WASHINGTON D.C. – Sen. John Kerry said today that Pakistan’s strategy for dealing with al Qaeda is not working and questioned whether the seemingly blind loyalty the Administration is showing to President Musharraf is sensible policy. Kerry also pressed the White House on whether President Bush is contemplating military force against Al Qaeda in the tribal regions of Northwestern Pakistan, where Osama bin Laden is suspected of hiding out. A top aid to Bush recently said that “all options are on the table” when it comes to dealing with Pakistan. Kerry, a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired today’s hearing.

 

Below is Sen. Kerry’s opening statement, as prepared:

 

Ambassador Burns, thank you coming before the Committee today. As we all know, Ambassador Burns has had a long and distinguished career as a Foreign Service Officer, serving as U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, Ambassador to Greece, and State Department spokesman, as well as on the National Security Council staff. He is currently the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, making him the third ranking official at the State Department, with oversight responsibility for U.S. policy throughout the world. 

 

He is also from Massachusetts, a graduate of Boston College, and a life-long Red Sox fan -- so we know he understands how to persevere through great adversity. 

 

Ambassador Burns, this is clearly a pivotal moment in Pakistan. Our intelligence agencies have just issued a dire warning about the threat posed by Al Qaeda in the tribal areas, the Taliban is using Pakistani territory as a base for attacks in Afghanistan, there has been major increase in extremist violence following the attack on the Red Mosque, and the political turmoil surrounding the ouster and reinstatement of Chief Justice Chaudhry has put President Musharraf in a precarious position with new elections scheduled for the fall.   We very much look forward to hearing your views on these issues and the Administration’s strategy for Pakistan going forward.  

 

We all recognize that Pakistan is a key ally in the region, and our relationship is one of the most important – and complex – relationships we have anywhere in the world. We need to make clear to Pakistan – both the government and the people – that we are committed to sustaining and building on this relationship over the long term in a manner that serves both of our countries’ interests.

 

We also appreciate the significant contributions and sacrifices the Pakistanis have made in the fight against Al Qaeda. At the same time, it is clear that our current strategy in Pakistan has not been working as well as it can – and must -- when it comes to our core objectives of fighting terrorism and promoting democracy.  We understand that it is a delicate balance between moving Pakistan in a more positive direction and not causing a major rupture in the relationship.  I hope we will come away from today’s hearing with a better understanding of the Administration’s plans, and how we can all work to build an effective long term strategy.   

 

Clearly, the most pressing and direct national security concern we face in Pakistan is the resurgence of Al Qaeda in the tribal regions bordering Afghanistan. We were all deeply troubled by the recent National Intelligence Estimate entitled “The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland” which made clear that while we have been distracted and bogged down in Iraq, Al Qaeda has grown stronger than at any time since 9/11. The NIE brought home in the starkest possible terms that Al Qaeda has “regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability, including: a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership.”  Osama Bin Laden and top Al Qaeda leaders are likely still hiding out somewhere in the region, and none of us here need to be reminded of the nightmare scenario of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal falling into the wrong hands. 

 

We also know that the Taliban is using the tribal areas as a base for launching attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan, and our generals tell us that Taliban leaders have maintained a headquarters in Quetta.  It is clear that we cannot succeed in the vital mission of stabilizing Afghanistan if the enemies of the coalition and the Karzai government enjoy a safe haven right across the border.

 

General Eikenberry, the former commanding general in Afghanistan, summed it up simply: “Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership presence inside Pakistan…must be satisfactorily addressed if we are to prevail in Afghanistan and if we are to defeat the global threat posed by international terrorism.” In other words, the central front in the fight against terrorism is right where it has always been: along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. We simply cannot allow history to repeat itself, and many of us are concerned that we do not have an effective strategy to counter this threat. 

 

Our intelligence community has linked the resurgence of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in this area directly to an agreement that President Musharraf struck with tribal leaders in Waziristan. I traveled to Pakistan around that time, and even then many of us had real concerns about the deal.  The Administration has now finally acknowledged that it has not worked for Pakistan, and it has not worked for the United States. After the attack on the Red Mosque, even Taliban declared the deal was dead -- and we have seen increased presence of Pakistani troops in the area since then.

 

Yet still, we hear that President Musharraf is actually trying to revive that agreement. Going back to a failed strategy is not the answer. The Administration has also made it clear that they have not ruled out U.S. military options in the area. We must be prepared to use force if necessary to protect our interests, but sending U.S. ground troops into Pakistani territory raises many difficult issues for us and for Pakistan.  We also have a five year, $750 million dollar plan for winning over the local population in this area, but real concerns have been raised about whether that money can actually be put to good use. We will be very interested to hear your views on the Administration’s strategy for dealing with this very real threat in both the short and long term.  

 

We must also consider the role of U.S. aid in advancing our interests. Since 9/11, we have given Pakistan roughly $10 billion dollars in aid -- and likely billions more in covert assistance. Roughly 75% of this aid has gone to reimbursement of counter-terrorism expenses and other security assistance. We clearly have a right to expect more in return for the massive amount of aid we are providing for the fight against terrorism.

 

At the same time, less than 10% of our aid goes to development and humanitarian assistance, and we must give strong consideration to whether targeting more aid to projects that help the Pakistani people directly would be more effective. One area we should pay particular attention to is funding for education, which the 9/11 Commission emphasized was key to promoting moderation – this is especially important given that more than half of Pakistan’s population is under 15 years of age. 

 

We have also reached a critical period for the future of democracy in Pakistan. It is clear that reinforcing our strong commitment to democracy, human rights, and respect for the rule of law is in the best interests of Pakistan and the United States. 

 

President Musharraf’s term is set to expire this fall, and under Pakistani law the National and Provincial Assemblies must conduct new presidential elections by October, with new legislative elections to follow. The Pakistani Supreme Court may have to rule on whether President Musharraf can stay on in his role as chief of the military, and whether he can legally be re-elected by a lame duck Parliament.  Now that Chief Justice Chaudhry has been reinstated to the Court, there appears to be a strong possibility that it will rule against President Musharraf on these questions. We need to be prepared for this eventuality, and the possibility that President Musharraf may leave or be forced out of office.  In fact, although he may be hedging on this now, President Musharraf has said in the past that he will relinquish his military role, and Khurshid Kasuri, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, said during his recent visit that President Musharraf was still planning to do so.  We must make it clear that we expect President Musharraf to live up to his promise.

 

It is also critically important that the upcoming elections are free and fair, and we should work to ensure they are conducted transparently and legitimately. This will send a very important message of support to the people of Pakistan, who are increasingly insistent on restoring true democratic rule, and will help to undermine extremists. We must also continue to raise our strong concerns over unexplained disappearance of some 400 people, the arrest of hundreds of political activists from opposition parties, and the recent crackdown on the media.

 

Finally, we must also consider Pakistan’s relationship with India, especially when it comes to Kashmir, the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, and the current status of our efforts to ensure that the proliferation disaster we experienced with the A.Q. Khan network is never repeated. 

 

Thank you again for being here today. 

 

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