STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANIEL K. AKAKA: 

Good morning, and thank you all for attending this, the fourth in a series of hearings to discuss progress made in the Department of Defense's security clearance process.

Almost two years ago, at our first hearing on the security clearance problem, I said that we could not afford to let this issue stay on the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) high risk list for long. Unfortunately, it seems that not enough progress has been made and this problem has once again made the 2007 list.

Fixing this problem is a national security issue, increasingly a fiscal issue. Delays in the clearance process, especially for top secret clearances, are costing taxpayers millions of dollars. Cleared workers are now in such high demand, and there is such a limited pool of them, that some contractors are offering signing bonuses of up to $20,000, or even new cars to individuals with a security clearance. In addition, cleared individuals are all but guaranteed a much higher salary than their uncleared counterparts. I am concerned that contractors may start putting clearance status above job skills when filling positions. These costs are eventually borne by the federal government in the form of more expensive contracts.

More importantly however, is the effect on our national security. First and foremost, there are not enough cleared individuals right now to fill the rosters of contractors working on national security functions. We rely on contractors to support us from the tanker drivers in Iraq to the analysts at the Department of Homeland Security. It is essential that we get the best and brightest a clearance as soon as possible so they can get into the field and fulfil their missions.

We have been assured time and again that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is up to the task of getting rid of backlogs and conducting clearance investigations in a timely manner. However, reports by GAO, and the overall numbers coming out of OPM, tell us that we are not where we should be in completing investigations and reducing backlogs. In 2004 we laid out benchmarks in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458), which called for completing 80 percent of security clearances within 120 days by the end of 2006, and within 90 days by the end of 2009.

We are now almost half way through 2007 and our goals are not being fully met. While some progress has been made in reducing times for initial clearances, the wait is still unacceptably long for reinvestigations, top secret investigations, and backlogged requests. In addition, we are told by GAO that investigation times reported by the Office of Management and Budget and OPM may not accurately reflect how long investigations really take.

There are still several obstacles to improving the clearance process, some of which are under our control, and some which are not. OPM still struggles to obtain timely access to data needed to complete an investigation. They also have a young workforce that is still gaining needed experience. At the Defense Security Service, unreliable estimates for OPM investigation requests continue. They operate on an inadequate budget and rely on a computer system on the verge of collapse.

I am concerned about the resistance towards modernizing the clearance process using new technology. Hundreds of thousands of file folders line shelves at OPM, containing information on active investigations.

These investigations are tracked by bar-codes on a computer system developed in 1984. Even though files are eventually scanned electronically, paper files are still sent across the country through couriers such as Fed-Ex. This slows down the process and puts sensitive personal information about those under investigation out of the hands of the federal government.

Other agencies have begun to utilize proven, modern technologies in their investigations. Many of their clearance times are considerably lower. Some of these agencies actually use the same contractors as OPM, but they employ modern technology and processes which OPM does not use. Technology can not be a substitute for humans making decisions, but it can be used as a tool to make more informed and timely decisions.

The Intelligence Reform Act required uniform standards for clearances across the government. It also required a system be put into place to allow for reciprocal clearances from other agencies. However, agencies still do not consistently recognize reciprocal clearances. Without reciprocity, an individual that is already cleared must start the clearance process over when moving agencies, causing additional investigations that are, in many cases, unnecessary.

I believe we need to determine if what is being done now will solve the clearance problem, or if we need a new direction. I am not convinced that the current system will work. I hope that testimony from our witnesses today will aide us in making that decision, and I thank them for their attendance today.

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