Mr. President, I rise today to call attention to the urgent need to prepare America against an attack on our agriculture. The nation's agriculture industry is crucial to our prosperity. Yet it does not receive the protection it needs. Our food supply system is vulnerable to accidental or intentional contamination that would damage our economy, and, most importantly, could cost lives.

There is no need to question whether animal-bourne diseases can actually threaten the United States. Look to last December's mad cow disease outbreak: only one cow was found to be infected, and yet the U. S. beef industry was thrown into a tailspin from which it still has not recovered. As a result:

• American cattle prices fell by twenty percent;

• some predict beef exports will fall by ninety percent from 2003 to 2004; and

• more than forty foreign countries have instituted bans on American beef, most of which will not be lifted in the near future. This fallout resulted from the infection of only two cows.

In the beginning of February, a version of the avian influenza, a disease sweeping through Southeast Asian poultry that has killed at least twenty-two people to date, was discovered on two Delaware chicken farms. It also surfaced in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and a far more contagious strain was later reported in Texas. While the two strains found in these states carry no known risk to humans, this discovery illustrates how easily an animal-borne disease can break out in the United States. Only four farms and one live chicken market have tested positive for the disease. Yet this discovery resulted in the slaughter of over ninety-two thousand chickens in the U.S. to date and a ban on American poultry exports in a number of Asian countries and the European Union.

We should learn two things from these recent outbreaks: 1) the cost to the agriculture community for even a small outbreak is high, and 2) we must be prepared for the unexpected.

While the emergence of mad cow and the avian flu in American agriculture has been detrimental, it has not come close to causing the amount of damage a larger outbreak could create.

Imagine if either of these diseases spread across the nation instead of being contained to just a few farms.

Or worse, imagine if the strain of the avian flu that is currently claiming human lives in Asia was found in the United States.

In these scenarios, the outbreak would have been far more difficult to contain and much more costly to our nation.

A 1994 Department of Agriculture study said that if a foreign animal disease became entrenched in the United States, it would cost the agriculture industry at least $5.4 billion. A 2002 report by the National Defense University predicted that this figure would be three to five times greater today. On a smaller scale, an outbreak that only penetrated ten farms could have as much as a $2 billion economic impact.

Earlier this month, the President released Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9) aimed at addressing many of these concerns. HSPD-9 is a great first step. It signals the Administration is aware of the vulnerability in our agriculture sector and considers this to be a homeland security priority.

Under HSPD-9, the President directed the Department of Homeland Security to ensure the execution of a number of much needed security measures, including the following:

• develop surveillance and monitoring systems for animal and plant disease and the food supply that provide early detection of poisonous agents;

• develop nationwide laboratory networks for food, veterinary, and plant health that ensures communication and coordination between related facilities; and

• develop a National Veterinary Stockpile that contains enough vaccine and antiviral products to respond to the most damaging animal diseases.

But the President's initiative does not go far enough because it fails to address a number of serious shortcomings with the current governmental response to agriculture security, such as:

• lack of communication between federal agencies;

• insufficient coordination with, and funding for, state and local officials;

• inadequate international collaboration; and

• the impeding nature of some state and local laws to effective response plans.

To address these many concerns, I introduced two bills, S. 427, the Agriculture Security Assistance Act, and S. 430, the Agriculture Security Preparedness Act, to increase the coordination in confronting the threat to America's agriculture industry and provide the needed resources. My legislation provides for more targeted state and local funding and a better-coordinated federal system.

The Agriculture Security Assistance Act would assist states and communities in responding to threats to the agriculture industry by authorizing funds for:

• animal health professionals to participate in community emergency planning activities to assist farmers in strengthening their defenses against a terrorist threat;

• a biosecurity grant program for farmers and ranchers to provide needed funding to better secure their properties; and

• the use of sophisticated remote sensing and computer modeling approaches to agricultural diseases.

The Agriculture Security Preparedness Act would enable better interagency coordination within the federal government by:

• establishing senior level liaisons in the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Health and Human Services to coordinate with the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and all other relevant agencies on agricultural disease emergency management and response;

• requiring DHS and USDA to work with the Department of Transportation to address the risks associated with transporting animals, plants, and people between and around farms;

• requiring the Attorney General to conduct a review of relevant federal, state, and local laws to determine if they facilitate or impede agricultural security; and

• directing the State Department to enter into mutual assistance agreements with foreign governments to facilitate the share of resources and knowledge of foreign animal diseases.

Over 30 federal agencies have jurisdiction over some part of the response process in the event of a breach of agricultural security. In a report on the United States's preparedness for responding to animal-bourne diseases issued in August 2003, Trust for America's Health, a non-profit, non-partisan organization founded to raise the profile of public health issues, stated that, "The U.S. is left with a myriad of bureaucratic jurisdictions that respond to various aspects of the diseases, with little coordination and no clear plan for communicating with the public about the health threats posed by animal-borne diseases." Protecting America's agriculture and it's citizens requires federal agencies to know who is responsible for what portion of the prevention and response to an attack on our agriculture.

State and local officials, and the communities they serve, are the front lines of defense for American agriculture. Without adequate resources, both in terms of funding and advice, these defenses will fail. While the Presidential Directive mandates the creation of a coordinated response plan that would include federal, state, and local partners, it falls short of supplying the state and local officials with the necessary funding and guidance to better protect their jurisdictions. Surprisingly, the Administration proposes huge cuts in fiscal year 2005 to homeland security grants for the states.

We have witnessed the impact a small, unintentional outbreak of mad cow disease had on our country. We cannot wait for a far more damaging and widespread attack on our agriculture system. While I commend the President's initiative in this area, further action is needed. I urge my colleagues to support this overdue legislation to protect America's breadbasket.