Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure partnering with you once again as we examine another high-risk government program. As you know, I also serve as the Ranking Member of the Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee, so this hearing is of particular interest to me.

Last month, the Nation learned a painful lesson about the importance of logistics. After Hurricane Katrina struck, the National Guard responded with the largest domestic mobilization in history. Unfortunately, the Guard was under-equipped. According to Lt. General Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the Guard lacked sufficient trucks, radios, and night vision goggles to do their job properly. At the same time, food, water, and ice that had been pre-positioned in the region was stuck in warehouses.

The federal response to Katrina underscored three challenges of logistics:

• Asset Visibility,
• Forecasting, and
• Distribution.

Commanders must have the ability to: (1) see exactly what assets they have and where the assets are located, (2) accurately predict future needs, and (3) quickly move supplies from factory to foxhole. Defense logistics requires balancing the roles of supplier to the warfighter with accountability to the taxpayer.

Department of Defense (DoD) logistics has been on the Government Accountability Office (GAO) High-Risk List since 1990, under various names, and the GAO has issued more than 72 reports in this area. While much more remains to be done, there have been some improvements.

One improvement has been in distribution. In Operation Desert Storm, it took months to move supplies into the region before the invasion. Once the supplies got there, it was often difficult to determine what had been delivered. We heard many stories of troops tearing apart truckloads of supplies looking for particular items that they needed.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, we were able to move supplies into the region more quickly, and once we got there, we had much better accountability for what we had. One reason for the improved visibility was the increased use of Radio Frequency Identification, or RFID, to track supplies. This is a critical improvement, and one that we need to continue to develop.

Shortages of critical supplies, however, continue. In Desert Storm, we learned about shortages of desert camouflage uniforms and boots. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, we learned about shortages of chem-bio suits, armored Humvees, and body armor.

It is just plain wrong that family members of those fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan needed to purchase, in many cases, critical safety gear for loved ones. We included a provision in last year's Defense Authorization bill requiring DoD to reimburse service members -- up to $1,100 per item -- for protective equipment. The law required the Secretary of Defense to develop regulations for reimbursement by February 25, 2005, yet these regulations were not issued until yesterday, while we were considering Senator Dodd's amendment to expand this program. The amendment we approved yesterday will help to ensure that our warfighters have needed protective equipment.

Such problems are why we are discussing DoD's strategic plan today.

I am pleased that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the GAO are working with DoD on the broad issue of defense logistics and have developed a measurable plan for improvement.

The presence today of Mr. Johnson, Mr. Kreig, and Mr. Solis demonstrates the commitment to the request we made of OMB at our hearing last February that there be a clear strategy to review high-risk programs and get DoD off the high-risk list. I do want to add that I am especially pleased that Mr. Johnson has taken our request seriously, and I understand that all areas on the high-risk list are under close review by OMB.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.