Washington, D.C. - U.S. Senator Daniel K. Akaka.(D-Hawaii) stated his opposition today to the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act (H.R. 7081). The bill passed the House of Representatives Saturday and is scheduled for a vote tonight in the Senate.

The following is Senator Akaka's statement in the Congressional Record:

Mr. President, I rise to express my opposition to the United States - India Agreement on nuclear energy. 

The agreement states it is intended for cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and for other purposes. It is the phrase "for other purposes" that is most troubling. As I have seen over the years, it is always prudent that one requests all of the specific details of any agreement before approving such a deal. And, the details of this agreement are most disturbing.

If you agree with me that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the greatest threats to humanity's continued existence then you should agree that preventing proliferation should be one of the cornerstones of our foreign and national security policy. Thus, there are only two reasons to support this agreement: first, it would enhance our international efforts to prevent proliferation, and, second, it would prevent further testing of nuclear weapons on the South Asian subcontinent.

Unfortunately, this agreement does neither. Instead it enhances the risk of proliferation and ensures additional testing of nuclear weapons in South Asia.

This agreement undermines the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other agreements that have been essential to our efforts for decades to prevent states from developing nuclear weapons. India is one of three states that has never signed the NPT, nor has it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Nothing in this agreement requires India to do either. In effect, India will gain all the rights of a nuclear state and bear none of the responsibilities. Nothing in this agreement requires India to commit to eventual disarmament - an objective that even the United States, as a treaty signatory, accepts. It is possible to conceive of an end-state in which the United States and Russia disarm but, in the case of India, there is nothing in this agreement that requires India to do so. This agreement would allow India to maintain a nuclear arsenal in perpetuity.

As of today, the United States is a signatory to the CTBT (although the Senate has not yet ratified the treaty), but India is not. The United States has agreed to greater safeguards and constraints on its nuclear weapons program than has India. This is an extraordinary exception that the Senate is being asked to accept.  Equally important, this agreement undermines our efforts to contain the spread of nuclear weapons to countries of concern. Right now those countries are North Korea and Iran. We do not know what adversaries tomorrow will bring. Even so, our concerns over the Iranian and North Korean clandestine nuclear programs are sufficient to warrant disapproving this exception for India's clandestine program. When the United States is trying to encourage Iran and North Korea to scale down and eliminate their nuclear weapons programs, to enter into a cooperation agreement with India for nuclear energy purposes would be sending the wrong message. 

I wish to remind my colleagues that the United States has been arguing that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Security Council should impose stiffer sanctions on Iran and North Korea. In addition, pending before the Senate is H.R. 7112, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2008. This bill would place new sanctions on Iran. I support such sanctions and I support similar efforts to establish accountability to the India program.

Another added concern is that India might support Iran's secret weapons program.  Already a number of companies in India have been sanctioned under U.S. export control law for providing sensitive missile technologies to Iran. India's export control regime remains deeply flawed. We have a history of this Administration not disclosing intelligence information that is derogatory to their argument. In the case of India, the Administration did not report export control violations of Indian companies until critical votes had occurred in the House.

What assurances have we received from the Administration that they are not withholding critical information at this time from the Congress? The Senate has received a classified annex to the public Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) but I would ask, is that document complete? Does it address all the critical questions? I would suggest to my colleagues that, until there is certainty that all the answers to these serious questions are satisfactory; it is better to vote no on this agreement.

Nothing in this agreement would prevent India from further testing of nuclear weapons. Some would argue that it makes it certain that India will continue testing, and, under this legislation, India can continue to receive nuclear materials from other countries even if the United States were to suspend any that it is providing. I believe that it is unlikely that the United States will find much of a new market for its nuclear products should this agreement be approved. India has a history of trading with Russia, France, and others in this area, and trade with these countries will, in the estimation of many experts, prosper.

As Michael Krepon, a noted analyst of the Pakistani and Indian nuclear programs has observed, "The upgrading of New Delhi's nuclear forces will most certainly require more nuclear testing." In the case of a test, I believe that India will argue that it was forced to in order to ensure the safety of its nuclear arsenal and India's nuclear trading partners will argue against sanctions in the name of preserving what few Indian nuclear facilities remain under IAEA safeguards.

India officials have made it abundantly clear that they maintain the right to test.  India's Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh said, "Let me hence reiterate once again that a decision to undertake a future nuclear test would be our sovereign decision, one that rests solely with our government." He noted "We want to keep the option [of conducting further nuclear tests] open if the situation demands. If the international situation requires, we may have to [conduct nuclear tests." M.K. Narayanan, a member of India's Atomic Energy Commission, observed that "This deal deals primarily with civil nuclear cooperation. There is no reference here to the event of a test. If there is a test, we come to that later on."

If India does test, Pakistan may retaliate. As Pakistan has already indicated, it would match India step by nuclear step. In April 2006, Pakistan's National Command Authority stated: "In view of the fact the [U.S.-India] agreement would enable India to produce a significant quantity of fissile material and nuclear weapons from unsafeguarded nuclear reactors, the NCA expressed firm resolve that our credible minimum deterrence requirements will be met." There is already a nuclear and missile weapons race in South Asia. This agreement will only accelerate it and nuclear tests will fan the flames even hotter. Is this prospect in the interest of the United States?

Has a National Intelligence Estimate concluded that such a scenario would enhance our national security?

I return to the questions I posed at the beginning of my statement: does this agreement enhance our international efforts to prevent proliferation, and, secondly, will it prevent the further testing of nuclear weapons on the South Asian subcontinent? The answer in both instances is a resounding NO and I urge my colleagues to oppose this legislation.

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