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[DOCID: f:49104181.wais]
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND RELATED AGENCIES
APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006
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TUESDAY, JUNE 28, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 4 p.m., in room SD-138, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Hutchison, Allard, Feinstein, Johnson,
and Landrieu.
OVERSEAS BASING COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE AL CORNELLA, CHAIRMAN, OVERSEAS
BASING COMMISSION
ACCOMPANIED BY:
MAJOR GENERAL LEW E. CURTIS, III, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
(RET.)
VICE ADMIRAL ANTHONY A. LESS, UNITED STATES NAVY (RET.)
BRIGADIER GENERAL KEITH MARTIN, PENNSYLVANIA ARMY NATIONAL
GUARD (RET.)
LIEUTENANT GENERAL H.G. TAYLOR, UNITED STATES ARMY (RET.)
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON
Senator Hutchison. The hearing will come to order. I
apologize for being late, I thank all of you for being here and
I'm very pleased that we now have our report and our hearing.
The Commission has concluded that making the necessary changes
in the report did not have a material affect on its conclusions
and recommendations, thus the report has been edited in
response to concerns of the Department, and we appreciate all
of the cooperation by both the Department of Defense and the
Overseas Basing Commission.
The Overseas Basing Commission was created in November of
2003 in the Military Construction Appropriations Act, Senator
Feinstein and I were the authors of that legislation. We passed
the legislation because we were concerned that the United
States was pouring large amounts of money into overseas
military facilities that were more appropriate to the Cold War
than to the security environment of the 21st century. I also
was concerned that the Department was not thinking boldly
enough about the posture more appropriate to that new security
environment, and creating the Commission served a dual
purpose--providing Congress with an independent view of our
overseas basing needs, and working with the Department of
Defense to tackle this effort vigorously.
We have before us a fresh look at these important
questions, not necessarily does it have all the right answers,
but it is another independent view of the subject. I believe
we'll find that the Commission's very existence will prove to
have been as important as any of the specific recommendations
it has to make.
I'm pleased to note the Commission report overall is in
support of the Global Basing Strategy of the Department of
Defense, and while the Commission diverges from the Department
on some of the specifics, its plan, in the words of the report
says, ``The Commission fully understands the need for change
and endorses most of the initiatives undertaken in the
Department of Defense's Integrated Global Posture and Basing
Strategy.''
I will not read the rest of my opening statement, but just
to say that I think the goal of the Commission and our goal in
passing the legislation authorizing the Commission has been
met, and I think that in the main it is also in agreement with
the Department of Defense Global Basing Initiative. There are
some differences, and we will discuss those. We will certainly
want to hear from the Department of Defense as well, but I
think when we are looking at some of the problems that we had
in transporting troops during the run up to the situation in
Iraq, and the training constraints that we have at overseas
bases, that certainly the move now to having more troops at
home and deploying from here is something that is in the works,
thanks to a lot of effort on the part of the Department.
So, with that, let me ask my ranking member, Senator
Feinstein for her opening statement, and as the co-sponsor of
the legislation to create the Commission, we're very pleased
that we now have a report, and we believe it will add to the
body of knowledge to make all of our bases better training
facilities, and better places for our service men and women to
live and work. Senator Feinstein.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Madame Chairman,
and my thanks to the Commission, to its Chairman, Al Cornella,
to the members, I really think you have done an excellent job.
I had a chance at reading the classified version and have just
received this new one now and look forward to looking through
it.
I am very pleased you're working through the classification
issues which have arisen in conjunction with the report, and
we've reached the point where we can go forward with this
hearing today. Senator Hutchison's and my goal in establishing
the Commission was really to enable and obtain an objective,
informed overview of the global basing plan from the
perspective of experts outside of the Pentagon. Your report
offers precisely the type of overview we were hoping to achieve
and it raises a number of valid and very thought-provoking
questions.
The timing of the report in conjunction with the ongoing
BRAC process could not really be more propitious. I understand
you've been invited to testify before the BRAC Commission, and
I would anticipate that your insight into the global basing
plan will be a valuable asset to them in their deliberations.
I agree with both you and the Defense Department that it is
time to re-think the stationing of the United States military
forces around the world, but I also share your concerns that
the Pentagon may be moving too fast, too soon without giving
enough consideration to America's overarching foreign policy
and national security objectives. This isn't just an exercise
of moving pieces on a chessboard. When, how and where we
reposition existing military forces overseas has a far-reaching
impact, not only on our national security interest, but also on
a whole host of economic and political interests. The movement
of troops from Europe and Korea back to the United States will
have a huge impact on the communities to which they are
returning, as your report rightly points out, quality of life
is a key element of the global re-basing strategy, so the
Department needs to be very careful to avoid returning American
troops and their families to bases in communities that are not
ready to receive them, and this is a major concern, I think, of
Senator Hutchison, and certainly of my own.
How the Pentagon expects to accomplish this in the midst of
the wholesale realignment of domestic bases that will occur as
a result of BRAC is a question that needs to be answered, and
interestingly enough, I see where, in your report, you
mentioned that costs, which are anticipated to be between $9
and $12 billion with only $4 billion currently budgeted from
fiscal year 2006 to 2011. You mentioned that these may be
understated, and that an independent analysis conducted for
your Commission put the tab at closer to $20 billion. I think
this is something that we need to come to grips with, I hope,
Mr. Cornella, that you will talk about that in your remarks.
Secondly, timing and synchronization are central themes,
but your report is a great first step, I really want to thank
you for it, and I certainly look forward to your testimony.
Thanks, Madame Chairman.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you. Senator Allard.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD
Senator Allard. Madame Chairman, I would like to make my
full statement a part of the record.
But I would just like to just briefly make these comments.
In some respects the Commission was critical of the manner
in which the Department of Defense put together its current
Integrated Global Basing Posture and Basing Strategy, and some
may even be tempted to argue that the Commission's
recommendations indicate that we need to delay, or stop
entirely, the BRAC process. Madame Chairman, I disagree with
that assessment.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I note that the Overseas Basing Commission stating it
fully, agrees with the Department's contention, that there's
considerable need for a rebasing initiative, in fact, the
Commission strongly endorses most of the rebasing initiatives
undertaken by the Department of Defense, and I look forward to
getting to the heart of the recommendations offered by the
Commission, and I believe that this hearing will further
demonstrate how important it is that the BRAC process move
forward, and that the Department's re-basing initiative is
fully implemented, and I note with interest that there's one
bullet in your conclusions and recommendations where you state
that the overseas basing posture of the United States and
domestic base closure and realignment are closely related.
Although the Commission calls for an overarching review of the
overseas basing posture, you state that we believe that the
BRAC process should move forward as scheduled, thank you,
Madame Chairman.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Wayne Allard
Thank you, Madame Chairman for holding this important hearing.
The Commission on the Review of Overseas Military Facility
Structure of the United States has performed a great service for our
country. The Commission's report lays out several principles that
should be considered when reviewing the Department of Defense's
overseas rebasing initiative. These principles include among others:
--Ensuring that the rebasing initiative is tied to a master plan
--Coordinating with agencies outside the Department of Defense
--Assessing the impact of rebasing on intelligence, force protection,
homeland security, and other important national priorities
In some respects, the Commission was critical of the manner in
which the Department of Defense put together its current Integrated
Global Posture and Basing Strategy. Some may even be tempted to argue
that the Commission's recommendations indicate that we need to delay or
stop entirely the BRAC process.
Madame Chairman, I disagree with that assessment. I note that the
Overseas Basing Commission stated it fully agrees with the Department's
contention that there is considerable need for a rebasing initiative.
In fact, the Commission strongly endorsed most of the rebasing
initiatives undertaken by the Department of Defense.
I look forward to getting to the heart of the recommendations
offered by the Commission. I believe that this hearing will further
demonstrate how important it is that the BRAC process move forward and
that the Department's rebasing initiative is fully implemented.
Thank you for the opportunity to say a few words. I look forward to
the testimony of our witnesses.
Senator Hutchison. Senator Landrieu.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Madame Chair, I have a full
statement for the record.
I would just like to add, I think it's very important that
our desires and needs as a Nation be brought into line with our
budget and monies that we have to allocate, and I'm seeing,
unfortunately, a pattern of setting out on a course
underestimating the costs associated, and basically running up
the debt. And so, I think we've got to be very practical in
this approach, we have some strategic defense postures to keep
in place, but we also have some very real budget constraints,
and if the cost is going to be twice or three times as much as
we had anticipated, then we're going to need to find the money
somewhere, and just can't pretend that we can do this with
minimal to no cost, and we've got to be able to be more
realistic about that, and I'll say more about that in the
statement that I submit. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Mary L. Landrieu
Madame Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing to review the
Overseas Basing Commission recommendations.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has stood as the
unrivaled military leader in the world. Our fighting men and women have
preserved national security and served our foreign policy interests
admirably since the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the attacks
of September 11, 2001 on the United States highlighted the need to
transform our national defense strategy to address the terrorist and
extremist threats which seek to destroy our country's influence in the
world.
Admiral Nimitz, one of our foremost Naval heroes defined the task
for us. He noted that ``whoever gets there firstest with the mostest
wins.'' That is our contemporary challenge which positions U.S.
fighting men and women abroad. We must place them around the globe in
such a way as to assure that U.S. forces are the first in the The
Theater, and that they can bring overwhelming force to bear.
Yet while our government contemplates a global strategy to keep our
Nation more secure, we must also consider the personal impacts our
decision-making will have. As we contemplate closing facilities in
Germany and other places in Europe, we must keep a special focus on our
military families. We are already asking them to make incredible
sacrifices. We do not need to add the inevitable burdens of separation
and worry by relocating our bases to places where it is unlikely or
impossible for their families to follow.
Another consideration for this process is ensuring that our allies
and friends recognize that we aim to strengthen our commitment to
secure our common interests. We must explore ways in which we can
together transform our partnership in order to enhance our collective
defense capabilities. It is time for our allies to work toward this
goal together. Gone are the days when the United States can be expected
to foot the bill for every cause.
Madam Chairman, while I trust that all the members of the Overseas
Basing Commission will provide valuable recommendations to strengthen
the U.S. Global Defense Posture, I think it is important that this
subcommittee keep in mind that managing this complex concept is a
costly endeavor. While have put much effort into the building blocks of
posture changes which include the facilities that make up our overseas
footprint. However, we also need a new approach to managing the force
which includes our permanent and rotational presence overseas must
include our allies and their own accountability for the goals which
they can no longer expect to achieve without their own proportionate
investment.
We must make certain that we keep our Nation's obligation to those
who have served and sacrificed in its defense. I believe that the U.S.
Global Defense Posture is important and necessary. I also believe that
our commitment to this endeavor must be tempered by realistic
expectations to be achieved and by appropriate and responsible
contributions to be made by the United States as well as our Allies.
In its report, the Overseas Basing Commission expressed areas where
the Department of Defense can provide for a more secure America.
Suggestions in the report range from better communication and a wider
spectrum of views by partners in the decision-making process to a more
cohesive overall design which would be administered by a specific body
that would be assigned responsibilities to both guide and monitor its
implementation. Also, the Commission suggests Congress exercise its
full authority in ensuring that plans and programs are appropriate to
the task.
The Commission's recommendations are critical in the strategy of
transformation which will change the face of national security for many
years to come. It is essential we have an honest and open dialogue to
insure America continues to preserve the lives of its citizens for
generations to come.
Thank you all for your testimony. Also, I hope that in the future
we will be able to discuss one of the most important issues which faces
this committee, the shortfall in Veterans Health Care funding.
Madame Chairman, Senator Hutchison, thank you for your continued
leadership on these issues. I look forward to the testimony of our
witnesses.
Senator Hutchison. Senator Johnson.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM JOHNSON
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Madame Chairman. I want to in
particular welcome a fellow South Dakotan, Al Cornella,
Chairman of the Commission, to the panel today and express my
appreciation and the Senate's appreciation for you leadership.
Mr. Cornella is a former BRAC Commissioner and has been willing
to take on the very significant task of chairing the Overseas
Basing Commission, and we're appreciative of that, Al, we are
proud of your service to the country. I welcome our other panel
members here, as well, who have each of them, undertaken a very
large scale, but very important undertaking, and will serve the
Senate well, I'm certain. I will submit a full statement,
Madame Chairman.
I do, however, want to note that I believe that the
Overseas Basing Commission recommendations and the ongoing
quadrennial review are of such significance that it would have
been my preference to have seen those issues resolved prior to
going onto the BRAC Commission's deliberations about the
closure and the Department of Defense's recommendations,
frankly, for the closure of military bases around the country.
I think that all of these interact with each other, and it is
hard for me to imagine how the recommendation from the
Department of Defense could be, well premised without in fact
having prior access to the studies and reviews of the
quadrennial review as well as the Overseas Basing Commission.
Nonetheless, here we are, and I look forward to the
testimony of the Commission, and I want to tell the Commission
that I was very supportive of this effort I think that your
work is going to be a very constructive and positive
contribution to our overall review of America's military
posture in the world and domestically as well, thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Tim Johnson
Mr. Johnson. I would like to thank Chairwoman Hutchison and Ranking
Member Feinstein for calling today's hearing to discuss the Overseas
Basing Commission's interim report.
I would also like to thank Chairman Al Cornella for appearing
before the Subcommittee today. The work performed by the Overseas
Basing Commission is vitally important to our national security and the
long-term viability of our military force.
Today the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Subcommittee
will hear testimony from Commission members about redeploying
servicemembers from U.S. military facilities overseas. Their report
could not come at a more important time.
The threats facing the United States today are vastly different
from those during the Cold War. Much has changed since that conflict
ended and we must shift our security posture to confront new and
emerging enemies. In addition, Secretary Rumsfeld has released his list
of proposed domestic base closures and realignments, and the Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission has begun their important
work to review and revise the Secretary's list. Domestic base closures
have a profound effect on our military force and the economic health of
local communities. We should not close a single domestic base if it may
unduly compromise our ability to defend our homeland.
Currently, the Department of Defense is undertaking a monumental
shift in overseas deployments. The threats confronting the United
States have changed dramatically following the collapse of communism
and the terrorist attacks of September 11. In response, approximately
70,000 soldiers, as well as 100,000 family members and civilian
employees, will be returning from overseas in the next decade. This
shift in our military force abroad is long overdue.
However, the Overseas Basing Commission's interim report raises a
number of important questions that must be addressed. For instance, the
U.S. military plans to move troops stationed overseas back to American
soil, but according to the Commission, if a crisis arises abroad, the
military does not have enough sea and air transportation to rotate
forces rapidly enough to respond. Just as troubling, the Bush
Administration has projected it will cost $12 billion to redeploy
soldiers back to the United States, but has only budgeted $4 billion
for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. The Commission believes these costs
are understated and according to their independent analysis the price
tag is closer to $20 billion.
Furthermore, if the Defense Department's proposed changes in
overseas bases are enacted, it will result in additional troop
rotations. The Commission's report argues that extended and more
frequent rotations could strain U.S. military personnel and their
families to the point where the United States is incapable of
maintaining an all-volunteer force. I am extremely concerned with these
conclusions. The military is already having trouble meeting recruitment
and retention quotas. Creating more stress for our soldiers and their
families will exacerbate this problem and irreparably damage our
military.
In response to these concerns, the Commission cautions the
Department of Defense and urges them to reduce the speed of returning
soldiers from overseas bases, and I believe this idea has merit. At a
time when we are fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we must ensure
the redeployment of American service members is in accord with our
long-term strategic defense goals and should be thoughtfully planned
and executed.
Additionally, the Commission contends overseas redeployment should
wait until the Department of Defense determines which domestic military
bases will be shuttered during this round of base closures. If
Secretary Rumsfeld and the Pentagon continue to move forward with their
plan to bring troops back to the United States from overseas
deployments, I believe we must consider postponing this current round
of domestic base closures. Simultaneously closing domestic and overseas
bases may irrevocably damage our ability to defend against threats at
home and abroad.
I commend the Overseas Basing Commission for addressing the
critical issues and concerns raised in preparation for shifting troops
back to the United States. I strongly encourage Secretary Rumsfeld and
the Department of Defense to seriously consider the Commission's
recommendations. We must reorganize our military force in order to
respond to the threats of the 21st century. The challenge is to do so
in a manner that is not detrimental to our national security and the
men and women who proudly serve our country.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Senator Johnson. I think that
the Department in the next panel will discus how it took into
consideration the troops that were coming back during the BRAC
process, so we will get a chance to question them on that.
Mr. Cornella, thank you for Chairing the Commission, I want
to thank each Commissioner for all of the time and effort that
you have put into doing this, you came to Washington many
times, you went overseas, we appreciate the effort for this
volunteer force that you gave us, and with that, let me ask
you, Mr. Cornella, to give us the synopsis of the report, and
whatever you would wish you say.
STATEMENT OF AL CORNELLA
Mr. Cornella. Madame Chairman, Senator Feinstein, staff
members, distinguished guests, members of the general public,
my name is Al Cornella. As I was introduced, I serve as the
Chairman on the Commission of Overseas Military Facilities
Structure of the United States, thankfully more commonly known
as the Overseas Basing Commission.
I serve with five other Commissioners, four of whom are
present today. From my far left, the Commission vice-Chairman
Lou Curtis, Major General United States Air Force, Retired,
Tony Less, United States Navy, Retired, Pete Taylor on my
right, Lieutenant General, United States Army, Retired, and
Keith Martin, Brigadier General, Pennsylvania Army National
Guard, Retired. Dr. James Thompson, our sixth Commissioner and
President of BRAC is out of the country and unable to be here
with us today.
I would also like to introduce the Commission's Executive
Director, Ms. Patricia Walker, seated behind me.
Madame Chairman, I would respectfully ask that the
statements you received be entered into the record, and I be
allowed to make a brief opening statement.
The Commission's talented staff included lead research
analysts, a general counsel administrative staff, and analysts
detailed from the Department of Defense and Government
Accountability Office. The Commissioners and staff have worked
diligently to prepare the May 2005 report. A final report will
be provided to Congress and the President by August 15, 2005.
We were asked to provide this early report so it might be used
in conjunction with the domestic BRAC process.
OVERVIEW
The Overseas Basing Commission was established by public
law in fiscal year 2004. The Commission's task is to
independently assess whether the current overseas basing
structure is adequate to execute current missions, and to
assess the feasibility of closures, realignments or
establishment of new installations overseas to meet emerging
defense requirements.
However, the Commission's work is not intended to preclude
the Department of Defense's effort toward developing an
integrated global presence and basing strategy, or IGPBS, and
you'll probably hear me use that acronym several times. Rather,
the Commission report should assist Congressional Committees in
performing their oversight responsibilities for DOD's basing
strategy military construction appropriations, and the 2005
base re-alignment and closure determinations.
But one thing I would like to add as I note from your
opening statements, that there are views about criticism of the
Department. I do not believe that our report is offered as
criticism of the Department, it's offered as ways to strengthen
the IGPBS plan, but we feel these are constructive thoughts
that we're sending forth.
The Commission has been active since May 2004 and began
with a thorough analysis of national security, defense and
military strategies. The Commission completed a careful review,
the Foundation for Global Reposturing, the 2004 Department of
Defense, again IGPBS. It is important to note, at this point,
the Department on several occasions has advised us that we are
entitled to and have received all of the information that has
been provided to Congress relative to overseas basing.
Second, based on the Commission's interview, interviews of
key officials in the office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Staff, the Combatant Commanders and the State Department,
the Commission developed evaluation criteria to assess how
effectively the current and future overseas basing posture
support current and future national security and military
operations. In addition, the Commission consulted with former
senior military leaders, and other national security experts.
We conducted four public hearings where we received testimony
from former experts, military experts, defense analysts and
experts on military family issues. At the final hearing, we had
representatives from the Department of Defense and the State
Department. We have engaged in briefings from the Department of
Defense, the State Department, the Congressional Budget Office,
Congressional research service, and other entities. We visited
military installations in many countries, meeting with U.S.
forces, embassy representatives, foreign military officers and
local officials. We have met with the majority of combatant
commands, and in most cases, with the commanders and their
staffs. We have made two trips to the Pacific Command, three to
the European Command, and one to the Central Command. We spent
about 2 months overseas traveling, the Commissioners also
received briefings from U.S. Southern Commands, Special
Operations Command, and Transportation Command. We have
interacted with several thousand people over the past year, the
vast majority from within the Department of Defense. All of the
Commissioners and I have learned a great deal from these
discussions, both here and abroad.
Based on this review and analysis, the Commission has
identified six major areas of concern--geopolitical
considerations, timing and synchronization, operational
requirements, mobility, quality of life and costs, and I will
touch on a few of these briefly, and then we are prepared to
address all of them in your questions.
TIMING AND SYNCHRONIZATION
The Commission would like to make note that decisions have
been made in regard to locations and force levels before the
2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, QDR, and the 2005 Mobility
Capability Study had been completed. The simultaneous
activities of Service Transformation Army Modularity Operation
Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Global War on
Terrorism, IGPBS, BRAC, resetting the forces and rebuilding, of
pre-positioned equipment--have all competed for funding within
a limited budget, not to mention the stress that's created on
the forces, the current schedule of IGPBS moves will adversely
impact the service's ability to adequately fund modernization
and readiness.
In regard to mobility, strategic and infra-theater, lift
and sea lift capabilities must be significantly upgraded. We
have yet to meet the lift capabilities identified by the
mobility requirement study of 2005, which was conducted in the
year 2000. In addition, announcements of global reposturing are
being made before the presently ongoing Mobility Capability
Study is concluded. Again, it would seem prudent to wait for
the results of that study. It is clear that the mobility of our
military forces being stressed by the current strain on
strategic infra-theater lift and sea lift capabilities, the
stress on strategic lift capabilities is being caused in large
part by ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Strategic mobility is the key to our ability to respond to
events worldwide, plans for sea and air lift capabilities as
well as pre-positioned equipment sets must take into account
the additional demands that IGPBS could place on an
increasingly continental United States-based force. Surging
forces from the continental United States will be problematic
if strategic and tactical life capabilities and pre-positioned
stocks are not in place.
QUALITY OF LIFE
Next, I'll briefly turn to quality of life issues. These
issues are complex, but are also key concerns of the global
positioning strategy, primarily because the United States
relies on an all-volunteer force. In order to sustain the
military force both in numbers and in strength, the
expectations of military personnel and their families with
regard to active and reserve duty as well as redeployments must
be met. If these expectations are not adequately met, then the
U.S. military risks being severely compromised. Needless to
say, this has enormous consequences politically, and in terms
of maintaining national security. We have a moral obligation to
our men and women in uniform and to their families to provide
the quality of life support that they deserve. Returning forces
and families should have housing, schools for their children
and adequate medical facilities in place before they return,
and the same should be maintained abroad until the last service
member departs.
The Commission calls this the ``last day-first day''
approach; not only does this have moral implications, but it
will also be reflected in retention rates. The Commission notes
with concern that the impact in recruiting and retention by
IGPBS rotational forces has not been adequately evaluated, nor
have associated risks to sustaining the voluntary force been
assessed. We strongly recommend that this be given priority,
and that necessary assessments be completed as quickly as
possible.
GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In the present era of the global War on Terror and the
indisputable global competition in defense, intelligence,
diplomacy, commerce and energy matters, the Commission feels it
would be wise to broaden the underlying assumptions, scope and
participation in the IGPBS process to include vital players
involved in other areas of national security. The inter-agency
process, for example, might include the Departments of Defense,
State, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, Commerce and
Treasury, the National Intelligence Director and others. After
completing the interim report, we were advised that have a
fourth Commission, but we of the fourth Commission have come to
a similar conclusion--the others are in the 9/11 Intelligence
Commission--while moving troops back to the United States may
be a political priority, force projection demands can only be
met by developing a rebasing strategy and coordination with
strategic U.S. alliances abroad, both existing and future.
Many of our overseas basing capabilities rest on
contingencies such as future political relations with bilateral
partners involving fully negotiated and ratified legal
agreements that support those relations. In many cases the
status of forces agreements, Article 98 agreements and other
legal agreements are not in place at the proposed new
locations.
TROOP LEVELS
I will mention one specific recommendation, as it is the
only one that has potential to change the number of returning
troops, and we estimate this recommended change to affect
roughly 4,000 troops. In order to hedge against uncertainty in
regard to near-term threats, demonstrate aid and continued and
enduring commitment to NATO, and allow for heavy force
military-to-military contact with our NATO allies, at least one
of the heavy brigade combat teams scheduled for return to the
United States should remain in Europe, fully manned, until one,
the Balkans support mission is lifted to a ground-based
defensive tank killing system is stationed in Europe and
Operation Iraqi Freedom is mitigated. Additionally, heavy
brigade combat teams' equipment should be repositioned to float
in the region. These recommendations are in addition to the
Department's plan for a Stryker Brigade in Germany, and the
173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy, and again, we offer these
suggestions only to strengthen the Department's plan, not as a
criticism.
PREPARED STATEMENT
As a final note, I wish to thank the members of the
committee for inviting the Commission to appear today. It's
been my privilege to briefly describe the Commission work to
date. Of course, the report has not been finalized and it is my
hope that this will be the beginning of dialogue in this
matter, so that the Commission can strengthen its analysis,
conclusions and recommendations before submitting the final
report on August 15. Please be assured that the Commission and
staff are open to the views and concerns of Congress.
Thank you for giving us this opportunity to serve your
needs and those of the Nation, and we will be happy to answer
any questions you may have at this time.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Al Cornella
My name is Al Cornella, and I serve as the Chairman of the
Commission on the Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the
United States, more commonly known as the Overseas Basing Commission
(OSBC).
I serve with five other Commissioners four of whom are present
today--the Commission Vice Chairman, Lewis Curtis, Major General United
States Air Force (Retired); Anthony Less, Vice Admiral, United States
Navy (retired); Pete Taylor, Lieutenant General, United States Army
(Retired); Keith Martin, Brigadier General, Pennsylvania Army National
Guard (Retired). Dr. James Thomson, our sixth Commissioner and the CEO
and president of RAND is out of the country and could not be here
today. I would also like to introduce the Commission's Executive
Director, Ms. Patricia Walker.
The Commission's talented staff included lead research analysts, a
general counsel, administrative staff, and analysts detailed from the
Department of Defense and the Government Accountability Office. The
Commissioners and staff have worked diligently to prepare this May 2005
report. A final report will be provided to Congress and the President
by August 15, 2005. We were asked to provide this early report so it
might be used in conjunction with the domestic BRAC process.
The Overseas Basing Commission was established by public law in
fiscal year 2004. The Commission's task is to independently assess
whether the current overseas basing structure is adequate to execute
current missions and to assess the feasibility of closures,
realignments, or establishment of new installations overseas to meet
emerging defense requirements.
However, the Commission's work is not intended to preclude the
Department of Defense's efforts toward developing an integrated global
presence and basing strategy. Rather, the Commission report should
assist Congressional committees in performing their oversight
responsibilities for DOD's basing strategy, military construction
appropriations, and the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission
determinations.
This Commission has been active since May 2004, and has conducted
four hearings where we received testimony from former military experts,
defense analysts, and experts on military family issues. We have
engaged in briefings from the Department of Defense, the State
Department, the Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Research
Service, and other entities. The Commission has met with commanders and
received extensive briefings on the transformation plan for the
European Command, Pacific Command, and Central Command. The Commission
has also met with the Transportation Command, Special Operations
Command, and Southern Command. The majority of our time was dedicated
to the areas of greatest change.
Main Testimony
Congress created the Overseas Basing Commission as an independent,
unbiased entity to produce a report that advises Congress on the
current and future overseas basing structure of U.S. military forces.
This is truly a daunting task. In order to explain the preliminary
conclusions and recommendations that the Commission is prepared to
offer to this committee today, let me begin by explaining the analytic
approach we took examining and thoroughly studying various important
aspects of the overseas basing structure.
Analytic Approach
First, the Commission began with a thorough analysis of national
security, defense, and military strategies. The Commission completed a
careful review of the foundation document for global reposturing, the
2004 Department of Defense Integrated Global Presence and Basing
Strategy (IGPBS).
Second, based on the Commission's interviews of key officials in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the COCOMs,
U.S. Transportation Command, and the State Department, the Commission
developed evaluation criteria to assess how effectively the current and
future overseas basing postures support current and future national
security and military operations.
In addition, the commission consulted with former senior military
leaders and other national security experts. Commissioners and staff
participated in six overseas trips to various commands. We conducted
four public hearings where we received testimony from former military
experts, defense analysts, and experts on military family issues. At
the final hearing we had Mr. Doug Feith and Vice Admiral Robert F.
Willard from the Department of Defense and Ambassador Rose Likens as a
representative of the State Department. We have engaged in briefings
from the Department of Defense, the State Department, the Congressional
Budget Office, Congressional Research Service, and other entities.
We visited military installations in many countries, meeting with
U.S. Forces, embassy representatives, foreign military officers, and
local officials. We have met with the majority of Combatant Commands
and in most cases with the commanders and their staffs. The
Commissioners have received briefings from U.S. Central Command, U.S.
Southern Command, U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S.
Transportation Command. We have made two trips to the Pacific Command,
three to the European Command, and one to the Central Command. All the
Commissioners, and I, have learned a great deal from these discussions,
both here and abroad.
Finally, based on its review and analysis, the Commission
identified six major areas of concern:
--Geopolitical Considerations;
--Timing and Synchronization;
--Operational Requirements;
--Mobility;
--Quality of Life; and
--Costs.
I will briefly address each area of concern, and explain the
findings and conclusions of the Commission on each issue.
Geopolitical Considerations
The Commission has determined that the DOD's IGPBS does not
adequately address current and future geopolitical and strategic needs
in response to existing and emerging security threats for two reasons.
First, it is the view of the Commission that the IGPBS is too narrowly
based on military concerns. While the Commission wishes to commend the
Department of Defense on the design of IGPBS--which is a strategy that
is directly aimed at addressing the matrix of existing and emerging
threats--it is clear that the IGPBS has been almost exclusively
designed by and for the military.
In the present era of a global war on terror and the indisputable
global competition in defense, intelligence, diplomacy, commerce and
energy matters, the Commission feels that it would be wise to broaden
the underlying assumptions, scope and participation in the IGPBS
process to include vital players involved in other areas of our
national security. The interagency process might, for example, include
the Departments of Defense, State, Energy, Homeland Security
(especially Immigration and Customs and Border Patrol), Justice
(especially the Federal Bureau of Investigation), Commerce, and
Treasury, the National Intelligence Director, and others. After
completing the interim report, we were advised that we are the fourth
commission to come to this conclusion. (Others are 9-11, Intelligence,
and Roles and Missions Commissions)
The basic concept of the IGPBS--as established by DOD--is
fundamentally strong, and can be further refined to include issues
related to homeland security, law enforcement, energy, non-
proliferation, and other pressing national needs and priorities.
Information sharing and inter-agency coordination among government
agencies is a top priority of this Administration, and we feel that
IGPBS can support this goal by broadening and diversifying its approach
and implementation.
Indeed, many of our overseas basing capabilities rest on
contingencies such as future political relations with bilateral
partners fully negotiated and ratified legal agreements that support
those bilateral relations. In many cases, the Status of Forces
Agreements (SOFA), access agreements, Article 98 agreements, and other
legal agreements are not in place in proposed new locations.
Timing and Synchronization
Another reason the Commission feels that the IGPBS should be
modified relates to more particular matters of the proposed timing and
synchronization of IGPBS. The Commission has concluded that while the
IGPBS is an ambitious plan to restructure our global posture, it does
so without fully taking into account other dynamic, ongoing and, in
some cases, unpredictable changes.
If the IGPBS is based on the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),
why would you not wait for the results of the current 2005 QDR--
scheduled to be completed this fall--or the 2005 Mobility Capabilities
Study (MCS) to be completed in August before announcing movements of
forces?
The simultaneous activities of service transformation, Army
modularity, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, the
Global War on Terrorism, IGPBS, BRAC, resetting the forces, and
rebuilding of pre-positioned equipment sets all compete for funding
within a limited budget. Not to mention the stress on forces. The
current schedule of IGPBS moves will adversely impact the Services
ability to adequately fund modernization and readiness.
Operational Requirements
The commission is concerned that heavy forces in Europe are being
removed from the mix. We also note the strategic importance of Okinawa.
Diminishing our capabilities on the island would pose risk to our
allies and our national interests in the region. At the same time, we
feel it is important to move from Futenma Marine Corps Air Station.
Moreover, not enough attention has been given to our ability to
train and exercise the force in the formulation of the overseas basing
plan. Infrastructure is sparse in some regions and, capabilities for
integrated training across services and with allies remain sketchy.
The Commission notes with concern that the impact on recruiting and
retention by IGPBS rotational forces has not been adequately evaluated,
nor have associated risks to sustaining the volunteer force been
assessed. We strongly recommend that this be given priority, and that
the necessary assessments be completed as quickly as possible.
Mobility
It is clear that the mobility of our military forces is being
compromised by the current strains on strategic lift, intra-theater
lift, and sealift capabilities. The stress on strategic lift
capabilities is being caused, in large part, by our on-going military
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, other tactical lift
demands in terms of responding to political crises such as in Haiti and
Sudan, as well as unanticipated natural disasters necessitating
military intervention such as in the recent December 2004 tsunami
event, also play a factor in challenging DOD's mobility capabilities.
While moving troops back to the United States may be a political
priority, force projection demands can only be met by developing a
rebasing strategy in coordination with strategic U.S. alliances abroad
(both existing and future).
Strategic and Intra-theater air and sealift mobility capabilities
must be significantly upgraded. We have yet to meet the lift
capabilities identified by the Mobility Requirements Study 2005
(conducted in the year 2000). In addition, announcements of global
reposturing are being made before the presently ongoing Mobility
Capabilities Study (MCS) is concluded. It would seem prudent to wait
for the results of that study.
Strategic mobility is the key to our ability to respond to events
worldwide. Plans for sea and airlift capabilities, as well as
prepositioned equipment sets, must take into account the additional
demands that IGPBS could place on an increasingly continental United
States (CONUS)-based force. Surging forces from CONUS will be
problematic if strategic and tactical lift capabilities and
prepositioned stocks are not in place.
Quality of Life
Next, I would like to turn to quality of life issues. These issues
are complex but are also key concerns of the global positioning
strategy, primarily because the United States relies on an all-
volunteer force. In order to sustain the military force (both in
numbers and in strength), the expectations of military personnel and
their families with regard to active and reserve duty as well as
redeployments must be met. If these expectations are not adequately
met, then the U.S. military risks being severely compromised. Needless
to say, this has enormous consequences politically and in terms of
maintaining national security.
We have a moral obligation to our men and women in uniform--and to
their families--to provide the quality of life support they deserve.
Returning forces and families should have housing, schools for their
children, and adequate medical facilities in place before they return
and the same should be maintained abroad until the last service member
departs. The commission calls this a ``last-day, first-day'' approach.
Not only does this have moral implications, but will also be reflected
in retention rates.
Costs
Now, with regard to the cost of changing the overseas basing
structure and the realignment and closure of bases in general, the
Commission recognizes that the costs are significant. In many cases, it
is not even possible to predict the true costs of certain strategic
changes.
The cost of IGPBS is estimated at $8 to $12 billion. An independent
analysis for the commission put the figure closer to $20 billion. Many
costs are sunk into projected host nation support that may not come to
fruition. In other cases, the services are expected to pay from within
their service budgets.
For example, costs need to be estimated and planned for troop and
base relocations. Significant upgrades of main operating bases, forward
operating sites, cooperative security locations, and pre-positioned
combat support sites need to be planned. Let us also not lose sight of
the fact that significant financial investments in new weapons systems,
strategic lift capabilities, training, and integrated systems need to
be made in order to keep the U.S. military as the premier fighting
force in the world.
Finally, these changes need to keep abreast of making Quality of
Life expenditures in order to attract and keep a dedicated military
force. Investing in the training of our military force is also a vital
component of maintaining strategic capability, and requires the
expenditure of enormous funds.
In light of this, the Commission recognizes that Congress should be
informed of realistic costs as to coordinate strategic and operational
requirements with budgetary needs and constraints. The Congress needs
accurate estimates to determine what is prudent, and must be prepared
to support IGPBS if it is to succeed.
Therefore, in light of the previously mentioned concerns, the
Commission makes the following recommendations:
--The detailed synchronization required by so massive a realignment
of forces requires that the pace of events be slowed and
reordered. We know of no nation asking us to leave. These moves
should be conducted at a pace that does not place additional
stress on our armed forces.
--That the entire effort of overseas basing be integrated into one
overarching design that is coordinated and synchronized with
all ongoing initiatives. Furthermore, an interagency review
process is put in place to periodically consider the impacts of
the global force posture and to ensure that outcomes are
consistent with overall national interests.
--The Commission believes strongly that Congressional oversight of
the global posture review is truly necessary. The Congress,
including the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees,
should provide more rigorous oversight (to include hearings) of
the global basing process given the scope and cost of the DOD
rebasing plans, their impacts on the individual services, the
men and women of our armed services and their families, and to
the political and trade alliances of the United States.
Particular attention should also be paid to the timing and
synchronization and cost of all the related efforts.
--DOD must ensure that all necessary infrastructure and quality of
life programs (such as housing, medical, schools, etc.) are
retained at overseas bases until the last day the service
members and their families depart. At the same time, Congress
must ensure that the necessary infrastructure and quality of
life programs are already in place by the first day the first
troops and families arrive from their overseas locations.
--Moreover, the Commission strongly urges that the planned overseas
basing structure be coordinated with strategic lift
considerations, especially with regard to troop and equipment
mobilization. We feel that this planning is necessary in terms
of adequately meeting the demands of the overall global pre-
positioning strategy
Additionally, the Commission recommends that:
--Marine Corps air assets assigned to Futenma Marine Corps Air
Station on Okinawa should relocate to Kadena Air Base and/or
Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station; all other Marine Corps assets
should remain on Okinawa.
--In order to hedge against uncertainty in regard to near term
threats, demonstrate a continued and enduring commitment to
NATO, and allow for heavy force military to military contacts
with our NATO allies, at least one of the heavy brigade combat
teams scheduled for return to the United States should remain
in Europe fully manned until: (1) The Balkan's support mission
is lifted; (2) a ground-based offensive tank killing system is
stationed in Europe; and (3) Operation Iraqi Freedom is
mitigated. Additionally, a heavy brigade combat team equipment
set should be pre-positioned afloat in the region. These
recommendations are in addition to the current DOD plan for a
Stryker Brigade in Germany and the 173rd Airborne Brigade in
Vicenza, Italy.
--Further, there should be a commitment to support continuous
rotational deployments to Eastern Europe and provide U.S.
military-to-military presence in the new NATO countries.
--The U.S should review its treaty with Iceland, and update it to
reflect the post-Cold War security environment.
--Greater depth is needed in Africa to secure long term United States
interests against potential competitors. The Horn of Africa
initiative should be replicated in those locations elsewhere on
the African Continent that may prove to be of increasing
importance to future strategic concerns. To some extent,
similar initiatives are needed in Latin America.
Final Remarks
As a final note, I wish to thank the members of this committee for
inviting the commission to appear today. It has been my privilege to
describe the work of the Commission to date, and to express its
preliminary recommendations.
Of course, the report has not been finalized, and it is my hope
that this will be the beginning of a dialogue in this matter so that
the Commission can strengthen its analysis, conclusions and
recommendations before submitting its final report on August 15, 2005.
Please be assured that the Commission and staff are open to the views
and concerns of Congress. Thank you for giving us this opportunity to
serve the needs of the Congress and of the Nation, and we will be happy
to answer any questions that you may have at this time.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you very much, Mr. Cornella, and
we will do 5 minute rounds so that everyone will have a chance,
and then we'll go back through for a second round.
TIMING OF IMPLEMENTATION
Let me start with the slowing of the plan, and that is the
area that concerns me the most in your recommendations. I
certainly agree that in a perfect world we would have
everything right up to the last day overseas for a family, and
then the first day they arrive everything would be in place,
but I don't know that that is realistic, nor do I think it is
necessarily in the best interest of the families or the
military, and here's why.
General Schoomacker has made modularity a priority for our
forces to be trained for the kind of combat that they are
seeing today, and I just wondered, if you are looking at the
military capability, did you consider that moving the troops
home, and having the modular brigades begin to train together
so that they could go back into Iraq and Afghanistan, what
impact slowing the process down, as you have suggested, would
have on that capability?
Mr. Cornella. Well, I'm going to let some others answer as
well, but I will start with your question, Senator. I think you
point out exactly what may be the problem, in the sense that
for modularity to occur, the timing is sensitive. And as forces
are moved back from overseas for all of this to take place, it
is intermeshed and it has to happen, but that is one of our
concerns, that in order for that to happen on the schedule that
has been put forth, we are very concerned that that
infrastructure, as you indicate, will not be in place at those
receiving locations, and we think that's critical, both in
regard to the moral obligation to our forces that I indicated,
and to quality of life for those folks, and for retention. I'm
going to see if any of the other Commissioners would like to
respond; I do have a little more to follow up on.
Senator Hutchison. I'd be happy to hear from anyone else on
that, but just if you could also direct your attention to the
capabilities to do that overseas, versus on our own bases.
Mr. Cornella. I'm not sure I understand your question,
Senator.
Senator Hutchison. Well, if they're trying to get these
brigades trained and ready to go, and they designated the bases
to do that, we don't have that kind of capacity in Europe and
Germany right now.
Mr. Cornella. I would turn to General Taylor.
General Taylor. Madame Chairman, I appreciate the
opportunity to respond to that.
TROOP MOVEMENT
I think there may be a little bit of misunderstanding about
what we have recommended. We're not saying that the forces
should not come back except in that one case, and we explained
why we felt that was necessary, or suggested that the
Department should consider leaving one heavy brigade there, but
the majority of the forces, large majority of them, we're in
agreement, they should come back. All we're saying is that,
don't do it until we have both the quality of life and the
training capability at our bases here in the United States to
receive these. The bases here in the United States are fairly
well occupied right now, and it's going to take some
infrastructure, in both quality of life resources as well as
training capability, new ranges--just a piece of desert is not
necessarily enough to train forces, we've got to build the
modern digistat ranges, we've got to make sure there's adequate
infrastructure there to receive them.
Our forces in Germany are being trained right now, yes, and
I've served there many years, and yes, there are some
challenges, but we have been able to train some forces over
there, our forces have given a good account of themselves in
Iraq and Afghanistan that have been moved from Europe, but
again, I emphasize that we're not suggesting that they
shouldn't come back, we just want to synchronize with the
preparation of the infrastructure here, at the receiving bases
here in the United States before we do that. And maybe that's
going to happen, but based on the information that we were able
to obtain through the conduct of our assessments, we didn't see
that the right resources had been allocated, or the right plans
had been made for that.
Senator Hutchison. Well, it just seems to me that building
permanent facilities at a foreign base that you know you're
closing is certainly not a wise use of funds, and you cannot
train the number of brigades that we're talking about in
Germany, which I'm not telling you anything that you don't
know, it just seems that maybe the focus should be more on
getting the facilities ready in the bases that are going to
take them here, and that would certainly be the more permanent
use of the dollars that are going into this, because if you
delay too long, you may be really affecting the capabilities to
transform the military, which certainly, the Department is
trying to do right now, and I think General Schoomacker's whole
theory is based on having them here and getting them trained so
that they can deploy directly from domestic bases.
General Taylor. Madame Chairman, I think we're saying
exactly the same thing, it's just a matter of timing, and we
encourage the Congress to put the right amount of resources
into it to do it as quickly as we can, and as soon as that's
done, I think we'd be totally supportive of what you've said.
Senator Hutchison. Well, the other thing is, pouring money
into overseas bases that we know we're going to abandon has to
be looked at very carefully in this big picture, and the longer
we wait the more things can happen that cause us to lose that
focus. So, I think we are headed for the same goals, but I do
think we have a difference in emphasis for what should happen
when. From my standpoint, I know that others disagree with me,
so we will certainly want to hear from them as well, and also
the Department. My time is up, so I'm going to stop and go to
Senator Feinstein.
MOBILITY
Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much, Madame Chairman. I
wanted to ask you about your comments on mobility. The reason I
do this is because virtually wherever I go, and I talk
particularly to Navy commanders, the question always comes down
to strategic lift and our inabilities and deficiencies there,
and you write that adequate strategic sea lift, airlift and
pre-positioned equipment and stocks do not exist, and that
current Intra-theater airlift is overstressed. Aside from the
lift capability, the Commission is also concerned that the air
and sea ports, inter-nodal connectivities and other mobility-
enabling systems are not adequate to meet potential
contingencies. Nor is there a budgetary plan to do so. And I've
had this told to me by CINCs, by others, and I watch the
budgets and we never seem to come to grips with it.
Can you add, in any way, to what you've said, anybody who'd
like to comment?
Mr. Cornella. General Curtis, would you like to comment?
General Curtis. Senator Feinstein----
Senator Feinstein. Don't be shy, say what you think.
General Curtis. Senator Feinstein, I've watched the airlift
mobility issues since I was a Captain at headquarters back when
the C-5 was first introduced. It is always tough to find the
space within the budget for the adequate procurement of lift,
and every time we go through the mobility capability study, and
the associated budget requirements, fitting everything in, our
unconstrained requirement is difficult, and in my experience,
there are trade-offs made.
But clearly, as we become a more CONUS-based force, and we
re-do the Army, both up armor and more air mobile vehicles,
like the Stryker, we need to balance those things very
carefully with lift capability versus our other requirements
for modernization. And there are no easy answers to that,
nobody will be satisfied in the end, because there are never
enough dollars to go around, but everybody within the equation
that reaches a solution needs to understand that's a very
critical balance, and I'm sure you do.
COST
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. Could you expand on your
comments on funding, that the cost may be understated, and tell
us a little bit about the independent analysis that was
conducted for you that put the tab at $20 billion?
Mr. Cornella. Thank you, I will take that question.
I left that out of the shortened version of the statement,
and there's not necessarily a great deal of explanation in the
other statement we presented to you. There is in our long
report, quite a bit of information in regard to the cost, but
that assessment was done by a detailee from the Government
Accountability Office, and estimated at $20 billion, and I
think that information was validated on May 10th by a senior
member of the Department when they said they did agree with our
figures, but we had cast a wider net to draw those figures in.
And so we were looking at areas other than what they were
stating in the $10 to $20 billion, pardon me, the $9 to $11
billion. We also did have several--two to be exact--members of
the Department say that the cost could be closer to $25
billion, so we feel the $20 billion number is defensible.
STRYKER BRIGADE
Senator Feinstein. I understand your European concern, that
replacing our heavy forces with a Stryker Brigade before we've
developed the organic tank killing weapon system necessary.
What kind of response has there been to that recommendation so
far?
Mr. Cornella. Response from the Department?
Senator Feinstein. Right.
Mr. Cornella. Well, we've not discussed that specific
recommendation at length with the Department, we have had
conversations in our travels with Commanders that made that
suggestion to us, that they thought that that was a good idea
that that take place, and General Taylor, do you have anything
you want to add?
General Taylor. There is an initiative on the part of the
Army to have an offensive tank killing capability with the
Stryker variant, but so far it has not come to fruition, and so
our basic premise is that we definitely need to have an
offensive ground tank killing capability there as well as the
other issues that we mentioned, and we're not saying that that
Brigade should necessarily stay there forever, but until the
criteria that we mentioned are realized.
Senator Feinstein. In terms of deployment of bases, and
transitioning the military, what lessons do you think were
learned in Iraq and Afghanistan?
General Taylor. I would first state an opinion, primarily
about Iraq that, while initially we felt that we could do this
with much lighter forces, we're finding out more and more that
heavy forces, even in a city environment is very necessary. I
know of some people who fight in that area very well, and some
of them are parts of my family, and they would clearly rather
fight out of a tank as even an up-armored Humvee, and I think
the reports coming back from some of the recent efforts in Iraq
have been, and Baghdad, have shown that there is a place for
heavy force, although the Stryker variant up in Mosul has been
very valuable as well. So, I think we're still learning, I
think the decision on all of this is still out, but we haven't
lost the need for some of our heavy forces.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you, my time is up, Madame
Chairman.
Senator Hutchison. Senator Allard.
OVERSEAS SAVINGS
Senator Allard. Thank you, Madame Chairman.
I noticed in your summary here that you hadn't talked in
detail as did Senator Feinstein, as to some of the costs. I
wonder if you could give us just some bottom line figures, if
possible, has the Department of Defense conducted an estimate
as to how much money would be saved by reducing their basing
overseas?
Mr. Cornella. I'm not sure if we were provided with that
number. Now it's logical to assume that if bases are reduced
overseas, there will be some savings, and they may be
significant. At the same time, those facilities may have to be
replicated within the United States; and also, I'm not sure
that those figures that are being put forth include any
mobility that might be required in order to surge out of the
continental United States. And I can't address that--those will
be good questions for the Department in the next panel.
Senator Allard. Did you try and conduct any kind of
estimate?
Mr. Cornella. I would have to ask staff about that; we will
provide you with that information.
Senator Allard. Okay. Is it correct to say that you do not
recommend the Department of Defense go back and do its re-
basing strategy?
Mr. Cornella. I think that I would turn to my other
Commissioners, but I don't think that we mean to indicate that
they do that.
General Taylor. Again, Senator, it's a timing issue, and a
synchronization issue, not the fact that they shouldn't do it.
Unfortunately, it's not 100 percent clear, at least up to the
point when we completed most of our reports, exactly what the
timing was, that was still a developing process. Remember, this
was prior to the release of the BRAC report, so exactly where
they were going, or that the Department was recommending they
were going was not available to us at that time. Now, some of
that at least portions of that information is available to us,
and that will help as we complete our report and look at where
they might be going here in the United States.
FORWARD OPERATING SITES
Senator Allard. It seems to me like in one of the hearings
on the Armed Services Committee, they talked about forward
basing, maybe in the Balkan states where we don't have now,
that you would end up basically with an air field with
utilities, and if you put in temporary tents, they would be
basically two by fours in tent structure, and then when your
mission was done, you would move out, does that seem like a
reasonable approach to you?
General Taylor. You're talking about both the security
locations and the forward operating sites? Yes, and our only
question about those is whether or not we have consummated the
agreements with the host countries that we should have in place
before we go too much farther, and that's being worked by both
the Department and others, but the concept is valid and we have
no problem with that.
Senator Allard. And do you have any reason to believe that
those host countries wouldn't cooperate with us? The last time
I talked to most of them they were thrilled to death to be part
of NATO, and even be part of the forward deployment effort.
General Taylor. I would suggest that would be a question to
ask the next panel. I'm sure they can enlighten you. We did not
have verifiable information that these agreements have been
consummated, but I'm sure the next panel can respond to that
better.
BRAC
Senator Allard. Okay. To what extent do you believe the
Department of Defense used its IGPBS to formulate its
recommendations for base closure and realignment? The Secretary
of Defense admitted his recommendations for base closures and
realignments to Congress and BRAC and it was in May, and the
question is, to what extent do you believe that the Department
of Defense used the IGPBS to formulate its recommendations for
base closure and realignments, did you look at that?
Mr. Cornella. Yes, and I think it had a great deal to do
with the recommendations to the BRAC Commission. The numbers of
returning troops from overseas impacted Army bases most
significantly.
Senator Allard. And the follow up, then, do you see any
reason why the BRAC process should not go forward?
Mr. Cornella. Or as we say in our report, we see no reason
why that should not go forward. I just would like to add one
thing to your previous question about the Nations where we
might have lily pads, or CSLs or whatever you might like to
call them. We have seen instances most recently, without
mentioning the names of any countries, one where access to an
Air Force base was either restricted or denied within the last
few months. We also have seen instances during the Iraq War
where certain Nations did not allow access. These are the types
of things that we're talking about in regard to making sure
that those agreements are in place before you establish those
locations in those countries.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Madame Chairman, I see my time
has expired.
COST
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Senator Landrieu?
Senator Landrieu. Thank you. Let me just see if I can
summarize a couple of these questions, because I think the work
you have done is extremely important, and we appreciate how
difficult it can be sometimes to really give an independent
view, and we want to be sure that we have our ears open and are
willing to hear the independent view, so let me just ask
again--one of the bottom lines of your report, which is all
documented here, Mr. Cornella, is that the cost associated with
moving our troops back could be twice as much as what is
currently estimated? Is that correct?
Mr. Cornella. Yes, Senator.
TIMING
Senator Landrieu. Is it also correct that you are
suggesting that the time frame that is being adopted as we
speak is probably too aggressive to accomplish the goal?
Mr. Cornella. Well, I think again, it's a timing issue. If
all of this could be timed properly, and we had, maybe, an
infinite pot of money, there probably would not be a problem,
but there are a lot of things that are taking place, and I
cited many of those in my opening statement.
Senator Landrieu. But in your estimation of the summary of
your report, there is a time frame that has been proposed, and
you reviewed it and in your professional judgment, you all are
saying that it is unlikely that the time frame can be met?
Mr. Cornella. We have addressed it, we have talked to
commanders in the field, and we feel it's probably ambitious.
Senator Landrieu. Would it be fair to say, then, that you
have some serious concerns about meeting that time frame?
Mr. Cornella. Well, I think we do in the sense that a lot
of the moves are already taking place, and have started in
regard to the Pacific, probably, without mentioning names of
countries, more than have taken place in Europe, but I would
agree with your statement, Senator.
Senator Landrieu. Again, I'm not trying to put words in
anybody's mouth, I'm just trying to clarify for the record what
I think. The goal of this hearing is, is to really hear what
you are saying about your view, and if it is that we've
underestimated the cost, we need to hear.
Mr. Cornella. Two thousand eleven sounds like a long way
off, it's really not that far, and I guess my point was that a
lot of the moves are already taking place as we rotate forces
through Iraq and Afghanistan, and I think the plan is to bring
the forces back from those rotations after they pick up their
families in Germany and other locations, so the bulk of the
moves may take place sooner rather than later, they may take
place sooner, rather than towards the end of that 2011 time
frame.
Senator Landrieu. General Curtis, then I think Mr. Martin
had something to add.
General Curtis. Yes, Senator, there are three numbers down
here in the report, and they really measure three different
things, as our numbers often do in government. And, the $4
billion is the number specifically tailored to this move within
the palm through 2011. The $9 to $12 billion, as I understand
it from the material being given by the DOD is an estimate
which includes other things of the total cost of this move, and
some of this money, I'm given to understand, would come out of
the general O&M accounts within the services, not specifically
be identified within the POM itself.
Finally, the $20 billion number is a life cycle number
beyond the POM, so it isn't directly comparable to either one
of the two previous numbers. The concerns I have after watching
the process, how we execute our financial processes is that the
moves with either be slipped because of an insufficiency of
funding to do it right, we will move without doing it right, or
we will take money out of the O&M accounts to pay for the move,
and not know what we didn't buy, what we gave up in terms of
readiness or something else by forcing the Services to fund
parts of the move internally. They're three different numbers
that all mean the same thing, but they could drive unforeseen
consequences if we insist on meeting the schedule without fully
funding it with identifiable funds, and that's one of our big
concerns.
Senator Landrieu. Mr. Martin.
Mr. Martin. Thank you very much, Senator, Madame Chairman.
In perspective, this is the most sweeping transformation and
repositioning of U.S. forces since the late 1940's, the Defense
Reorganization Act of 1947. United States forces, the
repositioning thereof, it should be positive for our national
security and our national defense. The Department's plan is a
good plan, if fully coordinated, synchronized, it can and will
enhance the Nation's security and defense interests. But it
should be and must be positive for our service men and women to
the maximum extent possible. The bottom line of what we said on
the quality of life is we shouldn't be moving soldiers,
sailors, airmen and Marines any faster than we can build the
new housing, the new medical facilities, new schools and
training facilities as General Taylor pointed out, and
certainly no faster than we can provide the air lift, sea lift
and pre-positioned stockage to move them from their United
States, now CONUS-based homes, to potential points of influence
and engagement. We have an opportunity right now because of the
Secretary's vision to do the right thing, we need to do it the
right way. It is an opportunity, and we believe, a
responsibility, because if we don't take care of the force we
have now, we could face a future, and the enemies and threats
of tomorrow with forces we won't have, and options we don't
like.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
Senator Hutchison. Are there any other questions of this
panel? If not, thank you very much for all of the effort that
you made. We appreciate it and look forward to looking at it
further, and now I would like to call the second panel from the
Department of Defense forward. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cornella. Thank you, Senator.
Department of Defense
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE RYAN HENRY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT
ACCOMPANIED BY:
PHILLIP GRONE, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INSTALLATION AND ENVIRONMENT
ROSE LIKINS, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF
POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS
Senator Hutchison. The next panel is Mr. Phillip Grone,
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and
Environment, the Honorable Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Ambassador Rose Likins,
Acting Assistant Secretary of State, in the Bureau of Political
and Military Affairs.
STATEMENT OF RYAN HENRY
Mr. Henry. Thank you, Madame Chairman, Senator Feinstein,
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity for
appearing before you today, along with the Overseas Basing
Commission and Chairman Cornella. Joining me today as you
mentioned are Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Rose Likins,
and Deputy Under Secretary, Phil Grone. And I want to say I
appreciate the insightfulness of your opening remarks today. I
would like now, if I may, to submit my full statement for the
record, and make just a few brief remarks at this time.
GLOBAL DEFENSE STRATEGY AND PROCESS
Madame Chairman, the Administration's plan to strengthen
America's Global Defense Posture will result in the most
profound re-ordering of military forces overseas since the end
of World War II. The September 11 attacks clarified our
understanding of the key security issues that we will face
during the beginning of the 21st century. Simultaneously, we
realize that much of our in-place force posture still reflected
a Cold War structure. We had forward garrison forces configured
to fight near and where they were based. Unlike the past
century, today we no longer can predict where, when, or in what
manner our forces may be called on to fight, therefore our
forces need to be able to rapidly project power into theatres
far from where they may be based. Through our Global Defense
Posture Realignment, we have aimed to strengthen our ability,
fulfill our international commitments to ensure that our future
alliances are capable, affordable, sustainable and relevant.
Then to focus on capabilities, and not just numbers. The
Defense Department conducted our Global Defense Posture Review
thoroughly and deliberately. We've collaborated with our inter-
agency partners through broad and sustained deliberations.
We've also consulted extensively with our allies and our
partners to incorporate their views. The Department of Defense
and the Department of State have held joint consultations with
relevant international partners, in over 20 foreign capitals,
beginning in December 2003, and continuing on a sustained basis
since then. We also have communicated with Congress, and
personal and Committee staff members throughout the review.
We've provided a detailed report to Congress in September of
2004, followed by the submission of detailed overseas master
plans from each of the regional Combatant Commanders in
February 2005. And over 40 times the Secretary of Defense, the
Combatant Commanders, the members of the Joint Staff, and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense have traveled here to
Capitol Hill to consult with Congressional Committees and
Members.
Finally, as mentioned by Chairman Cornella, we have worked
closely with the Overseas Basing Commission in its efforts to
provide Congress with an assessment of a global presence,
basing and infrastructure needs.
A COMPLEX UNDERTAKING
Madame Chairman, as members of the Overseas Basing
Commission have expressed, the United States Global Defense
Posture is incredibly complex. It is a multidimensional field
involving numerous areas; strategic analysis of geopolitical
and military factors, facilities and infrastructure analysis,
diplomatic and legal negotiations and arrangements, acquisition
policies and transportation issues, operational plans and
synchronization with the Base Realignment Commission, the QDR,
the Army Modularity Transformation, the Mobility Capabilities
Study, and the Navy's Fleet Response Plan. We, in the
Department, have thousands of people working on this complex
endeavor, full-time in the military services and the combatant
command, on the joint staff, in the acquisition community and
other areas, all overseen by senior military and civilian
officials and managed by Secretary Rumsfeld.
Madame Chairman, we stressed in our discussions with the
Commission that posture is more than just our footprint of
facilities, it also includes the presence, force management,
our surge capability and the pre-positioning of stocks among
these building blocks of global posture. Quality of life
concerns related to force management merit particular
attention. Changing the way in which we posture our forces was
driven in large part by the President and the Secretary's
desire to relieve stress on our military forces and their
families by providing more security at home, with fewer
overseas moves and less disruptions. Specifically, posture
changes will help reduce double separations, those caused when
accompanying dependents are separated from both the service
member and the their loved ones in the United States.
Additionally, our posture changes are phased over several
years to help ensure quality of life is sustained. Equally
important, the plan changes to our posture directly support
service initiatives aimed at keeping pace with our military
personnel, such as the Army's Modularity and Unit Location
concepts, the Navy's Fleet Response concept, and the Air
Force's ongoing Force Management Improvement.
Madame Chairman, of particular importance in this complex
undertaking has been our sustained effort to inject the Global
Defense Posture into other ongoing defense transformation
initiatives, specifically, the BRAC and the 2005 QDR. I welcome
the Commission's statement of support for the U.S. Global
Defense Posture as important and necessary. The Commission's
report reflects their earnest effort to assess military
facilities, and structure of the U.S. overseas facilities. The
Commission fundamentally agrees with many of the aspects of the
President's posture plan, and it recognizes the importance of
changing of posture to meet the 21st century's security
challenges.
Madame Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to speak to
you, and I look forward to answering your questions. And, if we
may, Ambassador Likins would also like to have an opening
statement.
Senator Hutchison. Madame Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ROSE LIKINS
Ambassador Likins. Thank you, Madame Chairman, and Senator
Feinstein. I appreciate the opportunity to be here and to offer
a few brief remarks.
Since late 2003, the Department of State has been working
closely with the Department of Defense and the National
Security Council on reviewing and strengthening the U.S. Global
Defense Posture. The Department has played an active role in
the shaping and implementation of our future defense posture.
We have been both participants in the inter-agency process, and
have been spearheading the diplomatic talks and initiatives
necessary to obtain the understanding and agreement of our
friends and allies for this important initiative. The
Department has and will continue to provide its frank
assessment of these proposals, and to provide our views as to
the best way forward. We've had a very good working
relationship with our DOD colleagues on this issue, conducting
all consultations together and jointly briefing Congress on
several occasions.
While the initial planning for the IGPBS was undertaken by
the combatant commanders in the individual services, these
plans were presented to the inter-agency for a full and
thorough examination before their submission to the President.
The Department has made its foreign policy views known on many
occasions and will continue to do so. We firmly believe that we
are taking the appropriate time to get this right, we continue
to rigorously review proposals with our DOD colleagues,
thoroughly examine the many facets of these plans, including
the necessary legal arrangements, and have conducted numerous
consultations with friends and allies around the world.
While consultations in some parts of the world are quite
advanced, others have not even begun, indicative of the fact
that we will take whatever time is necessary to ensure that our
plans are logical, workable, and that our engagement strategy
makes sense. Consultations are proceeding carefully and
deliberately to ensure that the arrangements put in place to
host our forces are enduring and beneficial to a wide range of
United States interests. Through the consultation process,
we've received valuable feedback that has enabled us to adjust
proposals and calibrate our expectations. We have gained
valuable insights throughout the process, and in many ways, the
consultation process is one of the many mechanisms for re-
thinking, and adjusting our defense posture plans.
To use just one example, during the consultation process,
we learned that the government of Germany was undertaking its
own base realignment and closure process. This prompted us to
accelerate the sharing of details with German officials related
to our proposed posture changes in Germany and to undertake
some additional coordination on our two initiatives. I want to
assure you that we will not rush into a location where there
are not adequate legal protections and guarantees for our
forces, and for their freedom of action. We believe that proper
legal arrangements are a fundamental requirement for any
defense posture changes. The State Department believes these
negotiations and DOD have substantially been involved in all
talks. We have dedicated legal experts and a special negotiator
working to ensure that the best legal arrangements are secure.
We support the OBS's view that their long-term strategic
national objectives, beyond simply military objectives,
somewhat to reassure you that our efforts on this issue are
focused on results that make sense from both the defense and
strategic foreign policy perspective. Thank you very much.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Madame Ambassador. We're
going to just have about 10 minutes of questions because we
have two votes called, and I don't want to keep you waiting any
longer.
Let me say, first of all, I'm very pleased that both the
Department of State and the Department of Defense are
represented on this panel because I wanted to make sure, and I
think it is very important, that the Department of State is a
part of this process as we are looking at closing of bases, or
forward deploying somewhere else, that we have both Defense and
State involved.
Mr. Henry, one of the Commission report findings says, ``If
unforeseen threats arise in either the near term or the mid-
term, we could be caught in mid-stride, unable to meet them.''
This is part of the reason they wanted to delay some of these
moves. My understanding is that the entire reason for
transforming our posture is because we're not currently
positioned to meet unforeseen threats, and we need to have the
capability to meet them as soon as possible. I would just like
to ask your comments on that part of the report, and if you
think speeding up the process will cause transformation to
occur better, or slowing it down would.
Mr. Henry. Yes, Madame Chairman, I would agree with your
statement, and as I mentioned in my opening statement,
uncertainty is part of the strategic landscape which we have in
a post-9/11 world. We no longer have the comfort or the
certainty that we had during the Cold War when we had a single
enemy and we could predict where we would probably have to meet
him. In a world we live in today, we might need to use our
forces through large expanses of the Earth's globe, therefore,
in the places we have our forces, we have to be able to move
them quickly to where they might be needed to be employed.
That's a fundamental feature of the transformation, and our
capability to meet it. We just can't predict how we will have
to fight with our forces, where or when.
As far as your question regarding transformation, this is a
part of an integrated approach to transformation. The Secretary
of Defense has published his National Defense Strategy which
supports National Security Strategy, and from which the Base
Realignment Commission, the Global Defense Posture, the
Quadrennial Defense Review, all of the major movements that
we're making in the Defense Department stem from. This is key
to transformation, all of these things supported simultaneously
to move forward in a networked fashion.
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Henry, in the previous panel there
was concern raised, and also in the report, about our lift
capacity. Do you think that we have a better capability for
lift where we need to go by basing more of our troops in the
United States, or do you think we have a lift problem that
requires troops to stay in Germany and Korea?
Mr. Henry. One of the analyses we did post-the Iraqi major
combat operations, was to look at the amount of lift that was
needed to move forces from Europe and around to where they had
to go, and to try to determine the amount of lift and the speed
of lift with which to get into the theatre, and if it would
make a difference coming from Europe or from the continental
United States, and depending on how we might position ourselves
as a part of the Base Realignment Commission, in some
instances, we could actually move quicker from the United
States. That was one of the considerations that drove the
Global Defense Posture, as was spoken by the previous panel,
combatant commanders and operators will never have as much lift
as they would like to, to feel comfortable, it is a matter of
adjudicating the risk overall of the contingencies that we
might have to face. As was mentioned by the panel, we are also
in the process of a Mobility Capabilities Study, something we
do approximately every 5 years to look at the total lift
requirements, and how we're going to meet them. As this has
been dovetailed into the Base Realignment work that we have
been doing, they have first done one using the old structure
and analysis. Now they're looking and finishing up their
analysis, using as a baseline the Global Defense Posture. As we
presented the committee in our report back in September of
2004, and it looks like the impact will not be significant in
roughly, in the same area that we would have had with the other
structure. The details are still to be concluded on that, and
we await the conclusion of the study, which will be integrated
in the QDR.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you. Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. When troops are moved back to the United
States, will they be accommodated in permanent or temporary
facilities.
Mr. Grone. Depending upon the unit and depending upon the
location and depending upon the time, there will be a mix of
permanent or temporary, in the main it will be permanent. The
discussion about whether or not facilities would be available
for returning forces is a phased plan over a 4-year period, 5
years if you count the troops coming back from Korea this
summer to Fort Carson between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year
2009. We are working, particularly with the Army, on
standardizing our facilities design so that they can be sited
to any location to use commercial construction standards, all
of which is designed to make permanent facilities more quickly
and more readily available to returning forces.
Senator Feinstein. So, you will not be coming to this
subcommittee or any other subcommittee to look for additional
dollars for temporary housing?
Mr. Grone. There may be occasions where, depending upon the
unit, there may be some temporary billeting for single enlisted
personnel that is required, but in the main we are planning to
move out aggressively to provide permanent facilities as
quickly as we can.
Senator Feinstein. If you do that, then what type of
coordination is being done with local school districts to
mitigate the impact of thousands of soldiers coming back with
many children?
Mr. Grone. Well, we have, the Army in particular, since the
bulk of the returning forces are Army, are engaged in a series
of intensive consultations with local school districts and
State and local government on transportation, schools and other
issues that might be affected by forces returning from abroad.
Certainly, with regard to housing, our preference is to rely,
as is our standard housing policy, on the community first, and
based on what we know, particularly for the three locations,
whether we have the bulk of the forces returning from abroad,
Fort Carson, Fort Riley and Fort Bliss, based on that 5 year
window between 2005 and 2009 that we have people coming back,
based on our assessment of the market's ability, the local
market's ability to adapt based on our existing housing
privatization efforts at all three of those locations. We
believe that there is sufficient market availability there to
accommodate returning forces, and a phase-in for families as we
have laid it out over the course of that 5 year period, so we
are intentionally engaged with school systems, and with local
governments. We'll continue that consultation through the
summer, so that when we get to the school year, 2006, next
year, that we will be as integrated as we can be. That is not
to say there won't be challenges, there will. But we believe
that we will have a quality of life piece well in hand, and we
look forward to continuing to consult with the subcommittee as
we move forward to make sure that you're comfortable with the
plans as we lay them out.
Senator Feinstein. I would really appreciate that, because
I know in California, we have schools that are really
overcrowded at present, and I think there needs to be some real
planning done in that regard, but thank you. Let me ask you,
Mr. Henry, because I'm really concerned with what I see as lift
deficiencies, and everything I've heard from the field doesn't
jive with what you say. Would you be willing to share with our
subcommittee your projected plans for specific lift--in other
words, how many C-17s, new C-17s, et cetera, that kind of
thing--because everything I read is that the lift capability of
our country is severely stressed.
Mr. Henry. Yes, we would be glad to share that, one thing
it will be part of the QDR that we'll be reporting to the
Congress, but we'll be glad to come up here in the interim as
the data becomes available and then as decisions are made as to
how we're going to proceed, we'd be glad to share that with the
committee.
Senator Feinstein. I would certainly appreciate knowing
what you're planning is. I mean, in the next 10 years, how many
C-17s will there be, for example?
Mr. Henry. Yes, Senator, and as those decisions are still
awaiting the final report out of the Mobility Capabilities
Study, as mentioned earlier, and so specific decisions still
await the final analysis and data.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Madame Chairman, I
think that does it for me. I would just like to conclude by
saying, I know DOD doesn't like helpful suggestions, or any
suggestion, but I really think this is a good report, and I
really ask you to review it with an open mind. I think they've
raised some very good points, and these are all people who have
served, who have been there, done that, I think they know what
they're talking about, period.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, I think they acknowledged
that they will.
Senator Feinstein. Not quite, but it was a nod, which is
the best DOD ever does.
Mr. Henry. Senator, we've read the report with great
interest and we look forward, hopefully, to being able to
discuss with the Commission their conclusions prior, and we
think that we can help them with information and analysis and
insights that would make the final report even better. Perhaps
correct inaccuracies and some assumptions that we think that we
could help them with.
Senator Hutchison. I would just say that the biggest
concern I have about the report is the slowing it down. I
really believe that when you make a decision like this, that in
order to be the most efficient, to use our taxpayer's dollars
wisely and to bring people home where they know it's going to
be permanent, it should be done quickly and not drug out. Now,
obviously we do want to have the accommodations, we want the
housing, and I think the public/private partnerships make that
much more able to be done than if we were just building them
through MILCON. Certainly coordination with the school
districts and health care facilities in a community will be
very important, and I think that is valid, but I would rather
see us gear up to do it quickly, than to slow down and have
buildings in Germany and buildings in America that are
duplicative.
Mr. Grone. In that regard, Madame Chairman, the most
important potential impediment we have to implementation is not
full authorization and appropriation of the budget requests to
support the round, so if we had the resources available, we
could certainly accelerate, and we will move out as
expeditiously as you desire to ensure we have facilities in
place for our people.
CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS
Senator Hutchison. We'll work with you on that. Thank you
very much, we're going to go to our vote now. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., Tuesday, June 28, the hearings
were concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]