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HANDOUTS
- Agenda, January 15, 2004, Community Liaison Council
(CLC)
- November 20, 2003, CLC Meeting Minutes Draft
- CDC Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Report:
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in a Dairy Cow –
Washington State, 2003
- NIH/NOAA R&W Association 2004 Membership
Guide
WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONS
Dr. Tom Gallagher convened the meeting, welcomed members
and guests, and reviewed the agenda.
PRESENTATIONS & DISCUSSIONS
November 2003 Minutes
Stephen N. Sawicki, Edgewood Glenwood Citizens Association,
offered a correction to page 9, under Other Discussion.
He said that first sentence should state the following:
Mr. Sawicki remarked that the CLC should develop
a letter to the Department of Homeland Security to
express that the CLC does not support using space
for bioterrorism research in BSL-2
and BSL-3 laboratories on the Campus.
Dr. Gallagher asked members to review the minutes of
the November 20, 2003, meeting and to respond to the
Office of Community Liaison (OCL) via telephone if there
were further updates.
Presentation and Discussion on Building 33
Risk Assessment
by Murray L. Cohen, Ph.D., M.P.H.
Dr. Gallagher introduced Murray L. Cohen, Ph.D., M.P.H.,
a consultant in biosecurity and biosafety. He explained
that Dr. Cohen had participated in the National Institutes
of Health Building 33 Risk Assessment and that he had
been invited to provide a summary and to complete the
discussion of the Risk Assessment Executive Summary,
begun during the November 2003 CLC meeting.
Dr. Cohen noted that the risk assessment project of
the National Institutes of Health Building 33 Risk Assessment
contained three components: a hazard assessment,
as set forth in the mission NIH had established for
Building 33; a risk assessment; and recommendations
for the NIH. Dr. Cohen said that the project team operated
under no constraints and had made recommendations, some
that the NIH had been contemplating, and others. He
said the project team members included specialists in
environmental and occupational health, civil engineering,
microbiology, statistics, occupational safety, operational
and physical security, environmental modeling, and hazard
communications. He said that 15 scenarios were developed.
Dr. Cohen cited three evaluation methods: maximum
credible event (MCE), based on a military model
for the need to prepare for the credible; maximum
possible risk, which also included the incredible
worst case agent analysis, which used a litmus
test of what would be the most dangerous agent that
could be used by a terrorist.
Dr. Cohen said a team of scientists from NIH and other
institutions had project independence and used a multidisciplinary
approach to consider worst-case scenarios. For the evaluation,
he said a focus group chose a concentrated preparation
of natural enhanced spore anthrax [Bacillus anthracis].
Because there were no existing data as to the threat
of what might happen in the community when using the
most concentrated, purest, naturally occurring form
of anthrax, Dr. Cohen said that the team decided to
conduct its own laboratory studies. Dr. Cohen said the
objectives of the experiments were to fill in gaps in
the existing literature and to develop scenarios that
would mimic the effects of respirable anthrax spores.
He added that the agent selected to simulate B.
anthracis in the tests actually had been a safe
[nonpathogenic] surrogate [B. subtilis].
Dr. Cohen reported that the experiments included using
a biosafety cabinet equipped with particle counters
to measure the pattern of generation or dispersion of
the experimental powder?of 1010 (10 to the 10th power
or 10 billion spores) concentration?which was as close
to pure as possible. He said the experiments involved
counting particles and measuring how long it took for
them to settle. He noted details of the size of respirable
spores used and the concentration of spores tested.
Dr. Cohen added that measurements included settling
times when spores were dropped or released and dispersion
differences. He said the risk assessment focused on
the impact and risks to the community from airborne
pathogens from Building 33 to 100 meters, or beyond
the fence. In addition, he said scenarios were tested
with the assumption of inoperative HEPA filters in the
BSL-2 and -3 laboratories to see if the substance were
spilled from a vial, how far it could disperse through
a smoke stack, and project in a cone pattern directly
toward the perimeter fence.
Dr. Cohen showed a slide indicating security countermeasures
and recommendations of the project team, including threat
scenarios, countermeasures, measures provided in the
NIH plans, measures planned by the NIH, and measures
proposed by the team.
CLC Member Comments and Queries
Ralph Schofer, Maplewood Citizens Association, who served
on the Risk Assessment Steering Committee, asked if
the spores were dropped in vials from various elevations.
Dr. Cohen said that the drops were all from 18 inches.
Tom Robertson, Parkwood Residents Association, asked
whether the tests included release in both calm air
and higher wind speed. Dr. Cohen replied that the most
dangerous state would be static, and that high wind
speed lowered risk by increasing dispersion and mixing.
Jack Costello, Bethesda Parkhill Citizens Association,
wanted to know whether the number of spores or of vials
that would be used in laboratories where this research
would be conducted was equivalent to that used for the
tests. Dr. Cohen said the 10 billion spores tested in
the worst-case scenario was far greater than the number
of spores that would be used in research. He added that
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
had conducted a study published in the 1960s about shift
workers in the wool and hides industry who, although
exposed to 500 spores over an 8-hour work shift, had
not become ill. Dr. Cohen said the number of spores
released in the test material was 400,000 respirable
spores per cubic meter. Further, he reported that no
danger was posed to the community when this material
was dispersed to a distance of 100 meters pointed directly
toward the perimeter fence.
Mr. Costello asked about other agents that might be
researched that would not be as deadly as anthrax. Dr.
Cohen said anthrax was the most dangerous of the Biosafety
level 3 agents and of the type that could be dispersed.
He noted that more dangerous agents would not be researched
in BSL-3 or BSL-3 laboratories. Deborah E. Wilson, Dr.
P.H., Director, Division of Occupational Health and
Safety, ORS, NIH, said that other bacteria on the list
would be less hazardous than the anthrax spores simulated
in these tests. Dr. Cohen added that anthrax spores
were hearty in their bioadaptation and that other agents
in this category would not persist as strongly.
Dr. Wilson added that not all of the scenarios could
be discussed publicly so as not to “train terrorists”.
However, she noted that events in the scenarios covered
a blast from a bomb or TOW missile [tube-launched, optically-tracked,
wire-guided missile]. If the building were blown up,
George Oberlander, Huntington Parkway Citizens Association,
wondered about the potential cumulative effect of exposure
to anthrax and other different agents. Dr. Wilson said
these biological agents do not have a cumulative effect
as would chemical agents. Mr. Costello and Mr. Oberlander
said these explanations were helpful.
Marilyn Mazuzan, Town of Oakmont, wondered about testing
animals with vaccines that would be developed and asked
whether enhanced anthrax would be used to see if vaccinated
animals became sick. Dr. Wilson replied that the biological
and physical properties of weaponized anthrax spores
differ from the dust spores used in the tests. Dr. Cohen
commented that he could not imagine how to dose an animal
with this material. He added that anthrax is not communicable.
Eleanor Rice, Locust Hill Civic Association, asked
about countermeasures against theft of laboratory materials.
Dr. Cohen said there were measures associated with psychological
profiles about who can work in laboratories. He said
the assessment included asking questions about theft
or how could anyone get through the physical security
measures in place. Arturo Giron, ORS, OD, NIH, added
that security measures comprise several and many new
aspects, including the ability to do background checks
on personnel via access to databases of the CIA and
FBI, limited access to BSL-3 laboratories, and the use
of biometric devices. Dr. Wilson added there were federal
regulations and policies developed by the State Department
denying people from certain countries access to laboratories
or agents. She added that a personnel risk assessment
would be completed by the FBI or the CDC before an individual
received clearance or access to a laboratory. Dr. Wilson
said that those physical security measures addressed
in the risk assessment had been accepted, and that some
additional operational measures were under discussion.
Morton Goldman, Luxmanor Citizens Association, asked
for further explanation about the angle of dispersion,
noting that he thought there were inconsistencies between
the 90 degree dispersion angle indicated by Dr. Cohen
and that shown by Dr. Wilson during the meeting in November.
Dr. Goldman noted there would be a disparity in concentration
between a narrow and a wide angle, because the area
is a function of the square of that angle. He said that
dropping that angle to 30 degrees would increase the
concentration by nine. Dr. Cohen said that a cone at
30 degrees would result in five spores per cubic meter.
Dr. Wilson said the cone was moved around from different
degrees and angles. She added that the styrofoam cone
used in her presentation was small and not a replica
of that used in tests. Mr. Schofer said that a cylindrical
dispersion pattern had been considered. However, Dr.
Cohen explained that a cone was selected because it
produced a higher dispersion concentration than a cylinder
and therefore a “worst case”.
Dr. Cohen presented conclusions of the risk assessment
and process, citing interdisciplinary scientific and
community involvement; security, safety, and facility
management; identification of hazards and maximum possible
risk scenarios; and the design and acceptance of the
most stringent security and countermeasures. He said
the community would be protected against worst case
challenges at the lowest possible amount of exposure
(2.03 spores/liter breathed in 20 minutes at 12 liters
per minute, or much fewer than the threshold of 500
spores demonstrated in the literature as not causing
infection in exposed workers). Regardless of the scenario,
he said the results did not reflect a number that would
be a health hazard to the community.
Although Building 33 will be fortified, Mr. Sawicki
said that this would not minimize the risk of it being
a terrorist target. He said the Committee’s recommendation
to the NIH did not deal with the general question about
having this type of research on Campus and something
such as a terrorist attack happening. He said the NIH
would be a target of attack because it was part of the
overall biodefense plan. Mr. Giron said that part of
the NIH security plan had been to make the Campus a
less desirable target by developing a sufficiently hard
security environment for the facility as a whole. For
example, he said that adding the fence and strengthening
the police and security force had made the NIH difficult
to attack. Dr. Gallagher added that terrorists would
look for an easier target. He said that the NIH would
be a low priority target, because terrorists wanted
to maximize death and damage and to create widespread
economic impact, panic, and terror. Mr. Sawicki said
that Building 33 became a target when the White House
announced that NIH would be part of the initiative against
terrorism. Mr. Costello said that, although he had been
against having Building 33 on Campus, he was less concerned
about a terrorist gaining access to it. However, Mr.
Costello recommended that the NIH not ignore the emotional
reaction of the community to the possibility of an attack.
He said that the NIH needed to do a better job of explaining
to the community how minimal the exposure was, because
people were afraid of what might come out of the building.
In addition, Mr. Costello said he felt that the risk
assessment had answered the CLC questions in detail.
Mr. Robertson remarked that the CLC had not heard input
from the community members who served on the Building
33 Risk Assessment Committee. Mr. Schofer said that
he had monitored the risk assessment process and felt
there was little risk. However, he remained opposed
to having these laboratories in Building 33 on Campus
and thought the laboratory belonged at Ft. Detrick.
Yet, he added that he had no plans to sell his house.
Dr. Cohen noted the potential benefits associated with
this research and said that it was very important to
develop responses both to infectious agents associated
with bioterrorism and to naturally occurring emerging
dangerous pathogens, such as SARS and Monkey Pox viruses.
Mr. Oberlander asked why the Building 33 laboratories
had to be located on Campus. Stella Serras-Fiotes, NIH
Office of Research Facilities Development and Operations,
responded that Anthony Fauci, M.D., Director of the
National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
(NIAID), and Thomas J. Kindt, Ph.D., Director, Division
of Intramural Research, NIAID, had presented their legitimate
arguments for these laboratories to exist on the Bethesda
NIH Campus, with specific examples of collaboration
and research projects. She added that a similar situation
could not be replicated at Ft. Detrick. Ms. Serras-Fiotes
said that the science drove the need for the lab in
Bethesda and the NIH Master Plan provided a site.
Ms. Rice noted that collaboration among scientists
from all over the world was evident in scientific publications
and she thought the NIH scientists could instead use
this alternative approach to interact. Mr. Schofer concurred,
citing an international conference where participants
had been linked by video and internet computer presentations
that fostered interactions among scientists. Margot
Durkin, Stone Ridge School, remarked that among 160
employees and 800 students there had been no student
withdrawals and that the applicant pool for next year
had increased. She felt individuals there were not unduly
concerned.
Dr. Gallagher thanked Dr. Cohen for his work on the
risk assessment and his presentation to the CLC. He
noted that much hard work had gone into this process
over a year’s time.
Other Discussion Items
Handout
Dr. Wilson provided an informational handout that referred
to mad cow disease. The members and guests discussed
this and other incidents of animal illness and potential
consequences.
Seed Genetics
Mr. Sawicki asked Dr. Cohen his opinion about the genetic
altering of seeds. Dr. Cohen said he did not know much
about this.
Perimeter Path Safety
Dr. Gallagher introduced Lesley Hildebrand, Huntington
Terrace Citizens Association, who wanted to discuss
safety issues associated with the path adjacent to the
perimeter fence. Dr. Gallagher said that letters published
in “Letters to the Editor” of the Gazette
and written by Ms. Hildebrand and her neighbors had
referred to the perimeter path as “mugger’s
lane.” Ms. Hildebrand said she appreciated hearing
the results of the Building 33 risk assessment. However,
she felt that protecting the NIH facilities and its
employees with a fence also had created a risk for walkers
using the perimeter path after dark. Ms. Hildebrand
hoped that the NIH would acknowledge the risk the neighbors
saw with this “area of opportunity” and
the potential for assaults on those walking to and from
the Metro station.
Ms. Hildebrand cited past crimes on jogging trails
in Rock Creek Park and Wheaton. Her concerns focused
on the distance of the path from houses or other buildings,
that landscaping obscured visibility and, in some areas,
parallel fences enclosed the path, allowing for only
two directions of exit. Mr. Sawicki concurred and said
that he would not want his wife to walk alone on the
path after dark. Ms. Hildebrand requested that the NIH
convene a risk assessment associated with use of the
perimeter path.
Ms. Hildebrand noted that these were unpredictable
times. She said she assumed that the NIH facility has
never yet been the victim of any terrorist attack like
the Oklahoma bombing. Mr. Giron and Dr. Wilson said
that the NIH had experienced past incidents of protest
and thievery within and on Campus. However, they noted
that with current security measures these incidents
no longer occurred. Dr. Wilson said there were things
that don't happen now that used to happen, outside of
terrorists, and that the women walking up our [NIH]
path to 41 don't get raped and that thievery had gone
down. Mr. Giron said that in the past there were some
very unpleasant incidents–acts of destruction–by
activists at labs and buildings.
Dr. Gallagher remarked that the NIH had not sought
a fence. Instead, he said the NIH complied with what
they were told to do [by the DHHS Inspector General].
Jeanne Goldstein, Montgomery County Civic Federation,
felt that neighbors who felt this way needed to adapt
to this change, and she maintained it was not the taxpayers’
mission to provide an easy way to get to Metro.
Dr. Gallagher said that the shuttle bus provided an
alternative means to reach the other side of the Campus.
He said that there was no solution which would serve
all people at all times. Dr. Gallagher and Mr. Giron
noted that efforts to make the path safe included adjusting
the height of the light poles and removing some outer
fence sections between posts on the south side. Dr.
Gallagher added that some neighbors had asked the NIH
to plant more trees to the southwest corner of Campus.
Dr. Gallagher said that there have been no past incidents
along the south path of the Campus. Mr. Giron confirmed
that installing call boxes was under consideration.
Ms. Hildebrand asked whether she should use them before
or after being attacked.
Dr. Gallagher introduced Major Ophus Robertson, ORS/DPS
Police Branch, and Officer Gill, Montgomery County Police,
whom he said had researched local crime records about
any incidents. Major Robertson noted that crime could
happen anywhere in Bethesda. He said that officers have
stepped up their patrols, using all-terrain vehicles,
bicycles on the perimeter path, and cruisers on surrounding
roads. In addition, he said there was a study under
way about installing blue light phones, which would
allow contact with NIH security officers. Major Robertson
said that he believed there would be nine phones installed
on that particular side of the Campus. He offered that
these phones would provide the ability for individuals,
who thought they were in an unsafe situation, to call
for help, or for others willing to help to contact NIH
security. He noted that installing phones was one more
step to provide a safer area. In addition, he suggested
that if individuals were uncomfortable in given situations
that they should act on their instincts, travel with
another person, or take another route.
Major Robertson asked CLC members to provide him with
suggestions or recommendations to improve safety. He
said if they were feasible that he would try to accommodate
them.
Badges
Jay Miller, a retired NIH employee, inquired about whether
retired employees could be issued badges in order to
allow them access to the NIH Credit Union on Campus,
as does the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA). Mr. Sawicki added that having a federal identification
badge allowed entry to the Navy grounds. Mr. Giron said
he couldn’t recall a specific policy and offered
to contact Mr. Miller after doing some research.
The meeting adjourned at 5:55 p.m.
CLC Members Present
Lorraine Bell, Palladian Partners, Inc.
Jack Costello, Bethesda Parkhill Citizens Association
Margot Durkin, Stone Ridge School
Tom Gallagher, OCL, OD, NIH
Morton Goldman, Luxmanor Citizens Association
Jeanne Goldstein, Montgomery County Civic Federation
Lesley Hildebrand, Huntington Terrace Citizens Association
Marilyn Mazuzan, Town of Oakmont
Debbie Michaels, Glenbrook Village Home Owners Association
Walter Mitton, OCL, OD, NIH
George Oberlander, Huntington Parkway Citizens Association
Lucy Ozarin, Whitehall Condominium Association
Eleanor Rice, Locust Hill Civic Association
Tom Robertson, Parkwood Residents Association
Stephen N. Sawicki, Edgewood Glenwood Citizens Association
Ralph Schofer, Maplewood Citizens Association
Randy Schools, Recreation & Welfare Association,
NIH
Stella Serras-Fiotes, Office of Research Facilities
Development and Operations, NIH
Deborah Snead, Bethesda-Chevy Chase Services Center
Alternate Member
Joseph O’Malley, Locust Hill Civic Association
Guests
Officer Gill, Montgomery County Police
Arturo Giron, ORS, OD, NIH
Joan Kleinman, U.S. Congressman Van Hollen’s Office
Jay Miller, NIH Retiree
Major Ophus Robertson, ORS/DPS Police Branch
Laurent Thomet, Gazette
Deborah E. Wilson, Dr. P.H., Director, Division of Occupational
Health and Safety, ORS, NIH
Ronald Wilson, Office of Facilities Planning, NIH
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