Rep.
Ellen Tauscher, Chair, Strategic Forces Subcommittee House Armed Services
Committee
This Thursday a House committee will
take the first step in signaling where Congress stands on a pending nuclear
energy agreement with Russia. The
hearing represents a critical opportunity for the United States to make
progress on limiting the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Ratification of the agreement should come
with a commitment to further joint action on dealing with Iran's nuclear program
and as well as a commitment to developing a post-START agreement that codifies
deeper nuclear reductions. Ratification of the nuclear cooperation agreement
should signal to the new Russian President and the next American President that
the American people require broader leadership on the part of both governments
regarding reducing the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.
On
May 12, President Bush submitted to Congress the text of a proposed agreement
on peaceful nuclear cooperation between the United States and Russia. The
agreement would provide Russia with access to U.S. nuclear technologies and
markets and the right to receive U.S. origin nuclear materials into Russia for
storage or processing. While the agreement is not necessary to do so, it could
also give impetus for the U.S. and Russia to collaborate on providing nuclear
fuel cycle services to non-nuclear states that are searching for solutions to
their demand for energy.
Referred to by shorthand as a "123
agreement," after the section of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act this agreement will
become law if Congress does not act to amend or reject. Because of the curious timing of the Bush administration's
submission, the agreement will only have reached the 76th
legislative day of consideration when Congress adjourns on September 26th,
letting its fate fall to a new administration and Congress if the current
Congress so chooses.
I strongly believe that we should not
let the clock run out and punt a decision this important. Instead
we must seize this opportunity to make progress on several critical related
issues. With North Korea's recent declaration of its plutonium, one of the
greatest threats to global security is showing signs of resolution, leaving two
significant challenges for both Russia and the United States: Ahmadinejad quest
for nuclear weapons and the still oversized American and Russian arsenals at
risk of theft and accidental launch.
The prospect of an Iran armed with
nuclear weapons continues to be one of the greatest threats to the United
States and to its allies. Despite assurances contained in the Nuclear
Proliferation Assessment that accompanied submission of the 123 document that
the United States has "received assurances from Russia...that its government
would not tolerate cooperation with Iran in violation of its U.N. Security
Council Resolutions," Russia continues to build a nuclear power plant at
Bushehr and thwarts harsher international sanctions against Iran. Arms control
experts warn that Russia remains actively engaged in missile, nuclear, and
advanced conventional defense cooperation with Iran. Underpinning Russia's
security cooperation with Iran is Moscow's commercial interest in staying
involved in a country with the world's second largest reserves of gas and third
largest oil supply.
While the incentives for changed Russian
behavior are hard to identify in the current climate, it is critical that
Russia agree to cease nuclear cooperation with Iran including construction of
Bushehr. At a time of record windfall
oil profits for Russia, abstaining from supporting Iran's nuclear program is a
small price to pay for a more stable region.
Of
equal concern is the loss of the last major arms control agreement of the 21st
Century when the START agreement expires in December 2009. START contains the transparency and
verification protocols on which the Moscow Treaty relies. As the United States
and Russia reduce the number of deployed nuclear weapons, pursuant to the
Moscow Treaty, these rules are crucial. When START lapses the United States
will lose any ability to verify that Russia is effectively reducing its
arsenal.
The
United States and Russia must negotiate a legally binding replacement to
START. Only through such an agreement can we ease Russian concern that
the United States is seeking a strategic advantage and begin to negotiate
openly and clearly.
The 123 agreement complies with all arms control criteria listed
in the Atomic Energy Act; so it does not threaten non-proliferation standards
and will in the short term, likely only offer limited commercial benefit to US
firms. Instead, what it does is put the United States and Russia back on a path
of serious cooperation, addressing the threat of weapons of mass destruction,
the most serious issue the international community faces.
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