It was over two years ago that this committee came together to review the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9-11 Commission, to issue legislation that addressed a number of the Commission's recommendations. The work we did was important and timely, but more remains to be done.
Many of the issues I raised during the original 9-11 Commission Report hearings are still outstanding.
First, not enough has been done by the Administration to increase foreign language capabilities in the federal government. According to the 9-11 Commission Report, al Qaeda was more globalized than we were. I completely agree. Al Qaeda knew the English language and American culture, but we didn't know theirs. Federal agencies lacked sufficient Arabic speaking agents on September 11th which contributed to the United States' inability to predict and prevent the 9-11 attacks. Although critical attention has been brought to the lack of foreign language expertise in America, much more needs to be done.
For federal agencies to recruit individuals with language proficiency, we need an educational system to produce individuals with those skills. And we need to not only teach the languages that are deemed critical today, but those that will be critical in the next 20 to 50 years. At the recommendation of language policy experts; federal, state, and local government officials; and businesses, I offered legislation in 2005 to establish a National Foreign Language Coordination Council with Senators Cochran and Dodd to develop a national language strategy. However, the Administration has blocked this effort and instead has focused efforts on a very limited plan: the National Security Language Initiative (NSLI). While I believe NSLI is a good first step, it should not be the only step the government takes to improve language capabilities in the U.S. Five years after 9-11 we should not still be debating how to improve foreign language training in the United States. I look forward to hearing our witnesses suggestions on how to improve language skills and cultural understanding to address current and future needs.
Second, the 9-11 Commission's recommendation that privacy and civil liberty protection oversight be increased has not been fulfilled. I was pleased that the Commission recognized the need for strong oversight of counterterrorism efforts to protect the privacy and civil liberties of all Americans. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458), as passed by this committee, was on the right track in establishing the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. However, the bill that passed Congress was weaker than initially proposed. In light of the increasing threats to personal civil liberties, I believe that the Board must be independent and have the power to protect the freedoms we hold most dear. Likewise, federal agencies must have strong and independent privacy officers to ensure that laws and procedures protecting the rights of individuals are followed. That is why I introduced the Privacy Officer With Enhanced Rights Act, or the POWER Act, with Senators Lieberman and Feingold, to strengthen privacy oversight at the Department of Homeland Security. As the 9-11 Commission Report states, "...insecurity threatens liberty.... Yet if our liberties are curtailed, we lose the values that we are struggling to defend."
Privacy need not be sacrificed in the name of security. In fact, violating privacy rights can endanger security, as is the case with the REAL ID Act. The 9-11 Commission recommended that the federal government set standards to prevent fraud in U.S. identification documents, such as drivers' licenses. This important recommendation was addressed by the Intelligence Reform Act, which mandated that standards for issuing drivers' licenses and identification cards be promulgated by a group of stakeholders under the direction of the Secretary of Transportation.
Unfortunately, the Intelligence Reform Act requirement was eclipsed in 2005 by the REAL ID Act, which requires each state's driver's licensing agency to collect and store substantial numbers of records containing licensees' most sensitive personally identifiable information, including social security number, proof of residence, and biometric identifiers. If such a state database is compromised, it could provide a one-stop access to virtually all information necessary to commit identity theft.
Moreover, the sharing of the aggregated personally identifiable information of licensees between and amongst various government agencies and employees at the federal, state, and local level, as contemplated by the REAL ID Act, could allow millions of individuals access to that information without protections or safeguards. The potential for the private sector to scan and share the information contained on a REAL ID compliant license exponentially increases the risk of identity theft as well. Despite these obvious threats to Americans' privacy, the REAL ID Act fails to mandate privacy protections for individuals' information nor does the Act provide states with the means to implement data security and anti-hacking protections that will be required to safeguard the new databases mandated by the Act.
REAL ID exacerbates the threat of identity theft: as the Honolulu Star Bulletin noted in an October 1, 2006, editorial, the REAL ID Act gives us "a false sense of security."
It is important that the 9-11 Commission's recommendations are implemented with good judgement and common sense and not overzealously. The identification security recommendation can be fulfilled without unduly sacrificing privacy in the process.
A third issue concerns the importance of securing nuclear weapons and nuclear material both at home and abroad. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has undertaken a number of investigations at my request into how the United States can improve the security of nuclear material. Some significant steps have been taken in the United States to store safely low-level nuclear materials that could be used in the production of so-called "dirty bombs." However, more needs to be done. Even more critical is the importance of securing nuclear weapons and material in the states of the former Soviet Union. As the recent death by polonium-210 poisoning in London of a former KGB agent illustrates, deadly nuclear materials are more widely available than previously suspected. Next month GAO will release another report at my request on the Department of Energy's international radiological threat reduction program.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you to draft legislation to address these and many other concerns raised in the 9-11 Commission Report. In addition, as Chairman of the Oversight of Government Management subcommittee, I will hold hearings on many of these crucial issues because rigorous oversight and strong legislation go hand in hand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
