I want to welcome you all to our hearing today on the intelligence community's assessment of foreign missile threats to the United States.

I would like to thank Mr. Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, at the National Intelligence Council for being with us today. His report describes the threat posed to the United States by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles.

It examines when a country could deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile based on technical, industrial, and economic capabilities, as well as when they are likely to do so based on potential technical problems, political developments, and economic delays.

We last held a Subcommittee hearing on the National Intelligence Estimate on Ballistic Missile Threats in February 2000. At that time, senior North Korean officials were preparing to come to Washington to discuss the missile moratorium. In May 2001, North Korea extended their voluntary flight-test moratorium until 2003, provided negotiations with the U.S. proceeded.

But negotiations have not proceeded. Relations with North Korea have soured. A key question for this hearing is the current status of North Korea's missile program.

There are some notable differences between this report and the one discussed at our February 2000 meeting. The previous report listed Russia as the chief threat. An increase in the danger of an attack by North Korea, Iran, and possibly Iraq, as well as the intelligence community's unanimous assessment that the Russian arsenal will decline to less than 2000 warheads by the year 2015 have reduced the threat assessment from Russia. In fact, the report states that the threats to the U.S. homeland will come from dramatically fewer warheads than today owing to significant reductions in Russian strategic forces.

The Estimate however also emphasizes the threat from nonmissile delivery means for WMD, especially from terrorist groups. While emerging ballistic missile states continue to increase the risks to U.S. forces, interests, and allies throughout the world, the intelligence community judges that the U.S. territory is more likely to be attacked with WMD using nonmissile means.

The terrorist attacks of September 11th have demonstrated that our enemies can strike American soil directly without having to put the time and money into a ballistic missile with a return address.

I am concerned about the growing interest by rogue nations and terrorist groups in unmanned aerial vehicles. During our Subcommittee hearing earlier this month on Iraq's WMD programs, our witnesses described how Iraq is adapting trainer aircraft and specially modified spray tanks that could be used in a biological weapon attack. This information is quite chilling.

We all fear the spread of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, but our policy cannot be one of constructing moats against imagined threats. We must have a policy that counters real threats in an effective and cost-efficient manner. Some of these dangers may, in the medium- to long-term, come from intercontinental ballistic missiles.