The Committee will please come to order.

I want to thank our witnesses, Ms. Elisa Harris of the Center for International Security Studies at Maryland and Dr. Amy Smithson of the Stimson Center for being with us this morning. I want to also welcome Dr. Jim Walsh of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Mr. Dennis Gormely of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Today's hearing about multilateral non-proliferation regimes is the third of a series of hearings this subcommittee has held on the issue of weapons of mass destruction proliferation.

Last November the Subcommittee held a hearing on "Current and Future Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Threats" and a second on "Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction with Non-Proliferation Programs."

This Subcommittee has jurisdiction over intergovernmental relationships between the United States and international organizations of which the U.S. is a member. In holding today' s hearing, we will explore ways in which these organizations may be used more effectively to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the means to deliver them.

Since September 11th, we have all become aware of the dangers directly posed by these weapons. Attacks against the United States are no longer in the realm of science fiction or Hollywood. As technology evolves, these weapons threaten to become even more deadly and more difficult to detect and to prevent from being used. If we do not take September 11th as a wake-up call, history may well repeat itself with even more terrible consequences.

We must use every tool at our disposal to deter the development and use of these weapons. We know now that the Al Qaeda network was busy trying to develop biological, chemical, and so-called dirty nuclear weapons. These were not weapons that Al Qaeda could develop on its own – they needed access to foreign technology and foreign scientists. Fortunately, so far it appears that they did not get enough information to perfect these weapon systems before we disrupted their efforts.

This demonstrates why it is so important that we choke off the proliferation of WMD technology at its source: government labs and commercial enterprises.

Terrorists can gain access to weapons of mass destruction or the technology to make them but they can only do so if foreign governments, or foreign scientists, or foreign companies provide willingly that information or technology to them.

Multilateral agreements are one way to prevent terrorists from gaining weapons technology. But multilateral regimes are worthless if they are not effective.

China, for example, adheres to most of these agreements, but as a recent unclassified report to the Congress by the CIA notes, China continues to provide missile-related technology to a variety of countries of proliferation concern. The CIA cannot "rule out" contacts by China with foreign nuclear weapons programs, and Chinese firms continue to supply chemical weapons production equipment and technology to Iran.

If we cannot get countries to abide by the international agreements they have adhered to, then our only alternative may be to take unilateral action to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This is not the preferred step; but it may be our only choice if multilateral agreements do not work.

I welcome our witnesses to today's hearing. I look forward to their suggestions as to what works and what doesn't work in our effort to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

I also welcome statements by other Members at this time before proceeding with our expert panel.