Sen. Biden Chairs an SFRC Hearing on Iraq with Amb. Crocker and Gen. Petraeus
April 8, 2008
BIDEN:
While our witnesses are taking their seat, let me begin by saying to the audience you are welcome. We're delighted to have you here. But I will tell you now anyone who speaks up, whether it's praiseworthy or otherwise, under any circumstances during the hearing, I will ask the Capitol Police to escort them permanently from the hearing room so that we can spend our time talking to the witnesses.
As I said in the anteroom to our distinguished witnesses, we're delighted to have you back.
I don't know how delighted you are to be back. But thank you for your patience. And, again, welcome to the Foreign Relations Committee.
To state the obvious, gentlemen, we, the two of you, and all of us on this platform share a common responsibility to defend the security of the United States of America. And your assignment to do so is focused on Iraq, and you perform that mission with extraordinary skill and courage in my view.
This country owes you and all the women and men who serve under each of you a genuine debt of gratitude, both those in uniform and out of uniform.
I want to, as one of the many on this platform who've visited Iraq on scores of occasions, or on many occasions, point out that there are -- that civilians are being killed. U.S. foreign service personnel are wounded, civilian personnel are injured, as well as our military women and men, and we owe them all, all of them, a great debt of gratitude. A debt, to state the obvious, we're not going to be able to fully repay.
But, gentlemen, your mission is limited to Iraq, and Congress and the president have a broader responsibility. We have to decide where and when to send troops, how to spend our treasure, not just in Iraq but around the entire world. We have to prioritize among the many challenges to our security -- I know you're fully aware of what they are -- but the many challenges to our security and the many needs of the American people that extend and exceed Iraq.
BIDEN:
We have to judge how our actions in one place affect ability to act in other places. And we have to make hard choices, based on finite resources.
As you rightly said this morning, General, it is not your job to answer those questions, although you're fully capable of answering those broader questions. It's the responsibility of those, as you put it in an exchange, as I recall, with Senator Warner, who have a broader view to make these larger decisions about allocation of resources.
Your focus is, and should be, and has been, well-focused on America's interests in Iraq and how our interests are affected, based on how things go in Iraq.
Our focus, then, must be America's security in the world and how to make us more secure at home overall.
The purpose of the surge was to bring violence down so that Iraq leaders could come together politically. Violence has come down. But the Iraqis have not come together, at least not in the fashion that was anticipated.
Our military has played a very important role in the surge, has played a role in reducing the violence. But so, as you've acknowledged, did other developments.
First, the Sunni Awakening, which preceded the surge, but was in fact enabled by the surge. Second, the Sadr cease-fire, which to state the obvious, could end as we're speaking. And, third, the sectarian cleansing that has left Baghdad, much of Baghdad, separated, with fewer targets to shoot at and to bomb -- over 4.5 million people displaced in and out of Iraq.
And these tactical gains are real, but they are relative. Violence is now where it was in 2005 and spiking up again. Iraq is still incredibly dangerous. And despite what the president said last week, it is very, very, very far from normal.
These are gains, but they are fragile gains. Awakening members, frustrated at the government's refusal to integrate them into the normal security forces, as you know better than I, General and Ambassador, could turn their guns on us tomorrow.
Sadr could end his cease-fire at any moment, and maybe his cease- fire is beyond his control to maintain. Sectarian chaos could resume with the bombing of another major mosque.
Most importantly, the strategic purpose of our surge, in my view, has not been realized, and that is genuine power sharing that gives Iraqi factions the confidence to pursue their interests peacefully.
What progress we've seen has come at the local level, with deal and truces made among tribes and tribe members and other grassroots groups. That is political progress, very different than was anticipated.
There is little sustainable progress, though, at the national level. And in my view, little evidence we're going to see any anytime soon.
Yes, Iraqi leaders have passed some law, but the details as they emerge and implementation as it lags, this progress seems likely to, in many cases, undermine reconciliation as opposed to advance it.
Despite this reality, it is your recommendation that when the surge ends, we should not further draw down American forces so that we would, for fear we'd jeopardize the progress we've made.
If that's the case, we're appreciably closer -- are we -- the question is, are we appreciably closer than we were 15 months ago to the goal the president set for Iraq when he announced the surge, and that is a country that can, quote, "govern itself, defend itself and sustain itself in peace."
If we stay the course, will we be any closer 15 months from now to that goal than we are today?
It seems to me that we're stuck where we started before the surge, with 140,000 troops in Iraq and no end in sight. That, in my view, is unsustainable.
It is unsustainable from a military perspective, according to serving and retired military officers, and it is unacceptable to the American people.
The president likes to talk about the consequences of drawing down our forces in Iraq. And he makes a dire case, which you echoed this morning. That's a debate we should have.
The president's premises are highly debatable. We've heard detailed testimony in this committee from military and civilian experts that disagree with the premises and the conclusions as what would follow if, in fact, we withdrew from Iraq.
Would starting to leave really strengthen Al Qaida in Iraq and give it a launching pad to attack America, as has been asserted, or would it eliminate what's left of Al Qaida's indigenous support in Iraq?
What about Al Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the people who actually attacked us on 9/11? We know where they live. We know who they are. And we don't have the capacity to do much about it.
If we leave, would they be emboldened? Or would, to paraphrase a national intelligence estimate on terrorism, would they lose one of their most effective recruiting tools, the notion that we're in Iraq to stay with permanent military bases and control over the oil? Not our stated goals, but the propaganda tool being used.
And would they, in fact, if we left Iraq, risk the full measure of American might which they're able to avoid now in Afghanistan and Pakistan?
What about Iran? Would leaving actually increase it's already huge influence on Iraq? Or would it shift the burden of Iraq from us to them and make our forces a much more credible deterrent to Iranian misbehavior?
These are open questions. Equally competent people as you have testified before us that the results would be the opposite that you and the president have posited. Worth debating.
BIDEN:
Would our departure accelerate sectarian chaos or would it cause the Iraqi leaders and Iraqi neighbors to finally begin to act responsibly and make the compromises they have to make in order to literally be able to live -- if they're as exhausted with fighting as is asserted?
We could debate the consequences of starting to leave Iraq. It's totally legitimate. But more importantly is the debate we're not having.
We should also talk about what the president refuses to acknowledge: the increasingly intolerable cost of staying in Iraq. The risks of leaving Iraq are debatable.
The cost of staying with 140,000 troops are totally knowable, and they get steeper and steeper and steeper every single day.
The continued loss of life and limb of our soldiers; the emotional and economic strain on our troops and their families due to repeated extended tours, as Army Chief of Staff George Casey recently told us; the drain on our treasury, $12 billion every month, that we could spend on housing, education, health care, or reducing the deficit; the impact on the readiness of our armed forces, tying down so many troops that we've heard from vice chief of staff of the Army, Richard Cody, we don't have any left over to deal with new emergencies; the inability to send soldiers to the real central front in the war on terror which lies between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where Al Qaida has regrouped and is plotting new attacks and is alive and well, and we know where they live.
Last month in Afghanistan, General McNeill, who commands the international forces, told me that with two extra combat brigades -- about 10,000 soldiers -- he could turn around the security situation in the south where the Taliban is on the move. But he then readily acknowledged he knows they're not available. There's no way he can get 10,000 troops, because they're tied down in Iraq.
Even when we do pull troops out of Iraq, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mullen says we would have on to send them home for a year of rest and retraining before we could even send them to Afghanistan, where everyone acknowledges more troops are needed.
BIDEN:
Senator Levin, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and I wrote to Secretaries Rice and Gates to request that, like you, General McNeill and our ambassador to Afghanistan testify jointly before our committees so we can make logical choices based on specific requests coming out of each of those theaters as to which is the place we should spend our limited resources.
We've spent less in six years in Afghanistan than we spend in three weeks -- three weeks in Iraq. So we still don't have a response, I might add.
And 15 months into the surge, we've gone from drowning to treading water. We're still spending $3 billion every week and we're still losing -- thank God it's less -- but 30 to 40 American lives every month.
We can't keep treading water without exhausting ourselves. But that's what the president seem to be asking us to do. He can't tell us when or even if Iraqis will come together politically. He can't tell us when or even if we will draw down below the pre-surge level. He can't tell us when or even if Iraq will be able to stand on its own two feet.
He says the Iraqi army will stand down -- the Iraqi army stands up -- which Iraqi army? A sectarian Iraqi army made up of all the Shia, or an inter-ethnic Iraqi army trusted by all the people?
He can't tell us when or even if this war will end.
BIDEN:
Most Americans want this war to end. I believe all do, including you gentlemen. They want us to come together around a plan to leave Iraq without leaving chaos behind. They are not defeatist, as some have suggested. They're patriots. They understand the national interest and the great things America can achieve if we responsibly end the war we should not have started.
I believe it's fully within our power to do that, and the future of our soldiers, our security and our country will be much brighter when we succeed in getting out of Iraq without leaving chaos behind.
I yield to my colleague, Chairman Lugar.
LUGAR:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I join you in welcoming General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker back to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
We truly commend their skilled service in Iraq and the achievements that United States military and diplomatic personnel have been able to bring forward under their leadership.
We're grateful for the decline in fatalities among Iraqi civilians and United States personnel and the expansion of security in many regions and neighborhoods throughout Iraq.
Last week, our committee held a series of hearings in anticipation of today's hearing. We engaged numerous experts on the situation in Iraq and on strategies for moving forward. Our discussions yielded several premises that might guide our discussion today.
First, the surge has succeed in improving the conditions on the ground in many areas of Iraq and creating, quote, "breathing space," end of quote, for exploring political accommodation. Economic activity has improved and a few initial political benchmarks have been achieved.
The United States took advantage of Sunni disillusionment with Al Qaida tactics, the Sadr faction's desire for a cease-fire, and other factors to construct multiple cease-fire agreements with tribal and sectarian leaders. Tens of thousands of Iraqi Sunnis who previously had sheltered Al Qaida and targeted Americans are currently contributing security operations drawn by their interest in self- preservation and United States payments.
Second, security improvements derived purely from American operations have reached or almost reached a plateau. Military operations may realize some marginal security gains in some areas, but these gains are unlikely to be transformational for the country beyond what has already occurred. Progress moving forward depends largely on political events in Iraq.
LUGAR:
Third, despite the improvements in security, the central government has not demonstrated that it can construct a top-down political accommodation for Iraq. The Iraqi government is afflicted by corruption and shows signs of sectarian bias. It still has not secured the confidence of most Iraqis or demonstrated much competence in forming the basic government functions, including managing Iraq's oil wealth, overseeing reconstruction programs, delivering government assistance to the provinces or creating jobs.
Fourth, though portions of the Iraqi population are tired of the violence and would embrace some type of permanent cease-fire or political accommodation. Sectarian and tribal groups remain heavily armed and are focused on expanding or solidifying their positions.
The lack of technical competence within the Iraqi government, external interference by the Iranians and others, the corruption and criminality at all levels of Iraqi society, a departure of Iraq of many of it's most talented citizens, the lingering terrorist capability of Al Qaida in Iraq seemingly intractable disputes over territories and oil assets, and power struggles between and within sectarian and tribal groups all impede a sustainable national reconciliation.
Iraq will be an unstable country for the foreseeable future. And if some type of political settlement can be reached, it will be inherently fragile.
Fifth, operations in Iraq have severely strained the United States military.
LUGAR:
And these strains will impose limit on the size and length of future deployments to Iraq, irrespective of political divisions or the outcome of the elections in our country.
Last week, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Richard Cody, the vice chief of staff for the Army, testified, and I quote, "Today our Army is out of balance. The current demand for forces in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds our sustainable supply of soldiers, of units and equipment, and limits our ability to provide ready forces for other contingencies.
"Our readiness, quite frankly, is being consumed as fast as we build it. Lengthy and repeated deployments, with insufficient recovery time at home stations have placed incredible stress on our soldiers and on their families, testing the resolve of the all- volunteer force like never before," end of quote, from the general.
Later in the hearing, General Cody said, and I quote again, "I've never seen our lack of strength of strategic depth be at where it is today," end of quote.
Limitations imposed by these stresses were echoed in our own hearings. General Barry McCaffrey asserted that troop levels in Iraq have to be reduced, stating that the Army is experiencing significant recruiting and retention problems and that 10 percent of recruits should not be in uniform.
Major General Robert Scales testified, and I quote, "In a strange twist of irony, for the first time since the summer of 1863, the number of ground soldiers available is determining American policy rather than policy determining how many troops we need.
"The only point of contention is how precipitous will be the withdrawal and whether the schedule of withdrawal should be a matter of administration policy," end of quote.
If one accepts the validity of all or most of these five premises, the terms of our inquiry today are much different than they were last September.
At that time, the president was appealing to Congress to allow the surge to continue to create breathing space for a political accommodation. Today, the questions are whether and how improvements in security can be converted into political gains that can stabilize Iraq, despite the impending drawdown of United States troops.
Simply appealing for more time to make progress is insufficient. Debate over how much progress we have made and whether we can make more is less illuminating than determining whether the administration has a definable political strategy that recognizes the time limitations we face and seeks a realistic outcome designed to protect American vital interests.
Our witnesses last week offered a wide variety of political strategies for how we might achieve an outcome that would preserve regional stability, prevent the worst scenarios for bloodshed, and protect basic United States national security interests.
LUGAR:
These included focusing more attention on building of the Iraqi army, embracing the concept of federalism, expanding the current bottom-up cease fire matrix into a broader national accommodation, negotiating with the Iraqis in the context of an announced U.S. withdrawal, and creating a regional framework to bolster Iraqi security.
But none of our witnesses last week claimed that the task in Iraq was simple or the outcome would likely fulfill the idea of a pluralist democratic nation closely aligned with the United States.
All suggested that spoiling activities and the fissures in Iraqi society could undermine even the most well-designed efforts by the United States.
Unless the United States is able to convert progress made thus far into a sustainable political accommodation that supports our long- term national security objectives in Iraq, this progress will have limited meaning.
We cannot assume that sustaining some level of progress is enough to achieve success, especially when we know that current American troop levels in Iraq have to be reduced and spoiling forces will be at work in Iraq. We need a strategy that anticipates a political end game and employs every plausible means to achieve it.
I thank General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker for joining us. I look forward to our discussion of how the United States can define success and then achieve our vital objectives in Iraq.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
BIDEN:
Thank you.
Gentlemen, Mr. Ambassador, I think it's on.
CROCKER:
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to provide my assessment on political, economic and diplomatic developments in Iraq.
When General Petraeus and I reported to you in September, I gave my considered judgment on whether our goals in Iraq were attainable.
Can Iraq develop into a united, stable country with a democratically elected government operating under the rule of law?
Last September, I said that the (inaudible) trajectory, of political, economic and diplomatic developments in Iraq was upwards, although the slope of that line was not steep.
Developments over the past seven months have strengthened my sense of a positive trend. Immense challenges remain and progress is uneven and often frustratingly slow, but there is progress. Sustaining that progress will require continuing U.S. resolve and commitment.
What has been achieved is substantial, but it is also reversible. Five years ago, the statue of Saddam Hussein was toppled in Baghdad.
CROCKER:
The euphoria of that moment evaporated long ago. But as Iraq emerges from the shattering violence of 2006 and the early part of 2007, there is reason to sustain that commitment and the enormous investment we have made in the lives of our young men and women and our resources.
Let me describe the developments upon which I base such a judgment.
The first is at the national level in the form of legislation and the development of Iraq's parliament. In September, we were disappointed that Iraq had not yet completed key laws. In the last several months, Iraq's parliament has formulated, debated vigorously, and in many cases passed legislation dealing with vital issues of reconciliation and nation building.
A pension law extended benefits to individuals who had been denied them because of service with the previous regime.
The accountability and justice law, de-Baathification reform, passed after lengthy and often contentious debate, reflecting a strengthened spirit of reconciliation, as does a far-reaching amnesty law.
The provincial powers law is a major step forward in defining the relationship between the federal and provincial governments. This involved a debate about the fundamental nature of the state similar in its complexity to our own lengthy and difficult debate over states' rights.
The provincial powers law also called for provincial elections by October 1 of this year, and an electoral law is now under discussion that will set the parameters for these elections.
All major parties have announced their support for elections, which will be a major step forward in Iraq's political development and will set the stage for national elections in late 2009.
A vote by the Council of Representatives in January to change the design of the Iraqi flag means that flag now flies in all parts of the country for the first time in years.
And the passage of the 2008 budget, with record amounts for capital expenditures, ensures that the federal and provincial governments will have the resources for public spending.
CROCKER:
All of this has been done since September. These laws are not perfect and much depends on their implementation, but they are important steps.
Also important has been the development of Iraq's council of representatives as a national institution. Last summer, the parliament suffered from persistent and often paralyzing disputes over leadership and procedure. Now it is successfully grappling with complex issues and producing viable trade-offs and compromised packaged.
As debates in Iraq's parliament become more about how to resolve tough problems in a practical way, Iraqi politics have become more fluid. While these politics still have a sectarian bent and basis, coalitions have formed around issues and sectarian political groupings, which often were barriers to progress -- have become more flexible.
Let me also talk about the intangibles: attitudes among the Iraqi people. In 2006 and in 2007, many understandably questioned whether hatred between Iraqis of different sectarian backgrounds was so deep that a civil war was inevitable.
A Sunni Awakening movement in Anbar, which so courageously confronted Al Qaida continues to keep the peace in the area and keep Al Qaida out.
Fallujah, once a symbol for violence and terror, is now one of Iraq's safest cities.
The Shia holy cities of Karbala and Najaf are enjoying security and growing prosperity in the wake of popular rejection of extremist militia activity. The Shia clerical leadership, the (inaudible), based in Najaf, has played a quiet but important role in support of moderation and reconciliation.
In Baghdad, we can see Iraqis are not pitted against each other purely on the basis of sectarian affiliation.
The security improvements of the last -- of the past month have diminished atmosphere of suspicion and allowed for acts of humanity that transcend sectarian identities.
CROCKER:
When I arrived in Baghdad a year ago, my first visit to a city district was to the predominantly Sunni area of Durra. Surge forces were just moving into neighborhoods still gripped by Al Qaida. Residents were also terrorized by extremist Shia militias.
Less than a year later, at the end of February, tens of thousands of Shia pilgrims walked through those same streets on their way to Karbala to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. Sunni residents offered food and water as they passed through, and some joined the pilgrimage.
News from Iraq in recent weeks has been dominated by the situation in Basra. Taken as a snapshot, with scenes of increasing violence and masked gunmen in the streets, it is hard to see how the situation supports a narrative of progress in Iraq. And there is still very much to be done to bring full government control to the streets of Basra and eliminate entrenched extremist, criminal and militia groups.
But when viewed with a broader lens, the Iraqi decision to take on these groups in Basra has major significance.
First, a Shia-majority government led by Prime Minister Maliki has demonstrated its commitment to taking on criminals and extremists regardless of sectarian identity.
Second, Iraqi security forces led these operations in Basra and in towns and cities throughout the south. British and U.S. elements played important roles, but these were supporting roles, as they should be.
The operation in Basra has also shaken up Iraqi politics. The prime minister returned to Baghdad from Basra shortly before General Petraeus and I left for Washington, and he is confident in his decision and determined to press the fight against these illegal groups, but also determined to take a hard look at lessons learned.
The efforts of the government against extremist militia elements have broad political support, as a statement April 5 by virtually all of Iraq's main political leaders -- Sunni, Shia and Kurd -- made clear.
A wild card remains the Sadrist trend and whether the Iraqis can continue to drive a wedge between the other elements of the trend and Iranian-supported special groups.
CROCKER:
A dangerous development in the immediate wake of the Basra operation was what appeared to be a reunification between special groups and mainline Jaish al-Mahdi. We also saw a potential collapse of the Jaish al-Mahdi freeze in military operations.
As the situation unfolded, however, Muqtada al-Sadr issued a statement that disavowed anyone possessing heavy weapons, which would include the signature weapons of the special groups.
This statement can further sharpen the distinction between members of the Sadrist trend, who should not pose a threat to the Iraqi state, and members of the special groups, who very much do.
One conclusion I draw from these signs of progress is that the strategy that began with the surge is working. This does not mean that U.S. support should be open-ended, or that the level and nature of our engagement should not diminish over time.
It is in this context that we have begun negotiating a bilateral relationship between Iraq and the United States.
In August, Iraq's five principal leaders requested a long-term relationship with the United States, to include economic, political, diplomatic and security cooperation.
The heart of this relationship will be a legal framework for the presence of American troops similar to that which exists in nearly 80 countries around the world.
The Iraqis view the negotiation of this framework as a strong affirmation of Iraqi sovereignty, placing Iraq on par with other U.S. allies and removing the stigma of Chapter 7 status under the U.N. Charter, pursuant to which coalition forces presently operate.
Such an agreement is in Iraq's interest and ours.
U.S. forces will remain in Iraq beyond December 31, 2008, when the U.N. resolution presently governing their presence expires. Our troops will need basic authorizations and protections to continue operations, and this agreement will provide those authorizations and protections.
The agreement will not establish permanent bases in Iraq, and we anticipate that it will expressly forswear them.
CROCKER:
The agreement will not specify troop levels, and it will not tie the hands of the next administration. Our aim is to ensure that the next president arrives in office with a stable foundation upon which to base policy decisions, and that is precisely what this agreement will do. Congress will remain fully informed as these negotiations proceed in the coming weeks and months.
Mr. Chairman, significant challenges remain in Iraq. A reinvigorated cabinet is necessary both for political balance and to improve the delivery of services to Iraq's people. Challenges to the rule of law, especially corruption, are enormous. Disputed internal boundaries, the Article 140 process, must be resolved. The return of refugees and the internally displaced must be managed. The rights of women and minorities must be better protected.
Iraqis are aware of the challenges they face and are working on them.
Iraq's political progress will not be linear. Developments, which are on the whole positive, can still have unanticipated or destabilizing consequences. The decision to hold provincial elections, vital for Iraq's democratic development and long-term stability, will also produce new strains.
Some of the violence we have seen recently in southern Iraq reflects changing dynamics within the Shia community as the political and security context changes.
Such inflection points underscore the fragility of the situation in Iraq, but it would be wrong to conclude that any eruption of violence marks the beginning of an inevitable backslide.
CROCKER:
With respect to economics and capacity-building, in September, I reported to you that there had been some gains in Iraq's economy and in the country's efforts to build capacity to translate these gains into more effective governance and services.
The Iraqis have built on these gains over the past months, as is most evident in the revival of marketplaces across Iraq and the reopening of long-shuttered businesses.
According to a Center for International Private Enterprise poll last month, 78 percent of Iraqi business owners surveyed expect the Iraqi economy to grow significantly in the next two years.
With improving security and rising government expenditures, the IMF projects that Iraq's GDP will grow 7 percent in real terms this year, and inflation has been tamed. The dinar remains strong, and the central bank has begun to bring down interest rates.
Iraq's 2008 budget has allocated $13 billion for reconstruction, and a $5 billion supplemental budget this summer will further invest export revenues in building the infrastructure and providing the services that Iraq so badly needs.
This spending also benefits the United States. Iraq recently announced its decision to purchase 40 commercial aircraft from the U.S. at an estimated cost of $5 billion.
As Iraq is now earning the financial resources it needs for bricks-and-mortar construction through oil production and export, our assistance has shifted to capacity development and an emphasis on local and post-kinetic development through our network of provincial reconstruction teams and ministerial advisers.
The era of U.S.-funded major infrastructure projects is over. We are seeking to ensure that our assistance in partnership with the Iraqis leverages Iraq's own resources.
Our 25 PRTs throughout Iraq have been working to improve provincial and local governance capabilities, particularly in budget design and execution.
CROCKER:
They're also helping to establish critical linkages between provincial and federal governments.
Our PRTs are great enablers, and we are working to ensure their continued viability as our forces redeploy. The relatively small amounts they disburse through quick response funds have major impacts in local communities, and congressional support is important, as it is for other vital programs in the F.Y. '08 global war on terrorism supplemental request.
Iraq increasingly is using its own resources to support projects and programs that we have developed. It has committed approximately $200 million in support of a program to provide vocational training for concerned local citizens who stood up with us in the Awakening.
Our technical assistance advisers have helped design new procurement procedures for Iraq's Oil Ministry. We developed the technical specifications from which Iraq's state-owned oil company will build new oil export platforms and underwater pipelines worth over $1 billion.
And in Baghdad, in the last three months, the municipality has stepped up to take over labor contracts worth $100 million that we had been covering under the Community Stabilization Program.
Like so much else, Iraq's economy is fragile, the gains reversible, and the challenges ahead substantial. Iraq will need to continue to improve governmental capacity, pass national-level hydrocarbon legislation, improve electrical production and distribution, improve the climate for foreign and domestic investment, create short- and long-term jobs, and tackle the structural and economic problems of the vital agricultural sector.
We will be helping the Iraqis as they take on this challenging agenda, along with other international partners, including the United Nations and the World Bank.
Mr. Chairman, along with the security surge last year, we also launched a diplomatic surge focused on enhancing U.N. engagement in Iraq, anchoring the International Compact with Iraq and establishing an expanded neighbors process, which serves as a contact group in support of Iraq.
CROCKER:
The United Nations has taken advantage of an expanded mandate granted to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, UNAMI, to increase the scope of its activities and the size of its staff. Under dynamic new leadership, UNAMI is playing a key role in preparing for provincial elections and in providing technical assistance to resolve disputed internal boundaries.
UNHCR has returned international staff to Iraq to assist with the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.
The International Compact with Iraq provides a five-year framework for Iraq to reform its economy and to achieve economic self- sufficiency in exchange for long overdue Saddam error debt relief.
Preparations are under way for a ministerial-level compact meeting in Sweden next month. Seventy-four nations were represented in last year's gathering in Egypt.
Iraq's neighbors also understand they have a major interest in Iraq's future. Turkey hosted the second ministerial meeting of Iraq's neighbors in November and Kuwait will host a third meeting later this month. In addition to all of Iraq's neighbors, these expanded conferences also include the Permanent Five members of the Security Council, the Arab League and the G-8.
Support from Arab capitals has not been strong and it must improve for the sake of Iraq and for the sake of the region. Bahrain's recent announcement that it will return an ambassador to Baghdad is welcomed and other Arab states should follow suit.
Iraq is a multi-ethnic state, but it is also a founding member of the Arab League and an integral part of the Arab world.
Last month Iraq hosted a meeting of the Arab Parliamentary Union, bringing the leaders of Arab parliaments and consultative counsels to Iraq for the first major inter-Arab gathering since 1990.
CROCKER:
It is noteworthy that the meeting was held in the Kurdish city of Irbil under the recently redesigned Iraqi flag, highlighting both the remarkable prosperity and stability of Iraq's Kurdish region and the presence of the Iraqi federal state.
We hope that this event will encourage more active Arab engagements with Iraq, and we expect that Prime Minister Maliki's effort against Shia extremist militias in Basra will receive Arab support.
The presence of the PKK terrorist organization in the remote mountains of Iraq along the Turkish border have produced tension between Turkey and Iraq and led to a Turkish cross-border operation in February, including movement of Turkish ground forces into Iraq.
At the same time, both governments are working to strengthen their ties, and Iraqi President Talabani made a successful visit to Turkey in March.
Syria plays an ambivalent role. We have seen evidence of efforts to interdict some foreign fighters seeking to transit Syria to Iraq, but others continues to cross the border. Syria also harbors individuals who finance and support the Iraqi insurgency.
Iran continues to undermine the efforts of the Iraqi government to establish a stable, secure state through the arming and training of criminal militia elements engaged in violence against Iraqi security forces, coalition forces, and Iraqi civilians.
The extent of Iran's malign influence was dramatically demonstrated when these militia elements clashed with Iraqi government forces in Basra and Baghdad.
CROCKER:
When the president announced the surge, he pledged to seek and destroy Iranian-supported lethal networks inside Iraq. We know more about those networks and their Quds Force sponsors than ever before, and we will continue to aggressively uproot and destroy them.
At the same time, we support constructive relations between Iran and Iraq and are participating in a tripartite process to discuss the security situation in Iraq. Iran has a choice to make.
Mr. Chairman, almost everything about Iraq is hard. It will continue to be hard as Iraqis struggle with the damage and trauma inflicted by 35 years of totalitarian Baathist rule.
But hard does not mean hopeless, and the political and economic progress of the past few months is significant. These gains are fragile and they are reversible.
Americans have invested a great deal in Iraq in blood, as well as treasure, and they have the right to ask whether this is worth it, whether it is now time to walk away and let the Iraqis fend for themselves.
Iraq has the potential to develop into a stable, secure, multiethnic, multi-sectarian democracy under the rule of law. Whether it realizes that potential is ultimately up to the Iraqi people. Our support, however, will continue to be critical.
I said in September that I cannot guarantee success in Iraq. This is still the case, although I think we are now closer.
I remain convinced that a major departure from our current engagement would bring failure, and we have to be clear with ourselves about what failure would mean.
CROCKER:
Al Qaida is in retreat in Iraq, but it is not yet defeated. Al Qaida's leaders are looking for every opportunity they can to hang on.
Osama bin Laden has called Iraq the perfect base, and it reminds us that a fundamental aim of Al Qaida is to establish itself in the Arab world. It almost succeeded in Iraq. We cannot allow it a second chance.
And it is not only Al Qaida that would benefit. Iran has said publicly it will fill any vacuum in Iraq, and extremist Shia militias would reassert themselves. We saw them try in Basra and Baghdad two weeks ago.
And in all of this, the Iraqi people would suffer on a scale far beyond what we have already seen. Spiraling conflict could also draw in neighbors, with devastating consequences for the region and the world.
Mr. Chairman, as monumental as the events of the last five years have been in Iraq, Iraqis, Americans and the world ultimately will judge us far more on the basis of what will happen than what has happened. In the end, how we leave and what we leave behind will be more important than how we came.
Our current course is hard, but it is working. Progress is real, although still fragile. We need to stay with it.
Mr. Chairman, in the months ahead, we will continue to assist Iraq as it pursues further steps toward reconciliation and economic development. Over time, this will become increasingly an Iraqi process, as it should be.
Our efforts will focus on increasing Iraq's integration regionally and internationally, assisting Iraqi institutions locally and nationally, to strengthen the political process and promote economic activity, and supporting the United Nations as Iraq carries out local elections toward the end of the year.
These efforts will require an enhanced civilian commitment and continued support from the Congress and the American people.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to recognize and thank all those who serve our country in Iraq, military and civilian. Their courage and commitment at great sacrifice has earned the admiration of all Americans.
CROCKER:
They certainly have mine, and it is an honor to be with them out there.
Thank you, sir.
BIDEN:
General Petraeus?
PETRAEUS:
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide an update on the security situation in Iraq and to discuss the recommendations I recently provided to my chain of command.
Since Ambassador Crocker and I appeared before you seven months ago there has been significant but uneven progress in Iraq.
Since September, levels of violence and civilian deaths have been reduced substantially, Al Qaida-Iraq and a number of other extremist elements have been dealt serious blows, and capabilities of Iraqi security force elements have grown. There has been noteworthy involvement of local Iraqis in local security.
Nonetheless, the situation in certain areas is still unsatisfactory and innumerable challenges remain. Moreover, as events in the past two weeks have reminded us and as I have repeatedly cautioned, the progress made since last spring is fragile and reversible.
Still, security in Iraq is better than it was when Ambassador Crocker and I reported to you last September, and it is significantly better than it was 15 months ago when Iraq was on the brink of civil war and the decision was made to deploy additional U.S. forces to Iraq.
A number of factors have contributed to the progress that has been made.
First, of course, has been the impact of increased numbers of coalition and Iraqi forces. You're well aware of the U.S. surge. Less recognized is that Iraq has also conducted a surge, adding well over 100,000 additional soldiers and police to the ranks of its security forces in 2007 and slowly increasing its capacity to deploy and employ these forces.
A second factor has been the employment of coalition and Iraqi forces in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations across the country, deployed together to safeguard the Iraqi people, to pursue Al Qaida, to combat criminals and militia extremists, to foster local reconciliation, and to enable political and economic progress.
Another important factor has been the attitudinal shift among certain elements of the Iraqi population. Since the first Sunni Awakening in late 2006, Sunni communities in Iraq increasingly have rejected Al Qaida's indiscriminate violence and extremist ideology.
These communities also recognize that they could not share in Iraq's bounty if they didn't participate in the political arena.
PETRAEUS:
Over time, the Awakenings have prompted tens of thousands of Iraqis, some former insurgents, to contribute to local security as so-called Sons of Iraq.
With their assistance and with relentless pursuit of Al Qaida- Iraq, the threat posed by AQI, while still lethal and substantial, has been reduced substantially.
The recent flare-up in Basra, southern Iraq, and Baghdad underscored the importance of the cease-fire declared by Muqtada al- Sadr last fall, as another factor in the overall reduction in violence.
Recently, of course, some militia elements became active again. Though a Sadr stand-down order resolved the situation to a degree, the flare-up also highlighted the destructive role Iran has played in funding, training, arming and directing the so-called special groups, and generated renewed concern about Iran in the minds of many Iraqi leaders. Unchecked, the special groups pose the greatest long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq.
As we look to the future, our task, together with our Iraqi partners, will be to build on the progress achieved and to deal with the many challenges that remain.
I do believe that we can do this while continuing the ongoing drawdown of the surge forces.
In September, I described the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq as a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources.
This completion continues, influenced heavily by outside actors. And its resolution remains the key to producing long-term stability in Iraq.
Various elements push Iraq's ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists and criminal gangs pose significant threats.
Al Qaida's senior leaders, who still view Iraq as the central front in their global strategy, send funding, direction and foreign fighters to Iraq.
Actions by neighboring states compound Iraq's challenges. Syria has taken some steps to reduce the flow of foreign fighters through its territory, but not enough to shut down the key network that supports Al Qaida-Iraq. And Iran has fueled the violence, in a particularly damaging way through its lethal support to the special groups.
Finally, insufficient Iraqi government capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust and corruption add to Iraq's problems.
PETRAEUS:
These challenges in recent weeks, violence not withstanding, Iraq's ethno-sectarian competition in many areas is now taking place more through debate and less through violence.
In fact, the recent escalation of violence in Baghdad and southern Iraq was dealt with, temporarily at least, by most parties, acknowledging that the rational way forward is through political dialogue rather than street fighting.
As I stated at the outset, though Iraq obviously remains a violent country, we do see progress in the security arena.
As this chart illustrates, for nearly six months, security incidents have been at a level not seen since early to mid-2005, though the level did spike in recent weeks as a result of the violence in Basra and Baghdad. The level of incidents has, however, begun to turn down again, though the period ahead will be a sensitive one.
As our primary mission is to help protect the population, we closely monitor the number of Iraqi civilians killed due to violence.
As this chart reflects, civilian deaths have decreased over the past year to a level not seen since the February 2006 Samarra mosque bombing that set off the cycle of sectarian violence that tore the very fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and early 2007.
This chart also reflects our increasing use of Iraqi-provided reports, with the top line reflecting coalition and Iraqi data, and the bottom line reflecting coalition-confirmed data only.
No matter which data set is used, civilian deaths due to violence have been reduced significantly, though more work clearly needs to be done.
Ethno-sectarian violence is a particular concern in Iraq, as it is a cancer that continues to spread if left unchecked. As the box in the bottom left of this chart shows, the number of deaths due to ethno-sectarian violence has fallen since we testified last September.
A big factor has been the reduction of ethno-sectarian violence in Baghdad, density plots for which are shown in the boxes depicting Iraq's capital over time.
Some of this decrease is, to be sure, due to sectarian hardening of certain Baghdad neighborhoods. However, that is only a partial explanation, as countless sectarian fault lines in numerous mixed neighborhoods still exist in Baghdad and elsewhere.
PETRAEUS:
In fact, coalition and Iraqi forces have focused along the fault lines to reduce the violence and enable Sunni and Shia leaders to begin the long process of healing in their local communities.
As this next chart shows, even though the number of high-profile attacks increased in March as Al Qaida-Iraq lashed out, the current level of such attacks remains far below its height a year ago.
Moreover, as we have helped improve security and focused on enemy networks, we have seen a decrease in the effectiveness of such attacks. The number of deaths due to ethno-sectarian violence, in particular, as I mentioned, has remained relatively low, illustrating the enemy's inability to date to reignite the cycle of ethno-sectarian violence.
The emergence of Iraqi volunteers helping to secure their local communities has been an important development. As this chart depicts, there are now over 91,000 Sons of Iraq, Shia as well as Sunni, under contract to help coalition and Iraqi forces protect their neighborhoods and secure infrastructure and roads.
These volunteers have contributed significantly in various areas, and the savings in vehicles not lost because of reduced violence, not to mention the priceless lives saved, have far outweighed the cost of their monthly contracts.
Sons of Iraq have also have contributed to the discovery of improvised explosive devices and weapons and explosive caches. As this next chart shows, in fact we have already found more caches in 2008 than we found in all of 2006.
Given the importance of the Sons of Iraq, we are working closely with the Iraqi government to transition them into the Iraqi security forces or other forms of employment, and over 21,000 have already been accepted into the police or army or other government jobs.
This process has been slow, but it is taking place, and we will continue to monitor it carefully.
Al Qaida also recognizes the significance of the Sons of Iraq, and Al Qaida elements have targeted them repeatedly. However, these attacks, in addition to AQI's use of women, children and the handicapped as suicide bombers, have further alienated Al Qaida-Iraq from the Iraqi people.
PETRAEUS:
And the tenacious pursuit of Al Qaida-Iraq, together with AQI's loss of local support in many areas, has substantially reduced its capability, numbers, and freedom of movement.
This chart displays the cumulative effect of the effort against AQI and its insurgent allies. As you can see, we have reduced considerably the areas in which AQI enjoys support and sanctuary, though there clearly is more to be done.
Having noted the progress, Al Qaida-Iraq is still capable of lethal attacks. And we must maintain relentless pressure on the organization, on the networks outside Iraq that support it, and on the resource flows that sustain it.
This chart lays out the comprehensive strategy that we, the Iraqis, and our interagency and international partners are employing to reduce what Al Qaida-Iraq needs.
As you can see, defeating Al Qaida in Iraq requires not just actions by our elite counterterrorist forces but also major operations by coalition and Iraqi conventional forces, a sophisticated, intelligent effort, political reconciliation, economic and social programs, information operations initiatives, diplomatic activity, the employment of counterinsurgency principles in detainee operations, and many other actions.
As we combat AQI, we must remember that doing so not only reduces a major source of instability in Iraq; it also weakens an organization that Al Qaida's senior leaders view as a tool to spread its influence and foment regional instability.
Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have consistently advocated exploiting the situation in Iraq. And we have also seen Al Qaida-Iraq involved in destabilizing activities in the wider Middle East region.
Together with Iraqi security forces, we have also focused on the special groups.
These elements are funded, trained, armed, and directed by Iran's Quds Force, with help from Lebanese Hezbollah. It was these groups that launched Iranian rockets and mortar rounds at Iraq's seat of government, two weeks ago, causing loss of innocent life and fear in the capital, and requiring Iraqi and coalition actions in response.
Iraqi and coalition leaders have repeatedly noted their desire that Iran live up to promises made by President Ahmadinejad and other senior leaders to stop their support for the special groups.
However, nefarious activities by the Quds Force have continued, and Iraq leaders now clearly recognize the threat they pose to Iraq. We should all watch Iranian actions closely in the weeks and months and weeks ahead, as they will show the kind of relationship Iran wishes to have with its neighbor and the characters of future Iranian involvement in Iraq.
PETRAEUS:
The Iraqi security forces have continued to develop since September, and we have transferred responsibilities to Iraqi forces as their capabilities and the conditions on the ground have permitted.
Currently, as this chart shows, half of Iraq's 18 provinces are under provincial Iraqi control. Many of these provinces, not just the successful provinces in the Kurdish regional government area but also a number of southern provinces, have done well.
Challenges have emerged in some others, including, of course, Basra. Nonetheless, this process will continue and we expect Anbar and Qadisiyah provinces to transition in the months ahead.
Iraqi forces have grown significantly since September, and over 540,000 individuals now serve in the ISF.
The number of combat battalions capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support, has grown to well over 100. These units are bearing an increasing share of the burden, as evidenced by the fact that Iraqi security force losses have recently been three times our own.
We will, of course, conduct careful after-action reviews with our Iraqi partners in the wake of recent operations, as there were units and leaders found wanting in some cases, and some of our assessments may be downgraded as a result.
Nonetheless, the performance of many units was solid, especially once they get their footing and gained a degree of confluence and certain Iraqi elements proved quite capable.
Underpinning the advances of the past year has been improvements in Iraq's security institutions.
An increasingly robust Iraqi-run training base enabled the Iraqi security forces to grow by over 133,000 soldiers and police over the last 16 months. And the still-expanding training base is expected to generate an additional 50,000 Iraqi soldiers and 16 army and special operations battalions throughout the rest of 2008, along with over 23,000 police and eight national police battalions.
Additionally, Iraq's security ministries are steadily improving their ability to execute their budgets. As this chart shows, in 2007, as in 2006, Iraq's security ministries spent more on their forces than the United States provided through the Iraqi Security Forces Fund.
PETRAEUS:
We anticipate that Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion next year. And this projection enabled us recently to reduce significantly our Iraqi Security Forces Fund request for fiscal year 2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion.
While improved Iraqi security forces are not yet ready to defend Iraq or maintain security throughout the entire country on their own, recent operations in Basra highlight improvements in the ability of the Iraqi securi
