Joe Biden, U.S. Senator for Delaware

May 2, 2003

Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak here tonight.

This is a momentous time, and even though I’ve used that word often since September 11, 2001, it remains true today.

Our vulnerability was exposed as never before. On that day, our national priorities came into much sharper focus. Yesterday’s soccer moms became today’s security moms.

Since 9-11, we have taken several significant steps to try to make America more secure. In many ways we are succeeding, but in other ways the jury is still out. And what we do in the days and months ahead may well determine whether our actions overseas will lead to a more peaceful world, and whether the security we seek is within our grasp.

The President had no choice but to use force in Afghanistan. He acted swiftly and with the full support of the nation. We struck a major blow against al-Qaeda, we deposed the Taliban, and we sent a message to terrorists that the long arm of America’s might will come down heavily on those who do us harm.

But I fear our goal of ensuring that Afghanistan no longer serves as a safe haven for terrorists has not been accomplished. To put it bluntly, we have not demonstrated sufficient leadership in support of President Karzai’s efforts to extend security beyond Kabul. Afghanistan is at risk of falling back into chaos or worse. Having won the war, we are in danger of losing the peace.

Today, we are at a pivotal juncture in a second war. As in Afghanistan, our military performed superbly in Iraq. We’ve removed a brutal dictator. If we get it right from this point, we’ll have reason to hope the Middle East may become a more secure and progressive place.

But that’s the big “IF.” Getting it right is a huge challenge. We must have staying power, and we have to work with others -- others in the region, others throughout the world, and with all the stakeholders inside Iraq. It’s no exaggeration to say that the choices we make to win the peace in Iraq will shape our future for generations to come.

The problem, in a nutshell, is that we face two valid but competing pressures in Iraq.

The first is to withdraw quickly – to bring our troops home as soon as we can and to avoid being seen as occupiers.

The second is to stay for as long as it takes to lay the foundation for a secure, stable and pluralistic Iraq, back in the hands of its own people and on a path to democracy. And that will take years of efforts and billions of dollars.

There’s only one way to square this circle -- to avoid leaving too early and leaving Iraq in the lurch or, alternatively, bearing alone the massive burden of a prolonged occupation. The answer is to internationalize the problem.

Our goal should be to encourage participation by other countries and key international organizations in building Iraq’s peace.

The best way to do that is to get that much maligned organization – the United Nations – to endorse, but not to run, the necessary security, humanitarian, rebuilding and administrative missions in Iraq.

I said “endorse, not run.” Especially on the security side, the U.N. should not be running the show. But its endorsement – through new Security Council resolutions – would open the door to full participation by countries around the world and to NATO, the EU and Arab allies. Without that endorsement, it will be hard for leaders whose people opposed the war – and that was the case in virtually every country in the world, including those whose governments supported us – to convince their people to help pay for and run the risks of waging the peace.

Iraq is not a prize that we should be fighting over. It is a complex society sitting in the heart of a tough neighborhood. As my friend Tom Friedman of The New York Times puts it, we may have to rent Iraq for a time, but it’s not our desire to own it. Yet, at this moment, we hold sole responsibility for Iraq.

We do not -- repeat -- DO NOT want to be seen as going from liberators to occupiers, having to bear all the burdens, risks and costs.

An indefinite American military occupation -- even a temporary one -- could fuel resentment throughout the Middle East, bolster Al Qaeda’s recruitment, and make us a target for malcontents everywhere.

If we do not get the help of other countries in a significant way, we will soon find ourselves making decisions in the most minute detail about the country’s governance.

If we are the only ones running the show, we’ll get the blame for anything that goes wrong. And things will go wrong, no matter how good and careful our soldiers are. The events of this week in Fallujah risk being repeated day in and day out.

If we alone choose the new Iraqi government, it will be seen as a puppet regime by the Iraqi people and by Iraq’s neighbors.

And if we’re the only ones on watch, it will be our sons and daughters patrolling the streets of Kirkuk and Najaf, running the risk of suicide bombers and snipers. It will be our taxpayers footing the entire bill on an overstretched budget – after they’ve already had to pay for the entire war. But the flip side, as I said earlier, is that building an Iraq that is secure, whole, free, and governed by its own people will be a long and expensive project. Just as the removal of Saddam should have been seen as serving the whole world’s interest, so too is rebuilding Iraq.

The best way to buy time is to bring in the rest of the world. That will give us the cover to stay in Iraq long enough to get the job done without alienating the Iraqi people and without putting the entire burden and risk of this great venture on our backs. So how do we get others on board? It starts with the U.N. endorsement I talked about a moment ago. But it goes beyond that to our entire attitude. We have to be mature, not spiteful. We have to repair the ruptures that have developed with our allies. We have to realize that an inclusive rather than an exclusive approach is the correct approach.

Now, I understand the tremendous frustration in this country about the way France and other allies dealt with the Iraq problem. I share that frustration and so do many members of Congress.

But I would respectfully suggest that retaliating against long standing allies – no matter how right we were and how wrong they were – is beneath a great nation and profoundly against our interests.

Just imagine if once the heavy shooting stopped in Iraq, the President had made a speech in which he addressed the countries that opposed the war. Imagine if he had said:

‘I deeply regret that you did not join our effort to end Saddam Hussein’s reign of terror in Iraq. You know how profoundly I disagreed with your position. But I want you to know that, equally profoundly, I believe it was your right as great democracies and long time friends of the U.S. to hold those positions and to disagree with us. We could not come together in war, but I want us to come together in peace. I want you to be full partners in helping Iraq build a better future.’

Imagine if the President had done that. He could have erased so much anti-Americanism. He would have looked ten feet tall. And Chirac and Schroeder and the rest would have looked two feet tall if they did not respond in kind. Magnanimity in victory is a great virtue – and in our naked self interest. We must mend diplomatic fences – as Sec. Powell is trying to do. He deserves our support. And by the way, folks, in the face of the Rumsfeld/Cheney juggernaut, Colin Powell has the toughest job in Washington. I have the utmost respect and admiration for the way he does his job and the quality of advice he provides this President. It’s time to make Powell’s job a bit easier by moving beyond the finger-pointing and recriminations that have been flying across the Atlantic and around the world. It’s time to heal the rift that has developed.

Let me briefly summarize what lies ahead.

The key to long-term success in putting Iraq on a path to stability and modernization is to establish from the outset a process that is viewed as legitimate. It must lead to a new Iraqi interim authority that is viewed as legitimate. And that authority must nurture the institutions that, ultimately, could lead Iraq to become a new liberal democracy in a region that desperately needs a democratic model. Before laying out the steps to get us from here to there, let’s understand the goal. We cannot simply jump ahead several steps and call for elections. In recent years, we have often witnessed the futility of countries putting the cart before the horse -- neglecting to build the essential underpinnings of liberal democracy: rule of law, a viable police force to create order, a credible judicial system, a free press, a secular education system, non-governmental organizations and the other elements of a civil society that operate with transparency and accountability.

If we try to impose liberal democracy by force and consider the mission complete once the tyrant is toppled and elections are held, we will be in for a nasty surprise, as we were in Algeria.

Trading a Shah for an Ayatollah is not a good bargain. Deposing Saddam and leaving a vacuum filled by a radical, anti-Western Shiite clerical regime would not be a good bargain either.

We also should avoid the temptation to hand things over to a new authoritarian figure who may happen to be friendly to us. Some will argue that given the dangers of a reversion to a neo-Ba’athist regime or a religious tyranny, we can ensure a quick departure by imposing an Iraqi leadership and giving it the means to maintain control. There will be strong pressures to pull out of Iraq before its political process has a chance to mature.

In my judgement, that would be grievous error. If our goal is enduring political stability, there is no escaping the fact that we will have to be involved for the long-haul so that Iraqis can develop the institutions of liberal democracy.

It is no surprise that religious-based groups have emerged as the most organized forces in Iraq. In a society where any political activity outside of the Ba’ath party was brutally suppressed for over three decades, the only networks left standing were in the Mosque.

This gives the Islamists an early advantage, but it does not mean that an fundamentalist Islamic Republic that seeks to impose the Sharia is inevitable.

Indeed, there is a long tradition in Iraq of moderate Shiite clerics who believe in the separation of Mosque and state. And there is a powerful example in neighboring Turkey of an state led by an Islamic party that is nonetheless secular, modern and democratic. In Iraq, we must invest the time and energy to encourage the development of moderate politics by developing the institutions... political parties, professional associations, labor unions, PTAs, sporting clubs all of the groupings we take for granted which form the vital fabric of a democracy.

Obviously, building these institutions will not be easy, and they will not spring up overnight. We need to take the time to do this right.

What we must do immediately is begin the process of legitimization that leads to direct Iraqi involvement in the rebuilding of their country. But we can only get there if we have the rest of the world participating. Otherwise, those Iraqis able and willing to take on responsibilities will be seen and labeled as tools of America, as collaborators with an occupier.

The irony is that many countries around the world are ready to jump in, but they prefer to do so under the umbrella of the United Nations. We should be smart enough to understand that it is in our best interest to not go it alone, and that the UN imprimatur will open the gate for other nations to provide genuine assistance and generate greater legitimacy.

A timely test is coming. The recent meeting of Iraqi political figures in Baghdad decided to reconvene toward the end May. The Administration has indicated its desire to have the next meeting create an Iraqi interim authority.

Is there any doubt the interim authority will have much greater legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqis and throughout the region if the UN, the EU, and key Arab allies like Jordan are involved in its formation? Folks: we get one good chance at doing this right. We do not have the luxury of a trial-and-error process where we go back to the drawing board after Iraqis have rejected an authority they view as illegitimate.

Yes, speed is important. Everyone knows Iraqis need to see Iraqi faces in their interim authority as soon as possible. But legitimacy should be the priority even if that means the process takes a little longer.

Legitimacy will come not just through a broader representation from the international community, but even more importantly from a broad representation from Iraq’s many communities and political persuasions. We should not make the mistake of seeing Iraq’s three main ethnic communities – Arab Shi’a, Arab Sunni, and Kurds as monoliths that have to be balanced against one another. There is rich diversity of ethnic identities and more importantly, political views, within Iraq.

We should strive to include as many as possible be they Turkmen, Chaldeans, or Assyrians be they tribal leaders, religious figures, secular democrats or Arab nationalists be they regional and community leaders, professionals or ordinary Iraqis ready to contribute to the rebuilding of their country.

The meetings held in Iraq thus far amount to two town hall meetings. Political activity is just beginning to manifest itself. It is hindered by the fact that many are afraid to leave their homes because of lawlessness. An independent media has yet to take shape. Getting law and order restored, getting the power back on, and making Iraqis aware of a transparent and inclusive process inclusive are critical to the legitimacy of the interim authority.

But the interim authority is only the beginning. We should help Iraqis convene a constituent assembly charged with drafting a new Constitution. The new Constitution should be put to the public in a referendum. Once it is approved, elections should follow under whatever governing structures Iraqis decide.

And there should be transparency allowing Iraqis to see authority being transferred to them. Working with our international partners, we should establish a timeline with targets for the gradual transition to complete Iraqi sovereignty.

All of this is an incredibly tall order. But in reality there’s no alternative. We took this on when we made the decision to move on Saddam. Only by winning the peace in Iraq, by getting it right, will we enhance our ability to promote and support democratic reforms throughout the region. That, in turn, will enhance our own security. For when there are no democratic outlets, dissent moves underground. It turns to resentment. And then it’s ventilated by extremism and even terrorism.

So we must make it clear to our friends in the region that their future – and their future with us – requires a move toward democratization. If we listen to the voices of Arabs themselves if we tie progress to empowering women, reforming economies, and expanding political participation, we will help infuse a sense of hope in the region.

And, finally, by getting it right, we will succeed in the fundamental mission that led us to take on these momentous actions. We will have made America a little more secure, diminished that sense of vulnerability we carry around silently with us day after day, in the shadow of our ongoing battle for freedom and liberty, at home and abroad.