

**Statement of  
Robert D. Reischauer  
Director  
Congressional Budget Office**

**before the  
Committee on Appropriations  
United States Senate**

**March 9, 1989**

**NOTICE**

**This statement is not available  
for public release until it is  
delivered at 10:00 a.m. (EST),  
Thursday, March 9, 1989.**

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before the Committee this morning to discuss President Bush's budget recommendations. In February, at the request of this Committee, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) prepared *An Analysis of President Reagan's Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 1990*. Because the Bush budget proposals are largely the same as those in the Reagan budget, most of the analysis in CBO's earlier report remains relevant.

CBO finds that the Administration has understated the deficits that would result from adopting its proposed policies. The size of this gap depends on the budgetary treatment of the proposed savings and loan Resolution Financing Corporation (REFCORP). The Administration proposes that REFCORP be an off-budget government sponsored enterprise. CBO believes, however, that REFCORP has all the earmarks of a government entity and should be included in the budget totals.

The Administration estimates that the federal deficit would decline from \$163 billion in 1989 to \$91 billion in 1990. Including REFCORP in the budget, however, would increase the estimated 1990 deficit by \$22 billion, as shown in Table 1. Incorporating CBO's assumptions of lower economic growth and higher interest rates would add another \$9 billion to the deficit estimate. CBO also believes that the Administration's use of technical estimating assumptions has

understated the deficit by \$8 billion. Taking into account all of these factors, CBO estimates that the 1990 deficit would be \$131 billion if all of the Administration's proposals were adopted.

**TABLE 1. CBO AND ADMINISTRATION ESTIMATES OF THE BUDGET DEFICIT UNDER BUSH ADMINISTRATION POLICIES (By fiscal year, in billions of dollars)**

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
<b>Administration Estimate, Including Asset Sales</b>	163	91	62	27	-4
<b>CBO Reestimates</b>					
Economic differences	-4	9	33	55	78
Technical differences	-2	8	17	22	22
REFCORP <sup>a</sup>	<u>9</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>b</u>
Subtotal	3	40	62	77	100
<b>CBO Estimate, Including Asset Sales and REFCORP</b>	166	131	124	104	97
<b>Adjustments</b>					
Asset sales	5	3	2	1	-1
REFCORP	<u>-10</u>	<u>-25</u>	<u>-15</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Subtotal	-5	-22	-13	1	-1
<b>CBO Estimate, Excluding Asset Sales and REFCORP</b>	161	109	111	105	96
<b>Balanced Budget Act Targets</b>	136	100	64	28	0

SOURCES: Office of Management and Budget; Congressional Budget Office.

NOTE: The totals include Social Security, which is off-budget.

a. The proposed Resolution Financing Corporation (REFCORP) would borrow money in private credit markets to assist in resolving troubled savings and loan institutions.

b. Less than \$0.5 billion.

One can make a good case, however, that the spending made possible by REFCORP borrowing can be distinguished from most government spending and should not be counted under the Balanced Budget Act. Excluding these expenditures for resolving the savings and loan crisis from the deficit calculations would be consistent with the way asset sales are already treated under the act. Excluding both asset sales and REFCORP, CBO estimates that President Bush's proposals would result in a 1990 deficit of \$109 billion--only \$9 billion above the Balanced Budget Act target of \$100 billion.

#### CBO ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS

CBO estimates that the long-run growth rate of the economy's productive capacity is about 2½ percent a year. In the aftermath of a recession, when much capacity is unused, the economy can easily grow more rapidly than this trend. But when almost all of the economy's capacity is being used, as is the case after six years of expansion, such growth is not possible. If the economy were to continue growing at its recent rapid rate, inflation would probably increase. The Federal Reserve has therefore sought to slow economic growth to a pace that is sustainable over the long haul.

## Forecast for 1989 and 1990

CBO's short-term economic forecast is shown in Table 2. The forecast assumes that the Federal Reserve will be successful in holding the economy's growth to a rate that will avoid a sharp increase in inflation, and that the 1990 deficit will be reduced to satisfy the Balanced Budget Act's requirements.

The growth rate of real gross national product, which was 2.7 percent in 1988, is expected to rise to 2.9 percent in 1989 and drop back to 2.2 percent in 1990. Excluding the farm sector, which was hard hit by last summer's drought, the growth rate declines from 3.5 percent in 1988 to 2.1 percent in 1989 and 2.2 percent in 1990. Unemployment should remain near its current level of about 5½ percent. Net exports and business fixed investment are expected to be the major sources of economic expansion in the next two years. Because of the strength of the dollar in mid-1988 and early 1989, however, the rate of improvement in real net exports is likely to be slower in 1989 and 1990 than it was in 1988.

CBO projects that increases in the prices of food and imports will push consumer price inflation up from 4.3 percent in 1988 to 5.0 percent in 1989. Because wage growth is likely to accelerate, inflation

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF ADMINISTRATION, CBO, AND  
BLUE CHIP SHORT-RUN ECONOMIC FORECASTS

	Actual	Forecast	
	1988	1989	1990
<b>Fourth Quarter to Fourth Quarter (Percent change)</b>			
<b>Real GNP</b>			
Administration	2.6	3.5	3.4
CBO	2.6	2.9	2.2
<i>Blue Chip</i>	2.7	2.4	1.8
<b>Nominal GNP</b>			
Administration	6.8	7.3	7.0
CBO	6.7	6.9	6.6
<i>Blue Chip</i>	6.9	6.8	6.2
<b>Consumer Price Index<sup>a</sup></b>			
Administration	4.2	3.6	3.5
CBO	4.3	5.0	4.8
<i>Blue Chip</i>	4.2	4.7	4.7
<b>Calendar Year Averages (Percent)</b>			
<b>Three-Month Treasury Bill Rate</b>			
Administration	6.7	7.4	5.5
CBO	6.7	7.9	7.1
<i>Blue Chip</i>	6.7	8.1	7.5
<b>Ten-Year Government Bond Rate</b>			
Administration	8.9	8.6	7.2
CBO	8.9	9.3	9.0
<i>Blue Chip<sup>b</sup></i>	8.9	8.9	8.5
<b>Civilian Unemployment Rate</b>			
Administration <sup>c</sup>	5.4	5.2	5.1
CBO	5.5	5.5	5.5
<i>Blue Chip<sup>b</sup></i>	5.5	5.4	5.6

SOURCES: Congressional Budget Office; Office of Management and Budget; Eggert Economic Enterprises, Inc., *Blue Chip Economic Indicators* (February 10, 1989).

- a. Consumer Price Index for urban wage earners and clerical workers.
- b. *Blue Chip* does not project a ten-year note rate. The values shown here are based on the *Blue Chip* projection of the AAA bond rate, adjusted by CBO to reflect the estimates spread between AAA bonds and ten-year government notes.
- c. The Administration's projection is for the total labor force, including armed forces residing in the United States, while the CBO and *Blue Chip* projections are for the civilian labor force excluding armed forces. In recent years, the unemployment rate for the former has tended to be 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points below the rate for the civilian labor force alone.

is not expected to subside much in 1990. Interest rates are projected to remain high in the first half of 1989, as monetary restraint continues. Rates are forecast to ease somewhat later in 1989 and in 1990, reflecting the expectation that the central bank will be successful in its effort to hold growth within the 2 percent to 2½ percent range.

### Uncertainty in the Forecast

CBO's short-run forecast represents only one of the possible paths that the economy might take over the next two years. We believe, however, that the forecast lies roughly in the middle of the possible outcomes and is a prudent guide to budgetary planning. It is also close to the average of the 50 private-sector forecasts summarized in the *Blue Chip Economic Indicators*, as shown in Table 2.

Most forecasters agree that the Federal Reserve's effort to control inflation is the key source of uncertainty in the economy today. Even under the best of circumstances, it is difficult for monetary policy to slow the economy gradually. The economy may continue to grow rapidly in spite of monetary tightening, thereby provoking higher inflation, further tightening, a rapid increase in interest rates, and eventually a recession. Today, the Federal Reserve's task is also complicated by the volatility of the dollar, the shaky condition of a

number of thrift institutions and banks, the debt problems of developing countries, and the high degree of corporate financial leveraging. Although CBO forecasts a smooth slowing of growth through 1989, a number of private forecasters expect a recession to begin this year.

The Bush Administration's forecast is considerably more optimistic than CBO on the outlook for inflation and economic growth. The Administration forecasts fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter growth rates that exceed CBO's by 0.6 percentage point in 1989 and 1.2 percentage points in 1990 (see Table 2). Inflation is more than a percentage point lower than CBO projects. Interest rates are about one-half of a percentage point lower in 1989 and about one and one-half percentage points lower in 1990. This more favorable outlook assumes that the potential for noninflationary growth is greater than estimated by CBO. The Administration projects that productivity will grow about 2 percent a year. While this is near the post-World War II average, the growth of productivity since mid-1981 has been only 1.4 percent a year. The CBO forecast assumes that growth of productivity will continue at the slower recent rate.



### Projections for 1991 through 1993

For 1991 through 1993, CBO's economic assumptions are not a forecast of future conditions but are projections based on past trends. As shown in Table 3, CBO projects that real GNP will grow at an average annual rate of 2.2 percent, and that the unemployment rate will remain close to current levels. Consumer price inflation is projected to decline moderately after 1990 and stabilize around 4 percent. Interest rates are projected to decline throughout the period until they reach levels near the average of inflation-adjusted interest rates since 1973. In 1993, the three-month Treasury bill rate is assumed to be 6.1 percent, and the ten-year government note rate is projected to be 7.7 percent.

The Administration's long-run assumptions, on the other hand, are substantially more optimistic than seems likely based on recent experience. The Administration assumes that unemployment during the 1991-1993 period will remain at 5 percent and that the economy will achieve an average growth rate of 3.2 percent a year. The Administration projects that inflation will fall to 2.2 percent in 1993, even though the economy is assumed to grow rapidly. Short-term interest rates are projected to drop to 3.5 percent in 1993 and long-term rates to 4.5 percent.

**TABLE 3. COMPARISON OF ADMINISTRATION AND CBO ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS, 1989-1993 (By calendar year)**

Variable	Actual	Forecast		Projected		
	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
<b>Nominal GNP</b>						
<b>(Billions of dollars)</b>						
Administration	4,860	5,219	5,577	5,947	6,304	6,648
CBO	4,859	5,209	5,542	5,902	6,281	6,685
<b>Real GNP (Percent change, year over year)</b>						
Administration	3.8	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.2
CBO	3.8	2.9	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.3
<b>Consumer Price Index<sup>a</sup></b>						
<b>(Percent change, year over year)</b>						
Administration	4.0	3.8	3.7	3.2	2.7	2.2
CBO	4.0	4.9	4.9	4.6	4.4	4.4
<b>GNP Deflator (Percent change, year over year)</b>						
Administration	3.4	4.0	3.6	3.2	2.7	2.2
CBO	3.4	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.1
<b>Three-Month Treasury Bill Rate (Percent)</b>						
Administration	6.7	7.4	5.5	4.5	4.0	3.5
CBO	6.7	7.9	7.1	6.7	6.4	6.1
<b>Ten-Year Government Bond Rate (Percent)</b>						
Administration	8.9	8.6	7.2	6.0	5.0	4.5
CBO	8.9	9.3	9.0	8.6	8.1	7.7
<b>Civilian Unemployment Rate</b>						
Administration <sup>b</sup>	5.4	5.2	5.1	5.0	5.0	5.0
CBO	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.6	5.6
<b>Tax Bases</b>						
<b>Wage and salary disbursements</b>						
Administration	2,436	2,609	2,783	2,973	3,163	3,347
CBO	2,435	2,615	2,787	2,969	3,163	3,370
<b>Other personal income<sup>c</sup></b>						
Administration	1,625	1,724	1,856	1,958	2,045	2,121
CBO	1,626	1,754	1,870	1,977	2,090	2,211
<b>Corporate Profits<sup>d</sup></b>						
Administration	302	352	399	442	475	499
CBO	299	328	351	378	390	401

SOURCES: Congressional Budget Office; Office of Management and Budget.

- a. Consumer Price Index for urban wage and clerical workers.
- b. The Administration's projection is for the total labor force, including armed forces residing in the United States, while the CBO projection is for the civilian labor force excluding armed forces. In recent years, the unemployment rate for the former has tended to be 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points below the rate for the civilian labor force alone.
- c. *Other personal income* is personal income less wage and salary disbursements.
- d. Corporate profits reported are book, not economic, profits.

## CBO BUDGET ESTIMATES

---

CBO's estimates of the deficit, assuming that REFCORP is treated as an on-budget entity, exceed the Administration's figures by \$40 billion in 1990 and increasing amounts in later years. In 1990, \$22 billion of the \$40 billion in reestimates is attributable to REFCORP. In 1991 through 1993, most of the reestimates are economic.

### Effects of Economic Assumptions

The differences between CBO's economic assumptions and those of the Administration lead to substantially different budget estimates, primarily on the outlay side. The combination of lower real growth and higher inflation in CBO's assumptions produces nominal incomes and tax receipts close to the Administration's. Despite lower nominal GNP projections, CBO projects slightly higher tax receipts in 1988 and 1989 than does the Administration; projected receipts are higher because CBO assumes more income in the form of wages and salaries and capital gains. CBO projects, however, somewhat lower tax receipts than the Administration in 1991 through 1993, largely because of a smaller corporate income-tax base.

CBO's economic assumptions increase outlays by \$13 billion in 1990 and \$72 billion in 1993, as shown in Table 4. CBO's projection of higher inflation leads to higher outlays for federal retirement programs, Medicare and Medicaid, and other benefit programs. CBO's higher interest rates increase the cost of federal borrowing. Finally, economic reestimates of revenues and outlays increase debt service costs. In total, CBO's economic assumptions increase the estimated deficit by \$9 billion in 1990, growing to \$78 billion in 1993.

**TABLE 4. EFFECTS OF CBO ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS ON ESTIMATES OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S BUDGET**  
(By fiscal year, in billions of dollars)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Revenues	5	4	-1	-3	-7
Outlays					
Benefit programs	a	4	9	15	24
Net interest					
As a result of interest rates	1	9	21	31	38
Debt service	<u>a</u>	<u>a</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>10</u>
Total Outlays	1	13	32	51	72
Deficit	-4	9	33	55	78

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTE: The totals include Social Security, which is off-budget.

a. Less than \$0.5 billion.

## Effects of Technical Estimating Assumptions

CBO's technical reestimates of the Bush budget increase the estimated 1990 deficit by \$8 billion, the result of \$11 billion in higher outlays offset by \$3 billion in higher revenues (see Table 5). CBO

TABLE 5. EFFECTS OF CBO TECHNICAL ASSUMPTIONS ON ESTIMATES OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S BUDGET  
(By fiscal year, in billions of dollars)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
<b>Revenues</b>					
Current law	-1	5	3	2	7
Capital gains tax reduction	0	-2	-9	-10	-9
Other proposals	<u>a</u>	<u>a</u>	<u>-1</u>	<u>-1</u>	<u>-1</u>
Total Revenues	-1	3	-7	-9	-2
<b>Outlays</b>					
National defense	-2	4	4	4	4
Leasing of Arctic National Wildlife Refuge	0	2	-2	0	a
Farm price supports	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
FDIC	a	3	3	4	4
Medicaid and Medicare	a	1	1	-1	2
Income security	a	2	3	3	4
Social Security	a	a	-1	-2	-3
Net interest	-1	-1	2	4	6
Federal Communications Commission auction receipts	0	2	1	0	0
Proposed asset sales	0	a	a	2	2
Other outlays	<u>-1</u>	<u>-1</u>	<u>a</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
Total Outlays	-3	11	10	13	19
Deficit	-2	8	17	22	22

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTE: The totals include Social Security, which is off-budget.

a. Less than \$0.5 billion.

expects that the 1990 proceeds from the Administration's proposals to sell oil and gas leases in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and to accept competitive bids for use of the unassigned radio spectrum will be \$4 billion less than the Administration assumes. CBO's estimates of spending for defense and for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation are also higher by \$4 billion and \$3 billion, respectively.

After 1990, technical estimating differences between CBO and the Administration average \$20 billion per year. Almost half of this disparity stems from differing estimates of the Administration's capital gains proposal. The Administration contends that reducing the tax rate on capital gains will permanently increase realizations of gains by enough to offset the revenue loss from the lower rate. CBO and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) judge that, after an initial surge in 1990, the increase in realizations will not be sufficient to offset the rate reduction. While the Administration estimates that its capital gains proposal would raise revenues by \$5 billion in 1991, CBO and JCT estimate a revenue loss of \$4 billion. Similar estimating differences prevail in 1992 and 1993.

## The Savings and Loan Problem

CBO discussed the budgetary implications of the Administration's plan to resolve the savings and loan crisis in testimony before the Senate Banking Committee last week. That testimony is attached as an appendix to my statement. In brief, the Administration proposes to spend \$205 billion over the 1989-1999 period. Of this amount, \$136 billion would be for resolving insolvent thrift institutions, administering the program, and paying off Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) notes. The remaining \$69 billion would be paid to service the debt incurred in financing the plan.

The bulk of the needed cash would be raised through borrowing. A new entity, the Resolution Financing Corporation, would borrow \$50 billion in private credit markets in 1989 through 1991 to help finance near-term resolutions. The existing Financing Corporation would raise \$7 billion, and the Treasury would borrow \$84 billion. Liquidation proceeds, the Federal Home Loan Banks, savings and loan assessments, and other FSLIC income would provide the remaining \$64 billion.

The Administration proposes that REFCORP be treated as an off-budget entity. In CBO's view, however, REFCORP would not truly be privately owned and should be included in the budget. Moreover,

we believe that the Treasury should do all borrowing, which would be less costly and quicker than borrowing through a new funding agency.

Spending the \$50 billion in borrowed funds, however, would have virtually no macroeconomic impact. Thus, one can make a good case for excluding such spending from Balanced Budget Act calculations in the same manner as asset sales and loan prepayments are now excluded. Excluding spending from Balanced Budget Act calculations may set unfortunate precedents, but so does creating off-budget entities to perform governmental functions. Ultimately, the appropriate budgetary treatment for financing a solution to the savings and loan problem is a policy matter that should be settled by the Congress and the President.

#### THE ADMINISTRATION'S BUDGET PROGRAM

The Bush Administration's budget program divides the spending side of the budget into two categories. For most of the budget--just over \$1 trillion in 1990--the Administration makes specific spending proposals. Another \$136 billion in spending, however, is subject to what the Administration refers to as a flexible freeze. The Administration proposes that total outlays for this residual category



be held to their 1989 level and that decisions about spending for specific residual programs be determined through negotiations involving the Congress and the Administration. In the meantime, however, the Office of Management and Budget has told the agencies that "the Reagan budget proposals within the residual category are to be treated as if they were the Bush Administration proposals for purposes of starting the budget process with the Congress."

CBO's analysis of the Bush proposals follows the same format. For programs where the Administration has made specific proposals, we have priced them out. For the residual programs, we have taken the Bush Administration's figure of \$136 billion as a target. The Reagan Administration's proposals for these same programs, however, would have resulted in spending of \$138 billion in 1990. Thus, just over \$2 billion in unspecified spending reductions beyond those contained in the Reagan budget would be required to reach President Bush's target.

#### Comparison with the Baseline

CBO's baseline budget projections provide a benchmark against which one can measure the Administration's budget program. The baseline projects the course of the budget on the assumption that current tax-

ing and spending policies continue unchanged. It generally assumes that tax and entitlement laws now on the statute books will continue. National defense and nondefense discretionary appropriations are assumed to keep pace with inflation. Because the baseline and the CBO estimate of the budget employ the same economic and technical estimating assumptions, differences between the two are solely the result of proposed policy changes.

CBO estimates that the Bush Administration's budget proposals would reduce the deficit by \$15 billion in 1990 and \$38 billion in 1993, as shown in Table 6. Over \$9 billion of the \$15 billion reduction in 1990 would come out of the residual programs, for which President Bush has made no specific proposals. The residual category consists almost entirely of programs within the spending jurisdiction of the Appropriations Committee, although some of these are mandatory programs, such as payments to the states for foster care and the administrative expenses of food stamps and family support. In addition, the residual category contains a number of offsetting receipts and permanent appropriations, notably the Postal Service fund. The \$2 billion in unspecified savings needed to hold residual programs to \$136 billion in outlays arises primarily because the outlays of the Postal Service will grow by about \$2 billion from 1989 to 1990.

President Bush's defense request is intended to provide a constant level of real budget authority for the military activities of the Department of Defense in 1990. It would provide real increases of 1 percent in 1991 and 1992 and 2 percent in 1993, using the Administration's economic assumptions. It would provide little if any real growth, however, under CBO's higher inflation assumptions. The

TABLE 6. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S BUDGET PROGRAM  
AS ESTIMATED BY CBO (By fiscal year, in billions of dollars)

	1990	1991	1992	1993
CBO Baseline Deficit	146	146	140	135
Proposed changes				
Revenues <sup>a</sup>	-4	b	2	3
National defense	1	-2	-5	-6
Nondefense discretionary spending	1	2	3	3
Entitlements and other mandatory spending	1	-6	-16	-17
Offsetting receipts	-1	-5	-3	-5
Asset sales and prepayments	-3	-2	-1	1
Net interest	-1	-3	-5	-7
Residual programs	<u>-9</u>	<u>-8</u>	<u>-10</u>	<u>-10</u>
Total Proposed Changes	-15	-22	-35	-38
Deficit, Bush Administration Budget as Estimated by CBO <sup>c</sup>	131	124	104	97

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTE: The totals include Social Security, which is off-budget.

- a. Revenue increases are shown with a negative sign because they reduce the deficit.
- b. Less than \$0.5 billion.
- c. Including asset sales and REFCORP.

Administration also proposes more spending to clean up and modernize nuclear weapons facilities. While details of the defense program are not yet available, CBO estimates that it would increase outlays slightly in 1990 compared with the baseline and reduce them in later years.

The Bush Administration makes specific proposals for about 40 percent of nondefense discretionary spending. Increases over baseline levels are requested in 1990 for international affairs, science and space, the decennial census, Federal Aviation Administration and Coast Guard operations, certain education initiatives, health research, and drug control and enforcement. The Administration proposes to reduce spending by eliminating direct loans by the Farmers Home Administration and Rural Electrification Administration and replacing them in part by guaranteed loans and vouchers. On balance, outlays for enumerated discretionary programs would be \$1 billion higher than the CBO baseline in 1990.

The Bush Administration's proposals for entitlements and other mandatory spending differ from the Reagan budget in three major respects. First, the Administration would substantially increase spending to resolve the savings and loan crisis, as previously described. Second, President Bush proposes no specific reductions in Medicaid or other means-tested benefits. Third, he recommends a new

refundable tax credit for each child under age four in low-income working families. Bush adopts the Reagan proposals for reductions in Medicare, federal retirement benefits, and farm price supports. He also retains almost all of Reagan's proposed increases in offsetting receipts and most of his proposed asset sales.

Compared with the CBO baseline, the Bush Administration's revenue proposals would reduce the deficit by \$4 billion in 1990 but would increase it slightly thereafter. This pattern follows that of the proposed reduction in the capital gains tax rate, which CBO estimates would increase revenues by \$3.3 billion in 1990 and reduce tax collections in 1991 through 1993. In addition to the capital gains proposal, the Bush Administration has proposed the establishment of enterprise zones, extension of the excise tax on telephone use, a child care credit, and additional incentives for oil and gas exploration. Otherwise, President Bush has endorsed the tax proposals contained in the Reagan budget, including extension of Medicare taxes and coverage to all employees of state and local governments, maintenance of airport and airway taxes at 1989 rates, increased Internal Revenue Service funding to enforce tax laws, and inducements for research and experimentation.

## Implications for the Appropriations Committee

What are the implications of the Bush budget proposals for the programs in the jurisdiction of the Appropriations Committee? Table 7 compares the allocation of budget authority and outlays to the Appropriations Committee under four different alternatives in the categories used for the 1987 budget summit. First is the CBO baseline, which increases discretionary budgetary resources--budget authority, obligation limitations, and credit limitations--by the rate of inflation. Second is a resource freeze, which holds discretionary budget authority and other budgetary resources constant at their 1989 levels. The third and fourth alternatives are the Reagan and Bush budgets, as estimated by CBO.

The Bush budget would cut budget authority for mandatory appropriations compared with current law, but by less than the Reagan budget. These mandatory programs are effectively controlled by other committees, however, and the Appropriations Committee is held harmless for their actions or inactions.

The story for discretionary appropriations is complicated by the presence of \$2.2 billion in unspecified outlay savings in the Bush budget. Table 7 shows what would happen if none of these unspecified savings came from discretionary appropriations. In that case, defense

discretionary budget authority would total \$310.0 billion--the same as the CBO baseline and \$5.9 billion less than the Reagan request.

**TABLE 7. PROGRAMS IN THE SPENDING JURISDICTION OF THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, FISCAL YEAR 1990**  
(In billions of dollars)

	Mandatory	Defense Discre- tionary	Nondefense Discre- tionary	Total
<b>Budget Authority</b>				
CBO Baseline	158.7	310.0	181.8	650.4
Resource Freeze	158.7	299.6	173.1	631.3
Reagan Budget, as Estimated by CBO	152.0	315.9	173.9	641.9
Bush Budget, as Estimated by CBO <sup>a</sup>	155.5	310.0	175.0	640.5
<b>Outlays</b>				
CBO Baseline	157.7	304.1	199.8	661.7
Resource Freeze	157.7	298.5	194.1	650.3
Reagan Budget, as Estimated by CBO	150.8	307.2	195.1	653.1
Bush Budget, as Estimated by CBO <sup>a</sup>	154.2	304.8	196.1	655.1

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

a. These figures do not include \$2.2 billion in unspecified outlay savings and the corresponding reductions in budget authority.

Nondefense budget authority would amount to \$175.0 billion--\$6.8 billion below the baseline but \$1.1 billion more than the Reagan budget. If any of the unspecified reductions were taken out of discretionary appropriations, the budget authority figures would be correspondingly lower. If the cuts were spread in a typical fashion, about \$165 million in budget authority reductions would be required to reduce 1990 outlays by \$100 million. If half the unspecified cuts were taken from nondefense discretionary appropriations, the total required reductions would be similar to those resulting from a freeze on budgetary resources.

As this Committee knows, President Bush's budget proposals have not been presented in the usual detail, and further information about them emerges each day. We will inform the Committee staff promptly if any of this new information causes a significant change in our conclusions. We look forward to assisting the Committee in your work on the 1990 budget.