Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT) today continued to show his strong opposition to the war in Iraq by voting against legislation which would provide funding for military operations in Iraq because it did not contain a firm and enforceable deadline for the phased redeployment of combat troops out of Iraq. 

“Once again, Congress is being asked to pour tens of billions of dollars more into an unending war, for uncertain goals, carried forward by little more than a mixture of blind faith and inertia,” Dodd said.  “The best hope for Iraq, and the best hope for America, lies in redeployment—not in another $ 50 or $70 billion poured down this hole. I have faith that time will open the eyes of every one of my colleagues; I hope they will begin by seeing the deep error of these bills.”

The full text of Senator Dodd’s statement is below:

Mr. President, I will oppose the motion to proceed to both the Senate and House bills to provide bridge funding to Iraq because they do not contain firm and enforceable dates to get our troops out of Iraq.

Once again, Congress is being asked to pour tens of billions of dollars more into an unending war, for uncertain goals, carried forward by little more than a mixture of blind faith and inertia.

Once again, the American people are being asked to shut their eyes tight against the facts and trudge blindly on—this time at the cost of some $50 or $70 billion depending on which bill we are talking about, and who knows how many more lives. And once again, those who question this war—a majority Americans—are being asked: “You support the troops—don’t you?”

Mr. President, how could we not? How could we not be awed by the bravery and sacrifice of our men and women in Iraq? How could we not be inspired by their choice to volunteer in the first place? How could we not be impressed by the discipline, competence, intelligence, and resourcefulness with which General Petraeus and the soldiers under his command have fought in Iraq? They deserve our respect, and much more.

But contrary to what the president’s supporters would have you believe, the debate does not end there. It begins there. And I’ve come to the floor today to suggest that the president’s supporters would do well to heed key military virtues: recognizing the difference between tactics and strategy—between short-term and long-term.

All the tactical brilliance in the world will win you nothing if it doesn’t find its place within a larger plan for victory. And in Iraq, that plan is exactly where we found it in the spring of 2003—nonexistent.

No one in this chamber would doubt that recent months in Iraq have seen significant tactical success. The number IED explosions has dropped significantly.

The total number of enemy attacks, and the number of coalition soldiers killed in action, have been in decline —even though 2007 recently became the deadliest year in record for U.S. troops in Iraq. Iraqi civilian casualties have been cut from a high of 3,000 in the month of December 2006—even though they still hover around an appalling 1,000 per month.

But overall, the security picture in Iraq is, for the time being, improved.

The question is: Why? What made that happen? If anything comes out of this debate, it should be an honest answer to that question—not so we can assign praise and blame, but so we can piece together a coherent strategy.

I don’t doubt that our troop’s dedication did its part to reduce the violence. But if American agency was the sole factor, why was violence in Iraq on the decline before the surge began—even before it was announced? It’s clear to me that there have been three deeper causes.

First,Muqtada al-Sadr, a prime mover of sectarian violence, has sat out the surge, patiently waiting for its inevitable end. As The New Yorker recently put it, “analysts credit much of the recent drop in Iraqi civilian deaths not to the surge but to Sadr’s decision, in August, to order the Mahdi Army, which is believed to have been responsible for much of the Shiite-on-Sunni sectarian killing in and around Baghdad, to ‘freeze’ its activities for six months.” Sadr and his fellow sectarian leaders may be brutal—but they are also calculating and self-interested.

They know that the surge, whatever is decided here today, cannot be physically sustained indefinitely.

Second, the drop in violence can also be attributed to the so-called Sunni Awakening: the decision by tribal leaders in Anbar province to turn against al-Qaeda and foreign jihadists. That choice was laudable and—as shown by Abu Risha, the charismatic tribal leader who allied with America and was murdered for it—truly courageous.

But it was also unforeseen by the surge and began independently of the surge. But as valuable and necessary as the fight against al-Qaeda in Iraq has been, it does little to stem the deeper civil war between Sunnis and Shiites—the overwhelming source of Iraq’s chaos.

The fight against al-Qaeda must go on—but there’s no reason why it compels us to police a civil war.

Third and finally, many analysts have argued that violence has bottomed out because Iraq’s ethnic cleansing is reaching a conclusion—because Iraq has, de facto, partitioned itself. With almost a million Baghdadis fleeing their homes in the conflict, the city has become ever more ethnically homogenous, reducing Sunni-Shiite flashpoints.

Each of these causes has contributed its part to what some are intemperately hailing as our long-awaited victory. It would be wonderful to believe that America made it happen, after all this time, through sheer force of will. Every one of my colleagues, I’m sure, wants to believe that.

But this is the clear line running through this chamber: between those who want it to be true so desperately that they blind themselves, and those who understand that that kind of belief—the kind that calls a proposition true because we want it to be true—is the kind that saw an alliance between Saddam and al-Qaeda, the kind that saw an Iraq full of WMDs, the kind that saw a mission accomplished four years ago.

But still, Mr. President, even if you grant that belief, even if you say that the surge, and nothing else, brought down the violence—is that our victory?

No. The surge was always a military means to a political end. Comptroller General David Walker put it well: “the primary point of the surge was to improve security…in order to provide political breathing room” for the Iraqi government. President Bush has said much the same. The surge was always meant to open a window for political reconciliation. Nearly 800 American sacrificed their lives to keep that window open; thousands and thousand of Americans took wounds to keep that window open. What has the Iraqi government done with it?

Failed to meet its own political benchmarks. Failed to enact oil legislation. Sustained a mass resignation of Sunni politicians, leaving more than half of its cabinet seats vacant. Enjoyed a month-long vacation.

This September, 60% of Iraqis—and 93% of Sunnis—thought it was justified to kill American troops.

And during America’s long sacrifice to keep civil war at bay, the Maliki government has grown more sectarian than ever, more and more openly an arm of the Shiites, more and more actively prejudiced against Sunnis. Hundreds of Americans died to give breathing space to Iraqi politicians—and they act as if Iraq doesn’t exist.

Many of the Iraqi forces we have relied on to stabilize that country are little more than retooled sectarian gangs. What’s stopping them from accepting our training, accepting our weapons, and then—as soon as the surge dies down—jumping once again down each others’ throats?

In the name of unity and reconciliation, our policies have divided Iraq deeper and deeper, until, as George Washington University Middle East expert Marc Lynch has argued, Iraq becomes “a warlord state…with power devolved to local militias, gangs, tribes, and power-brokers, with a purely nominal central state.”

That is Iraq with the surge in place. But President Bush has conceded that it can’t continue past July; and soon, we will be confronted by Iraq without the surge. So I have a simple question for my colleagues this morning:

What then?

And as President Bush tries to find an answer, as he tries to cobble together a plan more than four years too late, our billions will continue to be poured into a desert sinkhole; our nation will earn the enmity of more and more Muslims for our endless occupation; our military will be ground into the dirt, unit by unit, machine by machine, soldier by soldier; and young Americans will continue to die. And we will be not an inch safer.

That is why I’ve come to the floor this morning: not to pass judgment; not to score points; not to assign blame. But because as we hurtle on with all tactics and no strategy, the costs are becoming too heavy for us to bear.

There is only one realistic strategy, only one honest answer to “What then?” Redeploy our combat forces from Iraq, starting immediately. Refocus the fight on al-Qaeda, training those Iraqi forces we can trust, and protecting U.S. personnel and infrastructure. Rebuild our worn-down, battered military.

Our troops will have my respect for what they’ve done in Iraq for as long as I live. And I join President Bush in his fervent hope that their sacrifice would be enough to heal a shattered country. But my eyes are open. I know that the best hope for Iraq, and the best hope for America, lies in redeployment—not in another $ 50 or $70 billion poured down this hole. I have faith that time will open the eyes of every one of my colleagues; I hope they will begin by seeing the deep error of these bills.

I yield the floor.

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