At the request of United States Senator Daniel K. Akaka (D-Hawaii), a report prepared by the Library of Congress' Congressional Research Service examines the major, foreign conventional weapon systems that China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has acquired or committed to acquire since 1990 to upgrade its conventional force. The report, "China's Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions: Background and Analysis," pays particular attention to implications for U.S. security interests.
Senator Akaka, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Governmental Affairs Committee, sought the analysis to evaluate the consequences of Chinese conventional force modernization on Asian stability. The report pays special attention to Chinese air and naval acquisitions and describes how Chinese leaders began to pay greater attention to modernizing the PLA in the early 1990s, transforming it from a force mainly oriented towards domestic security to one focused on modern warfare. Since then, China has ranked among the top ten leading arms buyers among developing nations.
According to the analysis, the catalyst for PLA modernization, including the procurement of advanced foreign military equipment, was China's view that its top security problem was preventing Taiwan's permanent separation and securing unification as "one China." However, additional security goals may be precluding Japan's rise as the strongest Asian power, ensuring Chinese influence over the Korean peninsula, supporting Chinese claims to territory in the East and South China Seas, subduing India's quest for power, and countering American power in the region.
To modernize its forces, China is relying on arms sales from Russia, which have been essential in providing advanced aircraft (including Su-27 fighters), missile systems, submarines, and surface ships. The report is unclear as to the strategic advantage derived by Russia in selling such advanced systems to a country with which it historically has had difficulty along a shared border.
The report concludes that the operational significance of these major qualitative upgrades through foreign arms acquisitions remains to be seen and will depend in large measure on the PLA's ability to demonstrate an ability to conduct effective joint military operations.
The report also does an excellent job of comparing Chinese new conventional weapons to American capabilities, suggesting that in most cases – with some critical exceptions – American forces still retain a tactical and strategic edge. For example, the report mentions the potential threat from a nuclear armed SS-N-22, an anti-ship cruise missile, and the superior capabilities of the Su-27 fighter aircraft.
"The United States should not be complacent," Akaka advised. "The Chinese are, for the first time in modern history, developing a capability to project air and naval forces beyond their coastal areas. The United States needs to seek ways to address any threat to American interests as a result of that capability not only through pursuing our own military modernization program but also through a strategic dialogue with China which reassures China that we have a shared desire in regional stability. Indeed, in many ways, initiating a productive diplomatic dialogue with China on Asian security may be more difficult than maintaining our qualitative edge on power projection."
Akaka furnished copies of the report, authored by Shirley Kan, Christopher Bolkcom, and Ronald O'Rourke, CRS specialists in National Security Policy and National Defense, to all Senators. It is one of the most comprehensive, unclassified assessments currently available on Chinese conventional arms acquisitions.
"I believe my colleagues will find the report useful and insightful as we assess American policy towards China," Akaka noted.
Copies of the CRS report are available from the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services; United States Senate; Hart 446; Washington, D.C.; 20510.
