Washington, D.C. - U.S. Senator Daniel K. Akaka (D-Hawaii), Ranking Member of the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security, co-chaired a hearing with Senator Peter Fitzgerald (R-IL), Chairman of the Subcommittee, on the threat to U.S. security posed by international smuggling networks seeking to obtain and traffic in weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The following is the text of Senator Akaka's opening statement at the hearing, "International Smuggling Networks: Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterproliferation Initiatives":

Chairman Fitzgerald, thank you for holding today's hearing. It is the great tradition of this Subcommittee and the full Committee to focus on international security issues. This hearing is a very worthwhile contribution to the Subcommittee's continued efforts to improve the government's ability to address threats to our nation.

It was little more than a year ago that President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI. Since then, there have been major developments in counter-proliferation, most notably, the decision by Libya to end its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs.

The Libya case brought into the open what was once only whispered about in the corridors of the intelligence community: that is, the black market in WMD materials.

Although much has been written about the A.Q. Khan network operating out of Pakistan -- but with tentacles in many countries -- we still have not fully unraveled this network, and there are other people directing similar operations. Arresting Khan did not destroy his network. His was only one of many now facilitating the transfer of WMD-related material. Never before has there been so much demand by so many for WMD materials.

As an illustration of these extensive networks -- for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, I wish to point out two charts prepared by staff based on published reports.

What these charts illustrate is that there is a web of relationships, some private, some governmental, that tie illicit activities by either rogue states or terrorist groups to legitimate companies and countries.

To focus on stopping activities between rogue countries and terrorist groups would be to place a barrier only part way across the flood of destructive weapons.

We need to broaden and intensify our efforts because it is only a matter of time before hundreds of thousands of people are killed in an attack by a weapon of mass destruction - nuclear, biological, or chemical.

Yet, rather than aggressively doing all we can to prevent this, the United States sends, at best, mixed messages.

For example, even though the Central Intelligence Agency has identified a bomb exploded by terrorists as a more likely threat than a missile launched by a rogue state, we are spending billions of dollars to develop a national missile defense system that may not work and against a threat that does not yet exist.

For example, even though countless reports have identified radioactive material in the former Soviet Union as providing the most ready source of material to terrorists, funding requests for programs to secure Russian nuclear materials and eliminate weapons grade plutonium production have decreased.

Even as we decry the development of nuclear weapons by other states, this Administration is investing millions in developing a new earth penetrating nuclear weapon and millions in making new nuclear weapons easier to test.

What we need to do is clear. A simple six-step program would have tremendous impact:

1. accelerate efforts to control radioactive materials worldwide;

2. accelerate negotiations with the Russians to reduce the number of nuclear warheads and the number of weapons on alert status;

3. set an example by eliminating spending on new nuclear weapons;

4. ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;

5. negotiate a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and

6. develop and strengthen existing export control systems.

These are only a few steps of a broader agenda but they are critical components. What is so disappointing is how few of these obvious measures have been adopted.

I am pleased that we have with us today such distinguished witnesses from the Administration and the public to discuss these important issues, and I welcome them to the Subcommittee.