Statement by Robert J. Einhorn
Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee
June 12, 2008
The U.S.-Russia Civil Nuclear Agreement
Mr.
Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee on the
U.S.-Russia Agreement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation and its implications for U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
Since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and Russia have engaged in
important but circumscribed areas of nuclear cooperation, such as the
Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction assistance programs and the 1993 HEU
Purchase Agreement under which 500 tons of highly-enriched uranium from
dismantled nuclear weapons are being blended down to low-enriched uranium and
sold to the U.S. as fuel for its civil nuclear reactors. But for the two countries to enter into
full-scale nuclear engagement – including U.S.
transfers to Russia
of nuclear materials, nuclear reactors, and their major components – an
agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (a so-called “123 Agreement”
which is required by Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act) must be in
force.
The United States
has 123 Agreements with almost all countries with major nuclear energy
programs. A major exception is Russia,
a country with one of the most extensive, diverse, technologically advanced,
and commercially active nuclear industries in the world. The reasons for this anomaly include the
mutual mistrust that prevailed during the Cold War, the dormancy of the U.S.
nuclear industry in the post-Cold War period, and the differing approaches of
the two countries toward the nuclear fuel cycle. Since the mid-1990s, the main impediment to a
U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement has been Russian nuclear assistance to Iran, which the United States believes is pursuing
a nuclear weapons capability under the cover of a civil nuclear program. In an effort to induce Moscow
to end such assistance, the Clinton Administration and initially the Bush
Administration refused to negotiate a 123 Agreement with Russia unless it halted all nuclear cooperation
with Iran,
including its construction of a nuclear power reactor at Bushehr.
In recent
years, the case for pursuing a 123 Agreement with Russia has gotten stronger. Growing energy needs and concerns about
greenhouse gas emissions are improving the outlook for nuclear power worldwide
which, in an increasingly globalized nuclear industry, places a premium on
working with foreign partners. The 9/11
attacks and the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran have elevated
preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism to the top of the
national security agenda, generating strong interest in more
proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies and approaches to the fuel cycle
that could be advanced through U.S.-Russian collaboration. Moreover, following revelations about Iran’s clandestine enrichment program and other
illicit nuclear activities, Russia’s
policy – while still committed to the completion of the Bushehr reactor –
became more supportive of U.S.
and European efforts to press Iran
to end its pursuit of fuel cycle programs that would give it a nuclear weapons
capability.
In light of
these developments, the Bush Administration in early 2006 relaxed its linkage
between the Iran
issue and a U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement.
Instead of insisting that Moscow terminate all nuclear cooperation with
Iran (including its construction of the power reactor at Bushehr) before
negotiations on a 123 Agreement could get underway, it would now be willing to
enter into negotiations but would only be prepared to complete the agreement
and allow it to enter into force if Russia played a constructive role on the
Iran nuclear issue.
At the July
2006 meeting of G-8 leaders in St.
Petersburg, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir
Putin announced that bilateral negotiations would begin. The talks proceeded smoothly. An agreement was initialed in Moscow in June 2007 and signed in Moscow on May 6, 2008. On May 13th, the White House
transmitted the 123 Agreement and its supporting documentation to the Congress
for its consideration.
The
U.S.-Russia agreement negotiated by the two sides meets all the legal
requirements set forth in Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. In particular, it contains all the required
nonproliferation guarantees and controls, including a U.S. right of prior consent to re-transfers, a
guarantee that adequate physical protection measures will be maintained with
respect to U.S. exports, and
a guarantee that no U.S.-origin nuclear material will be enriched or
reprocessed without the prior approval of the United States. Indeed, the U.S.-Russia agreement is more
restrictive than the 123 Agreement negotiated (but not yet submitted to the Congress)
with non-NPT party India which provides U.S. advanced consent (rather than
case-by-case approval) for reprocessing and offers U.S. assistance in ensuring
uninterrupted fuel supplies in the event that an Indian nuclear test results in
the termination of U.S. nuclear assistance to India.
Entry into
force of the U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement can be expected to bringing significant
benefits. At a technical level, an
agreement could help accelerate U.S.
nuclear energy research and development plans in such areas as fast neutron
reactors and advanced fuel-cycle technologies where the Russians possess both
experience and facilities not available in the U.S. For example, the Department of Energy would
like to send fuel elements for testing in Russian fast neutron reactors but can
only do so with a 123 Agreement in place.
The Agreement also supports U.S.
commercial interests by allowing U.S.
firms to sell nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies to Russia
and to team up with Russian companies in joint ventures to develop and market
nuclear reactors and other products to third countries.
A 123
Agreement cannot, by itself, mend the U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship which
has deteriorated markedly in recent years.
Differences on such issues as NATO expansion, Kosovo, and missile
defenses can be expected to persist. But
by building on areas of clear common ground, the Agreement can help stop and
reverse the downward slide in bilateral relations and perhaps have a positive
spillover effect on other issues, which is especially important at a time of
presidential transitions in both countries.
Conversely, blocking the Agreement is likely to adversely affect
U.S.-Russian cooperation more broadly.
The most
important benefit of a 123 Agreement is that it can facilitate cooperation in
preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. For example, it can foster collaboration in
the development of advanced, proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors and fuel
management technologies. It can allow
the U.S. to contribute
materially to the Russian multilateral uranium enrichment facility at Angarsk, which would
reduce incentives for countries embarking on nuclear power programs to acquire
their own enrichment plants. It can also
create the necessary legal basis for Russia – should it decide to do so
in the future – to establish an international spent fuel storage facility that
could accept U.S.-origin spent fuel and spent fuel from other countries and
thereby reduce incentives for them to have their own reprocessing
facilities. And a 123 Agreement can
promote a more promising political and legal environment for pursuing a range
of threat reduction programs (e.g., nuclear security upgrades in Russia,
plutonium disposition) and for developing a new international civil nuclear
energy architecture, as agreed in the U.S.-Russia Declaration on Nuclear Energy
and Nonproliferation of 2007, that can boost reliance on nuclear power
worldwide without increasing the dangers of proliferation.
It is
understandable and appropriate that, in evaluating the 123 Agreement, Members
of Congress will focus heavily on Russia’s
role vis-à-vis Iran’s
nuclear program. Moscow’s record in that connection is
mixed. On the one hand, Russia has resisted tough U.N. Security Council
sanctions against Iran,
reduced its leverage with Iran
by shipping fuel for the Bushehr reactor, and failed to stop all Russian
entities from engaging in sensitive cooperation with Iran. But on the other hand, Moscow
has insisted on taking back to Russia
all spent fuel from the Bushehr reactor, proposed that Iran join an enrichment center in Russia rather
than have its own enrichment program, and voted for three modest but
increasingly strong U.N. Security Council sanctions resolutions. Although those resolutions were all weaker
than the United States
preferred, they have given legitimacy to U.S.-led efforts outside the Council
with foreign governments, banks, and businesses to impose financial and other
economic pressures on Iran. The Russians have also pressed Iran publicly
and privately to suspend its enrichment program as unnecessary and uneconomic.
On the
question of Russian entities transferring sensitive nuclear technology to Iran, the
record is also uneven. Despite a
substantial decrease in such sensitive assistance from the period of the late 1990s,
when Russian-Iranian cooperation was a significant irritant in U.S. relations with Moscow,
concerns have persisted about nuclear cooperation between Russian entities and Iran outside
the openly acknowledged interactions taking place between the two countries on
the Bushehr project. Indeed, some such
cooperation has reportedly taken place – and was the focus of high-level U.S. diplomatic
efforts with Russian leaders – in the period following the initialing of the
123 Agreement. However, those diplomatic
efforts, including during a March 2008 visit to Moscow
by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates, have apparently
resulted in strong assurances at the highest levels of the Russian government that
any further sensitive cooperation between Russian entities and Iran will stop.
If Iran is
to be persuaded to give up its enrichment program and nuclear ambitions, Russia
must be prepared to work more closely and forcefully with the U.S. and other
concerned states to exert strong pressures on Tehran and to make clear that its
future will be much brighter if it heeds the demands of the Security Council
and international community. Russian
authorities must also be prepared to exercise careful oversight in ensuring
that Russian entities are not assisting Iran’s nuclear and missile programs
by providing sensitive technology.
A key question for this Committee
and the Congress is whether Russia will be a more willing and energetic partner
for the United States on the Iran nuclear issue if we proceed to implement the
123 Agreement or if we walk away from it.
Some have argued that Russia’s desire for the 123 Agreement gives the U.S. powerful leverage that can be used to demand
that Moscow apply much greater pressure on Iran as a
condition for proceeding with the agreement.
This argument assumes Russia
wants or needs the 123 Agreement more than the U.S. does. But while the Russians clearly would like an
agreement, they can live without it. Indeed,
in the 1990s, when Russia
was in desperate economic shape, the lure of a 123 Agreement (and the economic
rewards that might flow from it) was not sufficient to persuade Russian leaders
to terminate all nuclear cooperation with Iran. Today, when Russia
is riding high economically, U.S.
leverage is even weaker. And as the
Russians are already proving by establishing nuclear energy partnerships with a
variety of Western and other countries, they have alternatives to the United States and U.S. companies.
A 123 Agreement can give the U.S. leverage
with the Russians. But the leverage, and
the ability to influence Russian behavior, comes not from withholding U.S. approval of the agreement; it comes from
implementing the agreement and giving the Russians a tangible, vested interest
in continuing to cooperate with the United States.
This is especially the case in
seeking to hold Russian leaders to their pledge to prevent any future sensitive
cooperation between Russian entities and Iran. It is important to note in this connection that
the 123 Agreement is not self-executing.
Even after entry in force, each nuclear export pursuant to the agreement
must receive specific approval by U.S. authorities. Moreover, Section 129 of the Atomic Energy
Act calls for termination of nuclear exports to any country that contributes to
a nuclear weapons program by transferring sensitive nuclear technology to a
third country. So if the Russians do not
honor their pledge, nuclear cooperation with Russia can be stopped.
Critical U.S.
nonproliferation objectives, especially the goal of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, cannot be
achieved without the active cooperation of Russia. The best way to gain that cooperation – on Iran and a wide
range of other nonproliferation issues – is to bring the U.S.-Russia 123
Agreement into force at an early date.