Thank you Chairman Voinovich. I join you in welcoming our panel of witnesses. I am grateful to my friend, the Chairman, for working with me in scheduling today's hearing, which will analyze how well prepared the National Capital Region (NCR) is for a major emergency.

I believe that the NCR -- with its twelve jurisdictions in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia -- can serve as a coordination model and a test bed for other parts in the country in implementing homeland security policies.

Our focus today is twofold. First, we will look at how well the region's state and local governments are coordinating amongst themselves and with the federal government and, second, we will examine whether federal homeland security dollars are being spent wisely.

Two months ago we were reminded of the importance of homeland security coordination in the nation's Capital when a small propeller plane caused the evacuation of federal buildings and the Congress after accidentally crossing into DC's restricted air space. Although federal officials responded quickly to the perceived threat, they failed to involve or even notify District officials.

Last week, the vulnerability of metropolitan cities was demonstrated by the coordinated bombings of the bus and subway systems in London. The London attack was horrific and senseless. I believe this tragedy can teach us how to better prevent, deter, and recover from a similar attack in the United States. If such an event were to occur in the District, an effective response would require the combined efforts of federal, state, and local officials because DC is home to the Nation's Capital and adjoins two states. The coordination challenge that NCR officials face is more complicated than other areas of the country where there is less of a federal government presence.

In addition, the NCR is required by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to share and administer Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants as a region. No single government has autonomous control over that funding. Reaching the necessary consensus between multiple jurisdictions on how best to spend the funding significantly compounds the work required to administer the grants.

This is not the case anywhere else in the country.

Sharing funding effectively while coordinating regional priorities is an exercise that other cities have not had to undertake yet.

While the requirement of regional coordination has created challenges for NCR members, the NCR has a head start in creating an effective regional model, which is what DHS is now encouraging throughout the country through its grant awards. The DHS Interim National Preparedness Goal, released this March, instructs state and local governments to collaborate regionally through mutual aid agreements to increase capability and share costs.

Let's not forget that the NCR began working on homeland security coordination and collaboration on September 11, 2001.

Despite the significant progress made in the past four years, I have some concerns about the level of coordination in the National Capital Region.

First, it does not appear that the District of Columbia Office of Homeland Security has a system in place to track homeland security funding being spent in DC and the surrounding counties. In response to a recommendation made in a May 2004 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, the Homeland Security Office recently established a database to centralize all UASI funded projects being undertaken by the NCR. However as GAO will testify today, this database does not hold any information on other homeland security grant funding being spent in the region. How can the NCR ensure that its UASI funding is being well spent if there are no consolidated records on other ongoing homeland security programs in the region?

Second, the NCR has yet to develop a strategic plan for homeland security in the region. Homeland security grants are not being spent to meet a set of cohesive, overall objectives. Instead, each project is considered on its individual merit. While this system may ensure that grant funds are spent on legitimate purposes, it does not enable the region to use grant funding efficiently to reduce vulnerability gaps and build capability. The NCR members are working on a strategic plan for the region but have not said when it will be finalized and implemented. I recognize that the NCR is working with limited staff and a number of pressing priorities. However, without a strategic plan, the NCR cannot effectively leverage the millions of federal dollars awarded to the region every year for homeland security.

Third, as the recent small plane incident shows, there are serious gaps in the coordination and communication between DC officials and the federal government. Mayor Williams, who is responsible for the District of Columbia and all those who live and work here, said he was not notified until after the event was almost over.

This failure of communication may be attributed to any number of different missing links: the DC police officer stationed at the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) was not informed of the violation by his HSOC colleagues because he lacks a Top Secret security clearance; the telephone line that connects the DC police command center with the Federal Aviation Administration was disconnected, and the Homeland Security Information Network never issued an alert to state and local officials.

We cannot afford to have a layered system where every single layer fails.

I know the men and women working to protect our Nation's Capital have a never-ending challenge before them and I recognize and commend them for their hard work and dedication. It is my hope that our hearing will assist these public servants by bringing needed attention to the critical work they perform.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I look forward to working with you on this and other DC oversight issues in the future.