

Answers to Advance Questions from Mr. Ryan Henry

1. Defense Reforms

More than a decade has passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms.

A. Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?

Yes, I support the implementation of these reforms. The focus upon "jointness" and civilian oversight driven by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 has significantly enhanced the responsiveness, readiness, and warfighting capabilities of our U.S. armed forces.

B. What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented?

The Goldwater-Nichols reforms represent a first step in the transformation process. They have had a pathfinder impact within DoD. They have strengthened civilian control, improved military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense, strengthened unity of command within our combatant commands, and improved readiness to operate as a joint warfighting team.

C. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

The unambiguous responsibility and authority assigned to combatant commanders for mission accomplishment and the increased attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning are the most important aspects in my view.

The goals of the Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as reflected in Section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control over the military; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of military operations; and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

D. Do you agree with these goals?

Yes.

Recently, there have been articles which indicate an interest within the Department of Defense in modifying Goldwater-Nichols.

E. Do you anticipate that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?

I cannot recommend any amendments to Goldwater-Nichols at this time. As you know, the Secretary of Defense has an abiding interest in the transformation of the Department to improve our national defense. Questions of responsibility, authority, and organization are matters of specific interest and continuous review. If any of these reviews recommend refinements to Goldwater-Nichols, I would expect the Department will consult closely with the Congress, and especially this committee. If confirmed, I would be personally interested in working with the committee on any efforts to review this legislation.

2. Duties

Section 134a of Title 10, United States Code, provides that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the performance of his duties. Department of Defense Directive 5111.3 emphasizes that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy advises and assists the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, particularly on strategy formulation, contingency planning, and the integration of Department of Defense plans and policy with overall national security objectives.

A. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

My understanding of the duties and functions derives from DoD Directive 5111.3, which states: The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (PDUSD(P)), as the principal assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), advises and assists the USD(P) in providing staff advice to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense, particularly on strategy formulation, contingency planning, and the integration of DoD plans and policy with national security objectives, and by law is empowered to act in his or her stead.

B. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

I believe I have been privileged to serve in positions and gain first-hand experience that qualify me to perform the duties of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

During the first 20 years of my professional career I served as a naval surface warfare officer and aviator, seeing extensive combat in two wars -- Vietnam and Desert Storm. During this period, I

was a naval strike planner, sea-strike mission commander, strike leader, and commanding officer, while making six extended deployments to the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. These experiences allowed me to work at the implementation end of policy development, contingency planning, and the execution of national security strategy.

For the next six years, I broadened my experience base in the areas of national security policy, transformational technology development, legislative oversight, policy analysis and development, and corporate operations and leadership. Upon returning from the Gulf War, I was a top graduate from the National Defense University in 1992 and won the Commandant's Award for my defense strategy paper, "Access and Agility – Strategy and Structure for the 21st Century." At the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), I served as the Information Systems Architect, integrating "generation-after-next" systems into the first network-centric command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture and laying the groundwork for early warfighter integration. During the first session of the 104th Congress, I served as a Senior Military Fellow with the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, working on the Defense Appropriations Bill (PL 104-61) and gaining an appreciation and understanding of the value of Congressional oversight and consultations. Following retirement, I was a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where my work focused on the impact of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) on the future of U.S. warfighting and the new security challenges confronting the U.S. and its allies after the end of the Cold War.

For the past five years I have worked at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Initially, I built a successful business segment that worked with the science and technology community in steering efforts to develop national security architectures for the Information Age and the discovery of future tactical, operational, and organizational paradigms.

For the past year, working directly with the Chairman of the Board and CEO, I have overseen the corporate-wide development of strategic business and technology initiatives in the nation's largest employee-owned research and engineering company (over \$6 billion in annual revenue and 40,000 employees). I have been developing the strategy and courses of action to provide information technology, systems integration, and eSolutions to government and commercial customers in order to solve complex technical problems in national security, homeland defense, energy, the environment, telecommunications, health care, and transportation.

I believe these experiences provide a solid base to advise and assist the Under Secretary in providing staff advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary, particularly on strategy formulation, contingency planning, and the integration of DoD plans and policy with overall national security objectives.

C. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense?

Having just returned this past week from five years of full-time employment in the private for-profit sector, I will need to acquaint myself fully, across the breadth of the Policy Under Secretariat, with its personnel and their individual work. I am also looking forward to receiving in-depth briefings on defense strategy, deliberate and crisis action plans, the integration of DoD plans and policy with national security objectives, and on the budgetary implementation of defense plans.

D. Assuming you are confirmed, are there any other duties and functions that you expect that Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Feith will prescribe for you?

None of which I am currently aware.

3. Relationships

If confirmed, what would be your relationship with:

- The Secretary of Defense**
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense**
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**
- The other Under Secretaries of Defense, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence**
- The Assistant Secretaries of Defense**
- The General Counsel of the Department of Defense**
- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff**
- The Commanders of the Regional Combatant Commands**
- The Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the National Nuclear Security Administration**

If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I will work closely with and help coordinate the work of the Assistant Secretaries in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I expect to maintain a close working relationship with under secretaries and assistant secretaries across the Department, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with Combatant Commanders. As appropriate, I also will, if confirmed, work closely with the Administrator and the Deputy Administrators of the National Nuclear Security Administration.

4. Major Challenges and Problems

A. In your view, what are the major challenges and problems that will confront the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

In my view, the primary challenges are: a) successful prosecution of the global war on terrorism; b) strengthening joint warfighting capabilities; c) transforming the force to protect and advance U.S. national interests; and d) building more adaptive war plans that are responsive to the changing and uncertain security environment. The PDUSD(P) plays an important role with respect to these three challenges.

B. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and problems?

If confirmed, one of my first priorities would be to assist the Under Secretary for Policy in advancing DoD's role in the war on terrorism. In this capacity, I would help the newly created office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense to define and organize the Department's homeland security functions. I would also provide advice on the effective prosecution of the war on terrorism.

If confirmed, I also would support the Secretary's efforts to enhance joint warfighting: 1) through integrating air, land, and sea assets in deliberate and crisis action planning; 2) extending jointness to all levels in the Department through transformation guidance; 3) strengthening joint exercises and training; and 4) building a more agile and responsive system for war planning through new processes and collaborative planning tools.

Finally, with respect to transformation, if confirmed, I would continue to focus the Department's transformation efforts on achieving the critical operational goals laid out in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (see question 17).

5. Priorities

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

I believe the priorities mirror the challenges addressed in question four above. If confirmed, my priorities would be to: 1) Successfully prosecute the global war on terrorism; 2) Strengthen jointness; and 3) Transform the force.

I would also contribute to the following priorities of the Secretary:

- Define and organize the Department's role in homeland security;

- Develop new concepts of global engagement;
- Counter the proliferation of WMD;
- Build war plans to fit the new defense strategy;
- Streamline DoD processes;
- Improve interagency process, focus, and integration; and
- Enhance consultation with Congress.

6. Strategy Formulation and Contingency Planning

One of the purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to increase attention on the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. Department of Defense Directive 5111.3 specifically assigns a major role to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for those important matters.

What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?

As I understand this activity, the Secretary of Defense sets the strategic direction for the Department, and the priorities for deliberate and crisis action planning, in consideration of Presidential guidance and the National Security Strategy. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (PDUSD(P)), on behalf of the Secretary, then works in an interactive and iterative manner with Combatant Commanders, the Joint Staff, and the Military Departments to develop written guidance to the Department for plans, programs, and budgeting and to the Combatant Commanders for war plans to achieve the Secretary's goals. PDUSD(P) conducts formal reviews of the final products to ensure they meet the Secretary's intent.

7. Space Management and Organization

What role, if any, do you believe the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should play in the establishment of national security space policy?

As I understand it, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has the lead for development of defense strategy, and as such should play a prominent role in developing national security space policy and coordinating it through the Space Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) within the National Security Council interagency process. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should identify, coordinate, and resolve national security space policy issues within the Department and support the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense for any Principals or Deputies Committee meetings on national security space policy issues.

8. National Guard Role in Homeland Defense

There is currently considerable debate about the role the National Guard should play in defending the homeland. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission) recommended that the National Guard be given homeland security as a primary mission.

A. Do you believe that defending the homeland should become the National Guard's primary mission?

I view the National Guard as clearly capable of conducting selected homeland defense missions. However, the National Guard should also be available to play a critical role in support of combatant commanders executing military operations abroad.

I understand that the Department of Defense has undertaken a study mandated by the Congress in the FY 2003 National Defense Authorization Act to determine the "proper balance" of force structures, proper roles and missions, and command relationships with the National Guard. Therefore, I believe it is premature for me to offer an opinion on the assignment of particular forces and missions pending the outcome of that review.

B. What type of role do you envision the National Guard and Reserve ultimately playing in homeland defense?

Independent of the results of the study described above, I believe the States will continue to use their National Guard in a state status for a variety of homeland security missions. I understand that several States, in fact, have already exercised this authority.

9. Homeland Defense

Despite the establishment of a new Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense retains homeland defense capabilities that will continue to be a key element of any homeland security strategy.

A. In your view, what are the principal roles and missions of the Department of Defense with regard to overall homeland security?

The Department defines its role in homeland security as follows: (1) *homeland defense*, the protection of United States territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression; and (2) *civil support*, providing military support to civil authorities at the federal, state, and local levels across a range of conditions.

B. What do you feel are the principal challenges to the effective integration of defense, intelligence, law enforcement and border/port security capabilities to improve our homeland security?

I believe that one of the main challenges is information flow between the agencies with responsibility for homeland security and defense. Heterogeneous and incompatible information and communications systems inhibit integration and responsiveness. If confirmed, I would advocate an interagency roadmap to address this long-term problem and procedural work-arounds in the interim. Similarly, new partnership protocols and interagency concepts of operation can enhance the combined effectiveness of federal, state, and local organizations. Finally, I believe the Department should reevaluate the processes by which it shares national foreign intelligence with the homeland security community.

10. Posse Comitatus

Some have suggested that the Posse Comitatus Act, which governs the use of U.S. armed forces in domestic law enforcement, is in need of review in the "post-9/11" environment. Do you feel Posse Comitatus unduly inhibits the use of American military capabilities in support of homeland security efforts?

As I understand it, the Posse Comitatus Act does not unduly inhibit the use of American military capabilities in support of homeland security efforts. The Posse Comitatus Act comes into play only when military personnel are directly involved in the enforcement of civilian criminal laws. In that event, it places restrictions on U.S. military personnel's ability to engage in search, seizure, or arrest activities.

As you are aware, last year Secretary Rumsfeld and Governor Ridge indicated that they believed that the Act appropriately addressed the use of the military to support civilian law enforcement. I understand that this issue is continually under review. If confirmed, I would look forward to consulting with this Committee on this issue.

11. Combating Terrorism

Clearly, combating terrorism is one of the most important missions of the Department of Defense.

A. What is the Department's comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism, both at home and abroad?

As I understand it, in accordance with the National Security Strategy, the Department's strategy for combating terrorism is directed toward the accomplishment of three comprehensive goals.

First, the Department's strategy seeks to eliminate terrorism as a threat to America's way of life by disrupting and destroying terrorist organizations with global reach. The Department is and will continue to use intelligence to identify groups that pose a threat to the United States, and will employ law enforcement and military efforts to defeat them.

Second, the Department is working with other federal agencies and departments to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and those who support them. It will do this by waging a war of ideas against extremism and anti-Americanism. The Department is working vigorously to deny state sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists. The United States will not allow tyrants and dictators to use sovereignty as a shield behind which to hide and plot against the sovereignty and security of others.

Finally, the Department appears to be closely involved in strengthening America's security at home to deter and protect against terrorist attacks. As described in the Quadrennial Defense Review, the military's highest priority is the protection of the United States and its citizens and interests. The U.S. Northern Command and the newly established office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense will work to improve the Department's ability to deter terrorist attacks and better manage the consequences of such attacks should they occur.

B. How can the Department best structure itself to ensure that all forms of terrorism are effectively confronted?

In my view, the Department currently appears well-structured for combating terrorism. Its capabilities should become more robust with the development of U.S. Northern Command and the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

C. Are changes to the Defense intelligence community advisable to ensure optimal support to combating terrorism and other homeland security efforts? If so, please elaborate.

There appears to be a significant effort underway to coordinate among all elements of the defense intelligence establishment regarding intelligence support. I understand that these efforts are continuously being evaluated within the interagency working groups. The new office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will coordinate with the Director of Central Intelligence to maximize the effectiveness of Defense Intelligence.

D. Are there steps the Department should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other federal agencies?

I believe the Department of Defense will work with the new Department of Homeland Security and the intelligence community to continue to improve coordination of interagency plans and operations to combat terrorism at home and abroad. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Homeland Defense, once confirmed, should play a significant role in enhancing DoD's integration into the nation's homeland security efforts.

12. Saudi Arabia

A. What is your assessment of the current state of U.S. - Saudi Arabian defense cooperation?

I view our decades-long, military-to-military relationship with Saudi Arabia as healthy and resilient. We have had a U.S. military training mission in the Kingdom since the 1950s. Saudi Arabia has traditionally been one of the largest purchasers of U.S. weapons and training. The Persian Gulf War, and shared security concerns since that time, have significantly increased the breadth and depth of our defense dialogue. Over the past 10 years, in particular, this dialogue has provided a solid foundation for the strategic partnership that exists between our two countries today. This is not to say that all aspects of the relationship have been without difficulty at all times.

B. What changes, if any, would you suggest to this relationship?

If confirmed, one area I am inclined to examine is the current level of Saudi participation in the Department's military exchange programs. Now more than ever, I think it is important that DoD invite Saudi military professionals into its war colleges, universities, and other venues, where the Department might promote an in-depth exchange to address any issues or concerns that might exist among the next generation of military leaders in both countries.

13. Afghanistan

A. In your view what are the major challenges the United States and the international community face in Afghanistan today, and how should we approach them?

In my opinion, major challenges facing the United States and international community include reforming and rebuilding key security institutions such as the Afghan National Army, the national police force, the border police force, and the judicial system. We must also effect the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of ungoverned parties. Success will require the continued support of this Congress, along with effective work by U.S. counterparts in the other countries who have committed themselves to these missions, and by the United States.

Concurrently, I believe we must ensure implementation of the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, which has led to the first legitimate government in 30 years. As I understand it, this agreement provides a framework for settling constitutional questions in 2003 and conducting national elections in 2004. Success will no doubt depend upon continued coordination with the Karzai government, the international community, and the United Nations to shape and resource a central government that is viable.

B. Do you believe that the United States should increase its troop-strength in Afghanistan?

I believe that the Department's goal is to keep its footprint small. The U.S. seeks to be a stabilization force, not an occupation force. Afghanistan belongs to the Afghans. At the same time, we must ensure that sectors of the country do not revert to safe havens for terrorists. I understand that DoD's current commitment (about 8,000 military personnel) is considered sufficient for the mission. In my view, judicious investments in the Afghan National Army and the central government will help reduce the commitment of military forces provided by U.S. and allies over the coming years.

14. Iraq - Post-Conflict

A. If we go to war against Iraq, what is your view of the appropriate role for the Department of Defense in the post-conflict environment?

In my view, if Iraq is liberated, the United States and its coalition partners will become responsible both for the temporary administration of the country and the welfare of its population. DoD should commit itself to stay only as long as necessary to ensure security, protect the territorial integrity of Iraq, rid the country of WMD, eliminate terrorist infrastructure, assist the Iraqi people in the process of rebuilding their country, and facilitate the creation of a broad-based, representative, Iraqi government.

At the same time, I believe DoD also must commit to leave as soon as the Iraqi people are able to undertake these responsibilities on their own behalf. Thus, if confirmed, I would advocate post-war plans that emphasize expeditious transfer of responsibilities from U.S. military forces to appropriate UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, and ultimately to the Iraqi people themselves.

15. Special Operations Command

The Nunn-Cohen amendment to Goldwater-Nichols established the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC).

A. What is your view on the relationship between SOCOM and ASD/SOLIC?

As I understand it, pursuant to law, ASD/SOLIC is responsible for oversight, policy and resourcing of special operations within the Department of Defense, and SOCOM has the responsibility for operational control over the actual special operations forces. The relationship appears sound and has proven beneficial to the effectiveness of the nation's Special Operations Forces. Their superb performance in Afghanistan serves as a case in point.

B. What is your view of granting SOCOM greater ability to function as a supported, as opposed to supporting, command?

I believe new realities require an expanded role for special operations. Just as U.S. Northern Command was established to meet new challenges, so SOCOM must adapt to better apply its scarce resources in a new security environment more effectively. I believe SOCOM should not only retain current responsibilities for acquisition, but also develop its capacity to function globally with its own operational planning staff. It is my understanding that the Secretary has designated SOCOM as a supported command in the global war on terrorism.

16. War on Drugs

A. What is your assessment of the ongoing efforts of the United States to significantly reduce the amount of drugs illegally entering our nation?

I observe the United States continuing to work with its friends and allies in Latin America, Mexico, and Southeast Asia to detect, monitor, and interdict the movement of illegal drugs to the United States. The President's National Drug Control Strategy represents a vision that can continue to decrease the supply of drugs, while significantly increasing the education of Americans about the dangers of using illegal drugs and the resources needed to treat Americans who are addicted to illegal drugs.

B. In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in U.S. counterdrug efforts?

I view the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in counterdrug efforts as one of support to law enforcement. By statute, the Department serves as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of illegal drugs toward the United States. The Department also supports other Federal agencies whose core missions include counterdrug activities.

The Department's role is restricted to ensure military personnel do not participate in actual field operations, including: search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activities. In my view, the Department should continue to execute its counter-drug support responsibilities, as long as they employ military-unique capabilities not available to civil authorities and do not detract from their core war-fighting responsibilities.

17. Military Transformation

The transformation of U.S. defense capabilities to successfully confront 21st century threats has been the subject of much discussion over the past few years.

A. In your view, what should be the objectives of military transformation?

I view transformation as a continuous process, not an end state. We must remain open to innovative concepts and ideas developed through service and joint experimentation programs. Broad objectives, however, are necessary to inform the transformation process and allow us to make critical near-term investments that are prerequisites for more transformational capabilities. In this regard, I believe that the six critical operational goals articulated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review are the right ones: 1) Protect critical bases of operations and defeat CBRNE weapons and their means of delivery; 2) Assure information systems in the face of attack and conduct effective information operations; 3) Project and sustain U.S. forces in distant anti-access or area-denial environments and defeat anti-access and area denial threats; 4) Deny enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strike; 5) Enhance the capability and survivability of space systems and supporting infrastructure; and 6) Leverage information technology and innovative concepts to develop an interoperable, joint C4ISR architecture and capability.

B. What is the role of experimentation, including joint experimentation, in this process?

Ongoing experimentation is an essential part of the development of future warfighting concepts, which are the engines of change for driving the development of transformational capabilities. Experimentation programs assist in the development, testing and further refinement of future concepts. However, in the immediate future it is particularly important to have a robust joint experimentation program. Enhanced joint capabilities will produce non-linear increases in combat capabilities, particularly as we attempt to exploit new technologies that provide improved situational awareness and intelligence across the entire battlespace.

I have been told that the Department's FY 2004 budget request, for instance, increases funding for the Joint National Training Center by about \$65 million, a 55 percent increase over its FY 2003 budget. Likewise, the FY 2004 budget request for the U.S. Joint Forces Command increases funding by \$16 million from FY 2003.

18. NATO Issues

At the Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO invited seven countries to begin accession talks to join the Alliance. The gap in military capabilities between the United States and many of its NATO partners, however, has been a growing concern over the past few years. The entry of new members into NATO may exacerbate this problem.

A. In your view, what are the main reasons, from a military perspective, for enlarging NATO?

I think the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia into NATO will have a positive effect on the military effectiveness of the Alliance. Each of

these invitees has robustly supported U.S. and allied actions in multiple theaters such as the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the global war on terrorism. The United States has been intimately involved in the creation of defense reform plans for each invitee. I understand that these plans emphasize development of niche capabilities that will allow for important contributions to the Alliance despite a relatively limited resource base within each particular state.

B. Do you believe the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the NATO Response Force will succeed in encouraging NATO allies to improve their military capabilities?

I am hopeful for both initiatives. The Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) represents a firm political commitment to address specific shortfalls in NATO capabilities. Participants identified a number of concrete programmatic efforts they should undertake – such as the acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles and new precision guided munitions. The commitment to develop the NATO Response Force (NRF) is an equally important achievement. The NRF should operate as a technologically advanced force that is capable of high-end operations. Allies should commit specific units to take part in the NRF under a rotational plan. During their period of participation, assigned units should receive hardware improvements and intensive training. These initiatives are mutually reinforcing and can serve as levers for the transformation of NATO.

C. Why should we expect these efforts to be more successful than the Defense Capabilities Initiative proved to be?

As I understand it, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) focused on a smaller and more achievable set of capability shortfalls than the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). It also received unprecedented support from the Secretary General. The NRF complements the PCC as a mechanism to assess and exploit PCC progress. The Prague Summit committed to specific timelines for NRC implementation. It also has strong political support. Thus, I am optimistic with respect to both initiatives.

The relationship between NATO and Russia is an important element of the new strategic framework with Russia.

D. How well, in your judgment, is the NATO-Russia Council working in practice?

I believe the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) has established an early record of accomplishments with: 1) the completion of the civil emergency preparedness exercise in 2002; 2) the completion of the generic concept paper on peacekeeping operations; and 3) discussions on topics ranging from terrorism to missile defense. These successes suggest continued utility as a mechanism for encouraging cooperation between the Alliance and Russia.

19. Russia

A. Are there steps you believe we should take to improve Russian and U.S. military relationships?

In my view, our military relationship with Russia has measurably improved over the last two years in a variety of spheres – such as the global war on terrorism, emergency/ consequence management, and search and rescue. I see a number of areas where we might make further strides, such as shared missile warning, missile defense, expansion of exchange programs, and in combined exercises.

B. Would you support resumption of a comprehensive military to military exchange and dialogue program, along the lines of the previous exchange program between Strategic Command and its Russian counterparts?

In my view, exchange programs with Russia can serve many important goals, including the promotion of: 1) transparency and strategic stability; 2) opportunities for cooperation in the global war on terrorism; and 3) opportunities to promote Russian defense reform. If confirmed, I am open to consideration of any proposals that serve these objectives.

20. Balkans

U.S. forces have been engaged, together with our NATO allies, in peacekeeping operations in the Balkans since 1995.

What is your estimate as to when SFOR in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo, and United States participation in those forces, will no longer be needed to maintain stability?

In my view, the U.S. contribution to NATO's military efforts in the Balkans has been essential for its success to date. However, while NATO's commitment to the peace of the region is enduring, the commitment of U.S. forces should not be indefinite. I believe that as the situation on the ground further improves, NATO and the United States. should continue the transition from force deployments to more normal security cooperation activities and initiatives. These actions can establish the foundation for Balkan integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures.

21. North Korea

A. How do you assess the near-term and longer term threat North Korea poses to U.S. and allied interests in East Asia?

In my view, North Korea poses a considerable threat to the U.S. and allied interests in Asia. Although North Korea's economy continues to deteriorate, North Korea maintains a robust indigenous missile program, has over 10,000 artillery pieces along the demilitarized zone, and is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. These programs not only pose a threat to North Korea's neighbors in East Asia, but North Korea's proliferation activities threaten global stability. The threat posed by North Korea will only grow over time if left unchecked.

B. What are the military implications for the United States of the ongoing tension on the Korean Peninsula?

In my opinion, the growing tensions on the Korean Peninsula have significant implications for the United States. North Korea could embark any day on further provocations in an effort to compel the United States into bilateral talks. The U.S. and its allies and friends must be prepared to respond to provocations by North Korea, such as a ballistic missile launch over Japan or the U.S., the reprocessing of spent fuel, or a nuclear test. The Combined Forces Command of United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) must maintain a robust deterrence posture and high state of readiness. The U.S. should continue to closely coordinate with the ROK, Japan and the international community on the current situation. This is not just a Korean Peninsula problem. The proliferation of fissile material or nuclear weapons could impact the foundation of U.S. defense strategy.

22. Nuclear Weapons

The Nuclear Posture Review established a goal of reducing operationally deployed nuclear weapons to a level between 1700 to 2200 by the end of 2012. The same facilities, personnel, and resources that will be used to sustain and modernize this smaller, operationally deployed force would also be used to dismantle retired nuclear weapons.

A. What criteria should guide U.S. policy in prioritizing these activities?

In my view, the Department's primary goal is to sustain the warheads it plans to deploy through a series of Life-Extension-Programs (LEPs), while reducing the number of operationally deployed weapons over the next decade. Refurbishment programs should stay ahead of component aging to modernize components where needed. Over the next decade or more, the planned LEPs for the B61 gravity bomb, the W80 cruise missile warhead, and the W76 sea-

launched ballistic missile warhead will likely consume most of the capacity available for assembly and disassembly of warheads. Within the remaining margin of available resources, I understand there is flexibility to adjust these activities to accommodate for unplanned repairs or dismantlement of warheads that DoD will retire.

The Nuclear Posture Review did not recommend additional reductions to the total number of nuclear weapons in the stockpile.

B. What nuclear weapons, if any, do you believe should be dismantled in the future?

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) identified the W62 as a warhead that the United States plans to retire when it is removed from the Minuteman III Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force later in the decade. Retirement is the first step in the dismantlement process. When it is dismantled will depend on the availability of capacity within the nuclear weapons complex.

C. Should the entire stockpile of nuclear weapons be modernized and sustained at the same level?

I do not believe the Department currently needs to modernize all warheads in its stockpile, nor should they anticipate sustaining the total stockpile at its current size. I confirmed, I would advocate that the Department reduce the number of operationally deployed weapons, the Department should assess its warhead requirements in periodic reviews to meet their goals for the New Triad.

D. What is the current U.S. policy on underground nuclear testing?

To the best of my knowledge, there is no technical requirement to resume underground nuclear explosive testing, and the President has decided to maintain the testing moratorium.

23. Arms Control

A. What is your view of the role that formal arms control agreements should play in U.S. national security in the post Cold-War era?

I support U.S. participation in the formal arms control treaties that serve U.S. national security interests. Future agreements must be judged on a case-by-case basis, based on the criteria of advancing U.S. national security interests. In general, I believe Cold War-style arms control agreements have well-served their purpose and that agreements such as the Moscow Treaty are more appropriate to future U.S. security needs.

The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (also known as the Moscow Treaty) is very different from previous strategic arms reduction treaties in that it does not include extensive counting rules, verification provisions, or interim reduction goals.

B. Do you support the Moscow Treaty?

Yes. I believe that the Moscow Treaty represents a significant improvement over Cold War-style treaties that reflected and exacerbated a confrontational and antagonistic strategic relationship between the United States and Russia. The successful negotiation of a concise treaty represents a turning point in building a new strategic relationship with the Russian Federation, based more on the pursuit of our mutual interests than the threat of mutual annihilation.

C. Do you believe that any conditions, understandings, or reservations to the resolution of ratification to the Moscow Treaty are needed to protect U.S. interests?

I do not believe that the Moscow Treaty needs any conditions, understandings, or reservations to protect U.S. interests. The Moscow Treaty preserves the necessary flexibility to carry out our national security responsibilities and our ability to respond promptly to advanced threat developments.

D. In the context of the terms of the Moscow Treaty, do you believe that the United States and Russia will have adequate insight into each other's strategic nuclear plans and programs?

The Consultative Group on Strategic Stability established by our respective presidents will serve to strengthen mutual confidence, expand transparency, and share information and plans. This group has already established a working group of experts to explore ways to enhance offensive nuclear transparency. Thus, I believe that we have a good basis for insight into each other's plans and programs.

E. Would you support the early implementation of the warhead reductions required by the Moscow Treaty?

As noted in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), DoD will conduct periodic reviews to evaluate the existing security environment, assess the continuing role of nuclear forces in achieving the Defense Policy goals, and review the progress made in the development of the New Triad. DoD will support the early implementation of the warhead reductions required by the Moscow Treaty if such reductions are justified by these periodic reviews. The current NPR plan is to reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,800 warheads by the end of 2007. The first review will begin this year.

F. What is your view of the role of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in U.S. national security in the post Cold-War era?

The United States is strongly committed to its obligations under the Treaty. The President wants to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons by bringing U.S. nuclear forces down from current

levels while developing newer non-nuclear and defensive capabilities and revitalizing our defense infrastructure. This important policy is part of the Administration's desire to build a new cooperative relationship with Russia. Moreover, compliance remains critical to the success of the NPT. In order to avoid weakening the Treaty, we must continue to press for full compliance by certain states and take steps to strengthen IAEA safeguards.

G. Do you support other arms control treaties in force to which the U.S. is a party?

Yes. I believe that the United States should adhere, as it has always done, to its treaty commitments. In addition, we should publicly name those countries that violate their treaty obligations in order to bring international pressure to bear on them to come into compliance. Treaties will be an effective international mechanism only if parties live up to their obligations.

H. What is your view of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and its verification measures?

The President has made it clear that he does not support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and that he does not plan to resubmit it to the United States Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

24. Nuclear Force Structure

The U.S. removed the bulk of its theater and tactical nuclear forces from the field in the 1990s, and its remaining nuclear force structure of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers was intended to deter our Cold War adversaries.

A. In your view, have requirements for U.S. nuclear weapons systems, platforms, and delivery vehicles kept pace with the rapidly changing security environment?

My understanding of the Department's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is that it examined the requirements for U.S. nuclear weapons systems and found that a new strategic triad, composed of diverse capabilities, is currently needed to underwrite U.S. national security in the 21st century. The NPR recognized that the new security environment demanded that we reexamine the requirements for strategic nuclear weapons systems, platforms, and delivery vehicles.

In my view, the range of capabilities the New Triad should possess (including non-nuclear and nuclear strike systems, active and passive defenses, and a responsive infrastructure, supported by robust planning, command and control, and intelligence capabilities) should better keep pace with the rapidly changing security environment.

B. Are existing systems, platforms, and delivery vehicles relevant and responsive to the current security environment?

I believe a broad range of capabilities are needed to be fully responsive to the uncertainties of the new security environment. The application of the Nuclear Posture Review's capabilities-based approach to U.S. nuclear forces generated a decision to transform the existing triad of U.S. strategic nuclear forces – intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) heavy bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) – into a New Triad composed of a diverse portfolio of systems. The New Triad is designed to give the President and Secretary of Defense a broad array of non-nuclear and nuclear, and offensive and defensive options to address a wide range of possible contingencies. ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers will continue to play a vital role in U.S. and allied security as part of the New Triad. I believe that this new Triad will be responsive to the current security environment.

C. What is your view of the role nuclear weapons should play in U.S. national security in the future?

Based on the reductions agreed to in the Moscow Treaty, I believe that nuclear weapons should continue to play a role in U.S. and allied security. They should: 1) continue to help deter attacks against the United States, its allies and friends; 2) dissuade competition from potential adversaries; and 3) continue to provide assurance to the public and to U.S. allies that have security agreements with the United States. That said, I believe the Department should continue seek to reduce U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons.

D. In your view, is the Stockpile Stewardship Program meeting the goals of allowing the Secretaries of Defense and Energy annually to certify each of the nuclear weapon types within our nuclear weapon stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable?

My understanding of the Stockpile Stewardship Program is that it has not failed us to date. But I believe the challenge to the Department of Energy, and, in particular, to the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, will grow as time passes and the stockpile ages.

E. Do you support the Stockpile Stewardship Program?

I support the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP). Stockpile Stewardship is an important tool for sustaining our nuclear weapons in a safe and reliable configuration. I believe we must continue to furnish it with the resources that it needs, including the infrastructure within the nuclear weapons complex, in order to meet future challenges.

F. Do you believe that there is a current requirement to resume underground nuclear weapons testing to maintain the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?

I do not believe there is any current need, or desire, to resume underground testing. While there are a number of questions that scientists and engineers might answer through an underground test, I understand that their current technical judgment is that there is no need to certify the safety, security, or reliability of any weapon type in the stockpile at this time through underground testing.

The Secretaries of Defense and Energy address the question of the need to test annually in the Certification Report to the President. Their recommendation takes into account the judgments of the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of the Department of Energy's Laboratories, the Military Departments, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command.

G. In your opinion will U.S. may have such a requirement in the future?

I believe it is conceivable that circumstances could generate requirements that would compel the United States to conduct a nuclear test at some point in the future. For instance, the non-nuclear test and evaluation program could find a serious safety, security, or reliability problem in a special class of weapon and determine that the only option available to restore confidence in that class of weapon is a nuclear test.

F. What is your view about whether the National Nuclear Security Administration is equipped and ready to return to underground nuclear testing should the Nuclear Weapons Council find they cannot certify all or a portion of the nuclear weapons stockpile and the President decides an underground test is necessary?

I understand that the Department of Energy has maintained its nuclear weapons test site in a three-year readiness posture. Many view this as insufficiently responsive should circumstances – such as the discovery of a problem with a type of nuclear warhead – compel a U.S. President to resume testing. To that end, I also understand that the Department of Energy is initiating a program to increase the readiness of this site such that it can technically support a test within 18 months of deciding to do so. If confirmed, I would support this initiative.

25. Threat of Growing Biotechnology Capabilities

Within the next five years, expected advances in biotechnology may lead to other nations having improved capabilities to manipulate biological agents. While the Department is currently focused on enhancing means of protection against known biological agents, it must also address emerging threats posed by these near-term advances in biotechnology.

What is your view of this threat and the adequacy of the Department's response thus far?

I view the on-going revolution in biotechnology as holding great promise for helping mankind conquer a host of deadly human diseases. Unfortunately, these same scientific breakthroughs, such as genetic manipulation, not only open new frontiers in medical treatment, but also provide opportunities for potential adversaries to create a new more horrific class of weapons.

That said, I believe that the Department has taken prudent steps in recent months to enhance the protection of our troops against biological threats of greatest concern. As a former combatant in Desert Storm, I strongly support the on-going program to immunize U.S. forces against smallpox and anthrax who are at greatest risk of exposure and the most critical to military operations.

In addition, if confirmed, I would advocate that the Department also develop a research and development program to anticipate the emergence of new biological threats.

26. DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program

The CTR program has four key objectives: (1) dismantling former Soviet Union (FSU) weapons of mass destruction (WMD); (2) consolidating and securing FSU WMD and related technology and materials; (3) increasing transparency and encouraging higher standards of conduct; and (4) supporting defense and military cooperation with the objective of preventing proliferation.

A. Do you believe the CTR program should maintain its current scope?

I understand that the Department is trying to refocus the CTR program, which is in its second decade. The CTR program now supports the global war on terrorism and interdiction of WMD. The WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative should help non-Russian Former Soviet Union (FSU) states secure their own borders against WMD smuggling by terrorists and others. The Department also has refocused CTR's Biological Weapons Prevention Program. The CTR program is establishing a disease outbreak surveillance system in the states in Central Asia in recognition of the expanded U.S. presence there. In addition, the Department hopes to request authority this year to use CTR outside the FSU to address emergency non-proliferation situations, or to take advantage of significant non-proliferation opportunities. If confirmed, I would support these efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the CTR program.

B. Are there other potential opportunities to address threat reduction using the CTR model, or do you believe the CTR model is applicable only to the FSU?

With the war on terrorism and the expanded, global focus on proliferation of WMD, I believe that other opportunities may arise outside the FSU. This is why, if confirmed, I would support the Department's request for authority to take advantage of opportunities to prevent proliferation of WMD outside the FSU.

C. Given increases in Russia’s gross domestic product during the past year and subsequent increases in its military spending and arms exports, what is your view regarding Russia’s ability to assume more of the cost share associated with CTR projects in Russia?

As I understand it, CTR assistance is provided in support of U.S. national security objectives. As such, the Department continues to work with the FSU to live up to their commitments under CTR. The Department also is looking for new ways for other Western countries to increase their support for the program, as well as for increased commitments by the recipient countries. Preventing the proliferation of WMD, and its means of production and delivery is the key U.S. objective. Congress and the Administration have supported up-front investment through CTR to achieve this goal. If confirmed, I also would support this continued investment formula.

27. Exports of Sensitive Technologies

In the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Administration states that “we must ensure that the implementation of U.S. export controls furthers our nonproliferation and other national security goals, while recognizing the realities that American businesses face in the increasingly globalized marketplace. We will work to update and strengthen export controls using existing authorities. We also seek new legislation to improve the ability of our export control system to give full weight to both nonproliferation objectives and commercial interests. Our overall goal is to focus our resources on truly sensitive exports to hostile states or those that engage in onward proliferation, while removing unnecessary barriers in the global marketplace.”

A. What policies and procedures do you believe are needed to achieve this objective?

It is my understanding that the Administration has begun a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of U.S. defense trade policies to identify necessary changes and ensure that those policies continue to support U.S. national security, economic, and foreign policy goals. DoD plays a key role in the ongoing interagency review. The aims of the review are to maintain America’s technological and warfighting advantages over its potential adversaries, while facilitating friends’ and allies’ efforts to increase capability and interoperability and enhancing controls where necessary to address key national security priorities. If confirmed, I would support the Department’s effort to improve U.S. defense trade policies.

B. What role should the Department of Defense play in this process? Have recent export control reforms designed to streamline the process, such as the use of the global program license authority for JSF, adequately addressed this challenge, or do you believe that additional steps are needed? What is your view regarding the status of negotiations with our allies to grant them special status in the form of waivers from certain U.S. export control laws?

I understand that the Department of State is currently leading Administration efforts to negotiate legally binding agreements with the UK and Australia that will exempt them (like Canada) from certain requirements in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). The ITAR country exemptions are extended to waive certain license requirements for export from the United States of certain unclassified defense items, technical data and limited services to countries with export control systems comparable to those of the United States. The objectives of ITAR country exemptions, as I understand them, are: a) raising foreign export control standards toward the U.S. level; b) enhancing defense trade and cooperation among allies; c) helping to streamline the licensing process by reducing the number of applications; d) enhancing U.S. technology security by allowing our licensing system to focus on higher risk export license applications; and e) supporting interoperability by facilitating defense industrial cooperation between the United States and select allies. If confirmed, I would support the above objectives and waivers for our UK and Australian allies.

28. Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

A. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

B. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes.

C. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

Yes.

D. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.