Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing: Six-Party Talks For Denuclearization Of The Korean Peninsula
February 6, 2008
BIDEN:
Welcome, Mr. Ambassador. It's great to have you here. Senator Lugar is on his way down the hall. But in the interests of time, what I'll do is start my opening statement and yield to him, so we have as much as we can with you.
Thank you so much for being here. I say later in my statement here, but I should say at the outset, I think you're one of the gems we have in the Foreign Service, and I thank you for your service. You've done just a tremendous job. Let me just say that out the outset.
Today the Foreign Relations Committee will examine the efforts of the United States and other participants in the six-party talks to remove the threat of nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula and to build a hopefully permanent peace there.
And I want to welcome again, Mr. Ambassador, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. You've been before our committee before, and it's an honor to have you back.
I also want to take note that the Foreign Relations Committee was originally scheduled to have Assistant Secretary Hill up here today to testify on a different subject, Vietnam, at a hearing chaired by our friend and committee member Senator Boxer.
I want to thank Senator Boxer, the chairwoman of our East Asian Subcommittee, and she's also chairman of the Environmental Committee, for agreeing to reschedule her hearing for March. At that time we look forward to hearing from the ambassador again.
Senator Boxer has a hearing to chair at 10 o'clock on the Environment Committee. I offered her an opportunity to make an opening statement before her hearing, but her hearing, in preparation for her hearing, she's not going to be able to be here to do that.
But, again, I'd like to thank her for yielding to the full committee to allow us to move forward with this hearing on Korea.
We all look forward to the day when we can close the book on the nuclear issue and turn to other challenges with regard to North Korea, like cooperation, expansion of trade, cultural and educational exchanges, a more normal relationship.
But we're not there yet, to state the obvious.
The New York Philharmonic will be playing a concert in North Korea at the end of the month, the first ever by a U.S. orchestra in North Korea. And I understand that they're going to perform the New World Symphony by Dvorak. I think that's kind of fitting.
But for now, we have do with the bad old world that we have, and keep our eye on the ball. The old world is the one we still inhabit.
Our goal and the stated objective of the six-party talks is to peacefully dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons program in exchange for energy assistance, sanctions relief and the creation of a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.
This is a noble objective and is consistent, in my view, with the vital security interests of all six nations that joined these talks, because nuclear weapons offer only a false sense of security for North Korea.
The Democratic Republic of Korea, or DPRK as it is called, will find true security, in my view, only when it has jettisoned its nuclear weapons program, rejoined the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and fully normalized relations, not only with the United States, but, even more importantly, with its neighbors to the south.
South Korea is a close friend and close ally of the United States. Last December, South Koreans went to the polls and elected a new president, President Lee.
Today, Senator Murkowski and I plan to introduce a resolution congratulating the president-elect and the Republic of Korea on their nation's vibrant democracy and affirming our desire to strengthen and deepen our alliance in the years ahead. There is much that we can accomplish together, both on and off the Korean Peninsula.
Some say we should never negotiate with North Korea because they can't be trusted. This view offers, unfortunately, no viable solution to a problem -- a problem that got much worse during this last administration, when the administration disengaged.
We wasted, in my view, a lot of time that North Korea used to acquire uranium enrichment equipment and to more than double its stockpile of plutonium, leading ultimately to an actual test of a nuclear device on October 9, 2006.
There is still, in my view, though, no substitute for patient, principled, sustained, high-level diplomacy. Moreover, our efforts are more likely to succeed when we enlist those of our allies, South Korea, Japan and others of our friends to help us.
Only through a mutually respectful, hard-headed diplomacy can we bridge our differences and find any common ground. That is what this committee has been calling for on a bipartisan basis for the past six years.
The formula for success is clear, if there is any, and I am glad that President Bush embraced it and chose Ambassador Hill to undertake it.
The formula is validated by history. President George Herbert Walker Bush in 1991 agreed to remove U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula, weapons we no longer needed to station in Korea given advances in technology, and thereby convinced North Korea to remain inside the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and to accept inspection.
Inspections by the IAEA yielded evidence late in '92 that North Korea was violating the NPT commitments as well as the terms of the 1991 South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Without the first Bush's diplomatic efforts, we might have remained in the dark, giving North Korea a free path to pursue its nuclear ambitions unchecked.
Under President Clinton, the United States negotiated the October 1994 agreed framework.
The North agreed to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear facilities under international monitoring. In exchange, Pyongyang was to receive two proliferation-resistant light water nuclear reactors and annual shipments of heavy fuel during construction of the reactors.
These light water reactors were to be financed and constructed through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, a multinational consortium including South Korea, Japan and the European Union.
The agreed framework failed to eliminate the North's nuclear program. But it did prevent the North from producing even one ounce of plutonium from '94 to '03, and I view this as no small accomplishment.
And the creation of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization established a useful precedent, namely, that the United States should reach out to other nations that share our interest in a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, and to help shoulder the financial and diplomatic burdens.
Under the terms of the February 17, 2007 agreement hammered out by our witness today and North Korea's lead negotiator, North Korea promised to freeze and then to dismantle its nuclear facilities and to provide a complete and accurate declaration of all of the nuclear programs, facilities and materials.
In exchange, the North is to receive energy assistance and sanctions relief. The ultimate goal remains the same: the complete dismantlement of the North's facilities in exchange for normalizations of relations with the United States and the establishment of a permanent peace regimen on the Korean Peninsula.
The freeze was implemented without a hitch, and North Korean workers under the direct supervision of the U.S. technicians are today in the process of dismantling three key nuclear facilities -- the reactor, the spent fuel reprocessing plant and the fuel fabrication plant.
North Korea is no longer in the plutonium production business.
But, as we'll hear from our witness, we still have a long way to go.
The North has yet submitted a complete and accurate declaration of its nuclear programs, as called for by the agreement. The original December 31, 2007 deadline to do that has come and gone.
North Korea's preferred outcome still appears to be both a limited nuclear deterrent and good relations with the United States. But unfortunately for them, they're going to have to choose, choose one or the other. The United States should not acquiesce in a nuclear-armed North Korea.
I hope Secretary Hill will share with us the administration's game plan going forward. How does the administration plan to convince North Korea to submit a declaration of its nuclear activities, including any proliferation of nuclear know-how and do it promptly so that we can get on with the business of dismantling the North's nuclear facilities, removing fissile material from the country, and ultimately normalizing our bilateral relations and integrating North Korea into the community of nations?
What do we want South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia -- as equal partners in the six-party talks -- to do to help us?
I also hope the ambassador will share with us some thoughts on how the administration plans to actually implement the next phase of the agreement.
Specifically, I hope he'll address the concern that Senator Lugar and I have expressed about the Glenn amendment, which currently prohibits the Department of Energy from providing more than token assistance to the denuclearization effort.
Senator Lugar and I have drafted legislation that would provide the Department of Energy and the Department of State with the necessary authority to implement a robust denuclearization plan, and I hope the administration will endorse it.
Mr. Ambassador, I look forward to your testimony.
And let me now turn to my colleague Senator Lugar.
Mr. Chairman?
LUGAR:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I join you in welcoming to the committee and this opportunity for us to consider ongoing developments and the elimination of the North Korean nuclear program. Remarkable progress has been achieved since the committee's last hearing on the North Korean situation, which was conducted in July of 2006.
Last year, through the six-party talks, the United States, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Russia and China reached agreement on shutting down and sealing North Korea's main nuclear facility.
In addition, there was an agreement that the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, would be invited back to North Korea and that North Korea would declare its nuclear programs. Last July North Korea took the necessary steps in its Yongbyon nuclear facilities to stop producing plutonium.
American technicians are now working at Yongbyon, observing and reporting on the disablement process. Personnel of the IAEA are present as well. These disablement activities go well beyond anything undertaken under the agreed framework of the 1990s or in this decade.
Although it is too early to determine the technical details of how North Korea's nuclear program would be disassembled (inaudible) the cooperative threat reduction model could be applied in North Korea. Officials in Pyongyang have sought information about the Nunn- Lugar program.
I believe it is in the interest of North Korea, the United States, and other six-party powers to preserve the significant progress that has been made toward a denuclearization of North Korea and the normalization of relations with that country that would be anticipated to follow.
The United States continues to accept, the quote "action for action approach" adopted through the six-party talks. In fact, Ambassador Hill and State Department colleagues have begun consultations with the Congress in preparation for possibly removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorists as well as eliminating the designation of North Korea under the Trading with the Enemy Act.
However, it is not prudent for the Bush administration to proceed with these two steps when North Korea fails to provide a complete and thorough declaration of its nuclear program by the end of 2007, as earlier agreed.
I understand that all six powers are focused on distinct steps in the process, are concerned with the pace of compliance, these actions that have been agreed on, that ultimately the process depends on the commitment and the will of the top leaders; this includes Chairman Kim Jong Il.
He has written, and I quote "in any work it is necessary to identify correctly the main knot in the whole string and undo it first by a concentrated effort which will make it easier to unravel the other knots and push ahead with the whole work creatively," end of quote from Kim Jong Il.
Such an effort would be usefully applied by North Korea to the present situation. In recent months, North Korean observers have noted the ascendancy of North Korean's foreign ministry in matters related to the six-party talks and negotiations with the United States. This is in line with the authority and confidence President Bush has placed in Secretary Rice and Assistant Secretary Hill.
As conditions warrant, and in coordination with the Department of State and South Korea, Secretary Gates should be prepared to engage with North Korean military leaders on a wide range of issues, such as the POW/MIA joint recovery program, which the Defense Department suspended in 2005.
President Bush, Secretary Rice, Secretary Gates, Assistant Secretary Hill are committed to the implementation of six-party agreements. A majority in Congress are prepared to work with President Bush on projects related to North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and on steps toward establishment of normal diplomatic relations.
I do not believe that U.S. commitment to the six-party talks or its determination to ensure the peaceful denuclearization of North Korea will change with the election of a new administration.
Moreover, members of Congress, myself included, are following this situation intently to support and fortify a unified vision on policy toward North Korea within our own government.
As (inaudible) program demonstrated in the former Soviet Union, remarkable progress can be based on mutual interest and a joint resolve to achieve peaceful outcomes. We should not assume that a similar result cannot be achieved in North Korea.
I join the chairman in welcoming back Secretary Hill, and we look forward to your testimony.
BIDEN:
Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours.
HILL:
Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for those kind words about our effort.
I also want to comment on the idea of hold a hearing on Vietnam, which I would very much look forward to. I understand Senator Boxer was very much interested in that.
I think we're working on a March date, which would work very well because I plan to make a visit to Vietnam in the very beginning of March.
It will be my fourth visit, and so upon my return I think I'd be in a position to give you very fresh information about that very, very interesting...
BIDEN:
... We'd appreciate that very much.
And again I want to say, with more of the committee members here, that Senator Boxer had a hearing scheduled for today. But she was kind enough to yield in full committee to have the hearing on Korea, so that's why I referenced that in the beginning.
We are looking forward to that as well, Mr. Secretary.
HILL:
I have a lengthy statement that I would like to enter into the record.
BIDEN:
The entire statement will be placed into the record, as if you delivered it, sir.
HILL:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
It's a pleasure to come here and to brief the committee on the status of the six-party process.
We are in an important phase. We have an agreement in Oct. 2007 which called for this phase to be over on December 31. And, of course, we have not met that deadline.
The main elements of the October 3 agreement have to do with the DPRK's agreement to disable the plutonium production, the Yongbyon nuclear facility.
It also calls for the DPRK to give us a complete and correct declaration of all of their nuclear program, materials, facilities and programs. This declaration, of course, is important because it forms the basis of further dismantlement of all their nuclear activities.
I can report to you on the status of the disabling activities. And I can also report to you on the status of the North Korea's efforts to get a complete and correct declaration, and I can tell you what we are doing to try to get that complete and correct declaration.
And if we are successful with that, I'd like to also give you a picture of where we intend to go from here and how we intend to get to the end of this very long road.
First of all, with respect to the disabling activities, the DPRK asked that U.S. technicians on behalf of the six-party process, to actually perform the disabling activities. And so, we've had teams of U.S. technicians there.
We've had about five people at a time. They rotate in and out, in two week intervals. We had five people there through the Thanksgiving holiday. We had another five people there through the Christmas holiday. And they've been doing truly a remarkable job of getting this nuclear facility disabled.
Now what does disabling mean? We identified some 11 tasks to be conducted, the sum total of which is to make it very difficult to put the nuclear facility back into operation -- not only to make it difficult, but also to make it expensive.
So the tasks have been centered on the three activities, core activities, in that nuclear facility -- first of all, the fuel fabrication facility, where they actually make the rods, secondly the reactor, where they take the rods and put in the reactor, to make the reactor work and thirdly, the reprocessing facility where they take spent fuel from the reactor and reprocess that into plutonium, eventually weapons grade plutonium.
So I can report to you that the disabling activities have gone very well. We've had very good cooperation from the North Korean people at the facility. And we have -- essentially, at the reprocessing plant, all the agreed disabling tasks were completed prior to December 31, including the removal of several key pieces of equipment that were very necessary for the separation of the plutonium from the spent fuel rods.
In addition, major pieces of equipment of the fuel fabrication plant were also disabled and removed prior to December 31.
One of the primarily disabling activities at the reactor is the discharge of spent fuel. Once you take out that spent fuel, you cannot put it back in. That is a process that is under way.
It got under way late due to health and safety concerns by our team that the pond, the place that they put these spent fuel rods, was unsafe and they needed to spend some time to clean that up.
The process is under way. But of late, the North Koreans have also slowed down that process, and I will get to the issue of why that has been slowed down. But it is very much under way.
I think is also significant, when I visited the facility at the end of November, beginning of December, what was significant to us is the fact that the technicians on site were not talking about, in any way, reconstituting this facility.
They understood that disabling is on the road toward eventual dismantling, which will come in the next phase and its complete abandonment.
In addition, it's very important to contrast this disabling activity which was not done in the 1990s, with the freeze that was done in the 1990s, because currently the North Koreans are not doing regular maintenance.
So I think, viewed in its entirety, assuming we are able to complete all 11 tasks -- and we do anticipate getting that done -- we will have a facility that, in the totality of the 11, plus just looking at the individual tasks, that it is unlikely that this facility will ever be put back into operation. So we feel this has been a very positive development.
Where the situation is less positive, of course, is the requirement that they provide a complete and correct declaration. Let me take you through that, what we are really looking for in that declaration.
There are essentially three elements to the declaration. First of all, the first element is nuclear materials. And here, based on our conversations with the DPRK, we have very good reason to believe that when they give us the amount of separated plutonium, the actual weapons grade plutonium that they have, that we will get an amount that we will be able to verify. We can verify though a number of means, including production records.
So they have agreed to do that. And this is important because identifying the status of the plutonium and how much there is and verifying the figure is extremely important from their own weapons development programs, but also extremely important from the point of view of proliferation issues. So they've agreed to do that.
We are working with them to make sure they also include in the list of materials what the state of their weapons development is. That is, if they have some -- we know they have an explosive device because they were able to explode fissile material, that is, have a nuclear test, in October 2006. So we need to know about the development of their weapons.
That has been more problematic in my discussions with them, but we need to continue to work with them and make sure that in the declaration, we can get insights into their actual weapons, if any -- weapons development that they have.
The second main area has to do with facilities. And here, we know through national technical means, what their nuclear facilities are. They know what their nuclear facilities are. And, perhaps most importantly, they know that we know what their nuclear facilities are.
And I think with respect to that second cluster of issues in the declaration, we can come to an agreement when they provide the declaration.
The third issue, however, is more problematic, that is in the area of overall programs. Here, we need to know about the plutonium program. And I think we will come to an agreement on what that looks like in the declaration.
But we are also very aware that they have made many purchases that are entirely consistent with the development of a highly enriched uranium program.
And, as you know, the CIA has assessed with high confidence that they did have an effort to develop this program.
We need to know more about the status of this program. If it is terminated, we need know when it was terminated. Obviously, if it continues, we need to ensure that it is terminated.
We have worked very closely with the North Koreans on this issue, because this was such a key issue. It was the basis, really, for ending the agreed framework.
We have identified -- together with the North Koreans, through our diplomatic talks, we have been able to get them to identify some of the key components that they purchased for uranium enrichment, but which are now, and they showed us the facility, being used for non- uranium enrichment purposes, that is non-nuclear purposes.
This was an important development because we were able to see that some of these materials, which would be essential to building a uranium enrichment facility, were not in a uranium enrichment facility.
More work has to be done on that, and more work will be done on that, so that we can clearly say at some point in the future that we can rule out that they have any ongoing program for uranium enrichment.
Finally, it is our considered belief that DPRK has engaged in cooperation with abroad, with their nuclear technology. Now, they have agreed, they have said to us, they have no ongoing programs, no ongoing cooperation with any country with respect to nuclear technology or know-how of any kind.
They have also affirmed -- they did it in the October agreement, they've done it previously -- that they will not have any such programs. So they've ruled it out for the future, they've ruled it out for the present, but we need to know what went on there in the past.
Now this is not just an effort on our part to just have a historical exercise. We believe that as we go forward, we need more transparency from the North Koreans on this.
We need to know what they were up to in the past. We need to have a clear picture of that so that we can go forward.
We are continuing to work on all of these elements, and it is important for us to do so because we cannot accept a declaration that is incomplete or incorrect.
So, Mr. Chairman, I think we are continuing to work on that. I don't want to make bets about a game that I am playing in, but we have reason to believe that we can continue, we can make progress.
And while we are not at all happy we have missed our deadline, that is December 31, we believe it is worth continuing to work on this.
Now, on our side, part of the agreement on the disabling activity and the complete list of nuclear materials, structures and programs, from our point of view, we were obliged to do certain things.
Most important of these was to provide a total of 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. And this 950,000 tons is in respect of these two undertakings by the North Koreans, that is disablement and declaration.
We have shared the burden of providing this heavy fuel with other members of the six-party process. We worked with the Russians and with the South Korean and Chinese on this, with the understanding that the Japanese are also prepared to join in this once some of their major concerns are addressed. And I will get back to what the Japanese concerns are.
So, to date, as we sit here today, the DPRK has received about 200,000 tons of heavy fuel oils, that includes the 50,000 tons that they received for just the shutdown of the facility. So, in total, they have received one-fifth of the total fuel oil that is due them, according to this October agreement.
We are prepared to continue that because they are prepared to continue the disablement, which we hope we are able to complete soon.
We're also prepared to continue that heavy fuel oil because we are continuing to work in a spirit of trying to solve the problem of the declaration. So we believe this heavy fuel oil has been an important aspect of the inducement for them.
In addition, under the October 3 agreement the U.S. also reaffirmed its intent to fulfill commitments regarding rescinding the designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism and the termination of the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act, with respect to the DPRK.
U.S. action related to the terrorism designation and the Trading with the Enemy Act application will depend, of course, on the DPRK's fulfillment of its second phase commitments on providing a complete and correct declaration, and disabling its nuclear facilities, as well as in the satisfaction of the legal requirements.
As we move forward on this process, as the North Koreans move forward on their process, Mr. Chairman, I am here to assure you that we will work very closely with this committee and with other members of the Senate and the Congress to make sure we are approaching this in a transparent and collegial way so that all can understand what the process is ahead.
At the same time, the U.S. will continue to press the North Koreans to address other important issues, including the questions about the Japanese abductees. We will continue to urge the North Koreans at every opportunity to address the Japanese concerns. Mr. Chairman, I can assure you, I have done this personally on many, many, many occasions, and I will continue to do this in the future.
It is very important for North Korea that as it goes forward, and we hope that it accepts a future of denuclearized future, that it understand that having a good relationship with Japan is a key part of that future. And we have really pressed the North Koreans to really understand that and to understand the depth of feelings in Japan about this abductees issue.
These were people in some cases taken off the streets during a period in the late '70s and early '80s. This is an issue that goes far beyond just people in the Japanese government, this is an issue that the general Japanese public feels very strongly about. And we owe it to our Japanese allies to really be vigilant and see what we can do to help get this problem resolved.
I want to also mention one other issue that is very important to us, and this is of course the issue of nuclear proliferation.
We believe that within the six-party process we can continue to address this issue, continue to press the North Koreans on this issue, and frankly, continue to monitor this issue, because this is part of the October 3 agreement that they have agreed not to engage in these types of activities.
So we are continuing to consider the issue of proliferation to be a very important element of what we are doing.
Mr. Chairman, if time permits, let me just say a couple of words about where we hope this will lead to. If we can get a complete and correct declaration, and if we can complete the phase two activities, we will then move to phase three.
It is our hope that phase three will be the final phase, because we cannot have this lengthy process go on and on. We do need to reach this culminating moment.
We believe that we have some elements that we can put on the table which will be worth the DPRK's while in giving up its nuclear ambitions.
One of the elements is, of course, to put on the table our preparedness, not only to improve bilateral relations -- because we've been doing that -- but in the context of full denuclearization, we would be prepared to establish full diplomatic relations.
Now, in establishing full diplomatic relations upon denuclearization, this is not to say that we are ignoring every other problem or that somehow we consider the only issue to be denuclearization.
I mention that, Mr. Chairman, because I want to assure you and I want to assure the committee the importance that I personally and that the administration attaches to the human rights issue.
We want to work with the DPRK on that issue. We want to work with them in a way that they will understand that as they join the international community, that it is in their interest to improve their human rights record. Every country needs to improve its human rights record, and, in that, I must say with (inaudible) understatement, the North Koreans are no exception.
So we would work hard on that issue, in the context of establishing our relations with them. We would try to, for example, set up a human rights dialogue sort of thing that has been done successfully in other countries.
Because at the end of the day, if North Korea truly wants to join in the international community, it's got to address the human rights issue. It is a practical matter; we need to address it in a practical way, to find ways that this can be improved in the short term, medium term and long term.
So one issue that we'll have on the table is this full diplomatic relationship.
A second issue that we will have on the table is our commitment, if the DPRK so wishes, to work with the DPRK and the South Koreans and the Chinese on creating a peace mechanism, a peace process, a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
We believe that the discussion of a Korean Peninsula peace regime could begin among the directly related parties once the DPRK has disabled its existing nuclear facilities.
That is, we would want to start of this next phase, once we get through this declaration, with the understanding that we cannot finally reach a peace regime unless we have a denuclearized North Korea. But we believe this would be of interest to the North Koreans.
A third focus of activity would be on something called Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism. The purpose of this is to try to begin the process of establishing a sense of community in Northeast Asia.
Now a lot of people look at this, and they say, "Oh, this would be an Asian version of CSCE or OSCE."
Perhaps it will, but for now we need to see what it can look like, what the parties can agree to, what has to be worked out carefully with parties who have very different outlooks on the whole process. But we'd be prepared to do this and to, of course, make North Korea one of the founding members.
And finally, a fourth area would be our willingness to work with the North Koreans to see about getting them into more international -- for getting them more access to international economic assistance, in particular getting them access to what the international financial institutions can offer.
Mr. Chairman, I don't know if you've had the pleasure of driving through North Korea yet, but when you see North Korea, the first thing that will strike you is the sense of economic deprivation, the sense that its people need a lot of help, and a lot of help very soon.
And in that regard, not only are we, would we be prepared to work with the international financial institutions, but we also -- this has already started, we continue to be prepared to provide humanitarian assistance whenever we can and to work very closely with the North Koreans to try to address the difficulties that its people are facing.
Mr. Chairman, this is a tough process. I know there are a lot of people who wonder why we did it step by step.
And the answer is, I would have preferred to do it one day, one morning when everyone fell out of bed and decided that North Korea would denuclearize. The problem is they weren't ready to do it in a morning. So we had to work on a step-by-step basis.
I am please that we got the reactor shut down. I am pleased we got the disablement activity well under way. But I am daunted by the need to work in the next phase to get complete denuclearization.
But in looking at the very difficult task, I do feel good about the fact that we are working very closely with neighbors in the region.
Our relationship with China is better as a result of the six- party process. We have worked very closely with our Japanese and South Korean allies.
As you know, there will be a new South Korean government taking office at the end of this month. We have been working very closely with the transition there, but also working with the current government.
It has been very important to work diplomatically, to create these relationships, and I believe that this peace and security mechanism that we are talking about in Northeast Asia will really be a logical follow on to the six-party process.
So, Mr. Chairman, with those comments and the statement that I have entered into the record, I am available for any and all questions and comments.
BIDEN:
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
We'll do seven minute rounds. That may allow us to come back for a second round of questions.
In terms of your testimony, if you could just elucidate two things -- you indicated that in terms of declaration, the third part of that declaration related to overall programs, and you said that we have considerable evidence that there have been the purchasing of material, key material that could be used for, I assume, enriching uranium.
Then you said you've identified key materials being used for other purposes, those same materials, that we identified for being used for purposes other than developing HEU. Can you give the committee an example for the record of what that might be, what some of that is?
HILL:
The other purposes, the North Koreans showed us essentially two conventional weapons systems. One of them did not work with the materials they had...
BIDEN:
The materials you are referring to, are they the aluminum tubes?
HILL:
Yes, they are aluminum tubes. It is our judgment that those aluminum tubes were not brought into the DPRK to be used in the weapons system that did not work. It's our judgment...
BIDEN:
Was it an artillery type system?
HILL:
Yes.
BIDEN:
OK.
HILL:
And so, the tubes were transferred to another weapons system, and that is where they have been used.
And we were able to -- in our discussions with the North Koreans, we were able to get samples from them to be assured that the aluminum being used in that second weapons system for parts was indeed the aluminum that had been suspected from the start.
BIDEN:
Right.
Now, one other question, did we identify the sources of those tubes, or is that classified, the source of the tubes that were purchased by...
HILL:
They came from abroad, but the country from which they came is classified. I am sure we can get it to you...
BIDEN:
No, I am sorry. Is it the same country from which the tubes went to -- to Iraq?
HILL:
My understanding is there are tubes, and there are tubes, but...
BIDEN:
Was the country the same source? Whether they were different tubes or not, were they from the same country?
HILL:
I believe so, but I would like to check on that.
BIDEN:
I think they were. I probably made my point larger than I wanted to.
One of the things that is just a sidebar here, that perplexes me, is the -- and I don't want to either give you credit or get you in trouble, but I personally attribute the change in attitude about how to proceed in North Korea to some of your intervention within the administration.
I may be wrong about that, but whatever it was, I find it perplexing that we're prepared to engage in this kind of discussion, which I applaud.
And you may recall the chairman and I seven years ago -- and I suspect if I am not mistaken, my friend from Nebraska as well -- but the chairman and I specifically suggested this kind of engagement occur, not be disengaged to begin with.
But at any rate, just as a sidebar, and it's not in your territory, why do we have such a radically different approach to discussing or talking with Iran?
But, anyway, let me get back to another point: Can you explain -- I have a number of very specific questions I'll get back to, but again, relating to your testimony, for our colleagues who are not on the committee and for Americans who may be listening in, the fourth part of the declaration relates essentially to who did you give information to, did you proliferate any of your activities on nuclear programs to any other nation, individual, et cetera?
And you have a sense, I think you believe, that there is no present assist going on now, and in the future they promise they will not, and you need to know, though, about what may have gone on.
For the record, explain why that is important to note.
HILL:
Well, first of all, we have information that is derived from intelligence sources on what has gone on. And I am sure in another forum...
BIDEN:
Yes, I'm not asking you what it is (inaudible) overall rationale, well, I understand. But I think it is important for the record for people to understand why this is an important aspect of the declaration.
HILL:
Well, I think from the point of view of going forward in a negotiation, if they have been cooperating with country X, and then as we go forward and we make further progress, and then it turns out that we find out or it becomes publicly known they have been cooperating with country X, this could really affect how we -- the course of the negotiation.
The point is, we need to know what they've been up to. Now, we're not interested in knowing it for the purpose of harming the negotiations or walking out of the negotiations, it's simply a matter of transparency.
When they had told us they have not had any nuclear cooperation with anybody, and they've said they don't have it now and they will not have it in the future, if they tell us they have not had any cooperation in the past and then it turns out to be clear that they did, this is a problem as we go forward.
We have to have some level of trust and some level of transparency.
And again, we are not looking to cause problems...
BIDEN:
I'm not suggesting you are. I just wanted to make sure -- I would assume that it also would be a good measure of knowing whether or not the intelligence we've conducted has been -- can be confirmed or not as well.
At any rate, I have a number of specific questions, I suspect my colleagues will cover them about how long -- I am pleased, again, I have great respect for your judgment, I am pleased that you are, seem to be mildly optimistic that this process will be completed and that the 11 disablement procedures, I should say, will take place.
And that you did reference, and I'll come back if someone doesn't, about how long it would take, if, in fact, things broke down, for them to reverse the procedures and resume the process.
And again, in the second round, if they haven't been discussed, I will go to a number of questions relating to the funding of this process.
But knowing my friend, who's the expert in the country on those issues, I suspect he'll raise that -- and I hope he does.
But again, thank you for the clarifications and your testimony. Thank you for your testimony.
And I yield to my colleague Senator Lugar.
LUGAR:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Hill, you went to North Korea in December and carried a letter from President Bush to Chairman Kim Jong Il.
Can you describe how you were received, what was your level of access? What was the chairman's response might have been to the president's letter?
HILL:
I was received by my counterpart, and I had in depth discussions with him on the subject of the six-party process.
I also visited Yongbyon and had really substantial access to what I needed to see to get a firsthand look at disablement.
With respect to delivering the letter, I asked if I could deliver this in person. I was told this was not possible, and they directed me to the foreign minister. So I delivered it to the foreign minister prior to my departure.
I should also mention that I met with, in protocol terms, the number three person in the country, that is the vice president of the People's Supreme Assembly, Mr. Yang Hyung Sup.
LUGAR:
The reason I raise that question at the onset is that as a veteran diplomat you'd have a better understanding of the nuance of these relationships.
But it would seem that if our communication is sufficient with Kim Jong Il and others around him, that the reward for moving ahead are so substantial that, to put it in vernacular, they would want to get on with it. In other words, perhaps they simply don't understand what lies ahead.
I know you are doing the very best you can to describe to whoever, at whatever level a person you can describe this to, but given the hierarchical nature of the regime, the leader himself apparently needs to have some vision of what it means to have North Korea liberated from, really, the bondage it's self imposed.
And all the of the avenues we're giving now, the problem with getting communication with the leader is very important, not only for him, but likewise for us.
You're subjected constantly to criticism in this country for why haven't North Koreans got on with it. What's wrong with them? December 31 came and gone, there are all sorts of other alternatives, all of which would bring greater sanctions upon North Korea, greater punishments, greater difficulties with their lives, all the rest of it.
So this is, perhaps there is no way for
