<DOC>
[109 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:25378.wais]
S. Hrg. 109-222
TERRORISM: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY
AND HOMELAND SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 26, 2005
__________
Serial No. J-109-46
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
JON KYL, Arizona JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN CORNYN, Texas CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
David Brog, Staff Director
Michael O'Neill, Chief Counsel
Bruce A. Cohen, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security
JON KYL, Arizona, Chairman
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
JOHN CORNYN, Texas JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
Stephen Higgins, Majority Chief Counsel
Steven Cash, Democratic Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Page
Cornyn, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Texas........ 19
prepared statement........................................... 42
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, a U.S. Senator from the State of
California..................................................... 3
Kyl, Hon. Jon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona.......... 1
Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont,
prepared statement............................................. 62
WITNESSES
Bettenhausen, Matthew R., Director, California Office of Homeland
Security, Sacramento, California............................... 11
Gorton, Hon. Slade, 9/11 Public Discourse Project, Seattle,
Washington..................................................... 4
O'Hanlon, Michael, Senior Fellow and Co-Holder, Sydney Stein
Chair, Foreign Policy Studies Program, Brookings Institution,
Washington, D.C................................................ 14
Renteria, Henry R., Director, California Governor's Office of
Emergency Services, Mather, California......................... 9
Thomas, Wayne C., Vice President, Homeland Security, Innovative
Emergency Management, Inc., Baton Rouge, Louisiana............. 7
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Responses of Michael O'Hanlon to questions submitted by Senator
Biden.......................................................... 34
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Bettenhausen, Matthew R., Director, California Office of Homeland
Security, Sacramento, California, prepared statement........... 37
Department of the Treasury, Office of Economic Policy,
Washington, D.C., report....................................... 48
Gorton, Hon. Slade, 9/11 Public Discourse Project, Seattle,
Washington, prepared statement................................. 56
O'Hanlon, Michael, Senior Fellow and Co-Holder, Sydney Stein
Chair, Foreign Policy Studies Program, Brookings Institution,
Washington, D.C., prepared statement........................... 64
RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, research brief....... 84
Renteria, Henry R., Director, California Governor's Office of
Emergency Services, Mather, California, prepared statement..... 87
Thomas, Wayne C., Vice President, Homeland Security, Innovative
Emergency Management, Inc., Baton Rouge, Louisiana, prepared
statement and attachments...................................... 95
TERRORISM: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
----------
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland
Security, Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:32 a.m., in
room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jon Kyl,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Kyl, Cornyn, Feinstein, and Durbin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF ARIZONA
Chairman Kyl. Good morning and welcome to the Subcommittee
on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the Senate
Judiciary Committee. We are pleased to have all of you here
this morning for what I think is going to be an enlightening
and very important hearing.
Let me begin by noting that Senator Feinstein and I will
make opening statements. If Senator Cornyn arrives at an
appropriate time, I will call upon him for an opening
statement, too, and then we will go right to our witnesses. We
have one panel today, but I suspect that that one panel will
engage in a pretty complete and lively discussion and there is
no time constraint here is the main point I wanted to make.
Hurricane Katrina exposed the weakness of our Nation's
emergency preparedness. As reported in an October 20 Washington
Post article, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff
acknowledged that Hurricane Katrina overwhelmed FEMA, exposing
major flaws in the nation's preparedness for terrorism and
natural disasters. Secretary Chertoff vowed to reengineer U.S.
preparedness.
We have learned a lot in the weeks since Hurricane Katrina.
Today, this Subcommittee will focus on the question of whether
we are prepared for a possible terrorist attack involving
problems similar to those caused by the natural disaster in the
Gulf Coast. A moderately sophisticated terrorist attack could
easily replicate the type and amount of damage caused by this
natural disaster, I believe, though I will ask you all whether
that is, in fact, correct, and the response would be even more
difficult to coordinate because we wouldn't have much time in
terms of warning, if any, as to when or where such an attack
might occur.
The objective of this hearing is to gain a better
understanding of the types of terrorist attacks that could
still take place, specifically those that could have an impact
similar to Hurricane Katrina's, the key success factors in
planning for and responding to an attack, the emergency
preparedness of the Federal Government and how it should work
with State and local authorities to respond effectively, and
any existing shortfalls that need attention by State, local,
and Federal authorities to improve readiness.
This Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland
Security has held numerous hearings about terrorist attack,
such as attacks against seaports, attacks with biological
weapons, and attacks against critical information
infrastructure. Earlier this year, the Subcommittee held a
hearing on the potentially devastating impact of an
electromagnetic pulse explosion.
Today, the Subcommittee will examine what should be done to
achieve an immediate, effective, and successful response to
terrorist attacks. The Subcommittee will hear from five expert
witnesses, one former Senator and member of the 9/11
Commission, a private sector expert, two State officials from
California, and a scholar from the Brookings Institution.
Senator Feinstein will introduce the two California witnesses
in her opening statement and I will introduce the other members
of the panel.
I will begin with former Senator Slade Gorton. He has
served in public office for four decades, 18 of those years
here in the U.S. Senate. Late in 2002, then-Majority Leader
Trent Lott appointed him to the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, where he served with
distinction and played a prominent role in formulating the
final report. He will testify to the Commission's findings and
warnings about preparedness for terrorist attacks.
Wayne Thomas is Vice President of Homeland Security for
Innovative Emergency Management, IEM, a Louisiana-based private
corporation focused on improving emergency preparedness at
Federal, State, and local levels. IEM has particular expertise
planning for responses to natural disasters and attacks
involving weapons of mass destruction. Founded in 1985, IEM has
worked with Federal organizations such as the Office of
Domestic Preparedness, the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
and the Department of Defense, as well as State and local
emergency management agencies in more than 25 States. Before
joining IEM, Mr. Thomas was administrator of the chemical
demilitarization program for the Oregon Department of
Environmental Quality.
Michael O'Hanlon is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings
Institution and he formerly worked at the Congressional Budget
Office. He specializes in defense issues, leads the work on
Brookings' Iraq Index, and has served as team leader on two
Brookings studies on homeland security in the last 3 years. The
latest Brookings study on homeland security is expected to be
published early in 2006. Dr. O'Hanlon received a Ph.D. in
public and international affairs from Princeton University. He
is also a visiting lecturer at the Woodrow Wilson School at
Princeton University.
As I said, Senator Feinstein will introduce our two
California guests today.
One final note about the witnesses at today's hearing. I
want to point out that I invited officials from both the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense
to testify. A witness from DOD was prepared to testify, but
DHS, the agency charged with leading the response in the wake
of an attack, informed me that FEMA was too busy at this time
to send a witness and that no other witness could be made
available. DOD was not inclined to send a witness if DHS
witnesses were not going to testify. I find this regrettable,
but look forward to hearing from both DHS and DOD in the
future.
The United States must be prepared to respond to terrorist
attacks. Hurricane Katrina exposed the weaknesses in our
Nation's emergency preparedness. We must determine whether
similar problems could occur with a terrorist attack.
I would like to thank Senator Feinstein, as usual, for
helping me prepare for and plan for this hearing. She and I see
eye to eye on matters of national security and the need to
respond to terrorist attacks and it is always a privilege to
work with her in a very bipartisan way on this problem that,
after all, confronts all Americans equally.
Senator Feinstein, thank you. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Senator Feinstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
the comments and I respond to them in kind. I thank you very
much for holding these hearings. I thank our witnesses. It is
certainly great to see Slade Gorton again. Welcome back. I will
make my remarks very brief.
September 11 is now 4 years away, and since that time, it
has been commonplace to say everything has changed since
September 11. And one thing that was supposed to change was our
readiness to respond to a catastrophe. With that in mind, the
Department of Homeland Security was forged and a large number
of departments were put together with a total of some 22,000
employees. It was supposed to be strengthened. The ability to
plan was supposed to have been made greater.
I increasingly believe that at least with respect to
emergency preparedness, September 11 did not change everything.
I think Hurricane Katrina is testimony to that. With Hurricane
Katrina, it was 5 days' warning, and yet there was not the
ability to evacuate and there certainly was not the ability to
respond adequately. That lack of response was inadequate on all
levels, local, State, as well as Federal.
So today, we examine the question, are we adequately
prepared? This isn't an academic debate. This is what could
happen in the wake of a terrorist attack or a huge natural
disaster on one of our cities. If the government response to
Katrina is any indication, it would be a time of chaos and
confusion with American life at risk.
I was pleased to see from Senator Gorton's prepared
testimony that he and the 9/11 Public Discourse Project have
strongly endorsed efforts to require that scarce homeland
security resources be allocated based on the best possible risk
analysis. This is an assessment of threat, vulnerability, and
consequence, and as you know, Senator, we haven't achieved that
yet because everyone wants their part of the homeland security
pie regardless of whether the assessment of threat,
vulnerability, and consequence indicates that they should have
part of that pie.
I am the original cosponsor, along with Senator Cornyn, of
Senate legislation to accomplish this. This legislation was not
approved by the Senate. The companion legislation passed the
House overwhelmingly and is now being considered as part of the
USA PATRIOT Reauthorization Act conference.
I also hope that our witnesses will address the questions
that I think most Americans share. Is the level of preparedness
for catastrophe higher than it was in 2001? Have things, in
fact, improved? If so, how did things go so horribly wrong in
Louisiana and what needs to be done to make us safer?
It is my pleasure to introduce our two distinguished
panelists from my State, the State of California, Henry
Renteria, Director of the State's Office of Emergency Services,
and Matthew Bettenhausen, Director of the Governor's Office of
Homeland Security. Respectively, they are charged with the
operations and policies of the State of California in
responding to disaster.
Over the course of 19 years as the head of the city of
Oakland's Office of Emergency Services, Henry Renteria
coordinated Oakland's response to eight Federal emergencies,
including the Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989. That is the one
in which a section of the Oakland Bay Bridge came down. More
recently, he led the recovery efforts in San Joaquin County
when a levee collapsed, flooding thousands of acres of
farmland.
Matt Bettenhausen is a former Deputy Governor of Illinois
with extensive law enforcement experience as a Federal
prosecutor. He played a critical role in the development of the
Department of Homeland Security as the first Director of State
and Territorial Coordination, establishing the procedures
linking State and Federal homeland security efforts.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think we are ready for
our witnesses.
Chairman Kyl. Thank you very much, Senator Feinstein.
We are ready to begin, and Slade Gorton, the floor is
yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. SLADE GORTON, 9/11 PUBLIC DISCOURSE PROJECT,
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
Senator Gorton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Feinstein
has already given a part of my speech, which was particularly
flattering, but I will begin at the beginning.
If terrorists strike again on American soil, it will be
local emergency responders--police, fire fighters, and
emergency medical technicians--who will be on the front lines.
Local emergency preparedness is now a matter of national
security. In addition, of course, while the Federal Government
through FEMA is not generally a first responder, its utterly
inadequate response to the needs of both victims and first
responders at the time of Katrina calls for dramatic changes in
its preparation for and response to both natural and terrorist-
caused emergencies.
On 9/11, shortcomings in emergency communications hindered
first responders and led to an unnecessary loss of lives,
especially bad among fire fighters in the Twin Towers and
between agencies responding to the World Trade Center site. As
the heroic fire fighters in both towers climbed higher, their
radio transmissions were disrupted by the many floors between
them and their commanders. Communications with their chiefs in
the lobby became weaker and more sporadic. Because so many
people were trying to speak at once, available channels were
overwhelmed. Transmissions overlapped and often became
indecipherable. Many fire fighters in the North Tower didn't
hear the evacuation order issued after the South Tower
collapsed. Some weren't even aware that it had come down.
Meanwhile, communications among agencies were poor. In one
well-known example, fire chiefs in the lobbies of the tower got
no information from the police helicopters circling above.
Because of poor inter-agency communications, many redundant
searches were conducted. This wasted precious time and caused
the deaths of many heroic first responders.
Hurricane Katrina reminds us that this problem has not been
solved. In Katrina, poor public safety communications again
delayed the response. New Orleans and the three neighboring
parishes were using different equipment and different
frequencies. They couldn't talk to one another. Helicopter
crews couldn't talk to rescuers in boats. National Guard
commanders in Mississippi had to use human couriers to carry
messages.
Last July, the 9/11 Commission recommended that Congress
turn over broadcast spectrum to first responders to improve
communication between agencies and to allow interoperability
among agencies. The House and Senate are finally moving on
legislation to reclaim analog TV spectrum currently held by
broadcasters and to designate some of it for use by emergency
responders, but the date in the bill just released by the
Commerce Committee is April 7, 2009, nearly 8 years after the
9/11 attacks.
By contrast, less than 4 years after Pearl Harbor, both
Japan and Germany had been defeated. It is ridiculous that it
should take eight years to implement such an obvious response
to the 9/11 attacks. Experts say that this transition could be
accomplished as early as 18 months from today and certainly
within 2 years. There will surely be another terrorist attack
or a major disaster in the next 4 years. We need a sense of
urgency to get this done now, not 4 years from now.
On 9/11 in New York and New Orleans, command structures for
emergency response were not clearly defined. It was not clear
beforehand who was in charge or what each agency's
responsibilities were. This confusion cost lives.
By contrast, in Arlington, Virginia at the Pentagon, the
command structure did work and there was not loss of lives
among first responders after the attack took place. I also have
the impression that Mississippi's response to Katrina did not
suffer from the same problems of command and control as did
that of Louisiana. Command and control in response to Hurricane
Rita seems to have worked better, as well. The Committee may
well wish to examine the facts and circumstances of command and
control in each of these cases so that we can learn what worked
and what didn't.
The 9/11 Commission recommended that local governments
adopt the incident command system. This system defines who is
in charge and what agencies' responsibilities are in a crisis.
Every locality should have a clear emergency plan with every
agency's specific role laid out beforehand in black and white.
As we saw in Katrina, if local plans are not highly specific
and are not regularly rehearsed, confusion is inevitable.
DHS set a hard deadline of October 1, 2006, for localities
to establish and exercise a command and control system to
qualify for first responder grants. Don't let that deadline
slip. Localities that do not have clear, well-rehearsed
incident command plans by that date should not receive Federal
Homeland Security grants.
Now, Senator Feinstein has already spoken to risk-based
funding. Since 2001, you have allocated more than $8 billion to
help State and local governments prepare for terrorist attacks.
Unfortunately, these funds have not been guided by any
assessment of risk and vulnerability. The 9/11 Commission made
a common sense recommendation that it be based on risks and
vulnerabilities, not politics. These funds are national
security funds, they are not general revenue sharing. They are
too important to be spent without any guarantee that they are
actually reducing our vulnerabilities.
Both of you support this kind of reform, as do many other
Senators. As Senator Feinstein said, the House proposal on the
subject is an excellent one. It is now in conference with the
Senate. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the 9/11 Commission
and the Public Discourse Project will soon submit a letter to
that Conference Committee strongly recommending the House
version, which is very similar to what Senators Cornyn and
Feinstein proposed here in the Senate. We urge that that be
adopted.
The Intelligence Reform Act required DHS to produce a
national strategy for transportation security by April 1, 2005.
We bitterly criticized the agency for not having done so in our
report in mid-September. We were told the next day, well, in
fact, they had finished it on the first of July, but that it
was classified, apparently, even the fact that it existed. As
such, it is unavailable to the public, the transportation
community, State and local governments, and first responders.
What use is it if the people who have to adapt to it don't know
anything about its existence or what it says?
Next, DHS has not produced the National Risk and
Vulnerabilities Assessment for critical infrastructures that
was due on June 15, making it very, very difficult to
distribute Homeland Security funds in a rational manner.
Moreover, that kind of assessment needs to be an ongoing
process. It is not a one-time job.
Finally, as Hurricane Katrina reminded us, large-scale
emergency responses are bound to occur again in the future,
whether from terrorist attacks or natural disasters. The
question, Mr. Chairman, is are we better prepared for the next
major terrorist attack, for the next natural disaster? Are we
prepared for an attack with a dirty bomb or one with chemical
or biological weapons? Are our emergency communications good
enough? Are our response plans updated and rehearsed? Are we
directing Federal funds as they are needed to protect our real
vulnerabilities?
Well, at least with respect to those last questions, the
answer is no. After 9/11, after Katrina, we are still not
prepared. We will do anything we can to help you and your
counterparts in this Committee and in both Houses to enact
these common-sense recommendations this year for the safety of
our first responders and the communities they are pledged to
protect. The lessons of 9/11 and again of Katrina are too
painful to be learned again a third time.
[The prepared statement of Senator Gorton appears as a
submission for the record.]
Chairman Kyl. Thank you, Senator Gorton, for that excellent
statement.
Next, Mr. Wayne Thomas.
STATEMENT OF WAYNE C. THOMAS, VICE PRESIDENT, HOMELAND
SECURITY, INNOVATIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, INC., BATON ROUGE,
LOUISIANA
Mr. Thomas. Chairman Kyl, Ranking Member Senator Feinstein,
other members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity
and the honor to be here today. It is very significant for our
company to have this opportunity and we appreciate it.
On the screen, you will see an image of a dirty bomb attack
that we projected on the West side of the Capitol building
here. I think this brings home to us what we are dealing with
as a potential scenario. Should this event actually occur, part
of this area may be uninhabitable for many, many years because
it is a radiological device.
Recently, we witnessed the devastation of Hurricane Katrina
and what happened along the Gulf Coast. I think we want to look
at a comparison between terrorist events and the natural
disasters that we just experienced.
The image that you are seeing now shows the extent of the
impact of Hurricane Katrina and this model that you are seeing
here is the storm surge model. We actually ran this model a
year ago for an exercise that we did and we were aware at that
time that this would be the extent of damage from a hurricane
of this type. So we are projecting the geographical extent of
the damage here into an image. We are going to compare this
with a couple of other types of scenarios.
The first one that you will see is an IED event. This
happens to be in Salt Lake City at the University of Utah
stadium. This is a vehicle-mounted IED, and you will see that
there are multiple IED attacks that happen in this one scenario
that we have utilized. The message here is that this type of an
attack is somewhat localized to the area, that the damage and
the casualties would be localized, but the damage and effect on
certainly the population where this happens in the Nation would
be significant.
Second, you are going to see a chemical warfare attack in
San Francisco at Golden Gate Park. This is a release of GB
agent, Sarin, the same chemical agent that was used in Tokyo in
1996. A very small quantity is used here. The effects on those
in the park would obviously be catastrophic, and we will
project at the end of the simulation the casualties that we are
looking at.
The last scenario that we have here is an anthrax attack on
a Midwest city. I think once you see the simulation, you will
see what city it is. This is a simulation that we did a couple
of years ago and it is an airborne release of weaponized
anthrax that impacts the entire city and beyond. In the bottom
right corner, you can see the red and yellow images appearing.
That is the distribution and spreading of the anthrax as it
migrates through the communities. This would be absolutely
catastrophic in this location or any urban environment were
this to occur.
So how do these events all compare? You can see that here
is the estimated fatalities that we have from these
simulations. You can see that Hurricane Katrina that we saw and
continue to see in New Orleans is less than we would anticipate
from the bioterrorism anthrax simulation.
Returning back to the dirty bomb scenario, I think it is
important that we also think about the Hurricane Wilma that
recently crossed Florida and caused substantial damage there,
went right up the East Coast very quickly and a few days ago
was causing quite a bit of rain here. If that had moved a
little bit to the West, it would have impacted D.C. The
combination of a terrorist event along with a natural disaster
could also be a very significant event.
I want to mention a few points here that from our
experience working with many of our clients across the Nation
and over the last 20 years, what we have seen from our
experience. There are, in terms of catastrophic planning, I
think various things that have been done, and one of the things
that we have done back in July of 2004 was to develop an
exercise, a planning exercise approach that we called Hurricane
Pam. This was a Category 3 hurricane that made landfall in
Southeast Louisiana. The consequences of that were used by the
local communities, the State, and the Federal agencies for
planning and 14 plans were developed at that time.
The consequences of a Hurricane Katrina-type event were
well known in that area and by all of the response agencies. In
fact, the model that we showed earlier demonstrated the extent
of the storm surge that we knew well over a year ago would
happen should this storm make landfall in this particular area.
The key aspect that we see working with our clients is that
planning is the cornerstone of really everything that we do.
But what we don't see is that we don't define what we want as
specific, acceptable results from developing these plans. What
is it we want to achieve? What is it that the public demands of
us?
We write plans, we execute those plans, but we don't always
define what we want, and that is a very important distinction
that we need to address. Simply having a plan that works well
may not achieve the results that you want if you don't
determine what you want to achieve in advance, and that is a
very significant change in planning approach that we would
recommend.
The second issue is the actual plans that we developed, do
we really understand the consequences that these disasters are
going to have on our communities and on our citizens? We need
that comprehensive understanding of a terrorist attack,
whatever type we want to consider, natural hazards, hurricanes,
earthquakes. Let us understand what the consequences are,
because that helps us plan effectively. Unless we utilize those
detailed consequence assessments, again, we cannot plan
effectively.
The third point I would make is that we have to address the
full integration of Federal, State, and local response
capabilities. As Senator Gorton said, local response is first-
line national response now and that is so accurate. All
politics is local. I think Tip O'Neill said that many years
ago. But all disasters are local. It is those local first
responders that are going to be there when it immediately
happens and they are going to be there over the years for the
clean-up and recovery from that disaster. They are critical to
solving the solutions here. So bringing the right people
together is very important from the front-line local
governments, State governments, and Federal agencies.
And the last thing I wanted to mention is that we have an
exercise program that we utilize to test our plans. I think it
is important that we make that program as rigorous as it can
be. We conduct a lot of exercises that are essentially open
book. We just test the plan and we check the marks here. But we
have to have an exercise program that is rigorous, that ensures
that we can effectively do what we say we think we can do.
I will sum it up in one statement, if I can. We have to
plan together, train together, exercise together, and that puts
us where we can respond and recover together as a nation. Thank
you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas appears as a
submission for the record.]
Chairman Kyl. Thank you, Mr. Thomas.
Mr. Renteria?
STATEMENT OF HENRY R. RENTERIA, DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES, MATHER, CALIFORNIA
Mr. Renteria. Thank you and good morning, Chairman Kyl,
Ranking Member Feinstein, and Subcommittee members. Thank you
for the opportunity you have given me to be here today to
testify on this very important subject.
Before I go into my remarks, I would like to, if we can,
show a very brief video that we have brought along with us.
[A videotape was played.]
Mr. Renteria. Thank you. As you can see from the video,
California, because of our history, and we do have a long
history of natural disasters, we learned very many valuable
lessons. We have taken these lessons and we have incorporated
them into planning for the next one. In summary, we have had
our Katrinas in California. We have had several disasters. We
have learned from every single one of them and we have applied
them to the next one.
As you saw, the Incident Command System is something that
came out of the Forest Service. This was something that was
used to manage large numbers of resources fighting large forest
fires. This Incident Command System has now been pretty much
developed into the civilian system as our Standardized
Emergency Management System. SEMS, as we like to refer to it,
is our bible for responding to disasters. This is the backbone
of the system that is in California. Because this is an
organizational system that can be used to deal with large-scale
events, it allows the opportunity for several agencies to
respond together under a unified command and deal with the
events of the disaster.
As you saw from the video also, the Federal Government has
now adopted the National Incident Management System, NIMS. It
is a real tribute to California that they took our system and
applied it, but I must also point out, the Federal Government
did not use NIMS at the Katrina event and this was really a
major issue that led to the things going wrong. If they had
used NIMS as we have depicted here, I think we wouldn't have
seen some of the issues that came up.
I also want to use this opportunity also to talk a little
bit about interoperability. We have heard that word before and
that is a major concern that we have. But I also want to show
you that interoperability is something that we have taken very
seriously, but it is also exacerbated by the fact that we are
such a large State. We have unique topography in California
that gives us major challenges and we have a huge number of
response agencies.
But we have some success stories. I think this is something
that I would like to point out. We have purchased what we call
our black boxes. These are pieces of equipment that can be
brought to a scene where first responders can literally plug
into these boxes in order to solve some of the interoperability
problems. We also have radio caches that we bring out to the
scene to distribute to first responders who are showing up that
may not have the radio frequencies that we have.
We have identified some success stories on a regional
level, specifically in San Diego, Orange County, Sacramento,
and even the Bay area. They have used some of the resources we
have gotten from Homeland Security to develop some regional
capabilities that gives us a model to follow for the rest of
the State.
But we still need help. We need some guidance. The Federal
Government needs to provide us some guidance on
interoperability. What are those standards that you want us to
follow? And we need the help with the frequencies, as was
mentioned earlier. Frequencies is a major issue for us all over
the country, and these frequencies and the spectrum that we
need to have addressed so that we can have our interoperability
taken care of.
I also want to point out, someone asked, what is the proper
role of the Federal Government in a disaster? My response is,
the Federal Government needs to be a partner. They need to be a
partner with the State and with local government before,
during, and after a disaster. Before the disaster, we must all
speak with a single voice in helping spread the message of
preparedness, preparedness from the level of the government,
preparedness at the private sector, and preparedness for the
individual citizens.
During a disaster, they need to also bring the resources in
to help us respond and save lives, protect property. But also
during a disaster, the Federal Government must also be part of
a unified command. We have a system set up in California. We
incorporate the Federal Government when they respond to our
request, and so part of that unified command must be there for
them to also participate in.
And after a disaster, besides bringing disaster assistance,
which we obviously need, the Federal Government also needs to
help us promote mitigation. The mitigation programs are the key
to preventing some of the loss of life and property that we
have in some of our natural disasters. We need to spend some
money ahead of time so that we don't spend so much money after
the event.
As we go forward and we identify the lessons learned, not
only from Katrina but from past disasters, we will keep
applying these lessons to our plans, we will keep exercising
these plans, and we will keep providing more training to the
necessary governments that need to be prepared to respond. But
we must also remember the old saying that failure is only the
opportunity to begin again intelligently. I think these are the
lessons that we need to prepare for. We need to prepare for the
next disaster, not the last one, and I think we are on that
road. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Renteria appears as a
submission for the record.]
Chairman Kyl. Thank you, Mr. Renteria.
Mr. Bettenhausen?
STATEMENT OF MATTHEW R. BETTENHAUSEN, DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA
OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
Mr. Bettenhausen. I want to thank the Committee and each of
the members for the opportunity to be here and also to praise
your leadership on these important issues of homeland security.
I know, Senator Kyl, we have many shared issues on border
security in California that you have and we appreciate your
leadership in providing the additional resources that we need
to better secure America's borders.
Senator Feinstein, you have been a great partner with
Governor Schwarzenegger, and just as you operate here in
Washington, D.C. in a bipartisan fashion, we know that you have
been a great partner with the Governor, that we work on
homeland security and emergency management issues in a
nonpartisan, bipartisan way, and we appreciate your support.
It has been a pleasure for me to join the Governor's team,
and he has assembled a great team, including my partner here,
Henry Renteria, but across the board, from food and agriculture
to health services and we are working together and we
appreciate your support and leadership here, and your work with
Senator Cornyn, whom I have also had the pleasure of working
with your daughter, Danley, when I was with the Department of
Homeland Security.
You have been great leaders in recognizing that our funding
must be prioritized, that it must be based on risk, that we
must look at threat, vulnerability, and consequence. We have
limited Federal resources and we must prioritize those and I
thank you both and this Committee for its leadership.
I also would like to recognize Senator Durbin from my
original home State of Illinois, where I also had the pleasure
of being Deputy Governor and serving as its first Homeland
Security Director and thank him for his leadership on homeland
security issues, not only while I was there and leading the
Illinois delegation, but working to continue making sure that
Illinois, like California, is well prepared and continues to
become better prepared as we look at these issues.
I think it is very appropriate that we look at the issue of
terrorism in terms of the lessons learned from Katrina, and
that is the focus that you have brought here today, and it is
very important that we look at it from that perspective, not
only from domestic terrorism that we learned from Timothy
McVeigh and the Oklahoma City bombings, but through 9/11 to the
1993 World Trade Center bombings which helped save lives
because there was better evacuation planning and there were
things that were done when 9/11 happened 4 years ago.
But when we look at Katrina, and every one of those lives
was precious, just as it was with 9/11, but if you look at the
consequences there, where we lost approximately 1,200
individuals, each deeply important, major disruptions in their
lives, but if you compare it to terrorism and if you compare it
to 9/11, we had three times the number of casualties when we
look at a potential terrorist attack.
As Senator Kyl appropriately pointed out, these attacks are
not going to come--and Senator Feinstein, you did, as well--are
not going to come with 5 days of warning. They are conspiring
against us. Their intentions are well known by the intelligence
community. It is well known by this Committee. They are looking
for mass casualties. They are looking for a more spectacular
event than 9/11. That means that we must keep the focus on
terrorism preparedness, where we could have a weapon of mass
destruction, a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
that could cause significant deaths and casualties.
One of the things that unfortunately or fortunately,
depending on how you can kind of look at it, we have not been
tested with major long-term care for mass casualties. In 9/11
and New York City, we were looking that we might have long-term
care and needs for burn victims. Unfortunately, it didn't
happen, and fortunately, I think because of the lessons learned
from the 1993 bombing, there were a lot less casualties because
there were evacuation plans and things in place that also saved
lives.
But we have to go and look at what will we do in a major
weapon of mass destruction event? What will be our medical
surge capacity? What will FEMA be able to do in terms of
providing support to our local, State, and counties in terms of
that medical surge capacity that we know just does not exist in
all of our communities when you are talking about an incident,
and as Secretary Chertoff has recognized, that they are
planning for housing and feeding--must account for 500,000 or
more--or more--and it is not only housing and feeding, it is
the medical surge capacity that would come with that. It comes
with the ability to also bring communications, which is another
lesson learned from Katrina, again from 9/11, and as Senator
Gorton talked about, we haven't gotten it yet.
In 1997, Congress promised our first responders that they
would have new frequencies and that we would have the capacity
to have spectrum so that we could pass video, data, and have
dedicated radio frequencies for our first responders. They were
to get that at the end of this year. That is not going to
happen, and I know the House markup is going on, that they are
looking at a deadline for those spectrums to become available
in 2008 and the Senate is looking at April of 2009. We need to
move quickly to do that because we have learned again and again
it is about communications, cooperation, and coordination. It
is communications, communications, communications. So we need
to do that.
I think one of the things that we look at as we move the
media off those bands and that we as a Federal Government go to
talk about auctioning those bands, as the government should--we
have huge Federal deficits and we need the resources--we were
meeting with Representative Lungren when we were out here. One
of the things Congress should also consider is when we go and
auction those things and we receive that money, that we
dedicate that funding to our first responders so that they can
use them to improve their interoperability and their
communication capabilities, and it would be a good way to help
finance it and make sure that we are committed to providing
those resources.
Besides communications, again, we need to know that FEMA is
going to have their logistics systems put in place so that when
we call on FEMA, that we are going to be able to get the
materials that we have requested that they have assured us that
they are there and that we are going to be able to use them.
Besides housing and feeding, there is also the financing of
the displaced. I think Secretary Chertoff has talked about
this, about the need to improve it, and he is working on that,
but it may be things that the Hill could look at in terms of
improving Stafford Act so it is fairer to all States and all
communities in terms of those impacted by disasters.
I think it is important to recognize, as Secretary Chertoff
has, that FEMA is not a first responder. It is the State and
locals. What is FEMA? It is nothing more than our first
responders who are out there who have staff and are trained to
take the urban search and rescue teams, the swift water rescue
teams, that become a national resource in an emergency. Eight
of California's USAR teams were in the Gulf.
We do not need to build Federal capabilities, as Governor
Perry talked about, a Maytag repairman sort of sitting there
waiting to be called. We need to better support our State and
locals so they have those first responders there who can
respond to anything 24/7, respond to incidents that don't
require Federal assistance, but to be there for national
emergencies as the national asset. So we can deploy USAR teams,
swift water rescue, disaster medical assistance teams, and
again, by USAR, I mean urban search and rescues.
Again, like Mr. Renteria talked about, we believe in and we
need the support of the Federal Government, but we do not need
the Federal Government in charge. We need the Federal
Government to come in and assist us under civilian authority
and control.
I would like to just talk briefly about IA, an information
analysis and threat awareness. We need to continue to make
improvements at all levels of government. I think the Federal
Government and our intelligence community also needs to know
that they can learn a lot from our local police officers who
are out there. There are a lot more of them there. We know
lessons learned in terms of Timothy McVeigh. It was local folks
that got it. Eric Rudolph, it was local police who finally
captured him.
We met and had our identity theft conference when we were
in California, Senator, and I thank you for taking a leadership
on that. We know that they need financing and they do it
through the criminal milieu and there are things that we work
at a local level that we can help provide, but we also need to
know the strategic threats that are out there and we need
better information sharing.
And then in terms of infrastructure protection, it was
raised by Senator Gorton, as well, we need to have that plan.
We need to have what the national infrastructure planning is
going to be. We need to have better coordination with us in our
private sector community in terms of which assets we need to
harden and protect, and Senator, we have worked closely on many
of those issues that we see in California, but we know that we
can't harden all critical infrastructure, but we need what is
the strategic system-wide plan so that we look at systems
rather than individual targets and how do we have the
redundancies, the resiliency, and the quick recovery capability
so no matter where you hit us, and if you hit us in multiple
places, we can quickly recover.
I see that my time has expired. I feel like I am back in
the Court of Appeals with the clock running. But I would be
remiss if I didn't talk about the importance of the individual
citizen and the individual citizen's role to be prepared. That
was really driven home with Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. You need
to have a family disaster plan. You need to help our first
responders so that they can address those most in need, those
who are injured, and so that they can focus their attention on
restoring services. So to the extent that you can take care of
yourself, that you can be on your own for 72 hours, you are
helping everybody. You are helping America and you are helping
yourself and citizen preparedness is a critical part of making
America safer and better prepared.
I thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bettenhausen appears as a
submission for the record.]
Chairman Kyl. Thank you, Mr. Bettenhausen.
Dr. O'Hanlon?
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL O'HANLON, SENIOR FELLOW AND CO-HOLDER,
SYDNEY STEIN CHAIR, FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES PROGRAM, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. O'Hanlon. Thank you, Senator. It is an honor to be here
before you as well as Senator Feinstein. I also want to thank
the Texas and Illinois delegation for giving us a great World
Series so far, I know happier for some than others--
[Laughter.]
Mr. O'Hanlon. --but too late for all of us. If we can agree
on one thing, the games go too late. I think some people on
this panel actually watched. Hopefully, you can't tell from our
testimony.
Anyway, I want to say a few brief things very consistent
with the general theme of what we have already heard from my
colleagues.
I want to first say, in terms of answering, Senator
Feinstein, your question about how much progress have we made
and where do we stand, while there are a lot of things we
haven't done and a lot of things we have, I want to put a
little bit of a conceptual framework in place and suggest that
we have put our greatest successful effort so far in the area
of prevention, and that is appropriate. I think we have done
better with the PATRIOT Act and with, even before the PATRIOT
Act or concurrently with it, breaking down some of the
bureaucratic barriers. The 9/11 Commission has offered some
ideas on how to do more of this. But even before they issued
their report, we had made some of these changes. I give the
Bush administration and the Congress a lot of credit for that.
I think the border integration at DHS, the border security
integration has gone better than some of the other efforts
there, although it requires continued pressure from those of
you who have a special interest in the border problem to keep
up the resources, because I don't think they are adequate yet.
But I do think that direction has been appropriate and the
integration there has made good sense.
On a few other areas, maybe New York City's efforts to
create dedicated police counterterror units and so forth, there
have been some remarkable efforts at prevention, which I think
have been helpful and it is part of why we haven't seen a lot
of terrorists on American soil. We did learn from President
Bush earlier this month in his October 6 speech that there had
been some attacks in the works we hadn't known about, or at
least those of us on the outside of government hadn't heard
about prior to that point, but overall, I have been relieved
that there haven't been more terrorists found on American soil
since 9/11 and more attacks that actually got to the advanced
planning stage or the implementation stage, and that is a
tribute to our prevention and that should remain the top
priority, I believe.
However, it cannot be the only priority because we are not
good enough and our borders are inherently too open to make
sure prevention always works. So we have to think a lot about
protection of key assets and consequence management, and that
is a lot of what my colleagues have been talking about, fellow
panelists up here. I want to make a couple of observations
before I get to my own graphics. Maybe I will conclude with
those, but let me lay out a couple of broad thoughts first.
I would just offer my main recommendations on what we
should do and what we shouldn't do at this moment in homeland
security and next efforts, because I think we always have to be
asking, what are our resources? What threats are most plausible
that we should be preparing against them? And which ones are
simply not plausible or too hard to deal with? Frankly, that
latter category is a distressing one to have to recognize, but
there are certain threats that unless we are prepared to do a
radical change in our way of life or unless we see the threat
get a lot more plausible, I think the best course of action is
a fairly minimal response. In other areas, I think we need to
do more. Let me just offer a couple of short lists of each, dos
and don'ts.
On the don'ts, I don't believe, for example, that we should
create a lot of excess hospital capacity for a quarantine in
the event of a massive contagious biological attack. Some
people have laid out very worrisome scenarios about contagious
biological attack and I don't want to say these are
implausible. In fact, we should spend a lot of time and effort
on vaccines, on prevention, on monitoring people as they come
into the country for health, trying to deal with health
problems over seas. The H5N1 virus is an example of something
we have to monitor and deal with through a health prevention
approach.
But I don't think that we should spend what would be tens
of billions of dollars creating excess hospital bed capacity
for a scenario that is relatively unlikely to happen, and if we
do have that scenario, it is going to be more important to
respond in other ways than by having hospital beds. I throw out
this scenario because some people have talked about the
desirability of having the ability to have many, many thousands
of people quarantined in any given city within hospitals in
excess of what we already have--not a smart use of money, I
don't believe.
There was a council on Foreign Relations study a couple of
years ago that called for spending $20 billion a year more on
first responders. I disagree. I don't think that would be a
smart use of scarce homeland security money. We obviously have
a lot of first responder needs that have not yet been met and I
think there is room for an ample serious discussion on that
topic alone, and we have heard some mention of initiatives that
would be appropriate. I have my own list. But I think we have
to keep that kind of list more or less within the $5 to $10
billion a year range that we have been spending so far on first
responders because I don't think that some of the ideas that
are out there make sense. Putting chemical protective suits for
all three million first responders in the country at the top
level of capacity, I don't think it is the appropriate thing to
do.
Making sure every police and fire radio in the country can
talk to every other one, I think that is excessive. I think
what you need is mobile communications systems that can be
interoperable, deployable ways for the fire and police radios
to talk to each other. But to replace all the radios would be
an excess use of resources.
I am sorry to go through this list of don'ts, but I want to
establish some credibility, I hope, before I go to a list of
dos, because we can really have a problem with homeland
security of a kitchen sink mentality where those of us, most
people in this room, I think, who are homeland security hawks
sometimes sound to the rest of the country like we just want to
do every single thing we can possibly imagine, not that anybody
has been guilty of that here, but sometimes the impression
people get is that homeland security hawks just want to spend
everything under the sun, throw in the kitchen sink, at this
problem. We have to avoid that temptation.
Another potential way you could spend umpteen sums of money
would be to essentially harden our public spaces the way Israel
has had to do. I do not believe we are now at a point in the
United States where every single mall, restaurant, McDonald's,
movie theater should have metal detectors. We may wind up in
that world, and the Israelis have wound up in that world. I
don't think we should be in that world right now because,
again, I think the cost would be excessive. The threat is not
yet credible enough to me to advocate that. Now, I could be
proven wrong tomorrow, but I don't--and we obviously need
certain kinds of buildings to be protected in these sorts of
ways and we always have to have the debate about which ones.
But I think to establish an Israeli-level security system for
every public space would be excessive.
Finally, I don't think we need to inspect every single
container coming into the United States. That would be roughly
a 20fold increase in capacity compared to what we do today. It
would require major redesign of every major port in the
country. It would require additional expense on a magnitude of
maybe ten times what we spend now. I would not recommend that.
Having said those things I would not do, let me say four
things I would do very quickly, show my pictures, and be done.
One, chemical plants. Chemical plants, at least the top
couple thousand most dangerous chemical plants in the country
are just not well enough protected today, and I will add one
little point of commentary on Senator Gorton's chart where he
called on the private sector to take primary responsibility
here. I agree with him partially. The private sector must do a
lot of this, but I think they need a nudge from Washington,
because if you are an individual owner of a chemical plant, of
course, you are not going to volunteer to be the first one to
protect your plant better than standards require. All the
economic incentives are against doing so, and why would you
want to draw attention to yourself or admit that you might have
a vulnerability?
So you may do a few things quietly, and some chemical plant
owners have, but most have not and I think it would be
unrealistic for Washington to expect them to. On the other
hand, we can't mandate with the heavy hand of government that
every chemical plant in the country hire 1,000 more security
guards tomorrow. That would be one of those don'ts that we
should not do. So we need to figure out some compromise, and I
think Congress needs to look at this in more detail than it has
so far.
Border capacity. I think the efforts of this Committee and
others have been instrumental and exemplary, but still
insufficient, and you know more about that than I, so I won't
go on.
Local police capacity, and I am fascinated to hear what my
colleagues from California have to say on this. I have some
friends on the L.A. City Council and elsewhere who have been
distressed that in Los Angeles, and I have heard similar
stories about Chicago and St. Louis and Houston, other places,
there is really not much dedicated capacity at the level of
local police to do what New York City is doing, which is to try
to--and New York City does remarkable things. They will send a
police officer to a convention of mosquito spraying equipment
to figure out if anybody is there who doesn't seem to belong
and might want that equipment to spray anthrax.
I don't think most other police departments in the country
have thought about how to do that sort of thing, or which
buildings might be most vulnerable to truck bombs, and
therefore, perhaps, they should not have parking garages
beneath them, or if they do, there should be much more rigorous
inspection. Now, we all know there are a couple of big
buildings in major cities that have taken these sorts of
precautions, but I think New York City is the only city that
does this systematically at the level of capacity that is
appropriate. So helping cities create more capacity for
preventive efforts at the level of police, I think is an
appropriate third priority after chemical plants and border
capacity.
Last thing, and Katrina brings this to mind, we need to
avoid a big polarized debate about DOD's future role in
disaster response. Some people want to say the States should
always be the first responders. As Mr. Renteria said, all
disasters are local--I guess it was Mr. Thomas--all disasters
are local, all disaster response has to be local. At some
level, of course, that is certainly true, but there are
emergencies for which DOD is the only plausible way to marshal
the kind of capacity we need and DOD is not yet good enough at
reacting urgently.
Historically, DOD has acted over a period of days. They are
not yet good enough at acting within hours. They should be able
to be. They don't need a lot of new units. They don't need a
lot of new capacity. They may or may not even need a new
exemption to posse comitatus, although I would advocate one
myself, but what they do need is better planning to figure out
how to deploy a lot of capacity quickly.
OK, so those are my dos and don'ts. My apologies for going
on a little long. I want to very quickly go through a couple of
graphics that are not quite at the level of professionalism of
my colleague, so I will be quick, but thankfully, Senator, your
staff helped me make them better than they would have been
otherwise.
This is what an anthrax attack could do with an airborne
dispenser, an airplane, cruise missile, crop duster, what have
you, in Washington. The shaded area is an area of high
lethality and this would not require any more anthrax than you
could have on one small airplane. So you are talking about
potential for obviously many, many thousands, actually tens of
thousands of deaths from this sort of an attack.
This is, of course, the worst case scenario, a hydrogen
bomb. It is not a particularly likely terrorist threat. On the
other hand, Russia still does have a lot of loose nukes that
are man transportable, or certainly car transportable, and I
don't think we have yet reached the point where we can feel
good about the security of Russian nuclear materials. Graham
Allison at Harvard was right, I think, to say we should have a
Fort Knox standard for all plutonium and highly enriched
uranium in the world. We should guard that as well as we guard
gold, all of it, and we haven't yet gotten there, which means
this threat is still plausible, hopefully very unlikely, but it
is plausible even though terrorists cannot plausibly themselves
enrich uranium or make plutonium.
This is another version of a dirty bomb and this is perhaps
a somewhat less likely one, but it would be far worse than the
graphs that Mr. Thomas showed earlier because what we are
talking about here is cobalt from, for example, a food
irradiation plant. Just one rod of this cobalt could actually
create enough--if dispersed explosively could create enough
contamination to look sort of like Chernobyl in terms of its
effects and leave much of Manhattan uninhabitable for decades.
Actually, I was surprised to learn this when I worked through a
little bit of the science myself, but this is the sort of thing
that we have somewhat unguarded, or at least not well enough
guarded in our country today. So when you find a specific
threat that could have this kind of implication, I think you do
need to take preventive measures.
And this, of course, I won't expect you to read, but this
is just a summary of what we have learned, and some of this was
done at DOD in their preparation for thinking through terrorist
scenarios, but you have got a short list of 15 with the typical
casualty numbers in the thousands, typical property damage
numbers in the tens to hundreds of billions, and most of these
are things we haven't yet done enough to prepare against, so I
will just quickly summarize that busy table with that comment
and thank you for your patience.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Hanlon appears as a
submission for the record.]
Chairman Kyl. On that cheery news, we will conclude our
panel discussion.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Kyl. Obviously, you probably have to have a little
humor to approach these extraordinarily serious subjects or it
can literally keep you awake at night, but our job is to try to
be as candid with the American people as possible, to bring
these problems to their attention, and to do everything we can,
along with our colleagues and those working with us at
different levels of government, to be as prepared as we can for
what Senator Gorton articulated was the inevitable terrorist
attack of the future.
Senator Cornyn is going to have to leave, I think, shortly,
and so I will call upon him now either for an opening statement
or if he has a question or so with the concurrence of my
colleagues here.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CORNYN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
TEXAS
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a
couple of things I want to highlight.
First, I would like to ask unanimous consent that my longer
statement be made part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Cornyn appears as a
submission for the record.]
Senator Cornyn. I was glad to hear, and I knew Senator
Feinstein, since she has been such a champion of this cause,
would speak about risk-based funding, and I am glad to hear
Senator Gorton reinforce that. That is simply a common sense,
necessary fight that we have to keep pursuing. Unfortunately,
there seems to be a tendency in Congress to want to split up
money on a revenue sharing basis rather than on a risk basis,
but simply put, the risk is too high for us to give up that
fight, so we are going to keep pushing on that.
I would say, coming from a State that was affected, of
course, both by evacuees from Katrina and then hit in Rita, how
badly we are still--what kind of bad shape we are in terms of
interoperability of communications. I can't tell you how many
mayors I talked to who said basically they were operating on
the basis of their cell phone. One said, ``Well, I will give
you my satellite telephone number if you need to call me.'' But
in other places, even in a big city like Houston, they did not
seem to have distribution on the necessary basis of
interoperable communications. I just wonder, and I think we
need to do more than wonder, we need to find out where all the
money that Congress has appropriated for this purpose has been
spent, because it looks like it has not been spent as well as
it should.
The third issue I would highlight is continuity of
government. This has been something that I have been concerned
about. If one of those airplanes hadn't been brought down in
Pennsylvania and hit the Capitol, it could have decapitated the
Federal Government's ability to respond by killing or disabling
a sufficient number of Senators and Congressmen that we would
not be able to respond.
While the House has attempted to deal with its ability to
constitute itself by providing for emergency elections in a 49-
day period, all you have to do is look at the period of time
after 9/11 to see how a much more immediate response is
required than 49 days. Can you imagine running for election
after a huge national emergency and just the difficulties of
that? they have also attempted to deal with their quorum
requirements by saying five members of the House can constitute
a quorum and literally pass legislation, elect a Speaker and
others, which I think has some constitutional problems, to say
the least. So I hope we will continue working on that.
Finally, let me just talk about evacuation and cyber
security. In the evacuations leading up to Rita, we saw that an
order of local officials to evacuate 1.2 million people,
because of the so-called Katrina effect, coming on the heels of
a much more devastating hurricane, resulted in the evacuation
of 2.7 million people, with our highways looking like parking
lots, which caused frustration, but fortunately, no lives were
lost and it was really nothing more than an inconvenience. But
I think, obviously, we need to look at our evacuation plans,
and it is not within one State, but I think, literally, a
regional evacuation. So we need to look at that. Of course, it
struck me that if we were indeed talking about a terrorist
attack as opposed to a natural disaster, we would likely have
no warning and thus no opportunity to evacuate.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me just mention cyber security
is a cause that I have been interested in and concerned about
for a long time. Of course, our ability to function in this
economy with the first responders to get information is
dependent on computers and our ability to basically include
what is largely held in private hands, whether it is through
financial institutions, local governments, or otherwise. We
simply need to do a better job of protecting our cyber systems
against computer attacks which could literally bring them down,
disabling our first responders, affecting a body blow to our
economy by bringing down our financial institutions or any one
of a number of other scenarios you can think of that would be
damaging, if not to life and limb, then certainly to our
economy. And we need to do a better job through statutes like
FISMA and others to enhance cyber security efforts, and I know
the Department of Homeland Security is working on that, but I
certainly don't think we are where we need to be.
Thank you for the opportunity to highlight a few of these
issues.
Chairman Kyl. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
Let me begin with some questions, and I think just to have
a good conversation, I will try to kind of stick to the 5-
minute round concept here. We will just go back and forth. But
if it takes longer for an answer or we have to go longer, as I
said, we will not be strict about that.
First let me say that I think this is a very good panel to
start a discussion, and I would hope that we will have the time
to convene--maybe even ask some of you to come back in the
future, but to continue the discussion because it is clear that
this is not just a one-time proposition, that we can perhaps
today only scratch the surface to identify some approaches and
some of the problems and identify areas that we want to engage
in in the future.
For example, the notion of cyber security that Senator
Cornyn just mentioned, we have been involved in that literally
for about 9 or 10 years. I remember when we first got involved
in it, and that is an area--and one other--that gets into a lot
of classified material that I really want to begin my
questioning with.
One of you criticized--I believe it was Senator Gorton--
that transportation plan that has been classified. This raises
an interesting question of the dynamic between that which you
don't want terrorists to know, but that which all of the people
involved in--all of the public officials need to know and to
some extent the public needs to know, the difference between a
Katrina, for example, needing to know what the routes out of
New Orleans are, and how we might respond to a terrorist
attack. And terrorists, we know, from Iraq have gotten very
good at planning the secondary attack. In other words, they
draw you all to a place and then they create the real problem
or they know what your exit or egress routes are, and that is
where they plant the IEDs and so on.
So, anybody, starting with you, Senator Gorton, want to
make at least some preliminary comments about the dynamic
between that which necessarily does need to remain classified
in the terrorist context, because that is the focus of hearing
today, versus getting information out in the public?
Senator Gorton. Well, obviously, much of the work of our
intelligence agencies about potential threats, about
individuals, is quite appropriately classified. But one of the
other panelists here mentioned the lack of desirability of
examining, you know, every single container that comes into the
United States by sea. You know, personally I agree with that
statement.
Nevertheless, an overall transportation plan by the
Department of Transportation is going to have to deal with that
issue. When should they be examined? Under what circumstances
should they be examined?
The people who are going to do the work in the ports here
and elsewhere are going to have to know, you know, what those
rules are. They are not, by and large, going to be people who
have security clearances. And the difficulty here in the United
States, literally almost forever, is the ease with which
information is classified, the temptation once it is classified
not to share it, often even with other agencies and the like,
and the extreme difficultly of getting it declassified. This is
just a particular example.
Are there elements in an overall transportation plan that
we should not broadcast to the world? I am sure there are. But
the existence of the plan and what people who are in the
private sector need to know about the plan in order to carry
out its recommendations? Of course, they should not be
classified.
Chairman Kyl. So one of the first things our Committee
should do is to try to focus on some general principles with
respect to the classification material so that that which needs
to be classified is not overly restricted in sharing of it with
the people that have to react to it and use it if there is a
terrorist attack.
Senator Gorton. Yes.
Chairman Kyl. We will try to work on that.
Now, let me just quickly turn--I found this interesting,
that most of the visual illustrations did not appear to me to
postulate worst-case scenarios by any means. In fact, all of
you used wind coming from the right direction rather than the
wrong direction, as I--well, no, excuse me. Actually, there
were two. Dr. O'Hanlon, in yours the wind was going to from the
southeast to the northwest to carry the radiation all the way
up through Manhattan. But, Wayne Thomas, your explosion on the
Mall blew it out toward the Lincoln Memorial rather than toward
all of the Government buildings within the Federal enclave.
I am not sure what my question here is, but I guess is it
that clearly a clever terrorist, knowing that to disperse
anthrax or the radiation from a radiological weapon or
chemicals understands, appreciates the importance of wind
direction, will take those calculations in mind. And we know
that they are very clever and calculating people, so that we
are likely to have the worst-case scenario where wind direction
is important for the effectiveness of a terrorist attack.
Would that be a fairly logical assumption, Mr. Thomas?
Mr. Thomas. Yes, sir, it is a very logical assumption.
Chairman Kyl. So we could easily have turned the wind
direction around from west to east in your scenario, exploded
the radiological device at the foot of the west side of the
Capitol, and had a fairly major disaster for the Congressional
office buildings, the Supreme Court, the Library of Congress,
and the Capitol itself.
Mr. Thomas. We certainly could have done that in the
scenario. I think we were considering when we did that one that
there would be an event happening on the Mall on the weekend
where you would have a large tourist population and members of
the public who would be impacted also. And it also went in the
direction of the White House.
Chairman Kyl. Well, there you go. No good can come of this,
is the bottom line of that, and I thank you for pointing that
out. Just don't tell the terrorists.
Boy, you have got to have a sense of humor in this, I
think, or it gets very depressing very, very quickly. It is
such a serious proposition.
Let me try to continue this conversation by calling on
Senator Feinstein next, and then I will move into another
series of questions.
Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you very much for your testimony.
I think one of the great lessons of Katrina was that every
mayor all across the Nation is going to be saying, ``Oh, my
God, I don't have an evacuation plan. And if I have an
evacuation plan, clearly it is not going to be adequate.''
I was a mayor for 9 years. I put a lot of effort into
emergency planning, and what I found is that you have to have
it all written and all rehearsed so that when something
happens, the response is automatic and fast. You cannot wait a
day or 2 days to make a decision.
So you have to know, if you need to get off-duty emergency
forces back into your city, how you do it; if you have to use
buses to evacuate people, how you do it. And I think what
Katrina demonstrated is that the poor in a city need help and
that there has to be a special plan given high priority,
whereas people who don't have the resources are able to know
where to go to be evacuated quickly. And I suspect nobody has
that in their plan.
You know, I had to grapple with if there were a major
earthquake, what streets would you bring in earth-moving
equipment. Where would you get the earth-moving equipment? What
companies would you go to? What yards would they be stored in?
Really technical things, where emergency beds, medical supplies
could be billeted for long-term use. I think we are led--how
could we used closed military bases now as points for
evacuation people to go to.
So I think there are a lot of things that Katrina brought
up, but what I wanted to ask you is, Mr. Renteria, you
mentioned that California will soon have its State
interoperability plan. When will that be?
Mr. Renteria. We are very pleased to report that by January
2006 we will have a strategic plan for interoperability. As I
mentioned earlier, it is a complex issue for California because
of our topography and just the number of agencies, but because
we do have some regional success stories, again, like San
Diego, Orange County, we are hoping to tackle it from a
regional standpoint and move it out.
But the committees that--
Senator Feinstein. Will it have standards?
Mr. Renteria. That is what we are hoping to have, some
standards. But, again, we need some guidance also from the
Federal Government on those--
Senator Feinstein. Now, where interoperability has been
successfully developed--and by this I mean the ability of EMS
personnel, sheriff's personnel, police personnel, maybe 10, 25
different departments, and maybe three or four counties, to
talk to each other in the event of an emergency. Where it has
been done, how has it been done successfully?
Mr. Renteria. That is, again, the San Diego model that we--
Senator Feinstein. Could you tell us how it has been done
successfully?
Mr. Renteria. They brought in all the players together,
identified the radio systems, identified the different vendors
that have been used, which is another issue that has to be
addressed, different proprietary issues relative to the vendors
and the private sector, because interoperability is beyond just
radios. It is the ability to talk to each other, the standards,
the common language, very similar to what SEMS is all about.
Senator Feinstein. Are they all on a single megahertz?
Mr. Renteria. I don't think they are on a single megahertz.
What they have done is identified the different systems that
they have, and I don't think there are enough channels to put
everybody on the same radio system, which, again, goes back to
some of the issues you mentioned earlier.
But they have identified how they can work at that regional
level to communicate with each other. I really want to explore
more and communicate more with you on how they have actually
done that so that we can--
Senator Feinstein. Well, let me ask you, are there any
standards for this? Because one thing that became rather clear
to me is that when all the systems went down in Louisiana,
particularly in New Orleans, they had no way of communicating
police officer to police officer. No way. No satellite
connection, no independent system.
So it seems to me that there are some standards that need
to be put out there that every jurisdiction knows what they
must do to have an emergency interoperable radio system up and
running.
Mr. Renteria. Absolutely. And I am glad you pointed that
out because one of the advantages we do have in California is
that we do have some of those systems in place, like our
Operational Area Satellite Information System. We refer to it
as ``OASIS.'' This is a satellite system that is in use and can
be utilized by local governments also, that the State provides
the communications devices for. So we do have some of those
things in place. Our challenge is to make sure that we can
expand it statewide, and that is what is going to be the
biggest challenge.
Senator Feinstein. [Presiding.] We have a vote that I
believe there are 10 minutes left in the vote, and they are now
cutting off the vote. One time I missed a vote because I got
there 60 seconds after it had been cutoff, so I do not want to
have that happen again. So what I am going to do is recess. I
think Senator Kyl already went to vote, but I have to as well.
So I will recess the Committee, and we will be back very
shortly. Thank you.
[Recess 11:51 a.m. to 12:08 p.m.]
Chairman Kyl. [Presiding.] Let's reconvene the hearing. My
apologies. We had a vote called, and I thought maybe Senator
Feinstein and I could play tag team, but I understand that the
votes are being cutoff right at the designated time, which is
odd for the Senate. And, therefore, Senator Feinstein did not
want to miss that vote, and I do not blame her.
Again, with only 20 minutes or so to go here, let me just
again thank everybody for kind of writing the preamble to what
I want to move forward with. And there are so many different
questions, so in my remaining time, I am just going to try to
set the stage for some future meetings.
In that regard, several of you made points that tied
together, and let me kind of summarize it, and then try to get
the response from each of you.
First of all, Mr. Bettenhausen raised what I noted as a
question specifically to ask you, but I would like all of you
to think about it, and that is, the differences, if any, in
planning for a natural disaster versus a terrorist attack. You
mentioned the difference, for example, in burn casualties that
might be expected in a terrorist attack versus most natural
disasters.
Dr. O'Hanlon really did us a service, I think, by forcing
us to concentrate on things not to do, not because they are not
good things, but because you have got scarce resources, and
inevitably we don't have time or resources to do everything we
want to do. And I would add a third thing, and I think some of
you alluded to this, too. We are such a big and open country
that even if we wanted to do some things, it would be
impossible, for example, harden every shopping center or the
like, and, therefore, to try to basically provide some triage
in the planning. And one of you said one of the first questions
is--I think this was Mr. Thomas. You said the first question
you have to ask is: What do you want to achieve in developing
this plan?
And it seems to me there are at least three things. One,
prevention. And I agree, Dr. O'Hanlon, that prevention needs to
be our first defense. Second, protection, which is to some
extent prevention, but it assumes that maybe something has
happened or is happening. And, third, responding and all that
that means. And we need plans with respect to all three, and it
is not just the Federal Government's job. For example, on
prevention, I think you talked about the chemical plants, for
example, and all of you in one way or another have talked about
the need for citizens to think about things that they could do
in their own lives and how they would respond as well.
So you have got: What do we want to achieve? Between
prevention and protection and response, how do we calibrate
those? What kind of resources do we have in order to prioritize
specifically what we do? And in the context of both natural
disasters and terrorist attacks.
If I could kind of frame the question that way, it is
impossible for all of you to adequately respond to that
question right now. But let me ask all of you to give it a
shot, and then add anything you would like to add for our
record, and then we may call you all back again, or if that is
not convenient, in some way get your advice in the future.
With that sort of four-part context, would all of you just
like to tell me what you think we need to know in getting ready
for more of these hearings based upon what I have said? Senator
Gorton?
Senator Gorton. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the principal
distinction between a terrorist attack and a natural disaster
is that, by definition, a successful terrorist attack has not
been predicted. We are trying to predict them, but when we can
predict them, we can probably prevent them.
But the first responders, the emergency responders are
going to be responding to a specific incident that has not been
predicted. Training for the disaster is vitally important. Most
natural disasters are going to have been predicted. I think as
Senator Feinstein said, we had 5 days' notice of Katrina in
many respects.
Now, in our part of the country, we still don't predict
earthquakes very well, and an earthquake is likely to be more
like the terrorist attack than the hurricane is. But I think
that is, you know, the primary distinction. But the training
for both, it seems to me, is vitally important, the kind of
things we talked about: a proper command structure, the ability
to communicate when most communication lines are down, all
that.
If I may indulge with two former colleagues, I would like
to put one other thought in your mind, and that has to do with
inevitable tendencies of any kind of governmental agency to
have rules and regulations that are perfectly appropriate when
you have got plenty of time, but that interfere when you don't.
If you and I, Mr. Chairman, were to change States, neither
of us could practice law immediately upon going to the other
State. We would have to go through some kind of procedure,
which is quite reasonable. But I am a member of an organization
that meets on various civic events every Monday, and two and a
half weeks ago our speaker was the head of a marvelous
volunteer organization of physicians and health care
professionals in Oregon and Washington that sends volunteers
all over the world to respond to health care emergencies. They
sent people to the Indian Ocean at the time of the tsunami.
The day after Katrina, they sent a crew to Baton Rouge,
where they were promptly told they were not licensed to
practice medicine in the State of Louisiana. And it took
somewhere between 24 and 72 hours before they could use those
skills in that place. I would tell you this. This was reported
to us by the head of the agency. I can certify it.
The other one I cannot certify, but I think you might want
to check on it. I have been told that a large number of highly
professional emergency responders, firefighting officials and
the like, immediately went from the Northeast down to try to
help. They were stopped in Atlanta and told they had to undergo
at least 24 hours of sexual harassment training before they
could be sent on to do the things that they do, you know, by
FEMA.
Sure, people ought to be licensed to practice medicine.
Sure, people ought to have appropriate training and the like.
But one of the great inhibitors, it seems to me, is just that
kind of mentality that rules that are perfectly OK in non-
emergency situations are highly damaging and restrictive in
emergency situations. And we and you at the Federal Government,
we have got to see some way or another that emergency
responders can respond instantaneously and promptly to the
emergency and are not restricted by inhibitory rules of this
nature.
Chairman Kyl. Thank you. Very enlightening.
Mr. Thomas?
Mr. Thomas. Mr. Chairman, I think your initial question was
the difference between terrorist events and natural hazards. To
me there is a very simple distinction between the two, and it
involves prevention. We can prevent terrorist attacks. We
cannot prevent natural hazards. They will happen. We could
watch Hurricane Katrina march across the Gulf. We knew it was
coming. We could not prevent the hurricane, but we could do
what we needed to do to protect our citizens and get them out
of the way. We knew it was affect our infrastructure. But that
was all something that we could anticipate.
With a terrorist attack, we don't know where or when it
will happen or what it will be. But an aggressive prevention
program is a major distinction between the two.
I think the other question that you posed was: What do we
want to achieve? I think I had mentioned that in my earlier
testimony. I think that raises the difficult questions. You
know, what is the outcome that we want in implementing these
plans, protecting the public? Is it 100 percent? Is it 95
percent?
We talk about evacuating large cities. We know that certain
parts of the population will refuse to go. Is that acceptable
to us?
These are questions that we have not really addressed.
Senator Feinstein mentioned the poor. How do we deal with them
in terms of ensuring their safety should a disaster happen? I
think these have been largely grouped into other issues and not
singled out for discussion and have not been addressed.
So there is a tremendous number of issues that we need to
get into here. You are right that we need a more substantial
dialog on this.
I think when we talk about results, it is not do we have a
prevention plan, do we have a response plan, and so forth.
Those are kind of the easy things to say. What does that
prevention plan do? If we implement it, how is it successful?
Is preventing all terrorist attacks the only measure that we
can have 100 percent success? Is evacuating 100 percent of the
population the only measure?
Those are the things that we have to define, and I think as
we look at those questions, that is where we have to use
technology and other capabilities to come up with, first of
all, the questions we want to address and then what are the
acceptable solutions that we as, I think, collectively citizens
want to have as our measures.
Thank you.
Chairman Kyl. Thank you. Would each of you also address as
we go on--I have been seeing something here, and that is, all
of you believe that we need better plans, even if plans do
exist.
Mr. Renteria?
Mr. Renteria. Yes. Without repeating some of the things
mentioned earlier, I think some of the things that are the same
have to do with the consequences of an event and the recovery
of an event. Consequences, you are going to have people killed,
you are going to have people hurt, you are going to have the
property damaged or destroyed. So natural disasters,
terrorists, human cause, whatever, you are going to have those
same consequences.
The responses to the consequences are basically the same,
too. We train to deal with these types of events every day. We
must respond to them adequately.
The differences: When you have a terrorist event--and Matt
can probably give you more information on this--you have a
crime scene. That involves not just local law enforcement
agencies but Federal. And that does complicate matters
sometimes because some of our locals are not used to receiving
this type of involvement.
And then the other thing that makes it different--and this
brings up my old social work background--is the psychological
effects of a terrorist event versus a natural event. All sorts
of psychological studies would tell you people understand these
``acts of God'' or something that is going to happen, may
happen, and all of us will be affected by it. But a terrorist
event brings a whole other level of fear and trepidation on the
part of people that they cannot go on with their normal lives.
To answer your question what we hope to achieve, for me it
is cooperation and being unified in our preparedness, response,
and recovery. We all need to be on the same page.
Chairman Kyl. Thank you very much.
Mr. Bettenhausen?
Mr. Bettenhausen. Senator, let me followup with one of the
questions you earlier had, which I think gets to some of your
prevention questions, protection, and responding. And that was
the issue of the classified transportation plan, and I want to
echo Senator Gorton's comments on that, but reiterate something
even more important.
There are not going to be enough dollars--there is already
a backlog--to provide security clearances with everybody who
has a potential need to know. There was the thought with
intelligence reform that we were going to change the way we
were doing business, that instead of writing the classified, we
would write to release; that we would truly embrace our
partners, the first responders, and providing them with
information; and not just information about potential threats
but strategic information.
We know that there is a lot of intent to do us harm, but
what is that intent? What are their capabilities? What are you
picking up in terms of what should we prioritize and be doing
first with the scarce dollars we have? Is it chemical? Is it
biological? Is it radiological? Is it nuclear? But help us with
the strategic planning. Write to release. Change the way that
we are doing business. Nobody needs to know sources, methods,
and means in terms of how intelligence is collected. But, you
know, by God, if a cyanide truck has been hijacked and is
missing, not only does law enforcement need to know where to
look for it, our first responders, our hospitals, our private
sector folks need to be dusting off their plans on how they
would deal with, you know, a cyanide situation.
So we will never have enough clearances with the turnover
and the backlog that we have even with the Federal Government.
We need to make sure that we are taking us full on partnership
and that we are looking at this information that needs to be
shared strategically and across the entire first responder
community, not just law enforcement but also fire, our public
works, and our important private sector partners.
Another problem if you have something with a classified
transportation report, it is a problem that we had with the
sort of--the inside-the-Beltway thinking, that we are the Feds,
we know how to do it, and, you know, you out in the hinterlands
don't have a clue. That was the first problem with NIMS version
1.0. They never asked the State and locals how to do it. They
never asked California: How have you been doing emergency
management so effectively? Jeb Bush, how have you been doing
it? And they went and they hired a contractor, and they came up
with a very nice system that was then presented sort of as a
fair accompli to State and locals and said, ``This ain't going
to work.''
When you go and you have your transportation plan, who owns
those things? Who operates it? It may be that the Federal
Government needs to have a strategic plan overall, but you need
to be talking with the State and locals, the ones who are
running and working these things from the very beginning, not
that you have come and thought this and now isn't this great
and present it to us--and, well, actually not present it to us,
classify it.
The other problem with classification, those of us who
sit--I have my letter clearances up to SCI. To some extent,
just don't pass the buck and say, look, I have now informed
you, but you cannot tell anybody else. That does me no good.
All that does it pass the buck. You need to help me with the
information and bring that together, because, again, as you
have pointed out, prevention is the No. 1 goal and priority, if
we can stop it before it happens. And that's what the
difference is in the planning in terms of what we need to do
versus all hazards. You cannot turn--we cannot force a tornado
to change. We cannot stop an earthquake from happening. But we
can interdict, we can deter terrorist activities with better
infrastructure protection, with better strategic intelligence,
with better planning in terms of trying to prevent something
from happening. That helps with the planning activities.
And then in terms of sort of terrorists, I think some of it
is that you have--the potential for the mass casualties and the
overwhelming of systems and things that you talked about with
cyber, that if you had a magnetic pulse in terms of what that
is going to do with our cars that now have electronics and what
it is going to do to our computer systems, how are we going to
deal with these issues that become just very large scale very
quickly.
So those are some of the differences, but it is still the
basics. As my good partner Henry Renteria was talking about, to
some extent when you are a first responder and you are going to
a collapsed building, you don't much care why it collapsed. Was
it because of an earthquake? Was it because of a tornado? Was
it knocked down by a hurricane? Or was it knocked down by the
criminal acts of evil men? Our first priority is saving lives
and preventing collateral damage, the kind of--even our
domestic terrorists know to do the one-two strike. That's what
we saw on 9/11. You know, Washington, D.C., New York. New York,
tower one, tower two. I mean, it's an established thing, so you
need to be thinking about it, and you have got those potentials
to prevent.
Exercises, very critical in terms of doing it, and with
FEMA, we've got a statewide exercise program. That helps to
develop better plans. Exercises are not about patting yourself
on the back about what a great job we can do and how we can
respond to it. It really is about testing your system,
overloading it, push it to the point of failure so that you
know how you can write those plans better, make them better,
and respond better in a real instant. It is doing after-action
reports. You know, unfortunately, we have more than our fair
share of natural disasters in California. But the fortunate
aspect out of it is we get a lot of lessons learned. But you
cannot lose those things, and you need to be asking the
questions: What went right and what went wrong? And how do you
make sure the right things are incorporated and duplicated and
the wrong things are pulled out of the system?
The last thing, I forgot to thank, when I was thanking, the
great staff that you have: the two Steves who we look forward
to working with them, because I think you are right, we are
just scratching the surface here, and to the extent that we can
help you and work with your wonderful staff, we will to help
flesh out some more of these issues.
Chairman Kyl. Thank you very much, and you are right about
our great staff.
We are now a little pressed for time, so, Dr. O'Hanlon,
would you--and then I am going to turn to Senator Feinstein and
leave and have her conclude the hearing. But if you could--
Mr. O'Hanlon. I will just say a few things, Senator. I am
struck by how hard this problem is. I have done most of my work
in my career in defense, which I think is easy compared--
national security, military issues, easy compared to these
questions, because these questions involve local, State, and
Federal efforts, they involve private sector. There is such a
different type of threat from one area to another. I think it
is just an inherently very challenging field of study.
Let me give one example and stop. There is one major city
in this country--I will not say which one--that tried to say,
OK, which of our big buildings do we really have to protect,
provide this local site protection for, having done all the
prevention, having prepared some consequence management. And
they went through and in their first iteration came up with a
couple thousand sites. And they said, well, there is a logic
that gets you to a couple thousand, but it is just too many to
protect, so we have to try again.
So they went through it, the same exercise, and got down to
a few hundred. And they said it is still too many, and they
finally did a third round and got to a few dozen.
Well, how do we know they got the right answer? They did
not really get the right answer. They were constantly trading
things off, one against the other. They came up against a
problem that was manageable in size and yet still ambitious in
scope. That underscores for me the nature of the challenge
here.
One more example, and I will stop. Skyscraper. How do you
protect skyscrapers? What is the appropriate level of
protection? Is it making sure a truck bomb cannot be--cannot
get within 100 feet by closing off side streets? Is it making
sure that air intakes are all at least two stories above street
level so people cannot put anthrax in? Is it making sure you
have security guards who are well trained at every entrance so
that people cannot sneak explosives up and create an apartment
bomb the way they were worried in 2002 in New York?
I think these are almost unanswerable questions, and the
only way in which you can work toward pretty good answers is to
have dedicated study ongoing from committees like this, from
commissions like the 9/11 Commission, and from experts in the
field.
So it is just a way of saying this problem is inherently
very hard, probably harder than any other problem I have
studied in public policy. And so, therefore, I thank you for
the ongoing attention from this Committee.
Senator Feinstein. [Presiding.] Well, you are very welcome,
and thank you.
Let me just begin by putting in a statement from Senator
Cornyn into the record.
As I listen to this, and having functioned as a mayor, it
occurs to me that what the Department of Homeland Security
might be doing is preparing a series of advisory standards that
can go to local and State jurisdictions in a number of
different areas, operability being one of them.
What should the standards be as you consider
interoperability? And what are your options? What kind of
equipment is available? How much does it cost? Let the local
jurisdictions make their own decisions, but there are some
technical advisory standards that are available, certainly
standards for evacuation of an area.
Now, in my city this becomes particularly dangerous. The
uniform forces all live outside the city, across the bridges.
If bridges come down, how do we get the uniform forces back?
That has to be thought of long before a major earthquake or a
terrorist attack.
How do you evacuate the poor? How do you evacuate hospitals
if you have to, nursing homes? I thought St. Rita's was just a
terrible example of the absence of any kind of overall policy
with respect to a nursing home where people watched water draw
up to them, and then obviously drowned in it because they could
not move. I mean, it was terrible.
Emergency manuals. How do you prepare an emergency manual?
What should be in that manual? How should you rehearse that
manual? What kind of synthetic scenario should you practice out
there based on your own individual needs geographically,
politically, across this country? Standards for a family
disaster plan. As you gentlemen have said today, families need
to have their own plans.
Well, I deal with this all the time. I am sure what I have
is inadequate. It is put together helter-skelter, didn't pay
much attention to it. I do not have a checklist, those kinds of
things. If you store water, how often should you change that
water storage? How often should you change batteries?
I mean, just technical things that could go out to all
Americans to know how they need to protect themselves in the
first 48 hours of a disaster. You know, 22,000 people int he
Department of Homeland Security, and this--
Mr. Bettenhausen. It is 180,000.
Senator Feinstein. I beg your pardon?
Mr. Bettenhausen. It is 180,000.
Senator Feinstein. You are right. Excuse me.
Mr. Bettenhausen. It is 22 agencies.
Senator Feinstein. That is right, 180,000, and they cannot
seem to do this kind of work. I find that inexcusable because,
to me, it is a no-brainer of a way that, without much cost, the
Federal Government could use its expertise, use its reach, and
use its ability to bring people together to prepare something
which could be of real practice use for local jurisdictions.
It may well be that the State of California can play a
leadership role in this respect, and hopefully when your plan
comes out in January you will share it with a lot of us so that
we can take a good look at it and see what you have done.
I would appreciate--and I think Senator Kyl would as well--
recommendations of what should we do with respect to the
spectrum now. How should we proceed? Those recommendations I
think would be very effective.
But I don't really have any other questions. If you have
any closing comments in addition, I would be happy to hear them
before I close the hearing.
Senator Gorton. Senator Feinstein, on that very last point,
I believe Senator McCain will propose an amendment when that
Commerce Committee bill comes to shorten the date on spectrum
transfer.
Senator Feinstein. Oh, good. I am happy to hear that.
Senator Gorton. It will be a tough vote, but I think he
will have that opportunity.
Senator Feinstein. Good.
Anybody else have a last comment? Mr. Renteria?
Mr. Renteria. Yes. First of all, I would like to thank Matt
for helping us thank everybody, because I think he helped us
remember all the names. But I also wanted to invite you and
other Committee members to our exercise that we are going to
have in California on November 15th. It is the Golden Guardian
event. Matt Bettenhausen and I have been working very closely
on it. His office is funding it. And so this is another
opportunity for you to see--and all of your staff to see,
also--what we are doing in California. We are going to include
an interoperability component also, so you can see--
Senator Feinstein. I would like to come. I will probably be
in the Miers hearings at that time if they are going on, but I
will certainly have my staff be there.
Mr. Renteria. I think we can have somebody show up.
Senator Feinstein. I appreciate it.
Mr. Renteria. Thank you again for this opportunity.
Senator Feinstein. You are very welcome.
Mr. Bettenhausen?
Mr. Bettenhausen. And that is part of what another famous
Californian said with exercise. We will also be working closely
with FEMA, so we will trust but verify by doing the exercises
as well.
But I think you also pointed out with our poor communities,
what you knew as a mayor, and what we also know from the State
standards. It is not just poor communities that we need to make
sure that we are doing extra planning for. It is also our
special needs citizens that are out there, and it is one of the
things that we have seen in terms of the exercises and
practices we do with our nuclear power plants in terms of
identifying those folks.
But, you know, it is another role that citizens can plan,
and we saw a lot of that with Katrina and Rita, knowing in your
neighborhoods who needs help and helping us help identify them
and helping--you know, being able to take care of your family
and then also helping your neighbors.
Senator Feinstein. Yes, I think even planning where to go.
Most people, I would hazard a guess, don't know where they
would go in an emergency. But having something that is
realistic, that gets you out of the immediate area where you
can sustain yourself for a period of time, making those
arrangements ahead of time. And I do think that is the world
that we live in, that we know there is some place we can go,
where there is some help around us.
Mr. Bettenhausen. Two things to followup, too. Not only
does the California Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management have a sort of--have a preparedness campaign,
because the First Lady of California has taken this on as a
personal mission, and she has been doing a great job.
Senator Feinstein. That is great.
Mr. Bettenhausen. The people who have turned out, to
become--be responsible for yourselves and be prepared and be
ready. But www.ready.gov has the listing of how you can prepare
a personal communications, a family communications plan, the
kind of kits that you have. And an easy way to remember how to
sort of restock in and out of there is, as you turn your clocks
forward and back, switch the canned goods and the water out of
it. The same thing that you should be changing your smoke
detector batteries. It is an easy way to remember it. That is
the time, you know, when you are doing those to--
Senator Feinstein. That is a very good idea.
Mr. Bettenhausen. That is when you should be doing the rest
of your work as well.
Senator Feinstein. See, I think to some extent we get so
esoteric, when most of this is good, solid, practical planning
ahead of time. And I do not believe that the cities of America
are really equipped for a major disaster.
Let me just end with one thing. I think it is very
important. In California, we have one American city that
doesn't have 100-year flood protection, and that is Sacramento.
And the people of Sacramento should know this. If we have an
earthquake and the levees go down, the flooding potential for
Sacramento is enormous. And I very much appreciate the fact
that the Governor wants to be of help. We want to try to get
some money to facilitate maximum levee repair within a
reasonably short period of time to protect the city against the
loss of human life. And I think we have agreed that that is our
No. 1 priority.
I met yesterday with Congresswoman Matsui. I know that is
hers. And we would really welcome continuing working with the
Governor's office to see that that happens.
Mr. Bettenhausen. And the entire California delegation.
Senator Feinstein. Yes, absolutely. Absolutely.
Mr. O'Hanlon, do you have a comment to end this thing on?
Mr. O'Hanlon. No. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Feinstein. Well, thank you all very, very much. The
hearing is adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Questions and answers and submissions for the record
follow.]
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