Mr. President, today the Senate is engaged in an important and historic debate on the Moscow Treaty. President Bush and President Putin signed the Moscow Treaty on May 24, 2002, to limit strategic offensive nuclear weapons. Unlike arms control treaties of the past, this treaty does not include definitions of terms, counting rules, elimination procedures, or monitoring and verification provisions – all conditions considered in the past as essential to an effective agreement. As President Reagan once said, "trust but verify."

The Administration believes that the lack of these features is an asset and indicative of a new age in American-Russian relations. In the words of President Bush, it is time that the United States "complete the work of changing our relationship from one based on nuclear balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common interests."

The Treaty reflects American and Russian intent to reduce strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 to 2,200 by December 31, 2012. Each party is free to define for itself its "strategic nuclear warheads" and to determine how to reduce them. The Treaty does not provide for the destruction of warheads or delivery systems. Nor does it place any restrictions on either party's force structure over the next ten years. Both sides can keep warheads for testing, spare parts, and possible redeployment.

The Administration plans to meet treaty requirements by moving an undefined number of warheads to a reserved force, some to storage, and dismantling others. The Russians will make similar force structure changes. Russia intends to continue to reduce weapon platforms and warhead levels and dismantle weapon systems with U.S. assistance under the important Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.

However, the Moscow Treaty leaves many issues unresolved and many questions unanswered. For example, Article I of the treaty specifies that each party shall "determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms."

The United States has defined this to be "operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads," and has defined operationally deployed to mean "reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles in their launchers, reentry vehicles on submarine-launched ballistic missiles in their launchers onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases."

Congress will have to wait to see how many warheads are destroyed and stored. Likewise, we will have to wait to see how Russia defines "strategic offensive arms." Russia may move to redeploy multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs.

Article II of the treaty states that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) will remain in force. During the signing of the Joint Declaration, Presidents Bush and Putin stated that the provisions of START, "will provide the foundation for providing confidence, transparency, and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions." But, START expires in 2009. If START is not extended, we do not know how the parties will provide confidence and transparency between 2009 and 2012.

Article III of the treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission but does not establish guidelines, procedures, or even responsibilities of the Commission. We do not know if the Commission will focus on monitoring and verification of agreed reductions.

Mr. President, when President Bush signed the Moscow Treaty nearly a year ago, he assured the American people that he would continue to work on a separate political declaration that would create a strategic framework for the United States and Russia.

This document was to be broader in scope and would address other security and arms control issues aside from strategic reduction, including non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, anti-terrorism, and missile defenses. We have yet to receive that document.

We need a better vision and a better strategy of how to make America safer and more secure from attack with weapons of mass destruction.

I fear that the President is moving us toward a world of greater insecurity besieged by fears of nuclear weapons proliferation. Today's Washington Post indicates that the Administration is willing to accept a North Korea with nuclear weapons. This, for one, is astounding, and, if true, threatens stability in northeast Asia. In addition, the Administration has sought funding for new battlefield nuclear weapons that are more "useable."

Until now, U.S. non-proliferation policy has been based on reducing the number of nuclear weapons states, controlling the spread of nuclear weapons technology, and eliminating nuclear weapons. We need to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and establish with the rest of the world a system that deters both countries and terrorist groups from gaining access to these dangerous technologies.

The Resolution intended to be introduced by Senator Daschle and others, which I am proud to cosponsor, lays out the type of comprehensive non-proliferation policy that we need to make the world a safer place for future generations. I urge my colleagues to support it and I urge the Administration to adopt its recommendations.

Thank you, Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time and suggest the absence of a quorum.