	1.06*** (.280)	-.226 (.476)	.742** (.373)	-.104 (.340)
affiliations	.190 (.380)	1.11** (.530)	.596 (.164) (.428)	-.426* (.258)	1.53*** (.519)	.050* (.515)
connections	.018 (.219)	.659** (.292)	-.086 (.213)	.315 (.290)	.897*** (.257)	.368 (.256)
guest_stay	-.211 (.249)	-.193 (.323)	-.022 (.239)	.272 (.289)	-.395 (.297)	.507** (.257)
high_travel	-.481* (.254)	.039 (.334)	.476** (.237)	-.337 (.962)	-.222 (.303)	.040 (.276)
cash	.342 (.715)	-2.99** (1.44)	-.010 (.753)	-2.16*** (.488)	.296 (.714)	1.69*** (.665)
_cons	-.913** (.383)	-4.26*** (.620)	-2.05*** (.440)	.775*** (.279)	-2.75*** (.560)	-2.54 (.530)
N	516	516	516	516	516	516
Pseudo R ²	.212	.393	.123	.242	.113	.060

*** p<.001 ** p<.05 * P<.10

Annex B

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Combatant Status Review Board

TO: Personal Representative

FROM: OIC, CSRT (07 October 2004)

Subject: Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal – BIN ATEF, Mahmmod Omar Mohammed.

1. Under the provisions of the Secretary of the Navy Memorandum, dated 29 July 2004, *Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base Cuba*, a Tribunal has been appointed to review the detainee's designation as an enemy combatant.
2. An enemy combatant has been defined as "an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces."
3. The United States Government has previously determined that the detainee is an enemy combatant. This determination is based on information possessed by the United States that indicates that the detainee is a member of the Taliban, associated with al Qaida, and participated in military operations against the United States or its coalition partners.
 - a. The detainee is a member of the Taliban and associated with al Qaida:
 1. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan in June 2001 from Saudi Arabia via Pakistan.
 2. The detainee went to Afghanistan to fight the jihad.
 3. The detainee is a member of the Taliban.
 4. The detainee completed military training at Al Farouq.
 5. The detainee received weapons training on the Kalashnikov rifle, rocket-propelled grenade launcher, and pistols.
 6. The detainee met Usama Bin Laden.
 - b. The detainee participated in military operations against the United States and its coalition partners:
 1. The detainee was engaged in the conflict at the Konduz line.
 2. The detainee was engaged in the conflict at the Khoshaghar line.
 3. The detainee was present at the Al Janki uprising at Mazur-e-Sharif.

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Exhibit K 1

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4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability of evidence or witnesses.

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