WASHINGTON D.C. – Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) and Senator Norm Coleman (R-Minn.), Chairman and Ranking Member of the Near East and South and Central Asian Affairs Subcommittee, introduced three new reports that conclude that a major new effort is needed to succeed in Afghanistan. The reports were: the Afghanistan Study Group report sponsored by the Center for the Study of the Presidency (co-chaired by General Jones and Ambassador Pickering), the Atlantic Council report (co-chaired by General Jones) and a paper written byDr. Harlan Ullman and others, “Winning the Invisible War:  An Agricultural Pilot Plan for Afghanistan.” 

 

 

It’s a privilege to be here today with Senator Coleman, the ranking member of the Near East and South and Central Asian Affairs Subcommitee, to introduce three important new reports on Afghanistan: the Afghanistan Study Group report sponsored by the Center for the Study of the Presidency, co-chaired by General Jim Jones and Ambassador Tom Pickering; the Atlantic Council report, which is also co-chaired by General Jones and represented here by Fred Kempe, who is the Council’s President and CEO; and a report written by Dr. Harlan Ullman.

 

I don’t need to remind you what’s at stake in Afghanistan.  The very same Al Qaeda terrorists who attacked us on 9-11 are still lurking, not far from where we left them on the Afghan-Pakistan border.  Our own National Intelligence Estimate warned us that they are planning more attacks on our homeland.  And just last week, Secretary Gates reminded us again that Al Qaeda and the resurgent Taliban pose a threat not only to Pakistan and Afghanistan, but to Europe and the United States. The bottom-line is that the front-line in the war on terrorism remains where it’s always been.

Also at stake in Afghanistan is the viability of NATO itself — which faces a major test as it takes on its first mission out of theater.  Coordinating efforts among nearly forty NATO and non-NATO allies, many of whom operate under different rules, is one of the key challenges that we face.  I’m sure we’ll be hearing more about that in these reports.

Despite the heroic efforts of U.S. and coalition troops, today we risk repeating the classic mistake that dooms many counterinsurgencies: a failure to appreciate the difference between tactical success and a winning strategy.  The fatal consequence, all too familiar to those of us who lived through Vietnam, is that you can win every battle, but fail to win the war.  Absent a new focus and a transformed strategy, I fear that may be happening again in Afghanistan. 

 

The first step, of course, is an honest assessment of where we stand, which is why I led several other senators this summer in calling for a non-partisan Afghanistan Study Group.  I look forward to hearing the assessments of today’s distinguished experts, which are based upon a careful, comprehensive, and unbiased study of the situation.

Here’s what I see: On the positive side, our generals tell us that every significant combat engagement last year ended in “a very decisive defeat” of the Taliban.  The Afghan National Army is itself something of a success story.  The Karzai government—despite its limited capacity and struggles with corruption—is making a good-faith effort at democratic governance in a country whose agrarian economy, tribal affinities, and war-torn history present daunting challenges.

Most of all, the Afghan people have shown unmistakable signs of wanting a peaceful, modern state.  In the end, they’re our most important ally and asset.  Their patience is finite, but they still support our presence. 

Despite these positive signs, the bottom line is that, on the current course, we’re losing ground in Afghanistan.  Between 2001 and 2005, there were 5 suicide bombings in Afghanistan -- there were 77 in the first six months of this past year alone. Reconstruction efforts have stalled, and Oxfam is reporting “humanitarian conditions rarely seen outside sub-Saharan Africa.”  Opium cultivation has soared to 93% of the world’s market.  Meanwhile, the weak central government lacks the capacity to wage a nationwide counterinsurgency.

So, faced with these realities, what do we need to do to get Afghanistan right?  Last month at Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies, I argued in favor of a comprehensive strategy that focuses as much on good governance and reconstruction as it does on kinetic military operations.  Victory in a counterinsurgency is measured not just in enemies killed but also in kilowatt hours of electricity delivered, in citizens’ ability to get justice without paying bribes, in allies won and enemies not made.  We must begin winning these battles in a way that also helps us win the war.

I look forward to hearing from today’s experts what such a comprehensive strategy might look like, as well as what military steps are necessary to make our crucial non-military efforts sustainable and successful. 

 I will leave it to our experts to share their insights about the way forward. But let me just say that I appreciated the Afghanistan Study Group’s call for a regional approach to address the extremist threat emanating from the Afghan-Pakistan border, coupled with efforts to better integrate Pakistan’s tribal areas into the political and economic life of Pakistan. The Atlantic Council’s report does well to recommend that NATO countries that aren’t able to contribute more troops should be encouraged to pull their weight by redoubling civilian reconstruction aid. And although we may not all agree with Dr. Ullman’s conclusions, his report makes an important contribution by showing how drug eradication efforts in Afghanistan have often worked at cross-purposes with our larger goals.  

Perhaps most importantly, these three reports exemplify the type of bipartisan consensus-building necessary to craft effective and sustainable foreign policy for an effort that will no doubt continue for years to come. 

With that, I will now turn it over to Senator Coleman, who will make his opening remarks. When he is finished, Ambassador Abshire, President of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, will provide a brief overview of the reports and introduce the speakers. When they are finished, we will open it up for questions from the press, which Mr. Kempe will moderate. I will have to leave around 230pm to attend a Finance Committee mark-up, but I encourage you to continue the discussion until about 3:15pm.   

 

Thank you.

 

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