Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the myth and dangers posed by the nuclear earth penetrating weapons proposed by the Bush Administration.
The Administration suggests that new nuclear weapons could be needed to destroy a growing number of hard and deeply buried targets (HDBT). The Intelligence Community has estimated that there are over 10,000 potential HDBTs worldwide. Many of these are near the surface, serve tactical roles, and can be attacked with conventional weapons. But some hundreds of these targets have stronger concrete re-enforcement, or are buried at great depths, or are in tunnels. They play a strategic role, protecting senior leaders, command and control centers, or stored weapons of mass destruction. Of particular concern are the very hardened or deeply buried HDBTs located in so-called "rogue" nations.
To attack the most deeply buried structures, the administration would like to have a nuclear weapon that could destroy a bunker some 300 meters, or about 1000 feet, underground without causing substantial "collateral damage." The Administration is proposing to explore two new nuclear weapons for attacking this category of targets. The first is the so-called Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, or RNEP for short. The second is a new class of low-yield nuclear warheads.
These two initiatives are often confused in the press or thought to be different versions of a mini-nuke bunker-busting nuclear weapon. The two candidates being considered by the Administration for modification into a RNEP, the B61 and B83 bombs, have been in the U.S. arsenal for a number of years. They are not, however, low-yield weapons. In fact, they have yields in the tens of kilotons to megaton range.
Due to Congressional concerns, the FY 2003 Defense Authorization bill required the Department of Defense to deliver to the Armed Services Committees of both chambers a report on the need for an RNEP before funds could be spent on the program. On March 19, 2003, the Administration delivered the report. After a 30-day waiting period, the Administration has said it will begin to study whether the B61 or B83 bombs can be modified into a RNEP. The Administration plans to spend some $15 million on this work in FY04, and the study could cost as much as $46 million.
As for low-yield nuclear weapons, these are nuclear weapons with an explosive yield of less than five kilotons. Ten years ago, Congress placed a prohibition on "research and development" that could lead to the production of a new low-yield nuclear weapon in the FY 1994 Defense Authorization Act. In the early 1990s, advocates of low-yield weapons claimed that precision strikes with such weapons could be used to attack weapons of mass destruction in third-world states that had acquired them. Congress was concerned that the development of such weapons would send the wrong message about the United States' commitment to non-proliferation. In addition, there were fears that if such weapons were developed, the firewall between nuclear and conventional weapons would be removed.
The Administration now seeks to remove the prohibition on research on low-yield weapons research. The Administration's Nuclear Posture Review calls for exploring new nuclear weapons "concepts" to be able to attack HDBTs with reduced collateral damage. According to the Administration, the Congressional restriction on research on low-yield nuclear weapons "impedes this effort."
Ignoring the policy implications of making a nuclear weapon an acceptable tool to be used like a conventional weapon, there is still the critical question of whether such a weapon could destroy a deeply buried target without massive collateral damage. Could a weapon burrow so deep that its nuclear explosion could be safely contained within the earth? The short answer to this question is no.
To be a bunker buster, the weapon design must protect the warhead and associated electronics while it tunnels into the ground. This severely limits the missile to smaller impact velocities, which, in turn, severely limits how far down it can go. In fact, limits on material strengths make 50 feet about the maximum depth to which a missile could penetrate into dry rocky soil while maintaining its integrity until the warhead detonates.
The radioactive fallout from a nuclear weapon detonated at a maximum depth of 50 feet could not be contained. Even a low-yield nuclear weapon of 0.1 kiloton, according to Princeton physicist Robert Nelson, must penetrate about 230 feet underground for the explosion to be fully contained. Based on the experience of U.S. underground tests at the Nevada Test site, a five-kiloton explosive has to be buried at least 650 feet to be fully contained. A 100-kiloton explosive must be at least 1,300 feet deep.
To comprehend what would happen if a nuclear bunker-busting weapon were used, consider the damage that would result from the use of a "low-yield" one-kiloton warhead. Such a weapon would be one-thirteenth the size of the atomic bomb dropped over Hiroshima, and of a size that may be pursued if the Congressional prohibition on research on low-yield weapons is removed. At the maximum depth possible of 20-50 feet, a one-kiloton warhead would eject more than 1 million cubic feet of radioactive debris from a crater bigger than a football field. If such low-yield weapon was used to attack a HDBT in or near a city, it could devastate the area. There would be major collateral damage because the ejected radioactive debris would create a lethal gamma-radiation field over a large area.
For the shock of a nuclear explosion to reach a hardened target at 1000 feet, a much larger warhead would be required, like the B61 and B83 bombs being considered for the RNEP. But the B61 and B83 bombs would dig a much larger crater and create a substantially larger amount of radioactive debris, causing that much more radioactive fall-out and devastation.
I also am concerned about the logistical problems of using nuclear weapons in a combat setting. Destroying bunkers requires knowing exactly where they are and delivering a weapon with precision and accuracy. During Operation Enduring Freedom, American Special Forces were used as spotters on the ground near the targets to provide the intelligence necessary to strike suspected al Qaeda command bunkers and weapon depots. Our special forces would be in great danger if on-the-ground spotting were required for nuclear bunker busters.
As we have seen in our efforts to target Saddam Hussein, his bunker complexes are often located in inside Baghdad. Leaders of other "rogue states" can be expected to construct their command and control centers inside their capital cities too. The potential for collateral damage to our troops and the public our forces are liberating are obvious.
Another consideration is battlefield assessment. Some bomb damage assessment can be done from the air, but if a closer look is needed, how soon could troops be sent in to determine if the strike was successful? The answer depends on the importance we place on the safety and health of our forces. If we use the underground Nevada Test Site as one real-world example, it will be a very long time. If battle planners need assessment more quickly, or we need to recover evidence of what was contained in a bunker, then American soldiers and marines will be put at risk.
This is not a theoretical consideration. We are discussing DNA testing of bodies found in Iraq to determine if they are in fact Saddam Hussein, his sons or his closest associates. Had the Administration used a nuclear weapon to destroy Saddam Hussein's command bunker, this task would be infinitely more difficult, and more dangerous.
I appreciate the challenge that deeply hardened bunkers pose. I am not convinced that RNEP or low-yield nuclear weapons are the answer. Indeed, the Pentagon already has a number of conventional weapons capable of destroying hardened targets buried at 50 feet, or putting them out of action by blocking entrances and exits. Moreover, Admiral James Ellis, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. STRATCOM, recently told Congress that he plans to emphasize conventional options in STRATCOM's new global strike mission in order to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons. Research and development have improved the precision, penetrating capability, and explosive power of conventional weapons dramatically over the last decade. Further research and development on conventional weapons to attack buried and hardened targets are underway.
Sometimes, the simplest solution is the correct one. We do not need a nuclear weapon to destroy a tunnel entrance or a mineshaft. The same research in material science and precision guidance that will allow a missile to aim and protect the warhead to penetrate further should be applied to conventional bunker busters. Conventional bunker busters could meet the challenge of threatening the several hundred most hardened and deeply targets in question. Conventional bunker busters would not place civilian populations or our forces at undue risk and harm, and would keep the barrier between nuclear and conventional weapons high and wide.
Finally, we must keep in mind the serious international implications of the Administration's pursuit of new nuclear weapons designs. Russian nuclear weapons designers have advocated new generations of more usable nuclear weapons. If the United States starts down this path, Russia will be encouraged to do the same. If Russia begins, maybe China will too. A new arms race in supposedly low-yield and "usable" nuclear weapons will result. If NATO forces move further east, Russia may deploy such weapons opposite NATO forces. China may view them as usable in crisis with Taiwan. We should stop this new tactical nuclear arms race before it starts. We should not develop the RNEP. We should keep the prohibition on research on the low-yield nuclear weapons.
