Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on Iraq, Witness: Ryan Crocker, US Ambassador to Iraq
July 19, 2007
The hearing will come to order.
We welcome all of our guests and we're truly happy you're here. But let me say to you this is a bit of an unusual hearing in that we are using a telephone connection from Baghdad.
Our ambassador, Ambassador Crocker, who we know well and I have great respect for -- matter of fact, I spent some time with him in an underground bunker in Afghanistan once he opened up the Afghan embassy right after the Taliban fell.
But I'm going to ask the audience if they'd help us out a lot. We don't know exactly how good this connection is going to be and we know there's going to be a delay. So you're going to hear a slight delay and I'm not sure how good the audio is going to be.
So if you would all just help us out and be very quiet, it would be useful. And maybe of no consequence, it may be as crystal clear and as wide open as if he were sitting in front of us.
And we're going to wait another moment, because -- I guess we'll start.
Ambassador Satterfield is going to be here from state. He's just arriving.
Welcome, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you very much for being here.
What we're going to do now, and I can see our ambassador in Baghdad, I'm going to make a brief opening statement and turn it over to my friend, Chairman Lugar, and then we'll hear from Ambassador Crocker.
Ryan, thank you very much for accommodating our schedule. It's very important to us and to the Senate that we hear from you and we thank you very much for accommodating us. You probably have a longer delay than one second in hearing me.
But with that, let me begin my opening statement.
Mr. Ambassador, again, thank you for joining us. And I'd also like to, as I said, welcome Ambassador Satterfield, who is here in the committee room.
In case we have a breakdown, we may turn to you, Ambassador Satterfield, but you're welcome to chime in any way you think is appropriate.
And I'd like to express my appreciation to you and the embassy staff, Mr. Ambassador. We recognize the hardships you face and we are truly grateful, truly grateful for your service.
Most of us, I think all of us here today have been to Baghdad. We have been, in my case and in many others, seven or more times. I'm sure others, as well. And it is not an exaggeration to say you are truly risking your good life for our country and we appreciate it.
The purpose of this hearing is straightforward. Mr. Ambassador we hope to hear from you a candid and unvarnished assessment of the situation on the ground in Iraq, especially the political situation.
The primary goal of the president's military escalation or buildup, I don't want to be pejorative, whatever you want to call it, was to buy time -- was to buy time for the Maliki government to make compromises and political reconciliation.
Last week, the administration delivered an interim assessment of the Iraqi government's performance on 18 specific benchmarks. The government made the least amount of progress, in my view, where it matters the most, on the key political benchmarks -- oil laws, provincial elections, constitutional revisions and de-Baathification.
I am of the view, and I thought the administration, and they may be of the view, that absent real political movement, there's no ultimate solutions. So maybe you will talk to us about whether or not these political benchmarks -- oil, provincial elections, constitutional revisions, de-Baathification -- are as important as -- sir, would you get out of the way of the screen there? I'm going to ask you to move, thank you, because we cannot see the screen.
The final assessment is due in two months and the Iraqi parliament is taking one of those months off. Given the lack of progress since the surge began six months ago, what gives you the confidence that we will see any progress between now and September?
And if you'd be willing to tell us, what can you tell us that would give us any confidence that the final report has any prospect of being one better than what we just received?
Mr. Ambassador, you're in a tough spot. I believe that the president's policy, which you are being asked to execute, is based on a fundamentally flawed premise and, I might add, the position of some Democrats I think is based on a similarly flawed premise, and that is if we just give the central government time, it will secure the support and trust of all Iraqis that there'll be a unity government that can actually deliver security, services and an effective government.
In my judgment, and I know you know this, it's been my judgment for well over two years now, there is no possibility of that happening, but that's purely my judgment.
It seems to me that there is no trust within the government now, no trust of the government by the people, and I don't see any realistic possibility of a capacity developing on the part of the government to be able to deliver security and basic services, that is, the central government, and I see no prospect of building that trust or capacity within the ensuring several years.
I've been saying this for some time. I know I sound like a broken record to my colleagues. But I really believe, unless we decentralize this process, we're in real trouble. And by the way, it's not just me. The director of the CIA, General Mike Hayden, back in November of '06, told the Iraqi study group, and I quote, "The inability of the central government to govern is irreversible."
That was the assessment of our CIA in November of last year. Has anything changed?
The truth is, in my view, Mr. Ambassador, Iraq cannot be governed from the center absent a dictator or indefinite occupation and neither of these are reasonable possibilities.
Instead, I believe we should promote a political settlement that allows the warring factions breathing room in their own regions and control over the fabric of their own daily lives, their own police forces, their own laws on education, jobs, marriage, religion.
And a limited central government would be charge of truly common concerns, including protecting Iraq's borders and distributing oil revenues. None of this is an American imposition. It's entirely consistent, as you know, with the constitution.
Probably you and I and my colleagues are among only the few people that have ever read that constitution. I've read the constitution and the constitution talks about this country being a decentralized federal system.
We continue to seem to want to centralize the federal system. I would argue the (INAUDIBLE) federation are closer to what they wrote than in the constitution.
But having said that, it seems to me we have to also initiate diplomatic offensive to bring in the United Nations, the major countries and Iraq's neighbors to help implement and oversee a political settlement.
It is past time to make Iraq the world's problems, not just our own.
So, Mr. Ambassador, whether you agree with what I am proposing or not, the bottom line is this -- just about everyone now agrees there is no purely military way to bring stability to Iraq. We need a political solution.
So I want your best assessment of the prospects of a political settlement, what it would look like and how you think it may be achieved.
I look forward to hearing your testimony and, again, Ryan, I want to thank you. I saw you firsthand under incredible pressure in Afghanistan and I've watched you now. I am very -- not that you need me to be proud of you, but I am very proud we have men and women like you, of your caliber, in the foreign service.
I thank you for your service.
I now yield to Chairman Lugar.
LUGAR:
Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Ambassador Crocker, as he continues his work and enlightens us on our policy in Iraq.
The future of that policy increasingly appears to depend on the administration's report due in September. Regardless of what the report says, however, we must begin now to prepare for what comes next.
It is likely that there will be changes in military missions and force levels as the year proceeds. If the United States military leaders, diplomats and, indeed, the Congress are not prepared for these contingencies, they may be executed poorly, especially in an atmosphere in which public demands for troop withdrawals could compel action on a political timetable.
We need to lay the groundwork for alternatives so that when the president and Congress move to a new plan, it can be implemented safely and rapidly. I'm encouraged the president has announced he is sending Secretary of State Rice and Defense Secretary Gates to the region to engage in concentrated diplomacy.
I would observe this diplomacy must be ambitious, sustained and innovative. It must go well beyond conferences with allied nations. We have to consider how diplomacy can change the equation in the region in ways that enhance our prospects for success in Iraq.
Regional diplomacy is not just an accompaniment to our efforts in Iraq. It is the precondition for the success of any policy that follows the surge.
We cannot sustain a successful policy in Iraq over the long term unless we repair alliances, recruit more international participation in Iraq, anticipate refugee flows, prevent regional aggression, generate new basing options and otherwise prepare for future developments.
If we have not made substantial diplomatic progress by the time a post-surge policy is implemented, our options will be severely constrained and we'll be guessing at a viable course in a rapidly evolving environment.
I believe the most promising diplomatic approach would be to establish a consistent forum related to Iraq that is open to all parties in the Middle East. The purpose of the forum would be to improve transparency of national interests so that neighboring states, including Syria and Iran, would avoid missteps.
It would be in the self-interest of every nation in the region to attend such meetings, as well as the United States, the EU representatives or other interested parties. The existence of a predictable regular forum in the region would be especially important for dealing with refugee problems, regulating borders, exploring development initiatives, preventing conflict between the Kurds and the Turks.
A consistent forum in the Middle East is particularly salient because that region suffers from conspiracy theories, corruption and the opaque policies of non-democratic governments.
We should be meeting with states on a constant basis and encouraging them to meet each other as a means of achieving transparency. We should not underestimate the degree to which the lack of transparency in the Middle East intensifies risk of conflict and impedes solutions to regional problems.
A constant, predictable, diplomatic forum would allow countries and groups to keep an eye on one another and such a forum would make armed incursions more risky for an aggressor.
It would provide a means of applying regional peer pressure against bad behavior. It would also complicate the plans of those who would advance destructive sectarian agendas.
If nations or groups decline to attend or place conditions on their participation, their intransigence will be obvious to the other players in the region.
We know the task of initiating even a partial military redeployment from Iraq will be an extremely complicated and dangerous undertaking.
I am hopeful that you, Ambassador Crocker, will shed light today not just on prevailing conditions in Iraq, but also on what is being done to prepare for a post-surge strategy. I appreciate very much your making time to hear us.
Thank you, sir.
BIDEN:
Again, Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much and the floor is yours.
Thank you very much and the floor is yours, Mr. Ambassador.
OFF-MIKES THROUGHOUT DUE TO TELECONFERENCE AUDIO FAILURE)
CROCKER:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar. Thank you for this somewhat unique opportunity to appear before the committee. I was last before you about five months ago in my confirmation hearing (OFF-MIKE).
BIDEN:
Yes, we have.
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
BIDEN:
I said we have received your statement and it will be placed in the record as if presented.
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
BIDEN:
We will start this with ten-minute rounds and if we begin to run out of time, we will alter it. But we should be able to do the two hours here.
Let me begin by asking you, Mr. Ambassador, the Iraqi constitution, I can't remember now, I think it's section 115 or 116, talks about the establishment of the regions and it's what I've been talking about for some time.
Is it not true that under the Iraqi constitution, any region that decides -- of 18 governorates, any one or more could choose to be a single, one governorate can become a region or they can combine with two, three, five, like they have in the Kurdish area, to become a region?
Once you declare that by a majority vote, is it not true that that region writes its own constitution?
CROCKER:
That is correct, Mr. Chairman. In my understanding, that is what the Kurdish (OFF-MIKE) have done.
BIDEN:
Yes. And what is available to the other governorates, as well, correct?
CROCKER:
Yes, sir. The (OFF-MIKE) law passed by the house of representatives (OFF-MIKE).
BIDEN:
Yes. Now, secondly, one of the things that if you conclude that you are going to be a region, and I read article 115, "The federal system in the Republic of Iraq is made up of a decentralized capitol, region and governorates and local administration."
And section 116 goes and lays out and talks about the Kurdish region and then 117 talks about this council of representatives can enact a timeframe in which people become a region. And then it goes on to point out, in articles 119 and 120, that if you choose to be a region, you can have control over your, quote, "own security, your own security," like they do in the Kurdish area.
There is no Iraqi army absent the Kurdish permission to move into there. They have their own local security. Is that not correct?
CROCKER:
That is partly correct, yes, sir.
BIDEN:
Now, the next question I have is that you point out, which I and Chairman Lugar have been talking about from slightly different perspectives for five years now or four years now, this is a tribal society.
There is no trust. As you pointed out from the outset of your comments, that it's a consequence of Saddam's tyrannical rule that in order to -- they've gone back to basics, from the family unit to the tribal unit, to generate enough security and trust among themselves. That's what this tyranny imposed upon Iraq.
And now we're in a situation where, as I see it, this is the question, is it not true that even in the Sunni areas, there is no Sunni or, in the Shia areas, no Shia overall unity? They are broken down into tribal and competing units within the Shia area as we speak. Is that not true?
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE) Iraq does have a strong tribal (OFF-MIKE) in the society. But in (OFF-MIKE), I would not characterize all of Iraqi society as tribal. There's also a very rich urban society (OFF- MIKE).
And you need that political level (OFF-MIKE) political movement that may be part of the tribal (OFF-MIKE). There are also others that are very much (OFF-MIKE).
(OFF-MIKE)
BIDEN:
Go ahead. I'm sorry.
CROCKER:
You are absolutely right, sir, in my view, to emphasize the element of fear, because that has (OFF-MIKE) this country, whether it's rural or urban (OFF-MIKE) and that has to do with the (OFF-MIKE), in my view, Mr. Chairman.
Whatever model the Iraqis choose, I would be concerned that none of them are going to work (OFF-MIKE) long-term security and stability unless and until the Iraqis (OFF-MIKE) local, provincial, regional and national (OFF-MIKE) work through the fear that's been imposed on them into (OFF-MIKE) level of trust.
(OFF-MIKE)
BIDEN:
In the interest of time, if I could interrupt you to get to a couple more questions, if I may. And I don't disagree with what you've said.
But the bottom line here is that almost four million Iraqis, many of them in that middle class, from those urban areas, have either fled internally within Iraq or left the country. As I understand it, it's close to 1.9 million displaced in the country, two million have left the country.
I think we're kidding ourselves if we think you can, from the center, from the center, build a system that eliminates the fear in the provinces, outside the urban areas.
And I have been very disturbed that this administration's failure to push for the ability of this constitution to take form has, in my view, led to this continued over-reliance on the idea that Maliki or anyone else, no matter how well intended, representing elements of Sunni, Shia and Kurds, would be able to, from the center, eliminate this fear.
Now, let me get to my next point. You know, Mr. Ambassador -- I shouldn't say you know. I believe there is no possibility we will have 160,000 troops in Iraq a year from now. It's just not going to be the case.
So time is running out in a big way. And so unless we do something, in my humble opinion, like we did in the Balkans, which you're very familiar with, which is set up a loosely federated system, we've had 20,000, on average, troops there, Western troops there for ten years. Not one has been killed, thank God.
It's not an answer to everything. But the genocide has stopped and they're becoming part of Europe. To think that we can accomplish reconciliation from the center I find to be well beyond any reasonable expectation.
Let me get to my last question. You say that the benchmarks, in your statement, are not a reliable measure. Then what is the measure of whether or not political process and reconciliation is taking place?
And I would add the very progress you show in Anbar Province is the very thing having Shia leaders call me here in Washington saying we're picking sides, that we are aiding and abetting the Sunnis in a civil war.
I'm not suggesting that's right or wrong. I'm relaying the fear. The idea that we are making progress in the provinces relative to Al Qaida I respectfully suggest is making it harder for you to deal with the Shia generally in accommodating a real political reconciliation.
But what are the benchmarks -- not benchmarks. What are the objective criteria we should be looking at to determine whether or not Iraqi attitudes toward each other and the willingness to work together on reconciliation is happening?
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
BIDEN:
I don't know what all this means, folks, but hang on, stay tuned. The one thing we don't want to be looking at is a picture of me. The one thing I don't want to be looking at.
Brady, what's the story, do you know? They're checking it out. I'm sorry. We're going to have a -- thank you. Our staff is on the phone with the technology experts trying to fix this. We may be getting back up quickly here. We'll see.
Ambassador Crocker, can you hear me? Because even if we don't have visual, if we have audio, I'm told we may still have audio. No, we don't have audio. Hang on a second here.
(PAUSE)
We'll come to order. We're going to try this with just the audio. I don't know whether or not, Mr. Ambassador, you can hear us. Can you?
Mr. Ambassador, we've lost the video, but...
(UNKNOWN)
You guys are going to have to un-mute your telephone. Yes, go ahead.
BIDEN:
Mr. Ambassador, can you hear us?
(UNKNOWN)
Hello. Can you hear us on the other end, please?
BIDEN:
Who is that speaking? Which end is up here? Are we being asked if we can hear?
We can hear you. So, Mr. Ambassador, just proceed with your comments. We went blank and we lost you after I finished my question. Would you proceed from there? The floor is yours, Mr. Ambassador, if you can hear me.
STAFF:
They're having difficulty dialing back in to their end. We're hooked up on this end. Our backup system -- their speakerphone is muted on their end.
BIDEN:
(OFF-MIKE) to the Senator and then I hate to say this to the rest of you, but we're going to cut back the time from ten minutes to five minutes to make sure everybody gets in. I apologize.
If we have time, I'm told the ambassador had, from beginning to end, a little over two hours. So if we have time after that, we'll come back not to the chairman and I, but we'll come back to all of you who have gotten cut out here, your time cut out. But in order to get everybody in, I think it's going to -- realistic, I am told, we'll have to go closer to five minutes, assuming we get this connection at all.
OFF-MIKES THROUGHOUT DUE TO SPEAKERPHONE TRANSMISSION OF TESTIMONY)
BIDEN:
Baghdad, can you hear the U.S. Senate? Ambassador Crocker, can you hear Joe Biden?
No, they obviously can't hear.
We're going to recess for somewhere between three and five minutes to see if we can set this up and then we'll come back and figure out where we go, if we can.
(RECESS)
BIDEN:
The hearing will come to order.
We're going to the old tried-and-true method of a speakerphone. So I'm going to put my microphone down here.
And, Ambassador Crocker, if you can pick up where we left off. The floor is yours, Mr. Ambassador.
CROCKER:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your question is a good one, because I think it brings into play several of the issues we've been discussing.
You mentioned the concerns that had been expressed to you by Shia acquaintances over the impact of the Sunni outreach effort on their interests and I think this illustrates why there needs to be a linkage between what happens in the provinces and the center.
What we have done here, in close coordination with the Iraqi government, was to establish, first, between General Petraeus and myself, a special section in the multinational force and the embassy, it's co-chaired by a foreign service officer and a British major general, to deal with engagement issues.
Now, they work very closely with an engagement committee that Prime Minister Maliki has established through his office and it is through this process that we deal on the federal level, the central level, with the steps we're taking at the local level, and this has worked in the case of Anbar quite well, where the tribes that have desired to get into the fight against Al Qaida have been formed into provisional police units that have been vetted through the Iraqi central government and who are paid by the Iraqi central government.
So I think this is the direction in which we wish to work. If we were to do this at a completely local level without centralized connection, I think the phenomenon that you allude to there would very quickly overtake the process, fears and concerns that whatever is going on in one area was somehow deeply inimical to the interests of another.
So this way to connect what happens regionally and provincially to the center I think is very important as we move forward.
BIDEN:
Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much.
When are regional elections going to take place? When are the governorates able to vote, if they wish to, to become a region? What date does that begin to occur? When does the law that was passed eight months or so ago take effect?
CROCKER:
My recollection, sir, is that the effective date for the establishment of the regions is April 2008. So that would be the time after which new regions could be established according to the law.
BIDEN:
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
I'm now turning it over to Senator Lugar.
LUGAR:
Mr. Ambassador, are you aware of or are you a part of any planning being done with respect to a transition in mission or redeployment of United States combat forces, something that might be called plan B?
Now, I ask this because I understand from widely reported press coverage that such integrated planning, interagency planning was being retarded by high level political pressures in the United States and, therefore, had been abandoned.
I would simply want to know is there any planning and then, more importantly, are you or the State Department involved in interagency planning with regard to a so-called plan B.
We can't hear you. We can't hear you.
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
LUGAR:
Yes, we can hear you.
CROCKER:
In terms of future planning, Senator Lugar, (OFF-MIKE) fully engaged with General Petraeus in trying to implement the president's strategy (OFF-MIKE).
From this vantage point, I can't speak to an interagency process. If there are advantages to being in Baghdad, it's having to deal with things in an Iraqi context and letting the interagency take care of itself.
The short answer is I'm not aware of (OFF-MIKE).
LUGAR:
Well, apparently, you're not involved. At least you've testified that you're simply dealing with affairs as they are there.
So let me ask you, then, directly, what is the most significant concern that you have about a potential redeployment of United States forces in Iraq?
OFF-MIKES THROUGHOUT DUE TO SPEAKERPHONE TRANSMISSION OF TESTIMONY)
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
LUGAR:
Ambassador, you mentioned specifically Al Qaida activities in Kirkuk, likewise Iranian activities, which are sometimes alleged all over the country.
General Petraeus has about 28,500 forces involved in the surge. His own work out at Fort Leavenworth would indicate a formula that maybe 250,000 were required to cover the country of Iraq.
My question, I suppose, simply, is how can the surge be successful with 28,500 and, specifically, what does happen in all the rest of Iraq that is not covered by Baghdad, Diyala, Anbar or those areas that are specifically involved?
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
LUGAR:
Thank you very much, sir.
BIDEN:
Senator Kerry? We're going to five-minute rounds in light of the delay. That's what we're doing. It's the prerogative of -- I gave the Senator ten, but we all started off at ten, John, but we've run out of time. We're going to go to 12:00.
KERRY:
Mr. Ambassador, thank you. It's good to see you for the second time today. I was your next questioner over at the Pentagon a little while ago and we got interrupted there. So I'm glad to be able to pick up here. And I will separate certainly what was appropriate to that briefing to this one.
When I chaired your confirmation hearing, you said at that time that you believed, as the president and the vice president and the secretary of state and all of our generals said, that there is no military solution, there is only a political solution.
Do you still believe that?
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
KERRY:
And so what we've achieved militarily in the last days would have to be described as tactical successes, is that not correct?
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
KERRY:
And one of those tactical successes in Al Anbar, which has been much referred to publicly and otherwise, is that the tribal chiefs have joined with us in an effort to try to deal with Al Qaida, correct?
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
KERRY:
But they are essentially, in Al Anbar, almost exclusively Sunni, who are acting to protect their own interests because Al Qaida was killing their villagers and their sons and daughters, raping them, correct?
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
KERRY:
So the Al Anbar success has to be separated from the fundamental conflict of Shia and Sunni, the fundamental civil strife that our troops are caught in the middle of in other parts of the country, particularly Baghdad and its surrounding area, is that correct?
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
KERRY:
Correct.
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
KERRY:
Well, let me follow-up on that, because the stated purpose by the president of the escalation of our forces in a temporary basis, I emphasize and he did, was to provide the breathing space for the leadership of Iraq to make fundamental political decisions, i.e., compromise.
The Al Anbar, separating Al Anbar there because of its sort of uniqueness, there's been almost zero political compromise whatsoever on any of the major benchmarks and fundamentals.
And your testimony earlier today was that essentially you think the benchmarks aren't as important as the process itself. So in a way, the goalposts are now moving a little bit.
And my question to you is, if there is no military solution and the process is important, but the fundamental conflict and killing is taking place because the stakeholders are battling between each other for the future of Iraq essentially and for their status in it, if there is no political settlement, how can the process become more important?
In the absence of that political settlement, our troops are going to remain in the same trap they're in today, where there's, as Senator Lugar said, inadequate people to do the job and the ability of Al Qaida and others to use our presence to continue to be the magnet for terrorism and for jihadists and for naysayers and opponents and so forth.
So where do we go in looking for that political compromise if you're moving the goalposts at this point in time and what do Americans have to look forward to in terms of a real resolution, since there can only be a political settlement of this conflict?
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
KERRY:
Right. But I'm not talking about Al Anbar, Ambassador. I'm trying to direct your attention to the rest of the fundamental conflict that is different from Al Anbar.
I mean, Al Anbar is not the model for the resolution of the Muqtada al-Sadr problem, who is modeling now his organizational effort on Hamas and Hezbollah. It's not the model for the resolution of the militia conflict between Shia and Sunni, et cetera, nor even the jockeying of political players between the rejectionists in the Sunni population and the Shia who have different interests.
So I'm really trying to focus you on that.
OFF-MIKES THROUGHOUT DUE TO SPEAKERPHONE TRANSMISSION OF TESTIMONY)
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
KERRY:
Mr. Ambassador, thank you. My time is up and I need to go vote in finance. But we're grateful to you and I didn't have a chance to extend that to General Petraeus, but we're grateful to you and all of the people serving over there for what you're doing for your country and we want you to be safe.
BIDEN:
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hagel?
HAGEL:
Ambassador Crocker, I would, like all my colleagues here in the Congress, add my thanks to you and your colleagues who are serving in Iraq. We are grateful for that service.
We may have differences of opinion on policy, but we acknowledge your service and all of your colleagues' service and we are grateful for that service.
I have, as all my colleagues do, limited time and I want to begin with acknowledging what the State Department noted this week in that our government would be engaging Iran once again and if we have time to get to that, I would like a brief comment on that as to when will that occur and where will that occur, what do we hope to accomplish.
But let's stay focused for the present time on the questioning here this morning.
One of the points that you made, Ambassador, when you opened this conference statement, and I'm paraphrasing, but I believe it's pretty accurate, you said after a year away from Iraq, you were struck by the damage that had been done in Iraq mainly by sectarian violence.
Now, that is in some conflict with a number of senior administration officials, in fact, including the president, who has said over and over that Iraq is the forefront, the battleground against Al Qaida, that Al Qaida is the central element of violence and destabilization in Iraq.
Now, of course, our national intelligence estimates of our 16 intelligence agencies have said that that's not true either. But I lay that out as a preface to a couple of questions that I have coming your way.
Senator Lugar made an interesting observation, and he's correct in this, as Senator Lugar normally is correct on these things, and that is that the counterinsurgency manual that General Petraeus actually wrote lays out a formula for force structure, essentially matching the force structure with the mission.
And, unfortunately, we have put our troops in a situation where they are woefully overmatched with a mission, because they do not have even near the numbers of troops that General Petraeus actually himself wrote in his counterinsurgency manual in order to do the job.
So we're putting our troops in a terrible position, overburdening them with an almost impossible task.
And I noted, and I would like you to respond to this question and a second question, that the prime minister of Iraq said this week that -- I'm paraphrasing again -- that Iraq was capable and ready to take over the security responsibilities of Iraq at any time, I believe he said.
In light of what you have just told us the last hour, that, it seems to me, at least your interpretation is in some conflict with what the prime minister's analysis of his own forces are.
And that's one question, Ambassador, I'd like to have you respond to.
The second is we hear an awful lot about, and you have said it, we have to buy time. We have to buy time. We need more time. We understand that. But here are the set of questions.
We buy time for what? For a political reconciliation process that is not occurring, that is not working. There's not even a political accommodation as the prelude to political reconciliation that we're making progress on.
We talk about some of the successes in Iraq and we have had some. I was there, as you know, appreciated your time, six weeks ago. You just mentioned the south. I had two very informed individuals, who you met with, who were over there for a few days last week, tell me that those four southern provinces are gone, that the Shia militia are in charge.
Now, I don't know if that's an overstatement or not, but you might want to comment on that.
So I'm a bit puzzled because if, in fact, we're buying time, I think the question needs to be addressed, we're buying time for what? How long is enough time?
We're in our fifth year and we still see no political reconciliation occurring. Actually, I think we're going backward.
So if you could focus on those two questions that I have noted, one, buying time for how long and for what and, second, your comment on the prime minister's statement this week that the Iraqi forces are ready and prepared to take responsibility for security in Iraq at any time.
And thank you.
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
BIDEN:
Thank you very much.
Senator Feingold?
FEINGOLD:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I just want to raise a note of caution about this discussion about Anbar Province. The first, of course, is the one that Senator Kerry so effectively raised, is the applicability of the lessons, Ambassador, of Anbar to other parts of Iraq. That's a very serious question which we have to address.
The second is I'm not so sure about Anbar itself. We have been subjected to so much hype in the course of this war that I would just urge you and the administration and my colleagues to not be so sure that everything will continue to be rosy in that region.
The fact is that when I was in Camp Fallujah in 2005, there was a very rosy scenario presented, after the battle of Fallujah. A year later, when I was in the same place, it didn't sound so good. Now, in 2007, it sounds better.
But for people to start suggesting that this is somehow a result of the surge or somehow simply because they're now on our side, they're our buddies now, I think we've heard enough things in this war, I would caution my colleagues.
I hope it is true. I hope those are the long term consequences for that region. But I think once Al Qaida is, in some way, minimized, our presence there may become the greatest focus of the Sunnis, who do not like it that we are there.
So I'd urge everyone to not be so sure that Al Anbar is taken care of anymore than Basra was taken care of, when everybody thought that was done, or Hilla Province, where I was taken because that's a safe place. The fact is these places come and go and if we are so naive as to think that sort of we're done with a place, we haven't learned the lessons that caused us to make the mistake in the first place of invading a civilization that, frankly, is extremely complex. That applies to Anbar, as well.
On a different matter, Ambassador, the interim assessment report released last week states, quote, "Left on their own, many ISF units still tend to gravitate to old habits of sectarianism when applying the law," unquote.
Indeed, there have been reports in a number of media outlets of ISF complicity in attacks on U.S. forces.
Can you discuss with us the extent to which members of the ISF are participating in sectarian violence?
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
FEINGOLD:
Well, what sort of action...
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
FEINGOLD:
Go ahead. Well, I was just going to ask what actions have been taken.
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
FEINGOLD:
I'm sorry.
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
FEINGOLD:
And, please, your comment on Anbar.
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
FEINGOLD:
Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
BIDEN:
Senator Coleman?
COLEMAN:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, thank you. Thank you for your service and I appreciate your reflections of the complexity of what we're dealing with in Iraq and various regions.
I just have to make one note about Anbar, because I would hope that the public would understand that this is not about hype and this is not something coming from the administration sending a message.
I think you're right about the complexity, about trying to establish linkages so that there's long term success. But when I was in Anbar in late April of this year, we have troops there from the Minnesota National Guard. There are two of the 136 combined arms battalion and they told me the story of a bombing in Habaniyah in which 80 Iraqis were either killed or wounded and it was our troops that were then giving blood. There were no American casualties.
And they told me the story of the next day, the local sheik and the mayor coming in and identifying Al Qaida operatives and saying, "We want to work with you."
So they were telling me that, for them, it was a turnaround. It had been the wild west six months ago. And I think the challenge is long term. I think it's fair commentary of my colleague from Wisconsin, but clearly the success is real and if that can become a model to beyond Anbar, I think we'd all be well served. But I appreciate your understanding that we have to have linkages long term.
And if I can, just one other comment for my colleague from Nebraska, and I'm sure he wasn't intending this, but I almost got a sense from the preface to his question that somehow discounting the Al Qaida threat and that sectarian violence is the key to all the fear and everything we're dealing with in Iraq, and I'm sure that's not the case.
If anything, from what I heard from you this morning and today, what Al Qaida does is, as you said, operates on the fault line and that their attacks are intended -- is it correct that their attacks are intended to exacerbate the sectarian violence?
Is that part of their plan? Is that part of what you're seeing?
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
COLEMAN:
Let me talk about, if I can, again, in the time that I have, Ambassador, just about shutting down Anbar and moving to the diplomatic side.
One thing that frustrates me is that for the neighbors in the region, for Mubarak in Egypt, Al Qaida is a threat to him. Iran and the extremists that they support are a threat to him. The same thing with Abdullah in Jordan. The same thing with the house of Saad (ph). The threats to their existence are Al Qaida and the forces they support, as well as the extremists that the Iranians support.
What is it that -- and we also know and as you indicated earlier, a lot of the flow of foreign fighters come from these countries and they come through Syria into Iraq. So it's a two-part question, because I know Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice have been going into the region.
What is it that our allies, our friends who are equally endangered by the strength of an Al Qaida and the strengths of Iran, what is it that they're not doing that they can do? What is it that we have to do to get them to be more involved? And then the third part of that is can they be helpful in shutting off the flow of Al Qaida and these terrorists coming in through Syria?
Is there something that they can be doing they're not doing and what is it that we have to get -- how do we make that happen?
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
COLEMAN:
Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Chairman?
BIDEN:
Senator Boxer?
BOXER:
Thanks so much, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for your leadership on continuing to push for a political solution, which I think makes eminent sense.
And before Senator Hagel leaves, I really have a rhetorical question I'm going to ask, which doesn't require an answer. It's really a way of expressing my own frustration.
As Senator Hagel has pointed out I think very straightforwardly, here you have an Iraqi leader who says to the Americans, "You can go home now. We're fine. Don't stay here on our account."
So I guess the question, the rhetorical question I have is how many Americans have to die while we're buying time for an Iraqi government whose leader says we don't need to be there?
And so to answer my own question, it's not a single one should have to die for that. And I hope the people in the audience will not respond to this one way or the other.
The point is there's a deep feeling of frustration and outrage in this country as we keep on pouring dollar after dollar and life after life into a place where the people say they don't really want us there.
Now, Al Qaida is a serious problem, sir. And by the way, thank you so much for your sacrifice and what you're doing for your country. I can't thank you enough for it.
But the bottom line is 53 Senators, a majority of the Senate, voted to change this mission because we know Al Qaida's there. They're 15 percent of the problem, according to the Bush administration.
And we're saying get our troops out of the middle of a civil war, where 85 percent of the problem is coming from, and, yes, redeploy them out so they can be a force to act quickly to go after Al Qaida.
I just have another question, a real question for you that deals with one of the comments that you made and that is that you kind of put aside the benchmarks, really basically didn't think they were important.
As a matter of fact, this past Saturday, sir, you said, quote, "I think electricity is more important to the average Iraqi than all 18 benchmarks rolled into one."
So I decided to look at what's happening on the electricity front. May 16, for the week of May 9 to 15, and this is State Department reports, national electricity supply was two percent below the period in '06. May 23, national electricity supply was 11 percent below the same period in '06.
May 30, national electricity supply was seven percent below the same period in '06. June 6, below the same period in '06 by three percent. June 13, eight percent below the same period in '06. June 20, it was unchanged from the same period. June 27, seven percent below. July 4, six percent below. July 11, four percent below.
So I don't understand. If you're trying to tell us how much progress is being made here and you dismiss the benchmarks and then you tell us electricity, aren't we failing there, as well?
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
BOXER:
Sir, I hear you.
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
BOXER:
I hear you. My point, you're sort of missing my point, if I might, because I'm running out of time here.
The point that I'm trying to make is you said -- you kind of pushed aside the benchmarks. Now, a lot of people have worked on these benchmarks, Republicans, Democrats, the White House.
You set hem aside and you were making a good, I think, point that the daily lives of the Iraqis are not going well. I am echoing that point and the fact is the estimates that I read to you come from all over the country, all over the country.
So my point is we're not meeting the benchmarks, the Iraqi government's not meeting the benchmarks. The electricity that you say is so important is worse, not better.
The Iraqi leader says, "We can handle this." And in my last trip to Iraq, I have to say, General Petraeus, at that time, was in charge of training the troops. He said he thought the troops were very well trained. He was very optimistic about them.
What happened to if we stand up -- if they stand up, we stand down? All this changes. It's a moving target.
The bottom line here, sir, is I know you have a very difficult assignment. I want to be helpful to you.
I guess, in closing, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to express the deepest sense of frustration from my state that people feel we have given blood, we have given dollars, we have given patience, we have given everything and people are at the end of their patience.
And, sir, I hope you will continue your work. I hope you will tell us the reality on the ground and not paint rosy scenarios in September and say, "Well, none of the benchmarks are met. We can't deliver electricity, but we're making progress," because that's only going to prolong the killing.
Thank you.
BIDEN:
Senator Voinovich?
VOINOVICH:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I'd like to submit for the record the letter that I sent to the president, along with the way forward, that outlines a program to urge him to develop a comprehensive plan for our country's gradual military disengagement from Iraq in a way that will protect our national security interests and prevent chaos in the region.
BIDEN:
Without objection, it'll be placed in the record.
VOINOVICH:
It may seem contradictory to some, Mr. Chairman, but I believe we can accomplish more in Iraq by gradually and responsibly reducing our forces and focusing on a robust strategy of international cooperation and coordinated foreign aid.
And I agree with our ambassador and I thank him very much for his service to our country, that we cannot abandon Iraq in chaos, but we must start to face reality and begin a transition where the Iraq government and its neighbors play a larger role in stabilizing the country.
And I think that you've got to make sure that they know it's inevitable that the U.S. is going to disengage and that our commitment is not open-ended. And what he does now and in the next several months is going to have a great deal to do with the kind of reaction that we're going to have to the recommendations that you and General Petraeus are going to be making to the Congress.
It doesn't seem that he understands the urgency of the situation, that he's not taking advantage of our presence and he should be. He ought to get on with the constitution. He ought to get on with the oil.
And I read in "The Economist" where they met (INAUDIBLE), you made reference to it, the countries talking about oil and security and the refugee problem and what I understand is he wasn't enthusiastic about it and he ought to understand, again, that he ought to be reaching out to these people and his executive committee to get them to help him deal with the situation that he has in his country.
In addition to that, we met earlier this week, several of us, with Secretary General Moon of the United Nations and I urged him, it's urgent for them to get involved. Is there a sense of urgency? What are you doing to let them know that this time is running out? Time is running out.
What are you doing?
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
VOINOVICH:
I want to thank you. I've been informed that if I don't...
BIDEN:
Well, actually, I was mistaken. They're going to have the five-minute grace period. So you still have a minute and a half to go.
VOINOVICH:
There's got to be some real evidence that action's taking place there and everything you can do to convey to Mr. Maliki and his executive committee, to the other players in the region that the American people's patience is running out.
And you may assume that some of the things you talked about are going to continue, but the fact of the matter is I don't think that's what the case is going to be.
And if I were in the position of the president or the secretary, I'd put them all in a room and say, "You know what? We're on our way out of here. Take advantage of the opportunity that you have. You all have a symbiotic relationship to work together so this thing doesn't blow. And if it does, then you are going to have some very, very serious problems. So help us, help us so we can stabilize the area and we'll be willing to provide humanitarian help. We're going to stay in the region, but we have to disengage. It's inevitable. Take advantage of this wonderful opportunity that you have."
BIDEN:
Thank you very much, Senator.
Mr. Ambassador, I want to thank you. I'll make a closing comment here in the next minute or so.
Number one, having the U.N. involved on the ground is not the same as having the permanent five of the Security Council take ownership of this problem.
I met with them, you might find it of interest, three weeks ago, the permanent members. I asked what would happen if the president came to them and said, "Call an international conference," not (INAUDIBLE), where they have equal ownership with the United States, equal ownership of the problem.
They said they would all participate. They would call an international conference.
If you don't raise this up, Mr. Ambassador, you're going to be left there adrift.
The second point is, with all due respect to everyone who has talked about this, you heard from my colleagues, we're not staying, Mr. Ambassador. We're not staying. You don't have much time and there's not much you can do about it, I know. So we need to begin to make this the world's problem.
And the last thing I'd like to say to you, Mr. Ambassador, I have overwhelmingly high regard for you, you said one thing that demonstrates that we have a fundamental disagreement, though.
You pointed out that you were talking to a group of Iraqis and saying that where there is no electricity, saying electricity is more important than an agreement on revenue sharing.
I would respectfully suggest, if you've got an agreement on revenue sharing, that would mean there was genuine political progress being made and accommodations going forward among the warring factions and that would mean there would be more cooperation and seeing to it that those who are blowing up the transmission lines didn't blow them up.
So I really think you guys have it wrong when you put on the back end the political settlement relating to regionalism, you put on the back end the constitutional changes, you put on the back end the importance of the oil agreement.
I don't know how you get the Sunnis to buy in without them knowing they, in fact, have a piece of the oil. I don't know you get the Shia to buy in unless they're able to have a regional government. I don't how you do that. You may know. I'm anxious to hear it later.
But bottom line, Mr. Ambassador, you're a very skilled diplomat, a professional, you've been around a long time. I promise you, old buddy, forget what Joe Biden says. Listen to the Republicans. We ain't staying. We're not staying. We're not staying. Not much time. Political benchmarks better be met or we're in real trouble, because we will have traded a dictator for chaos, notwithstanding all your incredible efforts.
And with that, Mr. Ambassador, if you'd like to make a quick closing comment, the floor is yours. And I'm going to have to go leave and vote and I'll be in touch with you by plain old telephone personally, if I can.
CROCKER:
(OFF-MIKE)
BIDEN:
Mr. Ambassador, I'm sorry, I'm going to have to go vote. I surely apologize. The time has run out.
I'd respectfully suggest they'd be more inclined to meet the benchmarks if the whole word community were pushing them. We have so little credibility. I think it's important you get the rest of the permanent five equally as hard pushing. That may be the way.
But at any rate, I'm going to have to end this, Mr. Ambassador. And with your permission, I'd like to give you a personal call, if I may, to follow-up on what we're talking about.
Thank you very much. I apologize, everyone, for this truncated hearing. And we are now adjourned.
CQ Transcriptions, July 19, 2007
List of Panel Members and Witnesses
PANEL MEMBERS:
SEN. JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR., D-DEL. CHAIRMAN
SEN. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, D-CONN.
SEN. JOHN KERRY, D-MASS.
SEN. RUSS FEINGOLD, D-WIS.
SEN. BARBARA BOXER, D-CALIF.
SEN. BILL NELSON, D-FLA.
SEN. BARACK OBAMA, D-ILL.
SEN. ROBERT MENENDEZ, D-N.J.
SEN. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, D-MD.
SEN. BOB CASEY, D-PA.
SEN. JIM WEBB, D-VA.
SEN. RICHARD G. LUGAR, R-IND. RANKING MEMBER
SEN. CHUCK HAGEL, R-NEB.
SEN. NORM COLEMAN, R-
