<DOC>
[106th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:57444.wais]
REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S DEPLOYMENT OF DOE-FUNDED
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP TECHNOLOGIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 26, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-36
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce
<snowflake>
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
57-444CC WASHINGTON : 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
TOM BLILEY, Virginia, Chairman
W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
MICHAEL G. OXLEY, Ohio HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
JOE BARTON, Texas RALPH M. HALL, Texas
FRED UPTON, Michigan RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
Vice Chairman SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania BART GORDON, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER COX, California PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
STEVE LARGENT, Oklahoma ANNA G. ESHOO, California
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina RON KLINK, Pennsylvania
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California BART STUPAK, Michigan
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
GREG GANSKE, Iowa THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
TOM A. COBURN, Oklahoma GENE GREEN, Texas
RICK LAZIO, New York KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
JAMES E. ROGAN, California DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona LOIS CAPPS, California
CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING,
Mississippi
VITO FOSSELLA, New York
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
ED BRYANT, Tennessee
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
James E. Derderian, Chief of Staff
James D. Barnette, General Counsel
Reid P.F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
______
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
FRED UPTON, Michigan, Chairman
JOE BARTON, Texas RON KLINK, Pennsylvania
CHRISTOPHER COX, California HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BART STUPAK, Michigan
Vice Chairman GENE GREEN, Texas
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
GREG GANSKE, Iowa DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
ROY BLUNT, Missouri JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,
ED BRYANT, Tennessee (Ex Officio)
TOM BLILEY, Virginia,
(Ex Officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Testimony of:
Bernardi, Richard T., General Manager, Bio-Imaging,
Incorporated............................................... 91
Card, Robert G., President, Kaiser-Hill...................... 114
Gallagher, James L., President, Government and Environmental
Services, Westinghouse Electric Corporation; accompanied by
Susan Wood, Director, Savannah River Technology Center,
Vice President, Westinghouse Savannah River Company........ 106
Hastings, Hon. Doc, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Washington........................................ 39
Jones, Gary L., Associate Director, Energy, Resources, and
Sciences Issues, General Accounting Office................. 43
Kotrappa, Payasada, President, Rad Elec, Incorporated........ 87
McIntire, Lee A., President, Bechtel National, Incorporated.. 110
Moniz, Ernest J., Under Secretary; accompanied by Gerald
Boyd, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science and
Technology; and Jim Owendoff, Acting Assistant Secretary of
Environmental Management, Department of Energy............. 51
Peterson, Ronald G., Group President, Fluor Corporation...... 122
Rogers, Terry W., President, Delphi Research, Incorporated... 85
Schofield, John T., President and CEO of Thermatrix,
Incorporated............................................... 96
(iii)
REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S DEPLOYMENT OF DOE-FUNDED
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP TECHNOLOGIES
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 26, 1999
House of Representatives,
Committee on Commerce,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in
room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Fred Upton
(chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Upton, Barton, Burr,
Bilbray, Blunt, Bryant, Klink, Stupak, McCarthy, and DeGette.
Staff present: Dwight Cates, majority professional staff;
Penn Crawford, legislative clerk, and Edith Holleman, minority
counsel.
Mr. Upton. Good morning, everyone.
Today, the subcommittee will continue its review of the
Department of Energy's efforts to deploy new environmental
technologies by the Department's Office of Science and
Technology, OST. These technologies are important, because DOE
currently estimates that it will cost $200 billion--``b'' as in
big--to pay for environmental cleanup responsibilities at its
several nuclear waste sites. Indeed, we have already committed
$51 billion to the cleanup effort since 1990, and DOE expects
that we will spend an additional $147 billion during the next
70 years.
In order to reduce these enormous costs and speed the
cleanup of these dangerous wastes, Congress has invested $2.7
billion in OST for the development of cheaper, faster, and
safer environmental technologies. However, so far, our expected
return on this investment has been very disappointing. In
November 1996, Chairman Bliley began a programmatic review of
this important issue by asking the Department three simple
questions: What technologies have been funded by OST? Which of
these have been deployed at DOE waste sites? And what cost
savings have occurred as a result of those deployments?
Remarkably, DOE was unable to readily provide this information,
because these basic, programmatic performance measures were
simply not tracked.
Chairman Barton's May 1997 oversight hearing revealed
severe mismanagement within OST, a lack of integration between
OST and the cleanup offices within DOE's Office of
Environmental Management, a disappointing deployment rate, and
many questionable funding decisions, including OST's $33
million investment in molten metal technologies. Although there
has been some progress in the past 2 years, according to GAO,
many of DOE's management problems have not been resolved. But,
today, I would like to focus on solving the deployment problem.
After several years of what seems to be an endless
characterization and study, DOE is now moving into the actual
cleanup phase. The Office of Environmental Restoration and the
Office of Waste Management are stabilizing and treating waste
sites, decommissioning nuclear facilities, and moving
radioactive wastes to the recently opened WIPP facility. By the
end of this year, cleanup at 4,490 sites, or 46 percent, of the
Department's 9,700 release sites will be completed. The
Department is also accelerating and disposal of the
transuranic, low-level, and mixed radioactive wastes.
Additionally, this year, 120,000 cubic meters of radioactive
wastes will be treated and disposed. Much of this work is
necessary to meet the Department's plan to complete cleanup at
many DOE sites by the year 2006. However, a large part of the
Department's cleanup job will remain after 2006. Many cleanup
projects, such as Hanford radioactive tank waste will take many
decades and several billion dollars to solve.
Unfortunately, amidst all of this cleanup progress,
relatively few OST-funded environmental technologies are
finding widespread application in the DOE cleanup market. DOE
can verify that only 160 of its technologies have been
deployed. Most of these technologies have been deployed only
once and a total of less than 300 deployment instances have
occurred. Notably, the Department's single most successful year
occurred in 1998; the year after our May, 1997 hearing with
approximately 104 deployments. However, DOE expects that only
60 innovative environmental technologies will be deployed in
fiscal years 1999 and 2000. Why would DOE set such low
expectations going forward? At this deployment rate, hundreds
of deployment opportunities will be missed annually as the
Department accelerates cleanup activities but ignores the use
of promising environmental technologies.
In addition to the total number of deployments, total cost
saving is also an important measure of success. At the
subcommittee's May, 1997 hearing, DOE identified $20 billion in
potential life-cycle cost savings that can be achieved with the
application of OST technologies. However, after $51 billion in
taxpayer funds spent on environmental cleanup to date,
including $2.7 billion spent on technology development, DOE can
account only for $700 million in projected cost savings. DOE
will never achieve $20 billion in cost savings unless the
Department and its site management contractors commit to
deploying these cost saving environmental technologies at a
much faster rate.
DOE's site management contractors play a very important
role in the technology deployment process, and new technology
will not be used unless the site contractor and its
subcontractors agree to use it. We should not expect the DOE
marketplace to embrace OST-funded technologies unless they
offer a real improvement over baseline technologies. However,
in many cases, the contractors seem to be reluctant customers
even when the technology is proven and available. Today, we
will hear about the experiences of several small businesses
that have developed promising technologies with OST funds but
are unable to penetrate the bureaucracy at DOE waste sites.
This committee's work on this issue over the past several
years has revealed that there is a substantial graveyard of
OST-funded projects that did not have technical merit, did not
have an identified end user once it was completed, or simply
should never have been funded. However, OST does offer several
proven and promising technologies. Although countless
deployment opportunities have already missed, there is a great
deal of cleanup work yet to be started or completed. If DOE and
its contractors are willing, there is ample opportunity to find
widespread use for several OST-funded technologies which could
save us billions.
Today, we will hear from GAO, DOE, the Department's site
management contractors, and a few environmental technology
vendors on how we will achieve this important goal.
And I would yield to the ranking member of this
subcommittee, Mr. Klink.
Mr. Klink. Thank you, Chairman Upton.
In May 1997, as the chairman said, the subcommittee held
its first hearing on the Department of Energy's Office of
Science and Technology. This office has long been a subject of
criticism by the General Accounting Office and by others.
Questions have been raised repeatedly about whether enough of
the technologies funded by this $2 billion program have
actually been used at DOE cleanup sites, and those questions
will be raised again here today.
The minority prepared the first request for the GAO for a
comprehensive request of OST prior to that hearing. It was
signed by both the committee and subcommittee chairmen and
ranking members. The report was completed in September 1998,
and GAO's testimony today is a follow-up to that report.
The investigation of the inefficient of taxpayer funds at
DOE should be a bipartisan effort. Now, I have to say that,
unfortunately, the preparation for this hearing was not.
Minority staff was excluded from meetings and communications
with technology vendors and site contractors. Written
information requested from the contractors by the majority was
not shared. One contractor even requested that minority counsel
attend the meeting but was told that was not allowed. Until
recently, we were not aware of the GAO's continuing work to
update our joint request. Such actions make it very difficult
for the minority to be a full and active participant in this
subcommittee's, and, Mr. Chairman, I will note, for the record,
we have had two other hearings in the past week, and in those
two hearings, the preparation was completely bipartisan; we
have worked together. So, it appears, some days we are in, and
some days we are out.
In any event, I do look forward to hearing from the
witnesses before us, and we hope that we can move forward
working together, because this is something that is very
important, and the minority would like to work with the
majority on this issue.
And if there is no objection, I would like to put into the
record two reports directly relevant to today's hearing. The
authors of those reports are not here today. One is a May 19
audit report from the Department's Inspector General on
technology deployment. The other is a communication from the
Environmental Management Advisory Board concerning one of DOE's
technology initiatives. The EMAB provided essential testimony
at our 1997 hearing, and I have got the two reports here, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Upton. Without objection, the material is entered into
the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.016
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.024
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.025
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.027
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.029
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.031
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.032
Mr. Upton. At this point, I will recognize Mr. Bryant.
Mr. Bryant. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
you for convening this hearing and look forward to the
testimony from what appears to be an outstanding group of
witnesses on the panel. I want to specially recognize our first
panelist today, my colleague, Mr. Hastings, from the fourth
district of Washington, and I know his interest in this is very
strong. He has long been an advocate for his district and for
his State on these kinds of issues, and I certainly would
welcome him and the other members of the panel and would yield
back.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Barton.
Mr. Barton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to come
to an O&I hearing. I am chairing a hearing on electricity
restructuring at 10, so I am going to have to leave, but I did
want to come and give an opening statement on this important
hearing.
Mr. Upton. If you can just put the mike closer.
Mr. Barton. Oh--on this hearing, which is a continuation of
a series of hearings that we did in the last Congress.
Over the past 10 years, we have invested nearly $3 billion
in the Department of Energy's Office of Science and Technology.
Congress appropriated those funds with the expectation that OST
would develop environmental technologies for use at DOE waste
sites to reduce the substantial costs associated with cleaning
up the Nation's nuclear wastes. We estimate those costs now
approach $200 billion.
Last Congress, when we began our review of OST, things
looked pretty bad. We held a hearing in May 1997 which
identified gross mismanagement within OST, a very poor
development deployment records of the technologies that OST has
funded. We determined that DOE's dismal deployment rate was due
to poor internal management and sufficient integration between
OST funding activities and DOE's cleanup efforts in the field.
At that hearing, the former Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management, a gentleman named Al Alm, told the
subcommittee that the record of deployment was bad because
``there was not really strong pressures to do more with less,
and without the pressure to cut costs, you don't have any
incentives to pursue innovative technologies.''
I am glad that you are holding this hearing today, Mr.
Chairman, because we have had at least 1\1/2\ years to try to
make some improvements. After the hearing back in 1997, then
Assistant Secretary Alm did undertake several initiatives to
improve the management at OST and increase the rate of
technology deployment. As a result of those initiatives, the
management, I am told, at OST has improved, and there has been
an increase in the deployment rate of OST-funded technology.
But I am also told at the staff level that we are nowhere near
where we could be and should be. Of the 160 OST-funded
technologies that have been deployed at DOE waste sites, almost
100 of them have only been deployed one time. A one-time use of
the technology that costs millions of dollars in development
will not maintain the commercial viability of the small
businesses that OST has funded to develop these new
technologies.
Apparently, there continues to be a breakdown in
integration between OST efforts and the cleanup work at DOE
waste sites. In the testimony today, the GAO will report that
OST continues to fund the development and demonstration of
technologies without involving or obtaining a commitment from
the end user. I don't think this is good policy. Each year, DOE
completes hundreds of waste cleanup actions; that is a good
thing. In many instances, the remediation project manager in
the field is unaware of the available innovative technologies
that could reduce the cost, could speed up the cleanup time
over the baseline technologies that are being deployed.
Today, we will also hear from DOE's site management
contractors. The questions that I would ask if I could stay at
the hearing are, are they doing all they can to promote and
deploy the best technologies offered by OST? Do they think that
the Department of Energy offers the right incentives to
encourage the contractors to use these new technologies?
The Department of Energy waste remediation market
represents the world's biggest single source of revenues for
large remediation companies yet this market seems impenetrable
to small companies. I hope that our hearing today will shed
some insight on ways that small companies can use these
innovative technologies and can compete.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Mr. Burr.
Mr. Burr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to take this opportunity to welcome Mr. Barton
back.
It has been somewhat lonely without him being here. I want
to take the opportunity to----
Mr. Barton. I am sure Mr. Klink shares that.
Mr. Burr. I noticed Mr. Klink grinned when we said that.
I want to take the opportunity to follow up on what Joe
did, and that was 2 years ago in April when we held a hearing
on OST, and I want to go a little bit further and read the
three points that Mr. Alm pointed to at that time for their
failure, he thought. He said, one, a conservative regulatory
environment limits the demand for innovative technologies. Two,
the Department's management and operating contracting structure
discourages use of innovation. Three, it lacks a real budget
pressure and the past has not required less costly solutions.
Well, we are here 2 years later to look at the progress
that has been made in the Office of Science and Technology. At
that time, we were very early into a 10-year plan that
projected, I think, somewhere between $12 billion and $27
billion worth of savings through the good work of OST. At that
time, 2 years ago, there were many fingers pointed at site
managers; that site managers were, in fact, the ones that
didn't promote the technological use by contractors, and, as
Mr. Barton pointed out, that in most cases we had a good one-
time usage by contractors of technology developed through OST
but never a continuation or an integration into the cleanup
process of any of the technologies from OST.
I hope, today, that the DOE will be candid with us in their
testimony and in their answers as it relates to how well we
have integrated technology into the work of all contractors,
not just some; how successful we are at fulfilling the 10-year
plan of savings of taxpayer money, because, ultimately, in that
hearing, the one thing that I think was passionate from all
Members of Congress was if it didn't change, there was no way
we could continue to support this area. I can assure you that
Mr. Barton's pledge then to supply real budget pressure can be
follow up by this hearing with an elimination through the
budget process if, in fact, we haven't made progress in the
right direction.
I thank the Chair for the opportunity to have this hearing,
look forward to the witnesses, and I welcome our colleague, Doc
Hastings.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. I would note that all members of the
subcommittee will have a chance by unanimous consent to put in
a statement into the record as part of the opening statement,
and we welcome our colleague, Doc Hastings, for his special
perspective on this issue from the State of Washington.
[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Tom Bliley, Chairman, Committee on Commerce
Today the Subcommittee continues its review of the Department of
Energy's efforts to deploy environmental technologies developed by the
Office of Science and Technology, or OST. Ten years ago, Congress
directed the Secretary of Energy to develop a program to fund the
development of technologies useful for the environmental cleanup of
DOE's nuclear waste complex. In response, DOE created OST with the
mission to develop technologies that would help DOE save money, reduce
environmental risks, and speed up the restoration process. In November
of 1996, I initiated a review of OST to determine how it had spent more
than 2 BILLION dollars of taxpayer funds. This review revealed some
real mismanagement. At this Subcommittee's May 1997 hearing, OST was
unable to provide a sound report on what technologies it had funded,
whether these technologies had actually been used, or even if there
were any savings.
Today, I am happy to report that in two years since the
Subcommittee's first hearing, progress has been made at OST to rectify
many of these management problems. Unfortunately, as OST cleaned up its
books, the books revealed a substantial catalog of poor funding
decisions and millions of dollars wasted on technologies that never
would have passed a credible peer review process. However, there are a
few diamonds in the rough. OST has funded several promising
technologies, and a few of these technologies have found widespread use
at the Savannah River site and the Oak Ridge site. But these few
success stories are the exception, not the norm.
In testimony, the Department presents tables and statistics that
show an increasing deployment rate of OST-funded technologies over the
past three years. I urge this Subcommittee to look behind these
numbers. In fact, of the 160 OST-funded technologies that have been
deployed, approximately 100 of these have been used only one time.
Commercial viability of a small business trying to sell a new
technology cannot be established or maintained with a one-time use of
that technology. In far too many instances, the Department has left
these promising small businesses stranded after spending millions to
help them get started.
DOE headquarter offices, DOE field site offices, site management
contractors, state and federal regulators, and numerous stakeholders
are not putting their shoulder to the same wheel. In many cases the DOE
has failed to bring these various parties together in this effort. The
Department must demonstrate greater leadership, otherwise the
widespread deployment and commercialization of these new technologies
will never occur.
Also, in some cases the Department's site management contractors
seem to be reluctant to use these new technologies. Let me be clear, I
do not expect site management contractors to use a new technology
simply because it has received government funds. But if a technology
has been proven to work, there should be no excuse for its lack of
widespread use at all sites where that technology is applicable.
At our May 1997 hearing, the Department identified 20 BILLION
dollars in potential life cycle cost savings as a result of the use of
OST-funded technologies. At the current rate of deployment, these
savings will not be realized. DOE must achieve quick acceptance and
application of these new technologies over the next few years as DOE
accelerates the completion of much of its cleanup work by the year
2006. Today I want to hear from the DOE, the small businesses who own
these new technologies, and the Department's site management
contractors on how we will achieve the substantial cost savings the DOE
has promised.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas
Mr. Chairman, I would like to start by thanking you for holding
this important hearing. For too many years, our government manufactured
nuclear weapons at sites around the country with little or no concern
for the environmental impact of those actions. I hope that these
hearings help to speed us along the track to cleaning up some of these
sites.
Today, this committee is set to examine the role of the Office of
Science and Technology in this cleanup process. Now, while I was not a
member of this subcommittee at the time, I understand that at a
previous hearing, in May 1997, DOE came here and told us that it while
they estimate the cost of these cleanups at $200 billion, that they
felt they could save some $20 billion of that through the development
of new cleanup technologies.
After 10 years of development and $2.7 billion, though, how much
has been saved? How far along in the cleanup process have we come?
Currently, cleanup at 4,123 of 9,700 sites, 43% of the total, has
been completed, while the savings so far are estimated at $750 million.
According to the EPA, the cleanup decisions for the remaining 5,577
sites will be made by the year 2000. It seems that we have a long way
to go in a very short period of time if we are to realize an additional
$19 billion in savings.
Questions have also been raised about the lack of a connection
between the development of technologies and the identification of an
end-user for those technologies. While a recent GAO report has
indicated that OST has improved in this area, it has been inconsistent.
OST should make sure that the technologies that they choose to fund
are useful and that the end-users are involved so that we are not
spending money on something that will not used.
Mr. Chairman, these are just a few of the issues that we should
raise in this hearing today. I look forward to hearing the testimony of
the witnesses and I hope that we can continue to work towards cleaning
up our legacy of hazardous and radioactive materials.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Hastings, under the rules of our
subcommittee, we would like to limit your remarks to 5 minutes,
and I have got this fancy-shmancy egg timer to let us know when
5 minutes is up.
STATEMENT OF HON. DOC HASTINGS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
Mr. Hastings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
inviting me to testify before your subcommittee, and I want to
say that I appreciate the courtesy this subcommittee has given
me in the past under your tenure and under Mr. Barton's tenure,
because the issues surrounding this are very important to me in
my congressional district.
As you are aware, the Hanford Nuclear Reservation is
located within my congressional district in central Washington.
With a majority of the Nation's volume of nuclear wastes
located at Hanford, the work of the DOE to clean up the legacy
of the World War II and the cold war is very important to the
health and safety of the surrounding communities in my
district.
In addition, as taxpayers, my constituents and I are
equally concerned about the efficiency of this program, and I
would like to say that in the future that the wastes are
``contained'' at Hanford, and they were ``previously'' at
Hanford. That is the goal when we talk about cleanup.
Since I came to Congress in 1995, the budget for DOE's
cleanup work has been under enormous pressure to reduce costs
and to get results. I am proud to say that at Hanford the
workers have taken this message to heart, and we really have
seen real progress made at the site. It goes without saying
that the development of new technologies has made much of this
advancement possible. A great example--this is only one
example--is the reactor cocooning called interim safe storage.
You will hear more about this from Bechtel-Hanford, because
they were the contractor in charge of finishing the C Reactor
at Hanford. In my view, this project has been a resounding
success for two primary reasons. First, the decision was made
that Hanford was going to be an industrial area and not a
children's playground, and, therefore, the standards didn't
need to be cleaned up to the standards of a playground. If you
have ever been to Hanford, you immediately know that this
decision was really just plain common sense. This decision
meant that we could focus on stabilizing the existing
facilities, including the nine reactors, and then to work to
minimize the surveillance and maintenance costs for the
foreseeable future. In other words, we could cocoon the
reactors for interim storage so we could better focus our
limited resources on other pressing needs.
Second, the deployment of several new technologies insured
that the project came in on schedule and on budget. The
cocooning of the C Reactor was really a test of how efficiently
such a project could be accomplished, and that is good news
considering that we have seven more reactors scheduled to be
cocooned in the next few years.
We demonstrated the use of 20 different technologies and
deployed 13 of those on the C Reactor. In the long run, this
will result in a savings to taxpayers when we do all the
cocooning around $23 million. Now, that this technology is
proven, it can be transferred to other sites around the complex
and the world.
While I believe that the work on the C Reactor represents
how things ought to be done with DOE working with contractors
and vendors to keep costs down and projects on schedule, I
realize that this is not always the case. You will hear from
many people today with a variety of perspectives on how the DOE
can improve its deployment rate and development schedules or
how companies can better use the technology that has already
been developed with the help of taxpayer funds.
I am sure you will hear a number of good ideas that we
should consider. However, I would like to offer one thought,
and this is probably more important than anything else as you
listen to this testimony. We must structure our cleanup effort
to ensure that profit-oriented businesses perform as
efficiently and as effectively as possible. Mr. Chairman, I
know this sounds easy; it sounds like common sense, but it is
very difficult to actually achieve. Let us look forward to ways
to enhance the cleanup effort without micromanaging companies
that we are relying on to achieve the results. Let us look for
ways to be a better partner instead of a big brother for our
major contractors. Let us look for ways to encourage small
businesses to add efficiency and innovation to the process
instead of looking for ways to force them into an established
process. If we are to be successful, we will save money----
At that, I just want to say, Mr. Chairman, the last is to
thank you very much for allowing me to testify in front of you.
I think there are innovations out there that can be used. I
think what you need to do as you proceed with this process is
to allow the free market and the innovations to be done with
little Government oversight.
And, with that, I would be more than happy to respond to
any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Doc Hastings follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Doc Hastings, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Washington
Mr. Chairman: Thank you for inviting me to testify before your
subcommittee today. As you and I have previously discussed, issues
surrounding the cleanup work of the Department of Energy are
particularly important to me and my Congressional District.
As you are aware, the Hanford Nuclear Reservation is located within
my Congressional District in Central Washington state. With a majority
of the nation's volume of nuclear waste located at Hanford, the work by
the DOE to cleanup the legacy of World War II and the Cold War is very
important to the health and safety of the surrounding communities. In
addition, as taxpayers, my constituents and I are equally concerned
about the efficiency of this program.
Since I came to Congress in 1995, the budget for DOE's cleanup work
has been under enormous pressure to reduce costs and get results. I am
proud to say that at Hanford, the workers have taken this message to
heart and we have seen real progress made at the site. And it goes
without saying that the development of new technologies has made much
of this advancement possible. A great example of this is the reactor
cocooning project, also called Interim Safe Storage.
As you will hear more about later, Bechtel-Hanford Inc. finished
cocooning the C Reactor at Hanford this past year. In my view, this
project has been a resounding success for two primary reasons. First,
the decision was made that Hanford was not going to be a children's
playground anytime soon, and therefore didn't need to be cleaned to
those standards. If you've ever been to Hanford, you'd immediately know
that this decision was really just common sense. This decision meant
that we could focus on stabilizing the existing facilities, including
the nine reactors, and then work to minimize the surveillance and
maintenance costs for the foreseeable future. In other words, we could
``cocoon'' the reactors for interim storage so that we could better
focus our limited resources on other pressing needs.
Second, the deployment of several new technologies ensured that the
project came in on schedule and on budget. The cocooning of the C
Reactor was really a test of how efficiently such a project could be
accomplished, and that's good news considering we have seven more
reactors scheduled to be cocooned in the next few years. Demonstrating
the use of 20 different technologies, with full deployment of 13, the
successful completion of the C Reactor project will enable the
remaining reactors to be cocooned more efficiently and more
effectively, saving the taxpayers an estimated $23 million. And now
that this technology is proven, it can be transferred to other sites
around the complex and around the world.
While I believe that the work on the C Reactor represents how
things ought to be done, with DOE working with contractors and vendors
to keep costs down and projects on schedule, I realize this is not
always the case. You will hear from many people today with a variety of
perspectives on how the DOE can improve its deployment rate and
development schedules, or how companies can better use the technology
that has already been developed with the help of taxpayer funds. I'm
sure you'll hear good ideas that we should consider during this funding
cycle for the Department's cleanup effort. However, I would offer one
thought as you listen to the testimony to follow: we must structure our
cleanup effort to ensure profit-oriented businesses perform as
efficiently and effectively as possible.
Mr. Chairman, this sounds easy, almost like common-sense. But it is
very difficult to actually achieve. Let's look for ways to enhance the
cleanup effort without micromanaging the companies we are relying upon
to achieve the results. Let's look for ways to be a better partner,
instead of a bigger brother, for our major contractors. And let's look
for ways to encourage small businesses to add efficiency and innovation
to the process, instead of looking for ways to force them into an
established process. If we are successful, we will have saved money for
years to come, sped up our cleanup work, and protected the health and
safety of our communities.
Thank you again for inviting me to be here today. I look forward to
working with this committee to make the changes that will ensure the
best use of our limited cleanup and research dollars.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Hastings, and we have spent a lot
of time talking specifically about this project.
I guess I just have one basic question. My sense is that
the community is fairly pleased with the work that has been
done, at least, recently there, and I don't suspect that there
is any real problems that have been--that have arisen since the
work has continued. Is my perception correct?
Mr. Hastings. I think your assessment is correct, and I
think there is a couple of reasons for that. No. 1, we changed
from the old M&O contract, that I loosely call Cost Plus, to
M&I, which is based on performance. That change came roughly 4
years ago, 4 years ago this summer, and I think that that has
been a reason why there has been some efficiencies, because
those efficiencies are based on performance, and you are
rewarded for performance. So, I think that is one of the major
changes why we have had some success out at Hanford.
Mr. Upton. What is the timetable for the cleanup? How many
years remain?
Mr. Hastings. Well, there are two huge projects going on.
The ``K Basin'' projects, and I will just briefly say that we
are moving the ``K Basins'' from right on the Columbia River,
essentially, to dry storage, and that problem was created
because of a change in the rules, if you will. ``K Basins'' was
supposed to have been a storage for a very short period of
time; in fact, it lasted for some 25 years. Now, one of the
basins has had some unanticipated leakage that we didn't
anticipate before. So, those costs need to be--and I am sure
somebody will talk about what those costs are.
The other is the 177 underground tanks, and then we don't
know, we haven't characterized everything in all of the tanks.
That is a separate project that is moving, and there are some
structural changes out at Hanford that I think were very
important structural changes that will enhance the success of
this project. But I can't say when the end is, because in both
of those cases, they are unanticipated problems, and you are
dealing, in both cases, with highly contagious--not contagious,
but hazardous materials, including radioactive material. But I
think that we have some structure now in place to see that this
can be done in a very quick manner, but, obviously, it is going
to take oversight on all of us.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Mr. Klink?
Mr. Klink. I have no questions, but I commend the gentleman
for his knowledge and his dedication to solving this problem.
It is obvious that you have put a great deal of time in on this
issue and that you bring a great amount of expertise to this
issue, and I thank you for giving us your time.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Bryant?
Mr. Bryant. I have no questions.
Mr. Upton. Ms. McCarthy?
Ms. McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, I don't have any questions, but
I thank the member for presenting this information to us; it is
very important. Thank you.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Upton. Okay. Thank you very much, Doc.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you.
Mr. Upton. The second panel includes Ms. Gary Jones,
Associate Director of the Energy, Resources, and Sciences
Issues at GAO as well as the Honorable Ernest Moniz, Under
Secretary, Department of Energy, who will be accompanied by Mr.
James Owendoff, Acting Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management and Mr. Gerald Boyd, Acting Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Office of Science and Technology.
As I think all of you know, we have a standing rule in this
subcommittee that all of our witnesses, outside of the members,
testify under oath. Do you have any objection to that? Seeing
none, we also allow you to have counsel if you wish to have
that under the House rules. Do you wish to have that?
If not, if you would rise, raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Upton. Thank you very much. You are now under oath, and
we will start with Ms. Jones. Your whole testimony will be
included as part of the record, and we would like you to limit
your remarks, if you can, to 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF GARY L. JONES, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, ENERGY,
RESOURCES, AND SCIENCES ISSUES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; AND
ERNEST J. MONIZ, UNDER SECRETARY; ACCOMPANIED BY GERALD BOYD,
ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY;
AND JIM OWENDOFF, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Ms. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am pleased to be here today to follow up on our September
1998 report to this committee. That report made several
recommendations to address DOE management problems that were
obstacles to deployment of innovative cleanup technologies.
Addressing these problems would help ensure that we get the
biggest payoff for the Federal Government's investment in these
technologies.
Our report noted that one key obstacle has been the lack of
coordination between the technology developers and DOE's Office
of Science and Technology and the technology users responsible
for cleaning up the DOE sites. As a result, there have been no
identified customers for some of the technologies that OST has
sponsored. For example, 30 percent of the 171 technologies that
OST has completed have not been used by DOE cleanup sites. Of
the technologies used, about one-half have been used only once.
OST has taken several actions to improve coordination. For
example, OST used a new ranking system that set funding
priorities according to users' needs for the fiscal year 2000
budget request. However, OST is still not using the
decisionmaking system it developed, called the Gate System, as
we recommended. The gates are decision points preceding each
stage of development and include criteria, such as defining
users' performance requirements and, before investing in
demonstration, obtaining user commitment to deploy the
technology. The gates dictate user involvement and establish
several go/no-go decision points during a project's
development. Our report pointed out that one reason the Gate
System had not been extensively used was that it would lead to
the termination of some projects, an outcome that was resisted
by OST's focus areas as well as the National Laboratories.
DOE told us that they did not implement our recommendation
on the Gate System, because they need to determine how best to
implement the system and who to involve in the Gate System
reviews. However, OST is using elements of this system in
annual project reviews. Although these reviews have benefits,
they are being implemented inconsistently, and it is unclear
whether they will ensure user commitment before substantial
investment is made.
Our 1998 report also noted that some OST developed
technologies were too generic to be readily implemented at
sites and that responsibility for funding technology
modifications to meet site-specific needs was unclear. For
example, Hanford was interested in using an OST technology to
help detect leaks in their high level radioactive waste tanks.
However, Hanford officials said that the technology needed
substantial fine-tuning for it to work on the tanks, and no
funding was available.
DOE says their Accelerated Site Technology Deployment
Program is addressing this concern. This program provides
funding to DOE sites for their first use of an innovative
technology. However, the program funds only a limited number of
projects, and the funding does not necessarily have to be used
for modifications. While this program has facilitated some
deployments, more proactively marketing technologies that OST
has already completed could provide a greater return on past
investments in technology development. This is particularly
important given that about two-thirds of the completed
technologies have never been used or were used only once.
Our report also noted that the technical expertise of OST's
focus areas varied, and site officials were sometimes reluctant
to consult with them. As a result, sites were not consistently
getting technical assistance to identify alternative solutions
to cleanup problems. OST is currently establishing a lead
national laboratory for each of its focus areas to increase
their level of expertise. Since OST is still defining the role
of the labs, it is too early to assess the impact of this
change on improving expertise.
There is also a question of the lab's ability and
willingness to support technologies developed by others,
because each lead lab is involved in developing technologies.
Further, without requiring that an OST representative
participate in technology selection, as we recommended, it is
unclear whether improving focus area expertise alone will
result in more consultations with sites.
Data on deployments was another issue we covered in our
1998 report. We found that OST's data were of poor quality. For
deployments claimed from the start of the program through
January 1998, 38 percent should not have been counted. OST has
since conducted a study that verified deployments reported for
fiscal years 1997 and 1998 and taken several steps to improve
the quality of data input, such as issuing a definition of
deployment. However, the data continues to have a high degree
of errors, with only about half being correct before data
verification. OST plans to hire consultants to help identify
the causes of poor data quality and recommend improvements. If
OST implements a systematic approach for ensuring data
accuracy, the quality of deployment data needed to manage the
program may improve.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Gary L. Jones follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ms. Gary L. Jones, Associate Director, Energy,
Resources, and Science Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic
Development Division, General Accounting Office
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be
here today to discuss the Department of Energy's (DOE) progress in
using the innovative technologies it has developed for cleaning up the
hazardous and radioactive contaminants at its sites. These sites
present environmental and human health concerns as a result of 50 years
of nuclear weapons research, testing, and production activities. Since
1990, DOE has received about $2.7 billion for developing innovative
cleanup technologies and has initiated over 800 projects. According to
DOE's data, 179 of the technologies have been deployed at DOE's sites,
100 of which have been used only once.\1\ Our September 1998 report to
this Committee made several recommendations to address DOE management
problems that presented obstacles to selecting and using innovative
technologies.\2\ The potential benefits of innovative technologies to
reduce costs or speed cleanups cannot be realized unless these
obstacles are overcome.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Figures are from DOE's data as of May 1999, some of which has
not been verified.
\2\ Nuclear Waste: Further Actions Needed to Increase the Use of
Innovative Cleanup Technologies (GAO/RCED-98-249, Sept. 25, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our testimony is primarily based on our 1998 report and on DOE's
actions in response to our recommendations. For this hearing, you asked
us to follow up on DOE's responses to our 1998findings and
recommendations on (1) coordination between technology developers and
users, (2) modifying completed technologies to meet site-specific
needs, (3) technical assistance to sites concerning innovative
technologies, and (4) the quality of data on deployment. In addition,
you asked us to determine what information is maintained and made
available to sites on the vendor companies for the cleanup technologies
that DOE has developed. In summary, we found the following:
As we reported in 1998, a key obstacle to deploying innovative
technologies has been the lack of coordination between the technology
developers in DOE's Office of Science and Technology (OST) and the end
users of technologies at DOE's cleanup sites. As a result, some
technologies have not met users' requirements. Since our report, OST
has begun several actions to improve coordination between technology
developers and users, such as setting its priorities according to the
users' stated technology needs. However, OST is still not using the
decision-making system it developed that requires user involvement
during development and user commitment before investing in
demonstrating a technology. Rather, OST is using elements of this
system in its annual project reviews. Although these reviews have
benefits, they are being implemented inconsistently and they may not
provide enough management attention to developer and user cooperation
as a technology progresses though development phases. More assurance
may be needed that users will ultimately deploy the technologies being
pursued and that a specific ``go/no-go'' decision is made before
substantial investments are made.
Our 1998 report noted that some OST-developed technologies were too
generic to be readily implemented at sites and that responsibilities
and funding sources for modifying technologies to meet site-specific
needs were unclear. DOE cites its Accelerated Site Technology
Deployment program as addressing these concerns. This program provides
funding to DOE sites for their first use of an innovative technology
developed by OST or other organizations. However, the program funds
only a limited number of projects and funding does not necessarily have
to be used for modifications. More could be done to proactively promote
OST's technologies by identifying potential applications and
alternative DOE funding for modifications, if needed.
We found that the technical expertise of OST's focus areas varied
and that site officials were sometimes reluctant to consult with
them.\3\ As a result, cleanup sites were not consistently getting
technical assistance to identify alternative solutions to cleanup
problems. OST is currently establishing lead national laboratories for
each of its focus areas to increase its level of expertise. Since OST
is still defining the role of the lead laboratories, it is too early to
assess the impact of this change on improving expertise. Furthermore,
without requiring that an OST representative participate in technology
selection, as we recommended, it is unclear whether improving focus
areas' expertise alone will result in more consultations with sites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ OST has five focus areas that manage technology development
projects for the major cleanup problems that DOE faces, such as
radioactive tank waste remediation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In our 1998 report, we found that OST's data on the deployment of
its technologies were of poor quality. Specifically, we found that, in
deployment instances claimed from the start of the program through
January 1998, 38 percent should not have been counted as deployments.
The most common type of error we found was counting technology
demonstrations that did not result in cleanup progress as deployments.
OST has since conducted a study that verified the deployments reported
for fiscal years 1997 and 1998 and has taken several steps to improve
the quality of data input such as issuing a definition of deployment.
However, the data being entered into OST's database continue to have a
high degree of errors with only about half of the deployments being
correct as listed in the database. OST plans to hire consultants to
help identify the causes of poor data quality and recommend improved
approaches. If, as a result of its study, OST develops and
systematically implements an approach for ensuring the accuracy of its
data, the quality of deployment data needed to manage the program may
improve.
Finally, OST's database, which is available to end users at sites,
generally contains information to allow sites to identify and contact
vendors. However, these data can become out of date because companies
move, merge, sell their patents, or make other changes. OST plans to
improve the information on vendors in its database by, for example,
linking information in the database with credit for deployment.
Background
The Office of Science and Technology, which is within DOE's Office
of Environmental Management (EM), develops new technologies that could
accelerate cleanup, reduce costs, reduce risks to cleanup workers, or
enable cleanup activities for which no cost-effective technologies
exist. For fiscal years 1990 through 1999, the Congress provided a
total of approximately $2.7 billion for the development of innovative
cleanup technologies, and OST has initiated over 800 development
projects.
OST is currently organized into five focus areas for specific
remediation activities: mixed waste characterization, treatment, and
disposal; radioactive tank waste remediation; subsurface contaminants;
deactivation and decommissioning; and nuclear materials. The focus
areas were established in 1994 to concentrate OST's resources on each
of the major cleanup problems that DOE faces. A field office that is
responsible for the day-to-day management of technology development
projects leads each focus area. For example, the Savannah River
Operations Office manages the subsurface contaminants focus area, and
the Richland Operations Office manages the radioactive tank waste
remediation focus area. The focus areas use DOE's national
laboratories, private companies under contract to OST, and universities
to conduct technology research and development projects.
Although OST is responsible for technology development, DOE's waste
sites are responsible for selecting the technologies they will use,
with the review and approval of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency and state agencies that regulate DOE's cleanups and with input
from the public involved with the site.\4\ Each DOE field office has
established site technology coordination groups to identify sites'
technology needs, provide OST and its focus areas with information, and
communicate information about OST's technology development projects to
the cleanup sites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Remediation activities at DOE's facilities are governed by the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, as amended, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976, as amended. These acts lay out the requirements for identifying
waste sites, studying the extent of their contamination and identifying
possible remedies, and involving the public in making decisions about
the sites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Actions Needed to Increase Coordination Between Technology Developers
and End Users
In our 1998 report, we found that OST was not sufficiently
involving end users during the development of new technologies. As a
result, no customers have been identified for some of the technologies
that OST has sponsored. Of the 171 technologies that OST had completed
as of March 1999, 59 technologies, costing about $76 million to
develop, have not been used by DOE cleanup sites.\5\ Although OST
developed a decision-making system in 1997 that would provide for
users' involvement in projects during the development process, the
agency was not consistently using this system, known as the gates
system. The gates system identifies seven stages of the technology
development process: basic research, applied research, exploratory
development, advanced development, engineering development,
demonstration, and implementation. The gates are decision points
preceding each stage. The gates system includes requirements such as
identifying specific user needs, defining users' performance
requirements, and before investing in a demonstration, obtaining users'
commitments to deploy the technology if it meets the performance
requirements. OST designed the gates system to provide its focus areas
with a process and criteria for making ``go/no-go'' decisions at
various points during a project's development. One reason why the gates
system has not been extensively used was that it would lead to the
termination of some technology projects, an outcome resisted by the
focus areas and national laboratories. We recommended that OST
rigorously and consistently use its gates system as a decision-making
tool for managing its projects and as a vehicle for increasing
cooperation between developers and users.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Figures are from OST data as of March 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OST did not implement our recommendation. The Acting Deputy
Assistant Secretary for OST told us that the office needed to determine
how best to implement the gates system and whom to involve in the gates
system reviews. However, OST has incorporated elements of the gates
system in its existing project reviews. Specifically, in March 1999,
the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary issued a memorandum directing the
focus areas to use the major criteria from the gates system in annual
assessments of their projects, known as midyear reviews. The midyear
reviews address the progress of each project, the importance and
feasibility of the technologies under development, the development
stage of the project, and whether it has met the requirements in the
gates system for that stage of development. The memo states that end
users should be involved in the reviews and that focus areas should
address the question, Has an end user made a commitment to implement
the technology? The requirements in the gates system, however, are more
specific. For instance, end users' performance requirements must be
incorporated before the project enters the advanced development stage.
The Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary told us that he considers the
midyear review guidance to be a first step in fully implementing the
gates system.
We have some initial concerns about what has been implemented to
date. We reviewed criteria that four of the focus areas had developed
for their midyear review panels to use.\6\ Only one of the focus
areas--deactivation and decommissioning--linked the review criteria to
the development stage of the project, as the gates system does. This
focus area provided reviewers with different sets of questions for
projects in basic science research, applied development, demonstration,
and deployment stages. We also note that, unlike the other three focus
areas, the radioactive tank waste remediation focus area did not review
all of its projects, but only those that were about to be demonstrated
or deployed, or that had concerns identified at previous reviews.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Three focus areas have held their reviews, but as of May 10,
1999, review reports were not yet available. A fourth focus area plans
to hold its midyear review during the last week of May 1999, while the
fifth focus area does not plan a midyear review this year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While using some of the gates system criteria in the midyear
reviews may be beneficial, we do not believe that the midyear reviews
provide enough management attention to help ensure developer and user
interaction and cooperation as a technology progresses though
development phases. A fully implemented gates system could provide more
assurance that the technologies being pursued are needed and will
ultimately be deployed by users and that a specific ``go/no-go''
decision is made before substantial investments are made.
DOE has taken some other actions to better integrate the needs and
technical requirements of end users into its technology development
projects. For example, EM has set up user steering committees to advise
each of OST's focus areas, which carry out the development and
demonstration of technologies. The user steering committees help focus
areas develop their program plans. In addition, beginning with its
fiscal year 2000 budget submission, OST used a new priority-ranking
system for its program that analyzed sites' data on their specific
cleanup projects and needs. The new priority-ranking system used
information that sites generated for DOE's AcceleratingCleanup: Paths
to Closure strategy \7\ rather than information generated by OST
personnel. Priorities for OST's fiscal year 2000 funding decisions were
based on factors such as the number and costs of DOE's cleanup projects
that could benefit from the proposed technology development work, the
degree to which the proposed work addresses the technology needs of the
sites, and whether sites plan to deploy the resulting technologies. OST
plans to continue using this user-based priority system. According to
OST officials, the system encourages the focus areas to work more
closely with end users at sites to identify work that will meet their
needs. These initiatives move the program in the right direction.
However, these initiatives, like the midyear reviews, also do not
substitute for the full implementation of the gates system. Continued
attention by OST management and focus areas will be needed to fully
implement these initiatives and make developer-user cooperation a
routine part of doing business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure is an annual report on
EM's strategy and progress in cleaning up the remaining 53 contaminated
sites. Its development requires sites to identify the scope of work,
timeframes, and costs for each of the more than 350 projects at the
cleanup sites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Identification of Responsibilities for Modifying Technologies Is Needed
During our 1998 review, DOE field staff and contractor personnel
responsible for cleanup told us that, in many cases, OST had developed
generic solutions that either do not meet specific site needs or must
be modified before they could be used. Site officials told us that it
was unclear who was responsible for paying for the modifications to
those technologies that could prove useful. For example, Hanford
officials were interested in using OST's Electrical Resistance
Tomography to help detect leaks in their high-level radioactive waste
tanks. However, a Hanford official said that the technology needed
substantial fine-tuning to make it work on the Hanford tanks and that
no funding was available at the time. In some cases, technology vendors
have been willing to fund the necessary modifications, but for some
needs unique to a DOE site, the market may be too small to elicit such
an investment from vendors. We recommended that OST identify the
technologies that could be cost-effectively used to meet sites' needs
and that EM identify funds for modification if needed.
DOE has not addressed this recommendation. In its written response
to our report, DOE cited OST's Accelerated Site Technology Deployment
(ASTD) program as addressing sites' concerns about using new
technologies. ASTD provides DOE sites with funding for their first use
of an innovative technology developed by OST or other organizations.
The program is intended to increase the use of technologies that could
speed cleanup or reduce costs. OST competitively evaluates sites'
proposals for ASTD projects to select projects to fund. Of the 46 ASTD
projects that OST has funded to date, 36 are using technologies
developed by OST.\8\ The sites receiving ASTD funds must also provide
funding for implementing the technologies, and ASTD funds are not
targeted to specific purposes within the project, such as paying for
modifications to technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ In fiscal year 1998, OST provided $27 million in funding for
the 14 ASTD projects selected from its first call for proposals. In
fiscal year 1999, OST is providing $16.8 million for 32 additional ASTD
projects selected from its second call for proposals, as well as $14.7
million for nine of the first projects that continue into a second
year. Another eight ASTD projects selected from the second call for
proposals are expected to begin in fiscal year 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While ASTD may have facilitated some deployments, OST could be more
proactive in identifying potential uses for its technologies and
providing sites with assistance in such cases. This is particularly
important, given that, of the 171 technologies that OST had completed
by March 1999, 59 technologies--or more than 30 percent--have never
been used by the sites. Of the 112 completed technologies used by the
sites, about half have been used only once. Such proactive assistance
might involve providing information on OST's technologies and technical
advice or working with the sites to arrange and share the costs of
technology modifications, if needed and cost-effective. These actions
could identify additional cost-effective uses for technologies that OST
has already completed and provide a greater return on past investments
in the development of technology.
Some Actions Have Been Taken to Provide Sites With Technical
Assistance, But Requirement Is Still Lacking
In our 1998 review, we found that OST was not fulfilling its role
of providing users with the technical advice and assistance that they
need to identify solutions to cleanup problems and to help implement
those solutions. Focus areas' abilities to provide technical assistance
varied, and some site officials told us that they were reluctant to
consult with the focus areas because they were not convinced of the
focus areas' technical expertise. We recommended that OST increase the
expertise available for providing technical assistance on innovative
technologies. We also recommended that EM require that an expert from
OST participate in technology selection processes for site cleanup
projects.
DOE has taken some actions to implement our recommendation for
increasing technical expertise. Specifically, OST recently selected a
lead national laboratory for each of its focus areas. The purpose of
establishing the lead laboratories is to im-
prove the technical expertise available to the focus areas for
assessing their technology development projects, identifying promising
basic research for further development, and providing sites with
technical assistance. With the exception of the radioactive tank waste
focus area, which has worked with a national laboratory for several
years, OST is currently in the process of defining the roles and
responsibilities for their lead laboratories.
It is too soon to tell whether establishing lead laboratories will
result in sites requesting technical assistance from OST more
frequently. We note that multiple objectives exist for the lead
laboratories and it is unclear whether technical assistance will
receive adequate attention. In addition, since each lead laboratory is
involved in developing some OST technologies, there is some question
regarding their ability and willingness to support and assist
technologies developed by other laboratories or organizations.
EM has not implemented our recommendation that experts from OST be
required to participate in sites' technology selection processes. OST's
focus areas have provided technical assistance for some technology
decisions at DOE's sites but have not been routinely involved in all
such decisions. For example, the subsurface contaminants focus area
participates with the Office of Environmental Restoration in providing
some DOE sites with consultations on groundwater and soil cleanups, and
the deactivation and decommissioning focus area is participating in
several value engineering studies with sites. According to an OST
official, the radioactive tank waste focus area, assisted by the
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, has given beneficial technical
assistance and advice to several key decisions for privatization
projects at Hanford and Oak Ridge. In privatization projects, DOE uses
fixed-price contracts, and vendors are responsible for identifying the
technologies that they plan to use. Technical assistance can help sites
develop performance specifications for the contracts, according to the
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for OST.
The Acting Assistant Secretary for EM told us that he believes a
policy on requiring OST's involvement in technical decisions for sites
would not be as useful as other efforts, such as the ASTD program and
integration teams that are studying waste problems common to several
sites and trying to develop integrated responses to the problems. We
believe that while technical assistance to sites may be increased by
these activities and by additional expertise in the focus areas,
technical assistance is not consistently being used to ensure that
sites' decisions are based on well-informed consideration of the full
range of available technology alternatives. During our 1998 review, we
found that sites infrequently sought technical assistance from OST and
its focus areas. In addition, ASTD and the integration teams have dealt
only with a relatively small number of innovative technologies. As a
result, DOE needs to do more to ensure that OST's technical assistance
role is reinforced and made more routine.
Process Is Needed to Ensure the Quality of Deployment Data
Our 1998 report found that OST's deployment data were of poor
quality. Specifically, we found that, for deployment instances claimed
from the start of the program through January 1998, 38 percent should
not have been counted as deployments. The most common type of error we
found was counting technology demonstrations that did not result in
cleanup progress as deployments. OST's focus areas are responsible for
obtaining information about the use of OST-developed technologies at
field sites and for inputting the data into a central database. While
our review was under way, OST began to verify its deployment data for
fiscal year 1997. We recommended that OST verify the accuracy of future
deployment data and label the earlier data that had not been verified
as an estimate.
Since our review, OST has completed a verification effort for
deployments that occurred in fiscal years 1997 and 1998, and DOE's
February 1999 report on the deployment of innovative technology
indicated that data from earlier years had not been verified. OST
verified its data through a Technology Achievements Study, which used
structured interviews with DOE field sites and technology vendors to
identify and obtain information about the deployments at cleanup sites.
OST corrected the errors found by the Technology Achievements Study
prior to publishing the deployment report.
OST's verification of fiscal year 1998 data found that only about
half of the deployments were correct as listed in the database.
Specifically, 18 percent of the deployments claimed should not have
been counted as deployments (compared with the 38 percent that we
found), and 43 deployments had been omitted from the database. Other
errors included deployments that were recorded in the wrong year or
that required major changes to the information provided.
Several actions were taken during 1998 to improve the quality of
the data. In August 1998, OST issued a definition of deployment for its
focus areas to use in gather-
ing and inputting deployment data. The definition emphasizes that a
deployment occurs only if the use of the technology furthers site
cleanup goals. OST also has site officials check deployment information
that focus areas have entered into OST's database. This step occurs
prior to verification through the Technology Achievements Study. In
addition, beginning in 1998, focus areas have been required to fill out
deployment fact sheets about each claimed deployment. This requirement
may help focus areas to improve their knowledge about deployments and
avoid such errors as the reporting of deployments in the wrong year or
wrong location because the fact sheets require specific information
about the site and project where the technology was used and the
identification of end users.
OST officials told us that they plan to continue the Technology
Achievements Study in fiscal year 1999 but have not decided if this
approach will be followed in the future. OST is hiring consultants to
conduct a one-time independent check of deployment data for fiscal year
1998, study reasons for the poor quality of the data, and provide
advice on ways of improving data quality. If, as a result of this
study, OST develops and systematically implements an approach for
ensuring the accuracy of its data, the quality of deployment data may
improve.
Vendor Information Is Generally Available for OST-Developed
Technologies
Private vendor companies generally provide the innovative
technologies that are selected for use at DOE sites. Therefore, it is
important that DOE's field and contractor personnel have access to
information about the vendors for OST-developed technologies. OST's
database, accessible to DOE site personnel and the public, includes
information on vendors. We reviewed vendor information in the database
for the 171 technologies that OST had completed as of March 1999.
Thirty-three of the completed technologies were not commercially
available, leaving 138 technologies that should have information for
contacting vendors. For 122 of the 138 completed, commercially-
available technologies (88 percent), OST's database included the basic
information that site personnel would need to contact a vendor namely,
the company's name, a contact name, and a phone number.\9\ According to
OST officials, if the necessary information is not in the database,
site personnel can contact staff in OST's focus areas to obtain vendor
information. We called focus area staff about 3 of the 16 completed
technologies that lacked information for contacting vendors in the
database. The focus area staff provided three vendor contacts for two
of these technologies and told us that the third technology is not
currently commercially available. We then attempted to contact the
three vendors with the information that the focus areas provided for
the other two technologies. For one of the vendor contacts, the area
code provided by the focus area was out-of-date. However, we were able
to contact the three companies and confirmed that they are current
vendors of the technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Some of the listings lacked other information, such as the
company's street address or fax number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OST officials told us that they plan to improve the vendor
information in the database. First, OST plans to change its database so
that the field for vendor information must be completed by focus area
staff when they are preparing deployment fact sheets. If the vendor
information is not complete, the focus area will not receive credit for
the deployment. Second, the Technology Achievements Study obtains
vendor information during its surveys that OST plans to put into its
database. According to OST officials, vendor information changes
frequently because companies may sell their patents, go out of
business, relocate, or change the trade name of the technology. The
manager of the Technology Achievements Study estimates that each year,
10 to 20 percent of the vendors may have some type of information
change including new addresses or area codes and new contact points due
to staff turnover or company mergers. If OST implements these two
planned actions, it will have greater confidence that its information
on vendors is complete and current.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement, and I would be pleased
to respond to any questions the Subcommittee may have.
Mr. Upton. I think you are the first witness this year that
hasn't used the full 5 minutes.
Ms. Jones. Do I get an award?
Mr. Upton. You do.
This egg timer can be it.
Mr. Moniz.
TESTIMONY OF ERNEST J. MONIZ
Mr. Moniz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Do I get the remaining
time?
Mr. Upton. It is now gone.
Ms. Jones. I yield.
Mr. Moniz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other members of the
subcommittee.
Mr. Upton. We will give you an extra 30 seconds. Go ahead.
Mr. Moniz. I am here to today to update you on the progress
the Department has made in managing the Science and Technology
Program in EM since the hearing on this topic before you 2
years ago. That hearing, we certainly acknowledge, galvanized
the Department into action to solve the technology development
and deployment problems that you pointed out.
Today, I am pleased to report to you we feel real results,
both on the on-the-ground results and new ways of doing
business, and real challenges that still lie ahead. We do feel
we are on the way toward a system that responds to our site
cleanup responsibilities, while, hopefully, getting the best
use of the American taxpayers' dollars.
The environmental safety and health problems in the weapons
complex, as you know, are often larger and more intractable
than those in most conventional commercial cleanup programs. In
many cases, no effective technologies have existed, and our
goal is to develop and deploy those technologies that can help
us achieve cleanup faster, cheaper, better, and safer.
We are investing only about 4 percent of the EM Program's
annual budget in the Science and Technology Program, about half
of the R&D investment made by large companies that depend upon
innovative technologies for success. The potential payoff is
substantial. Based on evaluations including independent
evaluations by the Corps of Engineers and the EMAB, we expect
that our science and technology investments will produce $10
million to $20 million in life-cycle savings for the program.
To achieve these results, we have done the following:
first, we have shifted our science and technology investments
in this 2-year period from developing technology that can be
used to technology that will be used. Site cleanup project
managers, as opposed to headquarters, are driving the
investment decisionmaking to address on-the-ground needs. The
technology needs have been mapped from major projects to
identify the technology chokepoints and ensure that what is
being developed will address the need.
I would just add that I have been with the Department now
for 1\1/2\ years, very heavily involved in portfolio
development and road mapping and technology across the board.
Frankly, no group has been more aggressive in pursuing those
approaches to planning than the Office of Science and
Technology in the EM.
Second, we have significantly strengthened our peer merit
review of technology development. We are using peer review both
at the outset of a project as well as to help us make go/no go
decisions at key points in an ongoing project. The National
Academy of Sciences favorably reviewed the system.
Third, in fiscal year 2000, we are putting into place a
significantly improved set of performance measures to help
drive the pro-
gram to success, including tracking number of technologies
deployed. We need good data to back up these performance
measures, and we are working to improve this. We are using the
results of the independent review of the fiscal year 1998
deployment data to develop and implement a system to validate
the fiscal year 1999 deployments as they occur. And to improve
cost savings data, we will begin using a standard calculation
methodology in fiscal year 2000.
We also continue to work on increasing deployment levels.
Today's hearing also raises questions about whether we are
managing our contractors in a way that maximizes new technology
benefits. Key to this are the incentives we provide to our
contractors to use new technologies. However, current contract
incentives, to complete as much work as quickly as possible or
within a fixed price, may occasionally conflict with trying to
accomplish that goal. Therefore, I have initiated an assessment
of existing contract incentives in our M&O and M&I contracts to
develop the contract incentive options for enhancing and better
aligning toward the use of new technologies. I expect an
initial report in September.
Technologies need to be available commercially to enable
deployment at multiple sites--another issue you have raised.
That is why we are focusing on developing the industry
partnerships needed to increase multi-site deployments. To
date, over 120 companies have told us that technologies we help
them develop are now commercially available. This is
significant progress, but we still need to do more with the
vendors to ensure even greater use.
Regulatory and stakeholder acceptance of new technologies
is also paramount to deployment. We have been working with the
States and the EPA to gain an acceptance of new technologies
and reduce regulatory barriers to deployment. But more needs to
be done, and we are going to expand our work, through the EPA
and the States, through the Federal Remediation Roundtable to
improve permitting processes for new technologies.
While more needs to be done, we are achieving on-the-ground
results. Over 50 percent of the OST developed technologies have
been deployed in the past 2 years. In fiscal year 1998, alone,
we had 108 first-time deployments of new technologies at DOE
sites, a sharp increase from previous years--That is indicated
on that slide over there.
Some of these first-time deployments came from the 13 new
projects under the Technology Deployment Initiative.
Ultimately, these projects, using a much better system than was
being used 2 years ago, are now expected, to result in over 70
deployments and $700 million in projected life-cycle cost
savings.
Mr. Upton. Go ahead.
Mr. Moniz. If I may just take another minute or 2, I
appreciate it. I will shorten the rest.
I do want to emphasize that technology development and
deployment are more complex than merely decreeing that ``thou
shalt use new technologies'' and counting deployments. The
goal, after all, again, is not simply more technology
deployment but making cleanup faster, cheaper, safer, and
better. As Albert Einstein said--now I am a physicist--``Not
everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that
counts can be counted.''
Our technology investments are diverse. They may be very
complex, such as the project that Congressman Hastings referred
to at Hanford--actually, a different one than he referred to--
an enhanced sludge washing approach being developed for $10
million has now reduced the projected life-cycle baseline cost
by $6 billion, which would be, obviously, roughly equal to the
entire lifetime investment in OST technologies.
On the other hand, the technology may be simple and cheap,
such as this device, the band ball, developed by Savannah River
Technology Center. This technology in its simplest terms is a
low-resistance check valve with a ping pong ball inside. What
it does is greatly improves the removal of subsurface
contaminants. It basically works on the differential in
barometric pressure from day to day. This is now doing a job
for less than half the cost of conventional approaches, and it
is being used by more 15 Government, commercial, and
international organizations, and as best we know this ping pong
ball was not manufactured in China.
But no matter whether it is cheap or expensive, technology
is helping us to do the job better. We are addressing some
previously intractable problems, such as the highly radioactive
waste in the gunite tanks at Oak Ridge--and, again, we have a
slide to indicate that. Technology is helping us do the job
cheaper. For example, the Department made the cleanup at Oak
Ridge $40 million cheaper with the out-of-tank evaporator.
Technology is helping us work faster. Livermore developed the
technology, and we are now ready for widespread use inside and
the outside the complex that removes subsurface contaminants,
orders of magnitude more quickly than conventional pump and
treat. Technology is helping us work more safely. For example,
the oxy-gasoline torch eliminates fire hazards for our workers.
So, we are looking to continuously improve how we do
business, as if we make progress, we still have more to
implement, as you well know, in the next 2 years--we do ask for
your support to continue our progress in this vital program.
And the last plea I would make is that in evaluating any RD&D
portfolio, that you assess the overall portfolio and not focus
just on individual projects.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ernest J. Moniz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ernest Moniz, Under Secretary of Energy,
Department of Energy
Mr. Chairman and other Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to
be here to discuss with you the improvements we have made over the past
two years in the Environmental Management (EM) Office of Science and
Technology (OST) program's development and effective deployment of
innovative technologies to support the cleanup of the Department's
nuclear weapons complex.
introduction
The Office of Environmental Management's (EM) mission is to clean
up the environmental legacy of U.S. nuclear weapons production and
nuclear research. EM's goal is to complete as much of the cleanup as
possible by the year 2006. But considerable cleanup will remain after
2006 focused on the most complicated and difficult problems. The EM
cleanup effort is expensive, technologically complex, closely
regulated, and relatively unique in the world. Achieving the goal of
accelerated cleanup requires targeted investments in science and
technology to respond to hundreds of needs identified by cleanup
project managers at the affected sites.
EM's science and technology investments (a total of $243M in fiscal
year 1999) have the potential to provide more effective, less
expensive, more timely, and safer environmental remedies, including
technologies where no effective remedies currently exist. These
investments can also provide the data or alternative approaches to
reduce the risk that cleanup will be delayed or will exceed current
cost estimates. Science and technology efforts within EM span the full
spectrum from basic research to direct deployment assistance for
cleanup projects and lead to fully integrated, technically defensible
solutions for cleanup and long-term environmental stewardship at DOE
sites. In order to maximize the value to the cleanup effort, EM's
investments in science and technology must be effectively implemented
across the DOE complex.
Approximately two years ago, your subcommittee held a hearing on
the effectiveness of the OST program. At that time there was limited
evidence that OST developed technologies were being deployed across the
EM complex. During that hearing, your subcommittee also identified a
number of concerns with the OST program: little or no involvement of
the actual cleanup project managers with the selection, development,
and implementation of new technologies; lack of a clear priority
setting process for technology selection; lack of robust peer and merit
review of science and technology investments; lack of effective
measures to assess overall program performance; and lack of evidence
that significant numbers of new technologies were being deployed in
support of the Department's cleanup mission. We are here today to
report that the Department took these criticisms very seriously, and as
a result, EM has made a number of significant improvements in the
management and integration of the OST program.
Over the last two years, OST and EM have substantially improved
their technical and strategic planning processes. First, we developed
policy and implemented new processes such as needs validation to assure
that science and technology investments are driven by cleanup project
managers. Second, we developed and are using a transparent,
quantitative prioritization system for determining our science and
technology investments; this system is wholly based on cleanup project
data. Third, we instituted uniform and systematic peer and merit review
systems; both are in place and working. Fourth, we established
meaningful and challenging performance measures to assure that
programmatic success can be demonstrated to regulators, state partners,
and other stakeholders.
The net result of these changes has been a significant improvement
in the way OST is managing our science and technology investments,
which is evidenced in part by increasing deployment rates for
innovative technologies across the DOE complex. With over 75 percent of
the EM cleanup still ahead of us (in terms of estimated cost), the
increasing deployment of innovative technologies should provide
considerable opportunities for significant cost savings (i.e., billions
of dollars) and schedule acceleration over baseline estimates. We are
achieving results from our science and technology investments.
Achieving Results
In the past, the OST program has been criticized for the relative
lack of deployments of new technologies across the DOE complex. I am
pleased to report that we have turned the corner and are beginning to
see the results of the investments we have made in science and
technology. As with any science and technology initiative, substantial
results cannot be expected overnight. We know that it takes at least
several years to develop technology, gather needed supporting cost and
performance data to demonstrate its utility and cost effectiveness
under actual field conditions, and to make it ready for actual
implementation. To accelerate the use of new technology in the EM
cleanup effort, EM management of science and technology investments has
evolved from a focus primarily on technology development prior to
fiscal year 1996 to the more recent thrust toward deployment. The
success of that strategy is now apparent.
OST-developed technologies, implemented by commercial vendors, are
being used to clean up DOE sites across the country. From fiscal year
1991 through fiscal year 1998, almost 300 deployments of OST
technologies took place at 30 DOE sites. While many of EM's cleanup
issues are unique to DOE, there are some common problems shared with
other federal agencies and organizations. To date, 32 deployments of
OST-developed technologies have occurred at 28 non-DOE sites across the
country and abroad. These sites include numerous military
installations, Superfund sites, nuclear reactors, and various
industrial sites.
For fiscal year 1998, EM committed to 49 first-time deployments of
innovative technologies at DOE sites. This goal has been far exceeded
and OST has played a major role in that success. DOE's Field Offices
have reported 122 first-time deployments of innovative technologies in
fiscal year 1998: 53 of non-OST technologies and 69 of OST-developed
technologies. OST has conducted an intensive review of claims regarding
its 69 technologies. To date, OST has verified that 55 of these first-
time deployments utilized OST funded technologies at DOE sites. These
55 deployments, taken together with the 53 non-OST technology
deployments, makes a total of at least 108 first-time DOE site
deployments in fiscal year 1998. Considering only OST-developed
technologies, in addition to the 55 first-time DOE site deployments,
OST has also verified 49 subsequent technology deployments at DOE sites
and 9 non-DOE site deployments, for a total of 113 deployments of OST
sponsored technologies in fiscal year 1998. These 49 subsequent
technology deployments reflect multiple usage of 18 OST sponsored
technologies. Attachment 1 provides a list of OST developed
technologies that contributed to meeting performance measures in fiscal
year 1998.
More OST supported technologies are being deployed each year, and
an increasing number of technologies are being deployed multiple times.
Figure 1 below illustrates the increasing deployment trend for OST
technologies. From fiscal year 1991 through fiscal year 1998, over 40
percent of OST's deployed technologies have been used more than once.
Of the technologies with multiple deployments, 52 percent have been
deployed 3 or more times. This increase in deployment of innovative
technologies is contributing to schedule acceleration at many sites.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.033
Figure 1. Cumulative Totals of OST Technology Deployments by Fiscal
Year
In fiscal year 1998, OST initiated the Technology Deployment
Initiative (TDI), now known as the Accelerated Site Technology
Deployment (ASTD) initiative, to provide a means and incentive to
promote the deployment of innovative technologies at multiple DOE
sites. During fiscal year 1998, 14 projects, encompassing some 36
technologies, were started. By the end of fiscal year 1998, 13
deployments at 9 DOE sites occurred under 5 of these projects, with as
many as 70 deployments projected over the next several years. Although
the number of deployments for fiscal year 1998 was originally
identified as 11 during testimony before the House Science Committee in
March 1999, a final data review increased this by 2 deployments, to a
total of 13. One particularly notable success under this program is the
Segmented Gate System (SGS). The SGS, which reduces the volume of
radioactively contaminated soils that requires disposal, was deployed
at four DOE sites in one year under ASTD. For the original fourteen
projects, over 60 private entities are providing products and services,
of which approximately two-thirds are small businesses.
In fiscal year 1999, a total of 40 projects have been selected for
initiation under the second round of the ASTD program. Technologies
stemming from these projects are scheduled to be deployed at fifteen
DOE sites, within one to two years of project start-up. Of particular
note, the Hydrous Pyrolysis/Dynamic Underground Stripping (HP/DUS)
technology will be used to clean up dense non-aqueous phase liquids
(DNAPLs) in the subsurface at DOE's Portsmouth, Ohio facility, the
Savannah River Site, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in
place of pump and treat technology.
In 1998, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed EM's efforts
to deploy innovative technologies. GAO found that OST's overall
deployment rate is comparable to deployment rates at both the
Environmental Protection Agency's Superfund Innovative Technology
Evaluation Program and the Department of Defense's Environmental
Security Technology Certification Program.
Although the results of our science and technology investments are
beginning to payoff, there remain areas in which improvements are still
needed. For example, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has
recently released an audit report critical of several aspects of OST's
efforts to deploy decontamination and decommissioning technologies. We
have reviewed this report. We have determined what corrective action is
needed to address the report's major findings and are beginning to
implement those actions.
Strategic Planning
To ensure that we are working to achieve common science and
technology goals, we developed the EM Strategic Plan for Science and
Technology and the EM Research and Development Program Plan. These
documents articulate a set of common goals and objectives, shared by
the EM complex, for the science and technology programs within EM. They
describe the relationship between the Department's missions, EM's
specific missions, the programs established to accomplish these
missions, the technical opportunities and barriers within these
programs, and the science and technology investments needed to directly
support EM's missions. But setting policy and having a plan are not
sufficient; we must also be able to successfully execute our program as
well. The OST Management Plan is one primary document that we use to
help execute the program. And one major requirement pervasive in all of
these plans is that EM's science and technology investments must be
driven by cleanup project managers, i.e., site managers responsible for
on and under the ground cleanup, in order to have the maximum impact.
At this point I want to elaborate on our major policy and programmatic
changes.
Cleanup Project Managers Drive Science and Technology Investments
The first key policy decision we made was that cleanup project
managers must drive science and technology investments for the OST
program to be successful. Identification of cleanup project manager
needs is the first step in the development of solutions to EM cleanup
problems. Input from cleanup project managers is essential to
accurately define and validate the needs to be addressed by EM's
science and technology investments. Science and technology program
needs are currently derived from needs developed by cleanup project
managers and documented in ``need statements,'' disposition map
technology risk levels, critical pathway technology risk levels, and
information contained in EM Project Baseline Summaries (PBS), i.e.,
relatively high-level project descriptions. Preliminary information for
fiscal year 2000, for example, indicates that one-third of EM's cleanup
projects and about 15 percent of the waste streams have technology
needs associated with them. The majority, but not all, of these needs
are currently being addressed by the OST program. The information also
indicates the size (cost and extent) and complexity of the technical
needs facing EM's science and technology program. They also identify
the individual cleanup project manager, the schedule within which the
solution must be available, and the impacts if these needs are not met.
Based on the cleanup project managers' input, OST's technical Focus
Areas--essentially, teams of Federal and contractor experts that
concentrate on a major area of technical need, e.g. high-level waste
tanks or deactivation and decommissioning of facilities--begin an
iterative process to develop fully integrated, multi-year technical
responses to the site needs. The Focus Areas work closely with cleanup
project managers to identify and document the specific science and
technology requirements a solution must meet. The Focus Areas establish
problem area roadmaps, also known as multi-year program plans, to
document the life-cycle planning for the solutions they are providing.
In addition, the Focus Areas ensure that their technical responses are
fully and completely integrated into the cleanup project manager's
activities.
This process of integrated, joint planning is intended to ensure
that budgets are adequate to support the technology development
efforts; delivery schedules align with technology insertion points; and
the cleanup programs have the financial and technical resources to
support deployment of the new technology. Finally, ongoing science and
technology projects are evaluated at key decision points to determine
if an effort should be continued or if an alternate strategy should be
adopted. Clean-
up project managers are fully involved in these evaluations to ensure
continued commitment to successful implementation of the solution.
Transparent, Quantitative Prioritization System for Proiect Selection
The second key policy decision we made was to use a transparent and
quantitative system for establishing OST's workscope priorities based
on data provided by our Field Offices. The complexity and duration of
the EM cleanup effort requires OST to carefully prioritize and sequence
science and technology projects. Our science and technology activities
are now planned and managed in an interactive, coordinated and
participatory relationship with EM's cleanup project managers and
stakeholders. OST's prioritization process is iterative and
integrative, beginning at the site problem level. EM's science and
technology activities are pursued if and only if they:
<bullet> meet the highest priority cleanup project needs;
<bullet> reduce the cost of EM's costliest cleanup projects;
<bullet> reduce technology risk; and/or
<bullet> accelerate and increase technology deployment by bridging the
gap between development and use.
Prioritization is first performed by the cleanup project managers,
in the sense that only those OST technical responses that are endorsed
by a cleanup project manager will be considered for integration and
prioritization into each Focus Area's portfolio. Prioritization of
technical activities is performed by each Focus Area, and then
reviewed, revised if necessary, and approved by the Focus Area's User
Steering Group, an oversight group charged with providing managerial
oversight of the Focus Area's investment portfolio. Following this, the
technical responses are compiled into work packages, which represent a
set of related technical responses to site problems. A national, OST
level prioritization process is then applied using a multi-attribute
analysis, that includes the following factors: cost savings, technology
deployment, site needs, and technical risk. The results of this process
are then reviewed by the Department's Field Office Managers and EM's
Deputy Assistant Secretaries to determine the final integrated priority
list. This entire process has recently been reviewed and endorsed
earlier this year by the Environmental Management Advisory Board
(EMAB), an independent advisory group to EM. The EMAB concluded that
OST's prioritization system was a transparent, robust quantitative
prioritization system that is rooted in technology needs data supplied
by project cleanup managers. We are committed to using this
prioritization system to determine our portfolio of science and
technology investments.
Peer and Merit Review Systems
The third key policy decision was to implement robust peer and
merit review systems. Continuous internal and external review by peers
and sponsors is generally recognized in the science and technology
community as a necessary element of sound program evaluation and
decision making. OST has put in place the review mechanisms and groups
needed to assure the technical or scientific merit and programmatic
relevance (potential to meet a cleanup project manager's needs) of its
activities. Scientific merit review is performed by independent peer
reviewers from universities and national laboratories, selected by the
Department's Office of Science on the basis of their professional
qualifications and expertise. OST's Environmental Management Science
Program has been recognized for the quality of its scientific peer
review through receipt of a Vice-Presidential Hammer Award.
Technical merit reviews of specific technologies are conducted for
OST by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). ASME review
panels provide independent, external evaluation of the technical merits
of a technology. Through fiscal year 1998, ASME has conducted over 58
technology merit reviews for OST, with another 40 reviews planned to be
completed by the end of fiscal year 1999. Programmatic relevance
reviews are conducted by each Focus Area to evaluate research projects
for programmatic relevance and technical, schedule, and cost
performance. Programmatic relevance review panels include OST program
managers, cleanup project managers, subject matter experts, stakeholder
representatives, and technology developers, as appropriate. Finally, ad
hoc reviews are conducted of the OST Program by the National Research
Council/National Academy of Sciences (NRC/NAS) and the EMAB. These ad
hoc reviews generally address broad program issues and help guide OST
and EM in addressing problems of greatest significance to the
Department.
Performance Measures
The fourth key policy decision was to use an effective set of
performance measures at the corporate EM level to guide and evaluate
our science and technology invest-
ments. Performance measures and the appropriate associated metrics are
critical to the evaluation and ultimate success of any program. They
can effectively drive the direction of any program and ultimately help
it succeed. EM's performance measures associated with science and
technology investments have evolved with the EM program and
improvements in our understanding of how to most effectively use
performance measures to achieve program goals.
Two years ago, at the time of our first hearing, EM was not
measuring numbers of technology deployments or associated cost savings.
That hearing catalyzed a number of changes to our performance
measurement system. Over the past two years, we have developed a set of
four corporate science and technology measures that are sound,
balanced, complement each other, and are reported by our customers at
our Field Offices through the Paths to Closure, EM's corporate strategy
document. The first of these measures--the number and impact of
technology deployments--was initiated in fiscal year 1998. Starting in
fiscal year 2000, the following three measures will also be used:
<bullet> number of high priority site needs being addressed by science
and technology activities
<bullet> reduction in programmatic risk resulting from science and
technology activities
<bullet> life cycle cost savings resulting from science and technology
activities.
These four measures are designed to assess both how well we are
managing our investments in, and how effective we are in using the
results from, our science and technology activities. These measures
will enable us to:
<bullet> measure the impact of our science and technology investments
in terms of deployment by tracking both the number of
technology deployments and, more importantly, a quantitative or
qualitative discussion of the value of the deployment in
helping to meet site and state regulator objectives;
<bullet> use site needs to better target science and technology
investments; to evaluate and track high priority site needs
being addressed; and the science and technology solution to
those needs that meet site schedule requirements;
<bullet> make the reduction of programmatic risk a priority for science
and technology investments by tracking the reduction in
programmatic risk (technological risk in particular) associated
with the site critical closure paths and the management of
contaminated media, waste streams, and materials; and
<bullet> improve our focus on the highest cost projects, set metrics
and document the resulting life-cycle cost savings from EM's
science and technology investments as part of our Project
Baseline Summary life-cycle cost variance analysis.
These four measures are a balanced and logical approach to
determining science and technology based contributions to accelerated
cleanup goals. These four performance measures are so integral to the
way we are managing our science and technology investments that I want
to discuss each of them in more detail.
Measure the effectiveness of our science and technology investments
EM started to track both the deployment of new technologies and the
value of those deployments in 1997. EM established technology
deployment as a corporate performance measure in 1998, asked the sites
to review and comment on the data, and is currently improving the
process for collecting, analyzing, and validating this data. EM is also
working on better ways to capture the value and/or impact of
deployments through qualitative descriptions rather than relying on
simply the number of deployments. The number of deployments is a simple
output measure. It implies that all deployments are of equal value and
that the value is something worth measuring. In fact, deployments vary
greatly in terms of impact on EM cleanup. For example, the Large Scale
Demonstration Project at the Hanford 105-C-Reactor involved the
demonstration of 20 innovative technologies, of which 15 were
ultimately deployed, to provide for the safe storage of the C Reactor's
core for up to 75 years until complete decontamination and
decommissioning can be performed. While this project nets a count of 15
technology deployments (including a laser tracking and data system, the
STREAM data management and integration system, and anti-contamination
clothing for workers with a personal heat stress monitoring system to
prevent overheating), the real impact of this project will stem from
the benefits that can be applied to another 12 full-scale production
reactors throughout the Department's nuclear weapons complex. As a
second example, the deployment of the Out of Tank Evaporator, Light
Duty Utility Arm, Fluidic Pulse Jet Mixer, Confined Sluicing End
Effector, and Crossflow Filtration technologies at Oak Ridge net a
simple count of 5 technology deployments, while masking the important
baseline enabling and schedule accelerating effects of these tank waste
cleanup technologies at Oak Ridge and potentially at Hanford and
Savannah River.
Use site needs to target science and technology investments
In fiscal year 1999, the site science and technology needs are
built directly into the cleanup projects. For the first time, we will
have comprehensively integrated the cleanup projects and site needs and
acquired direct user approval of OST's work packages at the project
level. That is, we will have a solid understanding of the relationship
between the approximately 400 cleanup projects, the 500 site needs, and
the 40 Focus Area work packages or investments. This relationship
serves as the baseline from which to measure progress. Focus Area
efforts to meet or address EM's highest priority needs will be
evaluated starting in 1999. Progress toward elimination of those needs
will be measured starting in 2000. This data is reported by the cleanup
project managers through the Project Baseline Summary structure
established in the Paths to Closure, EM's corporate strategy document.
Make the reduction of programmatic risk a priority for science and
technology investments
EM conducted an initial baseline of programmatic risk in 1998. This
was done through two methods: the pathways and events associated with
the site critical closure paths and the contaminated media, waste
streams, and materials identified in the disposition maps. In 1999, we
are baselining how EM's investments in science and technology correlate
to those risk levels. In a manner similar to the site needs, as
described above, we are mapping specific Focus Area work packages or
investments, to specific critical pathways and events and particular
streams on the disposition maps. The relationship between those
elements and the risks associated with the elements provide us with our
starting point or baseline from which to measure the effectiveness of
the science and technology investments. That is, we must measure
whether our investments are reducing programmatic risk and whether the
programmatic risk is being reduced in those areas that are most
important to the cleanup effort. This measure is also extremely
effective in helping OST to target the investments; we now know the
critical path and how we relate to it and by waste stream which
problems we are trying to solve. In 2000, we will be able to start to
measure changes in the risk levels, for pathways, events, and
disposition maps that are due to science and technology investments.
Improve our focus on the highest cost projects and document resulting
cost savings
In 1998 EM's cleanup projects were baselined and accelerated
cleanup goals were established. However, systematic tracking of science
and technology based cost savings relies on EM's ability to document
detailed, project-level progress towards accelerated cleanup goals. The
1999 Paths to Closure guidance starts to do exactly that. This year
through a Project Baseline Summary Cost Variance Analysis Report we are
requesting each of the projects to identify changes in projected life
cycle cost. This analysis looks at the life-cycle cost from the
previous year and provides an explanation of whether the life-cycle
cost for the project has gone up or down and why. One of the reasons
for the decrease in life-cycle cost is the application of science and
technology to change or improve the technical approach to the cleanup
activity. Using this data, we will be able to set metrics for cost
savings targets starting in 2000. This data will be reported annually
through the Project Baseline Summary structure.
The four complementary performance measures that we are
implementing are user-owned and determined, are outcome-oriented, can
be tracked over time, and relate directly to cleanup. Ensuring that the
measures are user-owned was a key element in their development and will
be key in their implementation and reporting. To meet this key element,
we needed a set of corporate measures, not OST measures, which were
reported by the Field Offices, through the project structure EM is
currently using to manage and plan cleanup activities. The performance
measures are outcome oriented and relate directly to the cleanup. That
is, they report the solution to needs, the reduction in risk, and the
achievement of cost savings that EM needs to meet site closure goals.
These measures will be tracked on an annual basis using site
information.
Although we believe we have the right performance measures in terms
of driving the program to achieve certain goals, we have had difficulty
in establishing the right metrics. When implementing a new set of
measures the availability of solid baseline data is critical to setting
realistic but challenging metrics. The corporate measures we are
implementing are based on data that was first available, in any form,
in January 1998. The data will be available in a more useable form late
in fiscal year 1999. Metrics development is a challenging task as is
evident from our early efforts to pick a corporate level metric for
deployment. We are considering the following factors in the development
of metrics:
<bullet> numerical goals versus percentage goals to drive and evaluate
performance;
<bullet> use of complete data sets or subsets of the data, e.g.,
technological risk of all the waste streams or just the high
risk waste streams;
<bullet> annual goals versus life-cycle goals, e.g., should we analyze
historical cost savings only or life-cycle cost savings; and,
<bullet> data collection methods available through Paths to Closure.
We believe these corporate measures are sound in terms of focusing
the program and as tools for improved management. However, to allow
proper analysis, that is, to successfully acquire the data for the
measures and to evaluate performance, the metrics must be correctly
crafted. This is a challenging task that we are still working on and
each of these factors must be taken into consideration as we develop
the specific metrics.
Other Concerns
During the last hearing before this committee, OST was criticized
for the quality of its deployment and cost savings data. As a result,
verifying technology deployments has been a key issue for us and we
have been actively working to improve the quality of our deployment
data. In fiscal year 1998, OST constructed Deployment Fact Sheets for
every technology deployment that occurred from fiscal year 1995 through
fiscal year 1998. These sheets were designed to both verify technology
deployments and to disseminate information about the deployments (they
are available on the internet at http://ost.em.doe.gov/tms). Our
highest priority has been placed on validating those deployments that
occurred in fiscal year 1998.
We have conducted a validation effort, known as the Technology
Achievement Study (TAS), on the fiscal year 1998 Deployment Fact
Sheets. The TAS is conducted by an independent contractor under the
direction of an OST Federal employee, who is not aligned
organizationally with any of OST's technical Focus Areas. This assures
that the TAS will remain free of conflict of interest. The TAS works
directly with technology vendors and their DOE and non-DOE customers to
verify the technology deployments reported on the Deployment Fact
Sheets. Any discrepancies that are revealed by TAS are then resolved
with the Focus Areas and the Field Offices, and any necessary changes
are then made to the final Deployment Fact Sheets. As a result of the
application of the TAS to the fiscal year 1998 deployment data, we have
a high degree of confidence (>90%) in the quality of that data.
For the fiscal year 1998 deployments, we are also performing a one-
time additional level of validation and verification. We have requested
the Center for Acquisition and Business Excellence at the Federal
Energy Technology Center to commission an independent audit of the
fiscal year 1998 Deployment Fact Sheets. The draft results of this
audit are anticipated by June 15, 1999.
OST continues to seek ways to improve the quality of deployment
data and to verify the accuracy and completeness of current and future
deployment information. Frankly, this is a difficult and expensive
task, but one to which we are committed. During its 1998 review of the
OST program, GAO contacted ten research and development organizations;
not one of these organizations routinely tracked deployments. OST
recognizes the importance of this data as an effective, albeit limited,
performance measure and will continue to track deployments.
Cost Savings
Since we testified in May 1997, EM has taken a number of steps to
improve the collection of cost savings data. In 1998, EM developed and
distributed a standardized cost savings methodology for use in
calculating technology-based cost savings. In 1999, as part of EM's
planning efforts, we established a data collection system for obtaining
life-cycle cost savings data from the Field Offices on a project-by-
project basis. Using this improved system will enable EM to identify,
by project, where technology is being used to reduce the life-cycle
cost of the cleanup, as well as where it isn't but needs to be. The
standardized methodology and the data collection system support the
implementation of technology-based cost savings as a corporate
performance measure in fiscal year 2000.
Over the last two years EM has taken several steps to increase the
amount of cost savings that result from our investments in science and
technology. We have taken aggressive measures to accelerate the
widespread use of new technologies. We are moving towards full
integration of our efforts with the cleanup projects, and we are using
the Field reported, and estimated, potential cost savings to prioritize
work. Having said that, there are many factors that affect the actual
cost savings that will result from these investments. These factors,
including changes in regulatory requirements, the schedules and
validity of existing baselines, and innovative approaches to
contracting, make it difficult to either calculate or separate out what
part of the cost savings was due specifically to a change in
technology.
As noted in the Paths to Closure strategy document, remaining life-
cycle cost of the EM cleanup is approximately $147 billion. While we
are continuing to review our life-cycle cost estimates, we know that a
major portion (>60%) of those costs will occur after 2006. In the
intervening two years since our last hearing before this committee, we
can confidently report to you an additional $300 million in projected
life-cycle cost savings resulting from the deployment of some of our
innovative technologies. Note that this figure represents the estimated
savings from the use of twelve technologies and is not intended to
reflect an exhaustive cost savings estimate of all our deployments
since 1997. This figure of $300 million in projected life-cycle cost
savings was developed by OST's Focus Areas working in conjunction with
field office personnel; site concurrence has already been obtained for
the majority of the estimated savings. Further, this figure of $300
million is in addition to the $400 million in cost savings that
resulted from the deployment of OST developed technologies from the
inception of the program through fiscal year 1996, as previously
reported to this subcommittee. Although this latter figure is difficult
to validate precisely, it suggests that the rate of cost savings is
increasing as new technologies achieve widespread deployment.
We continue to believe that science and technology investments are
needed and estimate that the life-cycle cost savings at the end of the
cleanup will be in the range of $10-20 billion. This range is based on
projected life-cycle cost savings from innovative technologies
identified in the fiscal year 1998 Paths to Closure strategy document
and includes both technologies already incorporated into site baselines
and technologies identified as potential substitutes for current
baselines. These cost savings estimates were obtained from information
provided by each field office for sites under its jurisdiction. It
should also be noted that this range of $10-20 billion is in accord
with other assessments of the potential life-cycle cost savings
resulting from the use of innovative technologies; for example, EMAB
estimated a potential life-cycle cost savings of approximately $10
billion; a study by the Los Alamos National Laboratory identified a
potential life-cycle cost savings of $10-17 billion from the
application of OST-developed technologies; in another assessment, OST
estimated $24-34 billion; and the Army Corps of Engineers, in a review
of the OST assessment, estimated a potential life-cycle cost savings of
approximately $20 billion. In addition, the standardized cost savings
methodology and the collection of cost savings data on a project by
project basis will enable us to improve our understanding of the impact
of these investments and help us to manage them better as well.
Moving Forward
This subcommittee's hearing two years ago catalyzed the Department
to improve the management of the OST program. We have made substantial
progress in this area and are beginning to see the results. But much
remains to be done. We have started, for example, to make better use of
the Department's laboratories in this arena. A ``lead laboratory''--a
collection of subject matter experts coordinated by a specific national
laboratory--is now providing direct deployment assistance as a part of
OST's Focus Area support to site cleanup managers. The goal of this is
to enhance the technical and scientific knowledge of each Focus Area
such that they become true ``Centers of Expertise.'' These centers will
provide valuable insight from basic research through deployment
assistance. This process must be institutionalized within each of OST's
Focus Areas.
In addition, we must also realize that the value of any science and
technology program rests not merely with the hardware that it produces,
but also with the value of the knowledge that it imparts. That is,
science and technology investments do not always result in pieces of
hardware that can be counted. Often the scientific data or the
demonstration results allow the project manager to make a better and
more informed decision. For example, the cleanup action level for
mercury in the East Fork Poplar Creek in Tennessee was initially
established at 5 parts per million (ppm). Research studies sponsored by
OST, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Electric Power
Research Institute demonstrated that the risk from mercury
contamination was low. As a direct result of this research finding, the
cleanup action level for mercury was raised to 400 ppm. This increase
was agreed to by the DOE, EPA, the State of Tennessee, and interested
stakeholders. The net result of this change to the cleanup action level
was a cost savings of at least $150 million and significantly reduced
(75%) the amount of floodplain ecosystem destruction. A second example
concerns the reduction of high-level waste glass volume at the Defense
Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) at Savannah River. OST is currently
funding research work that is directed towards understanding the
fundamental properties of waste loading of high level waste glass. The
aim of this research work is to enable an increase in waste loading of
high level waste glass. For each 1 percent increase in waste loading
that can be achieved, a total estimated cost savings of $250 million,
due to schedule acceleration, can be realized over the life cycle of
DWPF operations. The value and use of such scientific knowledge must
come to be institutionalized.
Further, we must be vigilant in addressing the recommendations for
improvement of the OST program provided by independent, external
organizations. The recent OIG audit report, which was critical of OST's
efforts to deploy decontamination and decommissioning (D&D)
technologies through large-scale demonstration projects, is a good
example. That audit report documented four recommendations to improve
deployment of D&D technologies: 1) require multi-site Federal and
contractor representation on large-scale demonstration project teams;
2) require timely publication of the results of the large-scale
demonstration project; 3) require that project management cost
information be consistently collected and analyzed; and 4) centralize
procurement for all contractor services on large-scale demonstration
projects. We agree with these recommendations and the D&D Focus Area
has provided formal guidance to the field sites to implement these
recommendations.
Larger structural issues must also continue to be addressed and
continuous program improvement achieved through, for example: rigorous
application of our new performance measures; re-examination of our
incentivization provisions for our site contractors with an eye toward
stimulating further technological innovation; and further streamlining
and improving the permitting processes for new technology. In an effort
to deal with these larger structural issues, I believe that the
following actions are necessary to continue and accelerate our improved
performance:
<bullet> Our four new corporate performance measures--increase in the
number and value of technology deployments; number of high
priority needs met; reduction of technological risk levels; and
achievement of life cycle cost savings--must be rigorously
applied to continue to drive our science and technology
investments in the right direction. Although we believe these
are the right performance measures, we want the subcommittee's
input, as well as GAO's, relative to the viability of these
measures, and the actual metrics that are assigned to them, as
effective tools for managing our science and technology
investments. With your help, we will drive the OST program in
the right direction through the application of the right
performance metrics.
<bullet> The Department has already begun an integrated review of what
is required to get to the next level of efficiency in the
deployment of appropriate technologies at our sites. At the
core, this entails having sufficient operational and cost data
to allow for the development of performance incentives that
will encourage and reward successful integration and deployment
of appropriate technologies. Joint development of the metrics
accompanying our new performance measures is intended to
generate this data. This is a complex problem requiring the
input of many programs, agencies and stakeholders. Thus,
special care must be taken to identify and allocate the risks
and rewards appropriately between the vendors and the
Department. Better incentive alignment is required. This
applies to both the vendor and contractor community as well as
our people, the project and site managers involved. This effort
will be a joint undertaking by EM, Procurement and the Contract
Reform/Privatization Office, and we expect an initial report by
September 1999.
<bullet> An expansion of our current work with the Environmental
Protection Agency through the Federal Remediation Technology
Roundtable (FRTR), State regulatory groups, and other
stakeholder groups. The FRTR is an interagency forum devoted to
exploring policy and other issues related to environmental
technologies and cleanup. Activities with the FRTR will be
expanded to include consideration of improved permitting
processes for innovative technologies. Ongoing efforts within
the Interstate Technology Regulatory Cooperation (ITRC) program
related to this issue will be continued and expanded, as will
similar efforts with other groups.
Conclusion
In closing, we have turned the corner in our efforts to make the
deployment of new technologies widespread through the DOE complex, but
now we must institutionalize our gains and redouble our efforts; the
deployment of new technologies must become routine and unfettered by
other than non-technical issues. We will be continuing our efforts to
expand the use of innovative environmental technologies in EM projects
to reduce costs, reduce technical and safety risks, and accelerate the
schedule of EM's cleanup program. We will continue to work with this
subcommittee and advise you periodically of our efforts.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.034
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.035
Mr. Upton. Well, thank you. I appreciate that.
I heard Ms. Jones, in her testimony, she said that two-
thirds of the technologies have never been used or only once.
Mr. Moniz. Only once.
Mr. Upton. I am glad to hear that the ping pong ball
approach has been used 15 different times, I guess, in addition
to Savannah River, but I note in the review of decontamination
and decommissioning technology development programs at the
Department of Energy reviewed by the National Research Council
on page 2, it says, ``The committee found that the DDFA
generally has failed to meet its objective to promote DOE's
sitewide deployment of new technologies. The LSDP, the main
deployment approach used by the DDFA, lacked planning and did
not meet its schedules or goals during the committee's
review.'' How does what GAO said and from this publication
which was put out, I think, in December 1998, how does that
comport with where we are in terms of spreading those
technologies around that you have developed.
I note just one other little comment: when Mr. Hastings was
here and he was very glad about the approaches that were used,
particularly the cocoon effort. There has been some concern
that, perhaps, it is only being used there and no place else.
Mr. Moniz. It still needs to be spread to the other
reactors. That is absolutely correct in that case.
With regard to the NRC recommendations, Mr. Chairman, first
of all, we certainly have accepted and agreed and are in the
process of implementing most of the recommendations. For
example, one of the very important recommendations was
improving overall strategic planning. In fact, we have
developed a strategic plan for science and technology and an EM
R&D program plan that, in fact, maps investments in science and
technology, including those of D&D where we do have a problem,
to site program manager needs.
The NRC recommended that top management at OST needed to be
involved in evaluation and prioritization of technology needs,
and that is happening with a multi-attribute decision analysis
scoring methodology using the Paths to Closure data. They
talked about linking all actions and funding to the prioritized
needs, and we need to respond to that in future solicitations.
Mr. Upton. Do you see us moving toward using some of these
technologies that have been developed more and more at these
sites?
Mr. Moniz. Yes. We believe we are making substantial
progress. For example, in 1998 there were 55 OST-funded
technologies that were first-time deployments, and there were
another 49 that were subsequent deployments. So, that curve
going up and obviously we hope to be able to maintain that
trend, but since the hearing, there has been a noticeable
uptick in those first-time deployments and multiple
deployments.
Mr. Upton. Well, I have another chart. I note that that
rise in your statement that you would like to continue that
trend the last couple years. I want to share this chart with
you here. As we understand it, the Department actually plans to
decrease the rate of technology deployments from 104, which
were done in 1998, to only 60 deployments in 1999 and again in
2000.
Mr. Moniz. Mr. Chairman, I believe the situation is that
those were the benchmarks----
Mr. Upton. These came out of the DOE budget, as I
understand it.
Mr. Moniz. Yes, and set as the benchmarks going forward.
The comparable benchmark in fiscal year 1998, was 49, and we
have significantly exceeded the 1998 benchmark. We hope to
exceed those benchmarks comparably.
Mr. Upton. So, you are hoping that those last 2 years will
continue to be on the incline?
Mr. Moniz. Exactly. Again, the baseline for 1998 was 49,
and we have substantially exceeded our baseline there.
Mr. Owendoff. Dr. Moniz, if I can----
Mr. Moniz. Please.
Mr. Owendoff. [continuing] just also on the----
Mr. Upton. Use the microphone, just a little closer.
Mr. Owendoff. Okay. As far, Mr. Chairman, as you have
mentioned specifically about Hanford and the reactors, in fact,
a team has already gone from Hanford to Brookhaven for the
graphite reactor at Brookhaven, and is now working with the
Brookhaven folks on how to implement those. The reactor at
Brookhaven was the next one, so we are pulling that team
across.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Mr. Klink.
Mr. Klink. Mr. Chairman, I didn't want to interrupt you
during your line of questioning, but the report that you cited
in your questioning----
Mr. Upton. We will share that with you.
Mr. Klink. Is that going to be submitted for the record?
Mr. Upton. Yes, put that in the record, without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7444.036
Mr. Klink. Thank you.
Mr. Upton. We can give you a copy of it now, actually.
Mr. Klink. That would be great.
Mr. Moniz, it has been 2 years since OST established the
Gate System to evaluate the technology projects that it was
funding. The idea, as I understood it, was that each project
was going to be rigorously evaluated, not only for its
technical progress but for its relationship to end users and to
their needs. No end user, no project.
The Gate System has not been implemented, and you are here
today to tell us about new systems and new committees that are
going to solve these problems. It seems to me that the DOE
continue to avoid the problem by constantly changing the review
process. To be honest with you, I don't know how anyone gets
anything done. I would like you to explain to us why you gave
up on the Gate System before it was implemented?
Mr. Moniz. Mr. Klink, my understanding, first of all--and I
will defer to my colleagues in a minute, if I may--we really
have not abandoned the Gate System established in 1997, which
had seven stages of development and six gates for go/no go
decisions. The criteria are still being used by the focus
areas, the teams that address each of the major problem areas,
to move a technology from one phase to another. Typically, EM
uses independent panels arranged by ASME, the American Society
of Mechanical Engineers, to provide technical merit review at
key decision points. However, there currently are over 250
technologies in various stages of development, and, frankly,
conducting peer reviews at each of the six gates for every
project----
Mr. Klink. I have only got 5 minutes, Mr. Moniz, and I
don't think you are being responsive to the questions I ask
you. Everybody told us that this Gate System was the greatest
thing going, and now it seems to me that we are in some kind of
either a modification of the Gate System or it has been
scrapped altogether. And you are saying now it has not?
Mr. Moniz. I think the core of the Gate System is being
employed. May I defer to Mr. Boyd?
Mr. Klink. Yes, that would be fine.
Mr. Boyd. Yes, we have not abandoned the Gate System at
all. We used to the do the gate review process on a centralized
basis, which was fairly expensive, and it was cumbersome. What
we have done now is to ask each of our five technology focus
teams to implement the gate review process as it was designed.
We have given them direction in writing and guidance on how to
do that. They have completed an analysis of all the
technologies that are in their portfolios, within each one of
those five focus teams and identified at which gate all those
technologies currently sit and are identifying those that need
a gate review. You don't necessarily need to do a review at
every gate; you need to do a review at a gate where there is
going to be a major investment. So, we have not abandoned that
at all. We believe it is a very effective process, and we are
continuing to use it but in a different way.
Mr. Klink. Again, I don't think you have answered the
question.
Ms. Jones, what do you think about this modification of the
Gate Program? Where are they headed with this?
Ms. Jones. Our understanding, Mr. Klink, is that they are
basically using what they call mid-year reviews, which is an
annual project review, and if you look at the documentation
that has been provided to the focus areas, it basically says
the mid-year review--and I am quoting from the document--``will
address the abbreviated gate deliverables in certain areas.''
Our review of this mid-year review process is that the Gate
System was very definitive in terms of there were specific
questions focused on each and every gate; there were specific
deliverables for each and every gate. This annual review
addresses these things in a very general way, but there is a
set of very general gate questions that are being used. So, we
don't see the Gate System being used as it was designed.
Mr. Klink. Mr. Boyd, I would like you to respond to that.
That was my understanding also, that this Gate System was very
definitive, and it does not appear to me, the testimony that we
are hearing here today, that DOE is using the Gate System as it
was defined. It looks like you have gone off into some
variation that is real nebulous, and we don't understand what
your are doing.
Mr. Boyd. Well, we certainly did not intend for it to be
nebulous. We went through a significant budget reduction since
we used the centralized approach and used a lot of money doing
that review. What we are attempting to do now is do the same
Gate Review in a more efficient way. We have published guidance
for that to be followed in the same structured fashion that it
was on a centralized basis but have each one of the focus teams
do that on a decentralized basis as they do their annual mid-
year reviews.
Mr. Klink. Ms. Jones, is it fair to blame budget cuts for
the fact that they have moved away from this very definitive
Gate System?
Ms. Jones. In my mind, we would have to have a better
understanding about why they moved away from it other than
budget problems. The other thing that I would want to point out
is that in our preparation for this hearing in looking at their
system of mid-year reviews, the reports are not out from them
yet, but what we found was that they were being applied
inconsistently across the focus areas. For example, one focus
area was not doing annual reviews on all their projects; others
were doing reviews on all their projects. One focus area was
using questions more like the Gate System; other focus areas
were using very general questions. So, even in terms of their
annual reviews, it is not being done consistently across the
focus areas.
Mr. Klink. Thank you.
Mr. Moniz. May I just comment, Congressman Klink? If you
would permit, I would like to suggest----
Mr. Klink. I don't control the clock.
Mr. Upton. Go ahead.
Mr. Moniz. I think it is a very important question and I
propose that we, GAO, committee staff get together, examine in
detail what we are doing. If we are not meeting the essential
goals of the Gate System, then we will come back to you and
talk about the situation.
Mr. Klink. That would help us a great deal, and we
certainly do want GAO involved.
Ms. Jones. We would be happy to.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Mr. Burr.
Mr. Burr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Boyd, how many cleanup sites have you visited?
Mr. Boyd. Practically all of them. I have not been to
Fernald; and I have never been to the Mound facility, but I
have been everywhere else.
Mr. Burr. How about you, Mr. Owendoff?
Mr. Owendoff. I have been to all except Livermore.
Mr. Burr. So, both of you are fairly familiar with the
cleanup sites, feel fairly comfortable?
Let me ask you--I am going to go back and ask some
questions that are a direct result of testimony 2 years ago.
Mr. Moniz, what is our total cleanup cost of DOE sites? What is
the current DOE estimates?
Mr. Moniz. The current baseline going forward from today is
approximately $150 billion in current year dollars; roughly,
$250 billion plus in----
Mr. Burr. So, it hasn't done anything but go up since 2
years ago. Two years ago, it was $227 billion to $229 billion,
and I take for granted that was in forward dollars.
Mr. Moniz. There has been something like a 10 percent
increase in the projected lifetime cost.
Mr. Burr. And what would you say has contributed to the 10
percent increase in your projections now?
Mr. Moniz. There are a variety of issues. In some cases,
for example, Congressman Hastings mentioned the ``K Basins''.
There have been unforeseen technical problems, which have
increased some major project costs. Other cases, there have
been schedule delays not associated with technology. Sometimes
there are other drivers, externalities, involving regulatory
issues, for example, which have changed schedules. May I
suggest that also Jim may want to----
Mr. Burr. Let me suggest to you that as it relates to the
regulatory hurdles, that this committee volunteered 2 years ago
to address any of the regulatory hurdles that DOE thought
caused the taxpayers an increase in their funding. To my
knowledge, there were no requests from the Department of
Energy. Mr. Owendoff?
Mr. Owendoff. That is correct, Congressman Burr. But on the
question on the increases, as you can appreciate, as we move
with the Paths to Closure, certainly in the near term between
now and 2006, and then from 2006 to 2070, which is a long ways
out, we are gaining better definition of those costs.
Mr. Burr. The real answer is we don't know the degree of
contamination; therefore, we can't project today the total
needs of cleanup, isn't it?
Mr. Owendoff. Some of that is fair, certainly, considering
the kinds of material that we are looking at, it is not normal
petroleum products contamination and normal chemicals. So, this
stuff is very difficult.
Mr. Moniz. Congressman Burr, I agree.
Mr. Burr. Well, let me ask you: wasn't that why OST was one
of its primary functions was to try to get ahead of the curve;
to try to create technologies that could meet these unexpected
things? Do you agree?
Mr. Owendoff. Correct, I agree.
Mr. Burr. Do you think we have done it?
Mr. Owendoff. I think that we have demonstrated. Yes, is
the answer, and I think that we are continuing. If you look at
some of the technologies that we have in the gunite tanks at
Oak Ridge to solve the problem down there on removing the waste
that was in a very concentrated area next to a cafeteria where,
over the years, we had kicked the can on how to solve that
problem. We did the same thing on high level waste at Hanford
on how to solve that. So, yes, Congressman Burr, I believe we
are.
Mr. Burr. I realize that you are Acting Director, but at
DOE that is a career, in some cases.
Do you believe that the technologies--and I have never
disputed that the OST has financed some innovative
technologies. The disconnect has always been contractors that
were using it. Whether we created stuff that contractors
couldn't use, wouldn't use, there wasn't the correct incentive
to use--I think Mr. Alm was very specific in his three things,
one of which we still use today, which is regulatory burdens,
and I would implore you to please get with us on that. Let me
ask you: Do you feel that the $12 billion to $27 billion in
savings--now that we have 8 years left on the 10-year plan--is
that still a realistic savings for the American taxpayer or has
it been adjusted, as well?
Mr. Owendoff. I can give example after example of savings
through new technology. What we are doing is we are making it
so that we don't foreclose the technology that is going to be
utilized for a particular activity. We say that with this
cleanup problem, we have multiple technologies--some of them
are innovative, some of them are baseline--that meet the
regulatory requirements. What we try not to do is to lock in
the technology, but rather let the marketplace work through
competitive bidding. And what we are doing there, also, is
ahead of time giving an added confidence to the regulators that
these technologies will work. So, we are trying to remove that
concern and that uncertainty from the equation before we bid
those projects.
Mr. Burr. Your predecessor, Mr. Alm, said 2 years ago that
one of his areas that he planned to find savings was to reduce
all support costs in the field offices from an average of 45
percent to 35 percent. Has that been done?
Mr. Owendoff. The most recent report that we prepared
indicated that, no, we have not been able to make significant
reductions in those support costs, and that is an area where we
are incentivizing contractors to get those support costs down.
But by the same token, we are also looking at what that means?
You need contracting support, public affairs and you need RAD--
radiation protection--specialists. So, we are trying to
understand what are the indirects, and, frankly, how many does
it take? We have had some good inroads at some places on
reducing those, but we are trying to understand, also, the
definition.
Mr. Burr. I realize that my time has run out, but I look
forward to another round.
Mr. Upton. I have got--thank you, Mr. Burr--I have got one,
really, last question to ask, as well.
Ms. Jones, you stated that DOE's Office of Environmental
Management could do more to promote OST-funded technologies by
identifying potential deployment opportunities. Specifically, I
am interested to know what should EM be doing, and, in
commenting, I would like Mr. Moniz to comment particularly as
it relates, perhaps, to--I know the Savannah River, I think,
used some 40 different OST-funded technologies yet Rocky Flats
and Hanford has used about 10, and I wondered why there is more
success at--what would explain that disparity, and, maybe, Ms.
Jones, I will let you go first.
Ms. Jones. Mr. Upton, what we were talking about in terms
of increasing deployments was for OST to be more proactive in
working with the user community on technologies that have
already been developed. Early on, in the OST development of
some of these technologies, they weren't working with the
sites. A number of technologies were developed without user
input, and they are not going to be able to used by the sites
unless they are modified. So, what we are looking for is really
a proactive marketing of these technologies; find out who might
be able to use them, and then work with the sites to identify
the funding for those needing modifications. Right now, it is
unclear whether it is OST's responsibility or the site
responsibility.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Moniz?
Mr. Moniz. With respect to your question of the various
sites, I think one of the lessons here is that we have
something to learn by studying the different kinds of contract
incentives that we have at the different sites, which I think
is partly responsible for the disparity you mention. I would
mention another example at Hanford, and this refers also to
Congressman Burr's question in terms of the lifetime savings
costs and for Savannah River--where some very big savings are
looming out there. I mentioned sludge washing, which has
resulted in a $6 billion baseline change in the TRUEX project
at Hanford, but, similarly, some of the technology development
going on right now in vitrification has an enormous, enormous
potential impact that we just have to push, technically, and
push it out if it works. If we can increase the loading of the
glass, in terms of waste, a 1 percent increase from a 25
percent base is worth $250 billion.
Mr. Burr. Would the chairman yield for a second?
Mr. Upton. I would be glad to yield.
Mr. Burr. Could you just define ``pushing it out'' for us?
I mean, this committee is having a difficult time determining
exactly what Ms. Jones said. Is the responsibility Mr. Boyd's
at OST? Is it Mr. Owendoff? Is it the Department of Energy? Is
it the contractors? Who is responsible to push it out?
Mr. Moniz. In my view, clearly, the principle line
responsibility resides clearly with Mr. Owendoff. And that has,
in fact, been amplified in the realignment initiative the
Secretary announced in April in which, the field offices now,
very explicitly, come under the lead PSO's responsibility.
Mr. Burr. Before you jump in a hole, do I take from that
answer that it is the site managers who have a responsibility
to place this technology at these sites to encourage
contractors?
Mr. Moniz. In my view, it is the head of EM who has the
principle point of responsibility. However, that only works in
the context of a system. The core of that system, in my view,
is the strate-
gic planning that we are doing, the disposition maps, the maps
that identify technology chokepoints where big leverage is
possible, not only in cost but also in things like in-State
cleanup quality. And we have to--Jim and Gerald have to monitor
those and work with the field managers who, in turn, must work
with the contractors.
In addition, the second thing is, we need to work carefully
to do a better job of aligning incentives and that is part of
the initiative report I mentioned earlier we will get in
September. I mean, we are not there yet; that is a fact.
Mr. Burr. With the chairman's indulgence, do I take the
meat of his answer, as it relates to your responsibility, a
reliance on the site managers to place this technology?
Mr. Owendoff. Congressman Burr, I don't shuck
responsibility. It is my responsibility, to work with the site
managers to ensure that we have the appropriate contract
incentives. At the beginning of each year, I work with the site
managers on what are the appropriate incentives.
I will use two quick examples. At Savannah River, they do
have incentives for implementing innovative technologies. That
is an approach they have sorted out in their whole incentive
program, and they feel that piece of it is important.
At Rocky Flats, the incentive is to put in stretch and
superstretch goals, not necessarily technology specific, but in
order to drag scope, to accelerate it. Clearly, things have to
be done, and, in that case, what is being done is, in order for
the contractor to earn fee, they have to go out and pull in
innovative technologies. Standard technologies will not work.
But what we are not trying to do is to tell them which ones are
where.
I don't have the answer of what works, as you can
appreciate. Some incentives will, but if I would say, ``I want
just a lot of money put on incentives for technologies,'' then
the question is, ``Okay, are they cost effective?'' What we
really want is cleanup; and we want accelerated cleanup; we
want safe cleanup; and we want the in-State to achieve. So, it
is the balance.
Mr. Burr. Do you understand our frustration with the lack
of it and then the inability to place some of the technology?
As a matter of fact, I guess these are your projections for
1999 and 2000--is that reflective of the change that we have
made as to who we get technology in the field to have a 44-unit
drop--I guess those are specific technologies--or is that a
reflection of the lack of the pool of technology that we have
at OST?
Mr. Owendoff. I think what that reflects is where the field
managers are wanting to say, ``This is what we know we can
deliver,'' and what it doesn't reflect is what they believe the
potential is for delivery. If you look at the 1998 chart, we
had an expectation of 49, and then we accomplished 108.
Mr. Burr. If you look at this chart, it would suggest that
the best thing we could do for placing technology is to have an
annual O&I hearing, because the bleep up certainly reflects a
response, I think, to congressional pressure, and I imagine if
we had one 2 years from now, we would see another bleep up in
the 2000, 2001----
Mr. Moniz. Sir, the hearing 2 years ago was absolutely a
critical event in terms of galvanizing the processes that we
have been working on it for the last 2 years. They are not
fully mature, but I think you are already seeing the results of
them.
Mr. Burr. I appreciate that and realize that the chairman
has been awfully kind to me.
Mr. Upton. My time has expired.
Mr. Burr. As the Department comes back and continues to
raise that cleanup cost--I mean, we do have a fiduciary
responsibility. At some point, the money runs out. The American
people look at us, and then they look at you, and say, ``To
what degree has the cleanup taken place?'' I agree with you, at
some point it becomes outcome; it is no longer process. We are
here talking about process today, and I hope that the premise
that you use in developing that process is, in fact, outcome,
which is not something that even charts yet.
Mr. Owendoff. Congressman Burr, look at the sites that we
are getting cleaned up, such as the Weldon Spring site in
Charles County in Missouri, and what the projection was and now
how we have accelerated that; at Fernald in Ohio, at Mound in
Ohio and, certainly, at Rocky Flats. I am directly accountable
for making those happen and accelerating those, and I think
that you can see compared to those projections 2 years ago in
cost and in time, they have been significantly reduced.
Mr. Burr. But with a 10 percent increase, that means that
others have exploded based upon our projected costs, and with 5
sites comprising 80 percent of the total numbers--and I believe
I am correct there--5 sites comprising 80 percent of the
projected cleanup, one would suggest very strongly that our
concentration should be very heavy on those 5 sites as the best
way to control our costs.
I appreciate the chairman's leniency.
Mr. Upton. The time has long expired. Mr. Stupak.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Jones, you didn't join in that last set of questions
from Mr. Burr, but let me ask you this question: the
responsibility for implementation of these deployments and
cleanups, is it a clearly defined line of authority as to who
has the responsibility?
Ms. Jones. Dr. Moniz has set up the line of
responsibilities through EM, OST, the technology developers, as
well as the users. I think there has not necessarily been
ownership in pushing out those technologies and ensuring that
they are deployed.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. And who is responsibility is it to decide
on the technology then?
Ms. Jones. It is the user responsibility to decide on the
technology; the one that will be cleaning up.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. Is that the contractor?
Ms. Jones. Usually, it is the contractor decision, yes.
Mr. Stupak. And what oversight, then, do you have over that
contractor to make sure they are doing it on the timeline and
doing what they project are going to do or what they bargained
to do, if you will?
Ms. Jones. That is actually DOE's responsibility, the site
manager's responsibility, but is also dependent on the
contract. If a particular cleanup is being done under a fixed
price contract, for example, really, the Department has no say
in the technology; it is going to be totally the decision of
the contractor, because they are taking all of the risks.
Mr. Stupak. But it is the Department's responsibility to
ride herdsman on the line.
Ms. Jones. Absolutely; yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Moniz, you state in your testimony that the
Environmental Management Advisory Board concluded that OST's
prioritization system was a ``transparent, robust, quantitative
prioritization system that is rooted in technology-needs data
supplied by project cleanup managers.'' Actually, the EMAB,
after a 1-day review, said the following, ``It was an
effective, defensible, and democratic system'' that should be
continued. EMAB also stated that its value would need to be
documented and warned DOE against sliding again into subjective
decisionmaking. It would have been helpful to have EMAB here
again. They had particularly valuable testimony in our 1997
hearing. My question, Mr. Moniz, there is no way EMAB could
bless your system when it hasn't even been implemented,
correct?
Mr. Moniz. I spoke with Mr. Berkey about 2 weeks ago, and,
correct, the system is not fully implemented. But we have
implemented a very large number of the tools that we are
talking about.
Mr. Stupak. How much has been implemented?
Mr. Moniz. Well, I can't make a quantitative statement,
but, certainly, the strategic planning part, for example, the
road maps, which are very important, have been implemented. The
Technology Deployment Initiative, which is focusing on getting
the better data, better analysis, is being implemented. The
focus area groups are there that work with the site managers. I
will let, also, Jim and Gerald add to that--but I think the
areas where we need to get more done, certainly, are going
through the performance measures to more specific metric
development and looking at the contract incentive alignment.
Those are two very important parts that we still need to fully
implement.
Do you want to add something to that, Gerald?
Mr. Boyd. The prioritization system that you addressed is a
five-factor system, and we did use it to put our fiscal year
2000 budget together. It was the first time it had ever been
used, and we have used it again inside of the Department to do
the 2001 budget formulation. So, we have used it, and the
review was to look at how well it worked for putting the fiscal
year 2000 budget together. The advisory board said it was their
view that it was a defensible system. I think their comment was
``Unless you continue to use something like that, you will fall
back into a subjective process.''
Mr. Stupak. Yes, but didn't they say you have to use it,
implement it on your cleanups?
Mr. Boyd. This particular attribute analysis, these five
factors, are based upon deciding which technology projects you
work on. It is not designed to prioritize cleanup sites, but it
is designed to get the needs of cleanup sites into the
technology prioritization system. So, it is only aimed at the
Science and Technology Program.
Mr. Stupak. But is that actually going to be carried out?
Mr. Boyd. Yes, sir. Our budget on the hill for 2000, which
is being marked up right now----
Mr. Stupak. But it hasn't really been carried out yet? It
hasn't been fully run through the system yet?
Mr. Boyd. We built the budget for 2000 with it. We will
implement that starting in October of this year, and we do plan
to carry it out as we ask Congress for the funding.
Mr. Stupak. We just want to make sure we don't go back to
the subjective decisionmaking that has been evident in the
past.
Mr. Boyd. Right. We have no intentions of doing that.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Mr. Burr?
Mr. Burr. Mr. Boyd, are you familiar with Bio-Imaging
Resources, Inc.?
Mr. Boyd. Yes, sir; I am.
Mr. Burr. A CAT scan technology to see inside of a drum of
unknown substance? We have spent $14 million over the last 10
years to develop a waste inspection tomography process here.
Why has that not been used?
Mr. Boyd. Well, it has been used, but on a very limited
basis. Dr. Moniz asked me questions about this particular issue
earlier today, and we are doing a review to try to determine
why that particular technology is not being used at DOE's sites
versus other competitive technologies of the same type. The
response we get from the site----
Mr. Burr. Of the same type, you are talking about a
standard x-ray versus a imaging Cat----
Mr. Boyd. Within the category of neutron-induced types of
assay systems, there are several different ones that are
available. They operate a little differently, and we have
quizzed several sites where this has been an issue, and the
response was that there was an open competition for this
technology and that the ones that won, won on a fair and open
basis. That is what we are looking into right now to see if we
can really determine that that is the case but that is the
response that we got when we queried the sites where this
particular company and their technology were not successful at
getting DOE work versus other companies.
Mr. Burr. Is there a reason to believe that with this
technology we were able to process more drums without opening
them or to process more drums more efficiently and faster;
consequently, we saved more time and money on the site?
Mr. Boyd. There is no question that this technology allows
you to assay drums without opening them, and it certainly saves
you a lot of time. It certainly reduces risk to the workers who
are doing the work. There is no question about that. There are
other technologies that are comparable, though, that are being
used instead of this one in at least a couple of cases where--
--
Mr. Burr. Comparable from a standpoint of?
Mr. Boyd. Non-intrusive; you don't have to open the drums.
Mr. Burr. How about comparable from the standpoint of the
speed with which contractors go through it?
Mr. Boyd. Mr. Burr, I don't really know. That is something
we have to look at. I am not certain if the contractors that
won the bids can do the work as fast as BIR or not. I would
have to look at that.
Mr. Burr. Isn't that an important part of the bid process?
Understand, I am not a scientist; I am not even a lawyer, so
that really puts my credentials down as it relates to a Member
of Congress, but one can look at the way that we pay for
cleanup, which in most cases is cost based plus. Therefore, the
longer you are there, the more revenues you have. In fact, this
is one particular area where when you perform your job you
become unemployed on that site, right? There is not a
tremendous incentive to find a faster way to do it, and there
may be incentives for employees to find safer ways to do it,
and what we are trying to determine is--we talked about the
correct incentives; I think Mr. Moniz mentioned that--was there
an incentive on this technology that we spent $14 million to
help develop?
Mr. Owendoff. Congressman Burr, the direction that I give
to the site managers is the criteria should be laid out,
certainly when they have a competitive bid; worker protection;
what is the economics of the throughput? how much can you
process through, and what are the dollars? I don't know the
history of this particular action, and I need to get back to
you, but in a competitive sense, we try to ensure that we don't
skew the evaluation so that it is only on one factor. For
instance, how big the machine is shouldn't be a factor. So, I
need, in this case, to look back and find out specifically. I
trust that the site managers, in working with the contractors,
did set it up appropriately, and we just need to evaluate it
and get back to you on why they did not succeed.
[The information referred to follows:]
The WIT system, developed by Bio-Imaging Research, Inc. (BIR, Inc),
uses high-energy computed tomography, emission tomography and emission
spectroscopy for non-destructive assay of waste drums. Environmental
Management's Office of Science and Technology (OST) has provided $9.8
million for the development of this technology, including successful
testing on both surrogate and real waste, primarily to enable DOE sites
to meet the characterization requirement for shipment of waste to the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).
The WIT system is now commercially available. BIR Inc. has recently
formed a new division, the Waste Inspection Technology Company (WITCO)
specifically to provide WIT services to DOE customers and is actively
pursuing jobs. WITCO partnered with a team of mobile characterization
service providers to supply DOE sites with all the required
technologies to certify transuranic (TRU) waste for WIPP disposal,
including WIT. The mobile vendors are certified by Carlsbad Area Office
(CAO) to perform waste characterization of TRU wastes.
Because the market for WIT is characterization of waste for
shipment to WIPP, the facility's delayed opening and limits on waste
acceptance pending NM's issuance of a RCRA permit have also lessened
the urgency for the technology. The other major marketing factor for
WIT is competition from other technologies currently available at DOE
sites and other companies.
In 1998, two contractor teams were awarded identical phased Task
Order contracts for characterization services: TRUtech and Mobile
Characterization Services (MCS). WITCO was part of the TRUtech team. In
November 1998, both teams completed their commitments under the Base
Period (Task Order No. 1) of the contract by providing characterization
of 187 drums. The teams were evaluated against the Statement of Work
requirements for acceptability and adequacy of submitted documentation.
The TRUtech team, as a whole, scored six unacceptable performance
ratings on the primary process sub-criteria versus the MCS team which,
as a whole, scored only one unacceptable performance rating. The
evaluation indicated that MCS was superior to the TRUtech in most
areas. Deficiencies identified during the DOE/CAO audit indicated that
TRUtech would not be able to demonstrate performance within a
reasonable period to meet obligations for program requirements and
other contract commitments. Therefore all of the additional
characterization services (Task Order No.2) were awarded to MCS.
Mr. Burr. I look forward to that.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Klink.
Mr. Klink. Thank you. Ms. Jones, I just wanted to pick on
one answer that you gave a few moments ago. You talked about
the choices of technology really belongs to the contractor when
they have a fixed price contract. Yet we had a hearing about a
year ago involving Pit-9 and Idaho--I don't want to revisit
that whole issue, because we don't have the parties here--but,
clearly, there was a huge disagreement between the Department
of Energy and between the private contractor as to whether or
not--who was at fault for the fact that all this money had been
paid out and that literally nothing, not one scrap of material,
had been cleaned up. Where do we stand there? I mean, whose
responsibility--and I hope that we are still working to resolve
that, and, again, I don't want to revisit that whole issue--
but, clearly, there are times when the contractor comes back
and says, ``Yes, we do have a clear-cut, fixed price
contract,'' but they are blaming DOE when they may have been
the ones that chose the technology. What are the lines of
delineation there?
Ms. Jones. One comment I would make is that it is also
DOE's responsibility to ensure that the technology that the
contractor is putting forward as being ready is, in fact, ready
to go and can work on the waste. I think what they found
subsequently is that the technology that was proposed was
really not robust enough to handle the waste in the Pit-9. So,
there is responsibility on both sides, even with a fixed price
contract.
Mr. Klink. After reading through both the 1998 GAO report,
your testimony and that of other witnesses, it appears there is
a critical issue I think we need to address today. And it seems
to be the failure of the Department to work with end users in
the cleanup process so that the technologies developed can be
used.
Ms. Jones. That is correct.
Mr. Klink. Is that how you see it? Do you agree with that?
Ms. Jones. That is what we said in our 1998 report; that is
correct.
Mr. Klink. When I read your testimony today, your report
and your testimony about the involvement or the lack of
involvement of the end users in the technology development and
the deployment process and then I read Mr. Moniz' testimony and
hear what he has to say today, they don't seem to be coming to
the same conclusion or, in fact, even talking about the same
program. You seem to be saying the end users still are not part
of the process; that, in fact, the technologies are still being
developed with no end user in sight, and Mr. Moniz is saying,
in short, that everything seems to be good; we are making great
progress, and the world looks fine. Can you explain to me your
perception as to why the message that I am getting from you is
different from the message I am getting from Mr. Moniz?
Ms. Jones. Mr. Klink, I think that DOE has made some
strides in terms of getting the end users more involved; in
particular, in the planning process, in the upfront budgeting
process that Dr. Moniz was talking about earlier. They have
gotten the end users involved in this kind of transparent
prioritization system, and they have been working on that;
also, in terms of their program plans.
I think where they still need to some more work is in terms
of trying to proactively market technologies that have already
been developed and also in terms of using the Gate System to
ensure that, as the technology is being developed, that the
different requirements in terms of user commitment--
particularly at the demonstration phase where they are asking
the user to put up some money to help fund the demonstration--
is actually happening. So, that when you get to the end, you
will have somebody that can deploy that technology if it meets
their performance specs.
Mr. Klink. Are you satisfied that it appears that DOE is,
in fact, going to be using that Gate System?
Ms. Jones. No, sir.
Mr. Klink. So, where are we going?
Ms. Jones. Again, we still recommend that they continue to
use the Gate System, because I think that is the most
definitive way of ensuring that the user is involved and that
the correct go/no go decisions are made at the appropriate
stages.
Mr. Klink. Dr. Moniz, response?
Mr. Moniz. I fundamentally agree with what Ms. Jones has
said. We have been making progress, as I said earlier. For
example, establishing the focus area user steering committees
for planning, budgeting, and tying technologies to the site
needs. I agree that we need to do more in terms of the
communication aspect in terms of making sure everyone knows
what technologies are there, and, as I described earlier, we
feel that we are implementing core elements of the Gate System.
But as I committed earlier and, I will repeat: we will get
together with GAO and with committee staff to evaluate exactly
what we are doing, rack it up against the formal Gate System,
and come back to you with either we are implementing it
effectively, or if we are not, we will change it.
Mr. Klink. Ms. Jones, Dr. Moniz testimony stated that the
Department had a new process called a Needs Validation to
assure that science and technology are driven by cleanup
project managers. Let me ask your opinion on that. How does the
Needs Validation work and how does this relate to the Gate
System?
Ms. Jones. There are so many different processes, Mr.
Klink. To be quite honest with you, I am not quite sure which
piece the needs assessment is. Maybe if Dr. Moniz could talk
about that, I would be able to comment on it.
Mr. Boyd. As part of the 10-year planning process, the
Paths to Closure document that we referred to earlier, there is
a new electronic data base that has been put in place by the
Department to make sure that we can determine what the
baselines are at the project level and build the budget each
year and the program each year on the basis of that project.
What we have been able to do in the Office of Science and
Technology is to feed into that system science and technology
needs that have been identified by the sites along with
recommended solutions. The project manager, then, while in that
data base building or formulating the program for the next
year, is able to look at what our recommendations are and
validate whether or not they believe that technological
solution is the right solution and select from a whole array of
things that could be solutions what they would like for us to
implement. So, that is one way that we are trying to get very
closely connected with them.
The Gate System clearly needs to be revisited and to bring
them in to the review of the technologies after the projects
have been started so that we can continue to validate that that
technology is still a good technology, it is meeting the mark,
and that it is something that they still want to use.
Mr. Klink. Ms. Jones, If I could just--I think you put your
finger on it, with your response to my last question to you,
the exact problem we have here, and from my perspective, as a
layman, hearing Mr. Boyd's answer just now, it seems very clear
to me, unless I am missing something, that DOE is putting too
much effort in changing all of these systems rather than
solving problems. Go with whatever your system is. If it is the
Gate System, go with it, and then let us solve the problems of
all this cleanup or let us solve the problem of having an end
user for all this technology that is going to solve our
problems. Instead, we seem to have a variation of all these
different processes in place. I would just ask, with the
chairman's blessing, Ms. Jones, to comment on what Mr. Boyd
just said.
Ms. Jones. We have just one other comment on the system
that Mr. Boyd was talking about. The kind of exchange being
done in terms of using these computer systems is one way in
terms of linking the user and the technology developer, but we
think even more importantly the focus area experts need to go
out and talk and with the project managers. That is not
happening in all of the focus areas. There is only so much that
you can do looking at data on a computer. We understand that,
for example, the tanks focus area does a very, very good job in
that area and the subsurface contaminants focus area is doing a
much better job, but the other focus areas need to get out and
talk and make these contacts so that it is just not all done
through this computer analysis.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Mr. Bilbray.
Mr. Bilbray. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry, I want to
shift the focus from the micro to the macro, and, Ms. Jones,
bigger than the specific implementation technologies or
whatever, I would like to ask a question about--and I leave
this open to the rest of panel--the determination of the
technologies that will be directed toward the contracts, the
assumptions that we make. And a good example--let me just throw
it out--is the assumption that incineration was going to be
totally abandoned in the mid-eighties, late eighties, and that
incineration, the entire concept of the emissions problems, the
dioxins problems, and everything else focused toward the
Federal Government looking at non-incineration options. The
transformation issue, that somehow there was major
environmental reasons to avoid transformation using
incineration and go to other technologies, was based on certain
assumptions by--dioxin was one of them--and the issue that
there were cleaner, better ways of handling the situation.
What I am wondering about, as somebody with a background in
air pollution, is that I think the dioxin issue was totally
reversed, if not backed off by 10 points, and the issue of the
non-point source emissions caused by transporting the use of
diesel engines and everything else has gone up by megatimes
than what we thought. My question is does anybody in the GAO or
in the Department of Energy go back and check the assumptions
of what technology should be followed or are we just, sort of,
once we set the course, we move forward?
And in layman's terms, the fact is there were assumptions
in the eighties about transformation and incineration that were
dead wrong. If you could consider the fact that rather than
incinerate it onsite and maybe reducing dioxins, which are one-
tenth the emissions we thought, we are now trucking waste all
over hell and creation emitting diesel fumes which are probably
100 times more toxic than we thought. Has anybody gone back to
basic assumptions and said, ``We need to review these
periodically; see if present good science supports our
assumptions and our contracts'' before we get to the fact of
lighting the contract?
Ms. Jones. Mr. Bilbray, I am going to defer to Dr. Moniz
for that.
Mr. Owendoff. Congressman Bilbray, I think what you have
hit on is that we talk about end users as if it is some name
and there are no faces that go with it. The role and
responsibility, certainly, for environmental management overall
rests with me. The site managers' responsibility is two-fold:
one, what kind of cleanup problem sets do I have? And what is
my current technology or technical approach to that? And what
are some opportunities that if I had some innovations could I
improve that? So, the good news is that the site managers own
the problem set, and they also sit with their other managers in
deciding how the money should be spent.
Now, a good example on what you brought up is at the TRU
Waste Treatment Facility at Idaho, Idaho National Engineering
and Environmental Lab. What we put out was a competitive
contract, and we said there is a level of expectation that you
are not going to pollute the air or you are not going to
pollute the ground or water or whatever. But, assuming that,
here is what we want the material to look like when you are
finished treating that TRU waste. We are not going to decide
whether or not it should be vitrification, put into glass, some
of it incinerated, or microencapsulate some of it. In fact,
what the contractors come back with is a suite of those
technologies and to say ``This is how I plan to use them, and
this is, when I look at the waste, how I plan to use those.''
What we have seen is, as far as incineration as a general
concept, that when we are looking at the actual cleanup
approach, we don't foreclose on any particular technology.
Because, in essence, we say, ``Okay, what is available today,''
and we try very hard not to prejudice ourselves with something
where there is an old wives tale that says, ``Oh, you should
not use this or that.''
Mr. Bilbray. Mr. Chairman, I ask for unanimous consent for
1 more minute.
Mr. Upton. I am sorry?
Mr. Bilbray. I ask for unanimous consent for 1 more minute
to follow up.
Mr. Upton. Go ahead.
Mr. Bilbray. And I appreciate that. My biggest concern is
where we saw situations like working on the air base in Los
Angeles that we couldn't allow them to burn or to even bury
their trash in the L.A. air base to be able to fulfill the
standards, but if we went to transport, we found that the no
project option ended up in real world emissions as more than
any onsite technology. The trouble is, I am wondering, is
anybody looking at the big picture of not just how do you
handle the waste here, but if you don't handle it this way,
what is the related emissions, the non-point source emissions,
and is anybody looking at the big picture world, the real world
impact of these technologies?
Mr. Owendoff. In fact, Congressman, we are. That is, in
fact, what the life-cycle approach is, because what folks say
is, ``Wait a minute, just because you are transferring from
here to here, you are not giving a life-cycle cost if you, one,
get it over there, and then what happens when it is in another
location?'' So, indeed, we are looking at those.
Mr. Bilbray. And I appreciate that, because I see the
stationary source being disproportionately having to carry the
weight and the transport problem, basically, not being
integrated into our decisionmaking, and we have identified that
is our big problem right now. Thank you very much.
Mr. Moniz. If I may, I just have one comment; I will make
it very brief. Your macro question is very interesting and an
even more macro response is that the issue of aligning policies
with environmental policies, with regulatory policies, with tax
policies is something that goes across the entire Government
and is certainly a major challenge to bring this together. We
are trying to do that in the Department through our portfolio
development, and, at some time, I would be happy to discuss
this with you or other members any time.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Ms. DeGette.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Jones, can you please describe what the Technology
Acceleration Committee was?
Ms. Jones. The Technology Acceleration Committee, if I
remember correctly, was the head of Environmental Management
along with the deputy assistant secretaries and site managers
that worked to together on technology development issues.
Ms. DeGette. Does that still meet, and, if you know--I have
heard it doesn't--and if it doesn't, why not?
Ms. Jones. My understanding is that was a committee that
was formed under Mr. Alm, and since his departure from the
Department, that committee no longer exists.
Ms. DeGette. In your analysis, don't you find that to be a
way of both delaying and reducing headquarters' attention to
the technology deployment issues?
Ms. Jones. We felt that that committee, if it had gone
forward the way it was projected to go forward and the way it
had been set up, could have helped with bringing some of the
more policy-focused issues to the attention of headquarters
management, yes.
Ms. DeGette. Was it successful in doing that in just the
small time it----
Ms. Jones. There wasn't a lot of time to make that
determination.
Ms. DeGette. I see, okay. I am wondering if some of the
rest of you can comment on your perspective on that committee,
perhaps?
Mr. Moniz. Jim, you would be the best one.
Mr. Owendoff. Sure. That committee, consisted of, as was
mentioned, myself, the DASs, and the site managers. We get
together multiple times throughout the year and talk about a
lot of things with that corporate group. Certainly, one of the
things that we do talk about is the Science and Technology
budget; what is appropriate and where are we spending the
money. One of the things that I especially am pushing the site
managers on regarding the accelerated deployment technologies
is how do we get more technologies in place? And, in fact, that
is why we have the commitments between them and myself on how
many technologies they are you going to deploy? We are trying
to not have a committee here, a committee here. My corporate
folks, field managers, and I talk about a lot of issues, one of
which is accelerating deployments. And we are talking about
what type of incentives do they put in their contracts to
accelerate it? Because we don't have a formal name for it
anymore, maybe that is a shortcoming. I just try to get the
work done and not put a label to it.
Ms. DeGette. Well, I assume you have some other committees
in DOE.
Mr. Owendoff. Not within Environmental Management.
Ms. DeGette. You don't have any committees?
Mr. Owendoff. Not with the field managers. I mean, within
the Department of Energy, yes, and Gerald has some within
Science and Technology where he is working with focus areas,
but we are talking about my senior managers, who are the site
managers, my deputy assistant secretaries, and myself. Every
time we get together now, we do not have to have a separate
name for that meeting.
Ms. DeGette. Well, but the Technology Acceleration
Committee kind of worked across disciplines, which is why it
was effective, and what you are saying is--well, it could have
been effective--what you are saying is, you are just doing that
without any formal name.
Mr. Owendoff. It is those people--the site managers; they
represent across.
Ms. DeGette. Well, but just what you are saying is, you are
doing that without any----
Mr. Owendoff. Yes.
Ms. DeGette. Okay. Ms. Jones, you wanted to comment on
that?
Ms. Jones. Yes. In preparing for this hearing, we asked the
Department what had happened to that committee and if anything
had replaced it, and what we were told was basically they had
formed integration committees. There is an executive--I don't
remember all the titles--but there is one executive committee
that is Mr. Owendoff and, I believe, five site managers, but it
does not include the head of OST; it does not include the other
deputy secretaries, and there is another committee below that
but, again, focusing on integration that are the deputy
assistant secretaries and some contractor folks and other
people from the site.
Deployment is one issue that these integration committees
focus on, but in our review of the minutes of their meetings,
we didn't see a lot of discussion of deployment issues. It
seemed to be focusing on other kinds of issues.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Burr?
Mr. Burr. Mr. Chairman, I would only take this opportunity
to make a recommendation to the Chair as well as to the
minority that, with the help of the Department of Energy, that
we either have a hearing or an opportunity to formally meet
with at least the five site managers who head up those sites
that comprise 80 percent of our cleanup funds, and I hope that
the Chair would pursue that as actively as he could.
Mr. Upton. I think that is a very good idea, and I would be
glad to pursue it, and we will make sure that it gets on the
schedule.
Mr. Moniz. We could be so responsive since they are
actually here today.
Mr. Upton. Are they all here today?
Mr. Moniz. I believe they are all here.
Mr. Owendoff. I have been meeting with them yesterday and
on the 2001 budget.
Mr. Burr. They are not physically in the room then?
Mr. Owendoff. No.
Mr. Upton. Well, I think we will look forward--maybe we
will work a date to make them all part of this.
Mr. Burr. I would also make a recommendation, Mr. Chairman,
that with, again, the help of the Department of Energy, that we
try to review the contracts on those five sites so that we
know, really, the interconnection of the contracts the use of
technology and the progress on cleanup.
Mr. Moniz. Congressman, we would be happy to bring up,
particularly, Walter Howes, who heads the Contract Reform
Privatization Office, and he can describe his ideas and our
efforts in terms of alignment in contracts.
Mr. Burr. Very good; thank you.
Mr. Upton. Panel, I want to thank you. I was not on this
subcommittee 2 years ago when your predecessors were here. I
look forward to continuing this oversight, and you are now
formally excused. Thank you.
Panel three includes Mr. John Schofield, president and CEO
of Thermatrix, Inc.; Mr. Dick Bernardi, general manager of Bio-
Imaging Research; Dr. Payasada Kotrappa, president of Rad Elec,
Inc., and Mr. Terry Rogers, president of Delphi Research, Inc.,
New Mexico.
Thank you for your patience. As you heard me explain to our
first panel, we have a long history of taking your testimony
under oath. Do you have any objection to that? House rules also
allow you to have a counsel in place if you would like. Is
there some need for that?
If not, if you would rise, and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Thank you. You are now under oath, and as was indicated,
your entire statement will be made part of the record. If you
would like to summarize it or keep your comments to 5 minutes
or less, it would be appreciated. And, Mr. Rogers, we will
start with you. Thank you.
TESTIMONY OF TERRY W. ROGERS, PRESIDENT, DELPHI RESEARCH,
INCORPORATED; PAYASADA KOTRAPPA, PRESIDENT, RAD ELEC,
INCORPORATED; RICHARD T. BERNARDI, GENERAL MANAGER, BIO-
IMAGING, INCORPORATED; AND JOHN T. SCHOFIELD, PRESIDENT AND CEO
OF THERMATRIX, INCORPORATED
Mr. Rogers. Very good. Mr. Chairman, committee members,
Delphi Research has been involved in development and
demonstration of its alternative waste treatment technology,
DETOX, in the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Science and
Technology sponsored programs since 1991.
Mr. Upton. If you could just move the mike a little closer,
that would be----
Mr. Rogers. Sure.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Some $12 million in total investment has been
expended on Delphi's process by three different DOE facilities.
During the course of our $10 million development program with
DOE FETC, we have prepared 13 proposals and have been the
subject of 14 reviews and evaluations. Yet we have not
completed demonstration objectives which are a prerequisite to
deployment.
Demonstrating waste treatment technologies on a DOE
operations site poses formidable obstacles and complexities for
the technology developer that requires intercession by DOE EM-
50 sponsor and the DOE EM management. Without advocacy and
support by these organizations, the developer is left to deal
with regulators, subcontractors, M&O contractors, and DOE field
offices on their own, making progress on actual demonstration
work incredibly difficult, if not impossible.
Our experiences at the Savannah River site have identified
three contributing factors to delays and cost growth. First, is
the poor demonstrationsite support that is provided by EM-50;
second, is critical decisionmaking process by DOE, which was
slow and costly, and, third, the strategic project decisions
were predicated on inconsistent marketing information.
Based upon our experience in the EM-50 Program, we present
the following five recommendations for the subcommittee's
consideration on how EM-50 programs might be improved. First,
the DOE office administering the project should be an advocate
for the technology, not a bystander or an adversary. Advocacy
can be obtained by, first, taking a proactive, solution-
oriented role in helping the technology developer resolve
issues and obstacles encountered in the process of
demonstration, and, second, being directly involved in the
negotiations with potential DOE users, not only as stakeholders
in the demonstration but as long-term customers.
The second recommendation is that M&O organizations who
sign on as partners or stakeholders in a demonstration project
should be held accountable by DOE EM to uphold their agreements
with the technology developers who are attempting to
demonstrate or deploy new technologies at DOE installations.
Relegation of the technology developer to subcontractor status
by an M&O contractor does not constitute a partnership or
stakeholder relationship.
The third recommendation is that market data on DOE waste
types is the basis for technology development needs; therefore,
the data must be reliable. DOE should utilize the expertise of
its resources from all the major sites, thus assuring that
decisions on funding and surviving projects will be in the best
interest of the complex rather than meeting the needs of a
particular site's agenda.
The fourth recommendation is that no demonstration of a
technology should be permitted to proceed at a DOE site which
does not have a vested interest in its success. That is to say
that economic development and commercial application are not
adequate incentives to ensure the demonstration partner will
assist in meeting demonstration goals.
And the last recommendation is that M&O contractors who are
involved in the development of competing technologies and who
declare or practice that they have no intent to deploy outside
technologies should not be considered as demonstration partners
by EM-50.
Neither large allocation of Government funds nor the best
laid plan for demonstration and deployment can be successful
when there is no single advocate within the EM management to
champion a project through the labyrinth of DOE directives and
organizations. Under the present project management structure
and using the existing programmatic requirements, the DETOX
demonstration could be funded for twice the amount of money,
and I believe that the problems and issues would rise to the
level of funding so as to prevent success. Only when the EM-50
Demonstration and Deployment Program incorporates a responsive
and well defined decisionmaking and site selection process and
an advocacy program offering guidance, assistance, and support
for technology developers, will the development and
commercialization of good, innovative technologies be
maximized.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Terry W. Rogers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Terry W. Rogers, Delphi Research, Inc.
Dear Mr. Chairman and Committee Members, Delphi Research, Inc. has
been involved in the development and demonstration of a waste treatment
technology in the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Science and
Technology sponsored programs since 1991. Some $12 million total
investment has been expended on Delphi's DETOXSM technology by three
different DOE facilities. During the course of our $10 Million
development program with DOE-FETC, we have prepared thirteen (13)
proposals, and have been the subject of fourteen (14) Reviews and
Evaluations.
Demonstrating waste treatment technologies on a DOE operations site
poses formidable obstacles and complexities to the technology developer
that requires intercession by the DOE-EM50 sponsor and DOE-EM
management. Without advocacy and support by these organizations, the
developer is left to deal with regulators, subcontractors, M&O
contractors, and DOE field offices on their own, making progress on
actual demonstration work incredibly difficult, if not impossible.
Our experiences at the Savannah River Site have identified three
contributing factors to delays and cost growth (1.) Poor demonstration
site support was provided by EM-50, (2.) Critical decision making
process by DOE was slow and costly, and (3.) Strategic project
decisions were predicated on inconsistent marketing information.
Based upon our experience in the EM-50 program, we present the
following recommendations for the Subcommittee's consideration on how
EM-50 programs might be improved:
1. The DOE office administering the project should be an advocate for
the technology, not a by-stander or an adversary. Advocacy can
be attained by
a) taking a proactive, solution-oriented role in helping the
technology developer resolve issues and obstacles
encountered in the process of demonstration, and
b) being directly involved in the negotiations with potential DOE
users not only as stakeholders in the demonstration, but as
long-term customers.
2. M&O organizations who sign on as partners or stakeholders in a
demonstration project should be held accountable by DOE-EM to
uphold their agreements with the technology developers who are
attempting to demonstrate or deploy new technologies at DOE
installations. Relegation of the technology developer to
subcontractor status by an M&O contractor does not constitute a
``partnership'' or ``stakeholder'' relationship.
3. Market data on DOE waste types is the basis for technology
development needs. Therefore, the data must be reliable. DOE
should utilize the expertise of it's resources from all of the
major sites; thus, assuring that decisions on funding and
surviving projects will be in the best interest of the complex,
rather than meeting the needs of a particular site's agenda.
4. No demonstration of a technology should be permitted to proceed at a
DOE site which does not have a vested interest in its success,
i.e., economic development and commercial application are not
adequate incentives to ensure that a demonstration partner will
assist in meeting demonstration goals.
5. M&O contractors, who are involved in the development of competing
technologies and who have declared, or practice that they have
no intent to deploy ``outside'' technologies, should not be
considered as demonstration partners by EM-50.
Neither large allocations of government funds, nor the best laid
plan for demonstration and deployment can be successful when there is
no single advocate within EM management to champion a project through
the labyrinth of DOE directives and organizations. Under the present
project management structure, and using the existing programmatic
requirements, the DETOX <SUP>SM</SUP> demonstration could be funded for
twice the amount of money, and I believe that the problems and issues
would rise to the level of funding, so as to prevent success. Only when
the EM-50 demonstration and deployment program incorporates a
responsive and well-defined decision-making and site selection process,
and an advocacy program offering guidance, assistance and support for
technology developers, will the development and commercialization of
good, innovative technologies be maximized.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Dr. Kotrappa. Am I pronouncing your
name correctly?
TESTIMONY OF PAYASADA KOTRAPPA
Mr. Kotrappa. Correct. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this
opportunity to testify today on the subject matter of great
interest. We hope that this testimony will be useful as an
example of the long and difficult path to get to any commercial
business from the Department of Energy, however promising the
technology may be.
We are a small business with a unique radiation emission
technology called Electrodyne Chambers, and these have been
successfully used for measuring radon; in fact, nearly 20
percent of the market share we have for radon. And how we got
into the Department of Energy business was interesting. We were
in the process of diversifying in order to go ahead and see
other applications, and that is where, in 1994 or 1995, Oak
Ridge National Laboratory identified the potential application
of Rad Elec technology for use in measuring the low levels of
uranium, plutonium, and alpha-emitting contamination in
surfaces and in soil, and the technology was projected to
provide better, cheaper, and faster method with a large
commercial potential applicable to more waste sites. Nearly 80
to 90 percent of all the sites have this problem of uranium and
plutonium. Our technology is not cleanup; it is a
characterization technology, which is important, as
characterization has to be done first during the processing,
decontamination and also after cleanup.
This cooperative development agreement was signed between
Oak Ridge National Lab and Rad Elec, and then it was--turned
out to be a very successful product and with the testing and
demonstration, and the ready was product in 1996. And the
technology was jointly--and then, later on, that was the time
when we found the separate division and started allocating some
of our money to see how we can commercialize this product and
how we spread the good news about this technology. And that is
where we are now successful in putting this technology in the
Marsin document and GETE/Dawnbreaker Program help does a lot in
making a business plan and really projecting what is the market
share and all that.
In November 1997, we made a presentation to a small number
of staff at Rocky Flats which we think is the highest potential
for application for technology. There are hundreds of buildings
which can make use of this technology adequately. And then
after a full presentation, and, in fact, the staff members got
so excited and they say they can immediately start using this
technology throughout all buildings and equipment; immediate
application is there. And we followed up within a month. We
sent the whole set of instrumentation for them to proceed and
start using it and see if any problems are there. And, then,
from that time on, which now is about 16 or 18 months now, we
heard very little except when anybody would inquire about it,
we hear that, ``Oh, everything is okay.'' And though the tests
have been done and has been demonstrated by a competent lab, by
Oak Ridge National Lab, still it was on at about 18 months, I
don't know how long we can survive.
And, then, we furthered--we did not keep quite--the further
commercialization process, we went ahead, and then did our own
limited demonstration project at Oak Ridge National Lab in the
high visibility area in K-25, and that report has come, and
there are two original publications have come and one in a
health physics journal and the other in DOE policy institute
journal. So, we have done everything that we can to give wide
publicity and recognition; everything we have done, and still
we are waiting and waiting.
I can summarize, possibly, three reasons why we had to wait
this long, and one is of course not developed in-house is one
of the catch words, and then one technology developed and
protected by one side is simply--does not pass on the other
side; that is because of mistrust or I don't know what it is.
And the second reason is the soft attitude why to try anything
new, and I am doing my job with the existing technology and why
take risk attitude. And this is the reason why these new
technologies are really falling behind. And any new technology,
there is some risk involved, and unless somebody takes a risk,
there is no benefit. Everybody knows, unless you take a risk,
there is no benefit. It always easy to play safe and forget and
carry on with whatever we are doing. So, that is what is going
on. The third reason would be that the decisionmaking staff
does not have the incentive nor the authority to implement
large schedules of new technologies.
Those are just my observations. I hope these points that I
made will be of some use. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Payasada Kotrappa follows:]
Prepared Statement of Payasada Kotrappa, President, Rad Elec, Inc.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee and Staff, on behalf of
myself and other members of the staff of Rad Elec Inc., I thank you for
the opportunity to testify today on the subject of the transfer of DOE-
funded environmental cleanup technologies to DOE sites. We hope that
this testimony will be useful as an example of the process that many
small businesses have experienced in the long and difficult path from
concept to deployment.
summary
Rad Elec, Inc. (REI) is a small business, that manufacturers a
unique class radiation measuring instruments called E-PERM<SUP>'</SUP>s
(Electret-Passive Environmental Radiation Monitor). Rad Elec.'s first
product was an E-PERM<SUP>'</SUP> radon monitor. This was
commercialized successfully and now commands nearly 20 % market share
in USA and is being used in 20 other countries. In 1994-1995, Oak Ridge
National Laboratory identified the potential application of this
technology for use in measuring low levels of uranium, plutonium and
other alpha emitting contamination on surfaces and in soils. A CRADA
(Co-operative Research and Development Agreement) between Oak Ridge
National Laboratory and Rad Elec Inc., developed and perfected the
technology. During 1997-1999, further commercialization and
demonstration efforts were put into place, through a partial funding by
DOE (GETE/Dawnbreaker program). These efforts have resulted into many
recognitions and publications in DOE and Scientific Journals. Limited
demonstrations and application researches were carried out at Oak Ridge
and at Rocky Flats. In spite of publications in DOE methods compendium
and other publications, demonstrations and application researches, the
use of this technology in DOE sites is painfully slow, putting Rad Elec
into economic stress. There are hundreds of buildings at Rocky Flats
and several large buildings at Oak Ridge and elsewhere, where this
technology can be used beneficially. It should be recognized that new
technologies provide an improved alternative to the base line
technologies. These involve taking some well-informed risk that will
eventually save money to DOE. There is no reason why such attitude
should not be used by decision making staff at DOE, as done with
private agencies. This will help innovators and for many DOE developed
technologies to emerge as successful, eventually saving money to DOE.
rad elec inc. company profile
Rad Elec, Inc. (REI) is a small business. It has less than 10
employees and annual sales close to $1M. It is the sole manufacturer of
a unique class radiation measuring instruments called E-
PERM<SUP>'</SUP>s (Electret-Passive Environmental Radiation Monitor).
Our first product was an E-PERM<SUP>'</SUP> radon monitor. The annual
performance of these electret radon monitors in the EPA's Radon
Proficiency Measurement Program over the last six years has shown that
they consistently out-performed any other radon-monitoring devices,
either passive or electronic. The technology is established the name as
one of the most rugged and accurate radon detectors. These are being
used in 35 States in USA and in 20 other countries. Twenty percent of
all radon measurement done in USA uses Rad Elec Radon Monitors.
diversification of technolgy to meet doe needs
1994-1995
In 1994-1995, Oak Ridge National Laboratory identified the
potential application of this technology for use in measuring low
levels of uranium, plutonium and other alpha emitting contamination on
surfaces and in soils. A CRADA (Co-operative Research and Development
Agreement) between Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Rad Elec Inc., was
approved and the work was carried out for a period of two years. DOE
(Office of Science and Technology, OST) funded this research to a tune
of about 1M and Rad Elec contributed similar funding mainly in kind by
providing technology, consulting and instrumentation. This resulted
into several publications including two major ``DOE Methods Compendium
Documents''. These documents provide scientific basis, the protocols
for routine use in D and D Characterization of DOE sites.
1997-1998
In 1997 three different paths were pursued in an effort enter the D
and D market. First, EIC technology was included in the Multi-Agency
Radiation Site Survey and Investigation Manual (MARSSIM) which was
published in 1997. The MARSSIM not only provided the basis for the use
of EIC by other U.S. Agencies including DOE but also provided the
statistical basis for large-scale site surveys. During the year REI
also participated in the DOE-funded Dawnbreaker/GETE program. This
effort produced a comprehensive business plan for commercializing the
technology and produced a business plan that had not previously
existed. At its conclusion, REI had an opportunity to make a carefully
prepared presentation of our company and its products to a number of
key participants in the D & D community. The exposure was important and
the follow up was intensive but our progress was slow. Finally, in
November REI was asked to make a detailed presentation on EIC
technology to a small group of staff members at Rocky Flats. The
presentation was well received and in December a full set of EIC
instruments and monitors was loaned to Rocky Flats for test and
evaluation.
demonstration at oak ridge (1998-1999) and application research at
rocky flats
REI began working closely with the OST-funded GETE program to
develop a full-scale EIC deployment plan. During the year GETE staff in
Oak Ridge, Rocky Flats and at the Savannah River Site also worked with
REI staff as well as site management and staff to consider the
deployment of alpha surface monitors. The preliminary results of the
Rocky Flats laboratory tests of the alpha surface monitors were
reported in the Denver meeting of Spectrum 98. The paper by Wilkes, et
al entitled ``Measurement on Low Level Plutonium Sources using Rad Elec
Electret Ion Chambers'' concluded that ``. . . The performance
demonstrated with this work indicates the system should receive serious
consideration for approval as a tool to confirm that unrestricted use
property release levels are met.'' At that time the Rocky Flats
Instrument Review Committee requested that additional EIC tests should
be made and, as of the present time, approval of EICs for use at the
site is still pending.
With the active participation of Mr. S.A. Meacham, Strategic
Analytical Management Services. LLC, the first large scale field
demonstration of the E-PERM( alpha monitoring system was completed with
REI funding in Building 1401, East Tennessee Technology Park in
November of 1998. A copy of the Executive Summary of the report
describing this field test has been included in the material
accompanying this testimony. The summary includes the statement that
``. . . Large area surveys can be conducted with an initial capital
cost of less that $14,000. Based on the use of 175 monitoring points,
the demonstrated costs is less than $2.00 per measurement (consumables
and labor) and can be conveniently performed overnight without
impacting daily operations.''
recognition of the technolgy (1998-1999) (enclosures)
The technology attracted the attention of DOE funded Waste Policy
Institute and a feature article entitled ``Rad Elec prepares to enter
the DOE market place'' was published in their official journal
``Initiatives'', a copy of this is enclosed.
Recently (May 1999), the technology attracted attention of the
editors of Health Physics Journal, a premier radiation Journal devoted
to radiation protection and published an article in their ``Technology
Monitor'' column. Article concluded, ``Contrary to its inherent
simplicity, the EIC system should receive due consideration for alpha
contamination surveys''. Reprint of this article is enclosed.
Rad Elec's commercial brochure and a list of all the relevant
publications on the technology are also enclosed.
comments, conclusions and recommendations
1. In spite of the development and demonstration that the
technology can perform the tasks (characterization surveys) better,
cheaper and faster, it takes a painfully long period for taking a
decision to use the technology at DOE sites. There are hundreds of
buildings at Rocky Flats and several large buildings at Oak Ridge and
elsewhere, where this technology can be used beneficially. Small
businesses like Rad Elec that depend upon the sales to DOE market
undergo economic stress during waiting period and may go out of
business. In our efforts from 1995-1999, Rad Elec has only very minor
sales to DOE less than $ 20,000 in 1998-1999 for small projects) and
Rad Elec has yet to receive major sales. It is more than a year since
we provided the instrumentation for test application and we do not
understand why it should take this long for a proved technology to test
use and recognize this as one of the method for their characterization
projects. The reeducation of staff personnel, the local community as
well as state and regulatory officials may be difficult. These issues
and others clearly play an important part. If there is more that REI
can do we will do it. However, it would seem that the critical
information is available and that the deployment decision now rests
with the M & I contractors and DOE site managers.
2. Such problems are faced by most DOE funded technologies.
3. It should be recognized that new technologies provide an
improved alternative to the base line technologies. These involve
taking some well-informed risk with the hope that there will be
considerable saving on the long run. Innovative attitude involving the
use of new innovation that has brought America to the forefront in the
world. There is no reason why such attitude should not be used by
decision making staff at DOE. This will help innovators and for many
DOE developed technologies to emerge as useful technologies saving
money to DOE.
Mr. Upton. Thank you very much. Mr. Bernardi.
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD T. BERNARDI
Mr. Bernardi. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and subcommittee.
For the past 10 years, I have been the DOE program manager
at Bio-Imaging Research, a small Illinois business located near
Chicago. BIR has developed new technologies for inspection of
nuclear waste drums using high energy x-ray and gamma-ray
computed tomography, CT. CT produces three-dimensional views of
what is inside a drum similar to medical CAT scanning. We built
these technologies into a mobile trailer called Waste
Inspection Tomography, or WIT for short.
The DOE investment in WIT, shared with BIR, has been about
$15 million over 10 years. BIR and DOE's goal is to provide a
CT service to DOE sites for the regulated inspection of nuclear
waste drums. These drums are mostly destined for the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant, WIPP, in Carlsbad, New Mexico.
X-ray CT identifies drum content, such as clothing, items
buried in cement, and prohibitive items, such as free liquids.
Gamma-ray assay CT identifies what radioactive elements are in
the drum and determines the amount of radioactivity. CT is not
invasive, meaning the drums don't have to be opened. Opening a
drum costs more and is risky due to needed radiation
protection. WIPP can CT x-ray and assay all drums, including
those that cannot be inspected by older technologies currently
deployed by larger DOE sites. We see through an assay that
denser waste materials, like sludge and cement, which make up
over half the waste drum inventory destined for WIPP.
Between 1996 and 1998, WIT was successfully field tested at
three DOE sites, including Livermore, Rocky Flats, and Idaho
and participated in three DOE-sponsored blind test programs.
WIT was the only system to pass on every drum tested. The test
results and verification statement from DOE as well as Federal
and State environmental regulators can be found on our BIR
Website at www.bio-imaging.com. Last year, WIT successfully
completed three quality assurance audits and inspected 187
drums at the Nevada test site; that is our one deployment.
The technology is ready and deployable today. Yet, today,
WIT is not deployed at a DOE site. Why? I offer six reasons and
solutions. First, WIPP has not yet fully opened. When it does,
DOE site budgets will need to support drum inspections. Second,
major DOE sites are currently deploying 30-year old x-ray and
gamma-ray assay technologies that only work well on lightweight
waste drums. Working side by side, WIT major sites can
accurately meet State mandates to inspect all wastes--
lightweight and dense--in a timely manner. Third, regulation
language must support both the already deployable technologies
and new technologies, like WIT. Fourth, though DOE has
identified a 159,000 drum market from small DOE sites for WIT,
this market does not yet exist. We need quantity contracts now
to foster private capital investment to reduce inspection
costs. Fifth, competition between industry cost-shared projects
and similar 100 percent DOE-funded projects should be
minimized. And, finally, DOE should do more to carry through
the path from development to deployment and cover the costs of
small companies as it does with the M&Os.
All of these reasons for delayed WIT deployment have now
placed a financial burden on BIR to maintain a deployment ready
WIT capability that cannot be sustained by a small business,
like BIR, without compensation from DOE or its M&O contractors.
In closing, the computed tomography revolutionized medical
imaging in the 1970's by minimizing surgical intervention,
resulting in improved health care. Computed tomography can,
today, provide DOE with accurate nuclear waste drum
examinations while minimizing costly drum openings for improved
environmental cleanup. Please help to immediately deploy WIT
within the DOE complex.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you this morning.
[The prepared statement of Richard T. Bernardi follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard T. Bernardi, General Manager, Waste
Inspection Technology Company
Introduction
My name is Dick Bernardi from Bio-Imaging Research (or BIR for
short). I'm General Manager for BIR's Waste Inspection Technology
Division. I've been with BIR since its founding 19 years ago. It's a
small private business located 30 miles northwest of Chicago. BIR has
been a DOE contractor since 1990 and I've been the DOE Program Manager
since that time. I'd like to begin by thanking the House Subcommittee
for the opportunity to present this testimony today. I am here to
discuss BIR's continuing difficulties in deploying and commercializing
services for the inspection of DOE nuclear waste drums.
Why New Technology is Needed
The technology and equipment that BIR provides to the U.S. DOE can
uniquely contribute to a timely national environmental problem: the
disposal of nuclear waste drums from our nation's nuclear weapons
factories. There are over 600,000 waste drums (that are 55-gallon drum
equivalent) at nearly 22 DOE sites across the U.S. that require
characterization before they can be disposed of at the DOE Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico. As you may
already know, the WIPP site has just opened within the past month and
has accepted about 100 of our nation's nuclear waste drums from DOE
sites near Los Alamos and in Idaho. Originally, WIPP was scheduled to
open in 1988. It has taken more than 10 years to achieve the first
disposal of nuclear waste drums at WIPP. This is the big reason why
deployment of our technology has been delayed.
The U.S. regulations for nuclear waste drum transportation,
treatment, and disposal, require inspection. We must identify materials
such as clothing, cement, items buried in cement, and prohibited items
like free liquids. This takes nondestructive x-ray examination. In
addition, nondestructive gamma-ray assay is required to identify the
type and determine the amount of radioactivity in the drum.
Nondestructive means examination without opening the drum, where the
opening of a radioactive waste drum is more expensive and risky because
of the needed radiation protection. BIR is the only company that
examines nuclear waste drums using x-ray computed tomography, (or CT)
which provides three-dimensional imaging inside a drum, just like
medical ``CAT'' scanning. These CT drum inspection methods are located
on BIR's mobile trailer called Waste Inspection Tomography (or WIT).
WIT can cost-effectively inspect these drums with better operating
performance than any other drum inspection method in use today. BIR's
extension of medical CT technology to the inspection of waste drums was
sponsored by the DOE.
CT revolutionized medical diagnostic imaging in the 1970s and '80s
through cost-effective minimization of exploratory surgeries. Today, CT
can provide DOE with safe and accurate nuclear waste drum inspection
through cost-effective minimization of invasive and potentially
hazardous ``glove box'' inspections of nuclear waste drums. However,
WIT is currently not deployed and not being used by DOE. That is the
situation I would like to rectify with the help of this House
Subcommittee.
Since 1990, BIR has contributed over $2.5M of its own resources
into the development of WIT, and DOE has supplied the remainder. BIR's
investments included providing our detectors, software, and 2 MV (two
million volt) x-ray CT technology, as well as cost-sharing the DOE
contracts. This represents a major investment from a company whose
annual revenue has averaged $6.5M over the past eight years.
How the New Technology was Developed
BIR's first contract with the DOE for WIT came from a Small
Business Innovative Research (SBIR) grant back in 1990. We showed how
to apply 2MV x-ray detectors and CT software that BIR developed
previously, to solve the problem of inspecting drums of radioactive
waste. Since then, about $8M in DOE funding has come directly to BIR
for the development of WIT, mostly from DOE research and development
contracts through competitive DOE solicitations from the EM-50
Industries Program Office in Morgantown, West Virginia at the Federal
Energy Technology Center (FETC). About $4.5M of DOE funding has been
provided to LLNL (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) since 1993,
mostly from the EM-50 Mixed Waste Focus Area for gamma-ray assay
technology development. This LLNL CT gamma assay technology has been
successfully transferred to BIR for use on WIT through BIR funds in a
Work-for-Others agreement between LLNL and BIR, which has been an
excellent example of successful national laboratory collaboration with
and technology transfer to a small business.
This 10-year, $15M investment from BIR and DOE has given rise to
the mobile WIT technologies that have demonstrated unique and superior
cost-effective solutions to our nation's nuclear waste drum inspection
problems without the need for new, costlier, fixed DOE facilities for
drum characterization. Based on three years of field experience at four
DOE sites, WIT has demonstrated that it can noninvasively see through
all DOE nuclear waste drums, more accurately identify their content,
and measure their radioactivity better that any system currently in use
at any DOE site. All of this is done without requiring riskier and more
expensive invasive inspection of nuclear waste drums. There is
substantial third party testing data demonstrating WIT performance, and
there is a verification statement from Federal and State environmental
regulators supporting these WIT performance claims.
WIT and Only WIT Passes Every Test
I'd now like to briefly summarize the WIT experience with DOE and
identify what I perceive are the numerous impediments to commercial WIT
deployment within the DOE complex, based on our experiences.
Since 1990, BIR has responded to numerous DOE need statements found
in various DOE solicitations requiring the development of new,
improved, and innovative nuclear waste drum inspection technologies.
Between 1990 and 1993, with the DOE SBIR, BIR experimentally
demonstrated the feasibility of using 2 MV high-energy x-ray CT to
inspect nuclear waste drums. Under DOE contract, with the industry
programs office (from FETC) between 1993 and 1995, BIR designed and
built the WIT trailer for CT x-ray and gamma-ray inspection of nuclear
waste drums. In 1996 under the same contract, WIT was field-tested at
DOE Livermore, Rocky Flats, and Idaho, and successfully completed its
first commercial nuclear waste drum scanning contract at Babcock and
Wilcox in Lynchburg, Virginia. In 1997, WIT was involved in three DOE-
sponsored inter-comparison blind test programs called the CEP, RCI, and
PDP tests. The WIT system is the only characterization system in the
country to participate in and pass on all drums tested and scored in
all three tests, based on DOE acceptance criteria. I will briefly
explain these tests.
During the Capability Evaluation Program (CEP) sponsored by DOE and
Lockheed-Martin Idaho, WIT passed on every drum tested on the first
scanning attempt. Other systems tested through the CEP were asked to
repeat testing two and three times in order to achieve passing scores
on some (but not all) drums.
WIT is the only characterization technology to participate in the
Rapid Commercialization Initiative (RCI), which resulted in a
verification statement from Federal and State environmental regulators
indicating that WIT complies with the DOE characterization requirements
for all nuclear waste drums tested for x-ray and gamma assay
inspections. This included drums filled with low-density materials like
clothing, and higher density materials. During the RCI program, WIT's
performance verification was overseen by three DOE offices with
regulator interface from Headquarters, site interface from Idaho, and
project management from FETC, as well as various Federal and State
environmental regulators. The regulators included the U.S. EPA, the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Southern States Energy Board, the
Western Governors Association, and five states, which include
California, South Carolina, Washington, Idaho, and Colorado.
In the latest Performance Demonstration Program (PDP), which was a
national test sponsored by DOE Carlsbad in October 1998, the WIT system
had the best assay scores (the most accurate) of 16 systems tested
nationwide for drums with sludge, which is one of the most difficult
waste materials to inspect. Nine systems from DOE sites and other
companies failed these tests. WIT identified 100% of the radioactivity
in sludge, whereas the next closest system from a DOE site passed with
only 80% identification. The closest commercial competitor to BIR only
identified 40% of the radioactivity.
WIT results from the PDP, RCI, and CEP can be found on BIR's web
site at www.bio-imaging.com.
In 1998, WIT participated in and successfully completed three
quality assurance audits conducted by DOE Carlsbad at the Nevada Test
Site. In parallel, WIT successfully completed its first DOE commercial
contract for the characterization of 187 nuclear waste drums, also at
the DOE Nevada Test Site as subcontractor to TRUtech, a Thermo-Electron
company who was contracted with Bechtel-Nevada, the site M&O.
Why Isn't This Technology Deployed Yet?
Unfortunately, WIT is not now providing characterization services
under a DOE contract. Yet the WIT technology is deployable today.
Another WIT quality assurance audit is now required by the U.S. EPA at
the Nevada Test Site in June, 1999 and is currently being planned by
Bechtel-Nevada, TRUtech, and BIR with no future DOE Nevada
characterization revenue in sight. Cooperation between DOE and EPA with
combined audits would assure quality inspections while providing
effective and timely quality audits at a reduced cost. Throughout 1998,
the three DOE audits at the Nevada Test Site have cost BIR in excess of
$560,000, with only $111,000 in cost-shared compensation received from
DOE. BIR was willing to participate in these DOE audits with cost-
sharing because Bechtel had a contract in place where up to 1,325 drums
were to be characterized with mobile services such as WIT. However,
Bechtel terminated our inspection services after 187 drums because of
the continuing audit process and a redirection of budget. Nevertheless,
DOE still required the three audits, which WIT successfully completed,
and is now requiring us to participate in a new fourth EPA audit
without any compensating contract for new characterization work at the
Nevada Test Site. BIR believes that Bechtel, the Nevada site M&O,
continues to be compensated by DOE for all its waste management
activities, including the audits. We also believe that small
contractors like BIR should be compensated for all their inspection-
related activities, including the DOE and EPA audits, just as Bechtel
is.
Why is WIT not now deployed at a DOE site or under contract with
the DOE to provide inspection services for nuclear waste drums,
especially with WIPP just opening? I believe the following six reasons
are the root causes of this situation, which can lead to potential
solutions:
1. The WIPP Delay--WIPP has been delayed in opening for 10 years
and it will take another four to eight months to completely open after
achieving final approval from the State of New Mexico for the RCRA Part
B permit. As a result of these continued delays, various DOE sites and
M&O contractors have not provided budgets or procurement activities of
significant quantities related to commercial mobile drum inspection
services. They have indicated they want to deploy mobile technologies,
and we believe this will most likely only occur after WIPP fully opens,
though we are ready to begin characterization work today.
2. Inertia Favors Outdated Technologies--Major DOE waste generator
sites continue to use existing, in-place, 30-year-old drum inspection
technologies for drum x-ray and gamma assay exams. The larger DOE sites
have already invested in these existing facilities and staff, which use
older x-ray and gamma assay instruments with limited capability for
drum inspections. These older capabilities cannot see through or assay
difficult and denser waste matrices like sludge and cement, which make
up over half of the existing nuclear waste drum inventory destined for
WIPP. But since these older technologies have demonstrated the ability
to characterize lightweight matrices like clothing and other
combustibles, which only make up less than half of the DOE waste
materials, the solution is for us and them to work together. WIT's
mobile trailers can work side-by-side with the M&Os from the major
sites, thus supporting their existing infrastructure and jobs while
nearly doubling the output, including the drums that the older
technologies cannot see through or assay. Increasing output is needed
at both DOE's Rocky Flats and Idaho to meet DOE mandated cleanup
commitments to the states of Colorado, Idaho, and others.
3. Regulations Need Updating--Existing regulations can favor the
older technologies and need to be modified. The first draft of the
language in New Mexico's RCRA Part B Permit only supported the older x-
ray technology and stated that dense drums that used the older x-ray
technology would need to be opened for invasive inspections. It has
taken BIR one year to modify the second RCRA permit draft application
to include language that will now allow WIT. This new language is
expected to be approved by New Mexico this coming August to allow CT
scanning technology to be used in addition to or alongside the older x-
ray techniques. This will reduce the number of costlier and less safe
invasive inspections by about half! As another example, the DOE
auditors are continuously requesting to see the WIT calibration data
for gamma assay. The older assay technologies do not measure absolute
values of radioactivity, since they must be regularly calibrated
against prior information about drum content (information that could be
wrong!). But WIT gamma assay is an absolute measurement method and
calibration is not required. So we have to continually teach DOE
auditors and their regulators the advantages of our new innovative WIT
technology.
4. We Need the Promised Quantity Order for Financial Feasibility--
On Halloween 1996 at a public meeting in the Forrestal Building here in
Washington, D.C., DOE Carlsbad and DOE Headquarters presented a plan
for commercial mobile nuclear waste drum inspection. The market was
identified as 159,000 drums from smaller DOE sites with the potential
for an additional 319,000 more nuclear waste drums from the larger DOE
sites. DOE also emphasized the need for new innovative characterization
technologies throughout the 1990s through R&D and SBIR solicitations.
In view of this and the imminent opening of WIPP in 1999, BIR continues
to spend its own money to pursue this marketplace with WIT. That is why
I am here today.
A single DOE task order for 187 drums is a far cry from a potential
market of 478,000 drums presented in 1996. DOE and its M&Os must put
forth a significant market share of drums to mobile inspection vendors,
who must invest millions of dollars in capital equipment to provide
state-of-the-art inspection services for the difficult waste materials.
Significant task orders of five years and 25,000 drums will permit
small business capitalization to get the job done, and more
importantly, can cut the cost per drum almost in half. Achieving
significant drum quantity task orders requires coordinated efforts
between many DOE sites and their M&Os, which DOE Carlsbad and
Headquarters has thus far not been able to materialize. Making
available significant drum quantities for commercial mobile inspection
vendors like BIR in a timely manner from M&Os of both large and small
DOE sites is required to achieve successful lower cost
commercialization of WIT inspection services and meet the nation's
schedule for nuclear waste drum cleanup.
5. Competition Between Fully DOE-Funded and Industry Cost-Shared
Projects Should be Minimized--There are two competitive groups within
the DOE waste drum characterization business. First, BIR has few
commercial service competitors, who use older technologies. But more
significant, competition comes from the DOE sites themselves. It is
difficult for BIR to directly compete in the waste drum
characterization business in the DOE market when the major DOE site
M&Os have already invested in technologies either developed by
themselves or have deployed older technologies purchased from
commercial competitors with 100% DOE funding. In addition,
I believe conflicts of interest and unfair competition exists when
DOE sites share technology they have developed and transfer this
technology that has been 100% developed or purchased with DOE funds. At
the same time, a small business like BIR has been required to cost
share the WIT technology development with DOE since 1993. These
conflicts can lead the larger sites to ignore WIT's innovative
technical and cost benefits. This is because of a prevailing preference
at the large sites to use in-place personnel and existing instruments.
The reason that only the small DOE sites (e.g., Nevada) have offered
drums to commercial service vendors like BIR is that the small sites
have little in-house inspection capability, unlike the larger sites.
Again, the solution is to have WIT work side-by-side with these
existing systems at the large DOE sites, as well as at small sites to
inspect all of the waste drum materials, both lightweight and dense, in
an accurate, safe, and timely manner.
6. Close Coordination is Nonexistent--Full DOE support for a
planned transition (e.g., compensation for quality assurance audits) of
innovative technologies from development to field deployment does not
exist for projects like WIT. Delayed deployment, because of the above
reasons, has now placed a financial burden on BIR that cannot be
sustained by a small business for the maintenance of WIT and its staff
in a deployment-ready condition. We should generate a general awareness
within DOE and each M&O contractor that currently deployed drum
inspection technologies have limitations and that WIT can provide cost-
effective solutions today. How many field operations people know that
the current drum inspection technologies fielded at DOE sites have
problems characterizing the dense waste drums? Conversely, how many DOE
sites know that WIT can solve these problems? Who within DOE and its
M&Os is responsible to see that innovative technologies that work like
WIT are properly applied to DOE problems? BIR has continuously marketed
to DOE and its M&Os at each site to develop and educate waste
management regarding WIT and its capabilities and benefits. DOE support
is needed for the transitioning of proven new innovative technologies
like WIT that have achieved successful initial field deployments and
have solved recognized DOE field problems, if sustainable
commercialization and deployment in the DOE market is our final goal.
Conclusion
In closing, medical computed tomography has successfully improved
medical care worldwide by improving the accuracy of diagnosis,
minimizing surgical intervention, and by keeping the cost of medicine
down through capital investment for improved health care. This same
logic applies to the application of computed tomography to nuclear
waste drum inspection where noninvasive CT inspection can greatly
improve the accuracy of identifying and measuring drum content, can
minimize costly drum opening intervention and hazardous radioactive
waste exposures, and can lower the overall costs of environmental
remediation. Thank you for the opportunity to present this testimony. I
hope this House Subcommittee will support the immediate deployment of
new innovative technologies like WIT to effectively cleanup our
nation's nuclear waste drum inventory.
Mr. Upton. Another gold star; more than a minute left.
Mr. Bernardi. Well, I can talk some more.
Mr. Upton. Yes. Mr. Schofield.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN T. SCHOFIELD
Mr. Schofield. My name is John Schofield. I am the chairman
present and CEO of a company called Thermatrix, which I founded
in 1992. Thermatrix was founded----
Mr. Upton. If you could just pull that mike a little
closer.
Mr. Schofield. Thermatrix was founded to commercial a
technology which was developed at London's Livermore Lab and
was abandoned in 1985 of having no commercial significance.
Today, Thermatrix, we expect this year our sales will be about
$60 million. We employ over 400 people, and 55 percent of our
business is overseas.
In terms of the deployment of the technology with the DOE,
we ran a test program at Savannah River with Westinghouse which
came out with flying colors. We supplied three systems to INEL,
and those systems are operating today. Thereafter, we were
asked by the DOE to get involved with a company called
ThermoChem, which had a steam reforming technology, to see if
we could bring that technology in conjunction with our
technology, and our technology, principally, is a unique
technology. We are the only people in the world with this
technology, and it is a flameless replacement for incineration.
It is widely deployed throughout the world, and, particularly,
it has been certified by the State of California, the State of
Massachusetts, and has received the prestigious Dean
Sensenbaugh Award from the Air Waste Management Association.
We formed a joint venture with ThermoChem, and with our
engineering resources and with our own money, we spent a
considerable amount building a pilot facility. We put in
roughly $1 million on top of the $4 million that the DOE put in
to build a pilot facility in Baltimore. The facility passed all
the tests. Six surrogate wastes were tested on this. We passed
all the criteria; we passed all the reliability tests, and we
even issued a brochure showing the pictures of the facility. In
April 1997, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Mixed
Waste Focus Group evaluated 23 technologies and picked out this
particular technology as being the most successful and the most
likely to be deployed.
In May 1997, a proposal was submitted to deploy the
technology at the Paul Smith Diffusion Plant at Piketon, Ohio.
We held a lot of meetings there; we put the proposal together,
and nothing ever happened. The reasons given were, one, there
were no funds available to deploy the technology, and the
question I would have is of all the technologies that are being
deployed in the program, nobody ever talked how many of these
technologies are actually invented by the contractors and
within the DOE and how many are outside, because I know when we
were told there were no funds available, 15 other technologies
had just been selected that happened to have been developed by
the contractors. And so they were able to deploy them
internally.
Second, we were told that it was impossible to
competitively bid for our technology, because we were the only
people in the world with this technology, and so how can they
deploy a unique technology on a sole source basis?
Mr. Upton. I hope you had it patented.
Mr. Schofield. We have it well patented worldwide, and sole
source selection does not seem to be a problem for the likes of
Pfizer, Chevron, Warner-Lambert, Exxon, Mobil, PPG.
At the site itself, when we talked to the people there, it
was very revealing. They said, ``Why do we want to solve this
problem? If we solve the problem, we don't have a job. It is
far better that we keep looking and searching for other
solutions and testing and looking around, because, on that
basis, we have a job.'' We reward our people because they solve
problems. It seems to me, the DOE rewards people for not
solving problems, because, on that basis, they keep their job.
Going forward, because of the amount of money we spent on
this, we now do no business with the DOE. It is our policy not
to do business with the DOE, and I am sorry to report that.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of John T. Schofield follows:]
Prepared Statement of John T. Schofield, Chairman, President and CEO,
Thermatrix Inc.
From 1980 to 1985 the DOE Laboratory at Lawrence Livermore invented
a technology to improve the efficiency of energy conversion as part of
the oil shale program. Approximately $25 million was spent during this
period but in 1985 further work was suspended and the technology was
abandoned as having no commercial application.
In 1985 researchers from Lawrence Livermore, in conjunction with
others, formed a company, In-Process Technology, to further the
technology development. $12.5 million of venture capital funds were
spent in the period from 1985 through 1991 without any product being
developed and in early 1992, a decision was made to close down the
company and abandon the technology. I, John T. Schofield, was brought
in by one of the venture investors to look at the technology. This
investigation during the first three months of 1992 resulted in the
establishment of Thermatrix Inc. in July 1992, to commercialize the
technology as an environmental technology to treat noxious emissions
from a wide range of process plants in the refining, chemical and
pharmaceutical industries.
As the founder of Thermatrix Inc., I provided funds, recruited a
team and by the end of 1992 had designed and received orders for the
first two systems using the ``Thermatrix technology.'' The technology
was successfully deployed and commercialized during the period 1993 to
1996 by attracting approximately $22 million in venture capital funds.
The technology was extremely successful and the product was sold not
only to blue chip clients in the major process industries, but also
three units were installed at INEL, and further installations took
place at various USAF bases, including Brooks, Patterson, McClelland
and the Naval Air Station, North Island.
Thermatrix has become a leader in air pollution control and sales
in 1999 are expected to exceed $50 million with over 50% being exported
outside the United States.
In 1994, ThermoChem, a small technology developer, was awarded a
contract to a value of approximately $4 million to build a steam
reforming system to treat low level mixed waste. The contract was
awarded by the US Department of Energy's Morgantown Energy Technology
Center under contract number DE-AR21-95MC32091. By early 1996, problems
began to appear in the design of the system concerning the treatment of
off gas from the steam reforming system and Thermatrix, which was known
to the DOE, was brought together with ThermoChem in an endeavor to
solve this problem. We were encouraged to believe that a solution to
this problem would provide a unique system, which could be extensively
deployed by the Department of Energy in dealing with a wide range of
mixed waste including radioactive PCBs.
Thermatrix, which went public in June 1996, contributed several
hundred thousand dollars of its own funds to supplement the inadequate
allocation of funds, under the original $4 million contract, set aside
for dealing with the off gas, and engineered, in conjunction with
ThermoChem, a highly reliable system combining the two technologies.
Thermatrix published the first details of this system in its Annual
Report for 1996 on pages 12 and 13. The system was built and tested in
accordance with a very exacting regime under the auspices of a joint
venture between Thermatrix and ThermoChem. The system which is shown in
the attached brochure and appeared in the 1997 Annual Report of
Thermatrix on pages 10 and 11, successfully treated six surrogate
wastes and passed reliability standards which had been set.
In April 1997 the Mixed Waste Focus Area of Lockheed Martin Idaho
Technologies Company at INEL published a study entitled ``Evaluation of
Alternative Nonflame Technologies for Destruction of Hazardous Organic
Wastes,'' reference number INEL/EXT-97-00123. This report evaluated 23
different technologies and ranked the steam reforming technology as
number one based upon ratings of categories of performance, readiness
for deployment, and environment, safety and health considerations. The
steam reforming system was recommended as one of three technologies for
continued development.
In May 1997, Formatrix, the joint venture of ThermoChem and
Thermatrix, joined with the US Department of Energy Oak Ridge
Operations to submit a proposal under the Technology Deployment
Initiative for ``Steam Reformation of TSCA and Low Level Mixed Waste at
the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant.'' Considerable time and
expenditure was incurred in putting this proposal together, including
meetings with responsible people at Piketon, Ohio, where detailed
discussions were held concerning the deployment of the technology. The
technology was never deployed and as a result in late 1997 the joint
venture with ThermoChem was discontinued and Thermatrix wrote off its
significant investment in this development.
Subsequent investigations revealed the following reasons for the
lack of continuation:
<bullet> No funds available,
<bullet> Inability to contract sole source for a unique technology,
<bullet> Allocation of funds from reduced budgets were being directed
internally to preserve jobs and were not available for the
purchase of ``outside'' solutions.
The Thermatrix technology has been successfully deployed around the
world on a commercial basis and has been awarded, world wide, the most
prestigious awards granted to any air pollution control technology over
the past decade. Thermatrix has expended a considerable sum of money in
pursuing this development and has also offered proven commercial
systems for destroying bottles of stored gases at numerous DOE
facilities, and for replacing the PCB incinerator at Oak Ridge
Tennessee with its technology which has been certified as being an
alternative to incineration. Thermatrix has been encouraged in all
these endeavors only to find that deployment does not occur for the
above stated three reasons. It is now Thermatrix policy not to propose
on any further consideration of the deployment of its technology with
the Department of Energy.
Mr. Upton. Well, I know we all appreciate your testimony
this morning, and I will tell you, Mr. Schofield, as I listened
to your testimony just now and as I look at this report that we
will make sure is part of the record from the evaluation of
alternative non-flame technologies for destruction of hazardous
organic wastes in April 1997, and I see that your firm is No. 1
in terms of capability for the cleanup work, and yet you do no
business at all, this is why I think we need additional
hearings, particularly with the five field managers that we
referenced a little bit earlier with Mr. Burr.
Mr. Bernardi, I had heard about your operation before you
came, and looked at your testimony, and, again, as a--I didn't
know much about this issue at all before I began to serve on
this subcommittee in terms of the cleanup, and in my role, I
have met with a number of folks. We heard from Mr. Hastings
this morning. I remember sitting down with Mr. Hastings, my
colleague, a month or so ago, 2 months ago, maybe, and I have
never been to Hanford; really, never been to Washington State
since I went to the World's Fair in 1964. But as he talked
about the site and described it with all of these containers
and did so again this morning, one of the concerns that he had
or that the folks in the field have is that they have no idea
what was in them, so they didn't know how to treat them; they
didn't know how to get rid of it. They knew that they were
leaking, but it seems as though in your description today that
your technology that you developed is the perfect one to answer
the questions, whether they be there or whether they be at a
WIT site or anyplace else.
Mr. Bernardi. For small packages, such as drums or small
boxes, yes. For tanks that are very large, it is certainly
difficult to build a CT scanner to a large tank. But,
certainly, for the smaller packages----
Mr. Upton. But is it possible to do that? Is it possible to
build a CT scanner?
Mr. Bernardi. Yes, it is, but that is not what we have been
concentrating on, but it is possible.
Mr. Upton. And do you have any Federal--I mean, we heard
with Mr. Burr's questioning a little bit earlier this morning,
I think they are going to go back and readdress and find out
why--but do you have any Government contracts now in terms of
the cleanup of this?
Mr. Bernardi. We have a contract to move our technology
back to the Nevada test site for an EPA audit; that is the only
contract we have. We have a contract with EM-50, which is our
R&D contract, which is closing out this last quarter of the
year. Those are the two contracts in this area. We have other
Government contracts in other areas but not cleanup.
Mr. Upton. For the record, maybe I would like to know--
particularly as we embark on a future hearing--maybe some of
the contacts or miscontacts that your company has had and,
perhaps, the reasons given in terms of why you were not awarded
something, particularly as we look at the promise of this.
Mr. Bernardi. Yes, I would be happy to provide further
testimony, if you wish.
Mr. Upton. You know, the Department, in its written
testimony, indicated that they ``we have taken aggressive
measures to accelerate the widespread use of new
technologies.'' It seems to me, as I listen to the comments
with all of your firms, that that has really not been the case.
Would anyone like to comment specifically on that?
Mr. Schofield. I think it depends where the technology was
invented, and it seems to me that the object of the exercise is
with the budget that the contractors have, they intend just to
spend that budget internally rather than spending external
dollars, and they will spend that money internally developing
their own technologies even if they are not successful, because
it preserves jobs, and the solution may be outside, but they
will not spend those dollars outside.
Mr. Upton. Well, Mr. Schofield, you indicated in your
testimony that one of the reasons you thought that you were
denied was because you were a sole source; there was no other
firm that had the comparable technology to compete with you in
terms of making of a bid.
Mr. Schofield. Correct.
Mr. Upton. And, Mr. Bernardi, is there anyone else that has
developed the technology that you have in terms of this CT
scanner?
Mr. Bernardi. No, there isn't. The problem, I think, lies
with the definition of a competitive procurement. When you are
comparing apples and oranges in a procurement, I don't view
that as a competitive procurement. Our goal has been to develop
leapfrog technology over what exists. We believe we have
demonstrated that, but the procurements aren't designed to show
the technical benefits of the technology, and that has been a
continuing story in everything we have gotten involved in. The
technologies that exist in the sites have a purpose, and they
do well for what waste streams they can work on, but when you
are competing with a technology that can work on other waste
streams and the procurement doesn't define that, then it is a
procurement that is waved toward the prior technology, and that
is what we have faced.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Ms. DeGette.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The first thing I would like to ask is unanimous consent
for members to submit questions to DOE maybe 7 days in response
to this panel and I assume the testimony from the next panel. I
was just commenting a minute ago how I would have liked to have
heard some of the responses of the DOE folks to this disturbing
testimony.
Mr. Upton. Without objection.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
Mr. Burr. Would the gentlelady yield for 1 second?
Ms. DeGette. Sure.
Mr. Burr. Would anybody from the Department of Energy raise
their hand that is here? Thank you for staying.
Ms. DeGette. Yes, thank you for staying.
My first question is if each of the four of you could
estimate the potential sales you could have for your products
to DOE sites and then the potential sale of your products
outside of DOE. What I am trying to do is get a feel for the
applicability for your products outside these specific DOE
sites. Mr. Rogers, you want to----
Mr. Rogers. Sure. I believe it was also mentioned here that
we had gone through--a number of us, actually, have gone
through what is known as the Dawnbreaker Program for
development of our business planning, and my recollection out
of that was that there was approximately $150 million to $200
million market avail-
able for application of our technology within DOE in the
treatment of low level mixed wastes, and outside of that, the
nuclear power industry probably represented the biggest
component; it was about $100 million market. And them you
branch out into hazardous and a number of other applications,
but if you are going to talk about low level mixed waste
applications, which our technology is focused on, that would be
the comparison. They are pretty equal.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you. Dr. Kotrappa?
Mr. Kotrappa. Yes, we went through the GETE/Dawnbreaker
program, and that really helped us to put our business plan in
place, and we do, I think, projected sales to use our
instrumentation for characterizing sites. As I pointed out,
nearly 80 percent of all the sites have this problem of uranium
and plutonium contamination; very large number of sites, and
this technology can do characterizations much cheaper and
better and faster. Based on that, we have projected in next 5
years we should have a business of $60 million to $70 million.
Because of that projection, we have gratefully followed all of
the commercialization steps that anybody can think of, and
still we have waited.
Ms. DeGette. Mr. Bernardi?
Mr. Bernardi. Yes. I have also participated in the
Dawnbreaker Program a number of years ago. Our projections,
depending on which scenario you use, is between $20 million to
over $40 million a year. The lifetime of the program would
coincide with the lifetime of WIPP's disposal program, which is
about 35 years.
Mr. Schofield. We are a public company. We went public in
1996, so some of our information is public information. In
1998, our sales were up 94 percent over 1997. We expect our
sales in 1999 to be around about $60 million, and we would
expect in 3 to 5 years to be somewhere in the $300 million to
$500 million range. In terms of deployment with the DOE, the
facility that we designed for Portsmouth was a $24 million
facility which would have cleaned up all the waste there in 3
years. I would expect, in terms of its type of deployment,
possibly that DOE represents about $100 million over about a 5-
year period.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you. For any of you, during the course
of your product development, did you prepare a cost-benefit
analysis either with or for the DOE to compare the cost of your
product or proposed product against the baseline product or
process? And, if so, what was the result of the analysis?
Mr. Schofield. I can answer that. Westinghouse produced an
independent report on the work they did at Savannah River
showing that this technology would product a cost benefit of
not less than 25 percent compared to any of the technology now.
McClellan Air Force Base did a similar evaluation and confirmed
the Westinghouse numbers. And in deployment, the fact that we
get these orders now from the big pharmaceutical companies, et
cetera, and the fact that a lot of our business is in Europe is
because energy costs in Europe are about three times what they
are in the States. The savings in Europe are that much greater
than they are in the States, and we get our business because we
are cost effective and because we do what we say we are going
to do.
Ms. DeGette. Would any of the rest of you like to answer
that question?
Mr. Bernardi. Yes, there are three ways you can look at
from our technology. First of all, on our Website, there is a
what is called a Rapid Commercialization Initiative Final
Report, and in there is a study that was done by the Army Corps
of Engineers doing cost analysis. And, basically, our
technology is competitive in sufficient quantity of drums, not
a 187-drum contract; you need tens of thousands of drums to
make it competitive.
Ms. DeGette. Right.
Mr. Bernardi. Also, it is certainly cheaper than building
new facilities at each of these sites, because it is a mobil
technology, and, third, compared to opening the drums, it could
be cheaper by a factor of anywhere from four to eight times
cheaper on a per drum basis compared to opening drums.
Mr. Kotrappa. Yes, we have done this analysis, so also, Oak
Ridge National Lab for promoting the product also did this, and
then we--as a large-scale application, our method is much
cheaper and better and faster with the analysis that we have
done and especially this program related to 100 buildings in
Rocky Flats. Each of that has to be parted out as contaminated
or not contaminated, and that was one of the--we supplied the
information to their request for information on the new
technology to do this job, and that is what we did, and we did
everything, and that what it is. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. To answer your question, Congresswoman, Delphi
participated in a DOE-sponsored program to evaluate
technologies--non-incineration and non-thermal treatment
technologies with the Department of Energy and had life-cycle
cost analysis performed on that to compare with other
alternatives. It was done early in the program, and since we
are still involved in demonstrating our technology, we really
haven't concluded those economic factors, if you will. One
humorous anecdote was that in one of the review meetings that
we had, there was a citing of a Government statistic, a DOE
statistic, that our technology would achieve these cost savings
of $200 million when applied to all the wastes in inventory
that is applicable to our technology. And, so we cited that
reference in a presentation we did, and we were challenged by
the ASME review committee on where that number came from, and I
said, ``Well, the gentleman who generated that number is
sitting right here in the back of the room. Would you care to
tell them where that came from?'' And his comment was, ``That
is a DOE-generated number and has no credibility whatsoever.''
So, I don't know where the answers are after that.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Mr. Burr.
Mr. Burr. Mr. Schofield, let me go to the statement you
just made which was Westinghouse identified a significant
savings--25 percent, is that what you said?
Mr. Schofield. Yes.
Mr. Burr. And that was specifically for what process or
what process at what site?
Mr. Schofield. Westinghouse ran a test program at Savannah
River using our technology on a remediation of chlorinated
hydrocarbons.
Mr. Burr. Why are you not a subcontractor for them now, do
you think?
Mr. Schofield. As a result of that test work and the report
that came out, we did receive and order from INEL to install
three units for the remediation of radioactive chlorinated
hydrocarbons, and those three units are in operation today.
Mr. Burr. But no other sites?
Mr. Schofield. No other sites. No, we have no other DOE
sites. We have installations at Air Force Base at North Island,
Naval Air Force Base in North Island, Patterson, McClellan.
Mr. Burr. Is DOE aware of the savings that you brought to
the Savannah River site for Westinghouse?
Mr. Schofield. Yes.
Mr. Burr. How many times have they contacted you in hopes
that they could place your technology at another site?
Mr. Schofield. We participated and we spent about $1
million of our own money building a pilot facility to process
radioactive wastes. The Portsmouth Diffusion Plant was the
identified ultimate deployment. We built the pilot plant; we
tested six surrogate wastes; we passed all the tests; we passed
the reliability tests; everything was approved. We then went to
Piketon; we drew up plans to build a facility at Piketon; we
spent a considerable amount of money doing that, and we were
told it will not be deployed, because the funds are not
available, and the people at Piketon basically said, ``We don't
want to solve this problem, because then we don't have a job
left if we solve the problem.''
Mr. Burr. How much money would you have saved in Piketon,
do you know?
Mr. Schofield. I don't know, because I don't know what the
annual cost is to----
Mr. Burr. What about the deployment funds?
Mr. Schofield. The deployment funds were $22 million to
build the facility.
Mr. Burr. Could you have saved $22 million?
Mr. Schofield. I would have thought we would have saved two
or three times that.
Mr. Burr. Okay. Let me ask you, you are doing business at
Savannah River for Westinghouse----
Mr. Schofield. Yes, we have an installation in your
community in North Carolina also at Cheesebrough Ponds.
Mr. Burr. And we welcome you. Let me ask you: any
application for your technology at Hanford?
Mr. Schofield. I have no idea. We have not pursued it,
because we refuse to spend any more time or money on this----
Mr. Burr. Oak Ridge?
Mr. Schofield. Oak Ridge, certainly. We had a lot of
meetings with Oak Ridge. We talked to Oak Ridge about a very
simple system to----
Mr. Burr. When you say you talked to Oak Ridge, did you
talk to the site manager at Oak Ridge? Did you talk to Bechtel,
which is the contractor? Who in that chain?
Mr. Schofield. No, we were talking to people from Lockheed
Martin, and there was a committee set up to look at our
technology specifically to destroy 22,000 gas cylinders that
were stored at Oak Ridge.
Mr. Burr. And what type of help did you get from the
Department of Energy relative to these conversations with
Lockheed Martin?
Mr. Schofield. The conclusion at the end of the day was
that they were not ready to get rid of those gas cylinders.
Mr. Burr. How much did DOE help you in your conversations
with Lockheed Martin at that time?
Mr. Schofield. Not at all.
Mr. Burr. Mr. Bernardi, I asked some questions about your
technology. They weren't too familiar with your technology.
Should they be?
Mr. Bernardi. Certainly in the field, they should be. I
spent these past 10 years driving to most of the sites of
flying to most of the sites.
Mr. Burr. You have got a mobil unit, almost like the mobil
mammography van, or something like that. You can go onsite
where there are no bricks and mortar costs; you drive in; you
are able to scan these containers, which eliminates the
opening.
Now, they led me to believe that there was a good process,
and the technology that was comparable apparently won out. Is
that how you see it as the manufacturer?
Mr. Bernardi. The competing technologies, commercially, are
the conventional technologies that have been around awhile, and
the procurement was tied to these DOE audits, and the selection
criteria was based on completing the DOE audits. The day we
were told that our contract was terminated was the day we were
ending our third audit, and we had successfully completed that
audit, and the contract was terminated based on previous audit
findings. Subsequently, we passed all the audits, but we are
part of a team of companies, and these DOE audits are something
that is an ongoing process, and it is ongoing for every site
for all technologies, and we successfully completed the audit,
and so we believe that we are just as legitimate a competitor
in this arena as anyone else.
Mr. Burr. But I think their comment was you were given the
opportunity to bid, and you lost the bid. Is that accurate?
Mr. Bernardi. The contract was terminated; at least the
work was terminated based on audit findings, because the audit
process was continuing.
Mr. Burr. Somebody is currently inspecting those
containers, right?
Mr. Bernardi. Right.
Mr. Burr. Conventional x-ray----
Mr. Bernardi. But, actually, the other people's contract
was also terminated, so we were both--our contracts were ended
both----
Mr. Burr. Are we not inspecting any of the barrels now?
Mr. Bernardi. Not at that site, that is correct.
Mr. Burr. It just stopped.
Mr. Bernardi. It just stopped, because we are continuing
the DOE audit process.
Mr. Burr. And that site is which?
Mr. Bernardi. That is the Nevada test site.
Mr. Upton. Might I just ask, when was it that it stopped?
Mr. Bernardi. We finished our work the fall of last year,
and this third audit was the beginning of this year.
Mr. Burr. Do you feel like that DOE knew the contracts had
been terminated?
Mr. Bernardi. I am sure people in DOE knew that, yes.
Mr. Burr. Do you think that people at Bechtel, since they
were the contractor, knew that contracts had been terminated?
Mr. Bernardi. Yes, sir; they were involved in it.
Mr. Burr. Certainly, I think they are going to be here on
the next panel. I will be sure to ask them.
Let me just ask as a last question to all of you: if you
could pick one thing to identify for this subcommittee as the
reason that new technology is not being integrated--I don't
want you to limit it to your technology. Trust me, I don't
think you would be here if you didn't think your technology was
the best--but why new technology is not being incorporated in
the cleanup process at sites around the country, if there was
one reason, what would that be? And let me start with you, Mr.
Schofield.
Mr. Schofield. In my view, the people at the sites don't
want to solve the problem. They want to prolong the problem in
order to save jobs.
Mr. Burr. Define people at the site for us. Contractors?
Site managers?
Mr. Schofield. Contract personnel.
Mr. Burr. Mr. Bernardi?
Mr. Bernardi. I have a number of reasons. I think I will
mix two things, sir. One is, in my technology case, it is the
combination of the opening of WIPP and the existence of older
technology onsites; those two things have made it difficult for
us.
Mr. Burr. Doctor?
Mr. Kotrappa. The delays are what really kill us, and they
don't make any decisions for a long, long period, and we wait
and wait and, you know, this new technology, we have put in so
much money, and to small companies, that money is a lot of
money, and delays is the way I would put it.
Mr. Burr. Delays caused by contractors or DOE?
Mr. Kotrappa. Unnecessary for that research where all of
the research has been done, the product is ready. And to go on
testing, testing, testing, I don't know why.
Mr. Burr. That sounds like it is generated out of OST.
Okay.
Mr. Rogers?
Mr. Rogers. If I had to distill everything down to one, I
would still refer to the five recommendations that I gave you
earlier, but probably the single most important of those would
be the fact that there is no single advocate within DOE EM
programs, and I am speaking as a demonstration technology
developer; I haven't made it to deployment yet. But there is no
single advocate to assist small business in overcoming the
overwhelming communications required and inertia required to
move a project forward.
Mr. Burr. With contractors? Site managers? DOE?
Mr. Rogers. Wrap a bow around all of them. I mean, it is
DOE; it is M&O contractors. As a matter of fact, it is not just
DOE, it is DOE--you have your Contract Administration Office to
deal with and reporting and all of the requirements that go
along with that. You have the site DOE office that you have to
communicate with, and then you have the M&O contractors. You
have your own team of subcontractors that, because a small
business doesn't have all the expertise, we have to bring that
on. So, it is an overwhelming management problem that is really
laid in the lap of the technology developer to solve.
Mr. Burr. I thank all four of you for your willingness to
come and for your candidness with your testimony.
I yield back.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, panelists. We appreciate your
testimony; it was very enlightening. You may look to see some
questions coming, and we look forward to those additional
responses, as well. You are excused. Thank you very much.
Our next panel includes Mr. Ron Peterson, group president
of Flora Corporation; Mr. Robert Card, president of Kaiser-
Hill; Mr. Lee McIntire, president of Bechtel National, and Mr.
James Gallagher, president, Government Environmental Services
of Westinghouse Electric.
Thank you all for being patient. As you heard from the
beginning, this morning, we have had a long tradition of having
our witnesses swear under oath or testify under oath and do any
of you have objection to that? And we also usually allow for
the availability of counsel. Do you any of you desire an
additional person to be with you? Mr. Gallagher, Dr. Wood might
accompany you on this?
Mr. Gallagher. Yes.
Mr. Upton. Okay, good.
If you would all stand and raise your hand, that would be
terrific.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Thank you very much. You are now under oath, and, Dr.
Gallagher, we will start with you. Thank you.
TESTIMONY OF JAMES L. GALLAGHER, PRESIDENT, GOVERNMENT AND
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION;
ACCOMPANIED BY SUSAN WOOD, DIRECTOR, SAVANNAH RIVER TECHNOLOGY
CENTER, VICE PRESIDENT, WESTINGHOUSE SAVANNAH RIVER COMPANY;
LEE A. MCINTIRE, PRESIDENT, BECHTEL NATIONAL, INCORPORATED;
ROBERT G. CARD, PRESIDENT, KAISER-HILL; AND RONALD G. PETERSON,
GROUP PRESIDENT, FLUOR CORPORATION
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am Jim Gallagher, president of the Westinghouse
Government Services Group.
Mr. Upton. If you could just put that mike just a little
closer.
Mr. Gallagher. I am pleased to discuss with you a
contractor's perspective on the environmental management
technology. As president of the Government Services Group, I am
responsible for the overall direction of our government
operations and can provide you a general background on our
management philosophy and systems at these facilities.
Accompanying me today is Dr. Susan Wood from our Savannah
River Technology Center, our primary interface with DOE's
Office of Science and Technology. She is available to help me
or you if you raise questions in need of more detail.
Simply put, technology deployment is important to us,
because it allows us to meet our mission needs, our regulatory
requirements as well as save money. Our experience shows that
we can achieve significant reductions in life-cycle costs
through technology, and we expand, scope, and deliver with the
taxpayer dollar.
Further, we have cast a wide net in search of these
technologies that meet our specific needs. While we have some
development success on our own, we also look to other DOE
sites, universities, commercial industry, DOE's Technology
Development Program or any other source to supply technology to
meet our mission. We have a process in place to make sure this
happens, and we believe we can demonstrate that it is working.
The committee forwarded to us a list of 154 technologies.
At our 3 locations, we have deployed 45 of them, and there are
at least another 113 opportunities to deploy them at one or
more of our sites. Because Savannah River is the home to most
of our work in this area, I would like to focus specifically on
technology development and deployment there, and I would like
to express my appreciation, Mr. Chairman, to your recognition
earlier of our success at Savannah River.
Of the 154 technologies you asked about, we have deployed
41 of them at Savannah River; 23, multiple times, ranging from
2 to 25 deployments each. We believe there are 54 more that may
have application there. I would not that Savannah River has
also deployed or developed technology not included on your
list.
From fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 1998, Savannah
River received $45 million in EM-50 funding. In our
Environmental Restoration Program, alone, the OST investment
has yielded $62 million in savings. We believe innovative
technologies from all sources will save more than $168 million
in life-cycle costs beginning in fiscal year 1996 and beyond.
That represents deployments in only one line program. We have
others doing similar work.
Cost savings is not the only measure of success. We can
point to cases in which technology deployment has increased our
margin of safety or has enabled us to perform mission tasks
that are critical to program success, such as safe shipment of
transuranic waste. We feel the key factor that contributes to
our technology deployment success is the fact that we involve
our end users in line throughout--from working with our
laboratory personnel to accurately define needs, to working
with our regulators and other public stakeholders to
incorporate their requirements. We also promote those needs
widely in the commercial marketplace.
Let me cite two specific examples of successful technology
deployment at Savannah River. There, we have closed two high
level waste tanks. These are the first such closures in the
Nation. As this process evolved, scientists developed a new
type of non-bleeding grout. Without this technology, which was
supported by EM-50, we could have not gotten regulatory
certification to close those tanks. That tank closure saved us
$150,000 per tank per year in surveillance and maintenance
costs, and there are 49 additional tanks that must be closed at
Savannah River.
Second, SEAMIST/FLUTe technology. This is the technology
that was part of the committee's inquiry to us and has been
deployed more than 10 times at Savannah River. And,
additionally, we have not only deployed it at Savannah River,
but we have also worked with NASA on a successful deployment at
Cape Kennedy.
Finally, as these examples demonstrate, we believe we have
a good record and are committed to working with DOE and with
the committee to bring the best technology available to the DOE
cleanup effort.
[The prepared statement of James L. Gallagher follows:]
Prepared Statement of James L. Gallagher, President, Westinghouse
Government Services Group
Good afternoon. I am James L. Gallagher, President of the
Westinghouse Government Services Group, and I am pleased to discuss
with you a contractor perspective on environmental management
technology. Westinghouse operates the Savannah River Site, the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant and the West Valley Demonstration Project under
contract to DOE, and we have a unique perspective as both developer and
an end user of innovative technology.
Simply put, technology deployment is important to us because it
allows us to meet our mission needs and our regulatory requirements, as
well as save money. Our experience is showing us that we can achieve
significant reduction in lifecycle costs through technology, and we can
expand scope and deliver more for the taxpayer dollar.
Further, we have cast a wide net in search of those technologies
that meet our specific needs. While we have had some development
success on our own, we look to other DOE sites, universities,
commercial industry, DOE's technology development program or any other
source to supply technology to meet our mission. We have a process in
place to see that this happens, and we believe we can demonstrate that
our process is working.
The committee forwarded to us a list of 154 technologies that are
of interest to you. At the three locations I referred to earlier,
Savannah River, WIPP and West Valley, we have deployed a total of 45 of
those technologies. We believe that there are at least another 113
opportunities to deploy these technologies at one or more of the three
sites.
Because the Savannah River site is home to the majority of our work
scope in this area, I would like to focus specifically on technology
development and deployment at the Westinghouse Savannah River Company.
As I mentioned previously, the committee provided a list of 154
technologies that are among those funded through DOE's Office of
Science and Technology process. The Westinghouse Savannah River Company
(WSRC) has deployed 41 of those technologies (27 percent). WSRC has
deployed 23 of these technologies multiple times, ranging from two to
25 deployments each. The successful deployments have included a range
of applications--from the stabilization of fixed surface contamination
to a process for expedited waste site characterization.
We believe there are an additional 51 technologies that may have
applications at SRS; in some cases there are technologies that have two
distinctly different potential applications. Others may be added to the
list of potentially deployable technologies, while others still may
have applications at other sites, but not at SRS. I would note that
WSRC has also deployed or developed technology not included on the list
the Committee is focusing on today.
From FY96 through FY98, WSRC received $45.0 million in EM-50
funding. We used that money to support university research on truly
innovative technologies, development of technology in-house, and
application of technologies developed by others. In our environmental
restoration program alone, we believe these innovative technologies
will save more than $168 million in lifecycle cost savings beginning in
FY96 and beyond. That represents deployments in only one of several
line programs within WSRC. We have other line programs doing similar
work.
Furthermore, cost savings are not the only success measure. We can
point to cases in which technology deployment has increased our margin
of safety, or has enabled us to perform mission tasks that are critical
to program success, such as the safe shipment of transuranic waste.
We feel there are at least four key factors that contribute to
WSRC's technology deployment success:
Well defined needs--Our line programs and our laboratory personnel
collaborate, and have continuously improved our ability to write
accurate technical statements of technology needs. Those needs are
advertised to potential vendors and other DOE sites via the Internet,
and have been highlighted at Vendors' Forums that have been sponsored
by WSRC and our DOE customer. At these forums, we have invited vendors
in from all over the country to hear our needs.
End-user involvement--The end users of technology are involved from
the beginning, from the needs identification process through technology
deployment. This is not a new practice at SRS. Our Savannah River
Technology Center (SRTC), the site's research and development arm, has
always had a primary focus on applied research, and on solving the
specific problems associated with working facilities.
Stakeholder and regulatory involvement--We keep our Citizens
Advisory Board involved. At SRS, that board includes the Environmental
Protection Agency and the South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control. That regulatory involvement can not be
overlooked; technology has to enhance our ability to meet regulatory
milestones. We are fortunate to have leadership at both EPA and the
state level that is interested in working with us on technology
solutions.
Utilization of technical resources--The Savannah River Technology
Center acts as a clearinghouse, and helps to ensure that the best
resources from industry, universities and other national laboratories
are utilized.
In practical application, our line organizations all have
technology panels that integrate technology specialists with end users.
These panels include DOE and contractor end users as well as
technologists from SRTC. The panels function in two ways: (1) to
prioritize program needs, and (2) to assess the maturity of
commercially available technologies. When cost effective solutions do
not exist, the technology panel members develop plans for the ultimate
solution to the problem. In some cases the research is performed by
SRTC; in other cases, DOE funding is used to seek solutions from
elsewhere.
DOE encourages the promotion of technology deployment through a
variety of incentives. These have included:
--Targeting performance based incentives that encourage Westinghouse
and its partners to utilize new technologies;
--Award fee evaluation that explicitly includes our performance in
technology management; and,
--Funding of large-scale demonstration projects that facilitate
deployment of innovative or improved technologies, including
items from industry and academia.
Let me cite several specific examples of successful technology
deployment at SRS.
Tank Closure--At SRS, we have closed two high level waste tanks.
This is groundbreaking work, the first two such closures in the nation.
As this process evolved, scientists at SRTC developed a new type of
``smart'' grout, a non-bleed grout technology. Without this technology,
which was supported by EM-50 money, we could not have gotten regulatory
certification that the tanks were closed. We estimate that tank closure
saves us $150,000 per tank per year in surveillance and maintenance
costs, and we have 49 additional tanks that we must ultimately close at
SRS. There are many more tanks throughout the DOE complex.
SEAMIST/FLUTe--SEAMIST/FLUTe, a technology that was part of the
committee's inquiry to us, has been deployed more than ten times at
SRS. The company (Flexible Liner Underground Technologies, Ltd.) is a
small business spinoff from a national laboratory, and the technology
is an inexpensive, reliable technology for locating a particular type
of contaminant (Dense Non-Aqueous Phase Liquids). We have not only
deployed the technology at SRS, we have also worked in conjunction with
NASA on a successful deployment at Cape Kennedy.
Drum Vent and Purge--NFT, a small Colorado company, developed a
technology that removes hydrogen and volatile organic compound gases
from transuranic waste drum headspace. The technology represents a
significant safety enhancement, and allows us to meet the waste
acceptance criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. It is
significant to note that this technology would likely not have been
developed outside the DOE complex, because the DOE complex may
represent its only unique application.
GeoSiphon--The GeoSiphon is a successful combination of research by
SRTC combined with research performed by the University of Waterloo.
GeoSiphon is a passive, in situ approach to remediation that collects
contaminated groundwater into geosiphon cells, passes the water through
a reactive matrix of iron filings, and discharges it to the Savannah
River. The lifecycle cost savings for installing and maintaining the 12
cells is more than $19 million over conventional pump and treat units.
GeoSiphon research and development was supported primarily by EM-40.
We believe the above are some of the examples that clearly
demonstrate the benefits and the cost savings associated with
innovative technology that we have deployed.
Our future success will depend on several factors. Many parties
must continue to collaborate--end users, regulators, DOE and the
research community. We must continue to document the success, both in
cost savings and results, of our various programs. And, we must have an
ongoing technology development mechanism that addresses those needs
that are completely unique to the end users in the DOE complex.
We believe we have a good record. We are committed to working with
DOE and with you to bring the best technology available to the DOE
cleanup effort, and to improve our performance into the 21st century.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Mr. McIntire.
TESTIMONY OF LEE A. MCINTIRE
Mr. McIntire. Thank you. My name is Lee McIntire, and I am
the president of Bechtel National, and we do the DOE work for
Bechtel. And we are not big developers of technology, but we
sure use a lot of them on all our projects in 88 countries
around the world, so we are very comfortable working,
screening, looking at all kinds of technologies.
I just had four components that we thought was important
for the success of environmental cleanup technology deployment.
One is, it has to be needs driven, and I would be glad to talk
about this more. It has to be, I think, be driven by the people
that had the problems in the field, and Mr. Owendoff mentioned
that before. I believe that it is where it needs to come from.
The new technology must improve on the project baseline too. I
think that it is a metric I would like to discuss in a minute,
and the continuity of funding is also important, and I think
you have heard remnants of that throughout the testimonies
today, whether it be by the small businesses or by DOE, it is a
factor in all of this. And then there has to be a partnership;
overused word, but between the technology programs, the
national labs, industries, small and large, and the
universities is really key.
The use of new technologies is improving project baselines
in all of Bechtel's cleanup assignments for DOE. Since 1994, at
the Hanford site, which is a pure cleanup for us, we have
screened 450 technologies that have been identified by the EM-
50 and other sources. We deployed 25 of those technologies. And
you might say, ``Why didn't you use 450?'' Well, we have
screening, and that is what screening is all about, is to find
ones that will solve our problems in the field. We incentivize
to get these things done where we can say there are four
important things. One is the safety of the people doing the
work and health and safety also. We are also looking at cost
savings; we are also looking at schedule savings, and we are
looking at the quality of the work as our reputation depends on
this holding up for decades after we do the work. So, we do
screen through those technologies and find what we want. And we
finally deployed 13 on the C Reactor that has probably been
overmentioned today. The reason that is mentioned so much is
because that is a project that is done, and that is very
important.
I think a key that we all ought to remember is that the
real, actual, physical cleanup of all these sites just started
recently. For many years, as you know, you have seen a stack of
paper on one side, the performance on the other side; that is
all reversed now. The percentage is different. So, the reason C
Reactor is mentioned is because you can do all the metrics; you
can study it; you can look at it; you can count it; you can
measure it, and it is all done and successful, and that is why
it is brought up. And it will say $23 million on the cleanup of
the rest of the reactors along the river there, which is a
really good idea. I also mention the original concept for the
reactors was probably at a cost of over $1 billion. The
original concept was to move all the reactors inland. So, it is
not only technology but innovative ideas said let us get it
down to what is in the low millions to do these.
I do offer three recommendations, however, that I think
could maybe help. I would continue to focus on needs drive
process, and I do believe EM-50 and the Department of Energy is
doing that. There is a vehicle for doing that, and we are very
much working on that. It has improved. There was a time when it
wasn't as needs driven, but I believe, my opinion is it is
improving.
Then, second, I would develop metrics that focus on the
results and improvements of the project life-cycle baseline. I
don't think you just want to use technology. What you want to
do is have a life-cycle cost that is safe and on schedule, and
so I think metrics ought to be--if I was this panel, I would
push for that, and I would look at those metrics over a 2- or
3-, 4-year period and see how we are doing, how DOE is doing.
Third, I would continue to look at funding. It is a part of
the whole success of this.
I think that is it. That is all I would like to say. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Lee A. McIntire follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lee A. McIntire, President, Bechtel National,
Inc.
Mr. Chairman--Members of the Committee: I have been invited before
you today to provide testimony on the deployment of environmental
cleanup technologies at Department of Energy (DOE) sites where Bechtel
has a contractual leadership responsibility for that mission.
As I am sure you are aware, Bechtel is a contractor to the DOE at
many of its installations across the country, including prime contracts
at the Hanford Site in Washington State, the Nevada Test Site, the Oak
Ridge Operations Sites in Tennessee; and we are part of the
Westinghouse team at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina.
Significant portions of our assigned contract work scopes are directly
tied to environmental cleanup missions, particularly at Hanford, Oak
Ridge, and Savannah River. As such, we are actively involved with the
DOE in determining technological needs for environmental cleanup,
identifying and assessing potential technical solutions to
environmental problems, and selecting and deploying those technologies
and approaches that effectively answer the specific needs, prove to be
most practicable, and are efficient in terms of cost and schedule
performance.
Bechtel is a worldwide leader in managing complex projects and
solving difficult technological challenges. To succeed in the extremely
competitive business markets in which Bechtel is engaged, we must
continuously develop, use, and improve upon ``best commercial
practices''. We see technology as a pivotally essential area for the
application of such practices. In fact, technology is an integral
element of Bechtel's planning, project management, and work performance
processes; it is not an accessory or afterthought. In a very purposeful
and pragmatic sense, we seek to bring best technologies to the DOE's
environmental cleanup programs.
I intend to keep my comments short. First I will describe four key
components for a successful technology deployment program; then provide
an overview of some of our current activities; and end with a few
recommendations.
key components for a successful program
Technology activities must be driven by project technology needs.
Technology use must be driven by the needs of the field projects;
this is essential to a successful technology program. Technology must
solve a problem and result in improved project performance. Simply
deploying the latest concept or device is not sufficient and will not
result in a successful program. The field project (or ``problem
holder'') understands the objectives, requirements, and needs of the
project, and is responsible for the resources to accomplish those
objectives. Performance is then measured by how effectively those
project objectives are accomplished.
If use of new technologies or innovative approaches best fit a
project's needs, then they will be effectively used and deployed. To
have a set of technologies to draw from, there must be an effort to
forecast these needs, then apply resources--either public or private--
to their development, such that they are available for the problem
holder when needed. This clearly requires an integrated effort
throughout the field of possible users.
Currently the field projects identify, document, and communicate
their requirements by preparing technology needs statements which are
then formalized through the Site Technology Coordination Groups (STCG),
and distributed to the DOE Office of Science and Technology (EM-50),
and to industry. The technology needs statements provide a clear
understanding of what type of technology is needed--and when--and
allows EM-50, National Laboratories, industry, and universities to work
towards providing solutions.
Identified technologies are screened by the field projects to
ensure that they are applicable to the priority needs as documented in
the technology needs statements. Those technologies that are applicable
are further evaluated with regard to technical adequacy, safety, cost,
and schedule impacts. This disciplined process focuses the limited
resources of the project.
New technology must improve on the baseline.
Good project organizations develop baselines to guide their efforts
and to gauge their performance over time. A project baseline is an
estimate of the cost and schedule to complete the defined scope of work
using best commercial practices. Project teams look to improve the
baseline through whatever means possible, including the use of new
technology or innovative approaches. If the new technology or
innovative approach cannot improve the cost, schedule, safety, or
quality of the project, then it should not be used. Likewise, the
benefits from new technologies must exceed the costs invested for full
deployment.
New technologies require demonstration, testing, new procedures,
and training before they can be fully implemented. It is our experience
that the DOE EM-50 program is providing the vehicle for that effort.
Without some means of demonstrating the anticipated effectiveness of
new technology--meaning, providing some form of verification of the
value of the technology--it becomes difficult, if not impossible to
encourage its deployment and use. This is particularly so when those
that are being encouraged to use the technology are being rewarded for
successful performance.
Continuity of funding is needed that is consistent with project
schedules.
Funding to support deployment of new technology must be provided
consistent with the identified needs of the projects it supports.
Delayed or inconsistent funding will hamper the time needed to develop,
demonstrate, and deploy new technologies, and may result in failure to
achieve anticipated cost savings forecast by technology roadmaps.
Funding delays may even result in increased project costs.
I understand the difficulty in doing this, as budgets are developed
well in advance of when funding is provided to the field, but having
the technology available for use at the right time is critical if we
are to not only meet project schedules, but realize possible savings
that would result from their use. Perhaps ``stability'' in funding for
technology development is at least achievable; then allowing the
planning that is necessary to help assure the right alignment between
development and deployment.
Partnership between DOE technology programs, National Laboratories,
industry, and universities is key.
To achieve maximum success in the technology arena, multiple
sources of technology--that have progressed through a development phase
and some level of demonstration or validation--are required. This is
where the DOE Science and Technology (EM-50) program provides value. By
further partnering with the National Laboratories, universities, and
other industry sources, the potential sources of available technologies
expand.
As I mentioned earlier, new technologies often require some time
before they are fully mature and ready for deployment. Where industry
owns or develops those technologies, DOE can access them through their
procurement process. Where such technologies do not exist or have
limited application (not commercially viable) the DOE Science and
Technology program, in cooperation with the National Laboratories and
others, can provide needed support to technology development and
demonstration.
This partnership is successfully working at Hanford and Oak Ridge,
where DOE and Bechtel partner with Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to help
identify, evaluate, and develop technologies. Other DOE sites use
similar approaches.
overview--progress is being made; baselines are being improved
Now let me back that up with some examples:
Hanford Technology Deployments.
Over the past several years at Hanford, the Bechtel team has
screened over 450 technologies identified from EM-50 and others for
applicability to its environmental restoration (ER) scope.
Since 1994, the Hanford ER program has deployed 25 new
technologies. In addition to vendors responding directly to the
published technology needs statements, the Bechtel team proactively
searches for potential technology solutions through continuing
interaction with the DOE's technology focus areas, industry contacts,
and technology meetings. The C Reactor Interim Safe Storage (ISS)
Project is a good example of how this process works. The project
involved extensively reducing the ``footprint'' of an old deteriorating
reactor complex and placing the reactor's core in a safe, inexpensive
to maintain condition.
The C Reactor Project was jointly supported by EM-40 and -50 as one
of DOE's first Large-Scale Demonstration and Deployment Projects. One
reason for the success of technologies deployed on this project was
that EM-50 technology support was integrated into the project planning
at the project's inception. As a result of that approach, the C Reactor
ISS field-demonstrated 20 innovative technologies, with 13 of those
technologies being selected by the project for deployment. To be
selected, the technology demonstration was required to confirm that
deployment would provide improvements to the project baseline (cost,
schedule, safety, and quality). Applying these improved technologies at
the seven remaining Hanford reactors is projected to result in savings
of at least $23 million.
The technologies deployed at the C Reactor ISS are also applicable
to hundreds of other similar facilities throughout the DOE complex, at
other government sites, and in commercial industry. Some of these
technologies are being deployed at the Ukraine's Chernobyl reactor.
Another opportunity for technology deployment currently being
pursued at Hanford is the Canyon Disposition Initiative (CDI) Project,
which is evaluating alternatives for disposition of five massive
chemical processing facilities. There is a potential cost savings of
one billion dollars if these former processing plants can themselves be
utilized as low level waste disposal facilities instead of subjecting
them to costly structural decontamination, demolition, and disposal.
Obtaining regulatory concurrence for alternate use of these highly
contaminated facilities for waste disposal will require improved
technology to support characterization, and to demonstrate long-term
environmental acceptability. Bechtel's team is currently partnering
with EM-30, -40, and -50, and with other Hanford contractors to provide
technology support in the characterization of a test case canyon
facility, Hanford's U Plant.
Oak Ridge Remediation Technology Results.
Deployment of innovative technologies to reduce cost and accelerate
schedule is a key element of the Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC,
environmental management and integration (M&I) contract at the Oak
Ridge Operations Sites.
The M&I approach was initiated in April 1998, so most of the Oak
Ridge results are carryovers from the traditional management and
operation contracting approach. Over the past eight years in Oak Ridge
operations, over 80 innovative technologies have been deployed.
Examples of these, jointly funded by EM-40 and -50, include Borehole
Miner, Pulsair Mixer, and Modified Light Duty Utility Arm for tank
remediation; and Soil Freezing Technology, and Passive Reactive
Barriers for treatment and control of subsurface contaminants.
Cost savings gained from innovative technology deployment are
evident in the underground tank remediation projects underway at Oak
Ridge National Laboratory. A suite of technologies designed to assist
with the cleanup of underground radioactive waste tanks have been
developed and deployed by Bechtel Jacobs in support of these projects.
Confined sluicing is utilized as a technique to clean Gunite and
Associated Tank (GAAT) internal walls, and to break up and retrieve
hard sludge deposits without introducing excessive amounts of
additional water. Robotic arms designed for large vertical tank
configurations have been effectively deployed for in-tank operations,
including handling and control of sluicing, sampling, and pipe cutting
and plugging tools. Remotely operated vehicles have proven invaluable
in support of in-tank cleaning operations such as tool handoff to
robotic arms, breaking up hard floor sludges, and physical movement of
sludge piles for retrieval. Overall, the use of these technologies will
accelerate the GAAT cleanup schedule by eight years and result in an
estimated cost saving of $112 million.
Savannah River Site Successes.
As part of the Westinghouse Savannah River team, Bechtel also
provides assistance with environmental activities at the site. Those
have been (or, will be) covered in more detail by my fellow panelist
from Westinghouse.
I would, however, like to mention in summary that over the past
three years the SRS ER program has successfully achieved 38 innovative
technology deployments, saving approximately $168 million in projected
lifecycle costs. Examples of these innovative deployments, which were
jointly funded by EM-40 and EM-50, include Barometric Pumping/Baroball,
In-Well Vapor Stripping with Recirculation Wells, and In-Situ Chemical
Oxidation using Fenton's Chemistry. These technologies are utilized for
the cleanup of contaminated groundwater.
recommendations
Progress has been made in the use of technology resulting in
improved project baselines. To continue to improve the process I would
offer the following recommendations:
First--Continue to work towards a needs-driven process and align
technology funding with projects' technology needs.
It is necessary for technology funding to be closely aligned with
the priority technology needs of the DOE environmental cleanup
projects. In order to be successful in utilizing technology to
accomplish improved cleanup results, support from EM-50 through its
focus areas must be strongly tied to field projects and to solving the
problems specifically identified by those projects. What is needed are
pragmatic and timely scientific and technological solutions. We support
the changes that are currently underway in the EM-50 program, which are
intended to improve continuity of funding and place sharper focus on
solving problem-holder needs.
Second--Develop metrics that focus on results and improvements to the
project life-cycle baseline.
DOE's EM-50 and EM-40 Programs should develop an improved set of
metrics to measure program success. These metrics should include cost
savings, schedule acceleration, problem resolution, and risk reduction.
Simply counting technology deployments does not provide an adequate
picture of technology's impact on the process.
Third--Place appropriate responsibility and accountability in the
Science and Technology program, and in the field with the
project performers.
The DOE Science and Technology program must be oriented to provide
solutions that meet science and technology needs identified by field
projects; and these solutions must be capable of being deployed by the
field project organizations. The program's success should be measured
against its effectiveness in providing workable and cost-effective
solutions in answer to the identified needs.
in conclusion
In my judgement, the process is improving. Is there more room for
improvement? You bet--and we all have both the responsibility and
accountability to do so. But now is not the time for a major upheaval
in the process, or a significant cut in the funds that support this
effort. I would recommend continuing to support the program, but also
continuing to insist upon real progress and measurable results.
Mr. Upton. Thank you very much. Mr. Card.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT G. CARD
Mr. Card. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify this morning.
My name is Bob Card, and I am the president and CEO of
Kaiser-Hill Company. The company has been the management and
integration contractor for DOE at their Denver area Rocky Flats
site since 1995, and understanding the site mission at Rocky
Flats is fundamental to discussion of technology deployment.
Rocky Flats is a closure project. Closing the site safely,
cost effectively, and quickly is our only mission.
Accomplishing this mission will, in turn, enable Congress and
the DOE to reallocate nearly $700 million per year of budget
resources to address long-term and technologically complex
challenges, such as the Hanford tanks.
In moving toward our goal, last Friday, we released our
detailed project baseline to accelerate closure to 2006. This
baseline shaves over $30 billion and 50 years from DOE's 1995
estimates produced just prior to our contract signing. This
aggressive short-term cleanup focus means that we are looking
for technologies that will help us achieve our goal safer,
better, cheaper, and faster than the way we currently do the
work. They must also be implemented before the problem they
were supposed to solve has already been taken care of, which is
a very short time cycle at our site compared to typical
deployment and development timeframes.
When technologies come across our desk that meet these
objectives, Kaiser-Hill aggressively pursues them. However,
technology is just one of the main tools we use to reach our
goal of accelerating site closure. From a technology
perspective, Rocky Flats is fortunate in that our closure
challenges are management and systems integration rather than
technology development. While the challenges we face are
certainly daunting, we do not have the long-term technological
problems that exist at some of the major DOE sites. We are not
aware of any insurmountable technology hurdles to accomplish
the site's cleanup.
That notwithstanding, the deployment of existing
technologies developed for different applications, however, is
important to closing Rocky Flats. We actively search out these
deployment opportunities, and we use our Vendor Response
Program to help screen and deploy these and unsolicited
technologies. This program is designed to help overcome
previous vendor relationship weaknesses. It helps technology
vendors match their technologies to specific needs we have
identified at Rocky Flats. As a result, the vendors save time
and money by having more detailed information about what the
site needs.
I want to say, the Office of Science and Technology is a
valuable partner.
I am going to conclude my testimony there. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Robert G. Card follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert G. Card, President and CEO, Kaiser-Hill
Company, LLC
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank you
for the opportunity to testify this morning. My name is Bob Card, and I
am the President and Chief Executive Officer of Kaiser-Hill Company,
the management and integration (M&I) contractor at the Rocky Flats
Environmental Technology Site (RFETS, or ``the site'') in Denver,
Colorado. Kaiser-Hill was awarded the contract to manage the site on
April 4, 1995, and operates under one of the first significant
performance-based contracts offered by the Department of Energy (DOE).
I realize contract reform has been a major concern of the Commerce
Committee over the past several Congresses, and I am pleased to say
that the reforms envisioned by this Committee are being realized at
Rocky Flats. While I would love to spend some time providing you an
update on the progress Kaiser-Hill has been making at the site, I will
confine my comments to the issues before the Subcommittee today.
overview
Rocky Flats is located next to the foothills of Colorado's Front
Range, about 15 miles from downtown Denver and within a major
metropolitan area of nearly 2.5 million people. From 1952 to 1989, it
was the primary manufacturing facility of plutonium ``triggers'' for
our Nation's nuclear arsenal. Rocky Flats was also a major facility for
the production of other nuclear weapons components.
In 1989, the site abruptly halted its production mission, and since
1992 its primary responsibility has been to clean up and close down.
This mission has been complicated by the manner in which production
operations were terminated. In 1989, DOE did not anticipate that the
site would permanently cease operations. As a result, production
processes were left in mid-stream--much like workers leaving for a
lunch break, except in this case the lunch lasted about six years.
Weapons components, scrap materials, waste, and hazardous chemicals
were all left in production lines or areas and configurations not
designed for long-term storage.
When Kaiser-Hill was awarded the M&I contract in 1995, the
Department estimated the responsible cleanup and shutdown of Rocky
Flats would require 65 years and over $37 billion. Since that time,
Kaiser-Hill and DOE have compressed this schedule to a proposed 2010
closure at just over $7 billion--a savings of 50 years and nearly $30
billion for U.S. taxpayers. This accelerated work will provide the same
outcome--the same ultimate level of protection for human health and the
environment--with reduced risks for workers due to the shorter overall
length of time involved in the cleanup effort.
Kaiser-Hill has accomplished this by two means: an aggressive
acceleration and compression of the cleanup schedule, and a detailed
management plan streamlining nearly every aspect of site operations.
Since 1995, Kaiser-Hill has cut nearly $100 million--about \1/6\ of the
annual site budget--from overhead and support costs. Nearly 6,000 main
contractor employees were at the site in 1995, and Kaiser-Hill has
sliced this number in half. In the environmental remediation and waste
management areas, Kaiser-Hill is saving an average of over $150 million
each year, compared to DOE's original cost estimates, through
efficiencies and innovation.
One of the more exciting events we've had at Kaiser-Hill is the
release last week of the detailed project plan mapping out our strategy
to close Rocky Flats by 2006--shaving an additional four years off the
accelerated 2010 schedule. Using lessons learned over the past four
years and a forward-looking management approach, we feel that the 2006
schedule, while very, very difficult, is an achievable and worthwhile
target.
Accelerating the schedule requires Kaiser-Hill to do three things
exceptionally well. First, and most importantly, we must conduct every
single work activity safely. A strong safety margin is critical to
achieving an accelerated closure. Second, we must execute our
responsibilities with appropriate safeguards and security controls.
Safeguards and security is a crucial issue given the significant
quantities of special nuclear materials at the site. Third, Kaiser-Hill
must continue to increase cost efficiencies at the site. Accelerating
the closure depends on our ability to cuts costs, produce savings, and
redeploy those savings into other closure activities.
We have been successful in each of these categories. In safety, we
have seen a 30 percent across-the-board increase in key safety
performance areas since taking over in 1995. This includes a 58 percent
reduction in nuclear safety rule violations, and a 57 percent
improvement in the lost workday case rate. The security and safeguards
area has seen similar improvements. For the last two years, Rocky Flats
has received DOE's highest rating for the overall status of its
safeguards and security program. The site has been aggressive in
securing both the advanced hardware and software needed by our forces
to ensure a strong security posture. The results have been seen in the
site's force-on-force exercises, in which elite military units attempt
to infiltrate Rocky Flats and gain access to its special nuclear
materials. In every case, the attack test results support the adequacy
of the site's security response. In the cost efficiency area, we have
also seen great success. In FY98, Kaiser-Hill was able to put $40
million into unfunded cleanup work by generating savings in other
activities. In FY99, efficiency gains in other site operations will
hopefully allow us to allocate a similar amount for additional unfunded
cleanup work. The ability to realize these savings, and refocus them on
cleanup activities, is a critical component of the 2006 closure
strategy.
kaiser-hill's technology approach
This background is important to the discussion of how technology is
used at Rocky Flats. The site has some fundamental differences
separating it from most major sites in the DOE complex. First, Rocky
Flats is focused on short-term closure. Second, while the challenges we
face at Rocky Flats are unique and quite complicated, we do not have
technical and environmental problems as extensive as some other DOE
sites--nothing as physically large as the Hanford tank system, for
example, or the Oak Ridge groundwater remediation challenges. Third, we
have not yet identified any insurmountable technological hurdles to
accomplishing the cleanup of Rocky Flats. Most of the technology we
need at the site we can either pull off-the-shelf, or we have been able
to adapt to the site's needs through creative problem solving.
Rocky Flats is a construction site, not a laboratory. Our
responsibility is to safely clean up and demolish about 700 structures
and just over three million square feet of building space. While
constantly seeking ways to operate more safely, accelerate schedule,
and cut costs, we need tools that will work in a productive environment
today. Kaiser-Hill is eager to incorporate new technologies at the
site, but these must deliver immediate, cost-effective results. As a
result, we take a very practical approach to technology deployment at
Rocky Flats.
Some of the technologies being used at Rocky Flats are very cutting
edge. One of the most significant examples is the Standard Waste Box
(SWB) counter we will begin using next year. This device measures the
total radioactivity inside SWB containers without having to open the
box. These measurements are necessary to qualify the SWB for disposal
at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), and are an important
component of safeguards and security in determining the total amount of
radioactive materials in the container. However, a counter to
accurately and quickly assay the radioactivity in the container has
never before been deployed. The SWB counter incorporates several
different technologies into one unit, and is a first-of-its-kind
technology for the DOE complex. Kaiser-Hill identified the need, is
getting the necessary technology on line, and, thus, has helped pioneer
a solution for the rest of the complex. The site estimates that this
single set of technologies will enable a fourfold improvement in safety
and time for the takedown of contaminated equipment destined for WIPP
and a sevenfold decrease in the amount of paperwork going to WIPP.
There are decidedly low-tech innovations at Rocky Flats as well.
For example, one of the site's most recent technological innovations
was redesigning ``bag-out'' bags to incorporate filters to release non-
hazardous gas buildup and to change the bag and gaskets/seals materials
used in bag construction. These bag-out bags are the inner layer of the
radioactive contamination packaging system used for much of Rocky
Flats' waste. These simple technology fixes allow four times greater
quantities of combustible waste material to be packaged per bag, which
reduces the number of shipments of this material to WIPP, and provides
a better seal--a more secure environment--to contain the radioactivity
than previous bag designs. The end result is that U.S. taxpayers will
save more than $20 million over the life of the Rocky Flats Closure
Project, and employees involved in the cleanup work will see a
significantly greater safety margin in the packaging process.
Other technology deployments at Rocky Flats are outside the area of
environmental technologies, but are equally important to achieving the
mission of the site. Safeguards and security is a good example. The
classified nature of the radioactive materials at Rocky Flats demands a
strong commitment to proper security. A recent deployment at the site
is the Ion Trap Mobility Spectrometer, which can quickly detect and
identify explosives or chemical agents attempting to be smuggled onto
the site. This technology provides a quicker, more accurate analysis of
possible contraband than previous technologies and is one of the many
ways in which we have upgraded security at the site.
Another important non-environmental deployment area is in
information technologies. Kaiser-Hill uses a unique integration of
commercially-available computerized planning, management, and database
software, including the Basis-of-Estimate Software Tool (BEST) cost
estimating system and the Primavera Project Planner (P3), which provide
detailed and logic-driven management planning. These and other tools
allow us to track activities at Rocky Flats for tangible progress,
allowing Kaiser-Hill to ``de-bottleneck'' and integrate activities to
ensure the maximum beneficial use of the site's resources. Proper
activity planning is critical to success at Rocky Flats, and
information technologies are a vital component of Kaiser-Hill's
planning process.
technology objectives at rocky flats
Technology objectives at the site are fairly simple: a new
technology must provide results safer, better, cheaper, faster than the
technology we are currently using. In order to achieve these
objectives, Kaiser-Hill has established a straightforward method of
assessing and deploying new technologies at Rocky Flats.
Integral to this is an understanding of how activities are
conducted at Rocky Flats. Every individual project at the site supports
the overall goal of closure. Technology is but one component of the
project as a whole, and it is the coordination of all activities that
moves Rocky Flats to closure. There is little room in the schedule for
error.
The project approach at Rocky Flats puts a great deal of
responsibility into the hands of line managers--the men and women
actually performing the cleanup work. From line operations management,
to subcontractors, to project managers, each person is responsible for
meeting performance metrics: worker safety, budget, and schedule.
Under its contract with DOE--and embodying the contract reform
principles sought by Congress and this Committee--all members of the
Kaiser-Hill team are incentivised to increase safety, ensure proper
security and safeguards, reduce costs, and accelerate the schedule. To
the extent that new technologies can assist in accomplishing these
objectives, they are aggressively pursued at the site. Technologies
must be fully deployable before they are used, and must have a fairly
high worth-to-risk ratio.
deployment process: technical planning and integration activities
Since line management has the primary responsibility to accomplish
the work safely, on time, and on budget, they have the lead role in
identifying roadblocks to progress in work activities, and assessing
the role new technologies can play in successfully executing work. To
assist in getting technology deployed where it belongs, Kaiser-Hill
operates several proactive technical programs to identify and assess
potential new technologies. These programs are used by Kaiser-Hill to
support operations and to support technology vendors.
The Planning and Integration (P&I) organization works with
operations at the management and project levels to develop the closure
strategy for the site and to integrate individual project plans into an
overall Closure Project Baseline. P&I also works with the line program
and project managers to package and integrate technical innovation in
their project activities. There are several elements to the P&I
approach:
a) Technology ``what if'' scenarios are run to determine how life cycle
costs, resource allocations, schedules, and other aspects of a
technical innovation would affect the critical path, overall
closure schedule, and program and project budgets. This
activity determines where the most promising ``breakthrough''
opportunities are.
b) Programmatic Risk Assessments are conducted at the detailed project
activity level to identify those activities with technical,
scope, cost, and schedule uncertainty, and to isolate those
activities that could become bottlenecks. Where an improved
technology is needed or foreseen, P&I and line managers develop
a path forward and engage potential vendors and service
providers to prepare an appropriate procurement. Multiple
options or paths forward are often pursued until the point at
which an optimal technical approach is decided upon.
c) Project plans prepared by the line organizations are scrubbed by P&I
for scope, Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) logic, schedule,
cost, and technology. One of the most effective ways to
integrate technology is to build it into projects at the
beginning.
d) Candidate technologies are screened and evaluated using performance-
based selection criteria: guarantees on commercial terms;
reduction of cost, schedule, and/or risk; compliance with
performance or regulatory milestones, and other requirements;
creation of options; provision of versatility and practicality;
and consistency with mandates for off-site treatment and easy
shutdown/closeout, so that the means of achieving a clean end-
state do not themselves pose hurdles to getting there.
e) Commercial candidates meeting the Site criteria need to be
qualified, recast in the specific terms of the relevant project
activity, adapted into the needed technical service, and
approved and/or permitted on a time line that fits the project
schedule.
There have doubtless been occasions on which vendors have felt that
their technologies have not been given every due consideration for
deployment at the site. To give vendors an opportunity to present and
demonstrate their technologies at Rocky Flats, Kaiser-Hill has
established a Vendor Response Program. This program assists technology
vendors in focusing their offering on the specifics of a needed
application at the site so that scheduling, costing, performance
metrics, and commercial terms can be quickly addressed, and teaming
with a service provider can be facilitated. With this focus, both the
vendor and the site save time and money. A mismatch can be quickly
identified, and the site benefits from a higher capture rate with those
technologies that truly meet the needs at Rocky Flats. Once a fit at
the project level has been determined, the project manager and project
engineers assist the vendor, as described above, to ensure success in
terms of the required project performance measures. The P&I and
Procurement departments serve as a coordinated entry point for
technologies at RFETS.
The Kaiser-Hill team subcontractors executing projects are the
actual technology end-users. In most cases, the subject matter experts
reside in the line organizations and are frequently in direct contact
with vendors in their respective fields of expertise for information
relevant to a specific project activity. Those project managers,
engineers, and workers who are most likely to realize gains are
motivated by the performance terms of the contract to invest the
resources required to integrate technology into their operations.
deployment process: technology operations
In addition to the individual project initiatives, there are
several technology initiatives run by the line and operating
organizations that are designed for the common benefit of all projects
or a specific group of projects. There are a number of these
initiatives functioning at any given time. They include:
a) The Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) Technology Steering
Committee, which reviews needs and vendor offerings for D&D
work, recommends applications, and qualifies vendors as needed;
b) The Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) Team, which reviews needs, vendors
offerings, and supports development and qualification of
technologies needed to characterize and certify wastes for
shipment;
c) Value Engineering Teams, which evaluate technical options and
benchmark technologies, performance capabilities, etc.;
d) Process Improvement Teams, which review and/or develop processes and
procedures for work activities at the site (e.g., radiological
survey and disposition of property, criticality reengineering);
e) Engineering Quality Assurance (QA), which reviews engineering
designs for safety, compliance with various codes, cost
effectiveness; and
f) The ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) Center, a clearinghouse
for technical information and demonstrations of technologies
having the potential to reduce worker radiation exposures.
Initiatives like these may be on-going, or in some cases ad hoc and
terminated when their mission is completed, while new ones are started
up to resolve an identified problem that is common to several projects.
They are staffed by subject matter experts drawn from the projects
themselves--again, using the expertise of those men and women actually
doing the work at Rocky Flats.
To ensure that the site is being exposed to a full range of the
technology options available in today's marketplace, the Kaiser-Hill
team regularly participates in conferences to communicate needs and
business opportunities to the technical community. Additionally,
qualified vendor technology demonstrations occur regularly at Rocky
Flats, sponsored by one or more interested project managers or
subcontractors.
needs at rocky flats and the role of doe-funded technologies
As the closure effort progresses, Kaiser-Hill continues to discover
new opportunities for technology deployment. Again, these technology
needs are driven by our primary deployment objectives: to accomplish
the closure of Rocky Flats safer, better, cheaper, and faster. Some of
the areas in which we are seeking additional improvements include:
a) in situ and stand-alone size reduction and contaminated equipment
removal;
b) survey and measurement of contamination and special nuclear
materials (SNM), both in situ and in containers;
c) characterization and decontamination of equipment and buildings;
d) detection and control of trace quantities of plutonium in soils and
water; and
e) business processes, such as waste container management, content
certification, and computerized documentation of materials to
be shipped off-site.
The Department's Office of Science and Technology (OST) is the
front-line organization providing technology support at DOE sites. OST
addresses the technology needs of the complex over the long term. This
reflects the lengthy schedules for cleanup at most sites. However, due
to the accelerated closure schedule at Rocky Flats, technologies that
may well fit the scope of work here cannot be used simply because they
do not fit the project deadline. Other categories of technologies that
have only a limited potential for use at the site are groundwater
remediation tech-
nologies and waste treatment technologies. There are major groundwater
contamination problems at some DOE sites, and many OST technologies are
focused on this particularly vexing issue. Rocky Flats is fortunate not
to have significant groundwater contamination problems. The site is
using passive systems for remediation, and this OST-supported approach
looks promising for other applications.
Regarding waste treatment technology, Rocky Flats is planning to
ship a significant percentage of wastes to other DOE and commercial
sites for treatment and disposal, and thus looks to those other sites
for deployment. This obviates the need for certain technologies at
Rocky Flats. The Savannah River Site, for example, plans to process
plutonium metals and oxides and some of the plutonium residues in the
Rocky Flats inventory. The Oak Ridge Reservation has already treated
some of the site's hazardous wastes. Rather than spend time developing
new technologies at Rocky Flats to treat each specific waste stream, we
are depending on other sites to engage in this activity. Again, these
other DOE sites do have a continuing mission in the complex, and the
development of these treatment and processing technologies is an
appropriate role for them. For these sites, the role of OST in
supporting longer-term activities would appear to be a wise investment.
Another OST area paying off at Rocky Flats is the leveraging of
funds from the Accelerated Site Technology Deployment (ASTD) and other
Focus Area programs. These programs have prompted the use of certain
technologies at the site that were on the edge of commercial
availability. In Fiscal Year 1998, the site received $2.9 million from
OST, and we expect that a total of about $3.65 million in OST funding
will be allocated at Rocky Flats in Fiscal Year 1999. While the amounts
are not large relative to the overall site budget, they have a
significant impact ``on the margin'' in planning specific activities.
technology deployment at the site
A sampling of some of the specific work activities at Rocky Flats
is helpful in describing the range of technologies the site uses to
accomplish these activities. Again, it is important to remember that at
Rocky Flats, technology deployment is not an end in itself. Technology
simply provides tools to get the job done. In most cases, the site
identifies the need: for productivity increases, for additional worker
protection, for solutions to technical problems, or for less costly
methods of conducting procedures. Once that need has been analyzed, an
appropriate technology solution is applied to the problem. In many
cases, addressing a need in one area produces benefits in the others.
Size Reduction: Remote Operated Systems, High Efficiency Tools
Process equipment from weapons production includes gloveboxes,
tanks, chemical reactors, furnaces, machine tools, and pipe, valve and
duct work. These materials, contaminated both radiologically and
chemically, are to be stripped out of all buildings by cutting and
packaging for off-site disposal. Current technical approaches include
metal saws, nibblers, chisels, etc.; workers in very cumbersome
protective clothing; complex air/fume controls; alarm systems; and
direct contact with sharp pieces of radioactive metal. This can be very
dangerous work. Many innovations in workspace design, equipment
handling, and cutting techniques have been made, yet accomplishing a
safer and less-costly acceleration of site closure still requires
order-of-magnitude technology improvements. The Kaiser-Hill team is now
instituting remote operated robotic work stations; containment/
ventilation/filter systems; and efficient hydraulic, torch, and
possibly laser cutters. These technologies will enhance productivity by
making the work much safer for the employees, and result in greater
work efficiencies. OST has provided leveraging funds for the first
stand-alone dual robotic platform (in Building 776), advanced hydraulic
and torch cutters, a torch-head fume control system, and design of a
high-throughput central station concept. These advances will have a
dramatic impact on worker safety at Rocky Flats.
Characterization of Equipment and Buildings: Survey Instrumentation
Characterization consists of the instrumentation, mechanics, and
data management systems for measuring, mapping, and documenting
radiological and chemical contamination. All process equipment and
building components must be characterized: first for work planning,
then for monitoring work progress, and finally for work release and
property release. The requirements differ for all three stages, and the
definition of what constitutes adequate characterization is a
regulatory issue. The Kaiser-Hill team is pursuing technical
improvements on all these fronts. For example, systems engineering
analyses showed that decontamination could be avoided and disposal
simplified in many cases by segregating transuranic (TRU) wastes from
other low-level waste materials. These case-method decision models
portend enormous cost savings throughout the DOE complex. The DISPIM
(Decommissioning In Situ Plutonium Inventory Monitor TM) neutron-gamma
system recently deployed in Building 771, with OST cost sharing,
provides an image that displays the radioactive contamination inside
gloveboxes and tanks. With this information, workers can plan the
cutting so as to minimize exposure and maximize the packaging of TRU-
level pieces of process equipment to be disposed at WIPP, while the
low-level waste can then be packaged and disposed at a much reduced
cost at other facilities. Also, the SCM/SIMS (Surface Contamination
Monitor and Survey Information Management System) system is being used
to characterize entire walls in Building 779 where equipment has been
stripped out. This system scans the walls automatically and identifies
``hot spots'' for concrete removal work. The SCM/SIMS combines both
conventional detectors and high sensitivity proportional counters; it
was demonstrated at other sites with OST support before Kaiser-Hill
acquired it through a commercial service provider.
Airborne Contamination Control: Fog n' Fix
Airborne radioactive contamination levels in some rooms are so high
as to preclude human entry for more than a few minutes--even with the
most protective supplied breathing air suits. These so-called
``infinity rooms'' required a work/support team of a dozen people for a
single entry to drain process pipes or perform decontamination
activities. The site has deployed a combination of a sugar/glycerin fog
called Capture Coating TM, a fluorescent dye called Invisible Blue TM,
and a poly-urea coating called Insta-Cote TM to capture and contain
airborne radioactivity. Insta-Cote TM is an OST supported technology.
The radioactive particles are settled out on room surfaces by the
aerosol, after which a spray-on flexible plasticized layer is applied
to enable workers to walk and work in the room without resuspending the
particles. Air contamination levels are reduced at least ten- to a
hundred-fold, resulting in much safer and faster work at significantly
reduced cost. Additionally, the size of the work/support crew is
reduced to four people, allowing more efficient use of employee
resources. The performance of the fog has prompted other applications
at RFETS. Its dispersive characteristics are superior to most fixatives
and its adherence to surfaces makes it a candidate for coating process
equipment of all kinds prior to size reduction.
Multi-Purpose Containers: Pipe n' Go
Residues from weapons production processes contain plutonium and
associated americium in amounts that require special handling,
radiation shielding, and disposal at WIPP. In addition, the closure
baseline specified stabilization treatment processes for over 50,000
kilograms of ash, salt, and combustible residues before they could be
packaged and shipped. Setting out to design a radiation-protective
package, the Kaiser-Hill team ended up developing a complete storage/
shipping/disposal container system called the pipe overpack component.
This pipe system is so robust with respect to safeguards and hazard
conditions that it has since been certified by regulators for the
shipping and disposal at WIPP of the majority of the site's residues
without prior stabilization and with greater quantities of plutonium
than previous drum packaging configurations. As a result, worker risks
are dramatically reduced, costs associated with residue treatment are
avoided, and the number of shipments to WIPP is reduced by at least a
factor of four. This significantly extends the capacity of WIPP to
accept TRU wastes from other sites. Further, all sites in the DOE
complex can capitalize on the pipe component technology.
Groundwater Treatment: Passive Reactive Barriers
Conventional groundwater remediation techniques involve active
processing by recovery, physical-chemical and/or biological treatment,
and recharge or surface water discharge. Cleanup typically takes
decades. Closure by 2006 requires that servicing requirements for
systems be minimized, and a passive technology was needed that would
meet the water quality cleanup requirements for the site. The geology
at Rocky Flats is such that contaminated groundwater plumes seep to the
surface at a finite number of locations, where they can be confined and
funneled to discrete ``reactors.'' These reactors are, in effect, sumps
filled with appropriate reactive media designed to render the water
safe for discharge. Discharge monitoring and occasional media change-
out are the only long-term requirements. This technological approach
has been promoted by OST and two deployments have been co-funded by the
Office. One is treating a plume contaminated with plutonium and
volatile organics. A second system, using an alternative medium, is now
being installed to treat uranium and nitrates. Instead of pumping and
processing tens of millions of gallons of water over the coming decades
at the site's water treatment plant, the plant can be shut down and
removed at great cost savings. The water will continue to be collected
by gravity and treated passively until its hazardous constituents are
eliminated.
Shipping Certification: Non-Destructive Assay
Materials assay is a little recognized but critical component of
the cleanup process, as accurately measuring the amounts of material
being transferred or disposed is not only an environmental issue, but
an important nuclear safeguards issue as well. All wastes must be
characterized and the containers documented/certified for acceptance by
the appropriate disposal site, such as WIPP or the Nevada Test Site.
With regard to radiological content, the amount of each isotope must be
assayed to specified accuracy. To minimize exposure, assay methods are
employed that do not require the container to be opened and waste
samples extracted for laboratory analysis. Quantities are determined by
counting decay events and/or heat release through the container
surface. Computational models of the physics are needed to correct the
measurements for internal shielding or interference by the waste
itself. Such methods, while safe, have not been able to meet site needs
for the high throughput rates and large dimension containers needed to
stay on track with an accelerated closure schedule. In Fiscal Year
1997, the Kaiser-Hill team pushed the technology envelope with a
competitive procurement for a WIPP-certifiable drum counter on pay-for-
performance terms. A commercial firm succeeded in meeting the specified
throughput rate. The next quantum step was to count SWB loads for
shipping. The SWB is ten times larger than a drum, which greatly
reduces the worker risk, time, and cost of size reduction, yet
magnifies the engineering challenges and cost of counting and
certifying the Box's radioactivity content. With OST co-funding, the
site is again pushing the technology envelope by developing a Box
counter that exceeds current commercially offered specifications in
sensitivity and throughput rates. This system will be completed in
Fiscal Year 1999, certified in early Fiscal Year 2000, and commercially
released for deployment complex-wide at that time. In addition to the
advantages in terms of size reduction work, the Box counter will cut
the high costs of WIPP certification for radioactive-contaminated
equipment sevenfold.
conclusion
Technology deployment has been, and will continue to be, an
important component of enhancing worker safety and nuclear safeguards,
increasing productivity, and realizing cost efficiencies at Rocky
Flats. The site's partnership with OST has provided leverage to deploy
some of the innovative solutions we need to accelerate the cleanup work
at Rocky Flats. OST is one of the many ways in which we seek out and
use technology at the site.
The pay-for-performance nature of the DOE/Kaiser-Hill contract at
Rocky Flats provides the fundamental incentive for us to aggressively
pursue technical innovation, and the DOE employees of the Rocky Flats
Field Office have proven to be skillful in linking performance measures
to those activities that will provide the greatest return on
investment--those most likely to accelerate the closure date. Since the
site closure takes a project approach, and performance measures are
tied to the critical path and to safety, project managers are
incentivized to employ innovative technology to complete their projects
on schedule and on budget. There are further incentives in the contract
to exceed these objectives--to come in ahead of schedule and under
budget. From this standpoint, technology is not only a method to
reaching a specific project ends, but it is also a means to
accelerating closure.
The overall result of performance-based contracting at Rocky Flats
is that the Kaiser-Hill team has reduced the estimated cost of cleaning
up Rocky Flats from about $37 billion when the contract was initiated
to about $7 billion under the current plan, without changing the end
result. Technology has made and will continue to make an important
contribution to safety and productivity at Rocky Flats. Since much of
the technical work at RFETS is being done for the first time anywhere
and under an accelerated schedule, the technology integration process
is a necessarily dynamic and interactive activity. The results are
helping steer the Rocky Flats site toward its closure with increased
worker safety, enhanced performance, and significant taxpayer savings.
Mr. Upton. Thank you very much. Mr. Peterson.
TESTIMONY OF RONALD G. PETERSON
Mr. Peterson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Please note that we
have submitted a report for the record, and I would like to
give a short summary in my time allotted.
Mr. Upton. That would be just fine.
Mr. Peterson. I am Ron Peterson, and I head up the
responsibility for the Government business at Fluor
Corporation. So, the Fernald site in Ohio is a part of what I
watch over as well as the Hanford site in the State of
Washington. I think on those two sites, certainly, we do have a
first-hand knowledge of the application of technology, and if I
could, I would like to give a brief summary of those two.
At Fernald, we have been managing that site since 1992. So,
over the past 7 years, we have deployed around $20 million in
OST funds, and with those deployments, which have ended up in
around 22 technologies being applied over this 7-year period,
we have estimated the savings in the $100 million range. One
could conclude, however--I would like to mention one of those.
We do have a water injection system which has allowed us to
accelerate the closure from 2019 to 2006. That 15 years has a
documented savings of $3.1 billion, so one could push the fact,
I would suppose, that $20 million has really been the linchpin
of driving that closure. But, in any case, we have documented
that single one in the $100 million range.
At Hanford, the spending on technology issues is somewhat
higher. It is around $10 million. In the 2 years that we have
been managing that site, we have deployed 11 demonstrations and
4 deployments, mainly in the tank waste area which we have
talked a little bit--177 underground storage tanks in the
decontamination, decommissioning area and then also, third, in
the solid waste area.
I think the approach to innovation and technology at these
sites in particular I think is very important in that more
often than not, the things that we are asked to do are
typically first of a kind. There are no known technologies. A
company like ours and those of my colleagues deal in R&D kinds
of things often and will apply commercial practices where
applicable. Our problem at these sites, so often, it is one of
a kind. And, so the choice that we have is either do it in an
R&D setting or do it in what one might term a production
setting, and we certainly think that the former is a smarter
way to do it.
In terms of recommendations, I, too, would have three
recommendations in the application of these funds in
technology. No. 1 would be, let us really do it in a problem
driven kind of way. Let us apply the dollars, technology, and
brain power in an applied versus a pure research way, because
we do have, certainly, a host of problems to deal with.
No. 2, in some fashion, let us ensure the surety in the
schedule of funding. It is very, very difficult and frustrating
to get 80 percent of distance down the road of development and
deployment only to find out that the schedule gets slipped or
funding gets cut.
No. 3, and, finally, I think that we need to put a lot more
effort into a well thought out programmatic plan as we launch
off on some of these things and less of a shotgun year-by-year
approach to it.
That pretty concludes my summary of that. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ronald G. Peterson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ronald G. Peterson, President, Fluor Government
Services, Fluor Corporation
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to address the Committee's
concerns regarding the Department of Energy's (DOE) deployment of
environmental cleanup technologies. As the management contractor at two
major Department of Energy clean-up sites, Fernald and Hanford, I have
witnessed first hand the application of technology in the ``cleanup''
process.
As a company, Fluor Daniel has a long tradition of executing large
complex projects for industry and government clients worldwide. We are
the first Management and Integration (M&I) contractor for Project
Hanford, as well as the first ERMC or Environmental Remediation
Management Contractor at the Fernald site in Ohio. Both of these unique
contracts are performance-based. They are designed to implement
commercial practices and applications, and to show a new, improved and
more disciplined way of doing business. Utilizing innovative
technology, as well as new management practices, is a vital part of our
plan to accomplish these missions.
In the past seven years as a major DOE contractor, our experience
in utilizing and deploying technology, as well as our experience in
working with DOE's Office of Science and Technology (OST) has generally
been positive. Like any major undertaking there is always room for
improvement--on our part, as well as on the part of others.
Overall, we believe it is fair to say that projects supported by
the OST have had a very positive impact on costs and schedules at
Fernald and Hanford. Additionally, the contracts under which we work
have further encouraged us as contractors to seek new and improved
technologies to accomplish our missions.
Prior to submitting our proposal for the contract at Fernald, we
were aware of the potential significant role that innovative technology
could play in ensuring that clean up could be performed in a safe and
more efficient manner. Fluor Daniel brought a similar understanding to
Project Hanford. Both Fluor Daniel Fernald (FDF) and Fluor Daniel
Hanford (FDH) are dedicated to utilizing innovative technology to
support the overall clean-up mission by working with project managers
to identify and deploy new, technologies for safer, less costly, and
faster remediations. Fluor Daniel's recognition of the importance of
technology development and deployment has resulted in the establishment
of a proactive approach which identifies opportunities for innovative
technology consideration and receives some funding from OST.
Fluor Daniel Fernald manages its basic Technology Programs
activities with funds from its prime contract with DOE. We regularly
identify technology needs and seek solutions for them from DOE, other
government agencies, universities, and the private sector, including
approaches used by subcontractors. We believe that there are proven
approaches for most stabilization and remediation requirements, however
we are always investigating new technologies that can be implemented
within the scheduled time frame to improve safety and efficiency at our
sites.
Since assuming responsibility for the Fernald Environmental
Management Project (FEMP) in December 1992, the site has received
approximately $22 million from OST. It is estimated that 25% of these
funds were passed through FEMP to national laboratories to support the
FEMP-administered DOE programmatic led initiatives. The projects
supported at FEMP have included; Integrated Demonstrations, Individual
Technology Demonstrations, Large Scale Demonstration and Deployment
Projects, and Accelerated Site Technology Deployment (ASTD).
As a result, Fluor Daniel Fernald has deployed 22 technologies, 19
of which are listed in the DOE Technology Management System. Some of
these, such as the oxy-gasoline torch and personal ice-cooled suits,
have also been deployed at other sites. We estimate that the potential
savings from the technologies deployed to date exceed $100 million.
The Project Hanford Management Contract (PMHC) team under FDH
leadership was designed to ensure that best-in-class contractors were
aligned with the appropriate work scope. In part, this contracting
approach was designed to ensure first hand knowledge of work practices
and state of the art technologies to perform the work efficiently and
cost effectively. The technology efforts under the PHMC are integrated
under a Technology Management (TM) organization. This organization is
aligned with the various project organizations and reports directly to
the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer. To ensure
alignment with the OST, Fluor Daniel Hanford has co-staffed the TM
organization with staff from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
under a formal Memorandum of Understanding. Additionally, Numatec
Hanford Company, a subsidiary of the French companies SGN and Cogema,
has been integrated into the project team to identify opportunities to
deploy technologies with a proven history of successful application in
the French nuclear industry.
At Fernald we have been involved in OST programs since 1992, and
have witnessed a transition from an emphasis on demonstrations through
the OST formation of Focus Areas, to the emphasis on deployment. With
this transition, FDF witnessed and encouraged a change from a
technology provider-driven program to a site needs-driven approach. We
support DOE at the FEMP through the Site Technology Coordination Group
that represents the end users, as well as stakeholders and regulators,
in determining needs and seeking solutions. We believe that the switch
to a needs-driven and deployment-emphasized approach is making OST more
valuable to closure sites. At FEMP, more than half or 11 out of 19
deployments supported by OST occurred in 1997 and 1998. The OST system
and FDF have improved with time.
Fluor Daniel Hanford, on the other hand, has only been involved
with OST since 1997, but has established a technology program that is
driven by the needs of the projects. The Project Hanford Management
Contractors have in their first two years successfully demonstrated 21
technologies and deployed 29 others, with plans to complete 8 new
technology demonstrations and deploy 14 more technologies in the
current fiscal year. These successes can be attributed in part to the
fact that the PHMC has been incentivized through Performance Agreements
and/or Performance Expectations to demonstrate and deploy new
technologies.
The impact on our projects has been substantial and our current
focus is on project enhancements that will tie technology investments
to risk. One example of high technical risk at Hanford is associated
with the retrieval of high level waste from underground storage tanks.
In partnership with the OST, under the Hanford Tanks Initiative (HTI)
project, a number of promising retrieval technologies were evaluated.
The HTI utilized a novel approach to simultaneously develop effective
technology and qualify industrial suppliers to retrieve wastes from the
Hanford tanks. Several commercial vendors competed in a two-phase
(design/demonstration) procurement, which provided the capabilities and
experience of the national laboratories at no cost to the project, and
yet preserved the business secrecy and competitive position of the
commercial enterprises. This unique arrangement effectively utilized
the investments DOE had made over several years in basic technology,
and qualified four vendors for waste retrieval.
historical evolution and involvement of ost
Early technology efforts at the FEMP were centered on the Uranium
Soils Integrated Demonstration (USID) which had been funded by OST
under the predecessor contractor. The USID was a program to treat
uranium-contaminated soil in a cradle-to-grave approach. This early
work eventually led to the success under the ASTD program of real-time
characterization, and treatment of uranium contaminated soil. A soil
washing pilot plant was constructed in conjunction with the FEMP
Operable Unit 5 (OU5) and testing was done to support the Remedial
Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS). Although the results did not
indicate that soil washing would be effective in treatment of soil at
the FEMP, the work was then used in the RI/FS as part of the
justification for selection of the preferred alternative. The work
funded in part by OST was valuable in determining a final remediation
strategy. The equipment used in the soil washing treatability studies
was then transferred to the DOE Ashtabula Environmental Management
Project for utilization.
Beginning in 1995 FDF's technology efforts involving OST changed
from a strategy of investigation and early stage technology development
to a strategy focused on demonstration of mature technologies directly
supportive of site closure, followed by implementation and deployment.
In 1995 a demonstration and deployment proposal was made to OST to
investigate the use of solution mining techniques to remediate an
aquifer beneath the FEMP. A determination was made that a main
component of solution mining was worth pursuing as a means of
accelerating completion of the aquifer remedy. In 1995 and 1996 two
tests of groundwater re-injection were conducted. The small-scale tests
showed that aquifer geochemistry could be managed and re-injection had
potential for accelerating completion of the aquifer remediation remedy
at the FEMP. Modeling simulations were conducted, and it was determined
that re-injection used in conjunction with an optimized groundwater
extraction strategy could potentially shorten the aquifer remediation
by 17 years. The optimized site groundwater remediation strategy has
the potential to produce savings of $40-50 million.
This cost savings represents a return on investment of about 8:1.
The Fernald site and OST jointly are funding a full-scale demonstration
of remediation using ground-
water re-injection. The demonstration has been operating for six months
and to date, the results look promising. The value to Fernald of this
type of development work supported by OST was that the work could not
be budgeted in a site undergoing remediation and striving to meet
regulatory milestones. If OST had not been available as a means to
jump-start promising ideas outside of the box, this work and the
subsequent cost cutting may never have been achieved.
The re-injection project marked a change in the way OST was
involved in the conduct of technology projects at the FEMP. The OST
program administered funding and program management, but the direction
of technical efforts were determined at the site by FDF and DOE
management. OST management directly supported accelerated remediation
and agreed to construct a full-scale demonstration system in the heart
of the groundwater contamination plume, so that when re-injection is
shown successful the equipment will then be used for the balance of the
remediation.
The overall effect on the Fernald baseline from numerous
improvements, including key enhancements from the groundwater injection
enabling technology, in conjunction with other improvements, have led
to compression of the Fernald baseline from the year 2019 to the year
2006, and a cumulative budget reduction of $3.1 billion.
We have also conducted a Large Scale Demonstration and Deployment
Project in conjunction with the Decontamination and Decommissioning
(D&D) of the FEMP Plant 1 Facility. The objective was to find promising
technologies that were ready to be tried in the field and compare them
under real field conditions to our project baseline D&D methods. A cost
benefit analysis was done comparing each technology demonstrated to its
corresponding baseline method, and the projects benefited.
The following technologies were identified as superior methods for
D&D work: the oxy-gasoline torch for steel cutting; the Vecloader HEPA
vac for insulation and other debris removal; centrifugal shot blasting
for removal of contamination in concrete floors; and the Personal Ice
Cooled System for personnel safety and improved efficiency for workers
wearing anti-contamination clothing in high heat stress working
conditions.
The Accelerated Site Technology Deployment program has also moved
promising technology efforts to the field. Early work, as part of the
USID, did comparisons of the results of measurements made with real-
time uranium characterization instruments on contaminated soil. The
knowledge gained in the 1997 tests resulted in real-time instruments
being considered for soil characterization and was deployed in 1998 and
1999.
In 1997, FDF submitted a proposal to integrate real-time
instruments with Global Positioning Systems (GPS) to produce area
contamination survey maps in one half-hour. This allows field crews to
work without a three to seven day delay waiting for sampling results.
The ASTD program allowed us to tap into the resources of two national
labs to focus on the problems of system and software integration. To
date, the real-time methodologies are acceptable to regulating agencies
for all measurements; except those for final certification for an area
that has been remediated. The OST investment was $2.4 million, while
the savings are estimated at $34 million.
Another example of an ASTD project for deployment is the Personal
Ice Cooling System (PICS). The PICS is being used at several other DOE
sites. The PICS circulates ice water through tubing in undergarment-
like clothing using interchangeable bottles that can be replaced
quickly. This improves worker productivity by allowing them to work
safely for longer periods of time in high heat stress areas.
Information and several PICS units were transferred from Fernald to end
users at the Nevada Test Site and Hanford. As part of the ASTD project
trial, sets of the PICS will be given to each site for their use in
developing their own deployment strategy.
The oxy-gasoline torch is another example of a new tool that is
being used as a result of the Large Scale Development and Deployment
Project. The oxy-gasoline torch is used for steel cutting operations.
Using gasoline for fuel at one-tenth the cost, the oxy-gasoline torch
is particularly effective when utilized on thick steel and cuts twice
as fast as the baseline method. These torches are currently being used
at six DOE sites.
When Fluor Daniel was chosen as the M&I contractor for Hanford in
1997, the team had a commitment to successfully demonstrate and deploy
new technologies. Since FY 1997, the OST program has provided PHMC with
approximately $22 million to support over 15 technology and deployment
projects. OST funding has enabled eleven technology demonstrations and
four deployments.
The successful OST funded deployments include; Laser Ablation/Mass
Spectrometer System, Macro-encapsulation of Mixed Waste Debris, Tank
Corrosion Sensor Monitoring, and Inductively Coupled Plasma/Mass
Spectrometer.
The Laser Ablation/Mass Spectrometer (LA/MS) was deployed at
Hanford to analyze highly radioactive samples extracted from waste
tanks. The LA/MS was used to quickly analyze the mass distribution of
metal components in a waste sample that has been split for detailed
analysis. The data obtained from the LA/MS has proven successful in
identifying partially blended samples that are not homogeneous and
require further blending to ensure that the sample is representative of
the larger primary sample. The use of the LA/MS has enabled us to
develop a better understanding of tank waste characteristics, including
chemical and radionuclide composition.
In 1997, the macro-encapsulation of mixed waste debris took place.
Over 880 drums of hazardous mixed waste debris were size-reduced
(achieving approximately a 75% volume reduction) and encapsulated in
high-density polyethylene tubing for long term disposal in Hanford's
low-level burial ground. This demonstration was very successful.
Two other significant initiatives have also taken place between
1997 and 1999. The first is the tank corrosion sensor deployment.
Corrosion of the tank walls is a serious concern for the underground
storage tanks at Hanford. These tanks store radioactive waste as a
result of plutonium production for 50 years. Deployment of improved
corrosion sensors resulted in a significant cost saving by minimizing
chemical additions necessary to adjust the pH of the tank waste,
therefore minimizing the volume of tank waste to be treated by
privatization.
The last initiative represented is the Inductively Coupled Plasma/
Mass Spectrometer (ICP/MS). The ICP/MS can simultaneously measure
elemental (more than 70 elements) and isotopic information in a waste
sample. The technology provides nearly complete chemical and isotopic
information from a single analytical technique and offers analysis with
lower detection limits for long lived isotopes.
As stated earlier, the PHMC is planning to complete eight
technology demonstrations and deploy 14 technologies during FY 1999.
For this effort, OST has provided Fluor Daniel Hanford and its
subcontractors with about $4 million to support technology development
and deployment in the areas of tank waste, deactivation and
decommissioning and solid/mixed waste management.
In support of tank waste retrieval efforts the PHMC team plans to
deploy three technologies this fiscal year. The Enraf Densitometer will
be used to provide tank sludge layer interface location and sludge
density information. Additionally a versatile variable speed new
generation waste transfer pump will be deployed that fits most waste
transfer pumping applications and a soil sampler will be used to gather
samples from the contaminated vadose zone at SX farm.
In support of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Operations
the PHMC team plans to deploy 7 technologies in FY99. Three
technologies provide tank and transfer line leak detection capabilities
and the multifunction corrosion probe will provide data to enhance tank
integrity and life extension data. New continuous air monitors will
reduce cost while making the site safer for workers. The Saltwell
Portable Exhauster is flammable gas qualified for tank pumping and the
Slimhole Neutron/Gamma Probe will provide changes in moisture and
identify the liquid surface beneath the growing crust in tank 101-SY.
The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Gloveport Monitor will be used
to support Facility Stabilization at the PFP. This technology will
permit plutonium-containing items in gloveboxes to be individually
assayed without the time consuming seal-in seal-out process. This
represents a significant cost and worker safety improvement.
There are also plans to deploy three technologies this year to
support Spent Nuclear Fuels. The Fuel Retrieval System will remove and
clean fuel elements from K Basins. Two technologies, the Integrated
Water Treatment System and the enhanced Thermo-gravimetric Analysis
Instrument will be used to remove particulate debris and for treating
the sludge from K Basins.
incentives and initiatives
Both the Hanford and Fernald contracts, although different, require
Fluor Daniel to undertake initiatives for the utilization of new
technology. We have also established programs and organizations to
encourage staff and other site contractors to utilize innovative
technologies. Both FDF and FDH search widely for innovative solutions,
including those from industry as well as from the DOE. We conduct
demonstrations of technologies in actual project conditions, evaluate
the results, and foster the deployment of successful technologies. For
example:
--The Technology Programs Department at the Fernald site supports all
the projects in determining technology requirements to expedite
remediation in a safer and faster approach that also reduces
costs.
--Fluor Daniel Fernald initiated efforts to include within the site
Records of Decision a commitment to continue to seek innovative
technologies throughout the closure effort.
--Establishment of a Technical University Program that involves
personnel from local and minority universities in assisting in
the identification, development, and demonstration of potential
innovative solutions.
--FDF supports OST in its deployment efforts by providing cost-sharing
for technology demonstrations and deployments and supporting
participation with DOE Headquarters technology initiatives.
--Making lists of applicable new technologies available to potential
subcontractors for their potential use.
DOE Hanford also has incentives to assist in promoting the
deployment of new technologies. In addition to the ASTD program at
Hanford, additional incentives include:
--Performance based contracting incentives implemented through
Performance Agreements and Expectation Plans to encourage the
application of alternative technologies that improve project
baselines.
--Technology planning efforts including the identification of
Technology Insertion Points (TIPs) and technology needs are
incentivized. TIPs are the key technology decision points that
represent an opportunity to insert technology to enhance the
baselines. These key decision points are tracked and reported
as DOE milestones.
--Incentives for the application of alternative technologies include
technology demonstrations and deployments.
Fluor Daniel also is supportive of efforts underway to evaluate and
encourage the participation of small businesses. Some examples are:
--Working with Petrogen, inc. for wide-spread deployment of the cost-
cutting oxy-gasoline torch by working with the union training
coordinators, vocational schools and from other DOE sites.
--Working with Concrete Cleaning Incorporated, the vendor of
centrifugal shot blasting, from the demonstration phase (at a
competitive evaluation of similar technologies conducted at
Florida International University) through the deployment stage
at Fernald.
--Employing Terra Kleen to work on a process to treat tri-mixed wastes.
Although the process was not capable of treating all waste
forms, the effort showed the support from OST on high risk
projects.
--An ASTD project has been used to involve a small business
subcontractor in the use of innovative dismantlement
technologies for D&D at the FEMP site.
--Currently investigating technologies from two companies that could
provide pre-treatment to improve the operation of the Advanced
Wastewater Treatment facility.
summary, recommendations, and conclusions
Technology has played a key role in our success to date at Fernald
and will play an ever increasing role at Hanford. Projects supported by
OST have had a substantial impact on baseline costs and schedules. Our
general observations, conclusions and recommendations include the
following:
--The initial investment in demonstrations by OST is paying off.
Technologies that were demonstrated in the mid-nineties are now
starting to be used.
--While not every initiative has been successful, OST has provided
support that has helped identify and deploy needed
technologies.
--OST has provided the funding for deployment of high-risk approaches
which could not have been supported from other funding sources.
--The ASTD program has been successful in deploying technologies, but
it could be improved by making a portion of the funds available
directly to the sites. This would permit a site to deploy
technologies in a more timely fashion instead of relying on the
periodic proposal requests and the uncertain timing of funds
from OST.
--The OST programs should be even more ``end-user'' driven. The local
DOE and site contractor personnel have a greater understanding
of each site and its unique needs. Programs without clearly
identified end-users should be minimized or eliminated.
--OST is currently reorganizing to better serve the sites. In these
efforts, OST should solicit input from the sites.
--OST could better serve the needs of the site by developing a program
that provides immediate service to the site focusing directly
on the technical problem in the field.
--OST should continue to fund development of technologies that are
necessary for problems that are unique to DOE, such as high
level wastes and tanks.
--OST should use its funding to provide up-to-date information on
commercial availability of potential technologies.
--OST should concentrate on deployments, especially at the closure
sites. Funding support should be based on an anticipated return
on investment.
In summary, while Fluor Daniel believes that there are proven
approaches for remediation for most of the problems at the sites, we
continue to investigate new technologies that can be implemented within
the time frame of our projects to improve upon our projected baseline.
In addition to working closely with the DOE, we broadly distribute the
technology needs statements for all our projects and encourage
innovative ways to engage industry in solving these important issues.
Mr. Upton. Thank you very much.
Mr. Gallagher, I noted that the record shows that
Westinghouse has deployed relatively more OST-funded
technologies at Savannah River compared to other sites. Why do
you think that is the case?
Mr. Gallagher. I think, in part, Mr. Chairman, it is
because we have a science and technology center that is run by
Dr. Wood--who I brought with me this morning, and I appreciate
you allowing that to happen--and the fact that we have a focus
there under her cognizance that has a cadre of scientists that
are devoted to looking at the technology needs, interacting
with the programs at the site in a very close linkage that
makes that happen.
Mr. Upton. And do the other project sites not have someone
like Dr. Wood? We have been talking about cloning in a couple
of the other panels that we have, but wouldn't that be part of
a function of the other major contractors at all these sites?
Mr. Gallagher. Well, I think it depends on the particular
sites. Other sites, those large sites like Hanford, has Bechtel
Northwest as a scientific arm for that particular site, but
other sites may not have a need like, for example, our West
Valley site or WIPP site does not have that specific need.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Peterson, how does Fluor do with regard to
having OST technology?
Mr. Peterson. Jim mentioned PNML, which is a division of
Bechtel Laboratories, but we also have internal field corps at
the Hanford site and Office of Technology, as well. We have a
Dr. Anderson who has been running that. Probably, the majority,
however, goes to Bechtel Labs as far as its development.
Mr. Upton. Would you say that the Department of Energy has
been a positive force in trying to influence OST technologies
coming into play? Have they been a main player in terms of
trying to influence or encourage that type of activity?
Mr. Peterson. I think they have. The two areas that you
have heard somewhat about in earlier panels was the ``K Basin''
issue where the characterization of the spent reactor fuel that
is in there, and, second, the robotics method in which it has
to be moved, is a very high priority of the DOE. And, so my
opinion is that they have been very supportive. The second area
that you have heard some about is the tank farm and the
characterization and ultimately the movement of that to make
preparations for the privatization piece which ultimately will
vitrify that liquid, mainly waste.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Card, I know that we are all pleased to know
that 2006 is coming and it is close, and I guess the release
that was made on Friday is certainly encouraging news. But as
we sort of focus on OST technology, I know that Rocky Flats has
less 10, I think, technologies that have been used there. What
would be the reason for that, do you suppose?
Mr. Card. Well, I think there is a couple. First of all----
Mr. Upton. And are they a part of the new plan that you
announced on Friday.
Mr. Card. Well, the baseline does include whatever
technologies we view are appropriate to meet that 2006
timeframe. I would cite a couple reasons. One is, I think, if
you look at the original mission of OST, it was to work on the
more intractable, long-range problems. Frankly, if you look at
the list of OST technologies, hopefully, we are going to be
done before many of them will be deployable, and, furthermore,
Rocky Flats is gifted in a way in that all of our ground water,
which comprises a large number of the OST suite, emerges as
surface water onsite, which, by the way, one of the OST
technologies we have applied is a passive treatment system for
that ground water before it emerges. So, I just view Rocky
Flats as, as I said, more of a management and systems
integration problem than a problem you see at these other
megasites, like Savannah River and Hanford and Oak Ridge where
you have the very large problems that people haven't even
figured out quite what to do yet.
Thank you.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Ms. DeGette.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Following up a little bit, we heard from the last panel and
others that you don't want to use technologies developed by
some of these small vendors and other folks. I am wondering if
any of you who wish would like to comment on that?
Mr. Gallagher. I will comment first. Mr. Schofield
mentioned the initial demonstration of his technology to a DOE
site was done at the Savannah River, and we did a separate
evaluation and determined it was cost effective. I can tell you
that we have looked over the technologies that we have applied
at Savannah River for all the programs, and over 65 percent of
these technologies that have been applied at the Savannah River
site are from commercially available technology and not self-
developed or through the OST Program.
Ms. DeGette. If it was effective, then why didn't you use
it?
Mr. Gallagher. You mean, additionally at Savannah River?
Ms. DeGette. Right.
Mr. Gallagher. Well, as Dr. Schofield mentioned, there was
additional applications for his technology at Idaho and there
limited applications at Savannah River. Dr. Wood might be able
to comment more specifically on that.
Ms. Woods. The technology was demonstrated as part of a
integrated demonstration program at Savannah River which
demonstrated a very wide suite of technologies that may be
available across the DOE complex. One additional commercially
available technology was selected from that suite for use at
Savannah River. It was actually being implemented when the
second technology was demonstrated.
Ms. DeGette. Okay. Would any of the rest of you like to
comment on that?
Mr. McIntire. If I could just comment on the issue of
whether we like to develop our own technologies or use somebody
else's. We don't develop our own technologies, so we have to
rely on other technologies either from the labs or through
bids. I want to men-
tion Oak Ridge M&I, too, is a--you know, the DOE keeps moving;
they keep learning from the past, and we are going into a
different stage, too, and we are not just maintaining like we
used to do. We are now tearing down, cleaning up, so they are
learning, and they are using different contracting vehicles.
The Oak Ridge M&I is a job where we are doing none of the work
ourselves. We are just managing it, and we are putting up 94
percent of the revenue all out in subcontracts. There are 150
RFPs out on the street over a 12-month period. Each one of
them, they are asked to use technology. Most of the jobs are
lump sum for a fixed price, so they have to use technology;
they have to take risks. So, I don't think we have the metric
shut to see how successful this is going to be, but it is--
anyway, on the question, do we like to develop our own, and we
don't want to any help? It is 180 degrees the other way.
Ms. DeGette. So, you disagree with that?
Mr. McIntire.
Ms. DeGette. Okay.
Mr. Card. First of all, Kaiser-Hill, we have consistently
exceeded our small disadvantaged business goals, winning the
Secretary's Award in 1997; being rated as highly successful by
the SBA in 1998. I empathize, though, with the plight of the
gentlemen who were up here earlier in that the process is long-
term. Let me just take two specific examples for Rocky Flats.
The gentleman from BIR, we were very interested in that
technology, but, as I think he alluded to, WIPP waste
acceptance criteria were a gold-plated, certified measurement
system; that is very expensive to develop. Even if you have the
technology to go through the paperwork, that is a very
expensive process, and I think he mentioned that he was nearly
there and his contracted was terminated at another site. I
think for low capitalized businesses, it is a very tough thing.
The other example was the surface radiation measurement
system. We continue to be very interested in that. However, our
job at Rocky Flats is to eliminate the need for technologies by
eliminating the work altogether, and we dramatically changed
our approach and focused on more contaminated buildings after
talking with that firm. We are still very interested when we
get to the more lightly contaminated areas where that
technology would have better application, but that is probably
now, frankly, 12 plus months out, and the question is how can
they maintain their business while we are waiting unless we are
instructed to subsidize in the meantime which is not our
current instructions.
Ms. DeGette. Okay. Did you have something, Mr. Peterson?
Mr. Peterson. I would also disagree with the premise that
says we like to develop in-house, on our own. First of all, we,
like Bechtel, are not a science company, we are an engineering
company. No. 2, 100 percent of the profit that we make is based
upon meeting schedules and meeting cost numbers. If we don't do
those, we make no corporation profit, and we will take whatever
technology is available to help us do that.
Ms. DeGette. Okay. Let me quickly, with consent of the
chairman, go back to a couple of specific questions relating to
the last panel, and, Mr. Card, since you are my pal, I will
pick on you, and, by the way, we were all happy to see your
announcement last week, as well about 2006.
Mr. Card. Timing of the change was a good one then.
Ms. DeGette. Yes, yes, at least for us.
In your written testimony, you said that you need
additional technology improvements in surveying and measurement
of the contamination out at Rocky Flats, and I am wondering if
you heard Mr. Kotrappa testify about his technology to measure
low levels of uranium, plutonium, and other alpha-emitting
contaminations, which was field tested at Oak Ridge and was
presented, as I understand, to Rocky Flats in November. I am
wondering what your response to that is and why they still
haven't heard back from you folks on their proposal?
Mr. Card. Well, I am not sure they--we put out two bids--
there are about three parts to my answer--we put out two bids
for this technology, and it is my understanding that, for
whatever reason, they did not submit a bid on the first one,
which is mobil containers, and, as Congressman Burr noted, the
successful bidder has a no bricks and mortar trailer with their
name on it. The drugs go in one way and come out measured and
nobody opens them. Even though it may be older, it meets the
bid specs. There was another bid we put out for larger
containers, waste crates, and it was my understanding their
technology was attractive and certainly within the competitive
range. The cost was significantly out of line, for whatever
reason, on that technology. Our bigger problems, frankly, are
in the residues, which are higher levels of contamination, and
we have very complex matrices. But what I would like to do is
go ahead and submit a one-page write-up to the committee on our
analysis of BIR and where they have been through our process.
Ms. DeGette. Yes, because Mr. Kotrappa was focusing on the
other vendor----
Mr. Card. Canberra, BNFL, and Amtech are the primary
international competitors, and all of them work at Rocky Flats.
Ms. DeGette. Rad Elec is the one that you are talking
about. So, if you can get us a written answer, that would be
helpful.
And then, I am wondering if, Mr. McIntire, you can comment
on this technology, as well?
Mr. McIntire. I was waiting for Congressman Burr to ask me
about Bio-Imaging, but you want to ask about which technology?
Ms. DeGette. Well, I am sure Congressman Burr will have
several fabulous questions.
Mr. McIntire. Okay. Could you rephrase your questions,
please?
Ms. DeGette. Yes, I would be happy to. The technology that
Mr. Kotrappa was testifying about on the technology they have
to measure the low levels of uranium, plutonium, and other
alpha-emitting contaminations in soils and surfaces.
Mr. McIntire. I can't comment at this time. I am sure I can
get back to you on it. I have got some notes here, but it would
take me 15 minutes to figure them out.
Ms. DeGette. To figure it out, okay. Thank you. Mr.
Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Mr. Burr?
Mr. Burr. I will try not to disappoint my colleague's
confidence in me.
Really, I am sort of lost as to where to start. Let me
start here. To each of you, do you think we can achieve a $20
billion life-cycle cost savings with the use of OST technology?
Mr. Gallagher?
Mr. Gallagher. I think that we can't do it with OST
technologies alone. I think we, as I mentioned in my testimony,
must look at universities, commercial vendors for innovative
technologies. The process that we have, Congressman, is that
for each of one our technology projects, we have a baseline
which has a schedule and cost and a baseline technology. Then,
when we come across an innovative technology that can reduce
the cost and the schedule, then we evaluate that and, with Dr.
Wood's organization at Savannah River, make that evaluation and
decide then whether or not to proceed with the new innovative
technology.
Mr. Burr. The answer is there is not enough confidence that
OST technology can do it alone.
Mr. Gallagher. You have to use others.
Mr. Burr. Mr. McIntire?
Mr. McIntire. I don't think I would say there is not enough
confidence in the OST. I think the process in DOE is looking at
all avenues. I will mention the M&I again; I think----
Mr. Burr. Do you believe they can get $20 billion of
savings through this effort?
Mr. McIntire. Not alone, but they are not trying to just do
it alone. They are trying to open it up to other avenues, too,
and we are looking at all avenues of technology. I think we
need to look at everything.
Mr. Burr. Mr. Card?
Mr. Card. Obviously, there is not $20 billion left at Rocky
Flats, but a thing that we have been working with Mr. Boyd's
office on, which is promising, is co-funding of technologies
that we need now but we need some seed money to test out, and I
think, certainly, for a site like Rocky Flats, that kind of
approach would be more fruitful than long-lead technology
development.
Mr. Burr. Mr. Peterson?
Mr. Peterson. I believe that the implementation of
innovation and technology will far exceed a $20 billion savings
if you really look at a $200 billion to $250 billion cleanup
problem. It is difficult for me, however, to say what OST's
input and piece of that is, but it will take innovation, and,
as we do that, there will be big savings as a result.
Mr. Burr. So, clearly, since the sites that you are in
charge of make up 70 percent of the cleanup costs projected for
DOE sites, the numbers that this committee could expect from
your answers that this would be the last time we would ever
hear DOE say that they projected an increase for the future
cleanups. Am I correct? At least of the 70 percent that are
represented here at the table? We will actually save money and
start going the other way.
Mr. Gallagher. I believe there is a significant opportunity
to save costs and schedule with innovative technologies. I
think the thing that we have to concentrate on, Congressman, is
the process in which we get those actual applications. And, as
you heard from the previous panel, there can be a lot of
barriers, procedurally and administratively, to get these
technologies to the field.
Mr. Burr. I will make the same offer to the companies that
we made to the Department of Energy. Any specific
recommendations that you see from a regulatory side, from a
process side that are recommendations you would like to make to
this subcommittee for them to follow through in a partnership
or whatever with the Department of Energy and with your
companies, we would certainly entertain that exchange of good
ideas, because our attempt is to clean up and to do it as cost
effectively as we can.
Let me shift, if I can, because I have got limited time,
and let me compliment all of you for your willingness to come,
for your commitment to use new technologies, but let me also--
several additional minutes, unanimous consent--let me also make
one comment relative to some of the testimony you gave; that
comment would be ``Bull.'' The cleanup process is not working
as smoothly as the testimonies you gave, and I think it is time
that somebody come before this committee and tell us what the
hell is wrong. Are we going to hit the 2006 figure in your
site? If so, and you can't incorporate technology, then why the
hell is OST sending you $3 million? If you don't need it, turn
it back in. If you are going to take it, then know that there
is some technology out there that you can incorporate in the
process. You do as big of an injustice as OST does, to some
degree, and DOE to these private entrepreneurs who are going
out on a shoestring, creating technologies with good
intentions. If the technology, Mr. Card, at BIR is as bright as
what you said, my question would be why didn't you put up the
capital?
Mr. Card. There is a whole variety of contracting issues
that we could get into if we were going to do that. You end up
in a situation that has been before the committee before. Do we
have one foot in too many buckets at the site? And, so we,
actually, are anxious to put up some capital for Rocky Flats.
Mr. Burr. So, the answer is that contractually, as it is
written, you can't do it?
Mr. Card. It would be institutionally difficult.
Mr. Burr. Since we do have some DOE folks in the room, let
me encourage them that we explore any waiver processes that
could exist so that if we are deficient in our ability to help
finance to the level needed for you to make a decision on new
technologies, that we look at a waiver process for promising
technologies that might have started at OST or started anywhere
that you see as long as we can contractually use those
technologies to save money and to clean up sites faster. There
is one thing that I can assure you that I will attempt to do
and that is to try to bring a higher degree of accountability
to the cleanup process, and I think for those of you that know
me, you know I am not going to go away or forget about it.
Let me ask you--I hate to pick on you, Mr. Card--how many
technologies do you think have come across your desk, new
technologies, relative to the Rocky Flats site?
Mr. Card. Well, it would be dozens. I don't have an exact
count, but it would be certainly in the many dozens.
Mr. Burr. And of that, we elected to use how many?
Mr. Card. I don't have that count either, because most of
the technologies we are employing are not technologies on the
OST list. I did mention several in the testimony, and I would
be glad to go into detail on them, but, for example, for us,
some of the more important technologies are not even
necessarily hardware and process equipment like you would
normally imagine barcoding drums, which we have a huge quantity
of. Computer systems and other management process improvement
systems are just as important to us in closing Rocky Flats.
Mr. Burr. How much in OST funds do you receive?
Mr. Card. I would say, of the large sites, we must be the
smallest recipient. It is in the few millions of dollars per
year; certainly less than $10 million.
Mr. Burr. Mr. Peterson, how much for Fluor?
Mr. Peterson. We receive around $3 million at the Fernald
site per year and around $10 million per year at the Hanford
site.
Mr. Burr. Mr. McIntire?
Mr. McIntire. Remember that both the Hanford project that
we are doing and Nevada, the dollar value is relatively small,
and the OST percentage, I believe, is in the 4 percent area of
the total cost of the cleanup. So, it is in that region.
Mr. Burr. Does that include Oak Ridge?
Mr. McIntire. No. Oak Ridge is similar--a little lower
percentage, a little more dollar volume. It is about $250
million of their total volume per year, and the percentage is
more like 2.9, 3 percent. Those are rough figures, and I would
be glad--I think we have already provided that information, by
the way.
Mr. Burr. Mr. Gallagher?
Mr. Gallagher. Twenty million dollars.
Mr. Burr. Twenty million?
Mr. Gallagher. Yes.
Mr. Burr. Is there any correlation between how much money
OST gives to you and how many technologies you ultimately end
up accepting as usage?
Mr. Gallagher. I think there probably is a correlation.
Mr. Burr. Are there any additional comments any of you
would like to make relative to this hearing and to this
process?
Mr. McIntire. Yes, I would like to say that I disagree with
some things that have been said, and some things I agree with.
The bull part I don't agree with, but the fact that the future
of cleanup and reducing, dramatically, like my colleague said,
probably more than $20 million is tied to technology and
innovation and creativeness. Sometimes we are getting a little
narrow on the technology part. It is also just creative
thinking, and I believe some of the small businesses that have
testified today, I think that is part of our future, and I do
empathize with working with the system. I think we could do
more, and I think we are doing more--all the companies are--but
I think there is more to communicate with these folks, and we
have to do more. I will commit our company to try even more
than we have done before, because I empathize with their pain.
Mr. Burr. Let me be bold and share with you where the bull
I thought came from; you deserve at least that. Three of you
referred to funding. I guess there is some consistency in the
people's willingness to come to Washington and say the problem
is money. Clearly, it may be, but one of the responsibilities,
I think, of companies is to, in fact, tell us what it will cost
us to do ``X.'' There is no way that the long-term cleanup
costs can rise every year if that honest exchange is, in fact,
happening. It is important that we be good stewards of the
taxpayer money. If that is an investment in OST because we feel
that the good works of that area of the Department of Energy
will ultimately save us money, that is what people have asked
us to come here and do. If we are not incorporating those
technologies, then they have asked us to ask the question, why?
If you are not using them, yet the problem is funding, and we
have addressed things that we thought were actually going to
bring down the cost versus come and listen to the reasons that
we need to put more money in, quite honestly, I don't think
that is a fair exchange, and I think there is a degree of
accountability that does not exist at DOE cleanup sites that we
must and we will get a handle on. That may alter significantly
who bids for them in the future. It may be that some of the
entrepreneurs that we saw in here with technologies might end
up actually having those technologies onsite, but I am
confident that funding is not the primary reason that sites
aren't getting clean. There is a process problem that allows us
to concentrate 99 percent on process and funding and 1 percent
on outcome. There is something wrong with that mix.
So, I apologize to all of you if you take offense at the
fact that I said your testimony was bull, but if we can't get
past that part of it and you to actually share with this
committee what the problem is--if 2006 is not a date you can
hit, then tell us why. If it is not a date you can hit, then
tell us why. If we can't meet the schedule that DOE comes in
here and says, ``Here is what our contractors will do,'' this
is your opportunity to tell us, ``We can't do what they said,
Congressman.'' But all of you have sat here and said
``Everything is rosy; it is great. We are incorporating this.
In the places where they are deficient with supplying us new
technology, we are creating it; we are finding it; we are
developing it.'' If everything was that good, we would have all
the sites cleaned up in 2006, and that is not the case.
So, I would just implore with each one of you that you have
as much of a responsibility to share with us accurate
information and suggestions as to how we accomplish this or
that word that each one of you has used, and that was
``partnership,'' will, in fact, not work.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. We appreciate your testimony this
morning and this afternoon, and we look forward to seeing you
again.
This subcommittee is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]