Prepared Statement by Vice Adm. Conrad Lautenbacher



Mr. Chairman, Members of the Seapower Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss Littoral Warfare Missions of the United States Navy in the 21st Century. In my opening remarks I want to lay out for you the strategic and tactical realities of littoral operations in the 21st Century and describe in broad terms our strategy for transforming the force to one that, while still excelling in traditional ``blue water'' missions, is becoming increasingly focused on the land campaign.

Following my remarks, Division Directors charged with meeting warfighting requirements and I will be glad to address issues in our respective littoral warfare missions. I have also furnished six annexes in my written statement for the record which address previously indicated areas of specific congressional interest .

Mr. Chairman, first, some opening observations. What is true in the last decade of the 20th Century will remain relevant in the first decade of the 21st. The inherent flexibility of the Navy/Marine Corps team will continue to provide a force uniquely positioned to deal with the global range of challenges we expect to face. Sea-based forces can gain initial maritime, air and information superiority, provide reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting, and attack through the battlespace to deliver and sustain forces ashore. These capabilities can be exercised without regard to the access and sovereignty issues that may hamper the rapid and effective use of land-based forces.

Our nation needs the capability represented by the Navy/Marine Corps team. Never before have the long term goals and objectives of both services been so closely linked. The transformation of the Navy in the 21st Century from a ``blue'' to a ``littoral'' waters focus will bring us even closer to the Marine Corps and its concepts for the application of power. The Navy of the 21st Century will ``fit hand-in-glove'' with the Marine Corps's Operational Maneuver from the Sea and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver concepts, and position both our forces well for the uncertainties of the new century.

Now, consider the strategic environment. The United States is today, and will remain, a maritime nation_a world power that is washed by the waters of the world's two great oceans. Since the founding of the Republic, a sense of the importance of the sea to our nation's health and well being has been deeply rooted in our national character.

We believe that the core objectives of our national security strategy will best be accomplished through a well-defined policy of political, economic and military engagement on a global scale. The essential element of this strategy is ``engagement.'' But to ``engage,'' you must ``be there,'' and ``being there'' in the 21st Century will involve almost continuous operations in the world's littoral regions. The realities of geography bound the challenge: 222 of the world's 265 countries border the sea; 75 percent of the world's population and 80 percent of the world's capitals border, or are in close proximity to, the sea.

It is essential for the United States to continue to influence events in these regions, many vital to our national security. Given the marked decline in our ground forces stationed overseas since the end of the Cold War, the Navy/Marine Corps team in the 21st Century will serve as an increasingly important and visible manifestation of America's commitment to remain engaged through forward presence.

Now, consider the tactical environment. In the 21st Century the Navy will be an offensive maritime force able to conduct precision land attack and theater air dominance from the littoral as part of joint, allied and coalition forces. While continuing traditional maritime battlespace roles, the Navy's focus will shift toward developing capabilities to distribute offensive firepower among a number of platforms on, under and above the water and adjoining land mass. Operating in the littoral, often in shallow waters in close proximity to merchant and civilian shipping, with sensors masked by land masses and urban environs, poses a complex warfighting challenge. Such an environment requires integration of sensors and combat systems in a common tactical picture. With reduced battlespace and engagement timelines, response times are correspondingly diminished. The proximity of land provides an adversary with opportunities for cover and deception, and short ranges and times of flight.

But past is prologue, and we have, and will continue, to operate in the littoral. We have met the challenge to date and we believe the unique capabilities of forward deployed naval forces to project power over land and perform sea and area control will continue to play a large role in preventing conflict and frustrating regional aggressors in the 21st Century. The unique combat power resident in our carrier battle groups, maritime patrol and helicopter forces, amphibious ready groups, surface combatants and submarines operating in the littoral provides us the capability to deny potential adversaries their objectives and foreclose their options. But increasingly sophisticated weapons systems available to any state with the financial wherewithal to afford them mandates that while continuing to meet the demands of a dangerous world by shaping and responding in the near term, the Navy must embark on a process to transform today's sea-based combat capabilities and support structures to shape and respond effectively to the new challenges of the 21st Century.

The recently issued report of the National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense, National Security in the 21st Century, presented a broad overview of the challenges and opportunities facing the Department of Defense in the next century. We have accepted the Panel's call for a ``comprehensive reshaping of the skills and capabilities of our armed forces'' and embarked on a measured transformation of our forces that will provide our national leadership much greater flexibility in its application of sea-based military capability. And it is our belief that much of this capability will come from surface, air and subsurface platforms operating in the littoral.

Given the complexities of operating in the littoral in the 21st Century, how do we ensure we will be ready? What are the processes by which we will implement this transformation?

First, we are capitalizing on the technologies already in the fleet or near initial operational capability. We are ``breaking down'' barriers in our thinking processes, getting beyond platform capabilities and limitations, and thinking beyond traditional demarcations of air, surface and subsurface communities. We are changing our organizational and operational concepts to ensure that our 21st Century tactics match the technologies and combat systems capabilities we will be bringing down to the waterfront.

We are aligning the Navy's resources and requirements to enhance those things that allow us to influence events ashore directly and decisively from the sea. From theater air dominance, land attack and force protection, to undersea superiority and command and control, we are moving away from a platform-centered Navy to one being built around data networks. And whether you term this a Revolution in Military Affairs or a Military Technical Revolution, the fact is that we are combining the near-term evolution of our new generation of ships and aircraft with a far-term revolution in the capabilities within these platforms to achieve a full-spectrum dominance from the sea unparalleled in naval history.

The focus of our near term efforts is to make evolutionary changes in current force structure and to meld the fundamental precepts of the Navy's Operational Concept and the Marine Corps's Operational Maneuver from the Sea. We have a solid base upon which to build: the world's most capable sea-based combat capability.

Consider our surface combatants. The multi-year buy of the Arleigh Burke Class Aegis destroyers, DDG 89101 will result in platforms with a significantly different focus than the thirty-eight ships that preceded them. From the ability to provide long range surface fire support and precision land attack, through area and theater ballistic missile defense systems, to a fully integrated remote mine hunting system and commercial-off-the-shelf based sonar, the Navy's most successful shipbuilding program ever will continue to build the world's most capable destroyer suited to meet the requirements for sea-based combat capability in the 21st Century.

The Cruiser Conversion Plan will preserve the relevancy of the Aegis cruiser force into the 21st Century. It will address both the continuing development of theater ballistic missiles by potential adversaries and the Marine Corps's requirement for ``responsive, precise naval surface fire support'' by installing Theater Ballistic Missile Defense and Land Attack capabilities in the VLS-configured units of this class. Plans call for 12 cruisers to be upgraded over the fiscal year 19992003 period, with the initial unit funded in fiscal year 2001. To ensure a joint integrated airdefense command capability resides at sea, Area Air Defense Commander capabilities will be provided in 12 cruisers. The plan will also provide ``Smart Ship'' core control systems technology improving mission capability, reducing crew size and life cycle costs. In addition the Cruiser Conversion Plan lays the foundation for the advanced computing architecture needed for the Navy Theater Wide upper tier ballistic missile defense system.

Each of these significantly enhanced capabilities represents a fundamental departure from the kinds of missions that were envisioned for the Aegis force of cruisers and destroyers when U.S.S. Ticonderoga put to sea in 1982. The Cruiser Conversion Plan will permit the Navy to leverage on theAegis success story and defer the need for a successor cruiser building program until the full rate production of the 21st Century Land Attack Destroyer, a revolutionary platform, is completed.

Essential to our ability to conduct Operational Maneuver from the Sea and to meet forward presence, contingency and warfighting requirements is the capability resident in our 12 Amphibious Ready Groups. While the number of Groups will remain constant, the evolution of their composition and capabilities will ensure our ability to fight and win on future littoral battlefields. 21st Century Amphibious Ready Groups will be comprised of one ``big deck'' General Purpose Amphibious Assault Ship (a Tarawa Class LHA) or Multipurpose Amphibious Assault Ship (a Wasp Class LHD) , a dock landing ship (LSD), and one San Antonio Class Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD).

The San Antonio Class LPD, with its triad of embarked Navy and Marine Corps mobility vehicles, the MV22 Osprey aircraft, the Landing Craft (Air Cushion) and the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle, will provide a modern, over-the-horizon launch and recovery platform necessary to the execution of both Operational Maneuver from the Sea and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver. Built from the keel up to accommodate this 21st Century mobility triad, the San Antonio Class will incorporate a complex surface combatant command and control suite, including Cooperative Engagement Capability and the Naval Fires Management System, and be part of the Navy's 21st Century Network Centric Warfare construct with connectivity equal to those afforded our aircraft carriers and Aegis cruisers.

In naval aviation the airwing is evolving today as we upgrade F14 fighters, already the Navy's premier long-range fighter, to a potent precision strike-fighter with the incorporation of the Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night system. Complementing the Navy's current F/A18 Hornet aircraft, the evolution of the F14 into a strike-fighter, including addition of new defensive countermeasure systems and night vision capability, will enable the Navy to maintain an increasingly lethal strike-fighter force on each carrier deck until arrival of the F/A18 Super Hornet.

The F/A18 Hornet remains naval aviation's principal strike-fighter, and improvements to the original Hornets include warfighting enhancements in the near term to improve weapons, communications, navigation and defensive countermeasures systems. The introduction of the F/A18E/F Super Hornet to the fleet in 2001 will provide critical growth capacity, weapon bring-back improvements, survivability enhancements, range and payload improvements. The evolution of the Hornet into the Super Hornet will keep the Navy's strike-fighter force lethal and viable well into the 21st Century. Ultimately, the F/A18E will replace older F/A18s while the two-seat F/A18F will replace the F14. As development of the Joint Strike Fighter continues throughout thedecade, the lethality, flexibility, reliability and survivability of the F/A18E/F will make it the right aircraft to fulfill the majority of missions associated with operations in the littoral well into the 21st Century.

The evolution of high performance aircraft has been complemented by the reshaping of the carrier air wing. Each of our ten active carrier air wings and one Reserve air wing is comprised of increasingly lethal multimission capable strike-fighter aircraft able to deliver our nation's newest families of precision weapons. The tactical support provided by the electronic warfare capabilities of the EA6B Prowler, the multi-purpose, multi-sensor capabilities of the E2C Hawkeye, and the expanded surveillance and reconnaissance role of the S3B Viking make the air wing uniquely capable of conducting sustained operations in the littorals. Our strike capability aboard each carrier has actually increased, despite airwings having become smaller, due both to the evolution of the F14 and the addition of new standoff and precision strike weapons. System enhancements that will significantly improve warfighting capabilities in the littoral environment are also planned for maritime patrol and helicopter forces not organic to the air wing.

While the aircraft carrier has been, and will remain the centerpiece of our naval global forward presence and striking power, this singular manifestation of our Navy's unparalleled combat capability is also evolving. We are modernizing our newer carriers and replacing our older carriers through a plan that maintains essential capabilities and force structure. U.S.S. Nimitz begins her refueling and complex overhaul this spring during which she will not only be refueled, but also modernized to serve more than two additional decades. All Nimitz class carriers will undergo a similar evolution as they reach the mid-life of their anticipated service.

Harry S. Truman will be commissioned this July to replace U.S.S. Independence this year, and the tenth and final Nimitz Class carrier, CVN 77, will enter the fleet in 2008, replacing U.S.S. Kitty Hawk. CVN 77 is being consciously designed as a transition carrier to the new design CVX, incorporating new technologies resulting from research and development efforts.

Tiltrotor technology will enable the Marine Corps to project power from over-the-horizon to the full reach inland specified in Operational Maneuver from the Sea. The MV22 Osprey will allow the Marine Air-Ground Task Force to fully exploit its combat power, triple the depth of its present day battlespace, and significantly complicate an aggressor's defensive requirements, inhibiting his ability to concentrate forces. The superior combat radius of the MV22 will also facilitate greater stand-off ranges for Navy and Joint Force assets if required by the tactical situation.

As in the surface and aviation communities, our submarine force is evolving from a blue water force to one particularly suited for a wide range of covert and overt littoral warfare missions including strike, antisubmarine, antisurface, covert intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, special warfare, mine warfare and battle group operations. Currently, submarines provide the only truly covert Special Operations Force insertion capability. When not conducting special national missions, submarine operations at periscope depth, closely linked with, and in mutual support of, surface and air battle group operations are the norm, rather than the exception today.

To complement the broadened role of submarines in our operational concepts, improved capabilities in specific mission areas are being evolved from current systems. The Unmanned Underwater Vehicle based Near Term Mine Reconnaissance System which will IOC in 1998, will be deployed by SSN 688 class submarines, complemented by a long term mine reconnaissance and avoidance system which will be introduced into the fleet in 2003. IntegratedUndersea Surveillance improvements, including twinline towed arrays for Surtass ships will use common towed array technology and new deployable distributed acoustic arrays for large area surveillance and tripwire indication and warning in key strategic locations.

Today we are at a cross-road in the development of submarines. The 688 class has been completed and the first of three Seawolf class ships is at sea undergoing various trials with impressive results. Also, 1998 marks the start of construction for the New Attack Submarine (NSSN) class. Utilizing a first of its kind construction teaming arrangement, each NSSN will be built by two participating shipyards. This approach promises to increase affordability based on a reduced learning curve since each yard will always produce the same sections of each ship.

The NSSN is the first U.S. submarine specifically optimized for littoral operations. Building on the success of the Seawolf program, its enhancements will include unprecedented stealth both acoustic and non-acoustic, a reconfigurable torpedo room which can be optimized for three missions: Anti-submarine Warfare, Strike with Tomahawk missiles, or Special Forces Delivery. NSSN will carry an advanced mine detection system and a reduced electromagnetic signature for mine avoidance, a nine man SOF lockout trunk and the ability to carry both the Dry Deck Shelter and the Advanced SEAL Delivery Systems. Sophisticated surveillance enhancements will include improved periscope imagery capability using a digital electro-optical photonic mast and improved acoustic sensors including towed arrays and a light weight wide aperture hull mounted array. The inclusion of advanced technologies and increased automation resulted in a 26 percent reduction in the number of watchstanders required to operate the ship at sea. Additionally, the NSSN was specifically designed to readily accommodate the insertion of advanced technologies allowing each new ship to be state of the art upon delivery and to remain so during its life. A major part of NSSN's technology insertion program is the use of Large Scale Vehicles. These one quarter scale models operating in Lake Pend Oreille in Idaho, allow new technologies to be rapidly and affordably prototyped at sea and proven before insertion into the NSSN program.

Moving beyond near-term considerations, joint warfighting capabilities will increasingly shift from platform-centric to network-centric architectures as the precepts of offensive distributed firepower are further realized. Within the surface navy, the 21st Century Land Attack Destroyer, DD 21, will be introduced, and the fleet will gain a theater-wide ballistic missile defense capability aboard our Aegis cruisers and destroyers.

The second element of our dual-track strategy for procuring aircraft carriers for the next century will become reality, as the most technologically advanced aircraft carrier the Navy has ever developed, CVX, will be commissioned in 2013. Because the service life of our aircraft carriers farexceeds that of any of our other ships, they must be designed and built with the flexibility to meet any unknown threats of the future. This includes the ability to operate future aircraft, the main warfighting capability of the carrier.

Using CVN 77 as a ``springboard,'' CVX will feature improved characteristics in selected areas, including aircraft launch and recovery systems, flight deck layout, an open architecture command and control system, information networks and technological innovations leading to significantly reduced manning and life cycle cost reductions.

The continuing development of the Joint Strike Fighter throughout the decade will ensure we have complementary revolutionary aircraft to enhance our airwings in the 20082010 time-frame.

In all communities, our joint command, control and targeting capabilities will migrate toward realization of direct sensor-to-shooter connectivity. Seamless coverage of the joint battlefield will be achieved by overhead sensors and information superiority will be gained, and maintained, by increased use of space-based sensors and connectivity. Long range sensor suites, joint connectivity with theater and national systems, and long range precision munitions will give our air, surface and subsurface platforms, operating independently or with carrier, amphibious or surface battle groups the ability to attack throughout the battlespace.

In the long-term much of what will evolve is still to be determined. But whatever platforms eventually put to sea as replacements for today's force structure, they will be ``revolutionary'' rather than ``evolutionary'' in design. Combat systems will be developed with open architectures, permitting on-line upgrades via software, as opposed to hardware changes. New modular construction techniques will dramatically change the way capabilities can be added to platforms and will maximize flexibility and combat capabilities specifically tailored to the mission.

Successful strategic thought is highly pragmatic, and such is our approach toward conducting future operations in the littoral. To be successful, we will evolve in stages, taking into account both changes in technology and the reality of the Nation's near-term security requirements. As the National Defense Panel correctly observed in December:





``The central challenge to our defense structure is to move forward in a manner that enables us to respond effectively to whatever occurs. This strongly suggests a hedging approach to preparing for the future. We must maintain adequate current capability as we adapt. As we learn more about new ways to apply military power, we can shift the emphasis of our forces while curtailing outdated or less useful forces and operational concepts.''





This ``measured'' approach is reflected in the Navy's approach to littoral operations in the 21st Century. Two perspectives are guiding our approach to the future. First, with the end of the Cold War, our determination of force structure and requirements are no longer threat-based, but capabilities-based. There is no longer a need to develop platforms designed to sweep the Soviet Navy from the seas. Instead, we can evolve a modernized Navy and design and build revolutionary platforms to influence events ashore, operating alone or in consonance with joint, allied or coalition forces.

Second, our transition strategy is both evolutionary and revolutionary. The former allows us to leverage off the capabilities of what is already, without qualification, the world's most capable navy. Evolving platforms currently at sea to meet early 21st Century requirements maximizes their ``return'' to the fleet and the American taxpayer. When technology permits and warfighting requirements demand both a technical and conceptual leap forward, such as with the 21st Century Land Attack Destroyer, LPD 17, the New Attack Submarine and the Joint Strike Fighter, a true ``revolution'' in sea-based combat capability will be effected.





ANNEX A_COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

Any consideration of Littoral Warfare Missions in the 21st Century must begin with command and control, for it is in this area that the impact of technology will have its earliest, and most visible, impact on warfighting. Departing from historical norms dating from ancient times, 21st Century military capability, rather than being necessarily defined by platform sensor and weapons limitations, will be derived from the ``networked'' nature of sensors, information processing and analytical systems. 21st Century sea-based combat capability, in the littorals or anywhere we choose to operate, will be marked by a shift from attrition warfare to one characterized by ``speed of command.''

Dominant battlefield awareness will be America's most significant warfighting advantage, and as communications speed approaches computing speed, mobile platforms such as Navy ships and multiple, dispersed Marine units will benefit in the same manner as stationary units already in the network. Complex combat systems to achieve detection, engagement, destruction and battle damage assessment will be found, not on the platform, but on the grid.

Network Centric Warfare may be the most dramatic change in warfare since the advent of aviation. The Navy stands at the threshold of a true revolution in application of sea-based military capability. Through developments in connectivity dramatically increasing the distribution and availability of data on the network, the Navy will develop the ability to widely distribute offensive firepower among a host of platforms, surface, air and subsurface.

This distribution of firepower will require an ability to share extremely accurate raw sensor measurement data in real time between ships, aircraft and land-based units. This technique, known as sensor netting, is fundamentally different from the current practice of transmitting highly processed track information between units. Previously existing tactical data link systems did not possess the throughput and data processing capacity required to achieve sensor netting, but in the Cooperative Engagement Capability we have the Navy's initial entree into the Network Centric Warfare construct for the new century.

Cooperative Engagement Capability will permit coordination of air defense sensors and data integration of such fidelity that a network of individual systems will operate as a single distributed air defense system. If any one sensor can ``see'' well enough to engage, every unit ``on'' the network will be able to engage. High quality sensor data and fire control weapons information will pass among multiple units where it will be automatically integrated into each unit's combat system. As a result, engagement decisions will be automated and executed in real time across the entire force.

The Navy's concept of operations for force protection in the littorals leverages on developments in connectivity to increase dramatically the sharing, distribution and availability of data among a host of platforms. Dominant battlefield advantage in terms of force protection will be achieved through improved situational awareness where complex combat systems detect, track and engage at longer ranges and greater lethality. By networking indigenous and national sensors with shipborne combat systems through sensor fusion, the full potential of the weapons carried in our ship's magazines will be realized.

Facilitating our achievement of dominant battlefield advantage will be Information Dominance, essential to the success of naval littoral operations, both for purposes of force protection and support to power projection missions. Long before the force approaches the range limits of friendly or hostile weapons, exploitation of enemy information systems and networks will prepare the way for powerful attacks while building our understanding of an adversary's capabilities and intentions.

During combat operations, precisely timed and shaped information attacks will be conducted with the intent of achieving the maximum degradation of the enemy's most important command and control processes at critical moments in the battle.

Concomitantly we need to be fully cognizant of the degree to which our own combat effectiveness is dependent on the superb sensor, communications and command and control capabilities that America's sea-based forces enjoy. As such, it is vitally important for us to be just as attentive to the protection of our own essential information-based processes as to our efforts to degrade an opponent's command and control infrastructure.

ANNEX B_FORCE PROTECTION

Navy requirements for Maritime Force Protection are contained in the Ship Class AAW Self Defense Capstone Requirements Document which was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations in February 1996. This document specifies theship self defense anti-air warfare contribution for each ship type and spells out the raid size, density, and required probability of raid annihilation for battle force and amphibious ready group ships.

Sustained operations in the littoral will require force protection capabilities which are effective against the maximum possible range of current and projected threats. Arleigh Burke Class destroyers, our front line surface combatants, are configured to operate in the littoral where low radar and acoustic signatures, offensive firepower and survivability features optimize these ships to lead power projection forces into coastal waters. The Flight IIA variant (DDGs 79 and follow) will be further upgraded to enhance total force effectiveness in the littoral with Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, Cooperative Engagement Capability, 5``/62 Extended Range Guided Munitions (DDG 89 and follow) and Remote Mine Hunting Sonar enhancements.



Netting sensors together creates a total force that is mutually supportive. In our amphibious force, an LPD 17, for instance, will be able to join the network where the synergy of all the sensors and weapons resident within the force contribute to total force protection. Air tracks detected by SPY1D radars in DDGs will be netted via Cooperative Engagement Capability to expand the battlespace of every platform. After 2008 the LPD 17 ship class is expected to operate to seaward consistent with the Marine Corps operational concept articulated in Operational Maneuver from the Sea; with Cooperative Engagement Capability, this ship class will benefit from other battle force air defense assets to provide defense against any potential air threats at a level consistent with the Capstone requirements. To accomplish this in the LPD 17 design, Navy has invested heavily in the benefits of radar cross section reduction combined with softkill NULKA capability, a combination providing a fundamental shift in warfighting philosophy for this amphibious ship class. Netting sensors and weapons, within the lifelines, with the Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) will give these ships a self defense capability equal to any combatant.

The aircraft carrier must be able to operate with impunity in the littoral. To operate with that level of confidence, important improvements to the carrier Ship Self Defense Suite have been undertaken. Although incremental in nature, these improvements reflect significant improvement in our current force protection capabilities. Radar upgrades continue to increase the reliability of current systems and improve their maintainability and performance in the littoral. Additionally, plans are in place to upgrade the carrier's self-defense weapons mix.

Near term improvements include installation of Cooperative Engagement Capability to provide additional situational awareness for theater non-Aegis Ship Self Defense Suite ships. Improvements will give the carrier the quick reaction and additional capability necessary to defeat the 21st century threat in the littoral. With non-Aegis Ship Self Defense Suite will come upgraded radar (SPQ9B replacing the currently installed Target Acquisition System) and Rolling Airframe Missile which will improve capability against low flying maneuvering threats. It is planned that upon completion of the Fiscal Year 01 Post Shipyard Availability, U.S.S. Nimitz will deploy with the first integrated self-defense system designed to counter the Capstone threat. Similar upgrades are planned for the remaining Nimitz class carriers as they become available for modification.

With the planned commissioning of CVN 77 in 2008 and CVX in 2013, significant improvements are planned for passive protection and survivability. Included are systems and technologies designed to deal with chemical, biological, and radiation threats, low flyers, torpedoes, and mines.

Submarines rely almost entirely on their inherent stealth for force protection. With no radar cross-section when operating submerged, they are not susceptible to attack by cruise or ballistic missiles. They require no air intake, allowing them to operate with impunity in environments containing chemical or biological warfare agents. The New Attack Submarine's unprecedented acoustic stealth will minimize detection by fixed system arrays or threat platform passive sonars. Its non-acoustic stealth improvements such as its photonics mast wake suppresser, closed loop electromagnetic silencing and effluent management system will minimize the chances of detection by non-acoustic means. Sail and chin-mounted high frequency active sonars will allow detection of floating and bottom moored mines. Submarine undersea reconnaissance operations to locate mines and hostile submarines will enhance overall force protection.

ANNEX C_MINE WARFARE

Mines pose a significant challenge to sustained operations in the littoral, and in recognition of this reality the Navy's fiscal year 1999 Mine Warfare Programs will be increased by $126M to ensure the maintenance and sustainability of our current Mine Countermeasures forces. The focus of the future is to provide Naval forces with an organic mine countermeasures capability to ensure unencumbered maneuver of the Joint Task Force in any scenario that might surface in the littorals.

Important surface and airborne mine readiness and sustainability shortfalls have been addressed through equipment replacement and upgrades. Specifically, installation of an Integrated Ship Control System will provide fully integrated digital engineering control systems on the MCM1 class ships. The Integrated Combat Weapons System promises to significantly improve the combat systems on all of the dedicated surface MCM platforms. Development of comprehensive tactical mine counter measures resolution route surveys and digital contact databases has been addressed by initiating a high-resolution survey effort in high-priority geographic locations and databasing the resultant digital bottom maps at the Naval Oceanographic Office. A Naval Reserve contribution, consisting of four Mine Search Units and twenty Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units, provides a unique blend of coastal surveillance and command and control capability to the Navy's mine warfare/littoral forces.

An aggressive mine warfare-focused quantitative fleet exercise program is provided by the Mine Warfare Readiness Effectiveness Measurement program which operationally assesses mine warfare across the full spectrum of naval force operations by instituting a rigorous, quantitative mine warfare-focused fleet exercise program patterned after the SHAREM program. An effective threat mine acquisition and exploitation program is resourced to oversee this fundamental assessment and databasing effort. Expansion of currently limited environmental-monitoring capability by surface MCM platforms has been improved through procuring and installing oceanographic sensor systems onboard dedicated MCM vessels. Advanced command and control interconnectivity is being addressed for Explosive Ordnance Disposal units and with advanced C4I data link for airborne mine countermeasures force helicopters to provide real time data to the MCM commander.

The development of an organic mine countermeasures capability throughout the force is a clear signal of the direction we intend to pursue in this warfare discipline. This organic mine countermeasures initiative will be fully integrated into the fleet and augment our dedicated forces in the 20062010 timeframe. By putting organic capabilities into our surface ships and submarines, our ``first to arrive'' forces will be able to operate in the littoral while conducting reconnaissance for mines.

Through an ambitious research and development program and follow-on acquisition strategies, the fleet will be equipped with a full range of air, surface, and sub-surface organic mine countermeasures systems. For surface combatants, the Remote Minehunting System, and for attack submarines, the Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System, will provide high endurance, offboard minehunting sensors to perform advanced area mine reconnaissance.

In aviation, the Airborne Mine Countermeasures Systems package will be comprised of the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System, the Airborne Mine Neutralization System, the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System, the Shallow Water Influence Minesweep System and the AN/AQS20/X Advanced Airborne Mine Sensor. The CH60 is being pursued to introduce airborne mine countermeasures into the fleet carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups and then as the transition vehicle for the MH53 helicopter in the dedicated AMCM force.

In addition, a specific effort to upgrade the aging/deteriorating offensive mine stockpile will be initiated. This effort will focus on a research and development program for the development of a next generation Littoral Sea Mine with remote control capability and a target detection device configurable for the littoral surface and submarine threat. The Improved Submarine Launched Mobile Mine (ISLMM) is being considered as the replacement for the current standoff capability in the current Submarine Launch Mobile Mine.

To further improve the efficacy of MCM in the shallow and very shallow realm of the mine threat spectrum, the Navy's Very Shallow Water Detachment was activated in fiscal year 1998 to provide an operational mine clearance capability in the forty foot to ten foot region. The detachment's primary goals are the development of doctrine and techniques and evaluation of new technologies to enhance our very shallow water capabilities. The introduction of the Shallow Water Assault Breaching System and the Distributed Explosive Technology system will provide an emerging ability to breach minefields in the surf zone rapidly during an amphibious assault.

As a result of these initiatives and many others, mine warfare will become an integral part of our operating naval forces as the Navy and Marine Corps routinely demonstrate mine warfare skills in fleet and joint exercises with organic capabilities.









ANNEX D_LAND ATTACK

At the heart of naval capabilities in the littoral operating environment will be the mission of Land Attack throughout the battlespace. The 21st Century Navy will possess the capability to influence, directly and decisively, events ashore from the sea. In surface fire support, we are developing capabilities in terms of responsiveness, lethality and range to influence the land campaign in the 200 mile range from the beach in support of the Marine Corps's Operational Maneuver from the Sea and the Army's Maneuver Warfare. In strike warfare, sea-based tactical capabilities will be capable to conduct precision engagements from the shoreline inland to 1500 miles or more.

Land Attack capabilities throughout the naval force will be complementary. Initial subsurface and surface platform preparation of the battlespace by elimination of command and control nodes, air defense systems and neutralization of deep strike targets posing high levels of risk to manned platforms will segue to the sustained deliverance of precision munitions, a telling attribute of sea-based tactical aviation.

Meeting the requirements of Operational Maneuver from the Sea mandates that our surface combatants break out of a four decade old 12-mile limitation on providing surface fires in support of forces ashore. Representing a revolutionary improvement in terms of range and accuracy of naval gun systems, the 5 inch/62 caliber Extended Range Guided Munitions gun, providing precision land attack capability up to 70 nautical miles inland, is currently planned for installation in Aegis cruisers (CG 5273) and destroyers (DDG 81 and follow). The cruiser installations will occur via the Cruiser Conversion Plan. All destroyer guns will be installed in forward fit. By 2008, 22 cruisers and 27 destroyers, totaling 71 guns, will be at sea in support of the land campaign, possessing a range and accuracy never before seen in a sea-based gun system.

In recognition of both the 21st Century focus on missions in the littoral and the increased sophistication of shore-based air defense systems, naval aviation air-to-ground weapons are evolving from today's range, warhead and adverse weather limited High Speed Anti Radiation Missile, Stand-Off Land Attack Missile and Walleye to a new family of joint service Stand-Off Outside Point Defense Weapons. The Joint Direct Attack Munition will improve the accuracy of general purpose bombs in all weather conditions and will also allow a single aircraft to attack multiple targets from a single release point. The Joint Stand-Off Weapon will replace five types of older air-to-ground weapons currently in the inventory and allow both area and point targets to be attacked at greatly increased stand-off ranges. The Expanded Response variant of the Navy's Stand-Off Land Attack Missile will provide aviation with a day/night adverse-weather, precision-strike weapon with over-the-horizon range, a major improvement in precision strike capability.

The Naval Surface Fire Support Mission Needs Statement approved in May 1992 stated a requirement for a combination of guns, rockets and missiles with sufficient range, accuracy and lethality to meet a wide range of requirements. The littoral battlefield also demands accurate and responsive precision strike capability to counter emergent, relocatable targets. In meeting both requirements, the Navy is currently developing a surface and submarine launched tactical variant of Tomahawk which will have loiter (3.5 hours at 200 nautical miles from launch point) and in-flight flex (redirecting missile in-flight from programmed target/mission to higher priority, emergent, or relocatable target) capabilities. Tactical Tomahawk will significantly enhance battlefield responsiveness and flexibility while providing an enabler for future capability growth. This growth may comprise the inclusion of smart submunitions in order to attack mobile targets or an automatic target recognition seeker and penetrating warhead to counter weapons of mass destruction.

With Tomahawk being a relatively ``slow'' subsonic missile, the Navy requires a surface and submarine launched supersonic Land Attack Missile to provide sea-based quick reaction combat capability. Two supersonic missile candidates are being considered: a naval version of the Army Tactical Missile System and the Land Attack Standard Missile. An Army Tactical Missile System Block IA missile was successfully fired from a MK41 Vertical Launcher at White Sands Missile Range in November 1996. Three Land Attack Standard Missile flightdemonstrations are scheduled for fiscal year 1998. The Navy isconducting a comparative analysis of both systems. After full evaluation of flight demonstrations and analysis, the Navy will determine the optimum near and long-term solutions to satisfy the land attack missile requirement.

ANNEX E_UNDERSEA WARFARE

The Navy's reorientation from an exclusive focus on deep water antisubmarine warfare operations to a more comprehensive undersea approach encompassing both shallow-water littoral and open ocean system effectiveness as well as organic mine warfare capability has resulted in significant changes to the Navy's consideration of the 21st Century undersea warfare mission. We have recognized that passive acoustic tactics are less effective against the quiet diesel submarine in confined, shallow water areas. This realization has resulted in reemphasizing Integrated Undersea Surveillance Systems which includes the use of multi-line arrays and Advanced Deployable Systems as well as active sonar systems and processors. We are working to fully integrate cooperative tactics and invest in systems that facilitate bistatic and multistatic operations. We are also changing our intellectual and tactical ``construct'' from ``antisubmarine warfare'' to ``undersea warfare.'' This change will have significant impact on our approach to the challenge of operating in the littorals in the 21st Century. For example, we will shift from dedicated mine warfare platforms to organic capabilities, fully integrating on-board shipboard sensors and submarine and surface ship deployed remote mine countermeasure systems for mine detection and avoidance missions. Netted sensors will also cooperate in a multistatic approach to submarine and torpedo defense, providing greater detection probability against adversary platforms and weapons.

Working as an Integrated Process Team with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Navy completed the 1997 ASW Assessment and forwarded it to Congress in February. This report reaffirms that undersea warfare remains a top priority littoral warfare mission.

The Navy is pursuing a multi-faceted approach to meet future undersea warfare requirements. We are integrating our strategy, force structure, concept of operations, research, development and procurement plans into a coherent approach to this important mission. We are taking advantage of exciting opportunities in commercially available computational and communications technology. In the near term we are increasing our proficiency in littoral undersea warfare, fully exploiting the potential of existing systems and paving the way for a network centric approach to this warfare mission. The medium and long-term outlook includes investigating ways to distribute sensors, rather than platforms, in the littoral, designing long endurance sensors and developing environmentally adaptive sensors specifically targeted to the littoral operating environment.

The Navy recognizes that operational requirements in the 21st Century littoral regimen require new approaches to what has been a traditional 20th Century platform-centric approach to the challenge. Maximizing the return on our current investment, we are evolving today's systems into capabilities particularly suited for the littoral. At the same time, experimental and innovative initiatives such as total systems integration of subsurface, surface and air sensors will ensure that the Navy's long term objective of achieving and maintaining maritime dominance in the littoral battlespace will be met.

ANNEX F_21ST CENTURY LAND ATTACK DESTROYER

Modernization of the Aegis force of cruisers and destroyers will ensure their continued relevancy in the new century. But to deal with different missions, different security environments and threats of 2010 and beyond, all within a constrained fiscal environment, a new approach to shipbuilding emphasizing low life cycle cost and reduced manning will have to be realized as the Navy begins replacing its oldest frigates and destroyers. After an exhaustive review of the various options through the Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis process, the Navy has selected a maritime fire support ship as the first of the next generation of surface combatant and designated it 21st Century Land Attack Destroyer, DD21. A revolutionaryplatform built from the keel up with the tenets of Network Centric Warfare and offensive distributed firepower fundamental to its design, it will be laid down in 2004 and commissioned in 2008 as the world's first fully integrated ship with warfighting, control and maintainability supported by a single open computer operating environment.

As a revolutionary platform, the 21st Century Land Attack Destroyer, will signal a significant technological leap and major change in ship design. It will possess greatly improved capabilities in a number of areas. Like today's Arleigh Burke Class, it will be a multi-mission ship, meeting forward presence and deterrence requirements of the Geographic CINCs. DD21 will operate as an integral part of naval, joint and combined maritime forces, contributing to joint and combined battlespace dominance in littoral operations.

But unlike today's destroyers, the 21st Century Land Attack Destroyer will have as its primary mission provision of land attack support to the ground campaign. To address the ``relatively neglected'' area of surface fires, it will provide 5 inch/62 Extended Range Guided Munitions and 155mm howitzer surface fire support at ranges to 100 nautical miles inland. Between 100 and 200 miles a supersonic Land Attack Missile will service the target set. Tactical Tomahawk will provide support from 200 to 1,500 nautical miles and beyond, and include the ability to both loiter and be re-targeted in-flight.

The 21st Century Land Attack Destroyer will also be capable of battlespace dominance. It will have the most advanced undersea warfare combat systems suite ever installed in a surface combatant. Utilizing a fully integrated systems approach through employment of a sonar suite that emphasizes both bi-static and multi-static capability, it will be a platform uniquely suited to the environmental challenges and operational threats posed by operating in the littorals. Its hanger will contain room for both helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles. In terms of Theater Air Dominance, the 21st Century Land Attack Destroyer will be able to establish and maintain local air superiority, relying on the 84 ships of the Aegis cruiser and destroyer fleet to provide the ``teeth'' in long range force protection.

DD21 will be the world's first fully integrated ship where warfighting, control and maintainability are supported by a single open computer operating environment. Technological advances such as Cooperative Engagement Capability will enable it to be built not to simply complement, but be fully interconnected with, the Aegis force of cruisers and destroyers providing long range theater air dominance capabilities. As such, the DD21 will be able, if required, to serve as a ``remote'' magazine for the Aegis force.

Other revolutionary aspects of DD21 will include an integrated electric power/distribution system, minimal signature hull form, submarine-like survivability, integrated topside design, joint, seamless command and control, and advanced mine countermeasures systems.

To be able to afford the numbers of ships required for both the 21st Century Land Attack Destroyer and the follow-on air dominance cruiser, life cycle costs 70 percent less than that of today's DDG 51 are targeted. Realistically, these goals will only be achieved with a dramatically reduced manning level, with ``technology'' performing many tasks currently assigned to ships' personnel. A manning level of 95 persons is the stated goal.

ANNEX G_CARRIER PROGRAMS: CVN77 and CVX

The revolution that Naval Aviation and the aircraft carrier brought to naval warfare has been an integral part of our country's rise to world superpower status. The unchallenged relevance of carrier aviation during the Cold War years has been consistently reinforced through the numerous contingency operations in the littorals of today. That relevance will be maintained by the carrier force of the 21st Century and will continue to provide ``FOUR AND A HALF ACRES OF SOVEREIGN U.S. TERRITORY, WHERE IT IS NEEDED, WHEN IT IS NEEDED.''

The required carrier force level of 12, as determined by the 1993 Bottom Up Review, and validated by the 1997 QDR and NDP review, will be maintained and evolved to face the known, projected and unknown threat capabilities of the future littoral environments. Reduced life cycle costs and increased flexibility are required in each ship that will serve the Nation for 50 years. We will achieve this vision through our aircraft carrier 'Dual Track Strategy.'

That strategy has begun with an integrated carrier research and development plan. The Navy will procure the tenth and final Nimitz Class carrier, CVN 77, and develop and build CVX, the lead ship of an entirely new class of carriers that will endure throughout the 21st Century.

CVN 77 is an essential ``transition ship'' that the Navy will use to explore new and emerging technologies that contribute to reducing costs for that ship, and potentially for the entire Nimitz Class, and to reduce risk for the design and construction of CVX. The accelerated procurement of CVN 77 in fiscal year 2001 both maintains the Navy's force structure and ensures critical and unique industrial base skills and vendors remain in place for construction of CVX.

Stretching toward a new design aircraft carrier that will serve half a century in the littorals and in other environments is a challenging undertaking. Leveraging off technology and innovation in CVN 77, as well as ``Smart Ship,'' DD21, DARPA, ONR and other programs will enable the CVX program to optimize affordability, mobility, supportability, flexibility, interoperability, sustainability, survivability, and maintainability of this new class of carriers. Integrated topside design, electric drive, command and control systems and signature control are examples of common applications among Navy ships which will benefit CVX.

To be able to afford the CVX Class, significant reductions in Total Ownership Costs must be realized. Because personnel are the single highest ownership cost, process improvements and technologies which reduce manning on the ship are crucial. Technology areas include aircraft launch and recovery systems, flight deck layout, open architecture command and control systems, and state-of-the-art information networks.

CVX is the future. This 21st Century carrier will replace the 52 year old U.S.S. Enterprise in fiscal year 2013, and will possess the most powerful combat capability of any Naval vessel. It's fully integrated systems will be engineered to comply with Network Centric Warfare concepts, incorporating the latest versions of such systems as Cooperative Engagement Capability. At commissioning, the ship will be fully connected with every other combatant in the battle group, providing and supporting battle space dominance in any theater. As every other aircraft carrier has, CVX will provide forward presence and deterrence as part of joint and combined maritime forces, whether in the littorals or other waters.

To ensure the Navy's new design carriers meet requirements, a detailed and complex Analysis of Alternatives is underway which will be used to determine the major characteristics of the ship, including size, propulsion type and air wing size. This is being done in part because this class carrier will be the centerpiece of Naval Aviation for the next 100 years, and must be flexible and adaptable to provide the presence and power to meet the unknown challenges of the future.