<DOC>
[106th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:65916.wais]
STATUS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROGRAM TO DEVELOP A PERMANENT
GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NEVADA
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 23, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-151
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
65-916CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
TOM BLILEY, Virginia, Chairman
W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
MICHAEL G. OXLEY, Ohio HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
JOE BARTON, Texas RALPH M. HALL, Texas
FRED UPTON, Michigan RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
Vice Chairman SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania BART GORDON, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER COX, California PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
STEVE LARGENT, Oklahoma ANNA G. ESHOO, California
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina RON KLINK, Pennsylvania
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California BART STUPAK, Michigan
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
GREG GANSKE, Iowa TOM SAWYER, Ohio
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
TOM A. COBURN, Oklahoma GENE GREEN, Texas
RICK LAZIO, New York KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
JAMES E. ROGAN, California DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
LOIS CAPPS, California
James E. Derderian, Chief of Staff
James D. Barnette, General Counsel
Reid P.F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
______
Subcommittee on Energy and Power
JOE BARTON, Texas, Chairman
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
Vice Chairman TOM SAWYER, Ohio
STEVE LARGENT, Oklahoma EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina RALPH M. HALL, Texas
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
TOM A. COBURN, Oklahoma BART GORDON, Tennessee
JAMES E. ROGAN, California BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING, RON KLINK, Pennsylvania
Mississippi JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,
VITO FOSSELLA, New York (Ex Officio)
ED BRYANT, Tennessee
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
TOM BLILEY, Virginia,
(Ex Officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Testimony of:
Berkley, Hon. Shelley, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Nevada............................................ 10
Crowley, Kevin D., Staff Director, Board on Radioactive Waste
Management................................................. 41
Gibbons, Hon. Jim, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Nevada............................................ 8
Itkin, Ivan, Director of Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management, U.S. Department of Energy...................... 24
Knopman, Debra S., Board Member, U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical
Review..................................................... 29
Page, Stephen D., Director, Office of Radiation, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency............................ 34
Paperiello, Carl, Deputy Executive Director, Materials
Research and State Programs, Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 20
Material submitted for the record by:
Cohon, Jared L., Chairman, United States Nuclear Waste
Technical Review Board, letter dated August 31, 2000,
enclosing response for the record.......................... 121
Colvin, Joe F., President and Chief Executive Officer,
Nuclear Energy Institute, prepared statement of............ 106
Crowley, Kevin D., Director, Board on Radioactive Waste
Management, letter dated August 18, 2000, enclosing
response for the record.................................... 103
Page, Stephen D., Director, Office of Radiation, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, letter dated September 18,
2000, enclosing response for the record.................... 127
Rathbun, Dennis K., Director, Office of Congressional
Affairs, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter dated August
28, 2000, enclosing response for the record................ 115
(iii)
STATUS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROGRAM TO DEVELOP A PERMANENT
GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NEVADA
----------
FRIDAY, JUNE 23, 2000
House of Representatives,
Committee on Commerce,
Subcommittee on Energy and Power,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in
room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Barton
(chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Barton, Bilirakis,
Largent, Burr, Shimkus, Bryant, and Boucher.
Staff present: Kevin Cook, science advisor; Elizabeth
Brennan, legislative clerk; and Sue Sheridan, minority counsel.
Mr. Barton. The Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the
Commerce Committee hearing on the status of the Department of
Energy programs to develop a permanent geologic repository at
Yucca Mountain, Nevada, is underway.
Today's hearing will address the Department of Energy's
program to develop an underground repository for the permanent
disposal of nuclear spent fuel and high level radioactive
waste. Solving the disposal question is absolutely essential if
we are to maintain our existing nuclear generating capacity to
meet the Nation's present and future energy needs. Members of
the subcommittee are all too aware of how much time and energy
has been spent wrestling with this issue in recent years. The
Department of Energy has a clear statutory and contractual
responsibility to begin accepting spent fuel beginning in
January 1998, which is a year and a half ago.
The government's failure to meet that obligation has
resulted in a growing financial liability that may eventually
cost the taxpayers tens of billions of dollars. But the
Department tells us that the earliest the repository will
actually be ready for operations is in the year 2010. We must
find a way to take acceptance of spent fuel from the utilities
and move it to the repository some time sooner than 2010 if at
all possible. Yet the Clinton administration has resisted all
efforts to accelerate the acceptance date giving us veto
threats rather than constructive solutions.
The focus of today's hearing is not on interim storage nor
on a take title option or any of the other areas of contention.
Today, we want to talk about the Department's plan to get the
repository ready for operation by 2010. We have to find out
whether that schedule, even though it is 12 years too late, is
realistic and achievable. To meet that schedule, the Department
must first complete several near-term milestones.
Late this year, the Department is to issue a site
recommendation consideration report followed by final site
recommendation and a final environmental impact statement next
summer. These documents are essential, and I want to repeat,
these documents are essential to support the final selection of
the Yucca Mountain site; and in turn, the license application
to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the fiscal year 2002.
All of these steps are on the critical path if the
repository is to open in 2010. Yet, there are grave concerns
about the ability of the Department to meet this near-term
schedule, and therefore, doubts about whether 2010 date is, in
fact, feasible.
The first of these concerns deals with the adequacy of
funding. Secretary Richardson finally admitted to this
subcommittee last year that the repository will not be built by
2010 unless there are major changes as to how the program is
funded. Unfortunately, that admission was followed by a veto
threat regarding our committee's bill to take the repository
program off budget to ensure adequate future funding. We are
still waiting for the administration and the Department to send
us a constructive proposal on how it intends to resolve the
long-term funding profile problem.
Today, however, we also have to address the short-term
funding situation. The Department did not receive all of the
funds it has requested for the fiscal year 2000. And it looks
like the fiscal year 2001 budget appropriation that is pending
also will be less than the Department's request. We need to
understand the impact of these near-term funding constraints on
the ability of the Department to meet its milestones for the
final environmental impact statement, site recommendation
requirement, the licensing, and the licensing application, all
of which are critical steps if the repository is to open on
time in 2010.
As chairman of this subcommittee, I am very concerned about
the Department's recent decision to recompete the management
operation contract for the civilian radioactive waste
management program. The contracts that the Department should be
recompeting, such as the one for the management of the Los
Alamos National Laboratory, the Department has never completed
in over 50 years, despite the University of California's
appalling mismanagement of security matters. But where the
contractor appears to be performing well, and the program is
coming up on several key milestones, this Department of Energy
decides that recompetition is absolutely essential. Go figure.
I need to be persuaded that the recompetition of the Yucca
Mountain contract at this juncture is really in the best
interest of the program. I don't see how the committee can
tolerate the Department claiming that the transition to a new
contractor is an excuse for any schedule slippages. Mark my
words, if they do recompete the contract, I will almost
guarantee you there is going to be a slippage, and I will also
guarantee you the Department is going to claim it because of
the new contractor coming online. I hope that I am not a
prophet and am proved wrong on that, but I just feel it in my
bones as I sit here.
The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board was established to
provide independent technical oversight of DOE's work on the
repository. As DOE approaches these critical program milestones
in the near future, I would expect that the role of the
Technical Review Board will become more important than ever
before. The Board has already surfaced a number of technical
concerns about the Department's planning and design work. We
need to understand these concerns better and find out if DOE is
paying proper attention to the scientific advice that it
receives from this review board.
The most complex, but possibly the most important issue
that we have to address today, is an appropriate radiation
standard for the repository. The Environmental Protection
Agency was directed in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to
promulgate public health and safety standards to protect
against release of radioactive materials from the Yucca
Mountain site. Such standards are to be based on and consistent
with the findings and recommendations of the National Academy
of Sciences. Last summer, the EPA finally circulated a draft
rule which proposed, in addition to an all-pathways individual
protection standard of 15 millirems, a separate standard for
the protection of groundwater.
It is my understanding that the Department of Energy, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the National Academy of Sciences
Board on Radioactive Waste Management, all have significant
disagreements with the EPA over this proposed stand-alone
separate standard for the protection of groundwater.
Hopefully, we will be able, after today's hearing, to
understand the scientific rationale for the need for the
separate EPA groundwater standard, if there is such a need, and
specifically, whether the proposed standard is consistent with
the legislative mandate in the 1992 Act. We also need to
understand the basis for the concerns that have been expressed
by the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
and the National Academy of Sciences about the EPA's proposed
standard. Selecting the proper standard and doing it in a
timely manner is essential for the repository project to move
forward.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Joe Barton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joe Barton, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy
and Power
Today's hearing will address the Department of Energy's program to
develop an underground repository for the permanent disposal of spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Solving the disposal
question is absolutely essential if we are to maintain our existing
nuclear generating capacity to meet the Nation's present and future
energy needs. The Members of this Subcommittee are all too aware of how
much time and energy we have all spent wrestling with this issue in
recent years.
The Department has a clear statutory and contractual responsibility
to begin accepting spent fuel starting in January of 1998. The
Government's failure to meet that obligation has resulted in a growing
financial liability that may eventually cost the taxpayers tens of
billions of dollars. But DOE tells us that the earliest the repository
will be ready for operations is the year 2010. I continue to believe
that we must find a way to take acceptance of spent fuel from the
utilities and move it to the repository site sometime sooner than 2010.
Yet the Administration has resisted all of our efforts to accelerate
the acceptance date, giving us veto threats rather than constructive
solutions.
However, the focus of today's hearing is not on interim storage,
nor on take title, nor any of those other areas of contention. Rather,
we are here today to talk about the Department's plan to get the
repository ready for operation by 2010. We have to find out whether
that schedule, even though it is twelve years too late, is realistic
and achievable. To meet that schedule, the Department must first
complete several near-term milestones. Late this year, the Department
is to issue a Site Recommendation Consideration Report, followed by a
final Site Recommendation and final Environmental Impact Statement next
summer. These documents are essential to support the final selection of
the Yucca Mountain site and, in turn, the License Application to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Fiscal Year 2002.
All of these steps are on the critical path if the repository is to
open in 2010. Yet I have concerns about the ability of the Department
to meet this near-term schedule, and therefore doubts about whether the
2010 date is feasible.
The first of these concerns deals with the adequacy of funding.
Secretary Richardson finally admitted to this Committee last year that
the repository will not be built by 2010 unless there are major changes
to how the program is funded. Unfortunately, that was followed by a
veto threat regarding our Committee's bill to take the repository
program off-budget to ensure adequate future funding. We are still
waiting for the Administration and the Department to send us a
constructive proposal on how it intends to resolve that long-term
funding shortfall. Today, however, we also have to address the short-
term funding situation. The Department did not receive all of the funds
it requested in Fiscal Year 2000, and it looks like FY2001
appropriations will also be less than the Department's request. We need
to understand the impact of these near-term funding constraints on the
ability of DOE to meet its milestones for the final EIS, the site
recommendation, and the license application, all of which are critical
steps if the repository is to open on time in 2010.
I am very concerned about the Department's recent decision to re-
compete the M&O contract for the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
program. The contracts that DOE should be competing, such as the one
for the management of Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Department
has never competed in over 50 years, despite the University of
California's appalling mismanagement of security matters. But where the
contractor is performing well and the program is coming up on several
key milestones, then the Department decides that recompetition is
absolutely essential. I need to be persuaded that re-competition of the
Yucca Mountain contract, at this critical juncture, is really in the
best interests of the program. We absolutely will not tolerate DOE
claiming that the transition to a new contractor as an excuse for any
schedule slippages.
The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board was established to provide
independent technical oversight of DOE's work on the repository. As DOE
approaches these critical program milestones in the near future, I
would expect that the role of the Technical Review Board will become
more important than ever before. The Board has already surfaced a
number of technical concerns with DOE's planning and design work to
date. We need to understand these concerns better and also find out
whether DOE is paying proper attention to the scientific advice it
receives from the Technical Review Board.
The most complex but possibly the most important issue we have to
address today is the appropriate radiation standard for the repository.
The Environmental Protection Agency was directed in the Energy Policy
Act of 1992 to promulgate public health and safety standards to protect
against the release of radioactive materials from the Yucca Mountain
site. Such standards are to be based on and consistent with the
findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences.
Last summer, the EPA finally circulated a draft rule last summer
which proposed, in addition to an ``all-pathways'' individual
protection standard of 15 millirems, a separate standard for the
protection of groundwater. I understand that the Department of Energy,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the National Academy's Board on
Radioactive Waste Management all have significant disagreements with
EPA over this proposed standard. We need to understand the scientific
rationale for the EPA standard, and specifically whether the proposed
standard is consistent with the legislative mandate in the 1992 Act. We
also need to understand the basis for the concerns expressed by the
DOE, NRC, and the National Academy about EPA's proposed standard.
Selecting the proper standard, and doing so in a timely manner, is
essential for the repository project to move forward.
I welcome my colleagues from the Nevada Congressional delegation
here today, as well as our distinguished witnesses from the federal
agencies and independent technical boards. Today's hearing should
answer the question of whether DOE is on the proper ``glide path'' to
meet its milestones and open the repository in 2010, or whether the
Department is flying along on a mere ``wing and a prayer.''
Mr. Barton. I see that my other colleague from the Nevada
Congressional delegation is here and I think I am right that we
have got the entire House delegation.
Ms. Berkley. Yes.
Mr. Barton. That is great. I want to welcome Mrs. Berkley
in addition to Mr. Gibbons. We look forward to their testimony
as soon as we have our finished opening statements. This is a
very important oversight hearing for the Yucca Mountain site.
And it would not be appropriate to do it without having the
input of our colleagues that represent the great State of
Nevada in the Congress.
With that, I would like to turn to my ranking member,
Congressman Boucher, and for an opening statement.
Mr. Boucher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
commend you for conducting the hearing this morning on the
status of the Yucca Mountain repository for the disposal of
spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste. The Energy
and Power Subcommittee has a long tradition of working on a
bipartisan basis to address our Nation's energy security in a
manner that is both serious and thoughtful. Nowhere has that
bipartisan spirit been more in evidence than in our efforts to
solve our Nation's nuclear waste problems. And in that
tradition, I want to say a word of welcome this morning to our
colleagues from Nevada, Shelly Berkley and Jim Gibbons, who are
appearing as our first witnesses.
In the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Congress assigned
to the Federal Government a responsibility for the permanent
disposal of spent nuclear fuel that is generated as a result of
commercial research or defense processes. And amendments that
we adopted to that Act in 1987, the Congress identified Yucca
Mountain in Nevada as the site to focus upon for the
construction of the disposal facility.
Since 1987, the Department of Energy has been conducting
the site and technical studies that were necessary for the
design and the construction of the repository. The Yucca
Mountain facility is scheduled to begin accepting shipments in
the year 2010. In order for the facility to meet that goal, and
to be prepared for the acceptance of shipments, the Department
of Energy must meet two important deadlines next year. The
first of these is the issuance of the final environmental
impact statement, and the second is the final site
recommendation.
I am highly concerned that recent decreases in the funding
appropriated by the Congress for DOE's Yucca project will have
a material adverse affect on the Department's ability to meet
both the short goal of insuring these important reports, and
the long-term goal of having the facility ready to accept
shipments by the year 2010.
I look forward to hearing this morning from witnesses on
the status of the project and on the projected ability of the
Department of Energy to meet both the near-term goal of having
these reports issued next year and the long-term goal of having
the facility ready by the year 2010.
Of even greater concern, although it is not precisely the
focus of today's hearing, is the adequacy of funding for seeing
the repository through the construction phase. H.R. 45, which
the chairman mentioned in his remarks, was reported by this
committee last year by our full Commerce Committee on a broad
bipartisan vote of 40 to 6. And it would have taken the nuclear
waste fund off budget to ensure that that fund, like the
Highway Trust Fund, can be used for its intended purpose and
for no other purpose. The Department of Energy has indicated
that unless Congress restores access to the roughly $9 billion
in the fund, the program will face major shortfalls within the
next 3 or 4 years. While it is unlikely that Congress will
enact legislation addressing the matter this year, I think it
is imperative that we take up this cause early during the
course of the next Congress.
I also want to thank Chairman Barton for inviting the
Environmental Protection Agency to testify about its pending
rulemaking on environmental standards for the repository. I
recognize that the agency is somewhat constrained in the degree
to which it can answer questions about the direction that the
final rule is likely to take, since that matter is still under
active consideration at the EPA. Nevertheless, I think it would
be useful to hear from EPA about the status of the rule and
those matters which the agency can address with respect to
progress toward its completion.
Mr. Chairman, I commend you for this timely discussion and
I join with you in looking forward to our witnesses' testimony.
Mr. Barton. Thank you, Congressman Boucher.
Mr. Bryant of Tennessee is recognized for an opening
statement.
Mr. Bryant. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief
in recognition of our two outstanding members. Having roomed
for a couple of years with a former member in your State and
one who whom I expect will return shortly as a Senator, I
learned very quickly that the correct pronunciation of the
State is Nevada. And they are probably too nice to point that
out to us today.
Mr. Shimkus. But you are not.
Mr. Bryant. But I am not. I would point out it is Nevada, I
believe.
Mr. Barton. Well, it ain't Texas, so I am not too worried
about it.
Mr. Bryant. I would say, again, in deference to our panel,
and this, our outstanding second panel also, I simply agree
with what has been said already. I have concerns with this idea
of rebidding the operation and management recompeting for that
as well as other issues. I'd like to see us stay on track. And
with that, I would apologize too. I know we are going to be in
and out today, many of us have other competing committees and
appointments. So please, don't take that personally as we come
and go and with that, I will yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Barton. Okay. The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Shimkus,
for an opening statement.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In lieu of time and
having gone over this now in my 4th year of talking about Yucca
Mountain and understanding both sides of the issue, I will just
yield back my time and wait for the panelists.
Mr. Barton. The ranking member and the chairman have great
sympathy, since we have been doing this for 14 to 16 years. You
are a novice, if you have only had to do it for 4 years.
Mr. Shimkus. But I stop talking and you continue.
Mr. Barton. Well, that may be the last time you get the
microphone.
The gentleman from North Carolina.
Mr. Burr. I will also say ditto, only to add to it, Mr.
Chairman, if we don't succeed now, Texas will be the target
site for this facility. I yield back.
Ms. Berkley. Perfect.
Mr. Barton. Give us enough money, we may think about it.
Mr. Burr. Isn't there a hole already in the ground down
there?
Mr. Barton. There is in my district, actually.
[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John B. Shadegg, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Arizona
Chairman Barton, I commend you for continuing the Subcommittee's
oversight into the issues of nuclear power and waste disposal. Nuclear
power is a safe and efficient source of energy production which allows
the generation of vast amounts of electricity while avoiding the air
quality concerns raised by many other sources of power. Electricity
consumption is expected to increase at the rate of one to two percent
per year for the next twenty years and nuclear energy is needed to meet
this growth without increasing air pollution.
To ensure the continued viability of nuclear energy in the future
while dealing with existing waste, it is absolutely essential that we
put the permanent repository for this waste into operation as soon as
possible. This is not optional: nuclear waste is currently stored at
dozens of power plants throughout the United States, and many of these
plants are running out of storage room.
The permanent waste repository at Yucca Mountain has been under
intensive study since 1987 and, by July, 2001, a final recommendation
on whether to proceed with construction will be delivered to the
President. Key to the President's decision is the use of sound,
unbiased science to determine the parameters of the repository.
Unfortunately, the importance of sound science appears to have
escaped the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in their attempts to
set radiation standards. There are numerous crucial aspects of these
standards on which the EPA has failed to follow the science, including
setting a standard which is lower than national and international
standards and far below the amount of radiation which the average
person receives in the course of normal, everyday life.
Let us examine in greater detail one of the aspects in which the
EPA has failed to use sound science: the EPA proposal to set a dose-
based standard for radiation exposure. This proposal is in direct
contradiction to the risk-based standard recommended by the National
Research Council, an independent, unbiased scientific institution
affiliated with the National Academy of Sciences. As the National
Research Council enunciates in its November 26, 1999 letter to EPA
Administrator Carol Browner:
``The Board believes that EPA's rationale for proposing a dose-
based standard is flawed for the following reasons. EPA's
statement in its reason 93 that a `risk-based standard . . .
depends upon current knowledge and assumptions about the chance
of developing a fatal cancer from a particular exposure level'
is incorrect. A risk based standard is not based on scientific
assumptions. Instead, it is based on a public-policy
determination of acceptable risk levels to individuals or
populations . . .'' (Emphasis in original)
There is a public policy dispute over what role nuclear energy
should play in the nation's future mix of generation assets. This is a
legitimate dispute and should proceed openly. What are not legitimate
are backdoor attempts to foreclose the option of increasing nuclear
capacity by blocking the safe disposal of existing waste. Permanent
storage of nuclear waste is an issue which must be decided on the basis
of sound science, not emotion or a desire to derail debate on the
larger issue of nuclear power. The EPA should concentrate on the job
which Congress gave it to perform, the setting of scientifically-based
standards to allow the safe permanent storage of nuclear waste.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Tom Bliley, Chairman, Committee on Commerce
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just two weeks ago, this Subcommittee held a hearing that addressed
the future of nuclear power. It was clear from that hearing that one of
the key impediments to nuclear power in this country is the lack of a
safe, centralized facility for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel.
DOE was explicitly directed by Congress back in 1982 to develop a
permanent underground repository and to begin accepting spent nuclear
fuel by January 31, 1998. In 1987, Congress further directed DOE to
focus its attention on Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the most promising
site for the repository. Yet DOE tells us that it is still at least 10
years away from having a repository.
The hearing today is to investigate whether DOE is truly on track,
as it claims it is, to open the repository in 2010. There are technical
challenges, financial challenges, and contracting challenges that call
into question DOE's ability to meet this schedule. We also must address
the fundamental question of the appropriate radiation standard for the
repository, which the Environmental Protection Agency is preparing to
issue as a final rule later this summer. The Department of Energy, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the National Academy of Sciences all
have significant disagreements with the standard that EPA is proposing.
We need to understand the scientific and policy basis for EPA's
proposed standard and the effect of that standard on the repository
program.
Today's hearing will help the Committee understand whether DOE
really is on the right track to open the repository in 2010, and
whether all the technical, financial, contracting, and environmental
pieces are in place to support that schedule. I look forward to the
testimony of our distinguished witnesses today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Barton. Let's hear from our senior member, Mr. Gibbons,
for 7 minutes and then we will hear from the junior member,
Mrs. Berkley, for 7 minutes. Welcome to the subcommittee.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM GIBBONS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I realize this is
simply an oversight hearing on the status of Yucca Mountain,
but I do appreciate the cordial and congenial welcome of the
committee as well as the interest of the chairman in hearing
from us on this issue as well. And Mr. Chairman, I would like
to have a full and complete written copy of my statement
entered into the record.
Mr. Barton. Without objection.
Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Chairman, as you well know, I have, all
along, adamantly and consistently, opposed any legislation or
concept that would create or further develop Yucca Mountain as
areas for nuclear waste in Nevada. Ever since I have been
elected to Congress, I have consistently voted against the
annual Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act, which
annually funds the studies, development and construction of
Yucca Mountain. And this repository is a travesty and an
injustice to the citizens and residents of Nevada. It has a
great potential to destroy the economy and the environmental
future of our State.
And long before I came to this House, as you have heard
already, Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress to store
America's high level nuclear waste with the 1987 ``Screw Nevada
Bill,'' as it was titled and the only issue left, Mr. Chairman,
today is science. It makes sense that factual standards based
upon sound science and reason, along with protection and
welfare of this Nation's citizens, should not be drawn upon
when we address nuclear waste storage.
Secretary Richardson himself stated that Yucca Mountain
site, ``will be based on science, pure science, not politics.''
I would question the Secretary's statement because of a
$1.4 million study he commissioned wherein it appears that we
are attempting to put the square peg in a round hole. A team of
experts are using this money to determine if tiny fluid
inclusions which are bubbles in mineral deposits within the
mountain are the result of hot, rising water which flooded the
repository in previous eras. If this is the case, Yucca
Mountain should be disqualified because it will happen again
and release potentially deadly nuclear waste into the
environment and cause great harm to the area as well as to any
base water or aquifer system in the area as well that the
region and the people depend upon. It now appears, however,
that Secretary Richardson, in his haste to complete Yucca
Mountain, will not even wait for his study to be completed
before he makes his recommendation.
In February he states, and I quote again, ``I have got a
lot of good science, I will have sufficient information.'' I
would ask this committee to talk to the Secretary and ask him
to take this vital information on fluid inclusion studies into
his account if we are to truly and factually base Yucca
Mountain on sound science. Yucca Mountain should be
disqualified, Mr. Chairman, for at least two other very
important reasons, one being that rainwater containing the
isotope chlorine 36, which is less than 50 years old, have been
detected far below the surface in the underground site.
Chlorine 36 comes from above-ground nuclear tests that Nevada
endured during the post-World War II and that timeframe era.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act does mandate that because of this
extremely fast-surface-water-travel-time to the repository, the
Yucca Mountain site should be disqualified. I am not an
engineer or a mathematician, but I think you and the members of
this committee can see the point.
The second reason for disqualification is the geologic
barriers of Yucca Mountain will not limit radionuclide
releases, thereby polluting groundwater supplies that are
currently used for human consumption and crop irrigation. This
again meets the condition for disqualification and is a true
show stopper. It is important, in fact, it is very important to
ensure that the Department of Energy does not ignore these
facts or attempt to alter their regulations. This scientific
approach dictates that DOE disqualified the site, not the
regulations.
Members of Congress also need to recognize the fact that
these studies are credible, and future legislation must address
these fatal findings. The art of political persuasion has no
place in this fight. Members of Congress and the DOE must look
to the hard scientific evidence that proves the site is
unsuitable.
Mr. Chairman, I and the rest of Nevada will never
relinquish our fight against Yucca Mountain. We didn't ask for
it, and we don't want it, no matter how much money you offer
us. I will continue to be adamantly opposed to the Energy and
Water Appropriations Act, which further funds construction and
study of Yucca Mountain. Recently, the President vetoed Senate
bill 1287, the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 2000, and
I congratulate him. I plan to contact the President and
encourage him to further his commitment to protecting the
citizens of Nevada by vetoing this year's Energy and Water
Development Appropriations Act.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will thank you for your time
here today, and with the indulgence of the chairman in letting
our views and the views of Nevada to be aired before your
committee, I would ask that in light of the fact that I have an
additional appointment, I know there may be questions of the
committee, but ask to be excused at this point in time.
Mr. Barton. Obviously, since we have such power over you,
if we said no, you could get up and walk out of this room a
free man.
Mr. Gibbons. Out of the courtesy of the chairman, I would
stay if it were requested.
Mr. Barton. We understand the constraints of the time. We
are glad for you to be here and put your views on the record,
because it is a very important issue for your district.
We'd now like to hear from the gentlelady from Nevada.
Nevada. That sounds like yankee to me.
STATEMENT OF HON. SHELLEY BERKLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA
Ms. Berkley. Well, there are a lot of Yankees now in
Nevada.
Mr. Barton. Making a lot of money. Your complete statement
is in the record in its entirety. We would recognize you for 7
minutes to elaborate on it.
Ms. Berkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'd like to thank
you and the rest of the members of the committee for affording
me the opportunity to speak about an issue that affects every
single person in my district and the entire State of Nevada.
Oversight of the Department of Energy's Yucca Mountain project
is crucial to the continued growth and development of my State,
crucial to the health and well-being of all Nevada families,
and crucial to the health of our environment. And that is why I
testify before you today, to share with you my concerns and the
concerns of my constituents about the status of the Yucca
Mountain project.
I understand that the purpose of this hearing today is to
address the oversight concerns surrounding the Yucca Mountain
project. I realize the subcommittee is discussing the time
line, engineering and regulatory aspects of the project, but
when discussing oversight issues, we must also look at the
scientific evidence and problems that have been raised
regarding the suitability of the Yucca Mountain to hold
radioactive waste.
On three separate occasions, the State of Nevada has
demonstrated using DOE's own data that the site should be
disqualified under both the EPA standard and DOE's own internal
site screening regulation, and each time the DOE or Congress
has changed the regulations to ensure that Yucca Mountain would
not be disqualified, regardless of the health and safety
consequences to Nevadans. In fact, DOE has found that geology
at Yucca Mountain is so poor that over 95 percent of the waste
isolation capability of the proposed site would have to be
provided by metal waste containers and other so-called
engineering barriers around the waste with only about 5 percent
of the site's waste isolation performance, depending on the
natural conditions. When this project started, the idea was to
find a place with natural geologic features to contain the
radiation. Clearly, that standard cannot be met at Yucca
Mountain.
Yucca Mountain is located in the young, geologically, area
with four volcanos within 7 miles of the site. Yucca Mountain
is surrounded by 34 known earthquake fault lines and has
experienced over 620 earthquakes in the last 20 years. One of
these earthquakes measured 5.9 on the Richter scale, and caused
over a million dollars in damage to DOE's own surface support
facilities. An aquifer flows beneath Yucca Mountain with water
moving so rapidly that even with all the engineering barriers,
radiation will unavoidably escape from the repository and
contaminate the water flow. As recently as yesterday, it was
reported again that scientists have found strong evidence that
the Yucca Mountain repository floor was once flooded with hot
water and feared that water could rise again. These are the
real oversight concerns.
I urge my colleagues to take into consideration the
alarming scientific evidence when determining the status of the
Yucca Mountain project. The real question here, are we going to
continue allowing political expediency to determine our
Nation's nuclear waste policy or will we listen to the science?
The Yucca Mountain project is a failed one. We need to invest
in our future and the future of generations to come, and work
together to find a responsible and safe solution. And I would
echo what my distinguished colleague from northern Nevada said,
not only are there Yucca Mountain appropriations in the Energy
and Water bill and applaud him for his efforts there, but there
is also a great deal of Yucca money in the Defense
appropriation bill as well.
I thank you for allowing me to testify before the
subcommittee on this important issue. I would also like to
submit as part of my testimony a recent article that has
appeared in the Las Vegas Review Journal and the Las Vegas Sun
that further detailed the scientific findings that disprove
Yucca Mountain as a suitable site to hold radioactive waste.
And I thank the committee very much for their cordial
acceptance of my testimony.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Shelley Berkley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Shelley Berkley, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Nevada
I would like to thank Mr. Barton and Mr. Boucher for affording me
the opportunity to speak about an issue that affects every single
person in my district, and the entire State of Nevada. Oversight of the
Department of Energy's Yucca Mountain Project is crucial to the
continued growth and development of my state, crucial to the health and
well-being of all Nevada families, and crucial to the health of the
environment.
That is why I testify before you today--to share with you my
concerns, and the concerns of my constituents, about the status of the
Yucca Mountain Project.
I understand the purpose of this hearing today is to address the
oversight concerns surrounding the Yucca Mountain Project. I realize
the subcommittee is discussing the time line, engineering, and
regulatory aspects of the project.
But when discussing oversight issues, we must also look at the
scientific evidence and problems that have been raised regarding the
suitability of Yucca Mountain to hold radioactive waste.
On three separate occasions the State of Nevada has demonstrated,
using DOE's own data, that the site should be disqualified under both
the EPA standard and DOE's own internal site screening regulation. And
each time, the DOE or Congress has changed the regulations to ensure
that Yucca Mountain would not be disqualified, regardless of the health
and safety consequences to Nevadans.
In fact, DOE has found the geology at Yucca Mountain so poor that
over 95% of the waste isolation capability of the proposed repository
would have to be provided by metal waste container and other so-called
engineered barriers around the waste, with only about 5% of the site's
waste isolation performance depending on the natural conditions. When
this project started, the idea was find a place with natural geologic
features to contain the radiation. Clearly, that standard can not be
met at Yucca Mountain
Yucca Mountain is located in a young geologically active area, with
4 volcanoes within 7 miles of the site. Yucca Mountain is surrounded by
34 known earthquake fault lines, and has experienced over 620
earthquakes in the last 20 years. One of these earthquakes measured a
5.9 on the Richter Scale and caused over a million dollars in damage to
DOE's own surface support facilities.
An aquifer flows beneath Yucca Mountain, with water moving so
rapidly that even with all the engineered barriers, radiation will
unavoidably escape from the repository and contaminate the water flow.
As recently as yesterday it was reported--again--that scientists have
found strong evidence that the Yucca Mountain repository floor was once
flooded with hot water, and fear the water could rise again.
These are the real oversight concerns. I urge my colleagues to take
into consideration the alarming scientific evidence when determining
the status of the Yucca Mountain Project.
The real question is, are we going to continue allowing political
expediency to determine our nation's nuclear waste policy--Or, will we
listen to science.
The Yucca Mountain Project is a failed one. We need to invest in
our future, and the future of generations to come, and work together to
find a responsible and safe solution.
I thank you for allowing me to testify before the subcommittee on
this important issue. I would also like to submit as part of my
testimony recent articles that appeared in the Las Vegas Review Journal
and the Las Vegas Sun that further detail the scientific findings that
disprove Yucca Mountain as a suitable site to hold radioactive waste.
______
[December 1, 1999--Las Vegas Sun]
Critics: DOE has changed Yucca rules
By Mary Manning
The Department of Energy offered new rules on the approval of a
proposed high-level nuclear waste repository site at Yucca Mountain
Tuesday--rules that were greeted with howls by national and local
critics who accused the DOE of changing the guidelines to ensure that
the repository will be built.
The DOE wants to change siting guidelines issued in 1996 that
spelled out certain findings that would stop a Yucca Mountain
repository, such as ground water moving too fast, an earthquake or
volcanic activity at the mountain.
Yucca Mountain, 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas, is the sole site
under study by the DOE for the world's first high-level nuclear waste
repository. The mountain has not yet passed scientific muster and will
not be ready to accept 77,000 tons of highly radioactive waste until
2010 at the earliest.
The DOE proposes to use complex computer models with whatever
scientific information it has in hand to prove a repository will work,
but no single fact should disqualify Yucca Mountain, the new rules say.
The proposal was published in the Federal Register on Tuesday.
The DOE's proposal would eliminate individual problems such as
rapid ground water flow from stopping the DOE from building the
repository, Nevada's technical coordinator Steve Frishman said.
``What they're trying to do is change the law by regulation,''
Frishman said. ``It's a simple attempt to avoid the law.''
Both Sens. Harry Reid and Richard Bryan, D-Nev., denounced the DOE
guideline.
In a letter sent to President Clinton today, Bryan said, ``As it
has become increasingly clear that the Yucca Mountain site cannot meet
the existing siting guidelines, the DOE has attempted to . . . evaluate
the suitability of Yucca Mountain based on a single, and far less
stringent, total system performance assessment.''
``Such a change,'' the letter stated, ``would destroy and remaining
public confidence in the site characterization process and place the
health and safety of over 1 million Nevadans in serious jeopardy.''
``It's more of the same old game-playing,'' Bryan's chief of staff,
Jan Neal, said this morning. ``The site doesn't meet the criteria so
instead of disqualifying the site they change the criteria.''
Reid said he had ``crave concern'' with the DOE's proposal. He
noted that atomic weapons fallout from Pacific Island nuclear tests
reached the repository's level 1,000 feet deep inside Yucca in less
than 40 years.
``That characteristic surely violated the earlier criterion that
such water migration must take more than 1,000 years,'' Reid said.
``Generally, the changes cited in your proposed rulemaking do very
little to dispel the perception that earlier guidelines are being
abandoned because they would disqualify Yucca Mountain from any further
consideration as a permanent disposal site,'' Reid wrote in a letter to
Energy Secretary Bill Richardson.
``This is a transparent effort to change the rules of the game in
the third quarter,'' Reid said. ``It's a rule change that could
threaten the health and safety of the people of Nevada.''
Reid and Sen. Richard Bryan, D-Nev., were successful this year in
forcing Senate Republicans to abandon efforts to store nuclear waste
temporarily at the Nevada Test Site, a former proving ground for
nuclear weapons experiments.
Public Citizen's Mass Energy Project senior policy analyst Amy
Schollenberger called the DOE proposal ``another blatant attempt to
ensure that Yucca Mountain is approved as a geologic repository for
radioactive waste, even though all of the evidence suggests that it
will endanger the public, the environment and future generations.''
Public citizen, a nonprofit consumer advocacy group launched by
Ralph Nader, has been a leading critic of the DOE's attempt to weaken
safeguards at the site. Shollenberger said if DOE is successful and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which must license the site, can
eliminate a ground water radiation limit, the region's aquifer could be
destroyed.
______
[June 22, 2000--Las Vegas Review-Journal]
Yucca hot water report could burn Richardson
By Keith Rogers
While Energy Secretary Bill Richardson was treading political hot
water Wednesday over his agency's handling of a nuclear secrets
security lapse, scientists studying what some believe is ancient
evidence of hot water rising within the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear
waste site were still at odds over their observations.
The team of scientists who met Wednesday at the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas are in the midst of a two-year, $1.4 million study
led by associate professor Jean Cline. The study should be completed in
April, she said.
The team of experts from federal agencies, universities and the
state--including Yuri Dublyansky, Nevada's consulting geologist from
the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences--probably won't
have their conclusions ready for an agency report this year. Richardson
will use the report when considering whether to recommend Yucca
Mountain as the place to entomb the nation's high-level radioactive
wastes.
Some 77,000 tons of waste--mostly spent fuel pellets encased in
metal rods from nuclear power reactors--will be destined for a
repository in the mountain, 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, by 2010
if the site is deemed suitable and a repository can be licensed by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Richardson, who called for the UNLV study in 1998, said then that
his recommendation for the Yucca Mountain site ``will be based on
science, pure science, not politics.''
More recently, on a Feb. 11 trip to the agency's Nevada Operations
Office in Las Vegas, Richardson said he will remain on course to make
his recommendation this year even though the findings from Cline's
group probably won't be part of the report he will consider.
``I've got a lot of good science. I'll have sufficient
information,'' he said in February.
But Nevada officials say Richardson should wait until questions
about the rising thermal water theory are answered--if they can be
answered conclusively. Richardson could face legal action from the
state if he makes a recommendation without knowing the answers.
At issue are tiny bubbles in mineral deposits from deep within the
mountain. Scientists want to know whether those bubbles hold fluids
that show hot water rose in the recent geologic past--1.6 million to 2
million years ago--and flooded what would be the repository floor.
If that's the case, state scientists fear it could happen again,
after waste packages have been put in the mountain, risking a potential
release of deadly nuclear remnants into the environment.
Joseph Whelan, a geochemist from the U.S. Geological Survey's
Denver office, said his associates believe the calcite mineral features
stem from rain or snowmelt that percolated downward from the rocks
above the proposed repository site.
``If this calcite formed from upwelling water flooding these rocks,
as has been proposed, then that water would have entirely filled all of
those fractures and cavities and it would have deposited calcite in
them all. This is not what we observe,'' he said during a briefing at
UNLV.
Dublyansky, who has been gathering samples from the mountain
independent of the team, said he disagrees with Whelan's statements.
Cline, however, said the group's results concerning the
temperatures of the fluids trapped in the minerals ``are very
consistent with Yuri's. They're also very consistent with Joe Whelan's.
All three parallel studies are consistent,'' she said.
The temperatures that were measured average about 122 degrees, but
a few of the 40 samples that have been analyzed contained fluid that
was about 176 degrees, or 36 degrees less than the boiling point of
water.
Dublyansky believes this bolsters his theory that hot water came
from below the repository site and not above, as the federal scientists
contend. But a key element in proving the theory is to determine when
the minerals were deposited in relation to the mountain's formation 13
million years ago.
Cline said the scientists will attempt to age-date the minerals
through uranium-decay methods using equipment at Canada's Royal Ontario
Museum Laboratory.
``We cannot say whether fluids went up or down, and we probably
won't be able to say that with any surety at the end of the study,''
she said.
Mr. Barton. Thank you. The Chair is going to recognize
himself for 5 minutes. We are going to try to get through the
question period fairly quickly so we can get to our other
panels. But I think we should ask a few questions. All of the
problems that you just highlighted in your testimony, those are
well known to the scientific community and to the technical
experts. Haven't they all, in various reports, passed the
scrutiny? I mean, I didn't hear anything new. I understand
where you are coming from. Look, I am not at all surprised to
hear what you just said, but haven't all of those been analyzed
and passed muster in terms of it being safe to put the material
in Yucca Mountain?
Ms. Berkley. With all due respect, Chairman Barton, as late
as yesterday, it was reported in the Las Vegas newspapers that
the scientists that are continuing these studies have just come
up with the finding of hot water having flowed under Yucca
Mountain, not that many years ago in geological years, and have
a tremendous concern that that water may rise again. So this is
yet another scientific finding that is as new as 24 hours. So I
think until the scientific studies are completed, that we
should not be shipping or even thinking about Yucca Mountain as
a potential site. But I do think that hole in the ground in
your district might be a suitable location if they studied that
as well.
Mr. Barton. I wouldn't have a problem with that, to be
honest about it, if it underwent the scrutiny that Yucca
Mountain has.
Ms. Berkley. Perhaps we could work on a dual-track
scientific study.
Mr. Barton. Well, I could take 10 casinos and a billion
dollars a year and give you, you know, some old rubber tires or
something that might be a fair trade.
Ms. Berkley. My concern, of course, representing Las Vegas,
which is the major population center in the State of Nevada,
located only 90 miles away from Yucca Mountain, that if, God
forbid, there was an accident, there is no amount of money that
Congress could have given the State of Nevada to compensate for
the loss of health, loss of health in the environment and the
loss of our economy and continued growth and prosperity.
Mr. Barton. I understand your concern. I am not at all
being frivolous about that. But there has been more scientific
review of this particular site, and it is under more scrutiny
by the environmental groups so that, you know, at some point in
time, at least I think that you do have to make a decision. And
it certainly appears to me, based on the evidence that the
decision to build it there, if, in fact, that is what it is, is
a safe decision. I am not going to say it is a non
controversial decision.
The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Boucher.
Mr. Boucher. I don't have any questions.
Mr. Barton. Okay. In order of appearance, the gentleman
from Illinois.
Mr. Shimkus. I would just make a point that I have young
children 7, 5, and 8 months. And there was a very popular show
that I think about a lot these days, called The Magic School
Bus. And in one show the Magic School Bus goes from, if you
believe in evolution, goes back through time through the
millennium, it really stays in one location, but it goes
through deserts, through swamplands, through ice age, through,
you know, through the billions of years that--I am a
creationist, but if you go to the extent there probably was
water flowing there a few millennia ago. You know that there
probably will be water flowing there again a few millennia from
now.
But I agree with the chairman, one site is better than over
60 sites for nuclear storage and the desert is better than the
temperate zone. Underneath a mountain is better than above
ground, and a location where there has been nuclear activity is
better than a place where there has never been. I applaud the
defense of your constituents. I think the science will bear out
that this is the best hope for us to move this issue forward.
And I thank you for your defense of your State and your
citizens. I really, if you want to add----
Ms. Berkley. To my distinguished colleague, I had the
wonderful opportunity to meet your family when they visited Las
Vegas, and they are worth protecting and defending, just as the
children that live in any district are. But if I thought for 1
minute making Yucca Mountain the national repository for
nuclear waste would solve the nuclear waste problem in this
country, I would probably be for it. All you are going to be
doing is create yet another waste site, and once the 100,000
tons of nuclear waste that is deposited across this country
gets trucked or taken by rail to Yucca Mountain, it will not
solve the problem, because nuclear waste will continue to be
produced as long as we have this type of technology.
And I would recommend to this Congress that rather than
spending the billions and billions and billions of dollars that
it is going to take to ready Yucca Mountain in order to accept
this nuclear garbage, that we start working on a scientific way
of solving this problem so that the nuclear waste we produce is
less toxic, less radioactive, and we have less of a problem in
this country. Yucca Mountain is not going to make this problem
go away. It is going to exacerbate it because it is going to
give me the problem.
Mr. Shimkus. Just reclaiming my time, we already transport
high level nuclear waste all over this country, and we have
done it safely for many, many years. And I think we will
continue to do so. Having nuclear waste in some of the major
metropolitan areas of our country, Chicago, Illinois, being an
example, is more catastrophic than, again, underneath a
mountain in the desert.
Now, if we could ship this to Vieques Island and we could
use Yucca Mountain as a naval training assault area, I may
support that. But you understand that we have our concerns of
our constituents as much as you do. And I think Congress has
spoken and the science will prove it out and we will eventually
move that. I yield back my time to the chairman.
Mr. Barton. Thank the gentleman from Illinois. The
gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Burr.
Mr. Burr. Mr. Chairman, I haven't got a question of the
gentlewoman, I would only make this statement. That this issue
and probably more than anything else that we have dealt with at
least in the 6 years that I have been here, displays the great
difference that exists in the definition of good science. Your
argument, Mr. Gibbons' argument is very compelling and the test
that is the State of Nevada does in response to the test that
the Department of Energy has done and nuclear regulatory--and
others, we see it again with the EPA's current study and the
questions that have been raised about that. If we get nothing
else out of this, then the right definition that everybody can
use for good science so that we can have an environmental
policy that produces an outcome versus a continuation of
complaints about the process, then I believe today we will have
accomplished a tremendous amount. In the meantime, I think what
Mr. Shimkus was trying to say is that every State in this
country, somewhere in that State we have nuclear waste stored.
Sometimes we make a decision based on what's good for the
entire country and consolidation of that storage. In this
particular case seems to be the will of Congress, and my hope
is though I believe that you will vigorously fight it, and you
should, that we can have some finality to this and soon.
Ms. Berkley. Mr. Burr, if I could correct one thing you
said. There is one State that doesn't have nuclear waste and
that is the State of Nevada.
Mr. Burr. The gentlewoman's point is made. I am sure that
we could find some radioactive areas out there, though. Thank
you.
Ms. Berkley. I think what my colleague who spoke before me
said, the people of the State of Nevada don't want this. They
have spoken loud and clearly to their representatives in
Congress and we have an obligation to those families to protect
them to the best of our ability. And because other Members of
Congress have a problem regarding nuclear waste in their
district near their population centers doesn't make it any
better or easier for us to accept it to alleviate your problem
in order to exacerbate my own.
Mr. Barton. Would the gentleman yield? I just want to ask
when we had an active military testing program for our nuclear
weapons, wasn't that done in Nevada?
Ms. Berkley. Of course that was long before I was born.
Mr. Barton. I understand that. Actually, some tests were
done as late as the 1980's underground.
Ms. Berkley. That is correct. No, if I could answer and I
don't mean this to sound sharp or----
Mr. Barton. You can be sharp. You have got the right to be
sharp. I have to be polite, but witnesses can be sharp.
Ms. Berkley. Well, I would hope to match your politeness,
and this is said with all due deference and respect, but I grew
up in Las Vegas, a lot of my friends had pains, particularly
dads in those days that worked at the Nevada test site. When
they were told by this Federal Government that it was perfectly
safe not only to be at the Nevada test site but to participate
in the both above-ground and underground tests, and all they
had to do was go home and take a shower and they would be fine.
Well, I just attended a hearing a couple of months ago in my
district, where all the Nevada test site workers that are dying
of cancers and some of the most hideous, heinous cancers that
you and I have ever seen and hope to God none of us ever
experience. And this is the same government that is now telling
the State of Nevada that it is perfectly safe to store 100,000
tons of nuclear waste under Yucca Mountain. They misled the
Nevada public and the American public back in the 1950's and
the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's; I believe the Federal Government
is misleading us now.
Mr. Barton. Well, I can't comment on the 1960's and 1970's
and 1980's, but I can assure the gentlelady from Nevada that
nobody is misleading anybody in any State of the Union right
now. That is why we have the technical review board. That is
why we are doing the environmental impact statement. That is
why this subcommittee has done a half a dozen hearings on this.
That is why I met with the county commissioners from your
district. That is why I met with State representatives and the
State senators, why I have been out there twice. I think it
ought to be located at Yucca Mountain. But I don't think we
ought to mislead anybody. And I don't think that the Clinton
administration or the Bush administration or the Reagan
administration or any of the administrations that have been in
office since the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was passed in 1982
have done anything but try to be above board, so that there is
informed consent, at least informed discussion and debate.
Obviously, there is going to be a difference of opinion in
democracy about some of these issues, that is why this hearing
is being held today. This subcommittee is not in the business
of misleading anybody in the United States of America, any
constituent of any Congressional district about what the true
facts are.
Ms. Berkley. I appreciate that. And I have seen you, I know
that you have come to Las Vegas because we once shared a plane
ride together, and I knew that you were going to Las Vegas on
behalf of Yucca Mountain. I don't think it is an intentional
misleading, but I don't think anybody, scientists or government
officials, could guarantee to the people of the State of Nevada
that this nuclear waste will never have a problem, there will
be no groundwater problems, there will be no volcanic activity,
there will be no earthquake activity that would disturb the
nuclear waste and create a problem.
And if I thought that anyone could give me that guarantee,
I would feel a whole lot better about this. But I am not
talking about the short run, 5, 10, 15, 20 years from now, in
my lifetime, talking about what may happen 100 years from now,
and that is a blink of an eye. I don't think I could rest well
in any grave knowing that I have created this problem for my
constituents and my children and my children's children if we
didn't vigorously defend against putting nuclear waste at Yucca
Mountain. And I know that you understand my position.
Mr. Barton. I understand that. The gentleman from Oklahoma.
Mr. Largent. Ms. Berkley, I'd just like to ask you, can you
give us some examples of guarantees that you could make for 100
years from today?
Ms. Berkley. That is exactly my point, Mr. Largent. Exactly
my point.
Mr. Largent. So we should do nothing ever, because you
can't guarantee anything.
Ms. Berkley. No, of course not. What I think we should be
doing----
Mr. Largent. That is my point. My point is you can't
guarantee anything 100 years from now. But that doesn't mean
that we should do nothing today because we can't guarantee
something 100 or 1,000 years from now. I'd like to ask you this
question, and that is this, simply, a not-in-my-back-yard, or
do you just totally oppose all nuclear activity?
Ms. Berkley. Oh, no, not at all.
Mr. Largent. We should have nuclear activity in terms of
generation of electricity?
Ms. Berkley. What I think the solution is----
Mr. Largent. Let me ask this question first. Do you support
nuclear energy production of electricity?
Ms. Berkley. If, in fact, we could find a way of disposing
with the by-product of nuclear energy, I would not be opposed
to its creation. Prior to Congress, in a past life I was in-
house counsel for Southwest Gas Corporation. I have an energy
law background. So this is an area that I know a little bit
about. Now, I am not opposed to nuclear. What I am opposed to
is this country hasn't come up with a policy of dealing with
the nuclear waste other than dumping it in the ground. What I
would--I mean, this is a great country. This is an
extraordinary country. And we are at the beginning of a new
millennium and the dawning of the 21st century. Certainly there
will be scientific breakthroughs in the next several years that
will afford us an opportunity of handling this very dangerous
by-product of nuclear energy in a more efficient safer way. I
don't believe dumping it in the Nevada Desert is going to be
the ultimate solution. Let us take the billions of dollars,
extend the areas that the nuclear waste is being stored at at
the nuclear repositories now, do dry-cask storing, which is
adequate for the next century, and during that time, let us use
these billions and billions of dollars and come up with a
scientific way of rendering this stuff less toxic, less
harmful, less dangerous. I would be all in favor of that,
because we still don't have a good nuclear energy policy in
this country.
Mr. Largent. First of all, if you do know anything about
this issue, and I assume you do, then you know that we don't
have the capacity to go another century with storing it in
onsite facilities. I mean, that just simply cannot happen. What
I would say to you is that do you believe that there is a
scientific solution that is out there that would guarantee us
100 years from now that there won't be a problem with it? Is
there a scientific solution that would meet the demands and the
hurdles that you are placing on Yucca Mountain?
Ms. Berkley. I am a great optimist, and I believe in this
country. If we could put a man on the moon with a concerted
effort of a 10-year plan, then if we put our minds together and
put the scientific minds working on this and make this a
national priority, we could come up with a solution of
rendering the toxic weight less dangerous, less toxic and more
safe so that we wouldn't have to keep relying on burying it
under the ground.
What happens when Yucca Mountain is full and we keep
producing this nuclear waste? What is the next State that is
going to be assaulted with this? And how many more years are
you, Congress, going to be considering the next national
repository? Yucca Mountain is another temporary solution. We
still will not have gotten to the major problem. And what
happens when it is filled up? Where do we go from there? Is it
Texas next? Is it Oregon, Washington? I mean, which one of us
wants to accept this stuff? None of us.
So let's roll up our sleeves, work together in a bipartisan
way, and figure out what we are going to do to render this
stuff less toxic and dangerous for all of us, for my sake as
well as yours. I don't want to leave it in anybody's district.
And I don't want to take it in mine.
Mr. Largent. You can filibuster in the Senate. My question
was do you believe that there is a technological solution out
there?
Ms. Berkley. Yes, I do.
Mr. Largent. That will guarantee us that 100 years after
implementing this solution, that they can guarantee you that
there won't be any problems whatsoever?
Ms. Berkley. The scientific solution may not be discovered
at this moment, but I believe it can be.
Mr. Largent. It is just a yes-or-no question.
Ms. Berkley. I think it is more complicated than a yes or
no. If you ask me does a scientist have a solution today as of
June 23, that I cannot answer. Do I think that if we spend--
take the billions of dollars that we are using now to ready
Yucca Mountain and invest it in scientific studies, I do
believe that we can come up with an answer. I do believe in our
scientists and I do believe in America.
Mr. Largent. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. I will just say
that I think that some of our best and brightest have come up
with a solution. It is Yucca Mountain. I hope we can do better
in the future as well. But at this point in time, I think we
have invested a lot of time. This committee has spent a lot of
time, and I yield back.
Mr. Barton. Well, before we let the gentlewoman go, we want
her to know that the subcommittee goes on record as we support
America also. Let's end this on a positive note that we can
agree on that.
Ms. Berkley. Well, I have to thank all of you. This is the
first time in the entire 18 months that I have served in
Congress that I have ever had the pleasure of being grilled by
an entire subcommittee.
Mr. Barton. Grilled? You haven't seen grilled. Wait until
next week when Secretary Richardson is here. You will see
grilled.
Ms. Berkley. I look forward to the opportunity of watching
somebody else in this seat. Thank you very much.
Mr. Barton. Come back next week. Thank you.
Let's hear from our second panel now, if they will come
forward. We have Dr. Ivan Itkin, who is the director of the
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management at the
Department of Energy, and I have had the privilege of meeting
Dr. Itkin in my office. He is a distinguished gentleman who
volunteered for that job, which shows how much he loves his
country that he took that position.
We have Mr. Carl Paperiello, who is the deputy executive
director for Materials Research and State Programs for the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. We have Mr. Steve Page, director
of the Office of Radiation for the Environmental Protection
Agency. We have Dr. Debra Knopman, who is a board member of the
Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board.
Last but not least, we have Dr. Kevin Crowley, who is the
staff director of the Board of Radioactive Waste Management for
the National Research Council. Welcome, lady and gentlemen.
Your testimony is in the record in its entirety. We will start
with Mr. Paperiello and ask you to summarize in 7 minutes, and
we will go right on down the line. Welcome to the subcommittee.
STATEMENTS OF CARL PAPERIELLO, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
MATERIALS RESEARCH AND STATE PROGRAMS, NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION; IVAN ITKIN, DIRECTOR OF OFFICE OF CIVILIAN
RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; DEBRA
S. KNOPMAN, BOARD MEMBER, U.S. NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW;
STEPHEN D. PAGE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF RADIATION, U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; AND KEVIN D. CROWLEY, STAFF
DIRECTOR, BOARD ON RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
Mr. Paperiello. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, the
staff of the NRC is pleased to testify about our regulatory
oversight of the management and disposal of high level
radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. Among the subjects I
will discuss today is the status of our review of DOE's program
to characterize the Yucca Mountain site as a potential
geological repository and our progress in establishing site-
specific licensing requirements for the proposed repository.
The Commission continues to believe that a permanent
geologic depository is the appropriate mechanism for the United
States to ultimately manage spent fuel and other highly
radioactive wastes.
The program remains on course consistent with our
responsibilities under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and
the Energy Policy Act of 1992. We are in the middle of an
important transition. The staff is moving from the prelicense
consultative role defined for the NRC in the statute to its
role as regulator and licensing authority as we prepare for
possible submittal of a DOE license application. And I will
note a number of the important milestones and activities that
comprise our program during this transition.
On February 22nd of last year, the commission published a
proposed regulation 10 CFR part 63 for public comment. This is
a site-specific--we have a high-level waste rule. This is a
site-specific rule for Yucca Mountain based on our experiences
to that date on studying the mountain.
As soon as we proposed our regulations, we embarked on a
series of public meetings to encourage involvement by members
of the public most affected by the decisions we face in
establishing our final rule for Yucca Mountain. From these
meetings, together with written submittals, we received more
than 900 comments for proposed criteria. The NRC staff has
carefully considered and analyzed these comments and has
incorporated many of them in a draft final rule that the
commissioners now have before them.
Later last year, after the comment period for the NRC's
proposed regulations closed, the EPA proposed standards in 40
CFR 197 for Yucca Mountain. The NRC has provided extensive
comments on the EPA proposal. The NRC has identified serious
concerns with the proposed standards that if unchanged in the
final standards, will increase significantly the complexity of
the NRC's licensing process without commensurate increase in
the protection of public health and safety in the environment.
That being said, however, we have made clear in our
proposed rules that once final EPA standards for Yucca Mountain
are in place, the NRC will amend its regulations as needed to
confirm to the final standards as required by law.
In July of last year, the DOE published for public comment
its draft environmental impact statement for proposed Yucca
Mountain repository, and the NRC provided detailed comments on
the DEIS in February of this year. On May 4 of this year, DOE
forwarded its revised siting guidelines at 10 CFR 963 to NRC
for concurrence. We expect that the Commission will reach
concurrence finding on DOE's draft guidelines later this year.
We suspect that DOE will prepare to issue a site recommendation
in July of 2001.
Before then, the NRC expected to review a proposed DOE
recommendation and provide comments as required by statute on
sufficiency of DOE site characterization and waste form
proposal.
If DOE makes a recommendation on the Yucca Mountain site,
and if the President and the Congress affirm that
recommendation, the DOE will then apply to the NRC for a
license to construct a repository. The NRC has 3 years to
determine whether to approve or deny the application, except
that the Commission may extend the deadline by not more than 1
year. Through early NRC staff identification and clarification
of key technical safety issues, we are optimistic that we will
be prepared to complete this demanding and first-of-a-kind
review in the time allotted. Consistent with this objective, we
have completed rulemaking to establish a licensing support
network using Web-based technology to promote access to
documents and thereby hasten review of the license application.
I would like now to turn to the subject of DOE's quality
assurance activities involving Yucca Mountain. DOE has
experienced problems in the past in carrying out its QA
program. In general, DOE has done an acceptable job in
uncovering its own quality assurance problems, but has been
less successful in taking prompt corrective action and
preventing recurring problems. I am pleased to be able to say
that recent DOE actions have improved the picture considerably
in this area. However, the task is not complete and reflecting
the need for continued vigilance, we have strengthened our
oversight of DOE's quality assurance activities.
In conclusion, it is important to stress that DOE bears the
responsibility for demonstrating that licensing and
certification requirements are met to protect public health and
safety and the environment. The Commission independently must
assess and find that such a demonstration has been made before
we can issue a license for any geological repository. Among
other things, completion of NRC's review of a potential license
application depends on the timely establishment of
scientifically sound standards and regulations, the receipt of
a high quality license application from DOE, and sufficient
resources for the agency to maintain its independent technical
review capability.
I want to thank you for the opportunity to review the
status of the NRC's high level waste regulatory program and
will gladly answer any questions that you have.
[The prepared statement of Carl J. Paperiello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Carl J. Paperiello, Deputy Executive Director for
Materials, Research, and State Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Overview
Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, the staff of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) is pleased to testify about our regulatory
oversight of the management and disposal of high-level radioactive
waste and spent nuclear fuel. Among the subjects I will discuss today
are the status of our review of the Department of Energy's (DOE's)
program to characterize the Yucca Mountain Site as a potential
geological repository and our progress in establishing site-specific
licensing requirements for the proposed repository.
The Commission continues to believe that a permanent geologic
repository is the appropriate mechanism for the United States to
ultimately manage spent fuel and other high-level radioactive waste. We
believe the public health and safety, the environment, and the common
defense and security will be protected best by the development of a
comprehensive system for the management and disposal of high-level
radioactive waste, that includes storage, transportation and deep
underground disposal. In our view, a deep geologic repository is a
sound and technically feasible solution to the problem of final
disposition of spent nuclear fuel and other high-level radioactive
wastes.
Status of NRC's HLW Regulatory Program
The NRC's High-level Waste (HLW) regulatory program remains on
course, consistent with our responsibilities under the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982, as amended, and the Energy Policy Act of 1992. This
legislation specifies an integrated approach and a long-range plan for
storage, transport, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and HLW. It
prescribes the respective roles and responsibilities of the NRC, the
DOE and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the nation's
HLW program. The Congress assigned NRC extensive prelicensing
responsibilities and the regulatory authority to issue a license, if
appropriate, only after deciding whether a DOE license application for
a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, complies with
applicable standards and regulations.
The NRC staff is in the midst of an important transition--from the
prelicensing, consultative role defined for NRC in statute, which has
been our emphasis to date, to the role as regulator and licensing
authority, as we prepare for a possible submittal of a DOE license
application. In my testimony today, I will highlight a number of the
important milestones and activities that comprise our program during
this important transition. Among these are: (1) establishment of a
regulatory framework; (2) comment on the DOE's draft Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) for a proposed repository at Yucca Mountain; (3)
review and, if appropriate, concur in the revised DOE siting
guidelines; (4) comment on a DOE site recommendation, should the DOE
elect to pursue development of a repository at Yucca Mountain; and (5)
if a license application is received, preparation for making a
licensing determination in the time allotted by statute. In addition, I
would like to say a few words about NRC's oversight of the DOE's
quality assurance activities and provide a brief update of our
transportation safety activities.
Establishment of a Regulatory Framework
We take seriously our obligations to provide a regulatory framework
for the possible licensing of a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain;
and to consult with the DOE and other stakeholders, including the
Nevada public, in advance of any license application should one be
received. We plan to have risk-informed regulations specific for Yucca
Mountain in place by the end of this year. Under the Energy Policy Act
of 1992, the Commission must modify, if needed, its regulations to be
consistent with final EPA standards within a year of their issuance.
Because in 1998 we expected only a very short period in which to issue
final implementing regulations after final EPA standards are issued,
the Commission initiated its own rulemaking in parallel with that of
the EPA in formulating its standards. The NRC was concerned about its
responsibility to make public, as soon as possible, how we plan to
implement the health-based standards called for by the Congress. In our
view, prompt, public access to our regulatory intentions was necessary,
not only to enable the DOE to begin preparing a possible license
application but, just as importantly, to allow for timely and
meaningful public involvement in the development of our implementing
regulations. After EPA issues final standards, we will act promptly to
prepare needed conforming revisions, if any.
On February 22 of last year, the Commission published proposed
regulations at 10 CFR Part 63 for public comment. As soon as we
proposed our regulations, the NRC staff embarked on a series of public
meetings to encourage involvement by members of the public most
affected by the decisions we face in publishing final regulations for
Yucca Mountain. From these meetings, together with written submittals,
we received more than 900 comments on our proposed criteria. The NRC
staff has carefully considered, and analyzed these comments, and has
incorporated many of them in a draft final rule that the Commissioners
now have before them.
Later last year, after the comment period for NRC's proposed
regulations closed, the EPA proposed standards at 40 CFR 197 for Yucca
Mountain. The NRC has provided extensive comments on the EPA proposal.
The NRC has identified serious concerns with the proposed standards
that, if unchanged in the final standards, will increase significantly
the complexity of the NRC's licensing process without commensurate
increase in the protection of public health and safety and the
environment. That being said, however, we made clear in our proposed
rule, that after final EPA standards for Yucca Mountain are in place,
the NRC will amend its regulations, as needed, to conform to the final
standards, as required by law.
NRC Reviews of DOE's Draft EIS, Siting Guidelines and Site
Recommendation
In July of last year, the DOE published, for public comment, its
draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for a proposed Yucca
Mountain repository. The NRC provided detailed comments on the DEIS in
February 2000. The NRC comments identified several broad issues and a
number of specific topical areas that the DOE should address to make
the final EIS complete. The DOE is now completing its final EIS which
must, eventually, accompany DOE's license application to construct a
HLW repository. The NRC is required, by law, to adopt, to the extent
practicable, the final DOE EIS. On May 4, 2000, the DOE forwarded its
revised siting guidelines at 10 CFR Part 963 for NRC review and
concurrence. The DOE proposes to use the revised guidelines to review
and evaluate Yucca Mountain for recommendation as a potential
repository site. We expect that the Commission will reach a concurrence
finding on DOE's draft final guidelines later this year.
If the DOE elects to pursue development of Yucca Mountain as a
repository, we expect the DOE will prepare to issue a site
recommendation in July of 2001. Before then, the NRC expects to review
a proposed DOE recommendation and provide comments, as required by
statute, on the sufficiency of DOE's site characterization and waste
form proposal. The NRC expects that it will take six months to complete
the necessary review of any site recommendation, and provide comments.
Preparation for Making a Licensing Decision
As part of our overall prelicensing strategy, we continue to focus
our review on the nine key technical issues that are most important to
repository safety and, therefore, to licensing. Since we redirected and
streamlined our program several years ago, the NRC staff has completed
a number of significant reports on the status of resolution, at the
staff level, of each of the nine key issues. Now, we are applying the
experience gained in preparing these reports to the development of a
Yucca Mountain review plan that will eventually guide our review of a
license application. As this development progresses, we also continue
to conduct public technical exchanges between members of the NRC and
DOE technical staffs and with NRC's Advisory Committee on Nuclear
Waste.
If DOE makes a recommendation on the Yucca Mountain site, and if
the President and Congress affirm that recommendation, the DOE will
then apply to the NRC for a license to construct a repository. The NRC
has three years to determine whether to approve or deny the
application, except that the Commission may extend the deadline by not
more than one year. Through early NRC staff identification and
clarification of key safety issues, we are optimistic that we will be
prepared to complete this demanding and first-of-a-kind review in the
time allotted. Consistent with this objective, we have completed a
rulemaking to establish a Licensing Support Network, using web-based
technology to promote access to supporting documents and, thereby,
hasten review of the license application. A further rulemaking with
regard to the Licensing Support Network is now in preparation.
Quality Assurance
I would now like to turn to the subject of the DOE quality
assurance activities involving Yucca Mountain. DOE has experienced
problems in carrying out its quality assurance program. In general, the
DOE has done an acceptable job in uncovering its own quality assurance
problems. However, it has been less successful in taking prompt
corrective actions and preventing recurring problems. I am pleased to
be able to say that recent DOE actions have improved the picture
considerably in this area. However, the task is not complete and,
reflecting the need for continued vigilance, we have strengthened our
oversight of DOE's quality assurance activities.
Safety of Packages for Spent Fuel and HLW Transport
In addition to our oversight responsibilities for any potential
geologic repository, the NRC is charged with certifying the safety of
the packages used to transport spent nuclear fuel and high level waste.
NRC continues to support the requirement that waste shippers use NRC-
certified packages for transport of spent fuel and high-level waste. In
the past year, NRC has reviewed and approved three dual-purpose cask
systems for storage and transport. We are also reviewing four more
dual-purpose cask system designs.
The shipment of spent nuclear fuel in NRC-approved transportation
containers continues to have an unparalleled record of success from a
safety perspective. To date, there has not been a release of
radioactive material from an accident involving an NRC-approved spent
fuel transportation container. In March 2000, NRC completed a safety
study on spent fuel shipment risks. This study found the risks
associated with transport of spent nuclear fuel by truck or train are
even lower than earlier risk estimates. NRC held a series of meetings
in 1999 to interact with interested stakeholders in a public forum to
discuss the issues related to spent fuel transport. The NRC has more
meetings planned for later this year.
Conclusion
It is important to stress that the DOE bears the responsibility for
demonstrating that licensing and certification requirements are met to
protect public health and safety and the environment. The Commission
independently must assess and find that such a demonstration has been
made before we can issue a license for any geologic repository. Among
other things, completion of NRC's review of a potential license
application depends upon: the timely establishment of scientifically-
sound standards and regulations; the receipt of a high-quality license
application from the DOE; and sufficient resources for the NRC to
maintain its independent technical review capability. I want to thank
you for the opportunity to review the status of NRC's HLW regulatory
program, and will gladly answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Barton. Thank you, Doctor. We would now like to hear
from Dr. Itkin, and your statement is in the record. We
recognize you for 7 minutes. Welcome to the subcommittee.
STATEMENT OF IVAN ITKIN
Mr. Itkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. I am Ivan Itkin, Director of the Department of
Energy's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.
I appreciate the opportunity to provide an update on the
status of our program and to address the issues of concern to
the committee. Over the past few years, the Department has made
significant progress toward a recommendation on the permanent
solution for spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive
waste.
We are on schedule to make a decision in 2001 on whether or
not to recommend the Yucca Mountain site as a repository. With
sufficient appropriations, and if the site is suitable for
recommendation and is designated so by the Congress, we are on
schedule to begin emplacement of the waste in 2010.
Let me again emphasize that the overriding goal of the
Federal Government's high level radioactive waste management
policy is the establishment of a permanent geologic repository.
Permanent geologic disposal not only addresses the management
of spent nuclear fuel from commercial electric power
generation, but is also essential to advancing our
nonproliferation goals. The repository will secure highly
enriched spent nuclear fuel from foreign and domestic research
reactors and surplus plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons.
A repository is necessary to support our nuclear powered Naval
fleet.
Finally, a permanent geologic repository is vital for
cleaning up the legacy of our past nuclear weapons production
at sites throughout the country.
In the next year, we expect to complete the near-term
scientific and engineering work for a Secretarial decision on
whether or not to recommend the Yucca Mountain site for further
development. We are on schedule to complete the documentation
required by law.
A Presidential decision to go forward with Yucca Mountain
must be based on science, and we are conducting a world class
scientific and technical program at Yucca Mountain.
We have had almost 5 years of direct examination of the
geology underneath Yucca Mountain, and we completed a 2,000
meter cross-drift tunnel in December 1999 to develop a more
complete three-dimensional model of the geologic formation.
We continue to conduct the world's largest thermal tests to
assess how long-term exposure to heat from waste packages might
affect the hydrology and near-field environment within the
tunnels that may be constructed within Yucca Mountain.
Since the release of the viability assessment in December
1998, we have focused on reducing uncertainty in the models we
use to predict repository performance.
We have refined our repository design to be flexible and
robust. And we can adjust the period of ventilation, vary fuel
staging at the waste packages, and adjust waste package
spacing.
Let me now turn to the program's current activities. The
program's focus for early fiscal year 2001 is to complete the
site recommendation consideration report. This report will be
made available to the State of Nevada, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, and the public to inform them of our findings and
to facilitate public comment on a possible recommendation.
The program issued the draft environmental impact statement
for a geologic repository in July 1999. More than 2,700
individuals attended public hearings on the draft statement and
more than 700 provided comments. We are presently analyzing the
comments, preparing responses, and continuing the development
of the final environmental impact statement.
Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the final environmental
impact statement must accompany a recommendation from the
Secretary to the President to develop this site. The Department
has requested $437.5 million for fiscal year 2001. This funding
is necessary to complete the activities needed for an informed
policy decision.
The full fiscal year 2001 request is also necessary for
critical work related to the preparation of a license
application that was deferred in past years due to funding
levels below those published in the viability assessment.
Let me address the program's efforts to recompete the
current management and operating contract. The program's
current M&O contract was awarded in 1991 and will expire in
February of 2001. Consistent with the Department's contracting
policy, we are recompeting our M&O contract. We received three
proposals on June 8, 2000, at the close of the bidding period.
We expect to award a follow-on later this year, and after
awarding the contract, we expect--no, in fact, we will demand
an orderly transition, and have allocated funds for contractor
transition in our fiscal year 2001 budget request.
Both the Environmental Protection Agency and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission have proposed regulations for radiation
dose limits at Yucca Mountain and to license a repository at
the site. To align our site suitability criteria to the
proposed regulations, the Department has proposed 10 CFR 963,
the Yucca Mountain site suitability guidelines. We are hopeful
that the Environmental Protection Agency will establish
reasonable standards that are protective of the public health
and safety and the environment, and that these standards can be
implemented by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in a rigorous
licensing process.
It is our understanding that the Environmental Protection
Agency will finalize the radiation protection standard for
Yucca Mountain this summer.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, we have made
significant progress. Since we set out to characterize the
Yucca Mountain site after enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1982, we knew we would face many challenges. I believe
by the end of next year, we will have met the most difficult of
those challenges. There will likely continue to be additional
scientific and institutional issues to be addressed during any
licensing process, but I believe that the program is well
positioned to move forward.
Thank you. I appreciate being allowed to present this
testimony, and I will be happy to answer any questions that you
may have.
[The prepared statement of Ivan Itkin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ivan Itkin, Director, Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy
introduction
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am Ivan Itkin,
Director of the Department of Energy's Office of Civilian Radioactive
Waste Management. I appreciate the opportunity to provide an update on
the status of our Program and to address issues of concern to the
Committee.
Over the past few years, the Department has made significant
progress toward a recommendation on a permanent solution for spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. We are on schedule to
make a decision in 2001 on whether or not to recommend the Yucca
Mountain site as a repository. With sufficient appropriations, and if
the site is suitable for recommendation and is designated by Congress,
our current schedule is to submit the license application for
repository construction to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2002,
to begin construction in 2005 upon receipt of construction
authorization, and, if the site is licensed, to begin emplacement of
the waste in the repository in 2010.
background
The overriding goal of the Federal Government's high-level
radioactive waste management policy is the establishment of a permanent
geologic repository.
Permanent geologic disposal addresses the management of spent
nuclear fuel from commercial electric power generation and from past
Government defense activities, and it is essential to advancing our
non-proliferation goals. A permanent disposal solution will also secure
highly enriched spent nuclear fuel from foreign and domestic research
reactors. It will also provide for the disposition of surplus plutonium
from dismantled nuclear weapons. A repository is necessary for the
disposition of spent nuclear fuel from our nuclear-powered naval
vessels. Finally, a permanent geologic repository is vital for cleaning
up the legacy of our past nuclear weapons production at sites
throughout the country.
program status
The near-term scientific and engineering work that will be the
foundation for a Secretarial decision on whether or not to recommend
the Yucca Mountain site to the President is expected to be completed
next year. A Presidential decision to develop a repository must be
based on sound science. It must not only be accompanied by the
documentation required by law, but also inform our policy makers, our
regulatory oversight agencies, and the public regarding the scientific
basis for the decision.
We are conducting a world-class scientific and technical program at
Yucca Mountain. Through the Exploratory Studies Facility, we have had
almost five years of direct examination of the geology underneath Yucca
Mountain. From this study, our scientists and engineers, including
experts from our nation's universities and our National Laboratories,
have advanced our understanding of a potential repository system. This
understanding led us to further focus our investigations, responding in
part to the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board and other experts.
In response to requests from the Nuclear Waste Technical Review
Board, we completed a 2000-meter cross-drift tunnel in December 1999.
This year, we will complete niches and alcoves in the cross-drift
tunnel that will assist us in developing a more complete three-
dimensional model of that geologic formation. For nearly two years, we
have gathered and integrated into our performance models data from the
cross-drift tunnel inside the mountain to refine our predictions of
repository performance.
Within the Exploratory Studies Facility, we continue to conduct the
largest thermal test of a geologic formation in the world. This test,
commonly known as the drift-scale test, assesses how long-term
exposures to heat from waste packages might affect the hydrology and
near-field environment within tunnels that may be constructed within
Yucca Mountain. This work will help determine the effects of heat on
waste package performance and assist in the further refinement of
repository design as we move forward toward licensing a repository, if
the site is deemed suitable.
Since the release of the Viability Assessment in December 1998, the
primary objective of the program's scientific and technical work has
been reducing uncertainty in our predictions of repository performance.
Our repository design has been refined to better manage thermal loads
and reduce uncertainty. It is a flexible and robust design that can
accommodate various operational modes, including adjusting the period
of ventilation, varying fuel staging and loading into waste packages,
and adjusting waste package spacing to manage thermal loads.
This approach will permit future generations to evaluate actual
repository performance, learn from the operations and monitoring, and
close the facility when appropriate. A repository that is flexible to
accommodate technical advances or future changes in priority is one way
to address concerns regarding the need for additional information due
to uncertainty.
planned activities
Let me now turn to the Program's current activities, and the major
events on the horizon. The culmination of the Program's site
characterization efforts is to prepare the documentation required under
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to support a decision on whether or not to
submit a site recommendation to the President. The Program's focus for
early Fiscal Year 2001 is to complete the Site Recommendation
Consideration Report. This report will present background information
and descriptions of the site characterization program and the site. It
will also include descriptions of the repository design, the waste
form, and waste packages; a discussion of data related to the safety of
the site; and a description of the performance assessment of the
repository. The Site Recommendation Consideration Report and its
supporting documents will be made available to the State of Nevada, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the public to inform them and to
facilitate public comment on a possible recommendation.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires a final environmental impact
statement to accompany a site recommendation to the President, if the
Secretary decides to recommend the site for development as a
repository. The Department issued the Draft Environmental Impact
Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear
Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County,
Nevada in July 1999. The draft environmental impact statement provides
information on potential environmental impacts that could result from
the construction, operation and monitoring, and eventual closure of a
repository at Yucca Mountain.
We conducted a public comment period on the draft environmental
impact statement from the end of July 1999 through February 28, 2000.
Twenty-one hearings were held, eleven throughout the country and ten in
the State of Nevada. More than 2700 individuals attended those hearings
and more than 700 provided comments. We are presently analyzing the
comments, preparing responses to be documented in the comment response
section of the final environmental impact statement, and continuing
development of the final environmental impact statement.
Our plan for Fiscal Year 2001 and beyond reflects the evolution of
the project emphasis from scientific investigations to data synthesis,
model validation, repository and waste package design, safety analysis,
and documentation. The Program's near-term priorities upon completion
of site characterization will be to enhance and refine repository
design features and to develop the remaining information required to
continue to a license application if a decision to recommend the site
is made by the Secretary and approved by the President and Congress.
fiscal year 2001 budget
To support our future activities, the Department has requested
$437.5 million for Fiscal Year 2001. The funding we have requested is
needed to complete the activities that are necessary for an informed
policy decision. In addition to compiling the remaining information
that is necessary for a possible site recommendation, the full Fiscal
Year 2001 request is also necessary for critical work, related to the
preparation of a license application, that was deferred in past years
due to funding levels below those published in the Viability
Assessment. The Program has been able to maintain its schedule for
major milestones over the past years despite significant reductions
from our request level, but only by deferring critical work that still
must be completed.
Regaining momentum with the Fiscal Year 2001 request will enable
the Program to be more responsive to emerging scientific issues, such
as those raised during our extensive ongoing interactions with the
Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. Now, when we are so close to significant milestones, we
should not allow insufficient resources to be a cause for delay.
contract recompetition
The Program's current management and operating contract was awarded
in 1991 and will expire in February 2001. Consistent with the
Department's contracting policy regarding management and operating
contracts, and in conformance with direction provided in the enacted
Energy and Water Development appropriations, we are recompeting our
management and operating contract.
The Department received three proposals on June 8, 2000, which was
the close of the bidding period. We have begun to evaluate submittals
by the three teams, which are led by MK Nevada LLC, Bechtel SAIC
Company LLC, and TRW Parsons Management and Operations LLC. We expect
to award a follow-on performance-based contract late this summer or
early in the fall. After awarding the contract, we expect an orderly
transition. We have allocated funds for contractor transition in our
Fiscal Year 2001 budget request.
regulatory activities
We have proposed 10 CFR 963, Yucca Mountain Site Suitability
Guidelines, for use by the Department in evaluating site suitability.
This proposal is intended to align the suitability criteria in the
Department's evaluation process with the standards being promulgated by
the Environmental Protection Agency and the licensing criteria being
promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Specifically, the
Environmental Protection Agency and Nuclear Regulatory Commission are
each revising the regulatory framework for standards involving
radiation dose limits at Yucca Mountain and for licensing this site,
respectively.
We are hopeful that the Environmental Protection Agency will
establish reasonable standards that are protective of public health and
safety and the environment, and that these standards can be implemented
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in a rigorous licensing
environment. It is our understanding that the Environmental Protection
Agency will finalize the radiation protection standard for Yucca
Mountain this summer. Soon afterwards, we expect the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to modify its licensing criteria to be consistent with the
standard.
conclusion
As I noted at the beginning of my testimony, we have made
significant progress. Since the enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act in 1982, our nation has made a substantial investment in permanent
geologic disposal. Approximately four billion dollars and years of
cutting-edge science and engineering have brought us to this point.
When we set out to characterize the Yucca Mountain site through an
ambitious scientific program, we knew we would be faced with
challenges. I believe by the end of next year we will have met the most
difficult of those challenges. There will likely continue to be
additional scientific and institutional issues to be addressed during
any licensing process. But, I believe the Program is well positioned to
move forward.
Thank you. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Barton. Thank you, Doctor.
We now would like to hear from another doctor--we are
getting overwhelmed with Ph.D.'s today--Dr. Debra Knopman, who
is the board member from the Nuclear Waste Technical Review
Board, which is tasked with overseeing all the scientific
analysis on these decisions. Your statement is in the record in
its entirety and we would welcome you to summarize it for 7
minutes.
STATEMENT OF DEBRA S. KNOPMAN
Ms. Knopman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
subcommittee. I am a member of the Nuclear Waste Technical
Review Board. My full-time job is director of the Center for
Innovation and the Environment of the Progressive Policy
Institute. As most of you may know, the Board members serve in
a part-time capacity. I am pleased to act as the Board's
representative today. Our Chairman, Dr. Jared Cohon, President
of Carnegie Mellon University, sends his regrets at not being
here. I will make summary remarks.
Mr. Chairman, when Congress created the Nuclear Waste
Technical Review Board in the 1987 amendments to the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act, it gave the Board a very important and unique
mandate. That mandate is to conduct an independent review of
the technical and scientific validity of activities conducted
by the Secretary of Energy in implementing the Act, including
characterization of the Yucca Mountain site and packaging and
transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive
waste.
I would like to update the subcommittee this morning
briefly on some of the Board's most recent recommendations on
the DOE safety strategy for the Yucca Mountain site, methods
for predicting repository performance, and scientific studies
of Yucca Mountain. I would like to make four points.
Point 1: Representation of uncertainties about the Yucca
Mountain site will be an important component of a site
recommendation decision document. The Board continues to
endorse the use of performance assessment, sometimes called
TSPA, supplemented by other lines of evidence for making a site
suitability determination. While the numerical models in a
performance assessment help us to understand and estimate how a
repository might perform at Yucca Mountain, the models are
based on many assumptions. For example, underlying the models
are assumptions about the natural environment, including
climate, water movement, chemistry, et cetera, and about the
engineered system, including corrosion and other processes.
The Board believes that explaining the uncertainties
inherent in the PA and the underlying assumptions as clearly
and fully as possible is essential for technical credibility
and sound decisionmaking. The board is concerned that a
performance assessment without such an explanation could
deprive policymakers of critical information on possible
tradeoffs between projected performance and uncertainty in
those projections.
Let me give you an example. One policymaker might be
willing to accept development of a repository that would
release half of the allowable dose and have only a 1-in-1,000
chance of exceeding that limit. However, that same policymaker
might decline to develop a repository that is expected to
release only a 10th of the allowable dose but has a 1-in-4
chance of exceeding the limit.
Another policymaker's preferences might be the opposite.
Because the uncertainties about repository system performance
may be substantial, estimates of uncertainty about doses are at
least as important as estimates of performance.
DOE and the Board have had numerous exchanges on this
point, and we understand that the program is making an effort
to respond to the Board's concerns.
The second point I would like to make: A case for
repository safety must be built on multiple lines of evidence,
not just a complex computer model. Although we endorse the use
of performance assessment modeling, the Board believes that the
modeling should not be used as the sole source of guidance
about long-term performance of the repository system. The Board
supports the DOE's use of multiple and independent lines of
argument and evidence, including defense-in-depth, safety
margin, natural analogs and performance confirmation testing to
supplement the use of TSPA, the total system performance
assessment, in its case regarding Yucca Mountain site
suitability.
In other words, this is a matter of not putting all the
scientific eggs in one basket of computer modeling. The Board
believes that the program is making an effort to develop these
additional lines of evidence. It is unclear at this time how
far along DOE will be in their development at the time of the
site recommendation consideration report.
Third point: There are important connections between
repository design and uncertainties in the safety case. In
other words, evaluation of the site's suitability is dependent,
to a considerable degree, on confidence in the technical case
made for performance of a proposed repository and waste package
design. That is the reason why one way to address uncertainties
in the safety case is to reduce them by modifying repository
design.
In particular, the Board has suggested that the DOE
investigate the effects of heat on the waste packages,
repository tunnels, and hydrologic and hydrogeochemical
processes at the site. The Board made this suggestion because
higher temperatures, especially if water is present in
repository tunnels, appear to carry additional uncertainties in
estimating repository system performance in comparison to lower
temperature below-boiling conditions in the rocks surrounding
the tunnels.
In the past, DOE has maintained that above-boiling
repository designs have the potential to vaporize water in the
rocks surrounding the repository tunnels, thereby keeping the
waste packages essentially dry for up to 1,000 years.
The Board is concerned that the performance assessment may
not, in its current state of development, capture adequately
how the thermal, hydrologic and other processes in the mountain
interact. And if this is the case, then the PA model may not be
able to accurately represent the uncertainty associated with
this above-boiling design.
A below-boiling design may have the potential to reduce
concerns about these coupled processes, but more thorough
analysis is needed before any judgment is made about the
optimal thermal conditions for the repository operation. The
Board is very pleased that DOE has begun preliminary work in
this area.
Fourth point: Important scientific studies are still going
on at Yucca Mountain. The primary focus of the scientific work
now in progress at Yucca Mountain is to reduce uncertainties
through the acquisition and analysis of additional relevant
data. For example, the Board believes on the basis of current
knowledge that the DOE has chosen the best materials available
for the waste package. However, our experience with the
materials extends only over a few decades a short time relative
to the tens of thousands of years of their intended life in a
repository.
The Board is closely following the DOE's efforts to address
questions about stress corrosion cracking and about dissolution
of the passive layer around the waste package that would act as
a barrier--corrosion barrier in the alloy being proposed for
the package. The east-west cross-drift recommended by the Board
and completed in October 1998 by DOE continues to yield
scientific dividends and will help address some of the current
questions about the rock where the proposed repository would
actually be located.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the Board believes that the
DOE's efforts to develop the site recommendation consideration
report have been very useful to identify issues that they would
need to resolve or clarify in a final site recommendation
report. At this point, the DOE has not encountered any single
issue in characterizing the Yucca Mountain site that
automatically eliminates it from consideration as the location
of a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel and high level
radioactive waste. However important technical questions remain
about Yucca Mountain, especially about the effects of heat on
the movement of water in the mountain and on the associated
transport of radionuclides.
DOE is taking steps to address these uncertainties, but
some uncertainty will inevitably continue about predictions of
repository performance. This may be true to some extent at any
site. At the time the decision is made onsite recommendation,
the Board believes it is critical that DOE not only offer
estimates of performance, but also clarify the extent and
significance of the scientific uncertainties that are a vital
part of decisionmaking.
Thank you very much for this opportunity to provide the
Board's views. I would be happy to respond to questions.
[The prepared statement of Debra S. Knopman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Debra Knopman, U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical
Review Board
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. I am Debra Knopman, a
member of the Nuclear Waste Technical Board. My full-time job is
Director of the Center for Innovation and the Environment of the
Progressive Policy Institute. It is my pleasure to act as the Board's
representative this morning and to express the views of the Board on
progress in the Yucca Mountain site-characterization program. The
Board's Chairman, Dr. Jared L. Cohon, sends his regrets at not being
able to be here today.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will make some brief summary
remarks and ask that my full statement be entered into the hearing
record.
The Board's Mandate
Mr. Chairman, when Congress created the Nuclear Waste Technical
Review Board in the 1987 amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(NWPA), it gave the Board a very important--and unique--mandate. That
mandate is to conduct an independent review of the technical and
scientific validity of activities conducted by the Secretary of Energy
in implementing the NWPA, including characterization of the Yucca
Mountain site and packaging and transportation of spent nuclear fuel
and high-level radioactive waste. Congress intended the Board to
communicate its findings and recommendations to the Secretary and to
Congress in a timely fashion before important decisions are made, not
after the fact.
The Board takes its charge very seriously, Mr. Chairman, and we are
pleased to have this opportunity to update the Subcommittee on the
Board's view of the Yucca Mountain program before the release of the
Department of Energy's (DOE) site recommendation consideration report,
or SRCR, which currently is scheduled for the end of this year. In
particular, I would like to update the Subcommittee briefly on some of
the Board's most recent recommendations on the DOE's safety strategy
for the Yucca Mountain site, methods for predicting repository
performance, and scientific studies of Yucca Mountain.
The DOE's Site Recommendation Consideration Report
As I mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the DOE intends to issue a site
recommendation consideration report on Yucca Mountain at the end of
this calendar year. The DOE plans to update the SRCR and use it along
with other information called for in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act as
the basis of a site recommendation, currently scheduled for mid-2001.
According to the DOE, the SRCR will include four elements: a
comprehensive computer model called the ``total system performance
assessment,'' or TSPA; a qualitative description of the attributes of
the Yucca Mountain site; a repository design and safety case; and an
outline of future research needs. Over the last few months, the Board
has commented to the DOE on some of these issues. I will briefly
summarize some of our most recent comments.
Representation of uncertainties about the Yucca Mountain site. The
Board continues to endorse the use of performance assessment, or PA,
supplemented by other lines of evidence, for making a site-suitability
determination. While the numerical models in a PA help us understand
and estimate how a repository might perform at the Yucca Mountain site,
the models are based on many assumptions. For example, underlying the
models are assumptions about the natural environment, including
climate, water movement, chemistry, seismicity, and volcanism, and
about the engineered system, including corrosion and other processes.
The assumptions may be based on field and laboratory data, on the
results of expert judgment, or on detailed conceptual and numerical
analyses.
The Board believes that explaining the uncertainties inherent in
the PA and the underlying assumptions as clearly and fully as possible
is essential for technical credibility and sound decision-making. The
Board is concerned that a PA without such an explanation could deprive
policy-makers of critical information on possible trade-offs between
projected performance and the uncertainty in those projections. For
example, one policy-maker might be willing to accept development of a
repository that would release half of the permitted dose and have only
a 1 in 1,000 chance of exceeding the permitted dose. However, that same
policy-maker might decline to develop a repository that is expected to
release only a tenth of the permitted dose but that has a 1 in 4 chance
of exceeding the permitted dose. Another policy-maker's preferences
might be the opposite. Because the uncertainties about repository
system performance may be substantial, estimates of uncertainty about
doses are at least as important as estimates of performance.
To help decision-makers better understand estimates of repository
performance in the PA, the Board recommends that the DOE include in a
site recommendation document a description of critical assumptions, an
explanation of why particular parameter ranges were chosen, a
discussion of data limitations, an explanation of the basis and
justification for using expert judgments, and an assessment of
confidence in the conceptual models used.
In addition, the Board recommends that the uncertainties associated
with the performance estimates be identified and quantified well enough
so that the performance estimates can be put in the context of what is
well known, what is less well known, and what is unknown (or
unknowable) about Yucca Mountain. The DOE and the Board have had
numerous exchanges on this point, and we understand that the program is
making an effort to respond to the Board's concerns.
Building a case for repository safety. Although we endorse the use
of PA, the Board believes that PA modeling should not be used as the
sole source of guidance about the features, events, and processes that
might affect the long-term performance of the repository system.
Therefore, the Board supports the DOE's use of multiple and independent
lines of argument and evidence, including defense-in-depth, safety
margin, natural analogs, and performance confirmation testing, to
supplement the TSPA in its case regarding Yucca Mountain site
suitability. These additional elements, combined with a clear
description of uncertainty as described above, will present a more
technically defensible demonstration of repository safety than would
any element by itself. In other words, this is a matter of not putting
all the scientific eggs in one basket of computer modeling. The Board
believes that the program is making an effort to develop these
additional lines of evidence, but it is unclear at this time how far
along DOE will be in their development at the time of the SRCR.
Connections between repository design and uncertainties in the
safety case. One way to address uncertainties is to reduce them by
modifying repository design. In early1999, the Board recommended to the
DOE that it analyze alternatives to the repository and waste package
designs included in the DOE's 1998 viability assessment. In particular,
the Board suggested that the DOE investigate the effects of heat on the
waste packages, repository tunnels, and hydrologic and hydrogeochemical
processes at the site. The Board made this suggestion because higher
temperatures, especially if water is present in repository tunnels,
appear to carry additional uncertainties in estimating repository
system performance in comparison to lower-temperature, below-boiling
conditions in the rock surrounding the tunnels. In the past, the DOE
has maintained that above-boiling repository designs have the potential
to vaporize water in the rock surrounding the repository tunnels,
thereby keeping the waste packages essentially dry for up to a thousand
years.
Understanding the differences in estimated performance and
associated uncertainties under different temperature conditions is an
important component of our overall understanding of potential
repository performance at the Yucca Mountain site. However, the Board
is concerned that PA may not in its current state of development
capture adequately how the thermal, hydrologic, mechanical, and
chemical processes in the mountain interact. If this is the case, then
the PA model may not accurately represent the uncertainty associated
with above-boiling designs. A below-boiling design may have the
potential to reduce concerns about these ``coupled processes.''
Nonetheless, more thorough analysis is needed before any judgment is
made about the optimal thermal conditions for repository operation.
In any case, Mr. Chairman, the Board believes that an analysis of
the tradeoffs between estimates of performance and the uncertainties in
those estimates is essential before a technically-defensible decision
can be made on repository design. The Board is pleased that the DOE has
begun preliminary work in this area.
Important scientific studies continue at Yucca Mountain. An
important aspect of reducing uncertainties is obtaining relevant data.
For example, the Board believes, on the basis of current knowledge,
that the DOE has chosen the best materials available for the waste
package. However, experience with the materials extends over only a few
decades--a short time relative to the tens of thousands of years in
their intended life in a repository. The Board is closely following the
DOE's efforts to address questions about stress corrosion cracking and
about dissolution of the passive layer that acts as a corrosion barrier
in the alloy that has been selected for the exterior of the waste
package. Answering these questions should help reduce uncertainties and
increase confidence in predictions of waste package performance that
are extrapolated from present-day experience.
The east-west cross drift recommended by the Board and completed in
October 1998 by the DOE continues to yield dividends in scientific
information that help to address some of the current questions about
the properties of the layer of rock where most of the waste would be
placed and about how liquid water and water vapor will move within that
layer. In addition, the ongoing drift-scale heater test, now in its
third year, should provide important information on the general effects
of heat on the mountain.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, on the basis of what we know at this
time, the SRCR will provide an important analysis of key issues that
are likely to be included in a final technical document accompanying a
site recommendation. Although the Board cannot say whether the SRCR
itself will be sufficient for determining site suitability, the Board
believes that the DOE's efforts to develop the SRCR have been very
useful in helping the DOE identify issues that would have to be
resolved or clarified in a final site recommendation report.
At this point, the DOE has not encountered any issue in
characterizing the Yucca Mountain site that automatically eliminates it
from consideration as the location of a permanent repository for spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. However, important
technical questions remain about Yucca Mountain, especially about the
effects of heat on the movement of water in the mountain and on the
associated transport of radionuclides. The DOE is taking steps to
address these questions, but some uncertainty will inevitably continue
about predictions of the performance of a potential repository system.
This may be true to some extent at any site.
At the time a decision is made on site recommendation, the Board
and the scientific community are likely to be asked at least two
questions: (1) Is the underlying science broadly regarded as
technically credible and sound? and (2) Are the uncertainties in
estimates of performance displayed clearly and openly, especially about
the major factors that may lead to a potential radioactive release? A
major question for policy-makers at that point may be whether the site
is suitable, given the level of uncertainty associated with the DOE's
site-suitability determination. The Board believes it is critical that
the DOE not only offer estimates of performance but also clarify the
extent and significance of the technical and scientific uncertainties.
Understanding uncertainties is vital for sound decision-making.
Thank you very much for this opportunity to provide the Board's
views. I will be happy to respond to questions.
Mr. Barton. Thank you, Doctor. We now would like to hear
from the director of the Office of Radiation at the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Mr. Steven Page. Your
statement is in the record in its entirety and we ask you to
summarize it in 7 minutes.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN D. PAGE
Mr. Page. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
subcommittee. I will focus my brief remarks on the issues that
I understand are of particular interest to you and the
subcommittee this morning. The Energy Policy Act of 1992
directed EPA to set site specific public health and safety
standards for Yucca Mountain. That legislation also required
the National Academy of Sciences to conduct an analysis of the
scientific basis for the standards to be applied to Yucca
Mountain.
Since then, EPA has finalized its generic high level waste
standards and certified a deep geological repository that
complies with those standards. During the past 10 years, EPA
has been working closely with DOE, NRC, OSTP, and the National
Academy of Science to apply these standards and to develop site
specific standards for Yucca Mountain that are technically
sound and achievable, legally defensible, and above all, are
protective of public health and the environment.
In August 1999, we published our proposed Yucca Mountain
standards. We received approximately 800 public comments from
70 groups or individuals which we will be responding to in
writing at the time we issue our final standards. We received
extensive comments from DOE and NRC as well as other government
entities, the National Academy of Sciences, industry, and
environmental groups, tribal organizations, scientific
associations, and members of the general public.
Now, I would like to turn to the three main elements in our
proposed disposal standards: Individual protection, human
intrusion, and groundwater protection.
We received more comments on these three issues than on any
other aspect of the proposed rule. The individual protection
standard focuses on exposures to an individual whose lifestyle
is similar to people living today in the Yucca Mountain region
and who obtains drinking water and food from local sources. The
human intrusion standard focuses on evaluating the ability of
the repository to withstand a single intrusion event. And
third, the groundwater standard protects important natural
resources by focusing on the quality of the aquifer supplying
water to downgradient communities.
As directed by the Energy Policy Act, our proposed Yucca
Mountain standards are based on and generally consistent with
the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences. The
NAS commented that the individual protection standard of 15
millirem is within the risk range they recommended, and that
the human intrusion standard very closely follows their
recommendations.
However, there were some differences on the proposed
groundwater protection standard, which I would like to address
briefly.
The NAS said that a separate groundwater standard is
unnecessary and that it lacks a sound scientific basis.
However, the NAS also recognized that EPA does have the
authority to consider policy issues in setting a separate
groundwater protection standard. They recommended that we
clearly identify the standard as an implementation of policy.
Historically, this administration as well as previous
administrations have had a policy of protecting groundwater
resources that currently are being used, or that potentially
could be used as a source of drinking water. More than 50
percent of the U.S. population draws on groundwater for its
potable water supply. Proper cleanup of contaminated
groundwater is often difficult, if not impossible, to achieve
and it is very expensive if it can be done at all.
It is important to remember that the aquifer under Yucca
Mountain currently is used as source of drinking water.
Therefore, we proposed protection of groundwater at Yucca
Mountain to the same level as the maximum contaminant levels,
or the MCLs, for radionuclides that we established under the
authority of the Safe Drinking Water Act. As you may be aware,
virtually every State has taken steps to comprehensive
groundwater protection. Forty-one States have numeric or
narrative groundwater standards to protect their groundwater
currently. Groundwater protection is also applied to every
hazardous waste facility in this country.
The citizens of Nevada, particularly in a region growing as
rapidly as the Las Vegas metropolitan area should be extended
the similar type of protection for the disposal of spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in the Yucca
Mountain repository.
An important question that some commenters raise is the
need for a separate groundwater protection standard in addition
to at all-pathways individual protection standard. Our proposed
rule contains two complementary standards: A 15 millirem all-
pathways individual protection standard and a 4 millirem
groundwater protection standard. While the 15 millirem proposed
standard directly protects individuals who may receive exposure
from radionuclides released from the repository, the 4 millirem
level protects the groundwater resource, as we mentioned
earlier. This level of protection is derived from the MCLs that
are used to define acceptable supplies of drinking water.
Similarly, should groundwater that is or could be used for
drinking water be a significant pathway, present and future
users of the groundwater resource are adequately protected. By
extension, it provides protection to individuals who now live,
or may live in the future, in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain.
We understand that DOE still has to undergo the NRC
licensing process. However, to date, DOE's ongoing studies show
compliance with the proposed groundwater standard, although EPA
is still considering options and alternatives for the final
rule. DOE's costs for the facilities are driven by many
external influences, including EPA's proposed standard, all of
which strive to enhance repository safety. Other more notable
influences include the recommendations of the Nuclear Waste
Technical Review Board and the rigorous NRC licensing process.
Further, EPA's current schedule to issue the final standard
this summer does not adversely impact DOE's ability to make a
site recommendation as planned. Thank you again for inviting me
to testify before the subcommittee today, and I am happy to
answer any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Stephen D. Page follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen D. Page, Director, Office of Radiation
and Indoor Air, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
introduction
Good morning Chairman Barton and Members of the Subcommittee. It is
my pleasure to appear before you today to provide you with an update on
the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) environmental protection
standards for the proposed geologic repository at Yucca Mountain,
Nevada. I will update you on the status of our final standards and
focus on issues of interest to the Subcommittee.
I would like to begin by reviewing EPA's statutory authority for
issuing the Yucca Mountain standards and the process that we are
following in developing the standards. I also will discuss the National
Academy of Science's (NAS) technical recommendations, and some
important elements of our proposed standards, including the proposed
ground water protection standard for Yucca Mountain. Finally, I will
generally address the expected impact of our proposed standards on the
cost of the repository.
We believe that, as a matter of policy, the environmental
protection standards that EPA ultimately issues should consider four
primary principles: good science, cost-effectiveness, equity, and
pollution prevention.
statutory authority
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 [Pub. Law No. 102-486, 106 Stat.
2776, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 10141 n. (1994)] gives EPA the authority to
establish public health and safety standards for Yucca Mountain. This
Act states that EPA shall promulgate ``public health and safety
standards for protection of the public from releases from radioactive
materials stored or disposed of in the Yucca Mountain repository''
[Sec. 801(a)(1) of the Energy Policy Act]. The Act further states that
EPA's standards ``shall be the only such standards applicable to the
Yucca Mountain site.''
Prior to the enactment of the Energy Policy Act, EPA developed
generic radioactive waste disposal regulations that applied to all
radioactive waste disposal sites, including Yucca Mountain, which was
currently under consideration as the Nation's first geologic repository
for commercial nuclear waste. These regulations are found at 40 CFR
Part 191 (50 FR 38066, September 19, 1985). These generic disposal
regulations were applied to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in
New Mexico, which EPA certified in 1998, and is currently operating as
the Nation's first geologic disposal facility for transuranic
radioactive waste produced as a result of our Nation's defense
programs.
In 1987, EPA's generic disposal regulations were remanded by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit [NRDC v. EPA, 824 F 2d 1258
(1st Cir. 1987)], because, among other things, we had not properly
considered ground water protection. Also in 1987, the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act was amended (NWPAA, Pub. L. 100-203), selecting Yucca
Mountain as the sole site to be characterized for high-level
radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel disposal. Then, in 1992, the
WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (WIPP LWA, Pub L. 102-579) was enacted, which
directed EPA to finalize the generic disposal regulations at 40 CFR
Part 191 and certify whether WIPP was a suitable site for transuranic
waste disposal. The WIPP Land Withdrawal Act also exempted Yucca
Mountain from the 40 CFR Part 191 generic radioactive disposal
standards.
So, in 1992, with the enactment of the Energy Policy Act, EPA was
directed by Congress to set site-specific environmental protection
standards for Yucca Mountain. In doing so, EPA was to consider
technical recommendations from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS).
The NAS issued its Yucca Mountain report in 1995. Between 1995 and
1999, when EPA issued our proposed environmental protection standards
for Yucca Mountain, we held technical discussions with the NAS, as well
as numerous interagency discussions with DOE, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, and other federal agencies to discuss
important technical and policy issues associated with the development
of the standards.
standards development process
EPA published its proposed standards in the Federal Register on
August 27, 1999 (64 FR 46976). We are working on developing the final
rule, and we anticipate promulgating the final rule this Summer. We
received extensive comments from DOE and NRC, as well as other
government entities, NAS, industrial and environmental advocacy
groups,Tribal organizations, scientific associations, and members of
the general public. We received approximately 800 public comments from
70 groups or individuals which we will be responding to in writing at
the time we issue our final standards.
We have made every effort to consider all sides of the issues that
have come to our attention. This includes meetings with interested
parties and discussions within the Administration. A significant amount
of this time has been spent addressing scientific issues in
coordination with NAS, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, DOE
and NRC. EPA has worked diligently with these organizations to resolve
the many complex issues. We are currently in the final stages of
drafting the final rule and supporting documents for our internal
Agency review process. These documents include the preamble and rule,
extensive technical background information document, economic impact
analysis, and detailed response to comments document. Once these
documents have been reviewed within EPA, we will begin the inter-agency
review process administered by the Office of Management and Budget, in
which DOE and NRC will participate.
We are taking the necessary time to ensure that we prepare
standards that are technically sound, legally defensible, can be
implemented reasonably, and are protective of public health and safety
from potential releases from Yucca Mountain. During the public comment
period, and thereafter, EPA staff traveled to local communities to hold
public hearings and meetings to discuss the standards, EPA's role with
respect to the other agencies' roles, and to answer general questions
about the Agency's process for setting the standards. These meetings
were held with community and Tribal leaders, as well as with state and
county representatives.
national academy of science's recommendations and comments
The Energy Policy Act required us to contract with the NAS to
conduct a study to provide findings and recommendations on reasonable
standards for protection of the public health and safety. On August 1,
1995, the NAS released its report (``the NAS Report''), titled
Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards. Since 1995, EPA has
thoroughly studied the NAS report and the public comments received on
the report in order to propose the standards for Yucca Mountain. The
EPA's proposed Yucca Mountain standards are based on and consistent
with the recommendations of the NAS. Where our proposed rule departed
from a strict reading of the NAS report, we made a special effort to
explain our reasoning.
The development of the proposed rule for Yucca Mountain was guided
by the findings and recommendations of the NAS because of the special
role Congress gave the NAS and because of the NAS's scientific
expertise. We worked very hard to incorporate NAS's comments into our
proposed rule; and, in some cases we have used NAS's recommendations to
inform our policy decisions. In its comments on our proposed standards
for Yucca Mountain, the NAS is supportive of many aspects of our
proposed rule and provides recommendations for improvement in areas
where we disagree.
important aspects of epa's environmental protection standards
The three main elements proposed in our proposed standards are the
individual-protection standard, the ground water protection standard,
and the human intrusion standard. Each standard must be met for DOE to
be in compliance with our rule. Provided below are some of the issues
on which NAS and others had important comments.
The individual-protection standard focuses on exposures to an
individual whose lifestyle is similar to people living today in the
Yucca Mountain region, and who obtains drinking water and food from
local sources. The ground water protection standard protects important
natural resources by focusing on the quality of the aquifer supplying
water to downgradient communities. The human intrusion standard focuses
on evaluating the ability of the repository to withstand a single
intrusion event.
Individual Protection
In its proposal, EPA adopted an annual dose of 15 millirem from all
exposure pathways as protective. This is equivalent to the NAS-
recommended annual risk range of 1 x 10<SUP>-6</SUP> to 1 x
10<SUP>-5</SUP>, which translates to a dose range of 2 to 20 millirem/
year. The annual risk associated with EPA's proposed 15 millirem
standard and 4 millirem standard for ground water fall within this
range. In its comments on the proposed rule, NAS determined that the
individual protection standard proposed by EPA fell within the range of
values it suggested. In those comments, the NAS stated that, ``EPA
appears to recognize that its standard must be written in a way that
provides appropriate protection to the individuals who have the highest
potential for exposure . . . while avoiding unrealistic and
unnecessarily conservative assumptions for individual exposure.''
Human Intrusion
In our proposed rule, EPA followed the NAS recommendations on human
intrusion. We did this by including a scenario for inadvertent human
intrusion that is analyzed using similar methods as the undisturbed
case (i.e., without intrusion). We were prescriptive in specifying the
intrusion event in order to make implementation a more reasonable
process for DOE and NRC.
Regulatory Time Frame
We proposed that DOE meet numerical standards for 10,000 years
after repository closure. The 10,000-year limitation was set to reduce
speculation about the application of a regulation beyond 10,000 years
and to be consistent with previous regulation of the WIPP geologic
repository. In its report, NAS recommended that the period of
compliance should extend to a time when the potential peak risks may
occur (this could be several tens of thousands years for Yucca
Mountain). NAS determined that there is likely little difference
between its recommendation and EPA's proposed standard because although
EPA's standard applies for only 10,000 years, EPA also proposed to
require DOE to consider the performance of the disposal system at the
time of peak dose, whenever that occurs, as part of the environmental
review process.
ground water protection
The NAS report concluded that an individual protection standard is
sufficient for the protection of public health from radiation releases
from the Yucca Mountain repository. The NAS did, however, state that,
under the Energy Policy Act, EPA has the authority to set a separate
ground water standard as a matter of policy. EPA has proposed the
ground water standard as an implementation of policy which we plan to
articulate more clearly in the final rule.
Ground Water Protection
Ground water is one of our Nation's most precious resources; more
than 50 percent of the U.S. population draws on ground water for its
potable water supply. If radionuclides migrate into this valuable
resource, there are multiple routes of exposure. In addition to serving
as a source of drinking water, ground water may be used for irrigation,
stock watering, food preparation, showering, and various industrial
processes. Ground water contamination is also of concern to us because
of potential adverse impacts upon ecosystems, particularly sensitive or
endangered ecosystems. For these reasons, we believe it is a resource
that needs special protection. Therefore, we proposed a level of
protection of ground water at Yucca Mountain at the same level as the
maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) for radionuclides that we established
previously under the authority of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA).
As you know, EPA has a long-standing policy of emphasizing the
protection of ground water resources in other contexts from all sources
of pollution. We developed a formal Agency strategy in 1990. Key
elements of our ground water protection and cleanup strategy in other
contexts are the overall goals of preventing adverse effects on human
health and the environment and protecting the environmental integrity
of the Nation's ground water resources. Ground water should be
protected to ensure that the Nation's currently used and reasonably
expected drinking water supplies do not present adverse health risks
and are preserved to present and future generations. It should also be
protected to ensure that ground water does not interfere with the
attainment of surface-water-quality standards that are necessary to
protect the integrity of associated ecosystems.
The pollution prevention approach to protecting ground water
resources avoids requiring present or future communities to implement
expensive cleanup or treatment procedures. This approach also protects
individual ground water users. Moreover, absent the protections in our
proposed rule, EPA believes the ground water in aquifers around the
repository itself could be subject to expensive cleanup by future
generations if releases from the repository contaminate the surrounding
ground waters at levels that exceed the drinking water standards. A
guiding philosophy in radioactive waste management, as well as waste
disposal in general, has been to avoid polluting resources that
reasonably could be used in the future rather than imposing cleanup
burden on future generations.
Virtually every state has taken steps toward comprehensive ground
water protection. Forty-nine states have developed programs to protect
current ground water sources of drinking water through the Wellhead
Protection Program. Forty-one states have numeric or narrative ground
water standards to protect their ground water supplies. As EPA has said
in testimony to this Subcommittee before, the people of Nevada should
not be exposed to higher risks than the people in any other state in
the U.S. EPA believes that ground water in a region growing as rapidly
as the Las Vegas metropolitan area should be protected from pollution
``up front,'' rather than becoming polluted, and then forcing the
residents to bear the cost of the environmental cleanup afterwards.
An important question that has been raised by some commenters is
the need for the separate ground water protection standard, in addition
to the all pathways individual protection standard. Our proposed rule
contains two standards for disposal of spent fuel and high-level
radioactive waste in the Yucca Mountain repository: a 15 millirem all-
pathways individual protection standard, and a 4 millirem ground water
protection standard. It is critical to understand the relationship
between these two separate, but complementary, standards. We proposed
an all-pathways individual protection standard and a separate ground
water protection standard because it was our view that it was
appropriate to do so in order to comply with our statutory mandate to
promulgate ``public health and safety standards for protection of the
public from releases from radioactive materials stored or disposed of''
in the Yucca Mountain repository [Sec. 801(a)(1) of the Energy Policy
Act].
The 15 millirem standard is an all-pathways standard that directly
protects individuals who may receive exposure (through any pathway)
from radionuclides released from the repository. The 15 millirem all
pathways standard is the same standard that we included previously in
our generic standards for geologic repositories (40 CFR Part 191).
Should any pathways including a ground water pathway prove to be
significant, the all-pathways standard serves to limit radiation
exposures to affected individuals. However, should the ground water
pathway be the most significant source of exposure, then an all
pathways standard would allow groundwater concentrations that exceed 4
millirem/year.
The 4 millirem standard is the MCL, promulgated pursuant to the
Safe Drinking Water Act, and is used to define the allowable level in
drinking water. If ground water that is or could be used for drinking
water, among other uses, is a significant pathway, present and future
users of the ground water resource would be protected at the level of
the current drinking water standard by a ground water standard. By
extension, a ground water standard would provide this protection
(albeit indirectly) to the individuals who now live, or who may live in
the future, in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain. In its report on the
technical bases for Yucca Mountain standards, NAS identified ground
water as the pathway likely to lead to the greatest exposure of the
public and the environment to releases from the Yucca Mountain
repository.
With respect to radioactive waste disposal, we believe the
fundamental principle of inter-generational equity is important. We
should not knowingly impose burdens on future generations that we
ourselves are not willing to assume. Disposal technologies and
regulatory requirements are developed with the aim of preventing
pollution from disposal operations, rather than assuming that cleanup
in the future is an unavoidable cost of disposal operations today.
Designing a disposal system, and imposing performance requirements that
avoid polluting resources that reasonably could be used in the future,
therefore is a more appropriate choice than imposing cleanup burdens on
future generations. The approach to ground water protection in our
proposed regulation is consistent with our overall approach to ground
water protection: it limits the contamination of current and potential
sources of drinking water in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain.
In designing our proposed ground water protection standard, EPA
offered as much flexibility as possible, while still ensuring adequate
environmental protection. For example, to facilitate implementation of
the standard, we proposed the concept of a ``representative volume'' of
ground water in which DOE and NRC would project the concentration of
radionuclides released from Yucca Mountain for comparison against the
MCLs. In addition, we proposed the concept of a ``point of compliance''
whereby EPA would establish the area where the concentration of
radionuclides would be measured. Our proposed standards offered several
options and explained the rationale for each in detail.
Our proposed standard requires that DOE provide a reasonable
expectation that, for 10,000 years of undisturbed performance after
disposal, releases of radionuclides from the disposal system will not
cause the level of radioactivity from combined beta and photon emitting
radionuclides in the representative volume at the point of compliance
to exceed 4 millirem per year to the whole body or to any organ. Put
simply, under our proposal, DOE must provide a reasonable expectation
that the Yucca Mountain disposal system will meet the same levels as
the current MCLs for radionuclides under the Safe Drinking Water Act
(42 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 300f to 300j-26). We frequently require compliance
with the MCLs in our regulations.
When we developed the current MCLs in 1975, we based them on the
best scientific knowledge regarding the relationship between radiation
exposure and risk that existed at that time. In the near future, we
intend to update the existing MCLs based on a number of factors,
including the current understanding of the risk of developing a fatal
cancer from exposure to radiation; pertinent risk management factors
(such as information about treatment technologies and analytical
methods); and applicable statutory requirements. Particularly relevant
statutory requirements, in this context, are the requirements (1) that
MCLs be set as close as feasible to the Maximum Contaminant Level Goal
(MCLG) [42 U.S.C. Sec. 300g-1(b)(4)(B)] and (2) that revised drinking
water regulations provide for equivalent or greater human health
protection than the regulations they replace [42 U.S.C. Sec. 300g-
1(b)(9)].
Our preliminary analysis of the current MCLs, which are being
revised under a separate Agency rulemaking, indicates that, when
updated for the latest scientific understanding, the radionuclide
concentrations to meet the current MCLs mostly fall within the Agency's
range of acceptable risks of 10<SUP>-4</SUP> to 10<SUP>-6</SUP>. This
means that there will be no more than one in 10,000 to one in 1,000,000
chance of excess cancer deaths. This is not unique to Yucca Mountain,
as it is the risk range that has governed the Nation's drinking water
regulations for the last 25 years. Based on the statutory requirements
and the factors identified above, we proposed allowable concentrations
for the radionuclides of concern at Yucca Mountain at levels that are
comparable to current standards.
effects of our rule on the repository's costs and doe's schedule
An EPA draft study (which will be available when the final rule is
issued) indicates that EPA's proposed standards will not have a
significant impact on the cost of the repository. We support DOE's
efforts to design the repository in such a way as to prevent or to the
extent possible limit any releases from the repository in order to
avoid passing on the costs of clean up to future generations. We
understand that DOE still has to undergo the NRC licensing process;
however, to date, DOE's ongoing studies show compliance with the
proposed ground water standard, although EPA is still considering
options and alternatives for the final rule.
As our economic impact analysis for our final standards will
illustrate, DOE's costs for the facility are driven by many external
influences, including EPA's proposed standards, the recommendations of
the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board and the rigorous NRC licensing
process, all striving to enhance repository safety. A primary concern
relates to minimizing the technical uncertainties of modeling and
enhancing repository performance through certain engineered
enhancements to the repository design (e.g., an improved canister, drip
shields).
conclusion
Thank you again for inviting me to testify before the Subcommittee
today. I would be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Mr. Barton. Thank you, Mr. Page.
We now would like to hear from Dr. Crowley. Your statement
is in the record in its entirety and you are recognized for 7
minutes.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN D. CROWLEY
Mr. Crowley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for
the invitation to testify.
For the record, my name is Kevin Crowley. I am the director
of the National Research Council's Board on Radioactive Waste
Management.
BRWM was established by the National Academy of Sciences in
1958 to provide scientific and technical advice to the Federal
Government on the safe and responsible management of
radioactive waste. The BRWM recognizes the importance of the
Yucca Mountain radiation protection standards and has been
interacting in a cooperative spirit with EPA and the other
Federal agencies at this table to help ensure that these
standards are based on sound science.
As Mr. Page mentioned in his statement, the Energy Policy
Act of 1992 directed the EPA administrator to obtain advice
from the NAS on the technical basis for Yucca Mountain
standards. The NAS's advice to EPA was provided in the 1995
National Research Council report entitled ``Technical Basis for
Yucca Mountain Standards.'' That is this report which I will
refer to as the TYMS report in the remainder of my testimony.
After EPA issued its draft standards in August 1999, the
BRWM wrote another report to the EPA administrator that
compared those standards with the recommendations in the TYMS
report. The purpose of the comparison was to determine whether
EPA followed the recommendations in the TYMS report and if not
to suggest how EPA could modify its draft standards to make
them consistent.
The 1999 BRWM report concluded that EPA's draft standards
were consistent with the TYMS report in several important
respects, and I have reviewed those in my full written
testimony. The BRWM also identified several points of
disagreement, and I would like to focus the remainder of my
oral testimony on those three points.
The first significant point of disagreement concerns the
form of the standard. EPA proposes a standard that is based on
the dose that an individual may receive from repository
releases. The TYMS report specifically recommended against
basing the standard on dose, but instead recommended the
establishment of what it calls a risk-based standard. A risk-
based standard, a standard that is based on the likelihood of a
health effect; in this case, the likelihood of contracting a
fatal cancer from radiation releases from the repository.
The TYMS report noted that the question, what is an
acceptable risk, is a societal judgment to be established
through the rulemaking process. Once a risk level is
established, then a dose value can be derived using existing
scientific knowledge.
The adoption of a risk-based standard as recommended by the
TYMS report would have several benefits, and I would like to
list those. First, there would be clear traceability between
the numerical value of that standard and the public policy
decision on what is an acceptable risk.
Second, the standard would be more readily understood by
nonexperts, which could help promote more meaningful public
input to rulemaking and greater public confidence in the final
standards and recommendations for Yucca Mountain.
Third, this approach would promote consistency between the
Yucca Mountain standards and regulation for other hazards such
as toxic chemicals. And fourth, a risk-based standard would not
have to be revised by subsequent rulemaking as advances in
scientific knowledge improve our understanding of radiation
effects on human health.
The second point of disagreement concerns EPA's inclusion
of a groundwater standard in addition to an all-pathway
standard. The all-pathway standard, of course, also applies to
groundwater. The TYMS report recognized that groundwater is
likely to be the primary source of individual exposure to any
radioactive materials that escape from Yucca Mountain. And the
report found that an adequate set-all-pathways standard could
protect both individuals living near the repository and
populations distant from the repository, including those
populations that would use the groundwater.
Therefore, the report did not recommend a separate
groundwater standard. The 1999 BRWM report concluded that the
imposition of a separate groundwater standard may greatly
complicate the licensing process for Yucca Mountain and have a
negative impact on the protection of the public. I have
provided more extensive comments on this in my written
testimony. I hope we have a chance during the Q and A session
to talk about the groundwater standard in a little more detail.
The third and last point of disagreement concerns the time
period over which the standard should be applied. The main
concern identified in the BRWM report is an EPA requirement
that repository performance be examined beyond 10,000 years to
see if dramatic changes could be anticipated.
EPA provides no guidance as to what qualifies as a
``dramatic change,'' nor does it state the purpose of this
examination. The BRWM report notes that this aspect of the
standard will provide no real benefit to protection of the
public.
Yucca Mountain repository must isolate waste from the
environment for many millennia. It is essential that the
standard for this repository be scientifically sound. The
overall conclusion of the 1999 BRWM report is that the current
EPA draft standards fall short of this goal in some important
respects. The BRWM hopes that EPA will accept the suggestions
it has made for improvements in the proposed standards. That
concludes my oral remarks. Again, thank you very much for the
opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Kevin D. Crowley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kevin D. Crowley, Director, Board on Radioactive
Waste Management, National Research Council
Chairman Barton and subcommittee members, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before the Energy and Power Subcommittee to
testify on the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) draft
radiation protection standards for Yucca Mountain. I am the director of
the National Research Council's Board on Radioactive Waste Management
(BRWM), which was established by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
in 1958 to provide scientific and technical advice to the federal
government on the safe and responsible management of radioactive waste.
My testimony to the subcommittee today will focus on recent reports
from the BRWM and committees under its oversight that bear directly on
the question of radiation protection standards for Yucca Mountain. In
particular, I will discuss the findings and recommendations from two
reports: Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards, also known as
the ``TYMS report,'' which was published in 1995, and a 1999 BRWM
report entitled Comments on Proposed Radiation Protection Standards for
Yucca Mountain, Nevada by the Board on Radioactive Waste Management.
As you know Mr. Chairman, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 directed
EPA to promulgate radiation protection standards specifically for a
potential repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The Act directed the
EPA Administrator to obtain advice from the NAS on the technical bases
for radiation protection standards, and the Act further mandated that
EPA base its standards on the NAS recommendations.
To respond to this request, the National Research Council, the
operating arm of the NAS and National Academy of Engineering, appointed
a BRWM committee in early 1993 to provide advice to EPA on the
standards. The committee held a series of information-gathering and
deliberation meetings (many in Nevada) over a period of about two years
and issued its recommendations in the 1995 TYMS report.
In developing its recommendations, the TYMS committee was very
careful to distinguish between scientific and policy judgments. The
committee recognized that some elements of the standards could be
addressed using scientific data and understanding, whereas other
elements required societal value judgements. For example, the committee
recognized that there is no basis in science for establishing
acceptable radiation exposure limits but, rather, ``acceptability'' was
a societal value judgement that was best established through the
rulemaking process. Similarly, the TYMS committee noted that the time
period of applicability of the standards has both scientific and policy
aspects.
EPA published its draft radiation protection standards in the
Federal Register (64 FR 46976-47016) on August 27, 1999. The BRWM,
acting under its own initiative and with approval of the National
Research Council's governing board, decided to issue a report that
compared the draft EPA standards with the recommendations in the TYMS
report. The purpose of this comparison was to determine whether EPA
followed the recommendations laid out in the TYMS report and, if not,
to suggest how EPA could modify its draft standards to make them
consistent. The BRWM's report was submitted to the public docket during
the comment period for EPA's draft standards. This report reflected the
consensus of the BRWM and was approved for release by the National
Research Council after being subjected to the Research Council's review
process.
The BRWM found that EPA's draft standards were consistent with the
1995 TYMS report in several important aspects, the most significant of
which are the following:
<bullet> Who is Protected. The TYMS report recommended that the
radiation protection standard be applied to representative
individuals who have the highest risk from radiation releases
from the repository. EPA proposed a standard to protect
individuals living near the repository--using a reasonably
maximally exposed individual (RMEI)--that is broadly consistent
with the TYMS report's recommendation.
<bullet> Level of Protection. The TYMS report concluded that the
numerical value for the radiation protection standard was a
policy decision to be established through the rulemaking
process. EPA has used rulemaking to establish an ``all-
pathways'' standard. This standard sets an upper limit on the
exposure the RMEI can receive from radiation releases through
all potential release pathways, including groundwater and the
atmosphere. The numerical value of this standard proposed by
EPA falls within the range of values suggested in the TYMS
report.
<bullet> Human Intrusion. EPA follows the TYMS report's recommendations
that the standards should require active and passive
institutional controls to prevent human intrusion into the
repository in the near term; that the standard should be based
on explicitly defined assumptions about how human intrusion
could occur in the long term; and that the standard should set
limits on radiation exposure to individuals as a result of a
human intrusion that are no more stringent than the all-
pathways standard.
<bullet> Exposure Scenarios. The TYMS report concluded that there is no
scientific basis for predicting future scenarios by which
humans could be exposed to radiation from a Yucca Mountain
repository. Therefore, the report recommended that such
scenarios be established through the rulemaking process. EPA
has used rulemaking to define exposure scenarios based on the
state of society, human biology, and knowledge that exists at
the time of submission of the license application for the
repository.
There are also several elements of EPA's proposed standards that
are inconsistent with the recommendations in the TYMS report. My
testimony will focus on the three most important elements:
<bullet> risk- versus dose-based standards;
<bullet> the inclusion of a separate groundwater standard; and
<bullet> the time period over which the standard should be applied.
Risk- Versus Dose-Based Standards
EPA proposes a standard that is based on the dose an individual may
receive as a result of radioactive releases from the repository. The
TYMS report specifically recommended against basing the standard on
dose. Instead, the report recommended that the standard be based on the
risk to individuals of an adverse health effect from radiation
releases, and the report further recommended that rulemaking be used to
establish an acceptable risk level.
The TYMS committee recommended a risk-based standard for several
reasons. First, the committee recognized that a risk-based standard is
more understandable to the public than a dose-based standard and its
use would therefore promote more meaningful public involvement in what
truly is a public-policy decision. A risk-based standard can be
expressed as a simple probability of developing a fatal cancer--for
example, a standard that has a numerical annual risk value of
10<SUP>-4</SUP> would mean that an individual living near the
repository could have no greater than a 1 in 10,000 chance per year of
developing a fatal cancer from radiation releases from the repository.
A dose-based standard, in contrast, provides no indication of hazard
levels and is understandable only by experts. The proposed EPA all-
pathways dose standard of 15 millirems per year, for example, provides
no indication of the number of fatal cancers that could be expected in
a given year from repository releases.
Second, a risk-based standard for Yucca Mountain can be compared
directly to other risk-based standards, such as EPA's standards for
toxic chemicals, because they use common units of measurement. Also,
the magnitude of the risk value corresponds directly to the level of
hazard. For example, a 10<SUP>-5</SUP> (1 chance in 100,000) risk
standard for Yucca Mountain would provide the same level of public
protection as a 10<SUP>-5</SUP> risk standard for regulating a
particular toxic material, assuming of course that both standards were
based on the same health effect such as fatal cancers. EPA currently
regulates hazardous chemicals on the basis of risk, so the adoption of
a risk-based radiation protection standard for Yucca Mountain would
promote uniformity across EPA's family of regulations.
Third, a risk-based standard would not have to be revised by
subsequent rulemaking as advances in scientific knowledge improve our
understanding of radiation effects on human health. There have been
significant improvements in our understanding of radiation effects on
human health over the past few decades, and dose-based standards have
had to be adjusted as our knowledge has improved. There is reason to
believe that these improvements will continue and that adjustments to
dose-based standards will be necessary in the future. For a risk-based
standard, the level of acceptable risk would be established during
initial rulemaking. This level would not have to be changed if new
science indicated a change in the relationship between dose and health
effects.
EPA's use of a dose-based standard not only makes it difficult for
the public to provide meaningful input to the rulemaking process, but
it may also lower public confidence in the output from that process.
Take, for example, the disagreement between the EPA and U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (USNRC) over radiological criteria for
unrestricted use of nuclear sites. The EPA standard (based on 40 CFR
Part 191) is 15 millirems per year, whereas the USNRC regulation (10
CFR 20.1402) is 25 millirems per year with ALARA (as low as reasonably
achievable). Both agencies claim that their release limits are
protective of public health. What is the public to think when the two
federal agencies charged with protecting public health cannot agree on
what the protective limits should be? The reason the EPA's and USNRC's
limits are different is that each agency has a different starting point
for establishing the exposure limit values, and neither agency uses
risk to establish such limits.
EPA points out in the preamble to its draft standards that it was
directed by the Energy Policy Act to develop a ``dose-based standard.''
The TYMS report's recommendation that the form of the individual-
protection standard be based on risk does not preclude EPA from
expressing the numeric value of the standard in units of risk and in
derivative units of dose, so long as the risk value is clearly
understood as the underlying basis for the proposed dose standard. In
its 1999 report, the BRWM noted that such an approach ``would achieve
the aims of the TYMS report's recommendations and it would allow EPA to
meet its Congressional mandate.''
To summarize, the use of a risk-based standard in the Yucca
Mountain rule would have several benefits:
<bullet> there would be clear traceability between the numerical value
of the standard and the public policy decision on what is an
acceptable risk;
<bullet> the standard would be more readily understood by nonexperts,
which could help promote more meaningful public input to
rulemaking and greater public confidence in the resulting
regulations;
<bullet> this approach would facilitate uniformity of the standard with
regulations for other hazards such as toxic chemicals; and
<bullet> if a risk-based approach were implemented for all elements of
the Yucca Mountain standard, it would eliminate the current
problem with the groundwater element of the standard, which I
will discuss next.
The 1999 BRWM report noted that a risk-based standard would be more
difficult to implement than a dose-based standard, and that EPA might
find it far more difficult to ask the public about acceptable risk
levels than to follow established precedents. Nevertheless, a risk-
based standard was recommended both in the TYMS report and the 1999
BRWM report because it requires public involvement in what is
fundamentally a public-policy decision.
Inclusion of a Separate Groundwater Standard
EPA has included a standard for the protection of groundwater in
its proposed rule in addition to the all-pathways standard described
previously. The proposed groundwater standard appears to be designed to
protect both individuals living near the repository and the general
public living at some distance from the repository. The groundwater
standard is a holdover from EPA's 1985 disposal regulations (40 CFR
Part 191) and is taken directly from the EPA's safe drinking water
regulations (40 CFR Part 141).
In incorporating the groundwater standard into the Yucca Mountain
standards, EPA has made several modifications from the safe drinking
water regulations. First, the groundwater standard in EPA's safe
drinking water regulations applies to public water systems. For the
Yucca Mountain standards, EPA proposes to apply the groundwater
standard to a groundwater aquifer some 2,000 feet below the Earth's
surface at the Yucca Mountain site and at some as-yet undetermined
distance from the repository boundary--the point of compliance for
alternatives being proposed by EPA range from 5 to 30 kilometers (3 to
19 miles) from the repository boundary. The Yucca Mountain standard
also applies to a volume of groundwater in the aquifer rather than to
water delivered by a public water system--EPA has proposed a value of
1,285 acre-feet (about 420 million gallons) but has also asked for
comments on values that range from 10 to 4,000 acre feet (3 million to
1.3 billion gallons). The numerical value of the standard itself is
based on 40-year-old dosimetry and does not conform with current
international standards, and it represents a different level of risk
than the all-pathways standard of 15 millirems per year.
The TYMS committee recognized that groundwater is likely to be the
primary source of individual exposure to radioactive materials that
escape from Yucca Mountain, and that committee found that the all-
pathways standard would protect both local and distant populations.
Therefore, the TYMS committee did not recommend a separate groundwater
standard. The 1999 BRWM report concluded that the imposition of a
separate groundwater standard ``may greatly complicate the licensing
process [for Yucca Mountain] and have but a negligible impact on
protection of the public.''
The 1999 BRWM report concluded that there was no basis in science
for establishing a separate groundwater standard and recommended that
EPA either ``make more cogent scientific arguments to justify the need
for this standard,'' or if it wishes to establish a separate standard
as a matter of policy, that it ``explicitly state the policy decisions
embedded in the proposed standard and ask the public to comment on
those decisions.'' The 1999 BRWM report did not suggest what scientific
arguments EPA could use to justify a separate groundwater standard, but
I would like to close this part of my testimony by suggesting one
possible approach for resolving the BRWM's objections.
I believe that EPA could justify a separate groundwater standard by
adopting the risk-based approach recommended in the TYMS report. If EPA
based its Yucca Mountain standards on a SINGLE VALUE OF ACCEPTABLE
RISK, it could express that risk in terms of two elements, one for
radiation exposures through the groundwater pathway (a groundwater
standard) and one for exposures through all pathways (an all-pathways
standard). These two elements would be scientifically consistent so
long as they are based on a single value of acceptable risk. To
implement this approach, EPA would have to modify the dose values for
the all-pathways and groundwater elements that currently exist in its
proposed rule so that they represent the same value of acceptable risk.
Time Period Over Which the Standard Should be Applied
EPA proposes that the radiation protection standards at Yucca
Mountain be applied over a time period of 10,000 years. The TYMS report
concluded that (1) an arbitrary time limit such as 10,000 years has no
scientific basis, and (2) peak risks from radiation releases from the
repository are likely to occur beyond 10,000 years. The report
recommended compliance be assessed for the site's period of geologic
stability and noted that a technical assessment of the site should be
feasible for on the order of one million years. After the TYMS report
was published, EPA asked for public comment on the timescale issue, and
the majority of those commenting stated that compliance should be
assessed at the time of peak risk.
EPA has nevertheless retained its earlier recommendation for
quantitative compliance assessment only up to 10,000 years and has
given a series of policy and technical arguments for this choice. The
TYMS report excluded policy considerations from its deliberations on
this issue, but concluded, as noted previously, that ``there is no
scientific basis for limiting the time period to . . . 10,000 years.
Clearly, the 10,000-year limit is strictly a policy choice and should
be acknowledged as such'' by EPA. As the proposed standards currently
read, the policy origin of the limit is not evident.
Though compliance is assessed for a period of 10,000 years, EPA
requires that the repository performance be examined past this point
``to see if dramatic changes . . . could be anticipated'' (64 FR, p.
46993). Here EPA provides no guidance as to what qualifies as a
dramatic change or as to the purpose of the examination. The BRWM
believes that this aspect of the standard will provide ``no real
benefits to protection of the public.'' The BRWM noted that EPA ``may
wish to be more specific in providing guidance on how the analyses
beyond 10,000 years could be used in determining compliance'' or
explicitly pass this task to the USNRC.
In conclusion Mr. Chairman, a Yucca Mountain repository must
isolate waste from the environment for many millennia. It is essential
that the standard for this repository reflect the best thinking that
science has to offer. The overall conclusion of the 1999 BRWM report is
that the current EPA draft standards fall short of this goal in some
important respects. The BRWM hopes that EPA will accept the suggestions
it has made for improvements in the proposed standards.
This concludes my testimony to the committee. I would be happy to
clarify my comments or answer committee members' questions. Again,
thank you for the opportunity to testify.
Mr. Barton. Thank you. Let's do 7-minute question rounds,
but we will have numerous rounds. The Chair will recognize
himself first.
First, let me say that we cannot have a democracy if we do
not have debate. So it is good to have this panel here. But I
want the record to show, because of what our two Nevadans said,
this is not a hearing that is about politics. There is not one
member on this dais right now that is going to get any
political plus of sitting through 3 hours of technical details
about what the radiation standard or the groundwater standard
at Yucca Mountain ought to be. The members that will get
political support and send out press releases have already been
here--the two Nevadans. And they will send out press releases
saying they stood up to the Congress and they spoke in no
uncertain terms about how it shouldn't be Yucca Mountain, and
that is how should be.
But none of us are going to send out press releases about
how we sat through 3 hours of some of the most boring
information you are ever going to have to listen to because we
want what is good public policy, and that is why we are here.
That is why this subcommittee is here is because this is an
issue that is very important. If you assume that each Member of
Congress represents about half a million people you have
members that represent 3 million people, or 3 percent of the
American population sitting at this hearing. And we are all in
this together.
As Congresswoman Berkley said, we are for America, and I
happen to think that the United States of America should have a
comprehensive nuclear policy that includes a repository, or a
depository, where the high level nuclear waste can be safely
stored. Now, we are not technical experts; you folks are. So we
have got to ask you some questions, and we have got to have
this debate. After 18 years, I was a White House Fellow in the
Department of Energy in 1981 and 1982, and participated in
policy debates at a minor level about what has come to be known
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. Eighteen years later I am
the subcommittee chairman and we are basically having the same
debate, although at, admittedly, a higher technical level. So I
just want to get that on the record before we get into the
questions.
Now, Mr. Page, you represent the Environmental Protection
Agency. Are you the decisionmaker on this separate groundwater
standard that is currently pending?
Mr. Page. No, sir, I am the office director of the Office
of Radiation Indoor Air. Carol Browner, my boss, will be taking
the recommendation forward to the administration, and that is
where that will get resolved.
Mr. Barton. Who made the decision within the EPA to go to a
separate groundwater standard?
Mr. Page. That decision was across EPA looking at what we
do in the rest of our environmental programs. And it is
consistent with that.
Mr. Barton. Did you have any influence in that decision? My
question is, are you a decisionmaker or are you a message-
giver?
Mr. Page. I participate in the meetings where the decisions
are made.
Mr. Barton. So you are at least high enough in the EPA that
you have some influence in the decisions?
Mr. Page. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barton. That is good. That is not bad.
Now, does EPA have a problem with the concept of an all-
pathways standard?
Mr. Page. No, sir, we recommend an all-pathways standard.
Mr. Barton. I know there is a disagreement about the level
of all-pathways standard. I think the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission recommended 25 millirems and the EPA all-pathways is
15; is that correct?
Mr. Page. That is correct. And I would also note that the
National Academy of Sciences recommended their range, which is
consistent with ours, with EPA's.
Mr. Barton. So we could have a real good debate between 15
and 25, in the spirit of the congressional give-and-take, we
would agree on 20. But that is a different debate. But there
appears to be, in the academic community, in the technical
community, not too much support for the EPA position that there
should be a separate groundwater standard. And if you look in
the law, there is no requirement for that. It appears that it
is an EPA policy decision that, in addition to protecting
public health and safety, the Carol Browner administration has
decided to also protect resources. Am I wrong in making that
last assumption?
Mr. Page. The protection of groundwater policy is the
policy of this administration as it was previous
administrations. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barton. But it is not a Federal law? You have got to
protect public health. You do not have to necessarily protect
resources?
Mr. Page. Correct.
Mr. Barton. But you have decided that it is in the public
good to protect resources, and that is a good public policy.
Mr. Page. Especially as these resources are being used as
sources of drinking water, which these are.
Mr. Barton. Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, la-dee-da-
dee-da, which I think is in the 1970's, the groundwater
standard has been implemented, so that it is enforced and
measured at the tap; is that not correct? Whatever the standard
is, you regulate it and monitor it at the tap where the water
comes out and people actually get ready to drink it.
Mr. Page. That is true for drinking water.
Mr. Barton. Now, the standard that is pending, as I
understand it, you are setting this 4 millirem not at the tap
but at the source; is that not correct?
Mr. Page. That is correct.
Mr. Barton. Okay. Now, is it not technically possible--
let's assume because it is a big assumption that we agree that
there ought to be a 4 millirem standard for groundwater,
wouldn't it be just as defensible to enforce it at the tap as
opposed to at the source?
Mr. Page. We believe----
Mr. Barton. I am not real interested in what you believe
right now. I am interested though in whether, if we agreed with
the 4 millirem that we could enforce it, you know, where the
people are actually getting ready to drink it as opposed to
wherever it might emigrate from?
Mr. Page. Mr. Chairman, EPA and many, many states use the 4
millirem to protect future or current sources of drinking
water. It is true what you are saying that you can regulate
that at the tap. That is the bottom line, if you will. But
prevention in this case very often, especially in the case of
Yucca Mountain, if you can develop designs that are reasonable
and can prevent the initial pollution of the resource----
Mr. Barton. But that is not a technical necessity nor is it
a Federal law.
Mr. Page. That is a policy call, sir.
Mr. Barton. That is an EPA policy call. Does anybody else
in the Clinton administration, other than EPA, support that
policy call? Does the Department of Energy? Does the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission? Does the Department of Agriculture? Does
the Department of Defense? Do any of them support that EPA
policy call?
Mr. Page. I guess I haven't polled all of those agencies
that you named. I can tell you that many, many States who carry
out----
Mr. Barton. I did not ask you about the States, I asked you
about within the Clinton administration, because we have--I
shouldn't admit this, but that was kind of a set-up question
because we can put into the record that all of those agencies,
I think all of those agencies do not support that.
Mr. Page. I can tell you that, from the Department of
Energy and from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and others
who comment on the Yucca proposal, they expressed their
concerns with that policy. And that is what we have up ahead of
us.
Mr. Barton. I think they opposed it, other than expressed
concerns with it, but that is, again, semantics. The Chair
would recognize Mr. Boucher for 7 minutes.
Mr. Boucher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
commend our witnesses this morning for informing us about these
technical and policy matters. I agree with the chairman that
this is where we earn our salary. There is not a lot of
political benefit in listening to this, but it is
extraordinarily important information, nonetheless.
In the rank of importance, I think the budget is fairly far
up the scale. Dr. Itkin, I would like to engage in a discussion
with you about that.
In 1982, in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, we established
the Nuclear Waste Fund. It is comprised of a fee of 1 mill per
kilowatt, which the utilities are required to pay into the
fund. They pass that charge along to their ratepayers. And in
the years that this fund has been in existence, that 1 mill per
kilowatt has accumulated $10 billion in principal for the fund.
That $10 billion in principal has accrued $4 billion in
interest. So $14 billion in potentially expendable funds have
been made available through the Nuclear Waste Policy Fund. But
of that $14 billion, Congress has appropriated to the DOE only
$5 billion for your various activities.
The balance of that fund remains subject to appropriations,
and in the current state of play under the current law, you
would only have access to the balance of it through the grace
of the appropriation process in the Congress.
Now, if you look at that appropriations process, starting
in 1996, the administration's requests have not been met by the
congressional appropriations. In fact, in the year 1996, the
administration's request was $630 million. Congress provided
exactly half of that amount, $315 million. And in each
succeeding year since 1996, Congress has appropriated less than
the administration has requested for your activities to prepare
Yucca Mountain.
And it appears that the trend is continuing even today. We
are prepared to bring the energy and water appropriations bill
to the floor of the House next week, and that bill, once again,
falls short of the administration's request.
I think Congress has a clear responsibility to meet our
need to keep this program on track, and I really question
whether this appropriations history complies with that
responsibility. I would welcome your comments concerning the
general subject.
Let me just phrase a precise question to you. The
Department of Energy historically has made projections of the
extent to which it will be able to continue its work in a
timely fashion, given the appropriations that you receive. And
you make several assumptions as you make projections of your
ability to perform. One of those assumptions is that the
continual trend of appropriations will be pursued, that it will
continue and that you will get roughly the same level of
appropriations that you have.
The other assumption that you have made for purposes of the
projection is that the balance of the Nuclear Waste Fund will
not be made available to you. That legislation, such as H.R.
45, will not be enacted into law, and that you would continue
to have to get annual appropriations.
Now, given those assumption, and given the appropriations
history that we have seen, and given the level of
appropriations that you might reasonably be able to expect for
fiscal year 2001, at what point in time would you anticipate
that the Department of Energy is going to fall behind its
schedule for the activities that are necessary to finish the
design and construction of Yucca Mountain, to load Yucca
Mountain, and then to engage in the sealing of the repository
under the schedule that you currently have? At what point in
time do you think if these trends continue that you are going
to fall behind schedule?
Mr. Itkin. Thank you very much, Congressman, I am very
pleased to address the subject. It is a very important one for
our agency, and you have correctly characterized the lack of
funding to the office in order to carry out its mission of
characterizing the Yucca Mountain site.
In the short term, we are somewhat gratified by at least
the initial reaction of Congress toward our appropriation. I
would like to preface that by saying that before we went to the
Congress, my office went to the department and to the
administration asking for a budget proposal that was 25 percent
higher than what we had gotten traditionally. Our current
budget this year is $351 million. We asked the administration
for $437.5 million. We made our case and the administration
did, in fact, recommend to the Congress the full $437.5
million.
What that level would do would be allow us to continue and
to finish the site suitability studies, the scientific work
necessary for a Presidential decision, and would allow us to
catch up and to prevent any further delay in the next process
if there is a positive recommendation. And that is in the
licensing stage. So in order to ensure that we do not fall
behind further, we need the full $437.5 million.
The House Energy and Water Development Appropriations
Subcommittee did give us a mark which is far higher than the
House has ever done before of $413 million. I think that they
were under a misimpression that at $413 million, it would fully
fund our program. It will fully fund making a decision next
July. In other words, we will have the resources necessary to
do the scientific work to inform the Secretary, and if he so
chooses, to inform the President. And we think that is very,
very important.
But it will not allow us to catch back up to the deferred
work that we have had to do because of these cuts with
licensing application.
So if I have an opportunity to get on my soap box, I am
asking Congress for the full $437.5 million. And I am hoping
that the other body will, in fact, provide with us a higher
appropriation and hopefully get this thing resolved in
conference.
Mr. Boucher. But you are concerned that if you do not get
the full appropriation, that fact will result in delay; is that
correct?
Mr. Itkin. Yes, if we get the $413 million, we will make
our fiscal year 2001 milestone, but we will probably have to
defer perhaps some months, maybe a year, getting our license
application submitted and approved. Which I think from many
Members of Congress, it is not these interim points that are
important, it is a desire by at least 2010 for us to accept the
waste. And I am trying to keep that schedule, and I will--if I
get the 437.5, we will be able to do the Presidential
recommendation and also provide the necessary makeup work that
is required so that we can get a license application on time.
Mr. Boucher. Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me just for
one additional question.
Mr. Barton. Sure.
Mr. Boucher. My really deep concern is that as we approach
the time and perhaps the year 2003 when construction of the
facility is scheduled to begin, and your costs are going to
escalate dramatically, that we are going to really find a
crunch, and you are going to have difficulty moving forward at
that time, unless you get access to the full fund. Is that a
realistic concern or are you less concerned for some reason?
Mr. Itkin. Congressman, it is a real concern that we have
to adjust the outyear funding. We are trying to moderate some
of our needs. I have taken the initiative of trying to develop
a modular procedure in the construction activities that would
tend to smooth out the cost so it wouldn't be such a burden or
spike in certain years. But even doing that, we will need to
work together, the administration and the Congress, to come out
with a new funding mechanism to deal with this problem, because
we will probably need, at the minimum, two to three times our
current funding levels.
And having said that, it becomes--you mentioned about
having full access to the fund. You know as well as I, there is
approximately $10 billion, $9-, $10 billion sitting there, and
that it is being used both by the Congress and the
administration to take care of other matters, to so-call
balance the budget.
Mr. Barton. I am sure you are aware that the House-passed
bill freed the waste depository fund. You are aware of that?
Mr. Itkin. I appreciate the House doing that. The law of
the Congress requires both Chambers to act in unison. That did
not occur. I am a legislator, at least a State legislator for
26 years. I understand how the legislative process works.
But having said that, I want to work with you, the
committee and the subcommittee, and the Congress in general
because we do have to solve this problem.
Mr. Barton. Next year, assuming that we are here and that
you are there, and we are doing this as an early hearing before
we move another waste depository bill, will the administration,
if you are still a part of it, put a proposal on the table that
addresses the issue that my good friend from Virginia has put
on the table? In other words, we never saw a Clinton
administration proposal this year that solves the funding
problem. We got a lot of reports about all the problems they
saw with our way to solve it. But thankfully, Mr. Dingell, Mr.
Boucher and Mr. Hall worked with Mr. Bliley and myself, and we
went ahead and went to the Budget Committee and the
Appropriations Committee and the Speaker of the House, and our
bill solved that problem.
So can we expect to see reciprocal problem solution to this
funding issue next year if you are still in charge?
Mr. Itkin. Mr. Chairman, we are working on that problem. We
recognize for our own future well-being in carrying out our
mission as directed by the Congress, that we will have to
resolve this. I cannot speak for the next administration in
terms of what they----
Mr. Barton. I said if you are still where you are. I am not
tying your hands to the future administration. But my guess is
that you are going to be here next year, even if there is a
change in political calculus at the White House because it
takes a while for those transitions to occur.
Mr. Itkin. Well, I will go on record saying it needs to be
changed and I want to be part of that solution.
Mr. Barton. That is mighty big of you.
Mr. Boucher. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence
and I yield back.
Mr. Barton. In order of appearance, we are going to go with
Mr. Shimkus unless there is another member that has a pending--
Mr. Shimkus for 7 minutes.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am shocked that the
ranking member started at 1996, and I did not have any of the
numbers from 82 to 95 to be able to evaluate the budgetary
aspects of the whole program. But I would like to join my
colleague on the mandatory process of the appropriation bills.
And if we can find a way to rob Peter to pay Paul to make folks
better served, understanding budgetary constraints, and look
for waste fraud and abuse in other areas of the Federal
Government, then I would be happy to join with him to address
those issues.
First of all, I want to ask a question to all of you at
table. Do any of you have any black helicopters? Do you know in
your agencies is there any black helicopters? No? Any of the
roofs painted blue, do you know, on any of the buildings?
Because of the different agencies involved, and there was a
statement I think by Dr. Crowley that you are working in a
cooperative spirit. Does that mean that you are in collusion
with each other to try to deceive the public and rain bad
science and ill-gotten gains from those who are participating,
destroying the health and the welfare of the citizens of this
great country? No?
For the record, everybody is shaking their head ``no'' for
all of these questions. And for all of those conspiracy
theorists out there, I am glad to say that you are on record
saying that there is no great conspiracy to game the system for
whatever organization--nefarious organization that may be out
there, and that you are all working diligently trying to move
public policy in a direction that will, in the end, protect the
safety, health and welfare of all the citizens in this Nation.
Can I make that assumption to you all? Is that correct? And
for the record, everybody is shaking their head ``yes,'' and I
appreciate that.
That is kind of in response to my colleagues who made some
implications based upon past practices and current practices
that--may be current practices. And I think that the fact that
we have in this debate and the fact that there is disagreement
and that we have outside people being brought in to review the
technical aspects, is a good response to my colleagues who may
not believe that we are attempting to move public policy in a
scientific manner, and that is probably why it has taken us so
long to get through this process to begin with.
I have been told and I tried to confirm this during some of
the testimony, that if you work in the Library of Congress for
a year you are subject to 700 millirems in that year. If you
work in this building for a year, probably 300 millirems.
Does--because of the millirem standard the EPA is proposing for
groundwater, wouldn't you think it would be in the EPA's best
interest to call for the immediate vacation of all the Federal
buildings in Washington, Mr. Page, based upon those standards?
Mr. Page. No, sir, I don't think EPA would agree with that.
Mr. Shimkus. Maybe your building we might agree. No, I am
just joking. But the--I think that is really the debate,
especially on this issue of groundwater; and I don't have all
the terminologies correct, but the other type of water
evaluations and----
Mr. Crowley. All-pathway standards.
Mr. Shimkus. Obviously, that is an area of debate and a
difference.
And, Dr. Crowley, can you talk to me about--and I think it
was the National Academy of Sciences that said the groundwater
issue raised by the EPA, there is no basis in science. Can you
elaborate on that?
Mr. Crowley. Thank you for asking that question. I can.
The issue of a groundwater standard, conceptually, it is
really very difficult to understand, even for experts. So I
took the liberty of scratching down some notes here so that I
was very careful in how I answered the question. What I am
going to do is, I am going to give you a short answer. Then I
will give you a slightly longer rationale for it.
The short answer, the reason that the groundwater standard
is not based in science is that if you adequately protect
people with an all-pathway standard you protect groundwater as
a resource. In other words, you do not need a separate
groundwater standard. Let me explain why that is true.
Firstly, you should understand that when the National
Academy undertook its work, the committee that was charged with
that, the TYMS Committee,was actually charged with asking--it
was asked to recommend standards to protect people, not
groundwater. The TYMS Committee concluded that an all-pathways
standard would protect people if it was set at an adequate
level and that an additional groundwater standard was not
needed. The committee reasoned if you protect the people with
an all-pathway standard then at each leg of the pathway, the
groundwater leg of the all-pathway standard, the atmospheric
leg of the all-pathway standard would be protective.
The phrase groundwater is a resource as EPA uses it in the
standard. I personally interpret that to mean groundwater for
future human use. As a resource, we are going to use it either
now or in the future. EPA notes that future users include both
individuals living close to and some distance from the
repository who might use groundwater from Yucca Mountain. In
other words, the EPA groundwater standard is also designed to
protect people.
EPA has proposed, as you know, to establish two standards,
the all-pathways standard and a separate groundwater standard.
The important things about these standards is each is really
based upon a different level of risk. In other words, you are
providing a different level of protection to people who might
be exposed to radiation from a particular pathway. This really
has very important implications because it means that for some
radionucleides the groundwater standard actually provides more
protection to the groundwater than an all-pathway standard
provides to people. But this is illogical because EPA states
that it is protecting groundwater as a resource for use by
people. So it really doesn't make sense to provide more
protection for groundwater than the people who consume that
groundwater. The TYMS Committee concluded that if you set an
adequate all-pathway standard you have protected people.
Mr. Barton. Would the gentleman yield? Is there any
correlation mathematically between the 15 millirem all-pathway
standard that EPA recommends and the 4 millirem groundwater
standard? Is there any way to compare the two standards or are
they noncongruent?
Mr. Crowley. I will take a swing at that, and perhaps Mr.
Page could also take a swing at that.
The 15 millirem all-pathways standard and the 4 millirem
groundwater standard really have different pedigrees. They come
from different parts of EPA. The 15 millirem standard comes
from 40 CFR 191. The 4 millirem groundwater standard comes from
the Safe Drinking Water Act. They are related in a very gross
way but not in a very exact way. If you look at the details of
the groundwater standards, you find that the different
radionucleides within that standard provide different levels of
protection.
Mr. Barton. Mr. Page, you want to comment on that? I want
to yield back to Mr. Shimkus if he----
Mr. Shimkus. That is fine. I just don't know if I had any
idea what he just said.
Mr. Barton. That is why I am the chairman and you are not.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am done, but I want
to ask just this one other question.
Mr. Burr. Mr. Page, then Mr. Paperiello wanted to say
something.
Mr. Shimkus. That is fine. Mr. Page.
Mr. Page. Sure. The 15 millirems all pathways is designed--
it has a risk base to it. And what it is designed to do is land
where EPA typically carries out environmental regulations for
hazardous waste, drinking water the 10<SUP>-</SUP>\4\,
10<SUP>-</SUP>\6\ risk for cancer.
Mr. Barton. And to convert, 10<SUP>-</SUP>\4\ is 1 in
10,000 and 10<SUP>-</SUP>\6\ is 1 in a million.
Mr. Page. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Page. The 4 millirem as well, if you look at the MCLs
and look at what they were based on back in 1975 when they were
developed, what you have there if you look at all the
radionucleides, all the radioactive materials that could be in
the drinking water, they also land in that range, in that risk
range. Most of them do. The 10<SUP>-</SUP>\4\,
10<SUP>-</SUP>\6\. So there is the correlation that I think
that you were asking.
Mr. Shimkus. We are going to let Dr. Paperiello answer, but
I want to follow up on one question. Four millirems at the
source, 15 millirem at the faucet, is there any--is there--do
we see an increase in radioactivity, an increase as the stuff
gets into the groundwater, the groundwater flows toward the
faucet? Is there a possibility of more millirems being glommed
on as it goes downstream to make it obviously more powerful?
My position is, you would think there would be a higher
standard at the site because there is going to be some
dissipation down the stream. But, in this case, you have a
higher standard at the source and a weaker standard at the
faucet. Is that--can I make that assumption?
Mr. Page. Let me respond to your question. I think you are
raising a point that was raised a lot in the comments that we
had on our rule, and I think it is a good one.
First of all, the 4 millirem, again, at the risk of
belaboring the issue, the 4 millirem is the level of protection
we offer all across the United States around hazardous waste
site facilities' wellhead protection, that we don't want that
amount of more than that amount going into the resource.
Now, Congressman, you said, what about close to the site?
How about further away? It is possible that somebody can draw
up because of how a plume has behaved in moving downgradient
that it is possible that you could have something show up that
is higher away from the site than it is close to the site.
Normally, you would expect it to dilute, et cetera, but these
travel in plumes; and this is part of the uncertainty that has
to be taken into account.
The point that I would make is the--the important question
I think that you have to ask on the 4 millirem, is it prudent,
you know, by cost or feasibility to protect at that level? That
has to be judged by that standard. And is it worthwhile
offering that amount of prevention? Because as that plume moves
down and hits the tap, the people at the tap are going to have
to pay for the cost. If that hits there and it is over the 25
or the 15 issues, the people have to pay the tap, have to pay
the cost of the cleanup.
Mr. Shimkus. I know I am way over, but if Mr. Paperiello--
and I will----
Mr. Barton. Mr. Paperiello answer. Then we are going to go
to the long-patient Mr. Burr.
Mr. Paperiello, if you want to answer the question for Mr.
Shimkus.
Mr. Paperiello. Let me talk about the drinking water
standard, which, of course, the commission objects to. I want
to make something clear. It is not a 4 millirem standard. The
MCLs are based on old science which is inconsistent with
current science. In fact, the current science which EPA has put
into Federal Guidance 13, the doses vary by a factor of almost
a hundred. And, in fact, for Yucca Mountain, the MCLs, not 4
millirem, is the standard, corresponds at the end of 10,000
years for the most mobile isotope to a dose of two-tenths of a
millirem per year.
Congressman you are correct. The average background to a
citizen of the United States is about 300 millirems from
natural background. It can vary a lot easily, a factor of 2.
Our standard is 25. If you use the models, the linear model of
risk, it is in the right risk range in the National Academy.
Mr. Barton. Can I ask you, just--if the average around the
country is 300 millirems, do we know what the average is in the
Yucca Mountain area? Is it 300?
Mr. Paperiello. Congressman, we do know that. I don't know
it off the top of my head.
Mr. Barton. Whatever it is--and we can get that for the
record--are these standards that we are debating today, are
they going to be in addition to the normal background naturally
occurring radiation that the folks are exposed----
Mr. Paperiello. They would be additional to the normal
background.
Mr. Barton. So is it technically possible--let's--assuming
that the--if the national average is 300, it is possible that
the Yucca Mountain average is 200. So if you add 15 or 25 or 40
or whatever, they are still going to be under the national
average. It is also possible they could be over if it is in the
background.
Mr. Paperiello. Let me give you an example. I am going to
be in Denver next week. Denver is a mile above sea level. It is
also in the middle of the Rocky Mountains. That has been the
typical example in radiation protection, any field of a high
natural background where the doses are approximately a hundred
to 150 millirem higher than what I get living in the DC area.
Mr. Barton. So that is 450.
Mr. Paperiello. That is right. There is no empirical
evidence that that represents a risk to the citizens of Denver.
I am just giving you a perspective. I know all the theory--I
know theory. I know how to derive the risk from radiation. It
is my field. I am just giving you a fact that the--empirically
you don't see an effect.
Mr. Barton. We would like to have for this subcommittee's
record what the natural occurring background radiation is in
Yucca Mountain. I think that is--if we are going to get into
this millirem debate, that would be a good number to have.
Mr. Paperiello. I will see what I can do, Congressman.
[The response had not been received at time of printing.]
Mr. Barton. Continue on your answer to Mr. Shimkus. Are you
concluded with it?
Mr. Paperiello. I just want to point out the fact that the
groundwater standards if it were 4 millirem would be one thing,
but it is not 4 millirem. It varies widely because of the old
science that was used. And, in fact, for Yucca Mountain it will
translate effectively into a two-tenths of a millirem standard.
Mr. Barton. Mr. Burr.
Mr. Burr. I won't even pretend that I understood everything
that you said, but I believe I heard you to say that there is
currently new science available, but the EPA, to set the
standard, used old science because it made it work out in their
behalf, is that----
Mr. Paperiello. For a variety of reasons, they have chosen
to stick with the old science.
Mr. Burr. Is that common in the scientific community when
there is new science available to revert to old science to come
to new conclusions?
Mr. Paperiello. In the scientific community, no. However,
when you get into law and regulations, the time that it takes
to change can allow old science--laws and regulations based on
old science to remain in effect until somebody can affect a
change.
Mr. Burr. Clearly, the EPA is concerned with law because
Mr. Page said in his opening statement--I didn't catch the
whole phrase--that it was legally defensible. So, you know, I
am sure that there is some consideration that has already been
put to that.
Let me move to Dr. Itkin real quick, because I am concerned
and inquisitive on the recompete decision. It is my
understanding that the policy says you can recompete or extend
contracts, correct?
Mr. Itkin. Yes. That is correct.
Mr. Burr. Tell me where TRW has openly underperformed in
their 10-year contract.
Mr. Itkin. I am not going to suggest that TRW did
underperform. There is Department policy, and also directives
of the Congress and appropriations act, that we recompete these
contracts when those contracts expire. And TRW had a 10-year
contract from 1991, and their contract will expire in February
of 2001.
Mr. Burr. But the agency has the ability to extend that.
Mr. Itkin. We could have extended it. We felt that there
was no good time to do this----
Mr. Burr. Was that the recommendation of you and your team,
that this contract be recompeted?
Mr. Itkin. It was the recommendation of the Department to
do that.
Mr. Barton. Would the gentleman yield on that point?
Mr. Burr. I would yield.
Mr. Barton. You gave a very careful answer to that. Now, I
am told that it was the internal recommendation that it not be
recompeted, that it actually be extended and that the Secretary
of Energy overruled that, and it is the Secretary of Energy who
made the decision against the recommendation internally to
recompete. Have I been told correctly or have I been told
incorrectly?
Mr. Itkin. Let me say that there were differences of
opinion within the internals of the Department that the--the
decision was made by the Department, and I interpret that to
mean the Secretary concurred in that decision.
Mr. Barton. Was this decision made before you became--you
obtained the position that you currently hold or----
Mr. Itkin. No, this decision was made subsequent to my
appointment.
Mr. Barton. Subsequent.
Mr. Itkin. Subsequent.
Mr. Barton. That means after.
Mr. Itkin. After.
Mr. Barton. Let's talk Texan here. Mr. Burr has raised
this. You know, sometimes we have to be a little pushy. And I
am going to be a little bit pushy. What was your recommendation
to the Secretary on recompete or extend?
Mr. Itkin. I was concerned about it, but I had mixed
feelings as to which way to go. Because, as a new person in
this position, I was concerned about what the effects might be
to the operation of the activity.
Mr. Barton. You share the concerns that I expressed in my
opening statement.
Mr. Itkin. Yes, but I have been now feeling--after managing
the program through the recompetition, as we go to
recompetition, I feel that my fears were not called for.
Mr. Barton. Before the decision was made to recompete, did
you make a recommendation to the Secretary on recompete or
extend?
Mr. Itkin. There were discussions that----
Mr. Barton. Did you make a recommendation, either verbally
or in writing?
Mr. Itkin. I don't remember personally making that
recommendation to the Secretary, although there were concerns
about recompetition.
Mr. Barton. So you made no recommendation.
Mr. Itkin. We basically made the--entered into discussion
as to the pros and cons of such recompetition.
Mr. Barton. You personally--the office that you represent
made no recommendation. The Secretary of Energy just had to
take--call these concerns, and then he made the decision. He
got no recommendations, he got pros and cons, and then he made
the decision. As opposed to you sending him a decision memo
initially----
Mr. Itkin. We did not send him anything in writing, as I
recall, in terms of a formal recommendation. There may have
been some internal discussions.
Mr. Barton. Did anybody within the Department of Energy
make a written recommendation to the Secretary whether to
recompete or renegotiate--or extend?
Mr. Itkin. One moment.
Not to my knowledge. I am told--I checked with my deputy to
make sure that he was not--may have been knowledgeable. To the
best of our knowledge, there was no formal recommendation not
to recompete.
Mr. Barton. So there were no recommendations yes or no. It
was simply a debate, pros and cons, and then the Secretary took
that debate and he made the decision.
Mr. Itkin. There was a discussion about the concerns raised
about what recompetition might do. We also, on the same point
looked at when we would recompete, what the problems would be
in the future. And it was the Secretary's feeling that the
Department should observe the departmental policy and that
the--and also respond to congressional directives which have
repeatedly been placed in the appropriations documents about
going ahead and recompeting.
Mr. Barton. I guarantee you there is no congressional
directive to recompete this contract at this time.
Mr. Itkin. I can't say that.
Mr. Barton. I can say that. There is no congressional
directive to recompete this particular contract.
Now, we have done everything we could to direct the
Secretary of Energy to recompete the Los Alamos contract with
the University of California but not on this one. So when the
Secretary is here next week, if we have a chance--it is going
to be a broader subject, but I will ask him this question, too.
But from all of your hemming and hawing and dodging and
weaving and bobbing and everything, I still take it that you
would admit if we were under oath, which we are not, this is
not the oversight subcommittee, that it was the Secretary's
decision to recompete this contract?
Mr. Itkin. Let me say this, in our Department the Secretary
is responsible for the conduct of the operation. Any decision
made by the Department obviously is something made with his
concurrence.
Mr. Barton. Okay. Mr. Burr. We will give you quite a bit of
time, since I took about 6 minutes on that.
Mr. Burr. I thank the chairman. I probably am concerned
more at the conclusion of the answer then I was when I
originally asked it. Because I think what, in fact, you said to
me, Dr. Itkin, if you are accurate, is that--do you consider
this a major contract?
Mr. Itkin. Oh, yes, it is a major contract.
Mr. Burr. I consider it a major contract, too. What you
have told me is that the Secretary didn't ask line management
for recommendation as to whether a major contract was extended
or recompeted. Is that an accurate depiction of what you told
me?
Mr. Itkin. That he asked--obviously----
Mr. Burr. The Secretary of Energy did not ask for a
recommendation from his line management on a major contract as
to whether it should be recompeted or extended.
Mr. Itkin. No, we had input in terms of--as I mentioned.
Mr. Burr. Input is significantly different than a
recommendation. And I have yet to find through my service as
vice chair of the oversight committee any major contract where
there was not paperwork involved for a recommendation.
Mr. Itkin. Just to reiterate, there is--there was no formal
recommendation on the part of my office to recompete or not to
recompete.
Mr. Burr. And it is not a fault of yours for not making the
recommendation, but, clearly, great concern as it relates to
the Secretary's not requesting a recommendation from the line
management of this project, which we consider to be a major
contract.
Let me move to Dr. Crowley, if I could. Let me read from
your statement and just ask you one question.
You said, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 directed the EPA
administrator to obtain advice from NAS on the technical basis
for radiation protection standards; and the act further
mandated that EPA base its standard on NAS recommendations. Did
they base their standard on the NAS recommendations?
Mr. Crowley. I think the answer to that question, based on
the report that the board did in 1999, is no.
Mr. Burr. So the EPA has not followed the Energy Policy Act
in its directions to the EPA administrator.
Mr. Crowley. That is the judgment of the Board on
Radioactive Waste Management, yes.
Mr. Burr. I thank you, Dr. Crowley.
Mr. Page, your turn. What is your background? Are you a
scientist?
Mr. Page. No, sir, general policy background.
Mr. Burr. You graduated from the University of Southern
California with a masters degree in public administration.
Mr. Page. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burr. Why did everybody else send scientists and the
EPA sent public relations to this hearing?
Mr. Page. I am sorry. I didn't----
Mr. Burr. Why is everybody else up here a scientist, Ph.D.;
and the EPA on the issue of this technical aspect sends
somebody with a public administration background?
Mr. Page. I was sent because I head the Office of
Radiation, Indoor Air. I am the senior person in the agency who
makes recommendations to the administrator on radiation policy.
Mr. Burr. But your background is not such that the
technical aspects of it are something that----
Mr. Page. The operation of my office--within the operation
of my office, we have many people.
Mr. Burr. I am talking about you. Do you make technical
recommendations or do you make----
Mr. Page. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burr. [continuing] policy recommendations?
Mr. Page. We are responsible for making----
Mr. Burr. You. You. Not your office, you.
Mr. Page. In my position, I am responsible for making
recommendations to the administrator that are both policy and
science based.
Mr. Burr. Based upon what your scientists found out or
based upon what you determine to be----
Mr. Page. Based on the work that my scientists do at the
scientific community. Based on other policy considerations that
we take into account in addition to the science--cost
effectiveness, practicality of implementation, things like
that.
Mr. Burr. What do you say to Dr. Crowley's statement that,
in fact, the EPA has not followed the Energy Policy Act of
1992?
Mr. Page. As I said in my testimony, in most of the areas I
think we were generally consistent with the NAS. I think, as
their testimony pointed out, that on the matter of, for
instance, groundwater that is a policy call. I think they were
right in saying that EPA needed to elaborate in its final rule
if that is where it goes on the policy aspects of that and make
that clear, that that is a policy, not a scientific judgment.
Mr. Burr. How many times have you been to Yucca Mountain.
Mr. Page. One time.
Mr. Burr. One time.
Mr. Page. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burr. And you have been in charge of this area of
responsibility for how long?
Mr. Page. A year and a half.
Mr. Burr. How long was that trip? How long were you at
Yucca Mountain.
Mr. Page. We were out there a full day and got a tour of
the facility.
Mr. Burr. Full day.
Mr. Page. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burr. What was the purpose of that?
Mr. Page. To be briefed by the Department of Energy at what
stage they were in the process, to get familiar with the
facility and to try to--in addition to the studies that I have
been looking at and studying and hearing from my staff, to kind
of hear from them directly on any concerns or issues they have
with the facility.
Mr. Burr. Could you accomplish that, all of that, in this
1-day visit?
Mr. Page. The site visit was to go through the facility and
match up with things that I have read, diagrams that I have
seen with the real situation.
Mr. Burr. And from a standpoint of the individual--and I
know the University of Southern Cal is a great school, but,
from your background, 1 day at the Yucca Mountain, you could
take all of the information that your scientific team has based
their recommendations on and you could make that evaluation on
that everything was accurate from a 1-day site visit to Yucca
Mountain?
Mr. Page. Mr. Burr, the site visit was intended to
complement all of the other information that I had been
presented and been collecting and have done over the last year
and a half. I think you would probably be more upset with me
had I not gone at all and sat in Washington behind a desk.
Mr. Burr. Actually, I think that is the only reason you
went, so you--if you were ever asked the question you could
say, yes, sir, I have been to Yucca Mountain.
Mr. Barton. You have been on 24 minutes, of which I took
about 6. So I think----
Mr. Burr. The clock was on the chairman, and he took 12.
But I will be happy to wrap it up.
Mr. Barton. We are going to do more than one round.
Mr. Burr. I appreciate the chairman's indulgence on this.
One last question.
Mr. Barton. All right.
Mr. Burr. Is your policy based on old science or new
science?
Mr. Page. Which policy are you referring to, Congressman?
Mr. Burr. The policy as it relates to what Dr. Paperiello--
--
Mr. Page. We are in the process right now of updating the
MCLs, the maximum contaminant levels, for the drinking water.
It is true that what we used for the purposes of the proposal
was the best science that was available legally. We are in the
process--though we were aware that the updated science is out
there, we are in the process of updating it right now.
Mr. Burr. I thank all of our witnesses. I am sorry I didn't
have an opportunity to spend some time with the other ones. I
yield back.
Mr. Barton. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 7
minutes.
Mr. Boucher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to inquire concerning another area; and, Dr. Itkin,
I suppose this question should be directed to you. In the 1982
act, a requirement was made that the Federal Government begin
to accept nuclear waste from the utilities beginning in 1998.
Obviously, that didn't happen; and the utilities have filed
suit. The U.S. Court of Appeals has held that the contract that
DOE entered into with the various utilities pursuant to that
statute to accept the waste was, in fact, breached; and now the
Court of Claims is considering the damages that will be
awarded. And I have got two questions about that.
First of all, are these damages going to be significant, in
your opinion? What do you think the size of the damages will
be? And that question is important because of the second
question. And that is, from what source will these damages be
paid?
The Federal Government has a judgment fund that is
administered by the U.S. Department of Justice that is
available for the payment of judgments against the United
States. However, in the contract that was entered into between
DOE and the utilities, under the terms of which DOE obligated
itself to accept this waste, there are specific provisions that
relate to any penalties that are assessed or damages that rise
from a breach of the contract. And in those clauses the
contract says that the utility is entitled to realize its
damages by deducting its future payments under the waste
management fund. So, in other words, if the utility is entitled
to money from the government, it can recover that by just not
paying its future obligations into the waste management funds.
So we create a cycle through this. If this becomes the
means by which the utilities are compensated, you wind up with
a worsened problem with the perpetual inability of DOE to
prepare the site and--because it doesn't have the funding to do
it and then further claims by the utility being filed with
that. I think that is a troubling potential scenario.
So my two questions to you are, first of all, how
significant are these damages likely to be? And, second, given
the two potential funds that the government might use to pay
those damages, what is your prediction of which it is going to
be? Will it be the government's judgment fund or it will be
this precise clause in the contract that would result in the
waste management fund being reduced as a consequence of the
damages?
Mr. Itkin. Congressman, I will try to answer that question.
The first question that you asked was on our failure to
realize the provision of the contract on starting to accept the
waste in 1998 if--and this is just very, you know, back of the
envelope calculations in terms of what it might cost in the
aggregate, you know. Looking at every utility, not just the
ones that have sued us or utility by utility, it is going to be
significant. It will probably run in the range of--for every
year delay it probably could range a few hundred million
dollars, which can add up, as you know, into substantial sums
of money, into billions.
Mr. Boucher. This is the total of all of the claims.
Mr. Itkin. The total. We assume that whatever judgment is
awarded, whatever claim is awarded to one will probably be
replicated to the others in a similar fashion. So----
Mr. Boucher. All of those taken together would be----
Mr. Itkin. All of those taken together, we are talking
about a few hundred million dollars a year. Which means to me,
as I have characterized it, as rent. It is almost where we have
bought the new home, and we are paying the mortgage, but we
can't get into the new home, and we are still paying the
landlord rent.
It is an unfortunate circumstance which I would like to
correct, and the easiest way of correcting it is to move as
expeditiously as possible. We can, using--you know, making good
determinations; and that is why I have asked Congress to fully
fund our program this year. And with respect to an earlier
comment, by 2003 is when we have to ramp up substantially in
terms of the dollars we need. So that will have to be done.
The second question, about who will pay or where will the
money come from, you have correctly, I guess, determined that
there are two possible sources. One is the nuclear waste fund,
and the other one is the judgment fund. Since the Department of
Justice will be making that decision, allow me the liberty of
assuming that--out of whose pocket the Department would want
that--Justice Department would want to take the money from. I
am assuming that whatever liability we have will come out of
the nuclear waste fund, not the judgment fund, although that is
not a determination that I will be making. I am just assuming
the bias that might occur on the part of the agency that will
make that decision.
Mr. Boucher. Well, if the funding comes out of the nuclear
waste fund in any manner----
Mr. Itkin. What will probably happen is that if there is an
adverse ruling, the judgment fund will pay it first, and then
the Department of Justice will seek to have the waste fund
repay the judgment fund for the amount of money that the
judgment--the check will be originally cut from the judgment
fund, and the judgment fund will seek recompense from the
nuclear waste fund.
In order to probably deal with this in an orderly and
responsible fashion, we will probably seek to work with the
utilities in terms of offering credits on what is to be paid up
in the future.
Mr. Boucher. Well, then do you get yourself into this
syndrome that I described earlier where this rent that you then
deduct from their future payments into the fund winds up
diminishing even further your ability to prepare the site and
therefore multiplies the number of claims in the damages and
eventually you find yourself without the financial ability to
go forward? I mean, is that a potential outcome?
Mr. Itkin. Well, yes, it is a concern but--and we have
looked at the projected income to the fund, and we have made
some, you know, obviously some assessments as to what this
might cost us, and we feel at this particular time we can
accommodate it. But, obviously, I am not privy to, you know, a
court of claims determination. I don't know what they will do.
We are seeking to work with utilities in terms of arranging to
deal with this problem out of court if we can.
Mr. Boucher. Have all of the utilities that have nuclear
facilities and with regard to whom you are currently under
contract to accept their waste filed claims against you?
Mr. Itkin. No, that is--they have not, not all have.
Mr. Boucher. Are you anticipating that those that have not
will eventually file claims? When you characterize this as
basically a rent, it is kind of an open invitation for them,
isn't it?
Mr. Itkin. I would think that every utility would want to
adjudicate its additional costs either with the Department
directly or, as you indicated, by suing us in court. But we are
hoping that we can be able to sit down and work with the
utilities. After all, we--utilities want us to get along with
our business. It is in their best interest for us to move this
whole process along expeditiously, and I think they recognize
that some of--some of them recognize, at least the operating
ones, the ones that have a future, recognize that this is
something that they would like to work out with us
collectively.
Mr. Boucher. So to summarize this discussion, your opinion
is that the nuclear waste fund is going to have the ultimate
financial liability for the damages that the utilities are
claiming, even if the judgment fund has the first
responsibility, is that correct? That ultimately the
responsibility will rest with the nuclear waste fund.
Mr. Itkin. It has been an opinion of mine. It is not
legally binding. It is just you asked for my thoughts, and I
presented you as I honestly believe the way it could happen.
Mr. Boucher. My concern then is that at the time that the
fund was structured and this one bill per kilowatt fee that
creates the fund was established, I don't think that it was
contemplated that the fund was going to have to be responsible
for several hundred million dollars per year in payments to
utilities because of the breach of the government's contract to
accept the waste in a timely way. And if this fund is going to
have to bear that financial responsibility, I really would
question whether the fund is going to be adequate.
Even if you get the whole thing--if Mr. Barton and I are
eventually successful in having the Congress that grants the
fund to you, I question whether it is going to be sufficient,
given the fact that these costs are going to multiply. They are
going to reach more than a billion dollars by that arithmetic,
easily. Aren't you concerned?
Mr. Itkin. I am concerned. I mean, I don't want to move
over this lightly. Obviously, if we could have prevented this
from happening, we would. Simply, we could not pick up the
spent fuel from these commercial facilities because we had no
place to put it.
Mr. Boucher. I think, at minimum, this discussion
underscores the importance of getting the full fund into your
hands and making sure that you have access to it at the
earliest possible time.
Mr. Chairman, I think it is yet another argument in support
of legislation that we are trying to process that would achieve
that result.
Mr. Itkin, thank you. I appreciate your responses.
Mr. Barton. The chairman is going to recognize himself for
7 minutes. Before Mr. Boucher leaves, I want to get this on the
record.
We have had informal discussion up here. The Energy and
Water appropriation bill is going to be on the floor next week.
Under the rules that we operate in the House, any Member can
offer an amendment. It is an open rule. And I am prepared and
Mr. Boucher is at least prepared to discuss the possibility of
an amendment that would restore your $26 million request to get
you full funding for the coming Fiscal Year.
But--and I am just speaking for myself--I am not willing to
do that unless the Department of Energy is willing to work with
us to find an offset within the Department's budget. In other
words, so it is in order under our rules. I can say to add
$26.6 million to this particular program, but I have to have an
offset for it. I am willing to do that, and I think Mr. Boucher
is willing to at least consider doing that in a bipartisan
fashion. But at least I am willing to do that if you call me
pretty quick and say we want the $26 million to come from A, B,
C or A or A and B or an across-the-board cut in the
discretionary programs under the Department's permission.
Mr. Boucher. Would the gentleman yield to me?
Let me say that I think it is a worthwhile endeavor, and
what we are offering to you today is an opportunity, and that
is our shared willingness to go to the floor of the House and
offer this amendment. But we are going to need the help of the
Department of Energy in suggesting to us the offset for the $26
million that would bring your appropriation up to the level of
your request. I am not sure it is actually 26. It looks like--
is it 26?
Mr. Barton. It is 413, 437.
Mr. Boucher. So it is an opportunity. What you might do as
a practical matter is go back and have some other conversations
with DOE about it and just see if it is the policy of DOE to
fully fund this program perhaps at the expense of some others.
And if a consensus can be arrived at that to do that, we are
happy to help. But we are going to have to hear back from you.
We are going to need to hear from you pretty soon if you want
to do it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Barton. Do you understand what we are saying? We are
going to get you $26 million if you can show us where to get it
from.
Mr. Boucher. He has had more years in the legislative body
than you or I.
Mr. Itkin. Somebody has to pay within the Department for
the $26 million we need. I can certainly inquire, but I am not
in a position to make the call. But thank you very much for
your offer to help. I wish it was more encompassing than just
the Department.
Mr. Barton. We have to work within the framework of the
appropriations cycle. We want to get you your money. But since,
you know, this is Energy and Water we think it is only fair
that it come from other Department of Energy funds. At least, I
think it is only fair. But think about it. If you want to
pursue that, let my personal staff or committee staff know. We
will get to work on it.
Mr. Itkin. Thank you very much for, at least, the help.
Mr. Barton. With the offer.
Mr. Itkin. The offer to help.
Mr. Barton. Let's be honest. We have not helped.
Mr. Itkin. I understand your offer, but there is no
commitment that it would work. You would offer an amendment.
Mr. Barton. I think if Rick Boucher and Joe Barton offered
the amendment in a bipartisan way and we would say that the
Department of Energy supported it, I think it would pass.
Mr. Boucher. I agree with that.
Mr. Itkin. I understand. Thank you.
Mr. Barton. Now I am going to ask my questions.
Mr. Page, I hate to belabor this, but I am going to belabor
it a little bit. I am going to read you some statements and
tell me if you have ever heard of the statement and, if you
have heard of it, who made it. These are direct quotes.
This is on the proposed EPA groundwater standard. ``It is
redundant and unnecessary for the protection of public health
and safety.'' Have you ever heard of that?
Mr. Page. I have heard of that.
Mr. Barton. Do you know who said that, what agency said
that?
Mr. Page. Might have been the National Academy of Sciences.
Mr. Barton. That is a pretty good guess, but if that is
your final answer, that is not the right guess. That was made
by the Department of Energy. I don't know if Dr. Itkin made
that.
Now let me read you another one, again on the EPA proposed
groundwater standard: ``Would result in non uniform risk
levels. They misapplied the maximum contaminant levels for
radionuclides and they far exceeded what is needed for the
protection of public health and safety.'' Have you heard that?
Mr. Page. I have heard that.
Mr. Barton. You want to make a guess?
Mr. Page. I am not going to take that bait. I know somebody
made that----
Mr. Barton. That is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that
went on the record in a comment period and said that.
One more. ``EPA's proposal to include a separate
groundwater standard lacks a sound scientific basis and will
add little, if any, additional protection to individuals or the
general public from radiation releases from the repository.''
Have you heard that?
Mr. Page. I have heard that. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barton. That comes from the National Academy's Board on
Radioactive Waste Management.
[The material referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.016
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.024
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.025
Mr. Barton. So it doesn't appear to me that there is a lot
of support out there among the groups that have shared
responsibility or have at least an interest in this issue,
supporting the separate standard. And in the face of this, I
mean, this isn't a Congressman that is out to make a political
statement. These are on-the-record comments by official
agencies of the U.S. Government that have the scientific and
technical background to comment on this proposed separate
groundwater standard. Given that, wouldn't it be at least
possible for EPA to consider going back to an all-pathway
standard and to back away from this separate groundwater
standard?
Mr. Page. Mr. Chairman, we will be discussing that in the
interagency process. I think you have in this hearing correctly
identified the scientific concerns with the groundwater
protection policy that EPA proposed. There are other reasons,
other policy issues. That is coming up in terms of discussion
across the agencies as to why that was done, what the rationale
is for it; and, yes, it will be considered or reconsidered,
yes.
Mr. Barton. Now, Mr. Burr talked about in his questions
that the science on which the 4 millirem groundwater standard
is based is old science. Sometimes old is good. Old is not
necessarily bad. I am 50, and I think old is good. But
sometimes, in the scientific arena, old is not automatically
good. You mention that there is a revision under way in the
science. When do you think that might actually come to
fruition, that you will have new data on which to look at
groundwater standards?
Mr. Page. That is handled by another office. I can't say
exactly when.
Mr. Barton. Within EPA.
Mr. Page. Yes, sir, within EPA. My sense is that this would
be looked at and revised prior to any final decisions on Yucca,
the licensing.
Mr. Barton. Within the next year, next 6 months? Give us
some--you are not under oath.
Mr. Page. I understand that.
Mr. Barton. No danger here.
Mr. Page. I know in discussions that we have had internally
that the Office of Water is aware of the need to update this.
They are aware of what the concern is as--specifically as it
pertains to Yucca Mountain, and they have committed to getting
that under way. I have not seen it, I am sorry to say. I can
get back to you as to when that might be, but I have not seen
what their schedule is.
Mr. Barton. Dr.--I may say your name wrong--Knopman. I got
it right then. You have been very quiet in this whole thing.
But you represent the Technical Review Board, and you actually
have a background, as I understand it, in some of this
scientific area that is under discussion. What would your
committee's recommendation be that you serve on today as to the
need for a separate groundwater standard at Yucca Mountain? I
think you all are on record that you don't need that separate
standard, but I want to give you a chance to correct me if I am
wrong about that.
Ms. Knopman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I didn't mean to be
quiet; nobody called on me.
Mr. Barton. In this kind of a group, you have got to stand
up. You can't just be shy and retiring or they will never let
you talk.
Ms. Knopman. I am not shy and retiring.
The Board is very careful to stay on the side of technical
judgment as opposed to policy judgment. So the Board has not
made a statement on the appropriateness of including a separate
groundwater standard. The Board, however, from a technical
perspective, does believe that we need a better understanding
of what the background levels are at the Yucca Mountain site.
Mr. Barton. The natural background.
Ms. Knopman. The natural background levels. And it is also,
I guess, somewhat a matter of debate now as to what kinds of
levels of dilution might occur in the saturated zone, the
groundwater that would be likely to be tapped into as a
resource. The assumptions made about how much dilution there
might affect whether or not that standard--how that standard
might be met or not. However, the Board has stayed out of this
question as it is, in the end, a policy judgment.
Mr. Barton. But doesn't the Board, if not have an
obligation, wouldn't they want to take a position? Because, you
know, some of these things are political. I mean, the Nevada
delegation, they are going to be against it for political
reasons. The industry--the private utility industry that has
the waste stored all over the country, they are generally going
to want to be for it just to get it solved. But it is the
technical--the country, you know, puts faith in the technical
experts. When we talk about science, it is assumed that
scientists are not political, that scientists are purely
objective, that scientists only make decisions based on hard
facts. And you know that is not true. Scientists can be very
political.
But in this case the Technical Review Board is tasked with
being the least political of the group. So if we are going to
have a scientific debate about separate groundwater versus all
pathways, I would think the Technical Review Board position
would be listened to and given great credibility by all sides.
Ms. Knopman. The Board is, I would say, is most concerned
about what is the practical difference between an all-pathways
standard and a separate groundwater protection standard. In the
context of the overall uncertainty of our estimates, we are
talking about a 10,000 year compliance period. The difference
between 25 millirem, for example, on the individual pathways
standard and the 15 millirem is insignificant relative to the
overall uncertainty in our estimate.
Mr. Barton. I agree with that.
Ms. Knopman. So the question is, how close does a 4
millirem separate groundwater standard end up coming within
that same range of or order of magnitude as the individual
pathways? The Board will need to, I think, do further analysis
to understand better the point that Dr. Paperiello made about
how that standard in fact translates at the 10,000 year level,
but we have not at present undertaken such analysis.
Mr. Barton. Let me ask you one more question. Then I will
go to Mr. Shimkus.
Has the Technical Review Board taken a position on whether
you should have a repository that cannot be reopened, that the
material cannot be retrieved, versus a repository that if the
technology changes, if there is a scientific breakthrough, you
could go in and a hundred years from now or 200 years from now
or 500 years from now use the best science available at the
time to control this material?
Ms. Knopman. I think the board has operated on the
assumption that virtually any kind of repository will be--waste
would be retrievable. It is just a matter of the degree of
difficulty.
Mr. Barton. The current proposal, though, is that it is
not.
Ms. Knopman. It is a matter of difficulty. You would mine
it out. It might be very hard.
But the Board has spoken before on the need for flexibility
in designs and the need for performance confirmation testing,
which means that even if a decision is made to proceed with
this, with construction and with placement of waste, that there
be continuous monitoring, particularly in the time----
Mr. Barton. You see, I have made comments to local
officials in Nevada that I think we should have the flexibility
that if we can find better science, find better ways to
monitor, whatever we can do that, build that in. So the bill
that is going to come out of the subcommittee next year, if I
am the chairman still, is going to put that flexibility back
in, as opposed to the current situation where we put in there
we lock it up, we post it and we walk away from it. So that
might be something to have your board take a look at.
Ms. Knopman. It continues to be an open question as to how
long the repository would stay open. I believe the document did
assume a 50-year closure period or that the repository would be
closed after 50 years. I am not sure that----
Mr. Barton. We want to limit--don't misunderstand me. We
want to limit the amount of material that is in this
repository. We don't want to leave it open-ended that you could
put more material. But to satisfy the concerns that
Congresswoman Berkley had, you know, you can't have absolute
certainty for 10,000 years, but you should be able to build in
flexibility so if we could figure out a better way to maintain
it, dispose of it, to control it, we ought to have the ability
to use the best available technology a hundred years from now,
200 years from now, whatever. That is my only point.
The gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just stepped out of the room to call my chief of staff to
see if it was--to get his recommendation whether I would be
able to stay around for a second period of questioning. He gave
me a recommendation. He said yes. The schedule looks like you
can do it. No one is at the door.
And, Dr. Itkin, you need to get better at this business. I
think most of us find it very incredulous that something as
important as a humongous, large contract--that the person in
charge did not give a yes or no, I support this. And I don't
know--and I don't think anybody in this room believes that you
did not give a yes or no--yes, I support them; or, no, I don't.
So, I would just respectfully request next time, when we review
this again, that we fully vet out this and--and there is
responsibility.
It was just a very bad display of the worst problems of
bureaucracy is no one wants to be held accountable or
responsible.
Mr. Itkin. Congressman, if I may respond, because since
we--I gave my response, I have since learned that, in fact,
there was a memorandum written prior to my----
Mr. Shimkus. We thought there would be.
Mr. Itkin. What I am saying is I did not know. I learned
now there was a memorandum written several months before my
arrival that was from my office and my deputy, recommending a
10-month delay in the recompete. And if I could yield, if it
would be appropriate, I could yield to the person who served as
the acting director during that time period.
Mr. Shimkus. I will let the chairman--I have some important
questions that I want to get on to for the record. That
satisfies my line of questions and I am glad that we were able
to go through the paperwork and get an answer to that question,
unless the chairman wants to jump in here.
Mr. Barton. I was actually in a staff consultation.
Mr. Itkin. I just want to advise the Chair that since we
had that conversation on the decision on the recompete, I have
been told that prior to my arrival at the Department, that--in
this position--that there was a memo written to the Secretary
from the previous director, acting director, to recommend a 10-
month delay.
Mr. Barton. Ten month delay in recompeting the contract?
Mr. Itkin. Yes, recompeting the contract. As a matter of
fact, if I might, may I allow my deputy who served as the
acting director to comment at this time?
Mr. Barton. I tell you what, let's let Mr. Shimkus get all
of his questions. I will come back on that because I have a few
more questions on that point. So if we will just delay until
Mr. Shimkus gets his questions in, and you will have more than
adequate opportunity, and I will give you some other
opportunities to comment on that.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The scientific
community that is present here, do we accept the initial
premise of the storage site that it would be a permanent
geological repository? And if we could go down the table.
Obviously, that was put into question by our previous panel. I
would like for you all representing the different agencies and
scientific community--is the premise still a permanent
geological repository?
Mr. Paperiello. That is the Commission's position, a
permanent geological repository.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you. Dr. Itkin?
Mr. Itkin. That is the position of this administration.
Mr. Shimkus. Great. Dr. Knopman?
Ms. Knopman. The Nuclear Waste Board oversees the work of
the Department of Energy, and if they are working on a
permanent repository, so are we. And I would just add, though,
that a permanent geologic repository is largely an
international consensus among many other countries that have
nuclear waste and are also pursuing this.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you. And again, that is the importance
of coming and that is new information that I did not know. Mr.
Page?
Mr. Page. Yes, sir, the standard that EPA will be
developing will be assuming that it is a permanent repository.
Mr. Shimkus. Dr. Crowley?
Mr. Crowley. The Board of Radioactive Waste Management has
looked at aspects of the Yucca Mountain repository in the past
and it is the Board's understanding that the DOE is working
toward a permanent repository.
Mr. Shimkus. If I have time I may go back to that, but I
want to ask another question. Based upon the history of the
transportation of nuclear waste currently, is it the scientific
community's view that it can be done safely today?
Mr. Paperiello. Yes.
Mr. Shimkus. Dr. Itkin?
Mr. Itkin. Yes.
Mr. Shimkus. Dr. Knopman?
Ms. Knopman. Yup--yes, there have been.
Mr. Shimkus. I like ``yup.'' That is a better one.
Ms. Knopman. There have been numerous analyses that have
showed low levels of risk under both normal and accident
conditions. The safety record has been good to date and
corroborates the low risks. And there has been fuel shipped
safely for many decades.
However, that does not mean the transportation problem is
done with. There are lots of issues relating to emergency
response and management and coordination and some further
testing that the Board has recommended.
Mr. Shimkus. Before I go to Mr. Page, I would have a little
comment. I think Congress understands the need to help local
communities be prepared to respond, and this whole
appropriation issue and the transportation issue is up for
debate. But I appreciate that response. Mr. Page?
Mr. Page. We believe it can be done safely with the
proper----
Mr. Shimkus. Dr. Crowley.
Mr. Crowley. The national academy doesn't have a position
on that, but in fact it is being done safely today.
Mr. Shimkus. Mr. Chairman, I would like to go one more, but
I will defer if we are out of--Dr. Knopman, in the discussion
you mentioned about the science and the possibility of the
dilutions of the rem standard, but I did not hear you talk
about what Mr. Page had mentioned was a possibility of a re--my
terminology is poor and I apologize for that--but the
reconcentration of that, of a larger millirem than the initial
position. Is that scientifically possible? Is that a criteria
that is accepted in the scientific community?
Ms. Knopman. What is--the dilution is the direction in
which the plume and the concentration of radionuclide would
proceed. However, what Mr. Page was referring to is that
depending on how the radionuclides are transported in the
groundwater system, they may remain in fairly concentrated
plumes even at significant distances from the repository
itself. So if you happen to stick a well right into one of
these concentrated areas of the plume downstream, you would get
a higher concentration than you might closer to the repository,
but where there has been more dispersion.
Mr. Shimkus. I will finish up with this. Is the real
debate, Dr. Itkin, on this millirem standard, the fear of
because of the higher standard, there is going to be an
increased cost to the facility which, based upon all the
budgetary constraints that the ranking member mentioned, could
astronomically increase the already tremendous cost burden to
the taxpayers, that through the rates have done to provide this
location?
Mr. Itkin. Well, that is a concern, that anytime you have a
very difficult standard to meet, that you have to provide
additional barriers, additional protections to guarantee that
to occur. And so, yes, there are additional costs associated
with very demanding standards.
But more of a concern, or at least equal or a greater
concern, is the fact that if we have a zero tolerance for
leakage, we probably cannot succeed here with the licensing
process. And so it would be a killer.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Barton. Thank you. This is going to be the last
question period because we have two pending votes on the floor
and you all have been here for 3\1/2\ hours, so we will let you
go pretty quick. The first thing I will do is ask unanimous
consent to include in the record a letter from the Health
Physics Society dated November 24, 1999, and it is to the
United States Environmental Protection Agency. And I am told
this has been cleared by the minority. So I am the only one
here so I am not going to object. But obviously, we are not
going to do anything that is not in good faith with the
minority.
[The information referred to follows:]
Health Physics Society
November 24, 1999
United States Environmental Protection Agency
Central Docket Section (6102)
ATTN.: Docket A-95-12
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
401 M Street, SW
Washington, D.C. 20460-0001
SUBJECT: The Health Physics Society's Comments on Environmental
Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada;
Proposed Rule
Dear Sir or Madam: On behalf of the Health Physics Society (HPS),
of which I am President, I am writing with comments and recommendations
regarding Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca
Mountain, Nevada, 40 CFR Part 197, promulgated in Federal Register Vol.
64, No. 166, August 27, 1999. These comments and recommendations were
prepared by the Society's Legislation and Regulation Committee.
The HPS is a professional organization of approximately 6,000
scientists, educators, engineers, and operational health physicists who
are dedicated to developing, disseminating, and applying scientific
knowledge of, and the practical means for, radiation safety. The
primary objective of the Society is to protect people and the
environment from potentially harmful exposure to ionizing radiation.
The Society concerns itself with understanding, evaluating and
controlling the potential risks from radiation exposure relative to the
benefits derived.
The Society's working principle is to keep radiation exposures from
justified ``beneficial'' practices as low as is reasonably achievable.
This basic tenet of radiation safety has resulted in an exceptional
history of safety and will continue to do so as we address the
important issue of high level radioactive waste (HLW) in the Yucca
Mountain repository.
In this context, the HPS appreciates the opportunity to comment on
the United States Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) ``Standards
for Yucca Mountain, Nevada; Proposed Rule''. The HPS believes that
these standards are precedent-setting and likely to have profound
impacts on future activities and standards, not only for radioactive
waste, but also for non-radioactive hazardous materials. The HPS also
believes that promulgation of the Yucca Mountain Standard (40 CFR Part
197) is fundamental to helping resolve some of the public safety issues
being encountered at our nation's nuclear power reactors. With the
operation and decommissioning of commercial nuclear reactors, a final
repository for spent fuel and other HLW is vital to the public safety
and health from existence of the nuclear fuel cycle. Numerous
stakeholders have proposed that allowing indefinite storage of spent
nuclear fuel at operating and decommissioned facilities is an option.
However, the HPS believes that such an option avoids, rather than
offers a solution to the HLW disposal issue. In addition, it ignores
the legal obligation of the federal government to take possession of,
and provide for safely disposing of spent nuclear fuel, not only from
nuclear power reactors, but also from our national defense program.
For these reasons, the HPS encourages the EPA to move forward
expeditiously with issuing 10 CFR 197 as a final rule. However, we urge
the EPA to consider changes to its proposed rule, as discussed below,
to ensure that the final rule is:
1. focused on protection necessary for public health and safety;
2. consistent with applicable recommendations of relevant national and
international scientific advisory organizations; and
3. in full compliance with statutory requirements.
The HPS believes that the proposed use of a separate ground-water
protection requirement is: 1) not necessary to ensure protection of
public health and safety, 2) inconsistent with applicable
recommendations of scientific advisory bodies, and 3) contrary to
statutory requirements.
Including a separate ground-water provision will detract from the
rule's primary purpose and focus on public health and safety. A limit
on dose received by an individual from all exposure pathways, as
included in the proposed rule, is fully protective of public health and
safety. The EPA's stated purpose for use of a separate ground-water
provision, i.e., to protect ground water as a resource, does not meet
the purpose of the regulation, which is ``protection of the public from
releases to the accessible environment from radioactive materials
stored or disposed of in the repository.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ From Section 801 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed provision for groundwater protection utilizes maximum
contaminant levels (MCLs) from EPA regulations implementing the Safe
Drinking Water Act. The MCLs for radionuclides proposed for use in the
rule are generally based on an outdated and superceded scientific
understanding of radiation risk. The MCLs implied in this rule equate
to a wide range of dose values (ranging over more than two orders of
magnitude), that will be considerably more restrictive in some cases,
and considerably less restrictive in others cases, than the proposed
all-pathways individual dose standard. Therefore, the use of the MCLs
will effectively over-ride the individual dose standard that is the
essential element of the proposed rule.
The use of a separate ground-water provision is not consistent with
the recommendations of the relevant national and international
scientific advisory organizations, including the National Council on
Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As endorsed by the EPA's Presidential
Guidance of 1987, these organizations unanimously endorse the use of
individual dose limits, taking into account all exposure pathways, to
assure protection of public health and safety. Further, the use of a
separate groundwater provision ignores the recommendations of the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) committee that was established by
statute to make recommendations on the scientific basis for a
protective radiation standard for the Yucca Mountain repository. The
NAS committee specifically did not use a separate groundwater provision
because the committee ``based our recommendations on those requirements
necessary to limit risks to individuals.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards,'' National
Research Council Committee on Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain
Standards, National Academy Press (Washington, DC 1995)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the proposed use of a separate groundwater provision is
contrary to statutory requirements. The Energy Policy Act of 1992
requires that the EPA ``shall, based upon and consistent with the
findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences,
promulgate, by rule, public health and safety standards for protection
of the public [that] . . . shall prescribe the maximum annual effective
dose equivalent to individual members of the public . . . and shall be
the only such standards applicable to the Yucca Mountain site.'' The
NAS committee found that a health standard based upon doses to
individual members of the public will provide a reasonable standard for
protection of the health and safety of the general public. Therefore,
the use of a separate groundwater standard, as proposed by the EPA,
would be in direct conflict with the statutory requirement that an
individual dose standard be the only such standards applicable to the
Yucca Mountain site.
The HPS believes that a 250 <greek-m>Sv (25 mrem) all-pathways
individual dose standard will be fully protective of public health and
safety and is consistent with recommendations of relevant scientific
advisory organizations and national and international regulations.
In its request for public comment, the EPA has noted that ``. . .
some countries have individual protection limits higher than we have
proposed [and] other Federal authorities have suggested higher
individual dose limits with no separate protection of ground water.''
The EPA has requested comments specifically on the use of an annual
Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE) limit of 250 <greek-m>Sv (25
mrem), rather than the proposed annual CEDE limit of 150 <greek-m>Sv
(15 mrem).
International and national scientific advisory organizations,
including the NCRP, ICRP, and IAEA, have recommended an annual limit of
1,000 <greek-m>Sv (100 mrem) Effective Dose Equivalent (EDE) as
suitably protective to members of the public from exposure to all non-
medical, man-made sources combined. (The EDE is inclusive of the CEDE).
As stated earlier, this recommendation has been endorsed in
Presidential Federal guidance as proposed by the EPA, and has been
adopted in federal regulations.
A 250 <greek-m>Sv (25 mrem) CEDE standard for Yucca Mountain would
represent a small fraction of the nationally and internationally
accepted annual limit of 1,000 <greek-m>Sv (100 mrem) EDE and is
consistent with the source-specific limits in other Federal
regulations, as well the regulations of many other countries. It also
represents a small fraction of the average exposure of 3,000
<greek-m>Sv (300 mrem) per year received by members of the general
population in the U.S. from background radiation. For these reasons,
the HPS believes that a 250 <greek-m>Sv (25 mrem) standard for Yucca
Mountain is fully protective.
The justification provided by the EPA for proposing an annual CEDE
limit of 150 <greek-m>Sv (15 mrem) is not convincing. The EPA states
that it is based upon a review of various guidance, regulations and
standards, as well as the NAS report. However, the majority of the
references cited include an EDE of 25 mrem. Further, the EPA compares
the proposed standard for Yucca Mountain with the 10 mrem per year
limit in the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
(NESHAPS). However, the NESHAPS are used to regulate emissions from a
large number of existing sources that represent actual exposures to the
general population of the U.S., while the Yucca Mountain standard will
be used to set an upper bound for analysis and assessment of
hypothetical exposures to a postulated group of individuals over the
next 10,000 years.
The EPA clarifies that the existing 25 mrem per year limit for the
Uranium Fuel Cycle (40 CFR 190), based on ICRP-2 dose methodology, ``is
essentially equivalent to the risk associated with [the] proposed limit
of 150 <greek-m>Sv (15 mrem) . . . [which] corresponds approximately to
an annual risk of 7 chances in 1,000,000.'' There is an implication
that there a is risk-based distinction between a 25 mrem per year and
15 mrem per year limit. The HPS has taken the position that this type
of risk assessment should not be used at the levels of exposure being
considered in this proposed rule. We believe that at these levels there
is not a scientifically-validated basis for reaching conclusions about
differences in implied risk. A copy of the HPS Position Statement,
``Radiation Risk in Perspective,'' is enclosed.
Finally, the EPA has not provided any analysis of the costs
associated with meeting a 150 <greek-m>Sv (15 mrem) versus a 250
<greek-m>Sv (25 mrem) standard as balanced against an expected increase
in health and safety benefit. Even at the 250 <greek-m>Sv (25 mrem)
standard, a number of conservatisms will necessarily have to be
introduced in the licensing application to address the uncertainties
and limitations in modeling for predicting potential exposures over
such long time periods (e.g., 10,000 years). However, the incremental
difference in costs associated with incorporation of additional
conservatisms for a 40% lower limit could be enormous, without any
demonstrated benefit to health and safety.
The HPS believes that the final rule should employ the use of the
concept of the ``average member of a critical group'' for applying the
individual dose standard, because it is more consistent with national
and international regulatory practice, as well as with specific
recommendations of the NAS committee, and will help avoid unnecessary
conservatism in dose analysis and assessment for the licensing process.
The NAS committee recommended use of an ``average member of a
critical group'' for applying the individual dose standard. The
critical group concept is consistent with the recommendations of the
ICRP and reflects standard national and international practice in the
area of radiation protection. The EPA justifies its proposed
alternative approach, the 44 reasonably maximally exposed individual
[RMEI],'' as an agency preference that is consistent with its practices
in other EPA programs. However, this concept has not been incorporated
in an NRC licensing process, which is where the final rule will
ultimately be implemented. The HPS believes that it is neither prudent,
nor necessary, to invoke this application in this rule, especially when
the EPA has noted that the RMEI ``provides a level of protection
substantially equivalent to that which would be achieved by the
[critical group concept].''
The extensive explanation provided by the EPA in the proposed rule
regarding how the concept is to be applied goes well beyond the
statutory authority assigned the EPA in the Energy Policy Act, since
the implementing authority is reserved exclusively for the NRC.
Accordingly, we recommend that the EPA limit the approach provided in
the final rule to endorsing the ICRP-based critical group concept as
recommended by the NAS committee.
In summary, the HPS believes that adopting these recommended
changes will result in a rule that will be more effective in ensuring
protection of public health and safety. The HPS also believes it will
be more suitable in supporting implementation of the national policy
for safe disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste in a deep
geologic repository.
Sincerely yours,
Raymond H. Johnson, Jr., C.H.P., P.E.
President
Mr. Barton. The Health Physics Society is a professional
organization of 6,000 scientists, educators, and engineers and
operational health physicists who are dedicated to developing
and disseminating scientific knowledge of and the practical
means for radiation safety. The Society's principle is to keep
radiation exposures from justified--and I quote--beneficial
practices as low as is reasonably achievable. So this is 6,000
scientists, educators, and engineers. And they sent this letter
to the EPA on November 24th, 1999.
I will put the entire letter in the record but I am going
to read the key paragraph. It says the HPS believes that the
proposed use of a separate groundwater protection requirement
is, one, not necessary to ensure protection of public health
and safety; two, inconsistent with applicable recommendations
of scientific advisory bodies; and three, contrary to statutory
requirements.
So it would seem to me, Director Page, that this is yet one
more indication that this policy of EPA to have a separate
standard is not supported in the scientific community. Do you
have any comment on this--you have not--we did not give you a
chance to look at this letter before the hearing. So I am not
going to ask you to comment on the specifics of it. But I mean,
I would assume that your people are generally aware of this
letter. Okay.
You testified earlier in a question, in response to a
question that I asked you, that EPA is in the process of
updating the science on the maximum contaminant level for the
Safe Drinking Water Act requirements, and I thought you told me
that EPA was not going to issue a radiation standard for Yucca
Mountain until that new science has been assimilated within the
EPA. But I want to give you another chance to say that. Did you
say earlier that you were going to wait until you get the new
science in place before you--if you are going to continue to
propose a groundwater standard? Or is the agency going to go
ahead and try to promulgate a groundwater standard sooner than
that?
Mr. Page. Thank you for the opportunity to clarify that.
Mr. Chairman, what I did say is that we were in the process of
updating the science behind the MCLs. What I also said, which
is different from what you were asking----
Mr. Barton. That is why--I thought I heard you say one
thing and the staff heard you say another.
Mr. Page. What I said was that I believed that the--when
you were asking me a specific time when it was going to be
done, it was my confidence that that process would conclude
prior to any final decisions, licensing decisions by the NRC,
that they would make so that process would not get in the way.
Can I make one more clarification that I think is important
for you to know? Using the only sciences, which is what we did
when we developed our proposals, and using certain scenarios
that we proposed in the groundwater or in the proposed rule,
the assessments that the Department of Energy has done and the
viability assessments and subsequent analysis that they have
done shows that they can make the licensing. So I think that is
an important clarification.
We do intend to update those MCLs and do intend to have
larger discussions on groundwater across the Federal agencies,
but I just want to tell you--I am getting a sense that you are
concerned that we might be in the way or driving costs up
unnecessarily and based on the analysis done to date, we are
not one of the more important factors in there in terms of what
we are----
Mr. Barton. There was only a veto threat on the bill for
this particular standard. I would think that certainly could be
construed as being in the way, or at least being a factor,
since the President of the United States said if you did not
have this 4 millirem groundwater standard he was going to veto
the bill. I kind of think that is a factor.
Mr. Page. What I understood the veto was, there is an
objection taken, among other things, to eliminating the role
that the Environmental Protection Agency would play, or a
delay. That is my understanding. I don't remember the 4
millirem being part of the Presidential veto.
Mr. Barton. Well, maybe I misunderstood that. There were
only three Presidential veto threats on the House-passed bill.
This is one of them.
I want to go back to Dr. Itkin. The dialog that we had
about recompete, it would be helpful if the Department of
Energy could give to the committee all documents that were
prepared before the Secretary of Energy made the decision to
recompete. You mentioned one document that the acting director
made. If there are other documents--now, we will send you a
letter and we are real good in drafting our letters, any and
all, la-dee-da-dee-da. I used to be oversight chairman, so I
guarantee you that I can get you a letter that covers the
bases. Just--you generally said that most of the debate within
the Department was more of a verbal nature between the
Secretary and various people on the issue. But to the extent
there were written documents--you mentioned one--we would like
to have that one, plus any other documents before the Secretary
made the decision. Is that understood?
Mr. Itkin. That is understood.
[The response had not been received at time of printing.]
Mr. Barton. Now, on that point, it is not generally a bad
thing to recompete contracts. Competition is good. It is not
bad. In this particular contract, since the critical path is
critical, it really seems inconsistent to, if you are trying to
meet your milestones, to go into a recompetition mode right
when it is time to make some of those decisions.
Now, I understand that there are three groups competing.
One is the existing group, TRW in conjunction with Parsons
Brinckerhoff, I think. You are----
Mr. Itkin. No, that is true.
Mr. Barton. I am getting--one the gentleman behind you is
shaking his head and you are doing this. There is a little
dichotomy there, but that is understandable. Hopefully it will
not delay the decision. But--the decision on whether to go
ahead or not go ahead and meet these critical path requirements
that you have got to meet in the next year and a half.
But I want to be on the record explicitly, if we get some
song and dance next year that they are going to have to slip
the milestone because of the recompetition, this subcommittee
is going to be very, very upset. And I know you share that
concern. I know you share that concern; you are just being a
real team player here and not being as open as you could be if
this was a private conversation as compared to a public
conversation.
Here is what I want the Department of Energy to do between
now and next year, if at all possible. The subcommittee would
like to see a proposal on funding to fully fund the
construction phase of the depository. Not just that it needs to
be done, but work with the minority, work with the majority,
come up with a proposal that we can put into a bill that the
Department will support. Okay?
I would like for the entire scientific community, if it is
at all possible between NRC and EPA and the technical review
committee and everybody else, to let's solve this separate
versus all pathways. The average citizen does not understand
that from Adam. If, in fact, the scientific community wants to
be scientific, we ought to be able to resolve whether you need
an all-pathway standard or you need a separate groundwater
standard, and it would be very helpful to have a meeting of the
minds on that.
And then we would obviously like to make sure that--this is
on the technical review board--any outstanding issues that have
not been addressed in the review board's opinion, we need to
get those explicitly put forward so that the Congress can
demand the Department of Energy and EPA and the various Nuclear
Regulatory Commission address those issues.
We have been messing with this for 18 years. It is really
time to make a decision one way or the other on this. And the
timeframe is the next 18 months, which means the next 6 months
of the next Congress we are going to have a new President;
maybe President Gore, maybe President Bush, but we are going to
have a new President. Now is the time to really bring all of
this to fruition, make these decisions, and go forward.
And so with that, I am going to adjourn the hearing. I want
to thank our witnesses. These are productive. I want to alert
our EPA, NRC, and DOE folks we are going to have a very
extensive list of written questions and we are going to ask
that we get answers within a month of when you get the
questions. Okay?
Thank you, gentlemen, and thank you, lady, and this hearing
is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]
The National Academies
Board on Radioactive Waste Management
August 18, 2000
The Honorable Joe Barton
Chairman
Subcommittee on Energy and Power
Committee on Commerce
U.S. House of Representatives
Room 215 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-6115
Dear Chairman Barton: In response to your letter dated July 20,
2000, I am enclosing responses to your follow-up questions from the
June 23, 2000 hearing on radiation protection standards for Yucca
Mountain. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need additional
information.
Sincerely yours,
Kevin D. Crowley
Director, Board on Radioactive Waste Management
Response to Questions Regarding the June 23, 2000 Hearing on Yucca
Mountain Radiation Protection Standards
note: the following three references are cited in this document:
1. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 1999: Environmental
Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada, Proposed
Rule: 64 Federal Register 46976-47016 (August 27, 1999). This document
contains EPA's proposed radiation-protection standard for Yucca
Mountain.
2. National Research Council [NRC], 1995: Technical Bases for Yucca
Mountain Standards: Washington, D.C., National Academy Press. This
report was written for EPA at the request of the U.S. Congress and
contains the National Academies' findings and recommendations on
radiation-protection standards for Yucca Mountain. This report is
referred to as the ``TYMS report'' in this document.
3. National Research Council [NRC], 1999: Comments on Proposed
Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada by the Board
on Radioactive Waste Management: Washington, D.C., National Academy
Press. This report provides a comparison of the proposed EPA standards
with the findings and recommendations in the TYMS report. It is
referred to as the ``BRWM report'' in this document.
Question 1: Please elaborate on the reasons for the Board's
opposition to EPA's proposed separate 4 millirem groundwater protection
standard.
Response: The Board on Radioactive Waste Management [BRWM] has not
taken a position either in favor of or in opposition to EPA's proposed
groundwater standard for Yucca Mountain. Rather, the BRWM has stated
(NRC, 1999, p. 11) that it ``does not believe there is a basis in
science for establishing such limits'' to protect public health. The
TYMS report (NRC, 1995) concluded that an individual-protection
standard would be sufficient to protect public health from a repository
at Yucca Mountain.
In my written testimony to the subcommittee, I explained why there
is no scientific basis for the proposed groundwater standard. EPA made
what appear to be several arbitrary modifications in applying its safe
drinking water regulations (40 CFR 141) to Yucca Mountain. In
particular, the groundwater standard in EPA's safe drinking water
regulations applies to water delivered at the tap through a public
water system, whereas the proposed groundwater standard for Yucca
Mountain will be applied to a volume of groundwater in an aquifer some
2,000 feet below the Earth's surface at some as-yet undetermined
distance from the repository. Second, the groundwater standard is based
on a different level of risk than the individual-protection standard
and, for some radionuclides, may actually provide more protection to
groundwater than the individual-protection standard provides to people.
In my written testimony I also suggested how EPA could justify a
separate groundwater standard for Yucca Mountain based on science:
namely, by adopting the risk-based approach recommended in the TYMS
report (NRC, 1995). I noted that if EPA based its Yucca Mountain
standards on a single value of acceptable risk, it could express that
risk in terms of two elements, one for radiation exposures through the
groundwater pathway (a groundwater standard) and one for exposures
through all pathways (an all-pathways standard). These two elements
would be scientifically consistent so long as they are based on a
single value of acceptable risk. To implement this approach, however,
EPA would have to modify the dose limits for the all-pathways and
groundwater standards that currently exist in its proposed rule so that
they represent the same value of acceptable risk.
Question 2: I understand that one of the first radionuclides that
could be released from the repository would be iodine-129. What is the
health risk associated with a 4 millirem dose from iodine-129? Is this
within the risk range recommended by the National Academy of Sciences?
Are there other radionuclides that would fall outside the NAS's
recommended risk range under EPA's proposed groundwater standard?
Response: I cannot provide the subcommittee with a direct answer to
this question. The BRWM has not performed a detailed examination of the
health risks associated with a 4 millirem dose from iodine-129 or any
other radionuclides associated with EPA's groundwater standard.
Moreover, given that the groundwater standard proposed by EPA is based
on outdated dosimetry, as noted in the BRWM report (NRC, 1999, p. 12)
and in my written testimony (p. 10), the risk values calculated by EPA
may not be representative of actual risks.
Question 3: The Conference Report accompanying the 1992 Act read as
follows: ``The Conferees do not intend for the National Academy of
Sciences, in making its recommendations, to establish specific
standards for protection of the public but rather to provide expert
scientific guidance on the issues involved in establishing those
standards.'' The National Academy was not intended to usurp the EPA's
rulemaking authority, but the direction to EPA is very clear in the
1992 law--the EPA Administrator is to set generally applicable
standards for the Yucca Mountain site ``based upon and consistent with
the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences.''
Mr. Page suggested in his testimony the ``EPA was to consider technical
recommendations from the National Academy of Sciences.'' However, the
law says ``based upon and consistent with.'' In your view, are the
proposed EPA standards based upon and consistent with the findings and
recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences?
Response: As noted in NRC (1999) and in my written testimony to the
subcommittee, many important elements of EPA's proposed standards are,
either in design or implementation, based upon and consistent with the
findings and recommendations contained in the TYMS report (NRC, 1995).
These are discussed on pages 4-5 of my written testimony to the
subcommittee and include who is protected, the level of protection for
the individual-protection standard, human intrusion, and exposure
scenarios. My written testimony also identified three elements of EPA's
proposed standards that are not based upon and consistent with the
recommendations in the TYMS report: (1) use of a dose-based standard;
(2) the inclusion of a separate groundwater standard; and (3) the time
period over which the standard should be applied. My written testimony
explains the nature of these inconsistencies (see especially pages 6-
13). The BRWM considers the first two of these inconsistencies to be
very significant. The third inconsistency is less significant, as
explained in my response to the last question in this document.
Question 4: The National Academy recommended that EPA adopt a risk-
based standard for the protection of individuals, yet EPA proposed a
dose-based standard. I recognize that the 1992 Act directed EPA to
``prescribe the maximum annual effective dose equivalent to individual
members of the public. That statutory language could be interpreted to
merely dictate the final form of the standard, and certainly does not
prevent EPA from using risk, as the National Academy recommended, to
derive a final dose equivalent. Is EPA, in fact, using a risk level to
determine the final dose?
Response: The BRWM noted (NRC, 1999, p. 4) that EPA did not use
risk to establish dose limits for its individual-protection standard.
Instead, EPA used dose-based standards that were carried over from
existing regulations (40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 141) and derived equivalent
risk values through arithmetic conversion.
As noted in both the TYMS (NRC, 1995) and BRWM (NRC, 1999) reports,
there is no scientific basis for setting a level of protection for
either a dose- or risk-based standard. Rather, protection levels are a
public policy decision, best established through rulemaking, based on
the risk the public is willing to bear from radiation releases from a
repository at Yucca Mountain. The TYMS report recommended (NRC, 1995,
p. 64-65) that the Yucca Mountain standard be based on risk because (1)
it would not have to be revised in subsequent rulemaking as scientific
knowledge advances, and (2) risk is more readily understood by the
general public than dose, and it provides a convenient way to compare
hazards to public health from different sources.
The BRWM recognized (NRC, 1999, p. 6) that establishing a risk-
based standard would be a major departure from current EPA practice and
that it would be far more difficult for EPA to ask the public about
acceptable risk than follow established precedents. Nevertheless, the
BRWM strongly recommended (NRC, 1999, p. 7) that EPA adopt a risk-based
individual-protection standard precisely because it requires public
involvement in what is, fundamentally, an important public-policy
decision.
Question 5: Could you please elaborate on the Board's concerns
about the time period over which the radiation standard must be
applied?
Response: In its proposed rule, EPA has asked for comments on two
alternative standards for the period of compliance. The first
alternative is essentially that proposed in the TYMS report (NRC, 1995)
in which the period of compliance extends to the time of peak risk from
repository releases. The BRWM has no concerns about this alternative,
and in fact believes that its adoption would be consistent with the
recommendations in the TYMS report (NRC, 1995).
The second alternative applies a quantitative dose limit for a
period of 10,000 years, but it also imposes an additional requirement
that repository performance be examined after 10,000 years to see if
dramatic changes could be anticipated. The BRWM recognizes that EPA can
choose, as a matter of policy, to adopt the 10,000-year limit in the
second alternative. Nevertheless, the BRWM is concerned about this
alternative because EPA provides no guidance on how the required
analyses are to be carried out beyond 10,000 years or how the results
are to be used in judging the acceptability of the repository. The BRWM
noted (NRC, 1999, p. 13) that ``to mandate that these results become
`part of the public record' but to give no indication of how they will
be taken into account seems to postpone rather than solve problems
associated with licensing and provide no real benefits to protection of
the public.'' This is especially true given that peak doses from
repository releases are likely to occur after 10,000 years.
The BRWM recommended (NRC, 1999, p. 13) that EPA either be more
specific in providing guidance on how the analyses beyond 10,000 years
should be used in determining compliance, or else explicitly pass the
task for developing such guidance to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, which is responsible for establishing regulations
consistent with the final EPA rule.
______
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.027
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.029
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.031
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.032
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.033
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.034
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.036
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.037
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.038
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.039
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.040
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.041
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.042
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.043
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.044
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.045
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.046
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.047
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.048
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.049
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.050
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.051
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.052
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.053
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.054
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.055
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.056
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.057
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.058
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.059
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.060
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.061
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.062
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.063
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.064
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.065
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.066
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.067
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.068
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.069
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.070
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.071
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.072
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.073
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.074
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.075
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.076
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.077
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.078
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.079
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.080
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.081
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.082
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.083
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.084
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5916.085