Haiti at the Crossroads of DemocracyRoger F. Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere AffairsRemarks to American Enterprise Institute Washington, DC April 14, 2004
Introduction When I thought about what I wanted to say here this morning, I knew that I wanted to stress that Haiti is at an important crossroads…that now, perhaps more than at anytime in decades, there was an opportunity for the Haitian people to make a break from their troubled past and begin again to make progress on the path of democracy and development. After waiting for 200 years, Haitians deserve democracy--and a government that looks out for their interests. Some people look at Haitian history, shrug their shoulders, and say, "Well, it’s Haiti, what do you expect?" That cynical perspective overlooks that fact that many times in the past the Haitian people have made great efforts to establish true democracy, only to be undermined from within by the selfish ambitions of a petty tyrant and from without by the low expectations of their friends and neighbors. The Bush Administration believes that if we all do our part and do it right, Haiti will have the democracy it deserves. I do want to talk to you about those prospects and what the United States will do to help the Haitian people fulfill them, but I realize that to articulate how the United States sees the way ahead, I have to explain how we found ourselves in the present predicament…how the hopes and aspirations of the Haitian people for a truly representative government have been frustrated in the past. It is a familiar story. It is the story of how a popular leader who promises radical change only to become what he once beheld. Sadly this story is not unique to Haiti. It is, if anything, a cautionary tale for leaders and citizens of democracies everywhere. A Brief History of Haiti and the Aristide Regime, or How to Lose your Democracy In its second century, a succession of strongmen and failed attempts at implementing democratic rule were followed by the election in 1957 of Dr. Francois Duvalier, a popular leader known as "Papa Doc" who promised democratic reform but quickly resorted to demagoguery and political violence to maintain his self-proclaimed title, "President for Life." He was succeeded by his son, "Baby Doc" Duvalier, who reigned in Haiti until 1986 when a combination of international pressure and internal antagonism brought on by decades of brutal and corrupt misrule forced him from power. As you know, the dominant figure in Haitian politics of the last thirteen years or so was Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Initially, many had high hopes for this charismatic priest who worked with the least fortunate in Haitian society and found most of his support there. His movement, Lavalas, meaning "cleansing flood" in Creole, was a self-styled reform movement that promised to undo the vestiges of the Duvalier regime. In hindsight, the Aristide regime bore too much of a resemblance to the Duvalier regime. Despite his early promise and lipservice to democracy, the Aristide years were yet another disappointing chapter in Haitian history. The lesson is that democracy is not an election, a street demonstration, or a dusty legal document, it is a way of living and working together and, as such, it is contingent on what people do and how they treat one another. Leaders can undermine a republic and their own legitimacy by their actions and that is how a people can lose their democracy. There are many examples of how Jean-Bertrand Aristide contributed to the collapse of his own government. However, four factors stand out: First, there is the culture of political violence and impunity that characterized his movement and his regime; Second, the corruption of the institutions of the state that flourished under him; Third, his polarizing rhetoric and willful refusal give any quarter to or compromise with political adversaries; And finally, his flouting of the concerns of his neighbors and friends in the international community. Political Violence and Impunity Some apologists at the time essentially made a moral relativism and ends-justify-the-means argument. They said, "Well in Haiti, politics is a contact sport, and moving against the remnants of the Duvalier regime required extreme measures." That argument overlooks the fact that murder is simply inconsistent with democracy. These early incidents were portents of things to come. Critics and adversaries of President Aristide often wound up dead, while their killers went unpunished. The murders of journalists Jean Dominique in April 2000 and Brignol Lindor in December 2001 and the former Aristide-thug-turned-renegade-gang-leader Amiot "Cubain" Metayer in September 2003 are examples. As years passed, Aristide increasingly relied on chimeres, violent gangs, to maintain his authority, intimidate opponents, and control the streets. A notorious example: On December 5 of last year, a day that came to be known as "Black Friday," chimeres assaulted State University students who were gathering for a demonstration in Port-au-Prince. An estimated 30 students were injured, at least 10 by gunfire. The University Rector suffered 2 broken kneecaps from a brutal beating by chimeres. Corruption The Haitian National Police was also thoroughly corrupted. Stood up with international aid after the intervention in 1994, the HNP was intended to be a national force that, unlike its many predecessors, would be a credible guardian of Haitian state and effective enforcer the rule of law. The United States and international community spent hundreds of millions of dollars to ensure the HNP could fulfill this role. Aristide clearly had other ideas in mind for the HNP. He systematically removed professional policemen and replaced them with thugs and criminals loyal to him. He withheld necessary funding to support, train, and equip the HNP. More and more, Aristide employed it as an instrument of repression. As a consequence, by the end of his reign, the HNP was a hollow and demoralized force. On paper, it was supposed to be 5,000 men strong. In reality, perhaps a quarter of that number showed up to work on any given day. Many good policemen left the HNP out of frustration. Many dangerous men, men who had no business being in the police force to begin with, were left to fight over the graft that was the perquisite of being an Aristide loyalist on the force. In the end, the HNP was less of a crime fighting organization, than it was an ongoing criminal enterprise. Demagoguery and Winner Takes All Politics Aristide’s handling of the parliamentary elections of May 2000 was an example of his winner takes all mentality. Not content with a majority won at the polls with the full resources of his political machine, Aristide declared several cronies the winners in close elections that should have gone to a second ballot. His contempt for the democratic process was evident. For Aristide, it seemed that winning wasn’t everything…it was the only thing. It was this approach to politics that made him such a polarizing figure and drove so many people away from him. Even before the split in the Lavalas party, many allies and adversaries came to regard Aristide as ultimately self-interested and untrustworthy. Flouting the Concerns of His Neighbors and the International Community Resolution 822 called on the Haitian Government to ensure a climate of security and confidence with a view to establishing the conditions necessary for free and fair elections in 2003. It also established November 4 of that year as the date by which an autonomous, credible, and neutral Provisional Electoral Council should be formed. The United States and other interested nations worked diligently to broker an agreement between opposition parties and the Aristide government throughout the fall of 2003 that would satisfy the opposition’s reasonable concerns about security, given the violence they had endured at the hands of the HNP and the chimeres. Aristide refused to guarantee their safety, and no agreement was reached. Despite his public protestations, Aristide was not negotiating in good faith. Months passed, the deadline for elections approached and tensions grew. As violence began to break out in the capital and outlying cities, many Haitians took to the seas. Naturally, this was of concern to all Haiti’s neighbors, including the United States, for humanitarian and security reasons. In his final days, Aristide issued numerous statements on immigration that most observers agree were intentionally ambiguous and intended to put his neighbors on notice that they faced the prospect of a major migration crisis, if they did not come to his aid. It was attempted blackmail, and the real victims were the Haitian people. Lessons Learned Haiti’s Future The Multinational Interim Force (MIF) has established security in the capital and many outlying cities. I want to thank the governments of France, Canada, and Chile for their contributions to the MIF. Their soldiers and the US forces in Haiti have performed brilliantly under difficult circumstances. We are also engaged in discussions with the United Nations and other member states as to the nature and composition of the follow-on Peacekeeping Force (PKO,) and those talks are progressing well. At the beginning of my speech, I said that if we in the International Community do our part right, Haiti would have the true democracy that it deserves. To achieve that goal, the Bush Administration believes that our engagement with Haiti needs to be guided by certain principles. Principles of US Engagement in Haiti Second, if Haiti is to make a break with its dark past, no form of political violence or corruption can be tolerated. It is vital to restore security and impose the rule of law through duly authorized forces, including the MIF, PKO, and a renovated, apolitical, independent, and professional HNP. All Haitians, without regard to political affiliation, must be held accountable for past crimes through a system of justice, not revenge. Third, to begin to fulfill Haiti’s economic potential and provide opportunity for the Haitian people, we will engage the Government of Haiti, the Haitian private sector and the Haitian Diaspora. We will help jumpstart private sector job creation, trade and investment. We will help the Government of Haiti ensure accountability in public finances including the effective and timely use of development resources. We will provide technical and legal aid to update Haiti’s Commercial Code, which dates from the 19th century, in order to help create the right environment for growth and wealth creation. We will also encourage the Government of Haiti to move forward, at the appropriate time, with restructuring and privatization of some public sector enterprises through a transparent process. US Engagement In addition to an ongoing $52 million economic development and humanitarian assistance program, the U.S. will begin an urgent three-year jobs program, which will provide tens of thousands of jobs to improve municipal infrastructure and create jobs in Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitien, Gonaives and other locations as needed. The project will rehabilitate schools and public buildings destroyed by rioting and burning; build or rehabilitate roads; and, improve community water supplies. Prospectively, the US government will seek to expand our humanitarian development programs to ensure that the medical and nutritional needs of Haiti’s most disadvantaged people are met. Since the latest crisis began to unfold in February, the US has responded with additional funds totaling $3 million to provide badly needed medical and food supplies On the political side, we will allocate $9 million for elections and democracy building to support the activities of the OAS Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti. This money is in addition to the special voluntary contribution of $4.9 million recently given to the Special Mission. Other efforts may include training and assistance to the Haitian National Police and support for Haiti’s new Truth, Justice and National Reconciliation Commission. Conclusion Thank you. |