Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing: Strategic Assessment of U.S.-Russia Relations
June 21, 2007
SEN. JOSPEH R. BIDEN (D-DE): This morning, the committee will hear testimony on the Unites States' strategy for managing relations with Russia.
Over the last seven years, Russia has, in my view, slipped into a mire of authoritarianism, corruption and manufactured belligerence. These developments, along with many serious domestic problems, have been partly masked by an extraordinary oil and gas windfall. Because these resources -- but these resources are not solving Russia's public health and demographic crisis. They aren't being used to modernize Russia's aging oil and gas infrastructure, and they aren't bringing peace to the North Caucuses. Instead we've seen the spread of rampant corruption, Kremlin efforts to muzzle dissent and bully neighbors, and a fixation on occupying and acquired pipelines to deliver hydrocarbons to our close allies.
In view of these stark realities and the Kremlin's charged rhetoric about the United States, the most important conclusion in my view that we can draw about our strategy for dealing with Russia is that we need a new one. Whatever our game plan has been -- and I'm not convinced we've had one -- it clearly isn't working. Russia is very important to the United States in at least three respects. First, we have an interest in the country's domestic situation, including the security of its nuclear stockpiles. Contrary to what Russian media might say, the United States needs Russia and needs a Russia that's strong and stable. Russia is the only other state in the world with enough nuclear weapons and delivery capacity to wipe us out and any other nation. We can't afford to see its government crippled by corruption and lack of accountability. And beyond that, Russia's domestic problems, especially the looming democratic implosion, could become a source of significant instability in the world. Russia is losing the population -- a population equivalent to the size of the state of Delaware -- almost 1 million people -- each year. Its population could be cut in half by the year 2050. No country can endure that type of loss indefinitely without serious consequences.
Second, we have an interest in Russia's neighborhood. Many countries in Eastern Europe and along Russia's border occupy positions of strategic and political importance. They rely on Russia for energy and trust that it won't abuse its size and resources like a playground bully. We must respond to Russia's actions that destabilize the country's neighbors or undermine the region's young democracies. Third, by virtue of its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and the size of its territory, population and economy, Russia remains a significant strategic player with the ability to affect many of our global interests. We've seen this recently from Kosovo to Iran to missile defense. In every case, Russia's influence, in my view, has not been helpful. For years, the Bush administration tried to paper over problems with Russia. More recently, the State Department has said it will work with the Kremlin when possible and push back when necessary. This formula sounds reasonable, but I worry that it provides neither the strategic vision nor the practical framework to deal with a Kremlin that has repeatedly and successfully outmaneuvered the West in recent years.
Mr. Putin has successfully exploited the differences in the Euro- Atlantic community for the past several years. But with new leadership in several of our key European capitals, it is time to forge a new common strategy for dealing with Russia. When the United States and Europe come together around a single cogent policy, we have a long and successful track record for managing relations with Moscow. A joint U.S.-European approach would not and should not constitute a threat to Russia. Indeed, I believe the principal goal of such an effort should be to refocus the Kremlin on all that Russia stands to gain from working with the West and all it stands to lose by sticking to its zero-sum mentality that it seems to be gripped by now. The West needs to offer a clear vision of the positive role Russia could and should play as a leader in the international community. We need to devise incentives that will recognize and reward Moscow's efforts to deal responsibly with the many common challenges we face. Conversely, if Russian leaders continue pursuing a zero-sum diplomacy, then it's time we address the issue together with our allies.
I look forward to our discussion with those -- on those and many other questions, and I hope it will yield ideas for how to manage this critical relationship in the future. I now yield to my colleague Chairman Lugar.
SEN. RICHARD D. LUGAR (R-IN): Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and I join you in welcoming this opportunity for the committee to examine the United States-Russian relations.
In recent months, newspaper stories have speculated about whether our relations with Russia were descending to the point where the Old War would return. Clearly, Washington and Moscow have disagreed on many topics lately. We have disputed aspects of policy related to energy security, missile defense, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, democracy in general, human rights, Iran, Kosovo, Georgia, Moldavia and other items. While Americans prepare to celebrate Independence Day, President Bush will be hosting Russian President Vladimir Putin in Kennebunkport, Maine. And I applaud the president and his efforts to engage his Rusian counterpart. I encourage him to do so even more regularly. The Kennebunkport meeting will not resolve all disputes, but establishing a commitment to diplomacy is important. The U.S.- Russia relationship is critical to the security and prosperity of the international community. Kennebunkport provides an opportunity for the two presidents to give direction to their bureaucrat -- to their bureaucracies and to lead our countries toward a stronger partnership.
During the last 15 years, the United States-Russia relationships have gone through geopolitical roller coaster rides. But throughout the highs and lows, both sides have understood that our work confronting the dangers of weapons of mass destruction was too important to be sidelined. We have worked together to implement nuclear and chemical arms control treaties. The two companies cooperated closely in the denuclearization of Ukraine, of Belarus, of Kazakhstan and through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, we've dismantled more than 2,000 intercontinental missiles. We eliminated 1,000 missile launchers , deactivating 7,000 nuclear warheads. In addition, our experts have worked together to remove nuclear material from vulnerable location around the world and to secure it in Russia. Such cooperation provides a foundation on which to rebuild trust and confidence.
I urge the presidents to solidify in new areas of cooperation on weapons of mass destruction. First, the Untied States and Russia must extend the START I Treaty's verification and transparency elements, which will expire in 2009, and they should work to add verification measures to the Moscow Treaty. Unfortunately, some bureaucrats on both sides are balking at such efforts in favor of less formal language that is not legally binding. I'm concerned that transparency and verification will suffer if legally binding regimes are permitted to dissolve. The predictability and confidence provided by treaty verification reduces the chances of misinterpretation, miscalculation and error. The current U.S. policy is at odds with the Bush administration's assurances to Congress during consideration of the Moscow Treaty.
SEN. LUGAR: Secretary Rumsfeld and others testified that the START regime would be utilized to bolster the Moscow Treaty, which did not include the verification measures. The current Russian-American relationship is complicated enough without introducing more elements of uncertainty into the nuclear relationship.
A second area of cooperation relates to the coming surge in global demand for nuclear power, which may provide a pretext for more nations to seek their own nuclear enrichment facilities. The spread of this technology to additional states poses long-term risks for both the United States and Russia. While the technology may be intended to produce reactor fuel, it can also produce materials for nuclear weapons.
Both presidents have offered plans to establish nuclear fuel assurances. Senator Bayh and I have introduced Senate Bill 1138, which proposes that countries who give up their enrichment and reprocessing programs have an assurance, either bilateral, multilateral or both, of nuclear reactor fuel at reasonable prices. Under such a regime, nations would be prohibited from using the template of nuclear energy to develop nuclear weapons. I remain hopeful that the chairman will hold a hearing on this important subject.
Third, the United States and Russia should be exploring how the Nunn-Lugar experience can be applied in North Korea. While difficult diplomatic work remains, we must be prepared to move forward quickly if the six-power talks succeed. The Nunn-Lugar program would have a different orientation in North Korea than it does in the former Soviet Union, but the program has the authority, flexibility and experience to adapt to the Korean situation.
Equally important, Moscow and Washington have proven that former enemies can work together to achieve shared security benefits. Such a track record would be critical to a successful diplomatic process on the Korean peninsula.
Fourth, Russia and the United States must come together to address the threat posed by Iran's nuclear weapons program. For too long our governments have been at odds over how to respond to Tehran's behavior. The differences in our approaches have narrowed recently, and there are prospects for continued cooperation between Moscow and Washington within the U.N. Security Council. I am hopeful this renewed collaboration will extend to missile defense as well.
Other subjects must be discussed at Kennebunkport, but weapons of mass destruction remain the number one national security threat to the United States and to Russia. Success in this area would enhance national security and improve the prospects of U.S.-Russian cooperation in other policy areas.
This year is the 200th anniversary of U.S.-Russian bilateral relations and the 15th anniversary of the Nunn-Lugar program. These anniversaries provide an occasion for both Moscow and Washington to rededicate themselves to a close partnership to address common challenges. And I join in welcoming our very distinguished witnesses, each of whom has been a very good friend of our committee, and I look forward to their testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. BIDEN: Thank you, Senator.
With the indulgence of my colleagues, I'd like to do two things: One, make an additional brief statement, two minutes, less than that; and we will have seven-minute rounds.
But let me emphasize, Mr. Secretary, what Senator Lugar said. I think there's a dangerous drift in the way in which we deal with the notion of strategic weapons. It frightens me, the almost seemingly lack of regard on the part of this administration for the Moscow Treaty and, quite frankly -- I'm going to ask you about this, I'll tell you now -- that there is a -- my understanding is that START, which is set to expire, the next president of the United States is going to have less than a year to have to deal with this.
And what I see is counterproductive actions on the part of this administration. Moscow appears to be willing to reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads below the Moscow Treaty levels, limit systems, as well as warheads, and is looking for verifiability and transparency.
I hope that what I hear -- what I'm hearing about the administration's attitude toward this is incorrect, because -- and secondly, and I want to re-emphasize, we owe Senator Lugar an incredible debt, this nation, along with Senator Nunn. And folks, there are 700 to 1,400 tons of highly enriched uranium in Russia -- 700 to 1,400. We're talking about worrying about Iran having 3,000 centrifuges running for a year, getting 25 kilograms, 25 kilograms -- 25 kilograms.
We're talking about going to war over 25 kilograms. That's what these centrifuges could produce in a year if they run. And you've got 700 to 1,400 tons of highly enriched uranium and over 100 tons of plutonium. And according to Russian security officials, only about 30 percent of that amount of material is secured.
So we've got a lot to talk about, Mr. Secretary. But let me also state at the outset I have great respect for you. You've served in administrations, Democrat and Republican. You've been an ambassador. You know a lot about this subject. We're thankful that you're prepared to come before the committee.
And I will now yield for your testimony, and then we'll go to questioning. Thank you very much.
MR. FRIED: Thank you, Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, senators. I appreciate the invitation to appear before you.
Russia is a great country and one with which we must work. We have significant areas of common interest. We have significant differences. We are in a complicated period in relations with Russia, and so this hearing is well-timed.
Our strategic approach to Russia means that we defend and advance our interests while building on areas of common concern, as we have done. It means we must find the right balance between realism about Russia and the higher realism of commitment to defend and advance our values.
Russia today is not the Soviet Union. As President Bush has said, the Cold War is over. But the world has recently witnessed statements and initiatives from Russia that puzzle and concern us. In the past few months, Russian leaders and senior officials have threatened to suspend Russia's obligations under the CFE Treaty, criticized U.S. plans for a modest missile defense system, attacked U.S. agreements with Romania and Bulgaria to establish joint training facilities in those countries, and resisted a realistic, prompt resolution of Kosovo's final status.
These and other policy concerns have been accompanied by an inconsistent but worrying toughening of Russian rhetoric about the United States and the outside world. And all this occurs against a background of steady deterioration of democratic practices within Russia.
Yet, in other critical areas, our cooperation is advancing. These include nonproliferation, including nuclear nonproliferation; cooperation on North Korea and, in general, Iran; counterterrorism -- and here I would like to note Senator Biden's important proposal to create an international nuclear forensics library; cooperative threat reduction efforts, which result from Nunn-Lugar legislation; the NATO- Russia Council and the WTO accession process.
Against this complex background, President Bush and President Putin will meet in Kennebunkport, a venue intended to allow the leaders to step back, consider how to avoid rhetorical escalation and concentrate on a common agenda.
Many ask why Russia has sharpened its rhetoric. While Russia's electoral season may play a role, there may be deeper causes having to do with Russia's view of its recent history and its place in the world.
Most in the United States and Europe saw the end of communism and break-up of the Soviet Union as an extension of the self-liberation of Eastern Europe, starting in 1989. We hoped that Russia, liberated from communism and the imperative of empire, would follow the same pattern.
But many Russians see the 1990s as a decade of decline and chaos. Many have bitter memories of that time -- the wiped-out savings, the increasing dysfunctionality of the state, the rise of corrupt oligarchs. Many Russians associate these internal problems with democracy and reform, and also link them with the trauma of perceived external retreat.
In Russia, the perception exists that the collapse of the Soviet bloc undid Russia's political gains in Europe in the 20th Century and it disillusioned the Soviet Union, undid much of Russia's territorial expansion from the mid-17th Century. In fact, the 1990s brought about a Europe whole, free and at peace -- working with the United States, and with Russia welcomed to play its part as a valued partner.
In the view of many Russians, however, the European order that emerged in the 1990s was imposed on a vulnerable Russia. Many Russians cite NATO enlargement; the pro-Western orientation of Georgia and, to some extent, Ukraine; and the unqualified and enthusiastic integration of the Baltics, and even Central Europe, into the Euro- Atlantic community as an affront. For many Russians, this order is unjust and something to be challenged and perhaps revised.
In Russia's history, periods of domestic disorder ended with the reemergence of strong rulers. President Vladimir Putin is often seen by Russians in this context -- as a popular restorer of order and a state-builder. President Putin's popularity appears related to Russia's new wealth, generated in part by high world prices for oil and natural gas. The Russians also see him as a leader who had halted Russia's international retreat and sought to reverse it.
Mr. Chairman, to understand is not necessarily to agree. The United States does not regret the end of the Soviet bloc. The United States does not believe that any nation has the right to a sphere of influence over unwilling countries. My purpose is not to justify, but to explain. And this may provide context for current Russian-American relations and some recent Russian rhetoric and actions. President Bush and the administration have avoided a rhetorical race to the bottom. We have sought to address problems in a constructive spirit wherever possible while at the same time remaining firm in defense of our principles and our friends.
The administration seeks to protect and advance the new freedoms that have emerged in Eastern Europe and Eurasia in parallel with the development of partnership with Russia. Nevertheless, Russia's historical view seems to affect its relations with the world and the United States, especially in the region close to Russia. Zero-sum thinking is evident in Russian allegations that U.S. plans to establish rotational training facilities in Romania and Bulgaria are a potential threat to Russia and constitute permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.
They charge that these plans violate the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Neither is true, however. Last April 26th, President Putin suggested that he would consider suspending Russia's implementation of the CFE Treaty. At the extraordinary conference on CFE in Vienna last week, which I attended as head of delegation, we and our allies stated that we regard CFE as a cornerstone of European security. We will work to address Russia's problems but not at the expense of the integrity of the treaty regime.
Russia has reacted with hostility to plans by the United States to place elements of a limited missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic intended to protect us and our allies from threats from the Middle East. At the G-8 Summit, President Putin proposed that the Russian-operated radar in Azerbaijan be used jointly for missile defense purposes. This promising proposal implicitly acknowledged the potential ballistic missile threat from Iran, though recent statements from Russia are mixed. We look forward to discussions.
In Kosovo, a U.N.-mandated negotiating process led by Martti Ahtisaari has concluded that the only solution is internationally- supervised independence for Kosovo. We now seek a U.N. Security Council resolution to bring into force Ahtisaari's plan. The status quo is not stable. U.S. and European troops under NATO must not be put into an impossible position. In rejecting independence, Russia suggests that a Kosovo solution will constitute a precedent leading to the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. We've made clear that these are very different situations.
Russia's energy resources constitute a source of national wealth but also leverage in its region and perhaps beyond. Last month the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan issued a declaration pledging to cooperate on increasing natural gas cooperation and development. This declaration attracted misplaced speculation. In reality, it need have no direct impact on U.S. government efforts to support multiple gas pipelines from the Caspian region to Europe. We do not believe in monopolies, but in competitive open markets. We seek an open and cooperative energy relationship with Moscow. The United States also strongly supports Russia's WTO accession and seeks prompt graduation of Russia from Jackson-Vanic restrictions.
Russia's relations with its neighbors, Europe, and the United States take place alongside a broader troubling trends within Russia itself. Increasing pressure on journalists is especially problematic. Most television networks are in government hands or owned by allies of the Kremlin. Attacks on journalists, including the murders of Paul Klebnikov and Anna Politkovskaya among others, chill the media.
The U.S. and its European allies continue to support Russian democracy in civil society. We are not, charges to the contrary, seeking to interfere in Russia's domestic political development. We will, however, always stand for the advance of freedom and democracy. America and most of Europe abandoned some time ago the notion that the internal character of nations was none of our business.
Mr. Chairman, we will be working with a more assertive Russia for some time. We welcome a strong Russia, but one that is strong in 21st Century -- not 19th Century terms. A modern nation needs strong, independent institutions and civil society groups. A truly strong and confident nation has respectful relations with sovereign neighbors.
We must remain steady. And as a steady country, we must work with our European partners to devise common approaches. We cannot give way to lurches of exaggerated hopes followed by exaggerated disappointment. We must simultaneously advance our interests and values, pushing back when necessary, while seeking to broaden and deepen cooperation with Russia.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, three American administrations have achieved much in Europe and with Russia since 1989. I hope we can take lessons from our successes as well as learn our lessons about continuing challenges, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you for your attention.
SEN. BIDEN: Thank you very much. I'm sure all of us have many questions, but we'll stick to seven minutes on the first round here, if there is going to be a second round.
I have made no secret of the fact I find the two witnesses we're going to have on our next panel -- two of the most insightful foreign policy analysts of this generation -- and I find myself in agreement with Mr. Brzezinski. And I'm going to unfairly and characterize, summarize what I think is one of the elements of his argument and I'd like you to respond.
He suggests in the paper he submitted that there is a new elite that's emerged in Russia, that Putin has surrounded himself with former KGB operatives from, sort of, top to bottom. And this new elite has embraced -- for a lot of reasons, some of which you've referenced -- a strident nationalism as a substitute for communism. And that the U.S. has been largely silent as a consequence of, in terms of many of the actions that Russia has taken, because of our lost legitimacy with Guantanamo, credibility because of our inability to have been accurate or misleading about the war in Iraq.
Our power has been viewed in diminished terms because of us being tied down in Iraq, and that has produced a heightened need for us to seek and need Russia's support in, for example, Korea and Iran where we otherwise would not have needed that much support. And that it's emboldened Russia to act with impunity in its geopolitical backyard -- George, Ukraine, Estonia, Lithuania, Central Asia.
How do you respond to that broad assertion? Has our being tied in Iraq, our conduct of our war on terror, put is in a position where we have diminished capacity to deal with Russia's aberrations under Putin?
MR. FRIED: At a first cut of the noun, sir, I would say it is simply not true that we have been silent in the face of Russian pressure on some of its neighbors.
SEN. BIDEN: But has it limited our efficacy when we've spoken?
MR. FRIED: I'd put it this way: I think in the period 2003-2004 it weakened the dispute over Iraq, weakened transatlantic solidarity on other issues. And that was a very difficult period. It's a period when President Chirac, Chancellor Schroeder were toying -- seemed to be toying with the notion of Europe as a counterweight to the United States. And in that context, it was harder to develop what you, sir, rightly say ought to be a common U.S.-European approach to Russia.
However, since 2005 and since President Bush went to Europe after his reelection and reached out to Europe, that period has been put in the past. We're working very well with the Russians on some issues. We're working very well with the Europeans as we deal with Russian issues. We've been working with the Europeans on Baltic issues, on CFE, on issues of energy security. So I think that the linkage that Professor Brzezinski makes is not accurate with respect to current U.S.-European cooperation. And I'd like to cite Chancellor Merkel, who has managed to work with us very well while maintaining a somewhat critical position on other issues such as Guantanamo.
SEN. BIDEN: Let me -- I have a number of specific questions I'll submit for the record, but I'm trying to get a sense of the sort of factual basis that is the predicate for U.S. determinations relative to how to respond to these differences we have with Russia, and how we view the present circumstances of the Russian government and Russian people.
And three of the areas relate to the demographic collapse that I referenced where the World Bank says that the debilitating decline in the Russian population is unprecedented among industrial nations. Without studying the statistics or the bad jokes you hear in the Kremlin, which are -- you know, the joke circulating in Moscow asks, "What are the three most popular cars in Russia?" And you know the answer: "A Mercedes, BMW and a hearse." And do we start off with the proposition, the premise, that Russia does have a demographic collapse on its hands that has to be dealt with?
MR. FRIED: Demographic trends, until very recently, have been very bad for Russia. That is the lowered life expectancy, less-than- replacement birthrate. Public health issues have been of great concern to the Russians and the statistical basis for that is clear. I should add as a footnote that in the last year some of these statistics have begun to turn around, so we have to withhold judgment about projecting into the future.
What it means if you think strategically 15 or 20 years out, it may mean that Russia's current tensions with the United States and some of its neighbors are not necessarily the future Russian leadership may look differently about Russia's priorities. A strong Russia may find its way not by getting into wrangles with the United States, but by addressing some of these problems internally -- at least that is to be hoped.
SEN. BIDEN: Well, I have a number of other things I wanted to get into. But let me conclude by asking: Would you characterize for us now, to the best of your knowledge, what the administration's present attitude is about extending and/or amending or replacing the START Treaty, which is due to expire in December of '09?
MR. FRIED: I'm not one of the experts on that. There are people who are working on it. We do want to work with Russia to develop a post-START regime. We want to maintain transparency. We want to maintain predictability. There are discussions going on with the Russians now about how to do that. There are a range of options, some more formal and elaborate and others, but we certainly do want to have a predictable and confidence-building post-START regime.
SEN. BIDEN: Well, I hope that the administration can now conclude what should follow START or at least give the next president the opportunity to deal with it by extending START. I think it would be the single greatest negative legacy this administration could leave if it leaves us in a situation where there is no future architecture to follow on to START. I think it would an absolute -- I think this administration would be judged incredibly harshly by history if they leave it undone, unspoken to, unresolved by the time it leaves. I pray to God that won't be the case.
I yield the floor. I yield to my colleague, Senator Lugar.
SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I mentioned this in my opening comment, I want to follow on the chairman's last question. McClatchy News Service reported in the last few days that essentially those in the administration queried about the START regime's coming to a conclusion and what followed indicated that we do want to know a lot about what is going on, but we don't need to know everything. This was attributed to an unnamed administration official. And this follows essentially the reason or the testimony that the chairman and I heard from former Assistant Secretary John Bolton when he came before the committee testifying about the Moscow Treaty.
At that time, we were -- I had the feeling -- told that we were really fussing around details. Essentially, these were broad scopes of weapons destructions that would occur in the fullness of time over the course of the Moscow Treaty and the need to pin down how many missiles, warheads, whatever sort of month by month, year by year, was an old regime idea -- not of this administration. We were in the more modern phase.
However, we were reassured -- those of us who were still fussing about these details -- that the START regime was still there and it would govern this process. But now we find that there is a feeling that the START regime is not going to be the regime. And essentially, as you've suggested, transparency -- whatever this may mean.
Now, let me just say, from my own personal standpoint, we appreciate the Department of Defense sending to our office every month how many warheads were separated from missiles in that month. Last month, nine occurred; small detail in the midst of 13,300 also on the chart, where we started on this, but this is something in which, as a senator, I'm very much interested.
I hope the administration is as interested as I am and the chairman and that we're not in a situation that we're saying, "Not invented on my watch," and therefore we have a more modern idea of transparency.
It seems to me we do need to know these things, and the Russians probably need to know a good bit about what we are doing, and that has been the basis for transparency and for trust, back to the "Trust, but verify" idea. And we take verification very seriously.
So I appreciate you testified to the chairman you're not an expert on this issue, but I'm hopeful that from this hearing you can carry back to those who are expert on the issue that whatever they're having to say about this isn't selling. And they need to know that soon, not in the fullness of time, because START I comes to an end, and that is important to many of us.
Do you have any further comment about this general issue?
MR. FRIED: Senator, I will certainly take back to my colleagues your strong views. I can only add that we take seriously the need for post-START arrangements that will make both sides believe that they are better off. We're working with the Russians now, working through the details. The negotiations are going on. We've exchanged ideas. And we're looking at this in a cooperative, collaborative spirit.
So post-START arrangements certainly belong on the positive side of the ledger of U.S.-Russian relations, and it's our intention that they stay that way.
SEN. LUGAR: On a second issue of efforts that are underway to find common ground on both President Bush and President Putin's proposals on nuclear fuel assurances to countries who forfeit enrichment and reprocessing regimes, what is the current status of negotiations on a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement, a one-two- three agreement with Russia, for example, or any other agreement in which both the United States and Russia would offer to countries that forgo experiments that lead to potential weaponry that they will have nuclear fuel available at reasonable prices? Do you have any general comment on progress in that area?
MR. FRIED: Here, too, we're making good progress with the Russians. We hope to be able to conclude a one-two-three agreement which provides for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and would allow for commercial trade of nuclear materials and technologies to some of the ends you suggested, sir.
We are also working with the Russians on what's called a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, so-called GNEP. This is a joint initiative that we've been working on for a year. It's a very bold initiative that does, as you said, expand peaceful nuclear energy development and mitigating proliferation risks.
Under GNEP, supplier countries would provide fuel services on a commercial basis but an attractive basis to countries that employ nuclear energy for peaceful purposes but forgo the acquisition of sensitive fuel-cycle technologies.
This is a serious initiative. It is moving ahead. We need a one-two-three agreement to keep moving. But happily this is an area where we are making steady progress and hope to continue to do so.
SEN. LUGAR: Well, that's good news. And I know you'll try to keep the committee abreast with how that's proceeding, because it's of intense interest to many of us here.
MR. FRIED: This is an issue on which we're working actively and, I'm happy to report, productively.
SEN. LUGAR: Let me ask, finally, currently Russia is engaged in multilateral negotiations on WTO accession. What is the administration's view on Russia entry to WTO? Do you believe this would bring about greater transparency and rule of law, or do you believe that in the event that we have at least progress on that and the Congress is not prepared to be cooperative on the situation, that this would create a setback? Give us a general forecast on WTO.
MR. FRIED: We support Russia's entry into the WTO. They're one of the largest nations in the world not in the WTO regime. We think it would be helpful for all of the reasons you cited. That said, we're not going to cut Russia a special deal. They have to meet the requirements that we put forward for every country. We're working through that.
We have had some successes, and we've concluded our WTO bilateral agreement. We're now working through the multilateral WTO process. And issues like agricultural trade, intellectual property rights are things we're still working through. But there's no question that the administration supports Russia's early accession to the WTO, and we're putting our energy into this.
SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. BIDEN: Thank you.
Senator Hagel.
SEN. CHUCK HAGEL (R-NE): Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Secretary, welcome. Can you give us a sense of the agenda, objectives for the Bush-Putin meeting in Kennebunkport on July 1st and 2nd? What specifically are we looking at as to objectives? What are the main focuses of the agenda? And what do we hope that we will attain from that meeting?
MR. FRIED: I have to start with a caveat that it is always difficult to predict what the two presidents or any two presidents will, in fact, discuss. We in the bureaucracy can serve up any number of papers, and then they do what they want.
But, that said, we're looking at a couple of things. First, it's an opportunity to get out of Washington and out of Moscow and to have in-depth conversations about the relationship and the direction it's going. Kennebunkport can be the setting for informal discussions, and I think we're looking at this in that context.
There are a number of issues that could easily come up. During the president's discussion on the margins of the G-8, there was a lot of time devoted to missile defense. Issues that could come up include missile defense, Kosovo, the general tone of relations, nuclear cooperation and some of the areas where we're making real progress.
But again, this is more of an occasion for an in-depth look at the strategic direction of relations and an effort to put things on a good course for the future. The advantage of a site like Kennebunkport is that it provides a venue for just that kind of discussion.
SEN. HAGEL: Well, are you saying that then there is very little structure to the exchange as to specific topics that we would want to engage President Putin on?
MR. FRIED: There are a number of topics which we would like to engage President Putin on. I'm just being realistic about the way these things work. There are a number of particular items high on the bilateral agenda now. I mentioned some of them. And I don't -- I expect they will come up.
But there's a larger context, and I think that the two leaders may discuss -- again, may discuss -- the broader direction of relations and developments in Russia and its neighborhood and some of the things that have been troubling U.S.-Russian relations in recent months.
SEN. HAGEL: Well, then, could you give us a status on where you believe the current relationship stands concerning the missile issue in Eastern Europe, where we stand on Kosovo? And I assume those will be two topics that the two presidents will take up since they are as important in the short term as any two issues we have with Russia.
MR. FRIED: That's certainly the case. With respect to missile defense, we were intrigued and remained very interested in President Putin's proposal which he made at Heiligendamm to allow for joint use of the Russian radar facility in Azerbaijan. Our view is that the Russians by opening up this possibility have opened up the way for a much larger discussion of missile defense and the possibility of U.S.- Russia cooperation on missile defense. In our view, missile defense is not intended to degrade the Russian nuclear arsenal but is intended to deal with much smaller threats -- two, three missiles from a regime like Iran or some other regime in the region -- in the future. Since Russia is not intended as the object of the missile defense system, it stands to reason that we would want to work with Russia to deal with common threats. Ideally, the U.S. could work with Russia. We would work with our European allies, work with the Poles and Czechs. And all of these systems could be made compatible so that everyone's security would benefit. We hope to have experts-level discussions on the Russian proposal soon. We've offered to engage in discussions with the Russians on President Putin's proposal; we hope they take us up.
With respect to Kosovo, we've had intense discussions with the Russians for some time now. The issue has moved to the United Nations where we and our allies have introduced a resolution to implement the Ahtisaari plan. The Ahtisaari plan provides for Kosovo's supervised independence and for extensive protections for the Serb community. Russia has not accepted this approach. They have said that this poll issue needs more time. In our view, the situation on the ground will only deteriorate with time. As President Bush said last week in Albania, the time is now to get moving on a solution. So we have some intense work ahead of us with the Russians.
SEN. HAGEL: Thank you. How are we engaging the Russians on energy and energy security issues in light, specifically, of a couple of weeks ago, the announcement by the Russians of the new pipelines coming up from the south, Turkmenistan's gas and Kazakhstan's gas connecting to the main pipeline into Europe? Give us a sense of this issue -- energy -- and our relationship and our engagement with the Russians on it. In particular, as you know, we've had some issues where Shell Oil and other companies have lost some ground as the Russians have nationalized those interests.
MR. FRIED: Senator, we believe in an open and competitive energy regime -- open upstream at the producers, open through transport, open pipelines and downstream at the consumer level. We don't believe in monopolies or cartels. We think that there ought to be multiple sources of transport, multiple sources of gas for Europe, and we've made our views very clear.
We're doing several things at once. We are working with the Europeans on a common energy strategy based on these principles. We're also working with the Russians so that they properly understand our policy. We believe that Russia's energy future will require massive upstream technology and investment, and we think that a open and welcoming investment climate is conducive to that.
So we're working on multiple levels at once with the Russians, with the Europeans and with the producer countries, including in Central Asia. This issue is going to take some years to develop. We've had some successes with the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline -- (inaudible) -- gas pipeline, and we want to build on that. There's much more I could say, but that sketch covers the bases.
SEN. HAGEL: Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
SEN. BIDEN: First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Fried, for the cooperation that you've given and the information in regard to the whole issue of what's going to happen between Serbia and Kosovo. And I would like if possible to get another update on where we are in terms of the infrastructure to support this proposed settlement of that situation based on those recommendations from -- (inaudible). I think I'd like to see where that's at. The other thing that I'm concerned about is whether the Europeans are concerned as much about that infrastructure as they should be. I'd like you to comment on that. For example, the status of NATO forces, international police, the governance model that would be put in place. I'm real concerned about are we going to have the infrastructure there to support this in the event that the U.N. Security Council should go forward with it.
Second, I'd be interested in your comments about why Russia's not supporting the Ahtisaari in the U.N. Security Council. They say the problem that -- was it Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Trans-Dniester would go off and that's a precedent setting so that's the reason. But I just wonder, is that really the reason? And are they just trying to continue their influence with the Serbs there in Southeast Europe? Are they looking for a quid pro quo -- for example, missile defense deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic? What are they really up to here?
And last but not least, if we're not able to get a U.N. resolution through the Security Council, what options are available in dealing with that situation where you've just said the situation on the ground is real cause for concern?
MR. FRIED: Senator, those are excellent questions, and those are the ones we are dealing with on a daily basis.
First of all, the good news is I think the international community is ready to support a settlement based on the Ahtisaari plan. NATO has increased its forces, its readiness and its ability to keep order. We have been working very closely with our NATO allies, and we're confident that they're in much better shape than they were during the March 2004 riots, and they're ready to handle security challenges.
On the civilian side, we are ramping up preparing for the international civilian supervision of Kosovo during its transition phase. The European-police mission and law-enforcement mission is also similarly ramping up. I'm confident that we're ready to do this. Under Ahtisaari there would be 120-day transition period where we would actually stand up these bodies. But a lot of work is being done on the ground right now.
And Senator, I'm happy to provide details to you, and I appreciate both your interest and your insights that you've shared with us over the past year and a half.
Your second question has to do with Russian motives and, of course, that's hard, as an outsider, to evaluate. The Russians have not linked Kosovo with other issues, such as missile defense. They've just not made the linkage. They have, however, made the linkage between Kosovo and other separatist conflicts -- Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Trans-Dniester in Moldova. In our view and the view of our European allies, Kosovo is a unique case. It has no precedent value. It's unique because of the way Yugoslavia fell apart, unique because of the Security Council resolution that has put Kosovo under U.N. administration for the past eight years. It has no bearing on the other separatist conflicts. Russia disagrees. They have said that if Kosovo is independent, it is possible that Abkhazia and South Ossetia should be as well. We disagree with that position. We believe, and have said so publicly and privately, that we support the territorial integrity of Georgia. So we want to draw a hard line under Kosovo and say that this is a one-off case. We don't like the notion of precedent.
If there's no U.N. resolution, we obviously have a much more difficult situation. It is much better to do this with a Security Council resolution than without. There is no advantage to doing it without a resolution, there are only disadvantages. However, the situation, as I said, will not improve with age and neglect. We can't stay where we are and hope just to kick this can down the road. There are some problems that have to be dealt with. We're in very close consultations with our European partners about exactly this question. And as President Bush said last week, the time is now to move ahead, hopefully through the U.N. process. But in any event, we can't simply kick this down the road and hope for the best.
SEN. HAGEL: I have some concern, in terms of the options and the involvement of the European Union, because I have talked with a couple of members of the EU, and they have some concerns about the legality of taking action without a U.N. Security Council resolution. I think it's extremely imperative that we allow them to take a leadership role here, because it's their problem more than ours.
They're the ones that are going to go in, and they're going to be responsible for the governance and enforcement of the recommendations and so on. And I think the president might have restated -- have been more careful about his statement that he made when he was in Albania. I know he's probably up, and so I wanted to say something that would be well received, but I think in some quarters, particularly members of the EU, they felt that that was -- that they'd have preferred him not making that statement. So I think it's something that everyone's going to have to pay particular attention to in terms of dotting the i's and crossing the t's, in the event that we decide to go forward without a U.N. resolution.
And someone better really think about it, dot the i's, cross the t's, and so forth. I don't want to see another Iraq. And if we don't handle it carefully, it could blow up. It won't be that much of a problem as Iraq, but it could be something that could destabilize the area and do great harm to the stability that's been built up over the last several years. It would impact on Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, you name it.
MR. FRIED: It could be very difficult indeed. And I completely agree with you that we need to be working in lockstep with our European partners. We are going to work with them every step. We're in close consultation with them, and you are right that Kosovo affects their security more than ours. So, when I say that we're working through these issues with the Europeans, I do mean it. We take that very seriously.
I also agree that it is in no way advantageous to do things without a Security Council resolution. Doing things with a resolution certainly is our preference. Yesterday, we and our allies introduced a resolution in New York. We stand by that, and we want to work through the U.N. process. That certainly is our preference. And we hope that Russia will help us. But in any event, we're going to work with our European colleagues and allies very closely.
SEN. HAGEL: Thank you.
SEN. BIDEN: Thank you. Senator Feingold.
SEN. RUSS FEINGOLD (D-WI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fried, thank you for testifying. I'd like to talk for a minute about the state of democracy in Russia. You said in a May hearing with the Helsinki Commission that Secretary Rice is well informed of issues of civil society and democratization and the Russian political scene, and that she had extensive discussions, both with President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov about these issues.
So how seriously does the Russian government take U.S. concerns about these issues, and has there been any relaxation of current restrictions on civil society and political organizations? And if there has, which elements are due to U.S. initiatives? And if not, how does the administration intend to engage with Russia on these essential democratic tenets?
MR. FRIED: We have made issues of democracy, press freedom, civil society, and in particular, Russia's NGO law, a subject of bilateral discussions with Russia on many levels. Secretary Rice has done this, Undersecretary Burns has done this, I've done this. My colleague, Assistant Secretary Lowenkron for Human Rights has done this.
I can't give you with certainty causality between what we say to the Russians and their actions. I'll give you an example that is not necessarily proof. We did raise the NGO registration bill with them. We talked about it with both the government and the presidential administration and with the DUMA. As that bill was going through the committee process, some changes were made that made it somewhat less onerous.
Its application has not had the negative effects that some people feared. Is that the result of what we and the Europeans said to Russia? I can't make that claim. I can only tell you what we did, and I can tell you what the result was. Do the Russians listen to us? They don't like, I don't think, to be lectured to. They think that the '90s was a period that they were talked at, and they are resistant. But we have to speak out where we see problems. And we do. We have to find the right way to speak out, but we have to continue to do so.
We work with civil society groups, we work on behalf of a free press. We keep in contact with various opposition groups. In the end, Russia's fate is going to be in the hands of the Russians, both the government and civil society. The role of outsiders, well meaning otherwise, is going to be second order. Russia will find its way for good or ill. But in any event, we should not silent. We are well past the point where we regard another country's democracy or lack thereof with indifference.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you for that candid answer. I'd now like briefly touch on the Russia-Iran relationship and its relevance to the United States. I understand you believe Russia has been a cooperative player as of late with regard to sanctioning Iran. In the past, Russia has been a principal source of assistance in Iran's development of nuclear power. But now it seems to have reversed course of late by informing Iran that it expects spent nuclear fuel to be returned.
Russia has also refused to deliver nuclear fuel to Iran, stop construction on a nuclear plan, and agreed to U.N. Security Council sanctions, albeit somewhat weak ones. What do you think accounts for this reversal? What is driving Russia's apparent about-face and can we take it at face value?
MR. FRIED: Russia's policy and its actions have moved slowly but steadily in a more positive direction, from our point of view, over the past five or six years. I can't say for certain what accounts for it, but I suspect that some of it has to do with impatience with the way the Iranian regime has defied the world, and missed opportunity after opportunity to respond to reasonable proposals.
I think that the Russians do not appreciate the resistance that Iran has shown to their efforts to advance reasonable settlements, and I think that we have seen a tightening of Russian attitudes toward Iran. Certainly, the Russians were helpful on the two Security Council resolutions we have passed and we if get into a third resolution, as I suspect we will, I hope the Russians will be equally helpful.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Well, that being obviously a critical component -- dealing with Iran is forging a strong multilateral consensus, which some elements of this administration seem to embrace and others do not. And it seems to me that this needs to include a positive and active engagement from Russia, which you were just talking about. If Iran continues to move forward in the direction it is currently headed and does not cease a uranium enrichment, do you think Russia would be supportive of more punitive sanctions? I don’t know if that’s what you were referring to when you just talked about the next phase, but through the U.N Security Council on Iran -- even though in the past it has resisted harsher measures.
MR. FRIED: I can’t make a prediction as to Russian policy in the future. But the Russians over the past years have moved steadily in a direction of putting more pressure on Iran to come into compliance with what the U.N. asks of it. They have done so step by step in a measured fashion, but they have moved in this direction. Sometimes they have not moved as fast or as far as we would like, but in the end we’ve had some pretty good results. We certainly do believe in a multilateral approach to this problem. It’s been a difficult approach, but we’ve made real progress over the past two-and-a-half years and we intend to keep working in this direction.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, sir. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. LUGAR: Senator Isakson.
SEN. JOHNNY ISAKSON (R-GA): Thank you, Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I have -- Senator Voinovich is the preeminent Balkan expert as far as I’m concerned. I pay very close attention. He’s been there many, many times. I’ve only been there three times, but I’ve been to Kosovo as recently as back in January. So we know for sure -- first question -- if Russia would veto a Security Council resolution for Kosovo independence?
MR. FRIED: They have said that they cannot accept at this point any resolution that would provide for Kosovo’s supervised independence. I can’t say for sure what they would do -- what they will do with the resolution we introduced yesterday, though they have already publicly said it’s inadequate. We hope to be able to work with them on a resolution that would let us move forward. There were a lot of discussions at the G8 summ
