Senate Foreign Relations Committee
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Security in a Post-Conflict Situation in Iraq
Statement for the Record
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Thank you Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to offer testimony to the committee with respect to the security situation that would exist in Iraq should the United States lead a coalition of military forces in deposing Saddam Hussein and dismantling his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.

Attached to this statement is a Report of a Commission on Post Conflict Reconstruction, which is the result of a two and one half year study on the subject from a general American policy standpoint, conducted by the Association of the US Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "A Wiser Peace," a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which builds on the project and commission report and addresses the situation in Iraq, is also attached. These reports contain focused recommendations on the long-term implications of repeated engagement in post conflict reconstruction activities and the immediate issue of Iraq. American and international involvement in these efforts can come about either as a result of interventions to preserve peace and assist countries emerging from conflict, as in the Balkans, and East Timor, etc., or as a result of American and multi-lateral military action as a victorious party to a conflict, i.e. in Panama and Afghanistan.

The tremendous challenges that would face the United States and its partners in Iraq can be organized into major analytical categories of executing tasks in providing security, economic and social well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation. While these groupings are useful for analysis, organization, and application of resources, it is imperative that any approach to Iraq in a post conflict situation begins with a presumption that only a comprehensive, holistic plan executed through integrated, yet decentralized actions will be successful. While security is the foundation for post conflict reconstruction efforts, the other three issue areas, or pillars, have direct impact on the long-term internal and external security capabilities and situation of the nation.

In fact, the lack of planning and preparation for such integration and coordination has bedeviled previous efforts in this area. The World Bank estimates that 50% of countries that emerge from a conflict situation are back in a conflict status within five years. That is a disturbing statistic given the stakes in Iraq. The coalition, under American leadership, cannot leave the success of these efforts within that country, with its population, strategic location, and resources to the odds of a coin flip. The resources exist to enhance the probability of success. Much has been done to marshal these resources, but much more remains to be done. The preparations for a military campaign continue to capture the bulk of the attention of both the populace and the government, while the less glamorous efforts to prepare for the aftermath continue to lag. Americans will evaluate the effort much more on what is accomplished in Iraq after a military

campaign than what is destroyed during the campaign. So will America's partners, the Iraqi people, and any potential adversaries around the world.

The tasks that need to be accomplished are well known.

First, the Iraqi regime must be deposed. The leadership must be found and if alive, detained for the purposes of either standing trial as international war criminals, or participating in whatever justice mechanism the Iraqi people determine meets their needs. Second, the security services must be dismantled and reorganized. Full disbandment and detention of personnel must apply to those agencies involved in repression and the protection of the regime. All of Saddam's special security organizations organized for the protection of the regime (the Military Intelligence Service, the Military Security Service, the Special Security Service, the General Intelligence Directorate, the General Security Services, and the Special Protection apparatus, etc.) must be disbanded and their members detained and vetted. This may number up to 50,000 personnel. Those security forces performing the day-to-day enforcement of civil and bona fide criminal law, as opposed to political repression, must have their leadership changed, but the bulk of the rank and file will be essential to the preservation of order. The national police force and the frontier guard, totaling perhaps an additional 70,000 men, must have their leadership removed. The level down to which commanders are removed will vary based on their record and policy. The leadership of the national police and border guard will be new and their behavior should be constrained by thorough monitoring and joint operations with international civilian police deployed throughout the country. The process of recruiting, training and organizing those civilian police and police monitors, numbering about 4000 to 5000 must begin now.

The Ba'ath party needs to be completely disbanded and its leadership detained and put through a vetting process before they are released to the general population

Within the context of dismantling the regime, the bureaucracy must be reorganized. Those elements that were used as instruments of repression and to protect the regime must be either disbanded or redirected. One of the first ministries to be thoroughly revamped must be the Ministry of Information. Those involved in technical work or the provision of services must be vetted, retained, and used by the military and civil administration to provide essential services to the population. As examples, electricity, water, sanitation, transportation, etc., are sectors which can be rapidly insulated from the political processes and continue to work.

Much of this will take civilian political and technical acumen, with partners from the military coalition and partners the United States cultivates from the diaspora and within Iraq. To date, there have been discussions and planning, but the most glaring gap has been the hesitance to organize civilian police and police monitors to integrate with the military to provide a seamless security structure.

The Iraqi Army must be reorganized. The Special Republican Guards and the Republican Guards will have to be dismantled. The default assumption must be that

members of these organizations are not qualified to continue to serve in a reformed Iraqi Army unless proven otherwise. The National Army will need new leadership, but the rank and file should be amenable to retraining and reorientation under new leadership. This is easier said than done and will require significant investment of coalition forces in time and labor to conduct the disarmament and demobilization of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, in a process that gathers information and releases parolees (in the military use of the term) in an orderly fashion. That process must be seamlessly connected to a reintegration program that puts former soldiers back into society ready to be a productive citizen rather than an unemployed burden on government services and a continuing security risk. Eventually, the reformed Iraqi armed forces could number between 150,000 and 200,000, but the process of creating a credible force of this size will take at least one to two years. The reduction in manpower means that about 300,000 to 400,000 men will be released into the economy over that same period. In the interim, many of the soldiers in the Iraqi Army, (excluding the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard) may be used in supervised public works projects or closely monitored and supervised security tasks.

Woven in with the dismantling of the regime and the restructuring of the security services, the second major objective must be to seize and control the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, (WMD) program in its entirety. This objective will be a primary effort during the military campaign, and it must continue at the same level regardless of the progress in any conventional combat. Just form the public record of what Iraq has been unable to account for since 1998, this is a massive undertaking. The number of munitions, the amount of chemicals and biological material will require a significant search and security effort. It can be expected that, in addition to selected targets comprising members of the regime, the effort to find and control weapons of mass destruction would consume most of the committed special operations forces. Chemical units, after accompanying the combat elements through the military campaign will then have to support this effort and it will take a significant portion of American and coalition assets to accomplish this critical task. However, in addition to controlling the weapons and the delivery systems themselves, facilities and records will need to be secured when found during the campaign, and then further coordinated efforts will need to be undertaken to ensure that the international community has a complete picture of the Iraqi programs. Records and physical evidence of the programs and the location of the assets will be critical to achieving one of the salient objectives. It is expected that almost 70 presidential compounds alone may have evidence of the WMD programs. Securing and searching those compounds will be labor intensive and require significant ground forces to ensure entry and control. Finally, finding, detaining, and debriefing personnel involved in the programs will be essential. It has taken us four months of inspections to speak to a handful of the one thousand scientists and engineers believe to be engaged in WMD programs. A comprehensive effort to secure the entire WMD program places not only a physical burden on security forces, but also requires additional coordination measures with technical experts. The WMD search and seizure effort will rely on intelligence provided by other agencies, and the operational work will require teaming in the cities, the countryside and the borders to ensure that weapons, documents, or personnel do not leak out of the country. America and the international community

cannot afford to repeat some of the mistakes and hesitancy with regard to wanted personnel that were made in the Balkans.

This takes considerably more intelligence and technical expertise than exists within the military. Military forces can seize and secure weapons, facilities, and personnel that are encountered and identified during combat and immediately thereafter, but to investigate and ferret out the entire network of programs will take a combined civilian and military effort.

Security for the population is the third high priority task. Here, much depends on the course of the fighting that results in achievement of the removal of Saddam and the seizure of the WMD program elements. Clearly, the potential for a humanitarian crisis is large. There are several factors that contribute to this situation. Due to the conditions imposed by a number of the UN Security Council resolutions, humanitarian aid agencies do not have infrastructure established within Iraq, comparable to what they had in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Therefore the immediate administration of humanitarian assistance will fall to the governmental agencies, either military or civilian, that arrive during the course of combat operations. The requirement to secure the largest cities and population centers will occupy a large number of conventional ground forces, and in order to minimize numbers, the coalition will have to rely on mobility advantages conferred by aviation. Maintaining the ability to see, prevent, and if necessary, react, to impending population crises will be essential.

The force must have the mandate and capability to regulate movement, both across borders and within the country. This is not a requirement designed to inhibit legitimate population movement covered under the Geneva Conventions and other customary laws of war. However, to achieve the primary objectives of regime change and disarmament, the security forces must have the ability to ensure that people and material that must be controlled does not escape by taking advantage of these laws.

A significant humanitarian risk exists on two dimensions. Should Saddam's forces withdraw into the cities and conduct urban warfare, there will be increased civilian casualties, which will put additional burdens on military and civilian medical assets. This is a problem of scale, which can be accommodated with the deployment of additional military and NGO medical capacity. However, a qualitatively different problem is very possible with the spread of chemical or biological contamination. This could come about as the result of overt employment by Saddam or his military leaders. There is also the risk of inadvertent release based on actions by coalition forces, given that will not have perfect and complete intelligence on the location of Iraq's WMD and may destroy facilities containing unknown stocks of chemical or biological weapons. In either case, military assets for chemical and biological reconnaissance and decontamination are limited and will be primarily occupied with supporting coalition forces. There are no assets other than coalition military units that have the capability to assist a contaminated population. NGOs are not prepared to provide services under contamination conditions, multiplying the problem. The demand for action to assist populations may inhibit military operations, and it will certainly become a first priority when hostilities cease, due

to public pressure. It is worth noting that a significant portion of these reconnaissance and decontamination units are in the reserve components, and there will be competing demands from the theater of operations and American local governments, who will be under some pressure to retain this capability for consequence management at home, especially under a heightened homeland security alert status.

The population must be secured from reprisals, both in violence to persons and the seizure of property. This means being able to control the population in terms of movement and assembly until legitimate authorities can gather the facts and sort through claims and counter claims. Decades of humanitarian abuse and internal resettlement have created the potential for people to settle scores and to assert their right to return to currently occupied land and homes.

The fourth major priority is to prevent factional violence and prevent armed groups from seizing assets, territory, or populations as Saddam's forces loosen their grip. The most dangerous time for the establishment of precedent counter to coalition overall goals for the people of Iraq will come if a security vacuum exists between the time Saddam's forces withdraw, or cease activity, and the arrival of American and coalition forces. The Kurdish parties, most notably the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, plus other parties and expatriate Iraqis, could total 5 million people. It is important to note that the two major Kurdish parties were part of the December Iraqi Opposition Conference in London that brought together some 57 opposition groups. Although the follow up January meeting to select a leadership committee was canceled it is interesting to note that the KDP and PUK leadership met in Ankara on February 6.

Other armed groups will occupy both the attention and the forces of the coalition in Iraq. Most notable are the Ansar al Islam, noted recently in the press as operating in the northeast portion of the country which is not under solid control of the Hussein regime. This force is estimated at about 1,000 fighters and has been active in developing crude chemical weapons capability. The Shi'ite Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq is an Islamic opposition movement that has been based in, and supported by Iran. While possessed of no love for Saddam Hussein, its leader is also opposed to American military occupation of Iraq. Any cooperative agreement with SCIRI must be viewed as one of convenience that will continue in force only so long as coalition and SCIRI interests converge. SCIRI has been reported to have combat elements of brigade size that could move into the eastern portions of Iraq and the Shi'a south, exacerbating elements of both Iran-Iraq regional politics and inflaming religious cleavage that will already be a source of concern to security forces and civil authorities.

It is heartening to note that most scholars and experts assess significant potential for Iraq not to fracture. For the safety of the Iraqi people, their economic and political future, and the security of the region, the country must be preserved as an integral political entity. Borders must be retained, and while there will be significant military and humanitarian movement across the borders, any attempt to redraw the Iraqi map must be resisted with the same resolve the coalition will bring to the military campaign to unseat Saddam. To this end, the United States must reassure regional partners that American intent is to

preserve Iraq and the coalition must dissuade any opportunistic meddling in Iraqi affairs from potential regional adversaries. In the on going constituting process for a new Iraqi government, due diligence must be paid to intra-state political arrangements that place more emphasis on political and regional divisions, rather than ethnic or religious separation.

Inherent in the security of the population, preventing factional and ethnic fighting, preventing reprisals, etc., is the ability to provide local policing within a framework of a non-arbitrary legal code, with objective judges and a humane correctional system. Policing and establishing the rule of law is a fundamental linchpin connecting the security issue to the humanitarian situation in the country. While national codes may be developed and promulgated, those codes are enforced and respect for law takes root at the local level. Recent history has provided evidence of the false dichotomy between military security, that focuses on heavy weapons, organized groups, and overtly political resistance, and personal security, that is a function of local knowledge, competent policing, a functioning criminal and civil justice system, and community involvement.

This comprehensive approach to providing security for the population requires significant interagency, NGO and IGO involvement if the military is not to be swamped. A deployable justice package must be organized now, and the personnel identified, organized and trained. An inability to provide a seamless security system for the population and Iraq as a state will produce conditions that will lead to crime, corruption, alternative sources of political and economic power and rule making, and will undermine the eventual successor Iraqi administration.

Finally, and most importantly for the long term viability of Iraq and the legacy of the coalition effort, Iraq's oil resources must be retained and developed for the benefit of the Iraqi people. Facilities must be secured, including the fields and the associated infrastructure. There are several major fields, including Kirkuk in the north and the Rumalia fields near Basrah in the south. There are over 2,000 individual wells in these fields and others, plus at least two major pipelines that transport the oil to Turkey and Syria. Iraqi oil sector professionals, (as opposed to the political deal makers at the highest levels) must be retained to operate the fields and work with international partners to improve the efficiency of the existing production facilities, while conducting exploration to realize the potential of future production. Iraq's oil production facilities are fragile. They have suffered from almost two decades of technological neglect and politically motivated exploitation. Production efficiencies have been sub-optimized in order to support regime political goals, and that has reduced return on what little investment and production there has been. Therefore securing the oil sector, physically, financially, and politically is absolutely critical.

Iraqi oil potential is significant, ranked as being second only to Saudi Arabia with 112 billion barrels in estimated reserves and perhaps as much as 220 billion barrels. Iraq only has developed 15 of 74 evaluated fields, and of the 526 known "structures" that may contain oil deposits, only 125 have been drilled. Clearly, possession of these untapped resources could confer extraordinary economic and political power. Although military

action in Iraq does not constitute a war for oil, the peace achieved and the type of governance attained will owe much to the way the oil sector is managed.

The history of the connection between resource wealth, governments and people illustrates a hard fact. Governments that derive revenue directly from resource exploitation generally are not accountable to the population, despite protestations that the government owns the resources in the name of the people. If some sort of participatory governance is to have any meaning in Iraq, then private Iraqi commerce should generate the wealth through market mechanisms, which the government can then tax for the purpose of providing government services. A healthy relationship between the governed and the government is built upon accountability in policy and budgets. A government with an independent source of revenue has no requirement to heed the people. Therefore it is imperative that the future structure of the Iraqi oil sector be determined with a broad representation of the Iraqi people, including the indigenous oil sector, in partnership with foreign private investors and oil technology providers. A significant hurdle that must be overcome on day one is to engage the indigenous Iraqi oil sector technocrats and professionals. They have a reputation for a perspective that is highly professional and highly insulated from politics.

Given the enormity of these tasks, a force of about 75,000 American military personnel for about one year will be required as the minimum force to stabilize the situation, accomplish the tasks outlined above and establish the conditions for sustainable peace and a capable Iraqi state. This force can be reduced as the situation stabilizes. That transformation process resulting in a sustainable, capable state is as much a function of integrated action on the part of civilian and military agencies after the fight as it is on the fight itself. The rate of transition, (what the outsiders do) and the rate of transformation, (what the Iraqis do), will determine the rate of coalition withdrawal and the types of forces that can be withdrawn first.

Much has been done to address these issues, but much more operational movement must take place. The government has attempted to pull together the requisite expertise to define the conditions and requirements for success. This started many months ago, and in several locations. The Naval War College, the National Defense University, the Institute for Defense Analysis, the Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command, and the Army War College are just a few of the many military organizations that have conducted conferences, table top exercises, and simulations to flesh out the plans and requirements. The interagency has been busy with exercises like Millennium Challenge and others, improving the ability of the government to coordinate. The Department of State has organized the Future of Iraq Project, with working groups of experts from around the globe, including members of the Iraq diaspora and opposition, with the intent of driving planning and resource requirements in sixteen different post conflict issue areas. They organized the Iraqi Opposition Conference that met in December, but which has not yielded the kind of constituting process that is required to hit the ground with military forces and receive the reins of government from a coalition military or civil administrator. United States Central Command, as expected, has been working diligently on the plans for post-conflict Iraq, and the Department of Defense has established a new

office to oversee a broad range of military and civilian issues that are expected in the aftermath. All of the government efforts have reached out, in one way or another to the public community of policy institutes, non-governmental organizations, and expert citizens of many countries. Additionally, there have been informal and formal contacts with international government organizations. A lot of information has been exchanged and the magnitude of the problem has been well defined.

But the effort to implement procedures and organize resources is still fragmented and there has been more activity than movement. From an American perspective, what is needed is a clear articulation of American goals for Iraq, the delineation of the tasks America expects to accomplish, what America will assist with, and what is expected of coalition and Iraqi partners, and the dedication of resources, i.e., people, equipment and funds, to the effort. America will lead the effort. Difficult as it may be, the United States needs to present a plan for comment, review, revision and implementation. Experience shows that circulating a draft is more effective than asking all concerned to start with a blank sheet of paper. At present the military effort is as nearly ready for post-conflict as it is for the military campaign, and the rest of government is supporting the military preparations for the campaign. But with respect to post conflict reconstruction, the United States and the international community are still "getting ready to get ready." The President and the Congress need to establish interagency authority and accountability now, and resources need to be pre-positioned.

Finally, the United States must articulate its transition strategy. The criteria that will govern the transition from military agency to civilian agency, and from outsider to insider in the execution of all the post-conflict reconstruction tasks must be developed, promulgated, and integrated into the plan. The United States must articulate the balance between American responsibility as outsiders setting parameters and assisting the process and the local ownership of that process. America must not let responsibility for the outcome become an open-ended commitment to establishing a particular brand of representative government in a place where the history, culture, and traditions may not furnish a suitable foundation. Conversely, "local ownership" cannot become a rationale for meager support and abandonment. This balance can only be achieved by working through the difficult planning and coordination efforts and making decisions about the levels and types of support ahead of time. The idea that "no plan survives first contact" only means that plans need adjustment. It does not obviate the need for detailed planning and coordination. Good plans anticipate change and have the resources and mechanisms available to take advantage of opportunities – reinforcing success and ameliorating setbacks.

Once the process begins, dynamic assessments are required – based on the criteria. Substitution of timelines for measurable progress in achieving the goals of reconstruction has led the United States and the international community to unsuccessful half measures and minimalism. Timelines are not an issue, as long as the time expected is tied to some measure of performance and success – a real part of the process.

Post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq can be successful – if success is adequately defined and if resources match intent. But time is short, the planning process has not kept pace with the military and diplomatic timeline, and the agencies who can resolve some of the outstanding issues are running out of time to do so.