Mr. President, I rise today to express my deep concerns that we are not as prepared as we should be for the consequences of a war with Iraq.

I have complete confidence in the ability of our armed services to defeat Iraq. We have a superb military which is, without a doubt, the most effective and most professional fighting force ever fielded in the history of mankind.

We can all be proud of our dedicated military men and women. It is their dedication and willingness to risk their lives in the service of their country that places a special responsibility on our shoulders. Our responsibility is to ensure that their service is not expended in the vain pursuit of ill-defined objectives and that our national security is truly enhanced.

In my capacity as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I meet with many of our field commanders. Prior to our debate last session on House Joint Resolution 114 concerning war with Iraq, I met with one of our senior commanders just returned from the war against terrorism. He told me "keep asking the hard questions" about the consequences of committing American troops to a war on Iraq. I have heeded his advice and it is the reason I stand today to discuss the consequences of war on Iraq.

I am concerned that we are not sufficiently prepared either materially or psychologically for a protracted occupation of Iraqi territory, nor are we sufficiently well-prepared domestically for possible terrorist attacks on American soil.

My constituents ask me why the President has chosen to fight Iraq at this time or what his objective is in so doing. I do not have a good answer for them because the President has yet to provide one.

Certainly it is true that Saddam Hussein has resisted and ignored over the past twelve years United Nations' resolutions calling for Iraqi disarmament of its weapons of mass destruction. Certainly it is true that Saddam Hussein has oppressed the Iraqi people and carried out terrible attacks against the Kurds and Shia tribes of Southern Iraq. Certainly it is true that Saddam Hussein has paid only grudging lip service to recent efforts by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to discover and eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

However, none of those issues justify going to war now if we are unprepared for the consequences of war and if we do not have a clear exit strategy for getting out of Iraq. It would be far better to take the time to ensure that we are prepared for both the consequences at home and abroad before sending our superb military into combat in a distant land.

The reasons for war have increased in number and difficulty as we build up our forces in the Gulf. At first, the President asserted that war was to end Saddam Hussein's program for developing weapons of mass destruction. More recently, the President has added that our objective is to "help the Iraqi people rebuild their economy, and create the institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq at peace with its neighbors." The President argues for war because he believes that "success in Iraq could also begin a new stage for Middle Eastern peace, and set in motion progress towards a truly democratic Palestinian state." Mission creep is already occurring and the mission has not begun.

In February testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, retired General Anthony C. Zinni asked, "do we want to transform Iraq or just transition it out from under the unacceptable regime [....]" and he added, "defining the problem, however, is only half the task. The other half deals with how you solve the problem. I have not seen a lot of specifics in this area."

The mission of an American occupation to establish a democratic Iraq is well-meaning but difficult to implement. Indeed, as I read testimony and speeches by Administration officials, I am struck by how many new objectives are being added to our mission: for example, establish the rule of law and an independent judiciary; create a free enterprise system; end weapons of mass destruction programs; make an American ally; create a bulwark against terrorism; forge a secular and democratic state; reform the educational system; and develop a free press. These are extremely ambitious programs for a country that has little if any historical experience and no recent experiences in any of these conditions. Perhaps we should be bringing democracy to our allies in the region.

A well-defined objective is crucial for a mission's success. Will the objective be a discrete military mission: seek and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, or an open-ended goal to bring democracy to a country that has no experience in democracy. The Administration now indicates that both goals are intertwined: to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction we must create a democracy in Iraq. Perhaps that is the case. But the opposite is also possible: a democratic Iraq responsive to the will of the Iraqi people, continuing to share borders with countries traditionally hostile to Iraq – including Iran which we have learned this week is well on its way to developing nuclear weapons, may feel compelled to restart its weapons of mass destruction program out of self-preservation.

Let us be clear: we can take weapons away from Iraqi leaders but we cannot erase the knowledge of how to make those weapons from the minds of Iraqi scientists. That capability will always remain. Weapons scientists and engineers will not unlearn what they have learned. To make another Iraqi WMD program impossible we need to develop solid support for an international regime with enforcement mechanisms to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deploy them.

Unfortunately, the President's rush to war is undermining the very international consensus we need to forge to prevent proliferation.

International cooperation is essential both in the short term and in the long term. In the short term it is essential for our goal of ending the threat from Iraq. A stable international coalition is the basis for managing any future crisis. In the long term it is essential to prevent the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction.

The Administration insists that all it needs is a "coalition of the willing" to go to war. That may be true for war but will there be a coalition to pay the costs of an indefinite occupation of Iraq? Without international support, the United States will pay the direct cost for our military presence and reconstruction. Our struggling economy will also pay an indirect cost adding to our sky-high deficit. Already it looks more like a coalition for war of the compensated than a coalition of the willing.

I believe we are not ready for the cost of such an occupation both in terms of money and our military.

When the British conquered Iraq in 1917, the British military commander, Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Maude, said "our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies but as liberators." When the British departed Baghdad in the 1930s, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis observed, "my own prediction is that they will all fly at each other's throats and that there will be a bad slump in the administration which will continue until someone strong enough to dominate the country emerges, or alternatively, until we have to step in an intervene."

We should heed history before we attempt to make a future. The danger is that the war will end in a few weeks while crisis endures for a long time.

Just recently, the Administration announced a $900 million contract for post-war Iraqi reconstruction. This is just a small down payment on what people in and outside the government estimate may amount to over $100 billion, not including the cost of maintaining a long term American troop presence in Iraq. A military presence will cost additional billions and tie down American forces, affecting training, rotation cycles, and recruitment of our entire military. The cost will born largely by the American taxpayer unlike the first Gulf War which saw Saudi Arabia and German contribute 44 percent of the operation.

Some suggest that Iraqi oil exports will pay for the occupation force and reconstruction efforts. But a recent study by the Council of Foreign Relations warns not to expect such a "bonanza." The Iraqi oil industry is estimated to need $5 billion in investment and three years just to return to pre-1990 production levels, and Iraq is already carrying an external debt burden of $300 billion.

If, as some experts predict, our forces confront ethnic, tribal, and religious in-fighting and are besieged by terrorist attacks emboldened by pan-Islamic hostility to the American occupation, we may need a much larger force than the current 45 - 75,000 under review by the Pentagon. No doubt, as in the first Gulf War, there will be score settling among Iraqis with vigilante justice and possibly open warfare. Many are predicting that Kurdish refugees expelled in 1968 from their homes in Kirkuk will pour back into this center of Iraqi oil wealth, bringing with them the possibility of war with Turkey seeking to protect Turkmen minority interests.

The Pentagon is reported to be planning on a two year military occupation of Iraq under a military governor that may be expanded to five years. Ironically, one of the first things this governor general will have to do is to rebuild the Iraqi military with professional training and new weapons. Time magazine reports that the Pentagon has "only a rudimentary plan for rehabilitating the bulk of the [Iraqi] Army." But it is clear that we cannot demobilize over 400,000 Iraqi troops without adding to the problems in the civilian sector.

We are just beginning to plan for all these post-war problems. On February 11, 2003, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith announced that the President " has directed his administration to begin planning now" for reconstruction and testified that the Administration was still "conceptualizing" peace. Now is too late for a war that may start this month. The Defense Department's Office of Reconstruction was opened only on January 20, 2003. Time magazine reported on March 2nd that "at this late hour, the Administration is not very ready for the peace."

As Middle East expert Anthony Cordesman warned in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on February 7, 2003, "we are rushing planning efforts without making adequate efforts to make up for our lack of knowledge. As a result, planners both outside and inside the U.S. government may end in doing more harm than good ..."

President Bush has stated that "we will remain in Iraq as long as necessary and not a day more." I appreciate his candor but I am deeply disturbed by such an open ended commitment to deploying American troops. We may wear out our welcome long before we have accomplished the democratic transformation of the Middle East envisioned by the President.

I am also concerned over the lack of preparation at home for the possibility of terrorist attacks. Even the President is dissatisfied with the counter-terrorism budget passed for this fiscal year. I am dissatisfied that we have not done more during the past two years. As chairman of the Governmental Affairs International Security Subcommittee, I began holding hearings on our preparedness against terrorist attacks in July 2001. I have continued to press for reform of our national and local preparedness. I agree with the President that the budget for this fiscal year was too small. We have done too little to defend ourselves against attack.

I am disturbed by the letter from FBI Special Agent Colleen Rowley to FBI Director Robert Mueller indicating that the FBI would not be able to "stem the flood of terrorism that will likely dead our way in the wake of an attack on Iraq." Last month the FBI issued a warning that "lone extremists represent an ongoing terrorist threat in the United States." Certainly, steps have been taken to improve our law enforcement capability but I believe much more needs to be done before we are as prepared as we should be. The President acknowledged as much when he announced in his State of the Union address his intent to create by May 1st a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center. This Center is at least three years away from being fully staffed according to Administration plans.

In other areas we are also behind. The Transportation Security Administration has just begun to assess the vulnerabilities of American airports to terrorist attack, especially from shoulder-launched missiles – that task force was set up after the deadly November 28th attack against an Israeli airline in Kenya. The President's plan to immunize 500,000 health care workers against small pox in thirty days has only inoculated 4,200 and is draining money and personnel from other programs in state and local public health departments.

Many state and local law enforcement officials have yet to receive federal security clearances so that they can receive information about potential terrorist attacks. Our emergency health care system is already stressed to the breaking point as hundreds of emergency departments have been closed due to budgetary constraints even as the number of patient visits has increased. Few of the respirators operated by local firefighters and other first responder rescue teams were found to be effective against poison gas. Many reservists in our first responder units have been called to active military duty, depleting critical services at home.

The list of problems is endless. The ability to solve these problems is limited by time and by money. The bottom line is that we have a lot to do and a long way to go before we are as ready at home for war as we are for waging war far away.

If war does come, both in Iraq and here at home, we will all support our troops and do the best we can to confront the problems here. I believe that the security of all Americans would be better served by taking the time to be better prepared. Allowing United Nations inspectors to do their work in Iraq will deplete the number of weapons Saddam Hussein might aim at our troops – already 46 Al Samoud missiles have been destroyed – and build international support for resolving the Iraq crisis. We will have not only a coalition of the willing but a coalition of the strong.

If we pursue our current path, we will have a war lacking in many things essential to achieving complete success. It will be a war without broad international support, without sufficient planning for post-conflict reconstruction and stability, without a definite exit time and strategy, and without a firm price tag. Moreover, it will be a war with serious ramifications for our long-term readiness capabilities for homeland security and for managing other crises.