SENATOR CLINTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Mr. Chairman, it has been a privilege to serve on this committee under your leadership. I'm very grateful to you.

And Dr. Gates, thank you for your candor. That's something that has been sorely lacking from the current occupant in the position that you seek to hold.

Your candor to this committee, to the American people, and especially to our men and women in uniform, is crucial to our success. We need a strong secretary of defense -- but that doesn't mean strong-headed.

And I appreciate your openness and willingness to engage with this committee today.

Part of that candor was evident when you responded to Senator Levin's question about whether we are winning the war in Iraq, contrary to what your predecessor told us from that very chair and what the President has told the American people.

Can you tell us when and how you came to the conclusion that you expressed in your testimony, that we were not winning, a conclusion different from the President's?

DR. GATES: I think that, frankly, if the President thought that the current tactics and strategy that we were employing were successful, he wouldn't be looking for fresh eyes and looking for new approaches and new tactics in our situation in Iraq.

I suppose that I came to that conclusion during my service on the Iraq Study Group, which was really the first time I'd had the opportunity to look at some of these circumstances in detail.

SENATOR CLINTON: Well, you know, Dr. Gates, since the president made a statement as recently as October 25 that we were absolutely winning, many of us believe that the outcome of the election has triggered the willingness of the President to perhaps look at other options.

As you said in your testimony today, you don't believe there are any new ideas on Iraq; that we know what the options are, and it is incumbent upon us, our government, hopefully in consultation with the Congress, on a bipartisan basis, to find a path forward.

Now, with respect to the path forward, have you reviewed Secretary Rumsfeld's memo regarding possible policy options for changing course in Iraq?

DR. GATES: I just read the version of it in the newspaper.

SENATOR CLINTON: Do you agree with the analysis that appeared in the article that contained a copy of the memo that you've referred to?

DR. GATES: It seemed to me that some of the options that Secretary Rumsfeld put forward are exactly among those that need to be considered in considering the path forward.

SENATOR CLINTON: You know, Dr. Gates, I've been honored to serve on this committee now for nearly four years. Many of the options that Secretary Rumsfeld put forward in that memo have been discussed in our committee deliberations.

They have been offered to administration witnesses as possible options. And yet there were no changes.

That strikes me as being very troubling, because now we're looking at the potential for a thorough review that will lead to changes that will be in America's interest, be in the interests of our men and women in uniform and, we hope, in the interests of the people of Iraq and the region.

Based on your experience, which goes back quite a ways in this town, do you believe the President, the Vice President and the existing Secretary of Defense are intelligent men?

DR. GATES: Yes, ma'am.

SENATOR CLINTON: Are they patriotic?

DR. GATES: Absolutely.

SENATOR CLINTON: Do they care about our men and women in uniform?

DR. GATES: Absolutely.

SENATOR CLINTON: Do they believe the decisions they have made for the last five years have been in America's best interests?

DR. GATES: I have not had that discussion with any of them, Senator.

SENATOR CLINTON: Well if we...

DR. GATES: I'm sure that they believe that they were in the country's best interests.

SENATOR CLINTON: So, therefore, we have this conundrum. We have a President and a Vice President who will ultimately decide -- as the President is fond of saying, he is the decider -- about the direction to pursue going forward in Iraq. And it is quite frustrating to many of us to see the mistakes that have been made -- some of which you have enumerated -- and to wonder whether there is any change that will be pursued by the President.

Do you have an opinion as to how and when the process will occur that might lead to some changes in options and strategies?

DR. GATES: My sense, Senator Clinton , is that this process is going to proceed with considerable urgency.

I would tell you that, if I'm confirmed, as soon as I'm sworn I intend to actually move very quickly in terms of the consultations with the commanders in the field and with the Chiefs and with others in terms of formulating my recommendations.

So I would say, certainly from my standpoint and, I think, also from the administration's, with considerable urgency.

SENATOR CLINTON: Finally, let me ask you, Dr. Gates: In an oral history of the '91 Gulf War produced by the PBS program "Frontline," you made some very definite points about how the military often overstate, or even, in your words, exaggerates the level of forces required to accomplish a specific objective.

I'm concerned that's precisely the attitude that we've heard from Secretary Rumsfeld, former Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and others, with regard to General Shinseki's recommendation and many in the uniform military, and civilian experts, who have consistently beat the drum that we don't have enough troops; we never had enough troops.

Therefore, how will you take that set of recommendations from your uniform military on board and figure out how you're going to assess it, given your previously stated position that it's often exaggerated when we look at missions to accomplish?

DR. GATES: Senator, that statement was made in the context of the bureaucratic wars in Washington and the decision-making process, or the process of considering contingency planning in the Situation Room.

I would tell you that CIA also, in those same meetings, often would describe, very pessimistically, the prospects for covert actions that were being considered by an administration.

And, frankly, it's my experience that both the military and CIA take that kind of approach. Because sometimes they hear, as one of the earlier senators was -- I think it was perhaps Senator Warner, the chairman -- they hear some awfully strange ideas in the Situation Room, sometimes, from members of the National Security Council staff.

It was always my experience that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, it was the State Department that most often wanted to use force and the Department of Defense that most often wanted to use diplomacy. And CIA never wanted to use covert action. Everybody wanted everybody else to take the actions.

I think that, when the actual decisions came, though, the recommendations of the military were taken very seriously.

And I remember when President Bush, the first President Bush, was asking about the offensive strategy, once we had 200,000 troops in Saudi Arabia. And we were at a meeting in the Situation Room in the fall of 1990. And the military came in and briefed on what they felt they needed to eject Saddam and the Republican Guard from Iraq, from Kuwait.

And they went through a long list of things: moving the 7th Corps to the Middle East, six carrier battle groups, activating the Guard and Reserve. And I'll never forget, the President stood up and said, "You've got it. Let me know if you need more."

And I think that that kind of deference, when you get past the debate about what the policy should be, the great deference should be extended to the professionals who are going to have to carry out the action. And I think the first President Bush did that in the Gulf War, and that certainly would be my instincts if I'm confirmed as secretary of defense.

SENATOR CLINTON: That would certainly be welcome.

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