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Senate Armed Services Committee

ADVANCE POLICY QUESTIONS

ADMIRAL JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., USN

**NOMINEE FOR COMMANDER
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND**

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Advance Questions for Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr.
Nominee for the Position of Commander, U.S. Strategic Command

Defense Reforms

Almost 15 years have passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms.

1. Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?

ANSWER: (U) Yes, I strongly support the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms. They have strengthened our Armed Forces and enhanced the effectiveness of our combatant commanders.

2. What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented?

ANSWER: (U) I believe the Department of Defense has vigorously and successfully pursued implementation of these important reforms.

3. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

ANSWER: (U) The most positive aspect is the overall improvement in our military operations. The Goldwater-Nichols Act resulted in much needed improvements in joint doctrine, joint professional military education, and joint strategic planning. Another important element is clarity in the chain of command from the President and Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders and unambiguous responsibility placed upon each combatant commander for execution of mission and preparedness of assigned forces.

The goals of the Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; and enhancing the effectiveness of military operations and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

4. Do you agree with these goals?

ANSWER: (U) Yes. The law gives combatant commanders the authority they need to carry out their assigned missions. This has been well demonstrated through the many complex joint operations conducted since the legislation was enacted, including the current global war on terrorism.

5. Do you foresee the need for additional modifications of Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment and possible revisions to the national security strategy? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

ANSWER: (U) It is clear that the Goldwater-Nichols Act has profoundly improved the performance and capabilities of the American military establishment. We have significantly improved our ability to conduct combat operations, manage defense resources, streamline management practices, and address organizational issues within the Department of Defense. As a result, I believe the Goldwater-Nichols Act remains an important and effective piece of legislation, and do not believe any major revisions are required at this time.

6. Based upon your experience as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe and Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and that the policies and procedures in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?

ANSWER: (U) Yes. Unity of command, input into resource allocation, and most importantly, the imperative of combatant commanders to plan and fight in a joint environment are all provided for, while empowering the individual Services in their roles of organizing, training, and equipping forces.

Duties

7. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command now that the Space Command and the Strategic Command have merged?

ANSWER: (U) My duties and functions as the Commander of this new, globally focused, and forward leaning Command will be ensuring we do more than simply blend two previously separate organizations and missions. The creation of this Command is a reflection of, and response to, the new global security environment, and it holds the very real promise of establishing a single organization with the flexibility, focus, and reach to meet both the current and as yet unforeseen challenges that lie ahead. My most important responsibilities will be to ensure this Command not only plans for and if necessary executes the missions that are currently resident in US Strategic and US Space Commands, but also takes full advantage of the synergies created by combining these two commands.

8. What are the mission areas that will transfer from Space Command to the new Strategic Command?

ANSWER: (U) The current US Strategic and US Space Commands will be disestablished on October 1st, and an entirely new Command, US Strategic Command will be established to carry out a broad range of assigned missions. In addition to carrying out each of the missions currently assigned to US Strategic Command and US Space Commands, the new Strategic Command will be well-positioned to take on new responsibilities and missions that require a global focus or global reach. In my view, establishing this Command is a tremendous opportunity to view the international security environment through an entirely new prism, and develop entirely new mechanisms for dealing with the global issues that face us. For example, the Department of Defense is currently studying several mission areas that have not been assigned previously to a combatant commander, but may make sense as we look out into the 21st Century. These missions include kinetic and non-kinetic global strike, department-wide information operations, lead agency for C4ISR, and an integrator for missile defense.

9. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform the space-related or other new duties that would be assigned to you as a result of the merger?

ANSWER: (U) I am privileged to have served in a full range of joint & Service assignments that heavily integrated space capabilities into successful joint warfighting operations. Also, my personal and professional military education includes two graduate degrees in aerospace engineering and aeronautical systems, which I believe have prepared me well for the highly technical aspects of the space mission. Importantly, if confirmed, I look forward to continuing my education and training with the outstanding men and women of US Space Command as we establish this innovative and globally-focused new US Strategic Command.

10. What are the most important lessons that you have learned as Commander in Chief of the Strategic Command that will help you implement the merger of the Space and Strategic Commands?

ANSWER: (U) There are two critical lessons I have learned as Commander of US Strategic Command that I believe have prepared me well for this new assignment. First, highly trained and motivated people are the key to success, and this new, highly-technical, globally-focused Command will be no different. Second, an organization, whether military or civilian, must be both highly efficient and highly adaptive to ensure success now and into the future. In the 10 months I have served at US Strategic Command, we have embraced and thrived on a full range of change, from the Nuclear Posture Review, to Unified Command Plan changes, to a new national security strategy, and I believe this will be the culture and expectation of the new US Strategic Command.

11. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command?

ANSWER: (U) The decision to establish the new US Strategic Command was made less than four months ago, and there are several important areas we continue to work to ensure the success of the new command. First, we are taking a dramatically different approach to componentcy, and are working with the Services to develop innovative arrangements that would allow the Command to “reach through” senior service component commanders to conduct rapid, responsive operations, but without requiring ownership of forces and the creation of redundant staffs at our headquarters. We are also considering new organization alignments within the headquarters to more efficiently carry out operations. Importantly, US Strategic Command will leverage the best in information technology to carry out global operations, and we continue to refine our C2 requirements for both current and future missions. We also are working diligently to strengthen even further our relationships with the regional combatant commanders and the Agencies, which have grown dramatically from the increased dialogue resulting from the findings of the Nuclear Posture Review.

12. If confirmed, what roles, including any related to establishing requirements or related to oversight, would you anticipate playing in space programs executed by the military services and Defense Agencies?

ANSWER: (U) Space is unquestionably critical to our nation’s future. As US Strategic Command will have oversight on a wide range of issues on a global scale, the Command will be in a tremendous position to articulate those requirements that remove old barriers and focus on the “operationalization” of space. On behalf of the regional combatant commanders, the Command will serve as the primary advocate for all warfighter space-related needs.

13. If confirmed, what would you anticipate your role would be in establishing requirements for missile defense programs executed by the military services and the Missile Defense Agency?

ANSWER: (U) With its global focus and space capabilities, US Strategic Command is ideally-suited to contribute to establishing requirements using an operational focus for an integrated, multi-layered, missile defense. Importantly, the Command will work and coordinate with the regional combatant commanders to address those global, operational issues and warfighting requirements that have not been fully met to date.

14. Will Strategic Command retain the computer network operations mission that currently is charged to Space Command?

ANSWER: (U) US Strategic Command will retain the computer network operations mission currently assigned to US Space Command. Importantly, we will take full advantage of the opportunity to examine where we can further develop and integrate the other elements of information operations to more completely and comprehensively meet critical national security requirements.

Relationships

15. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command, to the following officials:

a. The Secretary of Defense.

ANSWER: (U) In accordance with Title 10, United States Code, section 164, the Commander of US Strategic Command performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. He is directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the preparedness of the command and the ability to carry out missions assigned to the command.

b. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

ANSWER: (U) In accordance with Title 10, United States Code, section 132, the Deputy Secretary of Defense will perform duties and exercise powers as prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, and in the absence of the Secretary of Defense, perform his duties. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Deputy Secretary on all strategic matters.

c. The Under Secretaries of Defense.

ANSWER: (U) Title 10, United States Code, and current DOD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary of Defense regarding matters related to specific functional areas. Within these areas, the Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions, and in discharging their responsibilities the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. Importantly, as with other communications between the President, Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders, communications between the Under Secretaries and combatant commanders are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

ANSWER: (U) With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for C3I, Legislative Affairs, and Public Affairs, all Assistant Secretaries are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. Consequently, any relationship US Strategic Command would require with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense would be with and through the appropriate Under Secretary of Defense. Since the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for C3I, Legislative Affairs, and Public Affairs are the Secretary of Defense's principal deputies for overall supervision of C3I, legislative matters, and public affairs, respectively, any relations required between the Command and these Assistant Secretaries would be conducted along the same lines as those discussed above regarding relations with the Under Secretaries of Defense.

e. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ANSWER: (U) The Chairman is clearly established by Title 10, United States Code, as the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. He serves as an advisor and is not in the chain of command running from the President and Secretary of Defense to each combatant commander. The law does allow the President to direct communications between the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders be transmitted through the Chairman, which keeps the Chairman fully involved and informed as he executes his legal responsibilities. By law, and to the extent directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman serves as spokesman for the combatant commanders and provides a vital linkage between the combatant commanders and other elements of the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will work with and through the Chairman in the execution of my duties.

f. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.

ANSWER: (U) Title 10, United States Code, section 165, provides that, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the authority of combatant commanders, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces they have assigned to combatant commands. The authority exercised by a combatant commander over Service components is clear, but requires close coordination with each Secretary to ensure there is no infringement upon those lawful responsibilities a Service Secretary alone may discharge.

g. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.

ANSWER: (U) As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs are no longer involved in the operational chain of command. However, they perform two significant roles. Their primary function is to provide organized, trained, and equipped forces for employment by the combatant commander in the accomplishment of their missions. Additionally, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs have a lawful obligation to provide military advice. Individually and collectively, the Service Chiefs are a source of experience and judgment every combatant commander can and should call upon. If confirmed, I would work closely and confer regularly with the Service Chiefs.

h. The Combatant Commanders, including the Commander in Chief of the Northern Command.

ANSWER: (U) The Commander of US Strategic Command, has both supported and supporting relationships with the other combatant commanders. These relationships are primarily identified in the Unified Command Plan, the Forces For Unified Commands Memorandum, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, specific command arrangement agreements, OPLANs, and CONPLANs. In general, at present US Strategic Command is the supported combatant commander for the national strategic war plan, and is a supporting combatant commander for the remaining plans and missions. In the future, if confirmed, I would look to broaden and enhance the level and range of support to each of the regional combatant commanders.

i. The director of the Missile Defense Agency.

ANSWER: (U) The Missile Defense Agency serves as the missile defense systems engineering and development organization for the Department of Defense. It provides the research, development, testing, and evaluation of the missile defense and associated support systems which would be employed by the combatant commanders. Consequently, US Strategic Command will maintain a close and continuous relationship with the Director of the Missile Defense Agency as they develop the systems to support our warfighting requirements.

j. The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration.

ANSWER: (U) In accordance with title 32, section 3212, of the National Nuclear Security Act of 1999, the Administrator is responsible to the Secretary of Energy for all Department of Energy programs and activities involving the production, safety, and security of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, including the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Though the Administrator is outside the Defense Department's chain of command, these issues are of vital importance to US Strategic Command and contribute immensely to our mission of deterrence. If confirmed, I will work closely and confer regularly with the Administrator.

k. The Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration.

ANSWER: (U) The Deputy Administrator is responsible to the Administrator to oversee programs and efforts to prevent the spread of materials, technology, and expertise relating to weapons of mass destruction (WMD); detect the proliferation of WMD; eliminate inventories of surplus fissile materials; provide for international nuclear safety. These are strategic issues of concern to US Strategic Command, and if confirmed, my staff and I will work closely and confer regularly with the Deputy Administrator on these issues.

Major Challenges and Problems

16. In your view, what are the major challenges and problems that will confront the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command?

ANSWER: (U) We are in a new era of warfare—one in which we face increasingly asymmetric and technologically advanced threats—and the imperative for change is paramount. As we look to the future, we are developing warfighting skills and organizations that are capability-based vice threat-based, and we must integrate a wider range of existing and developing capabilities that have never been previously combined, to better leverage them across the full spectrum of military operations.

17. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and problems?

ANSWER: (U) The new US Strategic Command will bring together an incredibly broad range of capabilities and weave them into a more effective fabric of organizational structures, people, and forces capable of operating on a global scale and which can be quickly brought to bear on challenges across geographic and intellectual boundaries. I plan to focus on developing strong unity of effort among decentralized organizations, cultures, and processes to provide responsive, synchronized global support to the President, Secretary, and regional combatant commanders.

Priorities

18. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command?

ANSWER: (U) As stated above, if confirmed, my highest priority will be developing an organization, operating on a global scale, that is flexible and efficient enough to accept new missions as needed. We will structure the command to look to innovation and efficiencies first so as to work effectively support changing mission assignments in the dynamic international security environment of the 21st Century

Integration of Strategic and Space Command

19. The mission of the Space Command was relatively easy to define, as was the mission of the Strategic Command prior to the merger. How would you define the overarching mission of the new, merged Strategic Command?

ANSWER: (U) The mission of US Strategic Command is essentially twofold. At the most basic level, we will provide a global warfighting capability, second to none, to deter and defeat those who desire to attack the United States and its allies. Second, we will provide responsive, adaptive, and synchronized support to the President, Secretary, and regional combatant commanders to meet national security objectives.

20. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that there is a smooth integration of the Space and Strategic Commands?

ANSWER: (U) Three months ago General Eberhart and I chartered Implementation and Transition Teams, comprised of experienced personnel from within our two Commands, to shepherd the integration of the commands through important early milestones. He and I are fully supportive of this change and are both convinced of its value and contribution to national security. Importantly, we have been in close coordination with military and civilian leadership throughout the department as we shape the character and culture of this new organization. We continue to carefully examine the staff structure and organizational construct to ensure we fully address the needs of the new Command and its people, both now and as we accept future new missions. We also continue robust dialogue within the two commands and with those from a wider range of partners who will be contributors to our global synergies. As General Myers stated, “the only thing that will limit how far we go with this new command will be people’s imagination.” I will continue to foster such innovation to ensure the smoothest possible integration of the two Commands.

21. In your view what are the most important challenges that you face in implementing the merger of the Strategic and Space Commands?

ANSWER: (U) The most important challenges are those associated with bringing together these two superb commands in this dynamic international security environment, particularly as we conduct operations in the war on terrorism. As Secretary Rumsfeld stated on numerous occasions, it is not the wrong time to reorganize; it is imperative we reorganize so as to meet the nation’s national security needs. And so I look upon this as an exciting opportunity to create new organizational constructs. Importantly, we have a clear vision of what is required to complete the transition, and the true metric of our success will be the support we provide to the President, Secretary of Defense, and regional combatant commanders.

22. If confirmed, how will you interact with the military commanders of the service space commands and what role will each of these commands play in the transition to a consolidated Space and Strategic Command?

ANSWER: (U) The establishment of the new US Strategic Command provides a timely and welcome opportunity to make dramatic improvements in how we provide responsive, adaptive, and synchronized support to the President, Secretary of Defense, and regional combatant commanders. As the organizations chartered with organizing, training, and equipping our space forces, the individual service space commands will be full collaborative partners with US Strategic Command in developing the right forces and skills to execute our assigned missions. Also, as discussed earlier, US Strategic Command is taking a dramatically different approach to componentcy, and is working with the services to develop innovative arrangements that would allow the command to reach through senior service component commanders for execution, without requiring full-time ownership of forces.

23. In your view, what are the advantages and disadvantages of merging the two commands and what will you do, if confirmed, to minimize any disadvantages?

ANSWER: (U) The advantages of establishing US Strategic Command are numerous and compelling. We have a tremendous opportunity to bring together a wide range of global capabilities under a single unified commander, which will provide integrated, responsive, and synchronized support to the President and regional combatant commanders across the full spectrum of warfighting capabilities.

(U) From my perspective, there are no true disadvantages in creating this Command, only the opportunities addressed earlier. We will continue to work the individual issues associated with specific areas such as the stockpile and assured access to space, and I remain mindful of the need to appropriately address this large span of control. As always, I am committed to working with this Committee to address these and other important issues.

Adequacy of Space Launch Capabilities

24. What, in your view, must the United States do in the future, and what will you do if confirmed, to ensure continued reliable access to space?

ANSWER: (U) The United States should pursue, and I will advocate if confirmed, a responsive launch capability for the nation. Currently, the Department of Defense is evaluating several expendable and reusable launch vehicles. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles or EELVs have the potential to lower launch costs from the existing heritage vehicles and reduce launch generation timelines. In addition, the next generation of launch vehicles, often termed operationally responsive spacelift, may offer the US a unique opportunity to meet post-2010 security requirements, by allowing rapid augmentation and reconstitution of on-orbit capability, and providing an avenue for responsive space control and force application.

25. If confirmed, what improvements would you recommend to the U.S. East and West Coast space ranges?

ANSWER: (U) As Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Teets, Under Secretary of the Air Force, have each stated, we are committed to sustaining reliable access to space. The Eastern and Western space launch ranges are essential to national security, weapons system testing, and the commercial space industry, and we must sustain and modernize these national capabilities. These two ranges are in essence the Nation's "Gateway to Space" and I will continue to advocate critical range modernization and capability enhancements.

26. If confirmed, what would be your highest priority with respect to maintaining reliable access to space?

ANSWER: (U) I fully support the nation's ongoing efforts to maintain reliable access to and operations in space. It is absolutely essential we sustain a process of continually assessing, and when appropriate, upgrading the facilities, launch vehicles, and control systems to maintain our position as the world's preeminent space-faring nation.

27. If confirmed, would you recommend or support any changes in the Air Force Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program?

ANSWER: (U) I commit to you that I will examine the EELV program carefully and comprehensively, and will be a full partner with the Services and the Department of Defense in reviewing all requirements that impact our reliable access to space.

Space Requirements

28. In your view, are there current unmet requirements for space systems, and if so, what are they and what should be done to meet any such requirements?

ANSWER: (U) US Space Command is in the process of finalizing its Integrated Priority List (IPL), which will be merged and prioritized with US Strategic Command's to create an overall IPL for the new command. US Space Command currently highlights several programs as requiring additional emphasis in the near future. Specifically, the nation will benefit from increased funding of the Combatant Commander's Integrated Command & Control System, protected satellite communications (AEHF), computer network defense/computer network attack capabilities, space-based surveillance, and space-based missile warning.

29. In your view what space programs should be accorded the highest priority?

ANSWER: (U) As the command assumes its larger warfighting role on October 1st, our principal focus will be on those elements of the DoD space program that support warfighting and are essential for homeland security. This includes the critical command and control, communications, and surveillance capabilities that are part of the space control, space support, and force enhancement missions.

Deterrence and Missile Defense

30. Will the Strategic Command retain all of the duties related to missile defense currently performed by Space Command? If all of the duties will not be retained please identify those that will not be retained and to whom these duties will be assigned.

ANSWER: (U) The currently approved changes to the Unified Command plan reassigns Space Command's missile defense duties to the new US Strategic Command and the other theater Combatant Commanders. Under this construct, US Strategic Command has the responsibility for developing requirements for missile defense and space-based support for missile defense, advocating the missile warning requirements of all combatant commanders, and providing warning of missile attack to the other combatant commanders. We are currently studying the next round of changes, which may include assigning a Combatant Command the role of global integrator for missile defense.

31. What are your views on the relationship between defenses against long range ballistic missiles and nuclear deterrence?

ANSWER: (U) The projected evolution of our strategic forces, as envisioned in the Nuclear Posture Review, is the creation of a new triad of offensive forces, active and passive defenses, and a robust infrastructure, all working together to meet the national security objectives of assurance, dissuasion, deterrence and defeat. In this construct, ballistic missile defense is an important, complementary capability that strengthens deterrence.

32. What role do you believe Strategic Command should play in ballistic missile defense?

ANSWER: (U) Under the approved changes to the Unified Command Plan, US Space Command's previous missile defense duties are assigned to US Strategic Command and the other regional combatant commanders, which includes the duties listed above. Importantly, the Defense Science Board 2002 Summer Study on Missile Defense recommended the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assign the global support mission for missile defense to US Strategic Command, which would include responsibility for sensors, communications, planning and coordination with the agencies and regional combatant commanders. The Department of Defense is currently studying this critical mission, and I believe the new US Strategic Command is the command best-suited to performing this role and would support its assignment to the command.

33. The Nuclear Posture Review and your predecessor as commander in chief both advocated strategic force posture based on strong offensive and strong missile defenses. Do you believe that the size and type of the U.S. strategic offensive forces should depend in some degree on the evolution of missile defenses? If so, how, and to what degree?

ANSWER: (U) Clearly there is a relationship between offensive and defensive forces, but the character of the relationship is not yet defined. As missile defense systems are fielded and become a part of the equation, we look forward to being an integral part of the study and dialogue.

34. In your view, should U.S. strategic offensive forces and missile defenses be linked doctrinally? If you believe they should, how should they be linked? Is there currently such a linkage, and if so how are you involved in this process?

ANSWER: (U) The relationship between offensive forces and missile defenses merits comprehensive analysis, but at this point remains undefined. There are efforts underway to clarify and codify what we feel is at this point an intellectual link, and we look forward to further study and analysis as defensive systems are developed. US Strategic Command will have a significant role in both offensive and defensive systems, and I am confident we will achieve an appropriate balance.

35. Secretary Rumsfeld recently noted both the need for and the absence of a coordinated strategy for cruise missile defense. What is your view of the current state of cruise missile defense program coordination? In your view, should the newly combined Strategic and Space Commands play a role in cruise missile defense?

ANSWER: (U) I concur with the Secretary's assessment, and believe US Strategic Command has an important role to play using our critical integrated threat warning and attack assessment capabilities. I envision a strong partnership with NORAD and the regional combatant commanders, and believe the Command should assist on the issue where appropriate.

Russian Nuclear Forces

36. In your view, does Russia's apparent intention to retain MIRVed land based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or mobile missiles pose any threat to U.S. national security interests or to the effectiveness of any U.S. missile defense system?

ANSWER: (U) Although multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) represent a significant military capability, in light of our increasingly nonadversarial relationship with Russia, MIRVd forces pose no significant increase in threat over that posed by non-MIRVd forces. As you would expect, MIRVd forces do pose engineering and design challenges for missile defense systems.

37. In your view, what is the current Russian strategic nuclear doctrine? If Russia has a launch on warning doctrine, what challenge does this pose for the Strategic Command?

ANSWER: (U) Russia's currently published nuclear doctrine is one of deterrence; they seek to maintain a nuclear potential capable of guaranteeing a level of damage on any aggressor under any circumstance. As part of their deterrent capability, Russia maintains an early warning system capable of warning of a strategic attack on Russia and a survivable, redundant command and control (C2) system for strategic force execution. Although possession of these warning and C2 systems inherently provides Russia with a launch on warning capability, it is not their published doctrine, and in the stable and nonadversarial relationship we now enjoy with Russia, it is not a likely scenario.

38. Do you support military-to-military exchanges between the Strategic Command and counterpart Russian commands and if so, what are your plans to resume these exchanges?

ANSWER: (U) I fully support continuing, and in fact expanding, our military-to-military exchanges with our Russian counterparts. These exchanges contribute to preserving and enhancing strategic stability as we continue to develop our country's promising relationship with Russia. Strategic Command is currently planning several exchanges in the upcoming year between our forces and those of Russia's strategic and space forces, and we look forward to additional opportunities as part of an approved DoD engagement plan.

39. Do you support efforts to implement the joint data exchange center? What is the current status of the center?

ANSWER: (U) US Strategic Command supports those efforts that seek to ensure strategic stability with the other nuclear powers. The Joint Data Exchange Center may well play a role in continued cooperation, dialogue, and friendship with the Russian Federation; although, the JDEC program is currently on hold, pending US and Russian government resolution of several issues, including cost sharing, tax, and liability issues.

U.S. Strategic Force Posture Beyond the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty
(The Moscow Treaty)

40. Have you established a schedule with milestones to come into compliance with the Moscow Treaty? If not, will you establish such a schedule and when?

ANSWER: (U) As outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review, the military plans to retire all 50 of its ten-warhead Peacekeeper ICBMs and remove four Trident submarines from strategic service. These reductions will occur over the next 4 years and will result in a reduction of over 1200 warheads. The additional steps the US will take to reduce its inventory to 1700-2200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons in 2012 have not been determined, but will likely include some adjustments to all legs of the current triad, while preserving the strengths each leg provides to our deterrence posture. As in the past, US Strategic Command will be fully engaged with the Administration and Secretary of Defense as we work to determine the exact schedule for completing the reduction by 2012.

41. In your view, should the United States reduce the total number of nuclear warheads in its inventory, including both tactical and strategic warheads? If so, how should the United States proceed? In your view, what is the next step in such reductions?

ANSWER: (U) US Strategic Command fully supports the President's goal of reducing our operationally deployed stockpile to the lowest level consistent with national security. The command was consulted extensively during the Nuclear Posture Review, which studied the full range of strategic issues, and I concur with the determination that given the current international environment, emerging threats, and technology available, the nation's deterrence needs can be satisfied with 1700-2200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons. An important and appropriate future step is addressing tactical nuclear weapons and, as the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State have each stated before Congress, they will be a part of the future dialogue with Russia on this issue.

42. Do you believe that there is a minimum number of nuclear weapons or delivery systems that the United States should maintain under any scenario or circumstance?

ANSWER: (U) US Strategic Command believes, as the President stated and the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed, the Nuclear Posture Review fully studied our strategic requirements and determined that our national security needs can be appropriately met at the level of 1700-2200 operationally deployed nuclear weapons in the projected national security environment.

43. In your view, what is the minimum number of strategic nuclear warheads that should be assigned to each of the inactive and active inventories of U.S. nuclear weapons as a result of the December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and the Moscow Treaty?

ANSWER: (U) Implementation of the drawdown articulated in the Nuclear Posture Review is already underway, and goals have been established to determine the appropriate levels of operationally deployed warheads we will require over the life of the Moscow Treaty. The size of the overall stockpile, active and inactive, to support these levels is part of an ongoing review and will consider the important factors of reliability and ongoing life extension programs.

44. On what strategy are these numbers based?

ANSWER: (U) US Strategic Command is part of a larger dialogue which encompasses and balances many competing requirements to ensure we maintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile now and into the future. In this vein, the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy are working to match DoD stockpile and DoE infrastructure capabilities to establish appropriate warhead levels based on the national security environment, refurbishment schedules, and the challenges associated with aging stockpile and delivery systems. As always, the goal is to maintain a fully credible deterrent capability in support of our national security objectives.

Industrial Base

45. From your perspective, are there key sectors of the U.S. space and strategic industrial base that must be protected in order to sustain U.S. strategic and space forces for the foreseeable future?

ANSWER: (U) Numerous core industrial capabilities and specialized functional areas have no counterparts in the commercial sector. With the help of our Strategic Advisory Group, the Services, and industry, we determined specialized electronics, solid rocket motors, and guidance and reentry system technology are critical and unique sectors of the strategic US industrial base. In the space arena, critical sectors of the industrial base include our national technological capabilities to surveil both earth and space, sustainable and cost-effective spacelift, including launch vehicle technology and ranges, and satellite communication technology.

However, most importantly, in each of these areas the most critical need for sustaining the necessary industrial base is recruiting and retaining the intellectual capital which drives the overall sectors. How we approach and accomplish this important task will be critical to our long-term success.

46. In your view, are the ongoing efforts in this area adequate?

ANSWER: (U) The Army, Navy, and Air Force have established or proposed coordinated programs to address these areas. Importantly, US Strategic Command will advocate continued assessments of these critical areas and work to ensure our nation's approach to sustaining the industrial base is an integrated, systematic approach addressing people, platforms, and facilities, and the associated management of associated risks.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

47. Should tactical nuclear weapons be brought under the auspices of Strategic Command?

ANSWER: (U) Classified Answer

48. What is your view as to the role Strategic Command should play with respect to tactical nuclear weapons, whether or not they are brought under the auspices of the Strategic Command?

ANSWER: (U) Classified Answer

Annual Certification

49. The annual stockpile certification has just recently been completed and submitted to Congress. What do you believe to be our biggest challenge in maintaining the nuclear weapons expected to be in the enduring stockpile in the future?

ANSWER: (U) Classified Answer

The administrative process for certifying the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile requires the Commander in Chief of the Strategic Command and the three nuclear weapons laboratory directors to report annually to the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, who in turn certify to the President whether the nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe and reliable.

50. Since becoming Commander in Chief of the Strategic Command, have you identified any changes that you would recommend in this annual process?

ANSWER: (U) I believe the certification process is an accurate and responsive method for annually certifying the safety and reliability of the stockpile to the Secretaries and the President. My assessment as the Commander of US Strategic Command is based on independent analysis conducted by my Strategic Advisory Group's Stockpile Assessment Team, a nationally-recognized group of nuclear weapons experts. Importantly, I am satisfied with the level of cooperation among the nuclear weapons laboratories, NNSA, US Strategic Command, and the Department of Defense, and will continue to work closely with them as we share the collective challenges and responsibilities of maintaining the stockpile.

Pit Manufacturing Capability

51. Have you reviewed the annual requirement for plutonium pit production, by weapons type, in light of the December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and the signing of the SORT Treaty?

ANSWER: (U) In support of the Nuclear Posture Review, the nation is beginning to characterize the size of the active and inactive stockpiles that will be necessary to sustain the operationally deployed stockpile over the next decade. As we determine and refine the warhead levels, the Department of Defense will provide a requirement, approved by the President, to the Department of Energy for the numbers and types of weapons to be maintained in the nuclear stockpile. Based on this requirement, the Department of Energy will then determine the number and types of pits required.

52. If such a review has been completed, what are the results of that review?

ANSWER: (U) Although the National Nuclear Security Administration is still developing a concept for requirements, their early analysis supports establishing a small interim pit manufacturing capability at Los Alamos National Laboratory to meet near-term pit requirements and to continue planning the design of a Modern Pit Facility to meet the most probable range of long-term nuclear weapon stockpile requirements.

53. If such a review has not been completed, are you planning to conduct such a review, and when would that be completed?

ANSWER: (U) Although US Strategic Command does not play a direct oversight role for pit production requirements, we are close partners with NNSA in maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile. As the nation completes its review of stockpile requirements and composition, we will work closely with NNSA to ensure we maintain a credible deterrent posture for the nation.

54. Has a validated pit production requirement, by weapons type, been provided to the DOE?

ANSWER: (U) As stated earlier, as part of the Nuclear Posture Review, we are defining our overall stockpile requirements. As the nation determines the appropriate levels of warheads necessary to meet national security objectives, the Department of Defense will provide a Presidentially-approved requirement to the Department of Energy which, in turn, the National Nuclear Security Administration will use to determine the number and types of pits required.

Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP)

55. In your view are there hardened and deeply buried targets which are beyond the reach of a U.S. military strike, given current U.S. military nuclear and conventional weaponry and capabilities?

ANSWER: (U) Numerous studies over the last several years have identified facilities that are too hard and/or too deep to be held at risk by our current nuclear and conventional weapons. A review of the full range of options the nation might pursue to deal with these facilities is a prudent and appropriate step at this time.

56. Is there a DOD requirement for producing a feasibility study on RNEP to determine if RNEP could place the most challenging HDBTs at risk?

ANSWER: (U) The requirement for a feasibility study has been validated many times over the past several years, including the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated HDBT Defeat Mission Need Statement (Apr 94), the JROC validated HDBT Defeat Capstone Requirements Document (Jan 2001), and the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) approved RNEP Phase 6.2/6.2A study. Additionally, the mission need for this capability was identified in the SAND DUNE study (Mar 98), the Defense Science Board Report on Underground Facilities (Jun 98), the HDBT Report to Congress (Nov 01), and the Nuclear Posture Review (Dec 01).

Importantly, our focus remains on conducting a detailed feasibility study and any production decision would be made as part of a separate process.

57. If there is such a requirement, what are the categories or types of targets that an RNEP would hold at risk?

ANSWER: (U) The types of targets RNEP would be designed to hold at risk are facilities of sufficient national security interest that may fall into categories such as national leadership, strategic command and control, weapons of mass destruction storage and production sites, and ballistic missile storage and launch facilities.

Maintaining Expertise in the Military

58. If confirmed, what actions would you propose to take to ensure that nuclear- and space-related billets and assignments are not viewed as career-limiting and that nuclear and space programs and activities continue to attract top quality officers and enlisted personnel?

ANSWER: (U) The sustainment of intellectual capital through the recruitment, retention, and career progression of nuclear and space experts is one of the most difficult challenges facing this nation. Importantly, this is truly a national issue impacting more than just the Department of Defense, and we are engaged in dialogue on many levels to identify and implement possible solutions. The Center for Strategic and International Studies recently completed a study on revitalizing the nation's nuclear expertise, and we are evaluating proposals they have made to partner with US Strategic Command to address this issue. I also recently made a personal video in support of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's (DTRA) initiative to attract and retain nuclear scientists at DTRA and the nation's nuclear labs. Within the Department of Defense, I have spoken with each of the service chiefs about this vitally important issue, as we will be collaborative partners in developing nuclear and space expertise within the individual services. Finally, I look forward to seeing the results of Air Force Space Command's recently-created Space Professional Development Task Force which is chartered to address the Space Commission's recommendations for this important area.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

59. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

ANSWER: (U) Yes. If confirmed, it is my duty to keep you, the representatives of the people, informed of the status of our computer network operations, space, and strategic forces.

60. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from those of the Administration in power?

ANSWER: (U) Yes. It is my responsibility to provide the best military advice regardless of the Administration's views.

61. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command?

ANSWER: (U) Yes. If confirmed, I will make myself available to this committee or designated members as requested.

62. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

ANSWER: (U) Yes. I will be forthcoming with all information requested.